

IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 4311

LOCALITY: ORANJENBURG M/Y
(G.S.G.S. 4081/51/8348)

PERIOD COVERED: 1300 A hours on 22 MAR 1945 to 1315 B hours on 20 APR 1945.

ATTACKS:

U.S. 8th AIR FORCE	Date 20 APR 1945	S.A. 3614	Reported Weather Clear.
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95% Raid

PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE

A considerable amount of severe fresh damage is visible throughout the yard particularly in the central portion of the carriage sidings where all tracks are mutilated almost to the point of obliteration and many wagons are damaged, destroyed, or derailed. Just N. of this point the goods shed has been completely demolished and several smaller buildings damaged.

A number of hits are seen throughout the station sidings cutting lines and damaging the island platforms associated with the passenger station. Most severe damage to the station sidings is seen at a point just N... of the loco depot where all tracks are severed. The loco shed itself has been completely wrecked.

Another group of fresh craters is visible around the rail over road bridges at the S. end of the yard. A hit is seen on the edge of the N.E. rail over road bridge cutting the track. Other craters have cut the track or embankment on this same line further S and several hits are seen on the roadways in the vicinity.

Fresh industrial and business/residential damage is seen to the E., N., N.W., and N.E. of the yard.

Details of rail damage are as follows:

E.CILITIES

1. Loco Depot : Rectangular loco shed wrecked. 100% unserviceable.
2. Goods shed : Demolished. 100% unserviceable.
3. Passenger station: Hits seen on platforms and lines serving station. 50% unserviceable.
4. Carriage shed : No apparent fresh damage, repairs in progress. 15% unserviceable.

M/Y SIDINGS

All lines in station sidings severed in at least one place and central portion of the carriage sidings mutilated.

Station sidings : 100% unserviceable.

Carriage sidings: 100% unserviceable.

LOCOMOTIVE AND ROLLING STOCK

A number of wagons damaged, derailed or destroyed.

THROUGH RUNNING LINES

Hit on edge of rail over road bridge at S. end of yard has cut track. Several other cuts of embankment or track further S. on the line. Craters at both N. and S. ends of the yard have blocked lines. The through running lines are 100% unserviceable.

/REPAIRS

L-311 (Continued)

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REPAIRS

A number of old craters filled. Repairs in progress to carriage shed.

LOADING

Moderate.

(Prints 3100-3, 3113-16)

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 22 Squadron.

SORTIE: US7GR/141D.

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 1315 B hours on 20 APR 1945.

SCALE: 1/7,300 (F.L.36").

COVER AND QUALITY: Full and good.

LAST REPORT: Second supplement to Immediate Report K, 3986 (23 MAR)

COMPARATIVE SORTIE USED: US7GR/72D (4134) and US7GR/100C (3183,84)

PRINT DISTRIBUTED: 3102. (to follow when available).

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INTERPRETATION REPORT S...3614

ATTACK ON OBERNDORF MARSHALLING YARD ON 20 APR 1945

1. INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 82, fully escorted.
(b) Command : U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE
(c) Time : 1014-1023E hours.
(d) Bombs : 155 X 1000 lb. G.P.
 640 X 500 lb. C.P.

2. DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

- (a) Two concentrations, totalling more than 120 bursts, are seen extending across the rail-over-road bridge, the converging rail lines at the North end of the marshalling yard, a goods depot, and into an area of factory type buildings. One concentration of more than 65 bursts is seen extending across the passenger station, station sidings, carriage sidings, and into a business/residential section. One concentration of approximately 60 bursts is seen extending across the converging lines, rail-over-road bridge, locomotive depot, and into the area of the HOFERZOLLING A.G. gas mask factory. The rail-over-road bridges (h and i) are seen to be blanketed by a concentration of more than 50 bursts, with a portion of the concentration extending into a hutted camp area.

- (b) Bursts are seen on the Marshalling Yard and its facilities as follows: (Letters refer to annotations on INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. F. 686).

(i) LOCOMOTIVE AND REPAIR FACILITIES

- Locomotive depot (c) - four near hits.
Carriage shed (f) - one near hit.

(ii) TERMINAL FACILITIES

- Passenger station (a) - two, possibly three hits.
Goods depot (b) - two, possibly three hits - seen destroyed late in the attack.

(iii) MARSHALLING YARDS

- Station sidings (d) - approximately ten hits among rail lines and goods wagons.
Carriage sidings (e) - at least 15 hits among rail lines and goods wagons.

Converging lines at North end of yard - blanketed by H.E. burst.

Converging lines just East of Locomotive depot (c) - blanketed by H.E. burst.

(iv) THROUGH RAILING LINES

Rail-over-road bridge (h) - one, possibly two hits.

Rail-over-road bridge (i) - two near hits.

Rail-over-road bridge (j) - one near hit.

Rail-over-road bridge (k) - one near hit.

Two rail lines just South of (h and i) - one and two hits respectively.

(c) Other bursts:

- (i) no concentration and a group totalling more than 100 are seen extending across a hutted camp, a group of factory type buildings, a business/residential section, and into a docking area of the HOFERZOLLING CAUL.

- (ii) Two groups totalling at least 60 are seen in a lightly built up area, 1000 yards Southwest of carriage shed (f).

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3. ACTIVITY

(a) ORANIEENBURG MARSHALLING YARD

(i) The sidings are lightly loaded.

(b) ORANIEENBURG AIRFIELD

(i) The airfield is covered on small scale photographs.

(ii) Twenty five aircraft are visible as follows:

Type	N.hangar area	S.E.hangar area	S.dispersal area
Medium/large	6	5	1
Small	7	4	2
	13	9	3

(iii) The landing ground and runways are unserviceable.

4. ANNOTATED PRINT (SAV 95/1797-11)

(a) Shows first concentration of bursts extending across two rail-over-road bridges.

5. BOMB PLOT:

(a) A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed.

6. PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED

SAV	95/1796-1798	20 APR 1945	1014B hrs.	1/39,400 (F.L.7")	23,000 'A'
"	100/1618-1619,	"	"	"	"
"	1621	"	"	1023B hrs.	1/38,600 (F.L.7")
"	390/1726-1728	"	"	1016B hrs.	1/39,000 (F.L.7")
					22,500 'A'
					22,800 'A'

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*Navy Bomber
South Mac*

AK

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
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H) ORANIENBURG, GERMANY

20 APRIL 1945

RAIL FLYOVERS AND MARSHALLING YARD

NOTE: The patterns of 390B and 390C were almost completely obscured by smoke of previous bombing.

M.P.I.s - 95 Group: M.P.I. No: 1
100 Group: M.P.I. No: 2
390 Groups M.P.I. No. 3



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1 *See Bombs* V
 HEADQUARTERS
 13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
 APO 559

Date 20 April 1945
 13 CBW FO 104
 13 CBW OPS 323
 3 AD FO 648

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (ORANIENBURG, GERMANY)

TO : *Colonel Shuck - 95*

1. Information Concerning the Target: a. The first priority targets (visual only) for all Groups was the Rail over Rail Flyover, Railway M/Y, and the Rail over Road Bridge situated in and North of ORANIENBURG, GERMANY. The 95 Group was to attack the Rail Flyover, the 100 Group, the center of the M/Y, and the 390 Group, the Rail over Road Bridge at the South of the M/Y.

b. The second priority target (visual only) for all Groups was the Engine Test Beds on the Research Station and Air Field situated near RECHLIN, GERMANY.

2. Planning and Execution:

a. Order:	Bomb Load:	Force:	Assigned Target:
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(1) 93 A,B,C,D: Nauen

(a) 493	10 x 500 GP	27 A/C
(b) 34	10 x 500 GP	27 A/C
(c) 490	10 x 500 GP	27 A/C
(d) 385	10 x 500 GP	27 A/C

(2) 4 A,B,C,D: Deberitz

(a) 94	20 x 250 GP	27 A/C	Deberitz
(b) 486	10 x 500 GP	27 A/C	"
(c) 447	10 x 500 GP	27 A/C	Neu Ruppin
(d) 487	10 x 500 GP	27 A/C	"

(3) 13 A,B,C: Oranienburg

(a) 95	10 x 500 GP	27 A/C
	CHAFF FORCE	6 A/C
(b) 100	10 x 500 GP	27 A/C
(c) 390	5 x 1000 GP	27 A/C

b. Availability: Airborne:

(1) 95	Reg: 46 A/C	57 C/C	32 A/C
	Lead: 12 A/C	8 C/C	3 A/C
100	Reg: 42 A/C	50 C/C	26 A/C
	Lead: 14 A/C	10 C/C	3 A/C
390	Reg: 43 A/C	58 C/C	26 A/C
	Lead: 11 A/C	12 C/C	3 A/C

c. Malfunctions and Failures:

(1) 95:

(a) Lead A/C: None.

202-23

170 199

175 202

(b) Regular A/C:

95A: A/C 8317, Lt. Johnson, jettisoned 10 x 500 GP at 5153N-0253E because of #1 engine failure. NES-Sortie.

95B: A/C 1939, Lt. Snyder, jettisoned 10 x 500 GP at 5310N-1308E because of a personnel error. Toggilier moved the salve handle from the off position all the way to the salve position without having the cotter pin in place or having the collar on the salve handle properly positioned. NES-Sortie.

95C: A/C 8441, Lt. Radzekick, returned 10 x 500 GP to base because of turbo failure and #3 engine out. NES-Sortie.

(2) 100:

(a) Lead A/C:

100B: A/C 790, Capt. Dawson, H2X equipment failed at bombs away because of blown tube. No scope photos were taken.

(b) Regular A/C:

100B: A/C 815, Lt. Dickason, had 4 bombs hang up because of rack malfunctions. Bombs were salvoed 4 seconds later in target area.

A/C 917, Lt. Weiland, had 3 bombs hang up because of rack malfunctions. Bombs were salvoed immediately. K-21 camera did not take pictures because camera was frozen.

100C: A/C 015, Lt. Cable, jettisoned 10 x 500 GP at 5218N-0247E, because #3 engine was out. No Sortie.

