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INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B578 (R)

Report on damage on POINTE DE GRAVE tank ditch defence lines.

I. This report covers damage up to 1200 hrs, 18 Apr.45.
TOT 115QHS16 Apr.45. Ref. SA Report 3853.

II Target is an anti-tank ditch stretching across the tip of POINTE DE GRAVE, South of SOULAC-SUR MER, and the defences along this ditch.
G. S. G. S. 4249/61- 282615 to 343665.

III The attack has concentrated craters on or near the anti-tank ditch throughout its entire length. At the East end there is a concentration of craters along the ditch from 331618 to 340623. The fire pits on the North side of the ditch have been destroyed along this section. The outlines of a wire enclosed strongpoint at 335621 have been obliterated by hits in the area. Hits within a strongpoint at 328617 have cut the highway across the ditch in three places at this point. Near misses have thrown spoil into three small emplacements within the strongpoint and damaged a small shed in the area. There are five craters at 327614 in the vicinity of a row of unidentified objects.

A heavy concentration of craters is around point 315614 on the ditch. Fire points in this area have been destroyed. At 304618 where the railway crosses the ditch the line has been cut in three places by direct hits. There is a heavy concentration of craters along the ditch from 298614 to 309617. The only remaining defensive elements visible along this section of ditch are two short fire trenches. To the West at 283616 there are many hits in an area of emplacements and fire trenches, completely blanketing the area.

(3015,16, 4017 to 4023 of US7GR/302A-17 Apr.45)

Ref. (4045 to 4051, 4061 to 4063, 3071 to 3074 of US 7GR/101C-16 Apr.45)

IV. Target was covered on good quality photographs at a scale of 1/10,000

V. This report is prepared from photographic evidence and includes only information from sorties interpreted at A.C.I.U. Photographs of sections of the anti-tank ditch accompanies this report.

(4020 of US7 GR/302A-17 Apr.45)

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17 Apr 45

INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. B. 575(R)

Preliminary report on damage on POINT DE GRAVE tank ditch defence lines

- I This report covers damage up to 1700 hrs, 16 Apr 45 T.O.T. 1150, 16 Apr 45. Ref S. Report No. 3583.
- II Target is an anti-tank ditch stretching across the tip of POINTE DE GRAVE, South of SOULAC-SUR MER, and the defences along this ditch G.S.G.S. 4249/GM - 282615 to 343665.
- III On the EAST end, there is a heavy concentration of craters along the ditch from 331618 to 340623. The fire pits along the NORTH side of the ditch have been destroyed along this section. A very heavy concentration of craters is seen around point 330611, just NORTH and EAST of two bands of small arms emplacements. Some craters extend to the length of emplacements but the extent of damage cannot be determined. Some craters are within a strong point at 328617 but again cover does not permit detailed assessment.
- A heavy concentration of craters is around point 315614 on the ditch and fire points in this area have been destroyed. A heavy concentration of craters is seen from 298614 to 309617, probably destroying the fire points and emplacements along this section of the ditch. On the WEST end a very heavy concentration of craters are in an area of emplacements and fire trench at 283616 completely covering the whole area and destroying installations. Some few groups of craters are noticed from 500 to 1000 yards SOUTH of the ditch.
- IV Target was partially covered on poor quality smoke obscured photographs. A complete assessment of damage will be issued after first good cover.
- V This report is prepared from photographic evidence and includes only information from sorties interpreted at A.C.I.U. Photographs 4045 to 4051, 4061 to 4063, 3071 to 3074 of US7/101C of 16 Apr 45. Ref. 3037 to 3039, 3128, 9, 3006, 7, 4034 to 4035 of US7/26D of 10 Mar 45.

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M.A.

CONFIDENTIAL
17 APR 1945

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3583

ATTACK ON TANK DITCH DEFENSE LINE IN ROYAN AREA ON 16 APR 1945

1. INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 485
- (b) Command : U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE
- (c) Time : 1111-1200 B hours.
- (d) Bombs : 99 x 2000 lb. G.P.
959 x 1000 lb. G.P.
3465 x 500 lb. G.P.

2. DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

(a) Many concentrations and groups of H.E. bursts totalling at least 1700 are seen on and across the greater portion of the tank ditch defense line with several hits visible on a previously cratered strong point at the Eastern end of the defense line. An approximate 65% to 70% of the line was hit, while the Eastern half (unprotected by woods) was very heavily hit along 9/10 of its length.

(b) Other bursts:

Concentrations and groups of bursts totalling at least 900 are seen in open and wooded areas from 1400 yards South and Southwest, to nine miles South and Southeast of the central area of the tank ditch defense line. One concentration is visible on a road intersection while another pattern is seen on a partially built-up area. Approximately 30 bursts are visible in an open area 2000 yards Northwest of the central area of the defense line.

3. ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

4. BOMB PLOT: A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed.

5. PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV	Time	Photo ID	Time	Weight	F.L.	Count	Notes
34/850-852	16 APR 45	1107B	hrs.	1/26,500	(F.L. 7")	15,500	"A"
" 94/1679-1681	"	1146B	"	1/25,700	"	15,000	" "
" 94/1678	"	1146B	"	1/15,000	(F.L. 12")	15,000	" "
" 95/1773;1775,1777 1779	"	1128B	"	1/25,300	(F.L. 7")	14,750	" "
" 100/1598,1600,1605	"	1123B	"	1/25,700	"	15,000	" "
" 385/1258,1260,1262	"	1109B	"	1/25,300	"	14,750	" "
" 388/1209,1210,1212	"	1200B	"	1/26,500	"	15,500	" "
" 390/1703-1706	"	1119B	"	1/26,500	"	15,500	" "
" 447/1249-1252	"	1149B	"	1/26,500	"	15,500	" "
" 452/1243,1245,1246	"	1132B	"	1/15,000	(F.L. 12")	15,000	" "
" 486/1116,1118,1120, 1121	"	1135B	"	1/25,300	(F.L. 7")	14,750	" "
" 487/1093,1094,1095, 1099	"	1138B	"	1/25,300	"	14,750	" "
" 490/971,974	"	1132B	"	1/25,300	"	14,750	" "
" 490/979	"	1111B	"	1/15,300	(F.L. 12")	15,300	" "
" 493/919-921	"	1116B	"	1/25,700	(F.L. 7")	15,000	" "

6
1 ea S
1 Lead Newburg

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 16 April 1945
13 CBW FO 101
13 CBW OPS 320
3 AD FO 644

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (POINT DE GRAVE), FRANCE)

TO : Colonel Shuck-95

1. Information Concerning the Targets: a. The 1st priority target (visual) for all Groups was a Tank Defence Line reaching across POINT DE GRAVE near ROYAN, FRANCE.

b. There was no second priority target assigned; however, second runs were authorized on the 1st priority target.