A/C 852, Lt. Rosenbaum, Carpet I transmitter failure.

(3) 390:

(a) Lead A/C:

390A: A/C 750, Capt. Fisher, Vertical gyro in bomb-sight precessed rapidly, flux gate compass operated sluggishly. Causes undetermined at present time.

390C: A/C 127, Lt. Goodwin, Altimeter was incorrect. Cause undetermined at present time.

H2X equipment inoperative because maintenance personnel had disconnected spinner cable. R/N was unable to locate the trouble in flight. Scope camera was not used.

(b) Regular A/C:

390B: A/C 769, Lt. Baldwin, bombs failed to release on last P. because of rack malfunctions. Bombs were released on another target without difficulty.

d. A/C Outstanding: None.

e. A/C Landing Away From Base: None.

3. Navigation:

Position	Flight	13A (95)	13B (100)	13C (390)
Plan	AL:	Maj. Frankosky	Maj. Stivers	Maj. Campbell
Altitude	N:	Lt. Ballatore	Lt. Duncan	Lt. Drew
BU 11	7000'	7500'	7500'	7400'
		on time	on time	on time
		on course	on course	on course

C O N F I D E N T I A L

		7000'	7500'	7700'
CP 1	7000'	1 min. early on course	on time 3 mi. left	on time on course
		14000'	14200'	16500'
CP 2	16500'	5 min. early 2 mi. right	6 min. early on course	7 min. early on course
		21000'	20200'	22000'
CP 3	24000'	9 min. early on course	7 min. early 3 mi. left	9 min. early on course
		23000'	22550'	23900'
IP	24000'	14 min. early on course	14 min. early 2 mi. left	15 min. early on course
		23000'	22550'	23000'
TGT	24000'	(1st P)	(1st P)	(1st P)
		23000'	22000'	22400'
RP	23000'	14 min. early on course	11 min. early 3 mi. short	16 min. early 6 mi. short
		20500'	20400'	20500'
CP 4	20000'	8 min. early on course	5 min. early 3 mi. right	8 min. early
		8000'	7800'	10000'
CP 5	8000'	9 min. early on course	10 min. early 5 mi. right	11 min. early 2 mi. right
		8000'	7800'	8500'
CONT COAST	8000'	13 min. early on course	13 min. early 4 mi. right	14 min. early 2 mi. right
		2000'	2000'	4000'
WING COAST	Minimum	13 min. early on course	14 min. early 8 mi. right	16 min. early 2 mi. right

Elapsed time from first takeoff until first point of wing assembly:

	Altitude	95	100	290
Felixstowe	7000'	0735	0737	0739
First T. O.		0600	0615	0620
	7000'	95 min.	82 min.	79 min.

a. Assembly: 13A assembled over Bunker 23, 13B over Bunker 28, and 13C over Bunker 11. Assembly latitude was 7000'. Wing assembly was completed at Felixstowe and the proper interval in the Division column was taken at CP 1.

b. Route: The route was flown essentially as briefed to the Pre-IP. Bombing altitude, which was lowered to 23000' upon the advice from Kodak Yellow because of clouds at the briefed altitude, was reached 37 minutes prior to the IP. At the Pre-IP 100B hit prep wash and lost 1000' in altitude, forcing 100C to lose 500'. Because of the difference in altitude, 390A was overrunning 100C. The lead pilot of 100C decided to clear the Squadron from the open bomb bays of 390A and completed a 360 degree turn to the right, cutting the IP short 22 miles, on a second run on the 1st Priority target. After bombs away the Wing, with the exception of 100C, was reassembled at the RP. As 100C was completing this maneuver, 13A, not knowing that 100C was making a second run, lead the Wing to 100C's target at Neu Ruppin to allow 100C to release on this target. The briefed route was rejoined at CP 4 and 100C reassembled with the Group at this point. The briefed route was followed to the bases.

c. Weather: Over the bases at take off there were 1-4/10 cirrus at 14000'. Visibility was 3-5 miles. Enroute to the target there were 1-2/10 cirrus at 24000' with 7-9/10 thin alto-cumulus at 12000' from 10000' to 11000'. Visibility was unrestricted in light haze. In the target area there were 1-3/10 alto-cumulus at 12000' and 1-3/10 cirrus above 14000'.

On the return route there were patches of cirrus above 24000' nil at 1000E and 1-3/10 cirrus increasing to 5-8/10 over England. The bases on return there were 5-8/10 cirrus above 24000'. Visibility was 4-8 miles. There were light non-persistent contrails at 24000' from 1200E to target. Average winds enroute were 255/39K, 315/42K and 345/55K in the target area.

4. Flak:

None encountered or observed.

5. Communications: a. VHF (1) Channel A (790) communications within the Wing were very good. Discipline was good except at the target and rally point. Wing Leader reported that right after bombs away, he tried to contact all Air Leaders to see if everyone had bombed but he had much difficulty because of the chatter that was present at the time.

(2) Channel B (809) communications were very excellent. Wing Leader had contact with 3D Division ground station to 11 degrees east. Kodak Red reported the target weather as class C and also gave best bombing altitude. Good contact with other Wing Leaders.

(3) Communications with fighters on channel C (701) was very good. Contact was established at first fighter rendezvous and remained good throughout the mission.

(4) A/C 015, 100 Group, sent urgent message to Air/Sea rescue but made base safely. Message was then cancelled.

b. W/T (1) No excessive interference on 3D Division ground station.

(2)	13 A.	CP1	CP2	CP3	TGT	CP4	CP5
	Flight Plan	0748	0832	0924	1027	1045	1205
	ATA	0747	0827	0915	1013	1037	1156
	TOD	0748	0829	0930	1018	1043	1205

95 A	1	A	2	1013 - 1018
B	1	A	3	1016 - 1114
C	1	A	4	1014 - 1055

100 A	1	A	3	1014 - 1030
B	1	A	5	1014 - 1030
C	1	A	5	1022 - 1143

390 A	1	A	2	1016 - 1034
B	1	A	2	1016 - 1034
C	1	A	2	1016 - 1039

c. RCM (1) There was one carpet I transmitter malfunction in the Wing. Some small Wurzburgs looked at the formation between 430 and 570 megacycles. About 10 signals were logged and jammed.

(2) 312 units of chaff was discharged as prescribed by each A/C in the Wing formation. The 6 chaff A/C from 95 Group did not precede the Wing as briefed on the bomb run. These 6 A/C flew between the 95B and 95C Squadrons and directly in front of 95C. No protection whatsoever was given to the Lead Squadron by the chaff force even though no flak was encountered.

6. Photography:

a. 95 installed 3 scope, 5 oblique, and 6 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures. 2 sets of H2X scope photos are plotable, the remaining set is not plotable because of too weak returns due to the low brilliance.

b. 100 installed 1 16 MM scope and 6 vertical cameras, 0 and 5 of which took pictures. 1ff A/C 790, with scope camera installed; H2X malfunction. A/C 917, K-21 camera malfunction.

c. 390 installed 2 scope, 7 vertical, and 2 oblique cameras, 1, 7, and 1 of which took pictures. 1 oblique camera was not used. 1 set of H2X scope photos is plottable. A/C 750, with scope camera-H2X equipment failure.

7. Bombing:

a.	Attacking:	Jettisoning:	Returning:
95	1st P 26 A/C 260 x 500 GP	2 A/C 20 x 500 GP	1 A/C 10 x 500 GP
100	1st P 28 A/C 280 x 500 GP	1 A/C 10 x 500 GP	
390	1st P 28 A/C 135 x 1000 GP (RDX) 7 x VG 6 3 x T366 3rd P 1 A/C 5 x 1000 GP (RDX)		

<u>Airplanes:</u>	A (8548)	B (8782)	C (8754)
<u>Parrot:</u>	1st P	1st P	1st P
<u>Q.P.</u>	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned
<u>A/C Releasing:</u>	8	9	9
<u>Bomb Load:</u>	10 x 500 GP	10 x 500 GP	10 x 500 GP
<u>Method of Release:</u>	Minimum	Minimum	Minimum
<u>Altitude:</u> <u>True:</u>	23000'	23700'	23175'
<u>Ind:</u>	23000'	23500'	22500'
<u>Briefed Track (170)</u>			
<u>True Heading:</u>	172	139	165
<u>Drift:</u>	7 1/2 L	8L	6L
<u>Trail Change:</u>	None	None	None
<u>Ground Speed:</u>	280	230	292
<u>Tan. D.A.</u>	.64	.66	.665
<u>Time of Release:</u>	1013 1/2	1014	1014
<u>C-1</u>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>Pattern:</u> <u>Length:</u>	1080'	2800'	1400'
<u>Width:</u>	700'	2800'	1335'
<u>Errors:</u> <u>Range:</u>	100'S	1180'S	1300'S
<u>Def:</u>	0	2600'R	900'R
<u>Radial:</u>	100'	2760'	1625'
<u>Percent:</u>	1000'	0	21
	2000'	100	44
<u>Crew:</u>	Maj. Frankosky	Capt. Jenkins	Capt. Bailey
AL:	Capt. Gellen	Lt. Schulz	Lt. Tubokich
P:	Lt. Murray	Sgt. Shultz	Sgt. Willard
TG:	Lt. Ballatore	Capt. Rohn	Lt. Arterburn
		Lt. (23)	Lt. (3)
(No of Leads)		Lt. Lytle	Sgt. Skelnik
		Lt. (26)	F/O (7)
<u>Missions RN:</u>	Dement	Feeley	Durgen

- 5 -
C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Because of existing weather conditions, Squadrons in 13A, 13B and 13C were forced to fly lower than the briefed altitudes on the Bomb Run.

(1) Narrative: 95A: After the IP maneuver the Bombardier took over and proceeded to set up course by pin point pilotage, initiating the attack on a true heading of 182 degrees. Both rate and course were checked on points short of the target area, 20 miles from the BRL, the bombardier picked up the target area and identified the assigned MPI at 10 miles. A normal sighting operation was completed and at bombs away, synchronization was excellent.