2. Planning and Execution:

a. Order:	Bomb Load:	Force:	Assigned Target:
(1) 93 A,B,C,D:			Point-de-Grave, France
(a) 34	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C	
(b) 385 A	12 x 500 GP	12 A/C	
385 B,C	6 x 1000 GP-B-2	24 A/C	
(c) 490	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C	
(d) 493	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C	
(2) 13 A,B,C:			Point-de-Grave, France
(a) 390	2 x 2000 GP	36 A/C	
	2 x 1000 GP	36 A/C	
(b) 100	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C	
(c) 95	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C	
(3) 45 A,B:			Point-de-Grave, France
(a) 452	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C	
388	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C	
(4) 4 A,B,C,D:			Point-de-Grave, France
(a) 486	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C	
(b) 487	6 x 1000 GP-B-2	36 A/C	
(c) 94	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C	
(d) 447 A,B	6 x 1000 GP-B-2	18 A/C	
447 C,D	12 x 500 GP	18 A/C	

b. Availability:	Airborne:			
(1) 95:	Reg: 47 A/C	56 C/C	34 A/C	
	Lead: 13 A/C	6 C/C	4 A/C	
(2) 100:	Reg: 46 A/C	45 C/C	34 A/C	
	Lead: 14 A/C	8 C/C	4 A/C	
(3) 399:	Reg: 44 A/C	55 C/C	34 A/C	
	Lead: 12 A/C	12 C/C	4 A/C	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

c. Malfunctions and Failures:

(1) 95:

(a) Lead A/C:

95C: A/C 8260, Lt. Newman, one smoke bomb released early due to a false impulse when intervalometer was set up. One bomb hung up because of a rack malfunction.

(b) Regular A/C: None

(2) 100:

(a) Lead A/C:

100A: A/C 824, Capt. Rebbs, C-1 auto-pilot became inoperative on bomb run.

(b) Regular A/C:

100C: A/C 616, Lt. Leader, jettisoned 2 bombs because of a rack malfunction.

(3) 390:

(a) Lead A/C:

390C: A/C 910, Lt. McKinney, C-1 auto-pilot became inoperative on bomb run.

390D: A/C 127, Lt. Garlitz, H2X equipment was inoperative due to two defective voltage doubler tubes.

(b) Regular A/C:

390A: A/C 9013, Lt. Matthews, one bomb hung up because of a rack malfunction.

390B: A/C 643, Lt. Galceran, one bomb hung up because of a rack malfunction.

d. A/C Outstanding: None.

e. A/C Landing Away From Base: None.

3. Navigation:

Position	Flight Plan	AL: N:	13A (390) Lt. Col. Waltz Lt. Yary	13B (100) Maj. Weston Lt. Graham	13C (95) Capt. Wright Lt. Arterburn
IPSWICH	2000'		2300' on time on course	2000' on time 1 mi. right	2000' 1 min. late on course
BU 22	2000'		2300' 1 min. early on course	2000' 1 min. late 3 mi. right	2000' 2 min. early 3 mi. right
CP 1	2000'		2300' on time on course	2000' 2 min. late 5 mi. right	2000' 1 min. late 3 mi. left
CP 2	15000'		15600' 7 min. early on course	15000' 7 min. early on course	15000' 8 min. early 2 mi. right
IP	15000'		15600' 8½ min. early 3 miles left	15000' 5 min. early 10 mi. left	15000' 2 min. early 6 mi. left

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TGT	15000'	15500' (1st P)	15000' (1st P)	15000' (1st P)
RP	14000'	14000' 5½ min. early on course	14000' 5 min. early 2 mi. left	14000' on time on course
GP 3	Minimum	6700' 16 min. early on course	8000' 17½ min. early 3 mi. left	7000' 15 min. early 3 mi. left

a. Assembly: 13A assembled over Buncher 11, 13B over Buncher 28 and 13C over Buncher 23. Assembly altitude was 2000'. Wing assembly was not completed until after crossing the French Coast. 13A had no difficulty with assembly, but according to the reports of 13B & 13C, these two Groups were continually becoming entangled with one another. 13B reports that it was on time and on course at Ipswich and that 13C was early. However, 13C reports that it was 1 minute late and that 13B was 3 minutes late, thereby causing congestion at Ipswich. 13C, by being echeloned to the left of 13B, forced 13B to overshoot Buncher 22 and Splasher 7 thereby making a 4 minute interval between 13A & 13B.

Conflicting reports from 13A & 13C make it necessary for this Headquarters to analyze the Wing assembly on this operation, rather than state the facts. It is assumed that 13B was late at Ipswich, and that 13C, by being echeloned to the left, forced 13B to be on the outside of the turns, making an interval of 4 minutes between 13A & 13B.

A correction will follow in the supplement for this operation.

b. Route: The route was flown essentially as briefed to the IP. Bombing altitude was reached 30 minutes prior to the IP. This point was overrun by 13B because 390C did not turn over the IP. 13C followed in trail of 13B. After bombs away the Wing was reassembled at the RP and the briefed route was followed to the bases.

c. Weather: Over the bases at take-off there were 2-5/10 variable cirrus above an estimated 25000'. Visibility was 800-3000 yds in patchy fog. Enroute to the target there were nil low clouds, except for an occasional fog patch over Eastern England and Channel below 1000'. There were nil middle clouds and variable 2-5/10 cirrus and cirro-stratus above an estimated 25000'. Visibility was restricted, downward in haze, to 10-20 miles. In the target area there were nil low or middle clouds with 2-5/10 patchy cirrus above an estimated 25000'. Downward visibility was 20-30 miles. The weather on the return route was the reverse at the route to the target. Over the bases on return there were nil low or middle cloud with patchy 3-6/10 cirrus and cirro-stratus above an estimated 25000'. Visibility was 3-7 miles in haze. Average winds enroute were 210/18K, 175/17K, and 185/14K in the target area.

4. Flak:

No flak was encountered. One large inaccurate burst of smoke and flame was observed on the target area. This may possibly have been a ground rocket. Moderate fire was observed in the distance in the La Rochelle area.

5. Bombing:

a.	Attacking:	Jettisoning:	Returning:
95:	1st P 38 A/C 455 x 500 GP		1 A/C 1 x 500 GP
100:	TO 38 A/C 454 x 500 GP	1 A/C 2 x 500 GP	
390:	TO 38 A/C 76 x 2000 GP 74 x 1000 GP		2 A/C 2 x 1000 GP

C O N F I D E N T I A L

b. 13A (390)

Squadrons:	A (749)	B (447)	C (910)	D (127)
Target:	1st P	1st P	1st P	1st P
A.P.	Selected	Selected	Assigned	Selected
A/C Releasing:	10	9	9	9
Bomb Load:	all A/C loaded with 2x200GP and 2x 1000GP			
Method of Release:	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo
Altitude: True:	15950	15600	15300	15100
Ind:	15700	15300	14800	14700
Briefed Track (230)				
True Heading:	240	237	229	244
Drift:	1R	2R	2R	6R
Trail Change:	none	none	none	none
Ground Speed:	175	175	180	186
Tan. D.A.	.49	.50	.52	.525
Time of Release:	1118	1119	1119	1119½
C-1	yes	yes	not used	yes
Pattern: Length:				
Width:				
Errors: Range:				
Def:				
Radial:				
Percent: 1000'				
2000'				
Crew: AL:	Lt. Col. Waltz	Maj. Breeze	Capt. Watts	Maj. Gross
P:	Capt. Morris	Lt. Geelsby	Lt. McKianey	Lt. Garlitz
TG:	Lt. Riele	Sgt. Miller	Sgt. Geats	Sgt. O'Donnell
N:	Lt. Yary	Lt. Fredrick	Lt. Barrett	Lt. Hoffman
AN:	Capt. Nerdling			
(No. of Leads) B:	Lt. (7) Peccianti	Lt. (10) Flerman	Lt. (6) Goldstein	Lt. (5) McGrew
Missions RN:	Lt. (25) Flanagan	Lt. (8) Sternberg	Lt. (7) Weffert	Lt. (5) McCarthy

because of incomplete briefing, lead bombardiers of 390 A,B, and D synchronized on selected AP's in the 1st priority target area.