PI: The bombs fell on and around the assigned MPI. Pictures taken by 100C show that both tracks were destroyed about 100° to 300° N (short) of the fly-over itself. There were approximately 5 hits on the Eastern track and 1 on the Western one leading into the M/Y. (The bomb pattern measurements excludes 9 bombs that were 300° wide of the pattern. According to H2X photo-interpretation the bombfall was approximately 1 mile East of the MPI.

95B: Bomb bay doors were opened 2 minutes prior to the IP. After the IP maneuver the bombardier began to make course good by pin point pilotage, initiating the run on a true heading of 175 degrees. The target area was picked up at 12 miles and the assigned MPI was identified at 8 miles. A normal sighting operation was completed and at bombs away, synchronization was fair.

PI: The bombs fell in fields 3000' right and a little short of the assigned MPI. No damage was inflicted on the target.

95C: After the IP maneuver the bombardier took over and proceeded to set up course by pin point pilotage, beginning the approach on a true heading of 182 degrees. The bombardier picked up the target area at 15 miles and identified the assigned MPI at 9 miles. The bombardier proceeded to synchronize and a normal sighting operation was completed. At the BRL, however, bubbles were not level. The bombardier, moreover, had made a slight error in computing the true bombing altitude.

Bombardier used poor judgement in releasing his bombs when synchronization was poor. Bombardiers should take advantage of authorized second runs when synchronization is doubtful.

PI: The bombs fell from 800' to 2300' short of the assigned MPI in fields and on a razed factory area. No damage was inflicted on the target.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

95A: A/C 8317: jettisoned 10 bombs.

95B: A/C 1939: jettisoned entire load.

95C: A/C 8441: returned entire load.

Squadrons:	A (719)	B (790)	C (917)
Target:	1st P	1st P	1st P
A.P.	Selected	Assigned	Assigned
A/C Releasing:	9	10	9
Bomb Load:	10 x 500 GP	10 x 500 GP	5 x 500 GP
Method of Release:	Minimum	Minimum	Minimum
Altitude: True:	23226'	22700'	21650'
Ind:	23000'	22500'	21650'
Briefed Track (170)			
True Heading:	205	190	189
Drift:	8R	5R	5R
Trail Change:	Plus 8	Plus 8	Plus 8
Ground Speed:	276	288	260
Tan. D.s.	.615	.650	.600
Time of Release:	1014	1014	1022
C-1	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pattern: Length:	1445'	1300'	1110'
Width:	1255'	1110'	1110'
Errors: Range:	685'0	695'S	0
Def:	989'L	270'L	1800'R
Radial:	1217'	770'	1800'
Percent: 1000' :	18	75	0
2000' :	85	98	80
Crew: AL:	Maj. Stevens	Capt. Albrecht	
P:	Lt. Hellerich	Capt. Dawson	Lt. Bieland
TG:	Lt. Whitney	Sgt. Henien	Sgt. Appleby
N:	Lt. Duncan	Lt. Browning	Lt. Pranger
AN:	Lt. Dussalt		
(No of Leads) B:	Lt. (11) Shurba	Lt. (14) Silva	Lt. (9) Telliver
Missions RN:	F/O (10) Clinton	Lt. (29) Rowland	Lt. (18) Decker

Squadrons:	A (719)	B (790)	C (917)
Target:	1st P	1st P	1st P
A.P.	Selected	Assigned	Assigned
A/C Releasing:	9	10	9
Bomb Load:	10 x 500 GP	10 x 500 GP	5 x 500 GP
Method of Release:	Minimum	Minimum	Minimum
Altitude: True:	23226'	22700'	21650'
Ind:	23000'	22500'	21650'
Briefed Track (170)			
True Heading:	205	190	189
Drift:	8R	5R	5R
Trail Change:	Plus 8	Plus 8	Plus 8
Ground Speed:	276	288	260
Tan. D.A.	.615	.650	.600
Time of Release:	1014	1014 ^a	1022
C-1	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pattern: Length:	1445'	1300'	1110'
Width:	1255'	1110'	1110'
Errors: Range:	685'0	695'S	0
Def:	989'L	270'L	1800'R
Radial:	1217'	770'	1800'
Percent: 1000'	18	75	0
2000'	85	98	80
Crew: AL:	Maj. Stevens	Capt. Albrecht	
P:	Lt. Hellerich	Capt. Davson	Lt. Wieland
TG:	Lt. Whitney	Sgt. Henien	Sgt. Appleby
N:	Lt. Duncan	Lt. Browning	Lt. Pranger
AN:	Lt. Dussalt		
(No of Leads) B:	Lt. (11) Shurba	Lt. (14) Silva	Lt. (9) Tolliver
Missions RN:	F/O (10) Clinton	Lt. (29) Rowland	Lt. (18) Decker

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 100A: After the IP maneuver the R/N proceeded to assist the bombardier in setting up course, which was initiated on a true heading of 180 degrees. The bombardier picked up the target area at 10 miles. The bombardier observed that the MPI had been poorly hit by bombs and selected an AP left of the assigned MPI. A normal sighting operation was completed and at bombs away synchronization was good.

PI: The bombs fell on the M/Y approximately 1000' left of the assigned MPI. There were approximately 12 hits on tracks and junctions in the South end of the M/Y, 3 bursts in the factory area to the South of the MPI, 8 - 10 bursts in the factory area to the Southeast, and 2 bursts on a double track line just beyond the junction. Pictures taken by 100C show at least 12 craters on the tracks, one building adjacent to the M/Y on fire, and derailed goods wagons. A thin column of smoke over the target prevents a more detailed analysis.

100B: Initiating the run on a true heading of 180 degrees, the bombardier took over and proceeded to make course good. The bombardier picked up the target area at 10 miles and began synchronization. 40 seconds from the BRL, he identified the assigned MPI. A normal sighting operation was completed at bombs away

A normal sighting operation was completed and at bombs away, synchronization appeared to be good.

PI: The bombs fell short and partially on the M/Y at the assigned MPI. Photographs taken by 100C show at least 10 craters on the thru tracks and the sidings. At least 20 goods wagons were destroyed or damaged.

100C: Because of interference on the bomb run (390A was directly overhead just prior to the BRL) the Pilot was forced to abandon the first attack and made a second run.

The second approach was initiated on a true heading of 187 degrees, about half way down the original bomb run. Because of this, and coming in on a different heading, the bombardier's time for synchronization was considerably shortened. The bombardier identified the assigned MPI and had 20 seconds to synchronize.

All Lead Bombardiers in 13B added 8 mils of trail to center bomb pattern on the MPI.

PI: The bombs fell approximately 1800' left and short of the assigned MPI. There was no damage inflicted on the target.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

100B: A/C 815: rack malfunctions.

100C: A/C 015: jettisoned entire load.

100C: A/C 917: rack malfunctions.

<u>Squadrons:</u>	A (750)	B (447)	C (127)
<u>Target:</u>	1st P	1st P	1st P
<u>A.F.</u>	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned
<u>A/C Releasing:</u>	10	8	10
<u>Bomb Lead:</u>	5 x 1000 GP(RDX)	5x1000 GP(RDX)	5x1000 GP(RDX)
<u>Method of Release:</u>	Minimum	Minimum	Minimum
<u>Altitude:</u> True:	23220'	22650'	22785'
Ind:	23000'	22440'	22605'
<u>Briefed Track (170)</u>			
<u>True Heading:</u>	190	196	195
<u>Drift:</u>	7L	4L	3L
<u>Trail Change:</u>	None	None	None
<u>Ground Speed:</u>	273	260	272
<u>Tan. D.A.</u>	.68	.66	.65
<u>Time of Release:</u>	1016½	1016 3/4	1017
<u>C-1</u>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>Pattern:</u> Length:	1590'		
Width:	1590'		
<u>Errors:</u> Range:	310'0		
Def:	0		
Radial:	310'		
<u>Percent:</u> 1000'	100	70	60
2000'	100	87	100
<u>Crew:</u> AL:	Maj. Campbell	Capt. Denne	Capt. Morris
P:	Capt. Fisher	Lt. McKellar	Lt. Goodwin
TG:	Lt. Howell	Sgt. Seabolt	Sgt. Strickland
N:	Lt. Drew	Lt. Kodar	Lt. Kent
AN:	Capt. McInerney		
(No. of Leads) B:	Lt. (20) Buck	Lt. (12) Wills	Lt. (3) Johnson
Missions RN:	Lt. (27) Conroy	Lt. (9) Beddow	Lt. (6) Roche

<u>Squadrons:</u>	A (750)	B (447)	C (127)
<u>Target:</u>	1st P	1st P	1st P
<u>A.P.</u>	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned
<u>A/C Releasing:</u>	10	8	10
<u>Bomb Lead:</u>	5 x 1000 GP(RDX)	5x1000 GP(RDX)	5x1000 GP(RDX)
<u>Method of Release:</u>	Minimum	Minimum	Minimum
<u>Altitude: True:</u>	23220'	22650'	22785'
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<u>Briefed Track (170)</u>			
<u>True Heading:</u>	190	196	195
<u>Drift:</u>	7L	4L	3L
<u>Trail Change:</u>	None	None	None
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<u>Tan. D.A.</u>	.68	.66	.65
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<u>C-1</u>	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>Pattern: Length:</u>	1590'		
<u>Width:</u>	1590'		
<u>Errors: Range:</u>	310'0		
<u>Def:</u>	0		
<u>Radial:</u>	310'		
<u>Percent:</u>	1000'	100	70
	2000'	100	87
<u>Crew:</u>	<u>AL:</u>	Maj. Campbell	Capt. Denne
	P:	Capt. Fisher	Lt. McKellar
	TG:	Lt. Hewell	Sgt. Seabolt
	N:	Lt. Drew	Lt. Kodar
	<u>AN:</u>	Capt. McInerney	Kent
(No. of Leads)	B:	Lt. (20) Buck	Lt. (12) Wills
		Lt. (27) Conroy	Lt. (9) Beddow
<u>Missions</u>	<u>RN:</u>		

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 390A: Initiating the run on a true heading of 171 degrees, the bombardier took over and proceeded to set up course by pilotage. The bombardier set up rate and course on check points short of the target area. The bombardier identified the assigned MPI and with 4 minutes of synchronization; a normal sighting operation was completed. At bombs away synchronization was excellent.