(1) Narrative: 390 A: Bomb bay doors were opened after the IP maneuver. The bombardier took over after the turn at the IP and initiated the attack on a true heading of 230 degrees. The bombardier proceeded to synchronize on a selected AP and with 2 minutes of visual synchronization a normal sighting operation was completed. Synchronization at bombs away was good.

PI: The bombs fell in fields approximately 4400' left of what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 1700' left of the assigned grid coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP.

390B: After the IP maneuver the bomb bay doors were opened. The bombardier took over after the turn and began the run on a true heading of 216 degrees. A selected AP was picked up in the target area and with 4 minutes of synchronization the bombardier completed a normal sighting operation. At bombs away, synchronization appeared to be very good.

PI: The bombs fell in fields and on a road approximately 10000' left of what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 8300' left of the grid coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP. According to H2X scope Photo-interpretation, the bombs fell in the target area.

390C: Beginning the attack on a true heading of 221 degrees the bombardier took over and opened the bomb bay doors after the IP maneuver. The bombardier proceeded to synchronize on the probably intended assigned MPI and with 3 minutes of visual synchronization a normal sighting operation was completed. At bombs away synchronization was good.

C-1 auto became inoperative on the bomb run and was completed on PDI.

PI: The bombs fell on what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 1700' right of the grid coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP. There were approximately 8 hits on the tank ditch and mound at this point, which was flooded and destroyed. The railroad tracks just N of the MPI was destroyed for a length of approximately 400'.

390D: After the maneuver at the IP, the bombardier took over and initiated the attack on a true heading of 219 degrees. The target area was identified immediately after the turn at the IP. The bombardier picked up a selected AP and with 2 minutes of synchronization a normal sighting operation was completed. Synchronization at bombs away appeared to be good.

PI: The bombs fell in fields and on a railroad track approximately 3350' left of what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 1650' left of the grid coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP. The tracks were out in three places.

NOTE: BOMBING ERRORS AND PERCENT OF BOMBS WERE DETERMINED FROM WHAT WAS PROBABLY INTENDED TO BE THE ASSIGNED MPI.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

390A: A/C 9013: Returned 1 x 1000 GP because of a rack malfunction.

390B: A/C 643: Returned 1 x 1000 GP because of a rack malfunction.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

o. 13B (100)

Squadrons:	A (824)	B (794)	C (776)	D (209)
Target:	1st P	1st P	1st P	1st P
A.P.	selected	selected	selected	selected
A/C Releasing:	9	10	9	10
Bomb Load:	12x500GP	12x500GP	12x500GP	12x500GP
Method of Release:	salvo	salvo	salvo	salvo
Altitude: True:	15400	15800	14900	14600
Ind:	15000	15300	14500	14200
Briefed Track (230)				
True Heading:	239	235	214	212
Drift:	5R	4R	4R	4R
Trail Change:	plus 4 mils	plus 4 mils	plus 4 mils	plus 4 mils
Ground Speed:	175	165	165	172
Tan. D.A.	.505	.460	.460	.512
Time of Release:	1122	1122½	1123	1124
C-1	not used	yes	yes	yes
Pattern: Length:				
Width:				
Errors: Range:				
Def:				
Radial:				
Percent: 1000'				
2000'				
Crew: AL:	Maj. Weeten	Capt. Robbs		Capt. Wilson
P:	Capt. Hutchinson	Capt. Blanding	Lt. Wofford	Lt. Evans
TG:	Sgt. Kamper	Lt. Beisser	Sgt. Urice	Sgt. Wassen
N:	Lt. Graham	Lt. Grotty	P/O Furnia	Lt. Fenton
AN:	Lt. Dussault			
(No. of Leads) B:	Lt. (15) Zenske	Lt. (19) Belinow	Lt. (5) Paterno	Lt. (1) Garvan
Missions EN:	Lt. (16) Cordier	Lt. (19) Jenista	Lt. (17) Wells	Lt. (1) Eilers

As a result of improper briefing, all lead bombardiers in 13B synchronized on selected AP's in the 1st priority target area.

(1) Narrative: 100A: The attack was initiated on a true heading of 244 degrees. The bombardier identified the target area at 17 miles from the BRL. The bombardier picked up his selected AP and proceeded to synchronize.

The C-1 auto-pilot was too sluggish in taking out course corrections, consequently the run was completed on PDI. A normal sighting operation was completed and at bombs away synchronization appeared to be good.

All lead bombardiers in 13B added 5 miles of trail to the center patterns on the AP's.

PI: The bombs fell in fields 2300' right and beyond what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 2650' right of the grid-coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP. There were approximately 4 hits on the tank trench, and pictures taken by 95C show the trench and mound destroyed at this point.

100B: The bombardier took over immediately after the IP maneuver and initiated the attack on a true heading of 233 degrees. The rate and course were killed on points short of the target area. The bombardier selected an AP and proceeded with synchronization. A normal sighting operation was completed and synchronization at bombs away appeared to be good.

PI: The bombs fell in fields approximately 5870' left of and beyond what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 5370' left and beyond the grid coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP.

100C: After the IP maneuver the bombardier took over and began the run on a true heading of 220'. The target area was identified 15 miles from the BRL. The bombardier selected an AP and proceeded to synchronize. A normal sighting operation was completed and at bombs away synchronization appeared to be good.

PI: The bombs fell in fields and on a road approximately 43/4 miles left of what was intended to be the assigned MPI, but on the selected AP. According to H2X scope photo-interpretation, the bomb fall was approximately 51/8 miles S of the MPI.

100D: Initiating the attack on a true heading of 220 degrees the bombardier took over and began to set up course. The bombardier picked up an AP and proceeded with synchronization. 20 seconds from the BRL smoke and haze began to obscure the AP and the bombardier used the hot plate to help discern the AP. At bombs away synchronization was good.

PI: The bombs fell in the same location as 390B, approximately 7480' left of what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 7200' left of the grid coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP.