The bombardier experienced precessing of the vertical gyro on the bomb run. The sighting operation, however, was not hindered.

PI: The bombs fell around the assigned MPI, a rail over road bridge. Photographs taken by 100C show the damage inflicted by 390A, B, and C, whose patterns were all superimposed. There were 3 - 4 craters left on the tracks leading N from the bridge, approximately 700' away, and about 15 craters in the tracks leading from the M/Y to the bridge. Considerable blast damage is apparent among the goods wagons, and at least 15 were damaged or destroyed.

390B: Bomb bay doors were opened immediately after the IP maneuver. Beginning the run on a true heading of 175 degrees, the bombardier proceeded to set up course by pilotage. After the assigned MPI was picked up the bombardier completed on normal sighting operation. At bombs away, synchronization was excellent.

Deputy Leader of 390B attacked the 3rd priority target as bombs hung up over the 1st priority. He made a normal sighting operation on the 3rd priority.

PI: The bombs fell on A's pattern, and only a few are visible short of the MPI. Both Squadrons released almost simultaneously. A/C 769 released its bombs over Neuruppin, and they fell in the city 3500' short of the M/Y, on which the run was made. (One A/C released late, and the bombs fell 4000' beyond the MPI.) According to H2X photo-interpretation the bombfall was slightly short and within 1/2 mile of the MPI.

390C: The bombardier took over after the IP maneuver and proceeded to set up course by pilotage, beginning the attack on a true heading of 150 degrees. The bombardier picked up the target at 11 miles and completed on normal sighting operation. The MPI, however, was obscured by smoke and necessitated the bombardier to employ the hot plate to help approximate the assigned AP. At bombs away synchronization appears to be good.

The altimeter in the Lead A/C of 390C was giving inaccurate readings, thus accounting for a reported higher indicated altitude than 390B.

PI: The bombs fell on A's and B's patterns. Fresh bursts indicate the main concentration was about 900' left of the MPI, in fields and across the N end of the M/Y.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

390A: A/C 750: bombsight had a precessing vertical gyro.
390B: A/C 769: rack malfunctions.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

Ernest A. Kiesling

ERNEST A. KIESLING,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)


ORANIENBURG, GERMANY

20 APRIL 1945

RAIL FLYOVERS AND MARSHALLING YARD

NOTES: The patterns of 390B and 390C were almost completely obscured by smoke of previous bombing.

M.P.I.s → 95 Group: M.P.I. No. 1
 100 Group: M.P.I. No. 2
 390 Group: M.P.I. No. 3



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~7-20-72~~ ~~ORANIEBURG, GERMANY~~
~~SECRET~~

* CAMERA AND BOMBSIGHT

95 "A" SQ.

GILLEN (MAJ. FRANKOSKY)
8548 L-K *

CUMMINGS DESHAZO
9152 N-P 9175 N-L *

MOZLEY
8640 N-D

LOFTIN SCEURMAN
7201 N-J 8229 N-N

JOHNSON
8317 N-K

SLOANE BALZER
1867 N-O 8626 N-U

95 "B" SQ.

SCHULZ (CAPT. JENKINS)
8782 A-R *

JACKMAN COLEMAN *
8684 L-A 9037 L-T

SALVO
8106 L-E

SNYDER HENRY
1939 L-J 8469 L-U

LIPPITT
8676 L-V

HATCH SUNDIN
8272 L-P 8333 L-S

WALKER
2455 L-Z

95 "C" Sq.

TRBOVICH (CAPT. BAILEY)
8754 N-Z *

"CHAFF FORCE"

PALMER *
7783 I-R

DULLE O'TOOLE *
8288 A-V 9177 A-Y

CHRYSSTAL
8774 A-B

ERTEL RADEVICH
6801 A-A 8441 A-P

RAY
6946 A-F

MARKEY MCCLINTOCK
7992 A-Q 8741 A-M

BOLTE
6522 A-H

TURNER HANSEN
8269 I-K 8255 I-A

CALICURA
6838 I-E

LEGG DETLEFS
9052 I-S 8346 I-X

"OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT:

BANKS (MAJ. GRIFFIN)
7586 I-D

R/T COLLECTIVE CALLSIGNS AND FLARE COLORS:

13A--95th	13B--100th	13C--390th
A SQ. FIREBALL LEADER-----RR	FIREBALL DOG-----RY	FIREBALL JOHNNY-----GG
B SQ. FIREBALL BAKER 2----RR	FIREBALL DOG 2---RY	FIREBALL JOHNNY 2---GG
C SQ. FIREBALL BAKER 3----RR	FIREBALL DOG 3---RY	FIREBALL JOHNNY 3---GG
D SQ. FIREBALL BLACK-----RR	(CHAFF FORCE)	

SHIPS TO MONITOR: "A" SQ.

"B" SQ.

"C" SQ.

CHANNEL B BALZER N-U
CHANNEL C 8TH AF SCEURMAN N-N
CHANNEL G 66TH WG LOFTIN N-J
COMMAND #2 (5295) SLOANE N-O
M/F D/F

SUNDIN L-S
HENRY L-U
SNYDER L-J
HATCH L-P
WALKER L-Z

MARKEY A-Q
BOLTE A-H

CONTROL POINTS:

GILLEN L-K
DESHAZO N-L
BALZER N-U

STRIKE MESSAGES:

GILLEN L-K
DESHAZO N-L
BALZER N-U

SCHULZ A-R
COLEMAN L-T
WALKER L-Z

TRBOVICH N-Z
O'TOOLE A-Y
BOLTE A-H

LEADERS	"A" SQ.	"B" SQ.	"C" SQ.	CHAFF A/C	EXTRA AIRCRAFT:
READINESS	0435	0445	0440	0450	PFF-----8179 I-T
STATIONS	0535	0545	0540	0550	WING-----8990 N-X
TAXI	0650	0600	0555	0605	8617 L-Q
TAKE-OFF	0600	0610	0605	0615	8140 A-C
RENDZVOUS			0710	0710	CHAFF A/C 6902 I-G
OVER		BASE	BASE	BASE	
AT		7,000	7,500	6,500	ZERO HOUR 0730
BOMB. ALT.		24,000	24,500	23,500	LAST TAKE OFF TIME 0730

VHF AUTHENTICATOR---CLEVELAND
 DIVISION RECALL---BUY MORE BONDS
 WING RECALL---IT HAPPENED ONE NIGHT
 INDIVIDUAL ABORTION---SQUAT AND COVER
 REFERENCE BASE ALTITUDE---25,000
 REFERENCE BASE WIND---360 DEGREES
 60 KNOTS

TIME	FL.	C	CHARLIE	D	REPLY
0200-0800	RGG	C	CHARLIE	D	DOG
0800-1400	RR	H	HOW	Z	ZEBRA
1400-2000	YRY	L	LOVE	J	JIG

VHF CALLSIGNS:

BOMBERS----VINEGROVE ONE NINE
 FIGHTERS---BALANCE ONE SIX
 BOMBERS (CHAFF A/C)---ONE-NINE-ABLE
 FIGHTERS (CHAFF A/C)---BALANCE ONE SIX
 GROUND 66TH FTR WG.-----OILSKIN
 8TH AF-----COLGATE
 3RD DIV-----ARROWSWIFT
 13TH CBW-----HONEYPOD

SCOUTING FORCE:

KODAK CONTROL---1 P-51
 4 P-51's---KODAK RED---TGT W/X 40 MIN PRIOR
 TO TGT TIME.

IP POINT 8 TGT POINT 9
 2 P-51's----KODAK WHITE---ROUTE W/X 1 HOUR PRIOR
 TO BOMBERS TO 0900E.
 1 B-17--DROWSY "F" FOX---BASE W/X 1 HOUR PRIOR TO
 ASSEMBLY AND DURING ASSEMBLY.

EMERGENCY AIRFIELD---B-53 (5037-0239) DOMESTIC
 EXTREME EMERGENCY----Y-55 (5122-0613) COCKADE

RUSSIAN RECOGNITION SIGNALS

BASIC---DIP LEFT WING THREE TO FIVE TIMES
 SECONDARY---ROCK WINGS
 NIGHT BASIC---CONTINUOUS SHORT FLASHES OF NAVIGATION LIGHTS
 SECONDARY---GREEN FLARE

FIGHTER SUPPORT:

55 A AND B GPS. (P-51's) R/V 5239-0913)
 WITH 13A, B, AND C GPS. ONE SQUADRON WILL
 COVER SIX B-17 CHAFF A/C
 CALLSIGN---BALANCE ONE SIX

KODAK AUTHENTICATOR	CHALLENGE	REPLY
BAKER		84
CHARLIE		44
WILLIE		09
TOMMY		38
JASON		20
RONALD		10
FREDDIE		27
KARLO		08
GEORGE		16
MICKEY		98

GEOGRAPHICAL CHECK POINTS:

V LUNEBURG
Y MURITZ LAKE
P BERLIN
E MAGDEBURG
R LEIPZIG
F NURENBURG
I REGENSBURG
G KLATOUY
H CHIEM LAKE
T INGOLSTADT
S NORDLINGEN

CONTROL POINTS:
CP 1--ENGLISH COAST
CP 2--ENEMY COAST
CP 3--5239-0913
CP 4--5245-1151 (93rd & 13th)
CP 4--5253-1145 (4th)
CP 5--5135-0700

PROCEDURE TO FOLLOW WHEN LANDING ON THE CONTINENT:

- Land only at MERVILLE (5037-0239) or LAON/COURVON (4938-0332) or other specified field except in extreme emergency. DO NOT land on 9th AF tactical airfields.
- Have radio operator contact base while still airborne giving necessary information. Pilot can contact ground station on VHF.
- After landing, pilot will (a) arrange for medical assistance, if necessary, (b) fill out "Forced Landing Card" from Form 1 pad, (c) safeguard all secret and confidential items on ship, (d) contact nearest 8th AF Service Command Service Center representative if one isn't on the field, and (e) contact home base.
- Crew members will be responsible for individual flying equipment.
- On return Senior crew member will submit a written report to home Group Commander on necessity for Landing.