NOTE: BOMBING ERRORS AND PERCENT OF BOMBS WERE DETERMINED FROM WHAT WAS PROBABLY INTENDED TO BE THE ASSIGNED MPI.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

100G: A/C 616: jettisoned 2 x 500 GP in the Bay of Biscay because of rack malfunctions over the target area.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

d. 130 (95)

Squadrons:	(8201)	B (248)	C (8260)	D (823)
Target:	1st	1st P	1st P	1st P
A.P.	Select	Select	Select	Select
A/C Releasing:	9	10		10
Bomb Load:	12x500GP	12x500GP	12x500GP	12x500GP
Method of Release:	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo
Altitude: True:	1535	15850	14850	14200
Ind:	1500	15500	14500	14000
Briefed Track (230)				
True Heading:	235	234	233	239
Drift:	6R	1R	2R	6R
Trail Change:	None	None	None	None
Ground Speed:	171	187	183	182
Tan. D.A.	.52	.515	.53	.547
Time of Release:	1127	1128	1128½	1129½
C-1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pattern:	Length:			
	Width:			
Errors:	Range:			
	Def:			
	Radial:			
Percent:	1000'			
	2000'			
Crew:	AL:	Capt. Wright	Capt. Philpott	Capt. Bailey
	P:	Lt. Taylor	Lt. Seaburg	Lt. Newman
	TG:	Lt. Murray	Sgt. Laughlin	Sgt. Lee
	N:	Lt. Arterburn	Lt. Pyle	Lt. Jones
	AN:	Capt. Shirey		
(No. of Leads)	B:	Lt. (13) Carter	Lt. (7) Spears	Lt. (1) Skelnick
		Lt. (24) Weber	Lt. (10) Lowry	Lt. (5) Durgin
Missions	RN:			

C O N F

6
Lead Crew Jung
ea. Bomb of

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 18 April 1945

SUBJECT: Supplements to Tactical Reports (POINT DE GRAVE, FRANCE
16 April)
(AUSSIG, CZECHOSLOVAKIA
17 April)

TO : Colonel Shuck - 95

POINT DE GRAVE, FRANCE April 16, 1945

1. Under paragraph 3, page 2-and paragraph 5, page 4-change Lt. Col. Waltz to read - Lt. Col. Pennybaker.

AUSSIG, CZECHOSLOVAKIA April 17, 1945

1. Tabulation of Bombing:

Bomb Load and Method of Release:	95 A,B,C:	12 x 500 GP	Salvo
	100 A,B,C:	12 x 500 GP	Salvo
	390 A,B,C:	12 x 500 GP	Salvo

Group:	Length:	Width:	1000'	2000'	Radial:	Target:	AP:
95A:	1315'	790'	0%	0%	3000'	1st P	MPI
B:	1500'	875'	0%	0%	4185'	1st P	MPI
C:	800'	890'	0%	80%	1750'	1st P	MPI
17 April:	1205'	852'	0%	27%	1750'		
1-16 April:	1224'	850'	59%	71%	1339'		
March:	1667'	1340'	46.9%	73.1%	910'		
100A:	1525'	610'	65%	100%	670'	1st P	MPI
B:	1190'	1020'	38%	90%	1015'	1st P	MPI
C:	1055'	735'	90%	100%	735'	1st P	MPI
17 April:	1257'	788'	64%	97%	807'		
1-16 April:	1530'	993'	47%	71%	893'		
March:	2070'	1230'	40.8%	67.6%	870'		
390A:	1600'	1600'	5%	55%	1920'	1st P	MPI
B:	1085'	1085'	48%	100%	1000'	1st P	MPI
C:	Smoke obscured					1st P	MPI
17 April:	1343'	1343'	27%	78%	1460'		
1-16 April:	1250'	1170'	53%	78%	611'		
March:	1840'	1330'	47%	75%	784'		

13 CBW Averages:

17 April:	1268'	994'	30.3%	67.3%	1339'
1-16 April:	1335'	1004'	53%	73.3%	948'
March:	1859'	1300'	44.9%	71.8%	855'

2. Corrections: a. Paragraph 2, a, (2), (b), page 1: Change the bomb load for the 486 Group to read- 14 x 250 GP plus 4 x 500 IB.

b. Paragraph 2, c, (1), page 2: In addition - 95A: A/C 8667, Lt. Col. Stuart, the interphone system in A/C went out on the bomb run. The emergency interphone was used but did not operate until after bombs away. Ground check of this A/C revealed the interphone system was good. Exact cause for the malfunction is undetermined.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 95A: Attacking on a true heading of 235 degrees, the bombardier was able to identify the target area immediately after the turn at the IP. The bombardier identified the intended assigned MPI 8 miles from the BRL and made a normal sighting operation. At bomb release line synchronization was very good.

PI: The bombs fell on what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 575° short of the grid coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP. There were about 8 - 10 direct hits on the trench, which should be considered destroyed at this point. According to H2X scope photo interpretation, the bombfall was approximately 12000° East of the MPI.

95B: The bombardier picked up the target area immediately after the maneuver at the IP and initiated the attack on a true heading of 244 degrees. On the approach to the target the bombardier used pilotage to help make course good. The intended assigned MPI was picked up 10 miles from the BRL. A normal sighting operation was completed and at bombs away synchronization was very good.

PI: The bombs fell on what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 575° short of the grid coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP. A heavy concentration of bombs covered the tank ditch and mound around the MPI. A portion of the bombs fell in the smoke of A's bombs.

95C: Beginning the run on a true heading of 233 degrees, the bombardier was able to pick up the target area immediately after the turn at the IP. The intended assigned MPI was identified 11 miles from the BRL and a normal sighting operation was completed. At bombs away synchronization was very good.

PI: Smoke over the target obscures a portion of the bombs. A heavy concentration is visible on the tank trench 500° to 1000° short of what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 575° short of the grid coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP. According to H2X scope photo-interpretation, the bombfall was about 6000° NE of the MPI.

95D: Initiating the attack on a true heading of 242 degrees, the bombardier pinpointed himself down the run and set up rate. The intended assigned MPI was obscured by smoke from previous bomb strikes; however, the bombardier positioned the crosshairs in relation to checkpoints in the vicinity of the MPI. Synchronization appeared to be good at the time of bomb release.

PI: There were approximately 13 hits on the tank ditch and mound on what was probably intended to be the assigned MPI, 575° short of the grid coordinates MPI, and on the selected AP. According to H2X scope photo-interpretation, the bombfall was approximately 3 1/2 miles NE of the MPI. NOTE: BOMBING ERRORS AND PERCENT OF BOMBS WERE DETERMINED FROM WHAT WAS PROBABLY INTENDED TO BE THE ASSIGNED MPI.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

95C: A/C 8260 1 x 500 GP returned to base because of rack malfunction and 1 smoke bomb was released early, due to a faulty release, when intervalometer was set up.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

6. Communications: a. VHF: (1) Channel A (790) communications were reported good. Discipline was satisfactory.

(2) Channel B (809) communications were good. Wing Leader had normal communications with Arrowswift, Kodak, and other Wing Leaders.

(3) No fighter contacts were made as there was no assigned fighter support. Colgate was contacted satisfactorily by Wing Leader.

(4) There were no distress transmissions. Monitors performed duties satisfactorily.

b. W/T: (1) Division W/T ground station was weak at beginning of mission but otherwise reception was clear.

(2)	13A		CP1	CP2	TGT	CP3	
	Flight Plan		0824	1058	1124	1340	
	ATA		0823	1051	1118	1324	
	TOD		0839	1102	1125	1345	
	390A	1 A 1	1118 - 1125		95A	P A 1	1132 - 1136
	B	1 A 1	1119 - 1126		B	1 A 2	1130 - 1133
	C	1 A 5	1119 - 1140		C	1 A 2	1130 - 1145
	D	1 A 3	1119 - 1140		D	P A 4	1148 - 1200
	100A	1 A 1	1122 - 1138				
	B	1 A 1	1122 - 1150				
	C	1 A 3	1124 - 1200				
	D	1 A 2	1124 - 1250				

95A and D lead Radio Operators used the old system of Strike Reports in error.

c. ECM: (1) 95 Group reported 10 frequencies jammed between 550 and 570 megacycles. 390 Group detected 7 frequencies ranging from 540 to 612 megacycles, and 100 Group reported light activity between 519 and 560 megacycles. Most stations went off the air as soon as they were jammed. There were no Carpet I failures.

(2) 720 units of Chaff were carried per plane and, in 95 and 390 Groups, discharges as briefed. Discharge was not uniform in 100 Group and one-third of the a/c did not discharge chaff.

7. Photography: a. 95 installed 3 scope, 5 oblique, and 8 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures. 3 sets of H2X scope photographs were taken all of which are plottable.

b. 100 installed 1 scope, 1 oblique, and 8 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures. 1 16MM H2X roll was taken, and is plottable.

c. 390 installed 2 scope, 2 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures. 2 sets of H2X scope photographs were taken, one of which is plottable. There was too much brilliance, 20 mi. scan used, no range and no luber live in the H2X photographs taken by 390C; consequently, this set was not plottable.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

Ernest A. Kiessler

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis

HEADQUARTERS

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-D-20

AGO 559.
16 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Lead Crews Flying.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.

1. The following is a list of Officers flying on lead crews on the mission of 16 April 1945.

95 "A" SQUADRON

Command Pilot	- Capt. Wright
Pilot	- 1st Lt. Taylor
Co-Pilot	- 1st Lt. Murray
Command Navigator	- Capt. Shirey
Navigator	- 1st Lt. Arturburn
Bombardier	- 1st Lt. Carter
Radar Navigator	- 1st Lt. Webber

95 "B" SQUADRON

Command Pilot	- Capt. Philpott
Pilot	- 1st Lt. Seaburg
Navigator	- 2nd Lt. Pyle
Bombardier	- 2nd Lt. Spears
Radar Navigator	- 2nd Lt. Lowry

95 "C" SQUADRON

Pilot	- 1st Lt. Newman
Co-Pilot	- 1st Lt. Munson
Navigator	- 1st Lt. Boyes
Bombardier	- F/O Messenger
Radar Navigator	- 1st Lt. Shuster

95 "D" SQUADRON

Command Pilot	- Capt. Bailey
Pilot	- 1st Lt. Trbovieh
Co-Pilot	- F/O Sebo
Navigator	- F/O Kanzler
Bombardier	- 2nd Lt. Skelnick
Radar Navigator	- F/O Durgin

RAYMOND C. BRITTINGHAM JR.
Captain, Air Corps,
Asst. Operations Officer

C O N F I D E N T I A L

13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)

**POINT DE GRAVE, FRANCE
TANK DEFENSE LINE**


16 APRIL 45

MPI No. 1: 13 B and C Groups: this is the approximate MPI that 3rd Division intending 13 B and C using. The actual MPI according to the coordinates given on GSGS 4250, Sheet No. 6M/5 and 6N/1, was approximately 575° SW of this point. 100 A, B, C, and D used selected APs in the target area. All of the bombs fell around these selected APs. 95 Group synchronized on the MPI that 3rd Division probably intended to be used.

MPI No. 2: 390 Group: this is the approximate MPI that 3rd Division intended 390 Group to use. The actual MPI according to the same map sheets referred to above was approximately 1700° SE along the RR track and on the South side of it. All Squadrons selected APs in this area. 390 C actually bombed what was probably intended as the assigned MPI.

NOTE: 100 C's bomb pattern is not shown below. The bombs fell $4\frac{3}{4}$ miles S of MPI No. 1, but around the selected AP.

95 Group and 390 C and 100 A destroyed the portion of the tank ditch and mound that they hit.



SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 351

PERIOD: 0001 hours 16 April to 2400 hours 16 April 1945

.....
SECRET
By authority of
C.G., Eighth Air Force.
Initials *KGS*
Date 16 April 1945
.....

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Total Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>				<u>NYR</u>
					<u>E/A</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>OT</u>	<u>Totals</u>	
Heavy Bomber Atks.	1249	1205	3448.9	0-0-0	0	1	2	3	0
Fighter Escort	577	539	0	2-0-0 A 314-0-175 G	0	7	5	12	26
Fighter Sweeps	298	286	0	(a) 1-0-0 A 410-0-198 G	0	3	4	7	6
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	26	26	0	0-0-0	0	0	1	1	1
Weather Recon.	33	30	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	17	17	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>25</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	2225	2126	3448.9	(a) 3-0-0 A 724-0-373G	0	11	12	23	33(b)

(a) includes one Me-262 destroyed

(b) 13 a/c believed safe on the continent

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

1249 a/c (943 B-17s, 306 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied in three forces against the anti-tank defenses in the Bordeaux area, and rail and communication centers in south central Germany. 1205 a/c dropped 3448.9 tons (3367.6 tons GP and 81.3 tons IB) on assigned targets, the first force attacking its third priority, Landshut M/Y. All targets bombed visually, except Landshut where H2X technique with visual assists was employed. Weather: generally CAVU in Bordeaux, Regensburg, Plattling, and Straubing areas; 2/10 to 5/10 cloud in Landshut area. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 a/c (2 B-24s, 1 B-17) (1 B-24 to AA, balance to unknown causes). NYR: nil.

J.A.
CRB

mac

S E C R E T

First Force

Thirty group formations (306 B-24s - 2nd Air Division) sortied against Rosenheim M/Y and Transformer Station and the Traunstein Ry Bridge, Transformer Station and M/Y. 273 a/c dropped 679.8 tons (653.3 tons GP and 26.5 tons IB) on the Landshut M/Y, the third priority at 1531-1555 hours from 16,200-20,500 feet; bombing on H2X with visual assists. Leaflets dropped on Landshut. Weather: 2/10 to 5/10 cloud in target area; 7/10 to 10/10 in area of first priority targets. Flak: nil in target area; moderate and accurate at Augsburg. Battle Damage: 8 minor. E/A Opposition: nil. Losses: 2 B-24s (1 to AA, 1 to unknown causes). NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Five groups, 315 a/c (260 P-51s, 55 P-47s) sortied. Up 1200-1251 hours, down 1845-2120 hours. 299 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. A/Ps strafed included Landshut, Ergolding, Reichersburg, Kircham, Muhlendorf, Linz, Eger, Straubing, Gablingen, Praha/Kbely, Landshut/Lutzkendorf, Pocking, Erfording and autobahn near Bad-Aibling. Claims: 228-0-109 ground. Losses: 11 a/c (1 P-47, 10 P-51s) (7 to AA, 4 to unknown reasons). NYR: 21 P-51s (9 a/c believed safe on the continent).