HOSPITALS ARE LOCATED CLOSE TO THE FOLLOWING AIRFIELDS:
 LAON/ATHIES (4936-0343) ----- BEAUVIS/TILLE (4928-0207)
 DENAIN/PROUVY (5020-0328)
 (extreme emergency only)

DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Intelligence Officer

21 April 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Letter on the mission to Oranienburg, Germany on the above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - Major Frankosky was Wing Leader of 13A combat Group which attacked the Marshalling Yards at Oranienburg.

95A Eight A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the lead squadron, and all but one attacked the target. This A/C 8317 turned back at 0925 hours from 5254N-0932E because of engine failure, receiving sortie credit.

95B - Nine A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the high squadron, and all but one attacked the target. This A/C #1939 failed to attack because of personnel error, but received sortie credit.

95C - Nine A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the low squadron, and all but one attacked the target. This A/C 8441 turned back at 1005 hours from 5223N-1300E because of engine failure, receiving sortie credit.

Chaff - Six A/C formed a Chaff Squadron and completed their mission.

2. Reference is suggested to the Operational Narrative for further Intelligence Reports.

For the Intelligence Officer:

Arno A Krause
ARNO A. KRAUSE,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

MARTLES 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION

330

"J" FORM

STA.

1. DATE 1/144 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
 2. CBW B3A GROUP 95A GP. LEADER Major Frankosky A/C 8548 W/T KUQ-K
POSITION Lead DEPUTY LDR. Sgt. Deshazo A/C 9175 W/T LKM-L
 3. EST. TAXI TIME 0600 LST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0610 ETD BASE 0710
ETR BASE 1345
 4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 9 NUMBER OF SPARES INCLUDED
INCLUDED 1
 5. TIME 1ST T.O. LAST T.O. TIME 1ST LANDING
LAST LANDING
 6. SQUARDON 334 NO. OF A/C 8 CALL SIGNS; W/T LKM

SQUADRON 336 NO. OF A/C 1 CALL SIGNS: W/T KUG

K
A/C :
A.T.O. : 600
A.T.R. : 1345
REMARKS :

HEA JARTLERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIV "ION
"J" FORM

GP

STA 3

1. DATE 1/1/44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
 2. CBW 13A GROUP 95B GP. LEADER Capt. Jenkins A/C 8762 W/T R6P-R
POSITION High DEPUTY LDR. Lt. Coleman A/C 9037 W/T KUQ-T
 3. EST. TAXI TIME 0555 LST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0605 LSTD BASE
ETR BASE _____
 4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 10 NUMBER OF SPARES INCLUDED
1
 5. TIME 1ST T.O. _____ LAST T.O. _____ TIME 1ST LANDING _____
LAST LANDING _____
 6. SQUARDON 336 NO. OF A/C 9 CALL SIGNS; W/T KUQ

T A F U T V S P Z*

A/C : : : : : : : : : : : : :
A.T.O. : 602 : 606 : 607 : 626 : 627 : 618 : 608 : 620 : 625 :
A.T.R. : 1337 : 1339 : 1338 : 1340 : 1341 : 1342 : 1342 : 1344 : 1343 :
REM'S. : : : : : : : : : : : : :
REMARKS:

SQUADRON 412 NO. OF A/C 1 CALL SIGNS: W/T R6P

R

A/C : : : : : : : : : : : : :
A.T.O. : 602 : : : : : : : : : :
A.T.R. : 1340 : : : : : : : : : :
REM:KS : : : : : : : : : : : :

HEA JARTLRS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIV NION
"J" FORM.

GP

STA

1. DATE 1/1/44 TARGET OFFICERS
 2. CBW 13A GROUP 95C GP. LEADER Capt. Bailey A/C 8754 W/T LKM-Z
POSITION Low DEPUTY LDR. O'Tool A/C 9177 W/T RGP-Y
 3. EST. TAKE TIME 0605 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0615 ESTD BASE
ETR BASE
 4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 10 NUMBER OF SPARES I.C.D.
INCLUDED 1
 5. TIME 1ST T.O. LAST T.O. TIME 1ST LANDING
LAST LANDING
 6. SQUARDON 334 NO. OF A/C 1 CALL SIGNS; W/T LKM

7

A/C : : : : : : : : : : :
A.T.O. : 604 : : : : : : : : :
A.T.R. : 1351 : : : : : : : :
REM'S : : : : : : : : : : :

SQUADRON 4A NO. OF A/C 9 CALL SIGNS: W/T R6P

Y V B P A E M Q H

A/C : : : : : : : : : : :
A.T.O. : 605:617:619:620:621:622:622:616:623:
A.T.R. : 1335:1351:1353:1319:1352:1354:1352:1354:1353:
REH:KS : : : : : : : : : : :
:

CONTINUOUS

WV) - Q3 - 1/0

CALIF. SIGNS: W/II

HEA JARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIV NION
"J" FORM

GP.

STA.

1. DATE 1/1/44 TARGET 44 DUTY OFFICERS _____
OFFICER
2. CBW 13 A GROUP FORCE GP. LEADER Lt. Palmer A/C 7783 W/T STH-R
POSITION Low. Low DEPUTY LDR. Lt. Hansen A/C 8255 W/T STH-A
3. EST. TAXI TIME 0610 LST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0620 ETD BASE _____
ETR BASE _____
4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 6 NUMBER OF SPARES INCLUDED _____
INCLUDED _____
5. TIME 1ST T.O. _____ LAST T.O. _____ TIME 1ST LANDING _____
LAST LANDING _____
6. SQUADRON 335 NO. OF A/C 6 CALL SIGNS; W/T STH

R A K E X S

A/C	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	:624	:628	:628	:629	:630	:620	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	:1353	:1400	:1358	:1401	:1402	:1400	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
REM'S.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

SQUADRON

NO. OF A/C

CALL SIGNS: W/T

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, 412TH BOMB SQDN (H), 95TH BOMB GP (H), APO 559, U. S. ARMY, 21 Apr 45.

TO: Commanding Officer (Attn: Gp Ops. O.), 95th Bomb Gp (H), APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. Pilot had no choice but to abort.
2. Disciplinary action taken: None.

2 INCLS:

- Incl. 1 - Abortion Letter (Lt. Radzevich)
Incl. 2 - Abortive Aircraft (Capt. Peek)

James O. Frankosky
JAMES O. FRANKOSKY
Major, Air Corps,
Commanding.

FOUR HUNDRED TWELFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
APO 559

20 April 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion

TO : Office of the Squadron Commander, 412th Bomb Sqdn (H), 95th Bomb Gp (H),
APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. Pilot Radzevich of Aircraft No. 43-38441 on this date aborted at 5322N -
1304E at 1003 hours.

2. No. 3 supercharger had gone out at 10,000 feet on the climb to bombing altitude. The pilot could still keep in formation with a power setting of 36 Hg. and 2250 RPM and decided to continue on to the target. At 20,000 feet the pilot had to draw 39 Hg. and 2350 RPM on the other three engines to keep up with the formation. The last 10 to 15 minutes before the IP the pilot was drawing 40 Hg. and 2350 RPM to keep in formation.

3. As the group began to turn at the IP all the superchargers cut out completely and the manifold pressure dropped to 18 to 20 Hg. on all the engines. The pilot quickly put down the wheels and dropped out of formation. He dropped to 17,000 feet and the superchargers began to cut in and out. He could not hold his altitude and dropped to 15,000 feet. At this time the superchargers began to cut in and out and finally stayed in on the three engines. The pilot changed inverters when he first dropped out and checked every thing else trying to find the trouble. The trouble could not be located.

4. By this time the group had allready bombed the target and the pilot had no hopes of catching the formation onthe three engines. He took a heading back to the friendly lines and upon reaching them he turned in the direction of the returning bomber stream. He finally got into a formation with the 477th Bomb Gp.

5. Not being exactly sure as to where the battle line was and just where the friendly troops might be on the ground the pilot decided not to salvo the bombs. ~~or drop them on any target of opportunity~~ Bombs were brought back to the base.

Benny J. Radzevich
BENNY J. RADZEVICH
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Pilot.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

I. The following report will be filled out for every aircraft which does not bomb the assigned target or a target of opportunity, or leaves the formation before the target.

I. To be filled out by Pilot and Navigator in Group Operations Office within two (2) hours after landing, or at Mission Interrogation.

1. Date of mission 4-20-45.
2. Aircraft number 8441.
3. Pilot's name RADZEVICH, BENNY J.. Number of missions to date 2,
4. Combat mission ✓ or Practice Mission 4.
5. Coordinates of point of turn-around 53 22 N. 13 04 E
Time 1004 Altitude 20,000.
6. Target attacked, if any None.
7. or Place where bombs were jettisoned NON E
or were bombs returned to base? YES ✓
*1,2,+4
and didn't come in for 15 minutes
7. Reason for leaving formation All TURBO-SUPERCHARGERS
CUT OUT COMPLETELY AT IP. "3 out anyway.
8. Reason for not bombing HAD TO DROP DOWN & HAD NO POWER
9. Was aircraft attacked by E/A? NO Where? _____

FOUR HUNDRED TWELFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Engineering Officer
A.P.O. 559

20 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Abortive aircraft.

TO : Commanding Officer, 412th Bombardment Squadron (H).

1. Airplane B-17G #43-38441 aborted from a combat mission this date.

2. Pilot reported #3 turbo "out" and all turbos "out" at times when at altitude.

3. Upon inspection it was found that #3 amplifier was out. A search is being made for an intermittent short which is evidently showing up only at altitude. The pilot did everything possible to remedy the situation in the air, such as changing inverters and jockeying the turbo rheostat.