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Rosenheim M/Y	97	Not Attacked			
Rosenheim Transf. Station	62	Not Attacked			
Traunstein RR Bridge	54	Not Attacked			
Traunstein Station	56	Not Attacked			
Traunstein M/Y	37	Not Attacked			
Landshut M/Y (3rd Priority)	—	<u>273</u>	<u>653.3</u>	<u>26.5</u>	Unob. to Very Good
Totals	306	273	653.3	26.5	

Second Force

Twelve group formations (454 B-17s - 1st Air Division) sortied against Regensburg RR Bridges and M/Y, Plattling M/Y, and Straubing RR Bridge. 447 a/c dropped 1324.4 tons (1269.6 tons GP and 54.8 tons IB) on the assigned targets. at 1559-1604 hours from 17,500-19,000 feet; bombing visually. Leaflets dropped on Regensburg, Plattling, Straubing. Weather: CAVU with slight ground haze in target areas; 1/10 to 3/10 en route. Flak: nil at Plattling and Straubing; meager and inaccurate at Regensburg. Battle Damage: 2 minor. E/A Opposition: nil. Losses: 1 B17(to unknown causes). NYR: nil.

S E C R E T

Fighter Support: Five groups (262 P-51s) sortied. Up 1312-1332 hours, down 1850-1959 hours. 240 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: Three Me-109s were attacked vicinity Deinengen A/F, one u/i jet a/c bounced unsuccessfully vicinity Regensburg; one u/i e/a, believed jet, observed shadowing bomber forces east of Coblenz. A/Fs strafed included Plattling, Marienbad, Pocking, Gamacker and Cham. Claims: 2-0-0 Air, 86-0-66 Ground. Losses: 1 P-51 to unknown causes. NYR: 5 P-51s.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Regensburg West RR Bridge	74	74	217.5		Good
Regensburg East RR Bridge	75	72	210.0		Good
Regensburg M/Y	151	148	336.3	54.8	Very Good
Plattling M/Y	77	77	264.0		Good to Very Good
Straubing RR Bridge	<u>77</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>241.8</u>		Fair to Good
Totals	454	447	1269.6	54.8	

Third Force

Thirteen group formations (489 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against the Anti-tank ditch and defenses in the Bordeaux area. 485 a/c dropped 1444.7 tons GP on the assigned target at 1107-1159 hours from 15,000-16,000 feet; bombing visually. Weather: CAVU. Flak: nil to meager, inaccurate in target area. Battle Damage: 6 minor, 8 major (due to mid-air bomb explosion). E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Target</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	
Anti-Tank Ditch and Defense Line; Bordeaux Area	489	485	1444.7	Good to Very Good

2. Fighter Escort

Ten groups (577 a/c - 522 P-51s, 55 P-47s) sortied in support of the bomber forces. Up 1200-1332 hours, down 1845-2120 hours. 539 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: three Me-109s were attacked vicinity Deinengen A/F; one u/i jet bounced unsuccessfully vicinity Regensburg; one u/i e/a observed vicinity Coblenz shadowing bomber forces. A/Fs strafed included Landshut, Ergolding,

Reichersburg, Kirchham, Muhlendorf, Linz, Eger, Straubing, Gablingen, Enferding, Plattling, Marienbad, Pocking, Ganacker, Cham, Landshut/Lutzkendorf, Praha/Kobely, and autobahn near Bad-Aubling. Claims: 2-0-0 (air, 311-0-175 ground. Losses: 12 a/c (11 P-51s, 1 P-47) (7 to AA, 5 to unknown causes). NYR: 26 P-51s (9 believed safe on the continent).

3. Fighter Sweeps

Five groups (298 P-51s) sortied in free lance support of the bomber forces. 286 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: 1 Me-262 bounced while readying to land on Horsching A/F, 2 Me-262s were chased unsuccessfully in Munich area. A/Fs strafed included Pocking, Obernberg, Bad Aibling, Plattling, Straubing, Klabovy, Budejovic, Stadtandorf, Prien, Ort, Passau, Marienbad, Brunthal, Muhlendorf, Ganacker, Lake Chiem, Erding, Neubiberg, Landshut, Linz, Praha/Kakowice, Praha/Letnauy, Praha/Kobely. Claims: 1-0-0 (Me-262) air; 410-0-198 ground. Losses: 7 P-51s (3 to AA, 4 to unknown causes). NYR: 6 P-51s (3 believed safe on continent).

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

26 a/c (10 F-5s, 16 P-51s) sortied as follows:

10 F-5s sortied and obtained photos in central and southern Germany and western France.

16 P-51s as escort for FRU a/c.

Losses: 1 P-51. NYR: 1 P-51, believed safe on the continent.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

33 a/c (7 B-17s, 4 Mosquitoes, 22 P-51s) sortied as follows:

3 B-17s on routine flights over Atlantic to west of UK.

1 B-17 on routine flight from Azores.

4 Mosquitoes on special flights over the Atlantic and over southern and central Germany.

25 a/c (22 P-51s, 3 B-17s) as weather scouts for bomber forces. 22 effective sorties.

Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

17 a/c (13 P-47s, 2 B-17s and 2 OA-10s) completed routine search and patrol. Losses: nil.

8. Special Operations

25 a/c (16 B-24s, 2 B-17s, 7 Mosquitoes) sortied as follows:

1 Mosquito on experimental navigational flight to Italy.

5 Mosquitoes dropped chaff for 1st Air Division.

4 B-24s on VHF screening, jamming from 0956-1300 hours.

11 B-24s on leaflet mission to France, Holland and Germany - night

15/16 April. 10 effective.

3 a/c (2 B-17s, 1 B-24) as radio relays.

1 Mosquito on non-effective special operation.

All a/c on special operations returned safely.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

No opposition was put up against bombers or fighters in spite of favorable weather conditions. A small number of o/a, were sighted but these made no attacks.

One fighter group, after breaking escort with the second force destroyed two of three Me-109s taking off from Doinongen A/F. Another fighter group escorting the same force unsuccessfully bounced an u/i jet in the Regensburg area at 1610 hours. This group also sighted an u/i e/a, possibly a jet, at 1730 hours east of Coblenz. E/a was shadowing the bombers at 21,000 feet but evaded on an easterly course when fighters turned to investigate. One of the groups on free lance support chased 2 Me-262s unsuccessfully in the Munich area and another group destroyed an Me-262 about to land on Horsching A/F.