Chester L. Peek
CHESTER L. PEEK,
Captain, AC,
Engineering Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

I. The following report will be filled out for every aircraft which does not bomb the assigned target or a target of opportunity, or leaves the formation before the target.

I. To be filled out by Pilot and Navigator in Group Operations Office within two (2) hours after landing, or at Mission Interrogation.

1. Date of mission 4-20-45.

2. Aircraft number 1939.

3. Pilot's name Snyder. Number of missions to date _____.

4. Combat mission _____ or Practice Mission _____.

5. Coordinates of point of turn-around _____ N. _____ E

Time _____ Altitude _____.

6. Target attacked, if any _____.

7. or Place where bombs were jettisoned at IP, because toggles pushed too much
or were bombs returned to base? salvo switch

7. Reason for leaving formation by mistake

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

I. The following report will be filled out for every aircraft which does not bomb the assigned target or a target of opportunity, or leaves the formation before the target.

I. To be filled out by Pilot and Navigator in Group Operations Office within two (2) hours after landing, or at Mission Interrogation.

1. Date of mission 20~~17~~ April.

2. Aircraft number 8317. 334

3. Pilot's name Johnson 334. Number of missions to date .

4. Combat mission or Practice Mission .

5. Coordinates of point of turn-around 525-4 N. 0932 E

Time 0925 Altitude 20000

6. Target attacked, if any .

or Place where bombs were jettisoned 5153-0253 channel

or were bombs returned to base?

7. Reason for leaving formation #1 engine major oil leak
#4 engine rough

8. Reason for not bombing .

9. Was aircraft attacked by E/A? No Where?

Or by flak? No? Where?

10. Place landed if not Horham

If pilot left formation before the target, he will write a letter the same day to his squadron commander stating place, time, and altitude of abortion, reason and action taken, disposal of bombs, and time of landing.

II. To be filled out by Group Operations Officer after reference to letters from Squadron Engineering Officer and Squadron Commander:

1. Reason for abortion is considered to be:

- a. Weather
- b. Personnel
- c. Abortion of entire formation
- d. Enemy action
- e. Mechanical and equipment Abortion
- f. Other

2. The abortion is considered:

- a. Justified
- b. Unjustified
- c. Questionable

3. Sortie line Front line about 10°40' E but Route went across Holland first

STATION WEATHER OFFICE
AAF STATION 119
APO 559

21 April 1945

SUBJECT: Meteorological Interrogation Summary for Mission of 20 April 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, Hq., 95th Bomb Group(H), APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. Base at take-off: Time was 0600-0630 hours. 1/10 cirrus base 22,000 ft. Visibility 4 miles.

2. Route to target: 2-3/10 cirrus above 24,000 ft. Nil low or middle cloud becoming 7-9/10 thin altocumulus tops estimated 12-15,000 ft. from 07-11° east breaking to nil over target area.

3. Target: Oranienburg, Germany. Time was 1014 hours. Few small patches of altocumulus estimated at 12,000 ft. and 1-2/10 cirrus above 24,000 ft.

4. Return route: Patches of altocumulus estimated at 12,000 ft. and cirrus above 24,000 ft. Altocumulus became nil at 10° E. Cirrus increased to 5-8/10 over England.

5. Base on return: Time was 1335-1402 hours. 8/10 cirrus base 24,000 ft. Visibility 8 miles.

6. Remarks: None.

Leroy J. Troutner
LEROY F. TROUTNER,
WO (Jg), AUS,
Asst Weather Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Engineering Officer

APO 559
21 April 1945

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission of 20 April 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), Attention:
Operations Officer.

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission
of 20 April 1945.

a. Thirty-five (35) B-17 aircraft took-off as scheduled.

b. Thirty-three (33) B-17 aircraft returned to base after completion
of combat mission.

2. There were two (2) abortions.

a. 8317 - Engine failure

b. 8441 - Supercharger failure

3. There was no battle damage.


DONALD H. DOWLIN
Capt., Air Corps
Gp Engineering O

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Armament Officer

F-B-1

APO 559
20 April 1945

SUBJECT: Mission Expenditure Report for 20 April 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Following are the expenditures for the mission of 20 April 1945.

- A. Station AAF 119
- B. Unit 95th Bombardment Group (H)
- C. There was no ammunition expended on this mission.
- D. Total number of bombs expended 280- 500 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs.
48- Chaff Bombs.
4- CHB M 1 Sky Markers.

Frederick A. Flint
FREDERICK A. FLINT
1st Lieut. Air Corps
Asst. Group Armament Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Communications Officer

(J-A-1)

APO 559
21 April 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Communications for Mission of 20 April 1945

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, Station #119

1. All crews assigned to the mission were available for interrogation by the Communications Officer.
2. Mechanical and electrical failures noted were as follows:
 - (a) 335-A (VHF/tube failure)
 - (b) 412-P (VHF/replaced for shop check)
3. The following navigational aids were used successfully:
 - (a) Thirty-eight A/C used Splashers and Bunchers
 - (b) Thirty-eight A/C used Station 7000
4. Reception on Division ground station frequency was satisfactory. Local HF/DF frequency was hampered by heavy R/T interference.

Richard F. Knox
RICHARD F. KNOX
Major, Air Corps
Gp. Communications O.

"A" SQUADRON

STATION 119

FORM 3

DATE 20 April

LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
				EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
K	8548	Gillen ✓	✓	600		1345		
L	9175	Deshazo ✓	✓	601		1336		
P	9152	Cummings ✓	✓	611		1343		
D	8640	Mozley ✓	✓	612		1348		
N	8229	Scerriey ✓	✓	613		1347		
X	8990	Loflin ✓	✓	613		1347		
K	8229	Loflin ✓	✓	613		1347		
K	8317	Johnson ✓	✓	614		1212 Eng out		
U	8525	Balzer ✓	✓	615		1349		
O	1867	Sloane ✓	✓	615		1350		

"B" SQUADRON

STATION 119

FORM 3

DATE 20 April

LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
				EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
412	R 8782	Chubbs	✓	✓	602		1340	
36	T 9037	Coleman	✓	✓	603		1337	
"	A 8584	Pickman	✓	✓	606		1339	
"	F 8106	Salvo	✓	✓	607		1338	
"	U 8469	Henry	✓	✓	626		1340	
"	J 1939	Dwyer	✓	✓	627		1341	
"	V 8676	Hippitt	✓	✓	618		1342	
"	S 8333	Bundin	✓	✓	608		1342	
"	P 8272	Hatch	✓	✓	620		1344	
"	Z 2455	Walker	✓	✓	625		1343	

7783 "C" SQUADRON

R A K E X S

STATION 119

FORM 3

DATE 20 April

Cleaff Force

FORM 3

STATION 119

DATE 20 April '45

HEA JARTLRS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
"J" FORM

GP.

STA.

1. DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
 STAFF
2. CBW 13 A GROUP Force GP. LEADER Lt. Palmer A/C 7783 W/T STH-R
POSITION Low DEPUTY LDR. Lt. Hansen A/C 8255 W/T STH-A
3. EST. TAXI TIME 0610 LST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0620 ETD BASE
ETR BASE
4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 6 NUMBER OF SPARES INCLUDED
INCLUDED

HEA JARTLRS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
"J" FORM

GP.

STA.

1. DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2. CBW 13 A GROUP 95 C GP. LEADER Capt. Bailey A/C 8754 W/T LKM-Z
POSITION Low DEPUTY LDR. O'Toole A/C 9177 W/T RGP-Y
3. EST. TAXI TIME 0605 LST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0615 ETD BASE
ETR BASE

HEA JARTLRS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
"J" FORM

GP.

STA.

1. DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2. CBW 13 A GROUP 95 B GP. LEADER Capt. Jenkins A/C 8782 W/T RGP-R
POSITION High DEPUTY LDR. Lt. Coleman A/C 9037 W/T KUQ-T
3. EST. TAXI TIME 0555 LST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0605 ETD BASE
ETR BASE

HEA JARTLRS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
"J" FORM

GP.

STA.

1. DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2. CBW 13 A GROUP 95 A GP. LEADER Maj. Frankosky A/C 8548 W/T KUQ-K
POSITION Lead DEPUTY LDR. Lt. Deshazo A/C 9175 W/T LKM-L
3. EST. TAXI TIME 0600 LST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0610 ETD BASE 0710
ETR BASE 1345
4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 9 NUMBER OF SPARES INCLUDED
INCLUDED 1
5. TIME 1ST T.O. LAST T.O. TIME 1ST LANDING
LAST LANDING

CC, 187TH CBR
CO, 390TH BG
CO, 100TH BG

95TH BOMS GP

XXX

XXX

20 APR 45 1600 S-2

95TH BOMS GP S-2 OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE - CRANTWEING - 20 APRIL 1945

1. Leaflets - None..
2. Bombing Results - A Squadron - First Priority, visual - photos show bomb bursts covering MPI. Excellent results.
C B Squadron - First Priority, visual - photos show bombs bursting on Northern edge of target. Good results.
B E Squadron - First Priority, visual - photos show bombs bursting 1200 yards SW of target. Poor results.
Chaff Force - dropped chaff as briefed.
3. P/A - None.
4. Flak - None. Refer to Special Chaff Report.
5. Weather - CAVU.
6. Observations -
0942 - 5317-1110 - A very large air strip running through center of woods. Supply dump on hardstand next to it.
0946 - 5320-1130 - 1/2 full of cars.
0947 - 5317-1130 - 15 large 1/2 on 1/2. Could be transports.
0947 - 5320-1131 - Auxiliary 1/2 with 6 1/2.
0951 - 5326-1130 - Parchim 1/2 full - 100-300 cars.
0953 - 5323-1138 - 6 1/2 on 1/2.
0958 - 5325-1147 - 15 He-262s on 1/2.
1015 - 5234-1222 - 20 small 1/2 on well camouflaged 1/2 with long runway.
7. Other Information - Fighter support was excellent. Because one squadron of the 100th Group failed to bomb the First Priority target the 95th led the wing to New Ruppin where that squadron then bombed. There were no other departures from planned route. Order of bombing was 954-958-950.