2. Flak

Augsburg - moderate and accurate
Regensburg - meager and inaccurate
Bordeaux Area - nil to meager, inaccurate
Plattling, Straubing, Landshut - nil

3. Observations

20-25 u/i a/c on Lochfeld A/F.

40 plus t/e, mostly Ju-88s, Ingolstadt A/F parked in woods E and S field.

75 plus u/i a/c at Eferding A/F (4817N-1403E).

A/Fs at WP5021, WU7092, XLO504, XQ4991, XQ6599, XL3545, XL3959, LX3085, WP9581, did not seem to have any a/c on them.

30 plus u/i a/c on A/F N of Nordlingen (4 WT0835).

Karlsbad A/F- 35 t/e seen on city side of A/F. Several a/c burning in woods SE of A/F.

Straubing A/F, 60-75 Me-109s and FW-190s, on field.

Muhldorf A/F, 40-50 Me-109s and FW-190s, several Ju-88s, on field.

Erding A/F-, 50 u/i s/c on field.

Pocking A/F had 80-100 planes visible with approximately 55-60 good fires burning when squadrons left.

Bad Aibling had 70 plus e/a parked 1/2-1 mile west of field.

Obernberg A/F with 100 plus well camouflaged planes.

U/i A/F 2 miles N of Prague adjacent to Molgau River had 90 plus a/c of various types on field.

50-75 a/c on Pilsen A/F.

75 plus a/c, all types on Praha/Kakowice A/F.

50 plus a/c on Praha/Letnaly A/F.

25 plus a/c on Ganacker A/F.

300 plus u/i a/c on Budefovic A/F.

Ort A/F had 50 plus a/c of all types parked in open field.

Wallersdorf A/F (4844N-1245E) with 50 plus a/c of all types observed.

Passau A/F (4833N-1325E) with 50 plus a/c, Mc-109s predominate.

Kbely, Marienbad, Eisendorf, Plzen and Ruzyně A/Fs all had heavy concentration of e/a.

Much convoy activity of trucks on highways, especially between Karlsbad and Prague, moving in an easterly direction.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Anti-Tank Ditch and Defense Line; Bordeaux Area - Good to Very Good Results

Ground observers report excellent bombing by heavies with good concentrations on defense line. One flight of 12 a/c dropped 15 kilometers south of target with bombs striking near town of Mayan, no damage was done.

15 patterns of 500GP, 10 patterns of 1000 GP and 1 pattern of 1000 and 2000 GPs blanket 2/3 to 3/4 of the constructed ditch, which appears to be largely filled with water. 3 to 4 patterns are observed up to 5 miles S of the ditch and 1 500 GP pattern is seen 9 1/8 miles S about half way between the reported location of the French and German lines.

Landshut M/Y - Unobserved to Very Good Results

Smoke and cloud obscured part of the results but visual patterns and calculated projectiles clearly show that most of the bursts were in and around the M/Y. The yard was very severely damaged in the beginning of the attack and appeared unserviceable or almost wholly so. Patterns of GP are seen bursting squarely across the M/Y area and one pattern of GP bombs is seen to burst squarely on the buildings adjacent to the ordnance depot. These buildings have not been damaged in previous attacks, although the ordnance depot proper was seen to be severely damaged even in the beginning of the attack. An incendiary pattern is seen to burst across one end of the M/Y extending to the river across the built up area of the town.

Regensburg M/Y - Very Good Results

Six concentrations of mixed GP and IB in and adjacent to M/Y. Poor quality of photography makes the pinpointing of all bursts impossible. The following hits were noted: main station blanketed by bursts, the wagon repair shop and locomotive repair shop received at least 2 direct hits each with fires burning late in the attack, 3 locomotive depots near center of yard damaged by hits and near hits with the western most of the third being almost completely destroyed. The single loco depot in the western end of the yard received one near hit, the sorting sidings were blanketed by bursts with at least two explosions resulting. The storage siding and goods depot were blanketed by approximately 20 bursts, industrial area adjacent to the northern siding and barracks area adjacent to the S side of M/Y received direct hit or near hit, damage to target will be severe.

Regensburg West RR Bridge - Good Results

Six concentrations of GP bombs in target area. It was impossible to pinpoint any hits on the bridge proper, but the eastern approach received several direct hits cutting a gap of approximately 245 feet.

East RR Bridge - Good Results

Six concentrations of GP bombs in and adjacent to target area. It was impossible to pinpoint any bursts but photography taken late in the attack, it was possible to determine that the approach to the southern end of the bridge received at least 2 direct hits and several near hits. The bridge proper received at least one probable and several near hits, the northern approach received at least 2 direct hits, an industrial section adjacent to the west siding of the bridge was severely damaged from many bursts.

Plattling M/Y - Good to Very Good Results

Six concentrations of GP bombs in target area. Hits could be plotted on the following installations; passenger station blanketed by at least 20 bursts, wagon or locomotive repair shops at least 10 hits or near hits late in the attack, locomotive depot at least 5 hits late in the attack. Storage siding blanketed by bursts. All other major installations received hits; damage will be severe.

Straubing RR Bridge - Fair to Good Results

Blanketed by six concentrations of heavy GP bombs. One direct hit can be seen near the S end of the bridge, at least 3 probable hits near center of bridge, at least 5 hits on rail lines just S of bridge. Damage will be severe.

5. Ground Activity

- 21st Army Group - A Polish armored formation and Canadian infantry have reached the North Sea at Q7916 and U9725 and 9283. Other Canadian troops advanced towards the Zuider Zee against opposition. British troops repulsed counter-attacks at X8989 and captured a strongly defended village southeast of Uelzen. Resistance generally stronger on the entire British front.
- 12th Army Group - First U.S. Army armor continues to advance towards the Elbe river, and the Ninth Army build-up in the Elbe bridgehead continues. Third Army infantry advanced on a broad front to the south and east of Bayreuth, cutting the autobahn at several points.
- 6th Army Group - First French Army continued to advance in the Black Forest.
- Miscellaneous - Enemy resistance generally scattered, but where encountered is stubborn. There is no indication of enemy troops being brought from the Eastern front. In the Ruhr pocket the main difficulties would seem to be those arising from the disposal of enemy prisoners, which now total over 120,000.

D. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Ninth Air Force	2205	27-1-2 A 221-4-189G 4-0-1A	8
First US TAF +	1219	14-1-10 G	4
Second TAF	1404	12-0-5 A	8
RAF Fighter Command	<u>166</u>	6-3-1 A 49-4-9 A	<u>0</u>
Totals	4994	233-4-199 G	20

+ Complete report not available.

Ninth Air Force

Night 15/16

Sorties : 8 a/c

Missions : Patrols in Third US Army area

Claims & Losses: Nil

Day 16

Sorties : 2197 a/c

Missions : 9th Bomb Division- 578 sorties. Attacked Zerbst comm. center, Gunzenhausen M/Y, Kempten Ord. Depot, Wittenburg M/Y dropping 737 tons with fair to very good results.

9th TAC- 596 sorties. Armed recon. in Leipzig area, area cooperation with Third and Ninth Armored Divisions; attacked A/Fs.

19th TAC- 588 sorties. Armed recon. in Chemnitz, Dresden, Praha areas. Area cooperation to XX and VIII Corps; escort to medium bombers; air cover over Mulhausen and Gotha.

29th TAC- 435 sorties. Air cooperation to 2nd and 5th Armored Divisions and XIX Corps, dive-bombed Magdeburg; escort to medium bombers; attacked A/Fs.

Claims : 27-1-2 Air, 221-4-189 Ground

Other Claims :	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
MT	452	328
AFV	38	23
Locos	139	103
RR Cars	628	638
Gun Positions	20	15
HDV	85	
M/Ys	0	35
Rail Cuts	53	
Hy Cuts	8	

Losses : 8 a/c (4 to AA, 3 to unknown causes, 1 to accident)

First US TAF

Night 15/16

Sorties : 8 a/c

Missions : Patrols in Wurzburg and Bamberg areas.

Claims & Losses: Nil

Day 16

Sorties : 1219 a/c

Missions : 42nd Bomb Wing - 383 sorties. Attacked Jaffe and Coubre.

12th T.A.C. - 655 sorties - Dive-bombed RR bridge at Crailsheim. Air cooperation to 7th U.S. Army. Armed reconnaissance in Nuremberg area.

1st French Air Force - Not available.

Western French Air Force - 181 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in western France (Le Grand Cote and Royan areas).

Claims : 4-0-1 Air; 14-1-10 Ground

Other Claims :	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T	127	59
HDV	60	26
AFV	19	10
Locos	6	17
Gun Positions	6	0
Rail Cars	30	118
Bridges	0	3
Rail Cuts	10	0
M/Y	0	3

Losses : 4 a/c

Second TAF

Night 15/16

Sorties : 71 a/c

Missions : Armed recon. in Emden-Westerland-Wismar-Soltau areas; attacked Pritzwalk M/Y.

Claims : Nil

Other Claims :

	Destroyed	Damaged
MT	10	20
Trains	0	3

Losses : Nil

Day 16

Sorties : 1333 a/c

Missions : Armed recon. E of Zuider Zee, Emden, Bremen, Hamburg, Luneburg areas.

Claims : 12-0-5 Air

Other Claims :

	Destroyed	Damaged
MT	212	400
AFV	1	4
Locos	8	55
RR Cars	75	264
RR Cuts	81	
HDV	7	36
Barges	3	12
Tugs	0	2

Losses : 8 a/c

RAF Fighter Command

Night 15/16

Sorties : 17 a/c

Missions : Offensive patrols over A/Fs in south central Germany.

Claims & Losses: Nil

Day 16

Sorties : 149 a/c

Missions : Escort to bombers of RAF Bomber Command.

Claims : 6-3-1 Air

Losses : Nil

2. Fifteenth Air Force

15 April 1945

252 B-17s, 606 B-24s, 146 P-38s sortied against tactical targets south of Bologna.

245 B-17s, 585 B-24s, escorted by 145 P-38s, dropped 1577 tons GP and RDX on primaries, visually with good results. Losses: 1 B-17.

109 B-17s, 55 B-24s, 82 P-51s sortied against Neversa RR Bridge.

105 B-17s, 41 B-24s, escorted by 81 P-51s dropped 360 tons on primary; 49.7 tons on secondary (Ponte Di Piave RR Bridge) visually, very good results on primary; poor on secondary. Losses: nil.

153 B-24s, 83 P-51s sortied against Casarsa RR Bridge.

110 B-24s, escorted by 80 P-51s, dropped 244 tons RDX on primary; 17 tons RDX on secondary (Ponte Di Piave RR Bridge) visually with fair results. Losses: 1 B-24.

58 B-24s, 30 P-51s sortied against Ghedi Ammo Factory and Stores.

56 B-24s, escorted by 30 P-51s, dropped 126 tons RDX on primary, visually, very good results. Losses: nil.

51 P-38s, 37 P-51s sortied against rail targets in area bounded by Innsbruck/Linz/Pilsen/Regensburg.

48 P-38s, 36 P-51s strafed and skip-bombed assigned areas dropping 7.5 tons. Claims: 2-0-0A, 2-0-0 G. Losses: 6 a/c (5 P-38s, 1 P-51).

Operational Highlights. MASAF units put forth the greatest all out effort and exceeded all records previously set in the history of the Air Force. The force attacking Nervesa, Casarsa and Ghedi were routed around west coast of Italy to avoid bad weather in North Adriatic and to allow favorable axis of attack in reference to flak defenses. The force attacking tactical targets in Bologna area were routed over water so that rack malfunctions and loose bombs falling out when bomb bays were opened would not endanger friendly troops. Simultaneous attacks were planned to divide flak defenses and complete bombing attack in time limits set by the army.

Bombers

Sorties: 1233 a/c (872 B-24s, 361 B-17s)
Eff. Sorties: 1142 a/c
Tonnage : 2373.7
Claims : Nil
Losses : 1 B-17, 1 B-24.

Fighters

429 a/c (197 P-38s, 232 P-51s)
420 a/c
7.5
2-0-0A, 3-0-0G
6 a/c (5 P-38s, 1 P-51)

Fifteenth Air Force - 16 April

252 B-17s, 538 B-24s and 103 P-51s sortied against tactical targets in Bologna area.

98 B-24s escorted by 102 P-51s dropped 216.1 tons on primary, visually with fair results. Having been briefed to bomb only under visual conditions 252 B-17s and 440 B-24s returned to base when complete cloud cover was encountered in the target areas. Losses: nil.

36 P-51s sortied, 35 P-51s swept and strafed south of line from Munich/Pilsen/Linz. Claims: 5-0-0 air, 2-0-0 ground. Losses: nil.

Bombers

Sorties: 790 a/c (252 B-17s, 538 B-24s)
 Eff. Sorties: 98 a/c
 Tonnage : 216.1
 Claims : Nil
 Losses : Nil

Fighters

139 P-51s
 137 a/c
 Nil
 5-0-0A, 2-0-0G
 Nil

3. RAF Bomber Command

Day 16

18 Lancasters
 1 Mosquito

Lutzow at Swinemunde

Losses

1
 0

2 Mosquitoes
 21 a/c

Weather Reconnaissance

0
 1 a/c

Night 16/17

222 Lancasters
 11 Mosquitoes

Tilsen M/Y

167 Lancasters
 9 Mosquitoes

Schwandorf M/Y

19 Halifaxes
 4 Mosquitoes

Gablingen A/F

64 Mosquitoes
 21 Mosquitoes

Berlin
 Munich

47 Mosquitoes
 37 Halifaxes

8 B-17s
 6 B-24s

Bomber Support

4 Halifaxes
 1 Mosquito

Signal Investigation Patrols

620 a/c

Losses not available

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

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