CG, 157TH CGW
CO, 3907TH BG
CO, 100TH BG

95TH BOMB GP

XXX

XXX

20 APR 48 1600 E-2

95TH BOMB GP B-2 OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE - CHAMBERSBURG - 20 APRIL 1948

1. Leaflets - None.
2. Bombing Results - A Squadron - First Priority, visual - photos show bomb bursts covering MPI. Excellent results.
C B Squadron - First Priority, visual - photos show bombs bursting on Northern edge of target. Good results.
D X Squadron - First Priority, visual - photos show bombs bursting 1200 yards SE of target. Poor results.
Chaff Force - dropped chaff as briefed.
3. S/A - None.
4. Flak - None. Refer to Special Chaff Report.
5. Weather - CAVU.
6. Observations -
0942 - 5317-1110 - A very large air strip running through center of woods. Supply dump on hardstand next to it.
0943 - 5320-1130 - H/T full of cars.
0947 - 5317-1130 - 15 large V/H on A/D. Could be transports.
0947 - 5320-1131 - Auxiliary A/T with 6 V/H.
0951 - 5326-1130 - Parchim U/T full - 150-200 cars.
0953 - 5323-1130 - 6 V/H on A/T.
0955 - 5325-1147 - 15 He-262s on A/T.
1015 - 5324-1222 - 20 small V/H on well camouflaged A/D with long runway.
7. Other Information - Fighter support was excellent. Because one squadron of the 100th Group failed to bomb the First Priority target the 95th led the wing to New Boppin where that squadron then bombed. There were no other departures from planned route. Order of bombing was 95A-95B-95C.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

.....
: SECRET :
: By Authority Of :
: C.G., Eighth Air Force :
: Initials: J.T.A.... :
: Date: 20 April 1945 :
.....

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 355

PERIOD: 0001 hours 20 April to 2400 hours 20 April 1945

A. STATISTICS

	Total Sorties	Effective Sorties	Tonnage	Claims	E/A	AA	OF	Losses Totals	NYR
Heavy Bomber Atks.	831	803	1953.7	0-0-0	0	1	0	1	0
Fighter Escort	746	713	0	0-0-0	0	0	1	1	1
Fighter Sweeps	108	100	0	7-0-4 A	0	0	0	0	2
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	25	24	0	0-0-0	0	0	1	1	0
Weather Recon.	32	29	0	0-0-0	0	0	1	1	0
Air/Sea Rescue	10	10	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	47	44	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	2
Totals	1799	1723	1953.7	7-0-4 A	0	1	3	4	5

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

831 a/c (608 B-17s, 223 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied in three forces against M/Ys and RR facilities at seven towns roughly forming an arc from N-NW to S-SW of Berlin, and against similar installations in three towns in E and SE Bavaria and one town in W Czechoslovakia. 803 a/c dropped 1953.7 tons GP on all first priorities, one second priority (1 a/c) and one T/O. Bombing visual, with combination visual and Gee-H technique in case of one target (Brandenburg M/Y) only. Weather: CAVU to 3/10, with heavy ground haze and high cirrus over Brandenburg. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 B-17 to AA. NYR: nil.

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First Force

Eleven group formations (319 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against M/Ys at four towns W and NW of Berlin. 299 a/c dropped 761.3 tons GP on all first priority targets and one T/O at 0948-1023 hours from 21,300-23,500 feet. Bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Nauen, Oranienburg and Neuruppin. Weather: CAVU to 3/10 over targets with some ground haze. Flak: meager, accurate on some squadrons at Brandenburg; nil at assigned targets. Battle Damage: 10 minor, 5 major. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses and NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Five groups (271 P-51s) sortied. Up 0738-0750 hours; down 1230-1307 hours. 258 effective sorties. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51 to mechanical failure. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
RR Facilities at Nauen	87	82	202.5	Good
Wustermark M/Y	87	77	192.5	Good
Neuruppin M/Y	58	57	136.3	Very Good
Oranienburg M/Y	87	82	227.5	Good
<u>Other Target</u>				
Neuruppin A/F	—	1	2.5	Unknown
Totals	319	299	761.3	

Second Force

Eight group formations (289 B-17s - 1st Air Division) sortied against M/Ys at Brandenburg, Seddin and Treuenbrietzen, W-SW and SW of Berlin. 285 a/c dropped 702.8 tons GP on assigned targets at 1102-1136 hours from 19,000-26,500 feet. One of four groups attacked Brandenburg M/Y by Gee-H, others visually with Gee-H assists. Seddin and Treuenbrietzen bombed visually. Leaflets dropped on all three targets. Weather: generally CAVU, but heavy ground haze, dense persistent contrails and high cirrus clouds over Brandenburg forced groups to use Gee-H equipment. Flak: nil to meager and accurate at Brandenburg; nil at other targets. Battle Damage: 6 minor, 4 major. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 B-17 to AA. NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Four groups (241 P-51s) sortied. Up 0809-0835 hours, down 1343-1440 hours. 227 effective sorties. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: 1 P-51, believed safe on Continent.

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Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Brandenburg M/Y	137	137	339.3	Unob. - Fair
Seddin M/Y	68	66	161.8	Good
Treuenbrietzen M/Y	84	82	201.7	Good - Very Good
Totals	289	285	702.8	

Third Force

Twenty-two squadron formations (223 B-24s - 2nd Air Division) sortied against RR Facilities at three towns in E and SE Bavaria and at one town in W Czechoslovakia. 219 a/c dropped 489.6 tons on all first priority and one other target at 1137-1159 hours from 11,800-22,000 feet. Bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Straubing (by one a/c which also dropped $\frac{1}{2}$ ton GP), Zwiesel and Muhsdorf. Weather: CAVU to 3/10 over targets. Flak: nil. Battle Damage: nil. Losses and N.Y.R.: nil.

Fighter Support: Four groups (177 P-51s, 57 P-47s - 234 a/c) sortied. Up 0855-0914 hours; down 1444-1535 hours. 228 effective sorties. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses and N.Y.R.: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Junction & RR Bridge	-	-	-	-
Zwiesel	56	56	123.5	Very Good
Muhsdorf M/Y & Junction	54	53	115.8	Very Good
Junction & RR Facilities	-	-	-	-
Irrenlohe	57	55	125.5	Very Good
Junction & RR Facilities	-	-	-	-
Klatovy	56	54	124.3	Very Good
Straubing M/Y (sec)	-	1	.5	Unknown
Totals	223	219	489.6	

2. Fighter Escort

Thirteen groups (689 P-51s, 57 P-47s - 746 a/c) sortied in support of three bomber forces. Up 0738-C114 hours; down 1230-1535 hours. 713 effective sorties. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51 to mechanical failure. N.Y.R.: 1 P-51 believed safe on Continent.

3. Fighter Sweeps

Two groups (108 P-51s) sortied on free lance patrols and sweeps in support of second and third bomber forces. Up 0850-0901 hours; down 1410-1605 hours. 100 effective sorties. E/a Opposition: About 12 Me-109s were

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bounced while forming up after taking off from Letnany A/F, near Prague.
Claims: 7-0-4, Air. Losses: nil. NYR: 2 P-51s, believed safe on
Continent.

4. Fighter Bombing

Mil

5. Photo Reconnaissance

25 a/c (11 F-5s, 3 Mosquitoes, 11 P-51s) sortied as follows:

11 F-5s on routine mapping and D/A missions in central Germany.
3 Mosquitoes on night photo missions to Heligoland and Guernsey
Islands.

11 P-51s as escort to seven photo sorties.

Losses: 1 F-5 to mechanical trouble, pilot safe.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

32 a/c (4 B-17s, 3 Mosquitoes, 25 P-51s) sortied as follows:

2 B-17s on routine flights over Atlantic.

2 B-17s on routine flights to and from Azores.

3 Mosquitoes on special weather reconnaissance over U.K., N. Sea,
Denmark and Norway.

25 P-51s as weather scouts for bomber forces. 22 effective.

Losses: 1 P-51, cause not specified.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

10 a/c (8 P-47s, 2 OA-10s) on routine search and patrol missions. No
incidents.

Losses: nil.

8. Special Operations

47 a/c (22 B-24s, 10 B-17s, 13 Mosquitoes, 2 P-51s) sortied as follows:

Night - 19/20 April

16 B-24s on supply dropping mission. 11 effective. 2 NYR.

4 a/c (3 B-17s, 1 B-24) on radar scope reconnaissance of Salzburg and
Ingolstadt area. Leaflets also dropped.

2 Mosquitoes on special operation.

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C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

In spite of good operational weather there was no G.A.F. reaction to widespread heavy bomber attacks on targets ranging from the Berlin area to south of the Danube. None of the bombers or their close escort sighted any airborne e/a.

The only e/a seen in the air were in the Prague area where a P-51 group executing a sweep in general support of the Third Force engaged approximately 12 Me-109s around 1140 hours shortly after e/a had been observed taking off from Prague/Letnany A/F. When our fighters first approached this A/F e/a which were in take-off position stopped engines and waited until P-51s had left vicinity before attempting take-off. However, the P-51s which circled away from the field for some 15 minutes kept the area under surveillance and were rewarded with claims of 7-0-4 after waiting for all the e/a to become airborne. Enemy pilots were reported as aggressive and determined, but inexperienced. Noticeably absent was Me-262 activity which has marked other recent operations in the Prague area.

2. Flak

Brandenburg - Meager, accurate, tracking.
Seddin, Treuenbrietzen, Nauen, Wurstermark, Neuruppin, Oranienburg - Nil.

3. Observations

40 e/a sighted dispersed in wooded area next to A/F 5314N-1236E.

25 s/e e/a on Wittstock A/F (5312N-1231E)

63 a/c (22 t/e jets, a few He-111s - Balance s/e e/a) on Hostivice A/F (West side of Prague)

50 plus s/e on Kbley A/F (East of Prague).

100 plus a/c including 20 Me-262s on Letnany A/F.

25 u/i a/c on Brandenburg-Briest A/F in wood N of field.

50/60 t/e dispersed in woods on A/F 10 miles S Genthin.

50 plus cargo and transport type a/c parked wing tip to tip on Tempelhof

150 e/a on A/F just south of Ludwigsfelde.

N/Y at 5222N-1227E (SW of Brandenburg) very active.

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S E C R E T

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Oranienburg M/Y - Good Results

Six patterns struck M/Y intermittently along entire length. No fires were caused but the tracks were cut in many places. Storage facilities were also hit.

Nauen M/Y - Good Results

The patterns of all of the 9 squadrons crossed the rail lines, but six patterns fell on the yards and others were up to 1½ miles down the track. At least one explosion and fires were caused in the yards and all photos show that all lines were probably cut. Some damage in suburban area near yard.

Neuruppin M/Y - Very Good Results

Four patterns hit M/Y, cutting the tracks in at least 25 places and starting 2 or three fires in repair and storage facilities. One pattern blanketed the two remaining large hangars on the A/F, the others having been destroyed by a previous attack. M/Y was lightly loaded.

Wustermark M/Y - Good Results

Five patterns hit M/Y which was heavily loaded. One pattern hit junction West of the yard. Many craters may be seen in eastern half of the yard and several fires were burning at end of the attack. Smoke prevents detailed assessment of the damage. Attack probably left yard unserviceable.

Klatovy RR Junction and RR Facilities - Very Good Results

Very severe damage to M/Y, rolling stock, industrial type buildings, rail junction, rail lines and M/Y choke points.

Zwiesel RR Junction and RR Bridge - Very Good Results

Rail-over-road bridge well hit. Major roadways, lightly built-up area also well hit.

Muhldorf M/Y and Junction - Very Good Results

Rail lines well hit. Rail-over-road bridge, main part of M/Y, autobahn also well hit.

Irrenlohe Junction and RR Facilities - Very Good Results

Very good concentrations on rail junction and rail-over-road bridges, M/Y choke point, main part of M/Y, roadways.

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Seddin M/Y - Good Results

Three concentrations of GP bombs bursting in central portion of target area and an additional three concentrations on aiming point at western choke point of the yards. In central portion of target area at least 220 direct hits on rail lines and cars in the area. Three large explosions visible during the attack. Damage to this portion of the yard should be very severe. Smoke covered a portion of the western choke point early in the attack; however, at least 50 bursts could be seen on rail lines in the area and concentration covered the rail-over-road bridge.

Treverbrietzen M/Y - Good to Very Good Results

Six concentrations of GPs bursting in M/Y area. Main passenger station received at least one hit. Locomotive depot, one hit; eastern choke point of yard, at least 50 direct hits. Photography at end of attack showed all rail lines in this area cut. At least 45 direct hits on rail lines in western choke point area. Damage to both choke points of this small yard should be extremely severe.

Brandenburg Alstadt Sidings (B) - Fair Results

Due to intense smoke in area not all concentrations of bombs could be plotted. However, 5 concentrations could be seen in or adjacent to the target. At least 25 direct hits on rail lines in the SW end of the yard. Two direct hits on locomotive depot - depot approximately 30% destroyed. Locomotive and car shops - at least two direct hits. A storage area adjacent to the target received direct hits. A few scattered bursts in the area of the Arado Flugzeugwerke, where some damage will result in barracks area. Damage to this target will be moderate.

Brandenburg Alstadt (A) - Unobserved due to smoke

Smoke covered this target throughout attack; however, three partial concentrations of bombs could be seen in the target area. Photography taken late in attack showed that minor damage had occurred. The through line at eastern choke point appeared to be cut and the main goods depot appears to have suffered some damage.

5. Ground Situation

21st Army Group

: Canadian Army have cleared up to the East coast of the Zuider Zee. Holland completely cut off and now a fortress. Garrisoned by elements of 12 German Divisions.

Second British Army - Armored elements reached the Elbe opposite Lauenburg S 8935. Infantry following closely. Hamburg-Bremen autobahn cut at S 3733. Opposition still heavy South of Bremen.

S E C R E T

~~SECRET~~

12th Army Group

: 1st U.S. Army - Infantry still meeting opposition at Halle (D9522). In the Harz pocket, two US Infantry Divisions attacking against strong opposition. Reports from this sector confirm cases of wounded American PWs being murdered. German PWs yesterday identified as recon. elements and revealed that concentration of troops last night at Y0868 had mission of attacking South into Harz Mountains. Enemy combat team penetrated N. flank to Kusey (Y2747) and Wenzel (Y3046) today where they were engaged by US elements.

3rd U.S. Army - Leipzig area now reported clear. Armored elements captured Grofeinpour (P0031) but not yet reported clear of enemy; and reached Eschenbach (O-9436) and Neustadt (O-9444).

6th Army Group

: 7th U.S. Army - Armor reached Alfdorf (S 4529) and S 5028. Other elements captured Lorch (S4323) with bridge intact. Nuremburg cleared.

1st French Army - Infantry captured Oberkirch (W2592) and Gegenbach (2079). Arm'd elements captured Tubingen (W9792) and recon. elements reached Reutlingen (X0889).

D. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>CLAIMS</u>	<u>LOSSES</u>
Ninth Air Force	2155	5-3-6 A 89-0-92G	13
1st US TAF +	567	70-0-102G	0
2nd TAF	1155	33-3-8 A 7-0-19G	9
RAF Fighter Command	135	0-0-1 A	0
	4012	38-6-15 A 166-0-130G	22

+ Complete report not available.

S E C R E T

Ninth Air Force

Night - 19/20 April

Sorties : 5 Intruder Patrols in Riesa area.

Claims and Losses: Nil.

Day - 20 April 1945

Sorties : 600 Medium Bombers
1550 Fighters
2150 a/c

Mission : 9th Bomb Division - 600 sorties, 132 tons GP dropped on Ordnance Depot at Straubing with good to excellent results; 143.5 tons GP and 54 tons IB on POL depot at Deggendorf, excellent results; 230 tons GP on Memmingen M/Y, good to excellent results; 182 tons GP on Wittenberg M/Y, good results; 12.8 tons GP on Flak position at Wittenberg; 157.8 tons GP on POL depot at Annaberg, good to excellent results; 138 tons GP on Nordlingen M/Y, good to excellent results; 9 tons on u/i T/O.

9th TAC - 448 sorties. Armed reconnaissance E of Leipzig; air cooperation with 7th Corps; airfield cover; escort to bombers and reconnaissance.

19th TAC - 683 sorties. Armed Reconnaissance in Regensburg area; air cooperation with 8th, 12th and 20th Corps; battle area cover, escort and reconnaissance.

29th TAC - 419 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in Brandenburg area; air cooperation with 19th Corps; escort and reconnaissance.

E/A Claims	5-3-6 Air, 89-0-92 Ground	Destroyed	Damaged
Other Claims			
MT	378	165	
RR Cars	493	585	
Locomotives	59	15	
ABV	17	20	
HDV	54	13	
Gun Positions	25	7	
Rail Cuts	59		
Hwy Cuts	16		

Losses : 13 a/c (5 Medium Bombers, 8 Fighters)

~~SECRET~~

First U.S. TAF

Night - 19/20 April

Sorties : 8 a/c on Intruder Patrols

Claims & Losses: Nil.

Day - 20 April

Sorties : Bombers No Report
559 Fighters.

Mission : 42nd Bomb Wing - Report Not Available.

12th TAC - 519 Sorties. Air cooperation with 6th, 15th and 25th Corps; armed reconnaissance in Crailsheim, Heidenheim, Ulm, Essingen areas. 11 a/f's in Ulm area attacked. Escort to mediums and reconnaissance.

First French TAF - Report Not Available.

Western French Air Force - 40 sorties.
Strong point in Pointe de Grave area attacked.
Fighter operations and reconnaissance.

E/A Claims : 70-0-1C2 Ground

Other Claims		Destroyed	Damaged
MT	220	250	
RR Cars	55	53	
Locomotives	4	4	

Losses : Nil

~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T

Second TAF

Night - 19-20 April

Sorties : 85 Mosquitoes on Armed Reconnaissance
21 Mosquitoes on Defensive Patrols.
106 a/c

Missions : Armed reconnaissance in Emden, Westerland, Wismar, Hamburg, Oldenburg areas; defensive patrols in the Scheldt area.

Claims & Losses: Nil.

Day - 20 April

Sorties : 54.5 Armed Reconnaissance
136 Prearranged support.. Rail Interdiction
117 Immediate Support
137 Interception Patrols
114 Reconnaissance,
1049 a/c

Missions : Armed reconnaissance in areas of Hamburg, Wittenburg, S of Lubeck, Emden, Bremen, Frisian Islands.

E/A Claims: 33-3-8 Air, 7-0-19 Ground.

Other Claims	Destroyed	Damaged
MT	127	185
RR Cars	52	106
Locomotives	2	31
200 Ton Vessel	0	1
Smaller Vessels	0	4
Rail Cuts	41	

Losses : 9 Fighters

R.A.F. Fighter Command

Night - 19/20 April

Sorties : 10 Intruder Patrols over N. Germany
2 Interception Patrols
12 a/c

Claims : 0.0-1 Air

Losses : Nil.

-12-
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Day - 20 April

Sorties : 107 Escort to RAF Bomber Command
10 Anti-Midget Submarine Patrols
6 Reconnaissance
123 a/c

Claims : Nil.

Losses : Nil (1 P-51 Category "E").

2. Fifteenth Air Force

Report Not Available.

3. RAF Bomber Command

Day - 20 April

	Losses
100 Lancasters	Regensburg Oil Storage
	1

Night - 20/21 April

81 Mosquitoes	Berlin (6 separate attacks)	0
32 Mosquitoes	Schleissheim A/F (two attacks)	0
3 Mosquitoes	Bomber Support	1
<u>3 Mosquitoes</u>	RCM	<u>0</u>
<u>119 a/c</u>		<u>1</u>

NOTE: THE FOREGOING IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY REPORTS AND IS NOT TO BE USED FOR RECORD PURPOSES.

CHARLES Y. BANFILL
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Director of Intelligence.