

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 5523

ATTACK ON KALTENKIRCHEN AIRFIELD on 7 APRIL 1945

INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 143, with full fighter escort
- (b) Command : U.S. 8th AIR FORCE
- (c) Time : 1322 - 1333 B hrs.
- (d) Bombs : 560 X 500 lb. G.P.
700 X 250 lb. G.P.
1638 X 150 lb. G.P.
442 X 100 lb. G.P.
140 X 500 lb. I.B.

2. DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

(a) Three heavy concentration of H.E. bursts are seen blanketing over half of the only runway and an approximate 8/10 of the landing area. Photographs ranging from clear to cloudy make a complete interpretation impossible. Of 12 aircraft visible at the time of the attack, nine are probably destroyed or damaged.

(b) Bursts are seen on the airfield and its facilities as follows; (Nomenclature used refers to annotations on target illustration).

Runway - 30 to 40 direct hits.

Landing area - 350 to 400 hits. Very probable hit on an aircraft parked in the Northwest corner of the field.

Station Buildings and stores - 2/3 of this area blanketed by at least 60 bursts, with hits and near hits to small units. Possibly hit by I.B.s.

South Dispersal - Hit by compact pattern of bursts with very probable hits on eight aircraft dispersed here. Part of the pattern extended into an open area to the Southeast.

Barracks and Stores - At least 30 bursts scattered throughout the Southwest area.

Probable storage area (Immediately West of Station buildings) - hit by concentration of I.B.s.

Southwest barracks area - An undetermined number of bursts are visible through clouds to the Northeast of the barracks.

(c) Other bursts

(i) At least 60 H.E. bursts in an open areas 1 1/2 miles to the Northwest

(ii) At least 20 HE bursts in an open area 1 mile to the Northwest.

(iii) Much smoke, probably caused by I.B.s, is visible through cloud in the area immediately Southwest of the airfield.

3. ACTIVITY

(i) The field is partially covered on cloud obscured photographs.

(ii) Twelve aircraft are visible as follows.

Type	N.W.Side	S.E.Side.	Remote S.E.dispersal
10 Medium	2	8	
2 small			2
12 Total			

4. ANNOTATED PRINTS:

No 1. (SAV 452/1190 - 7) Shows first wave of attack.

No.2. (SAV 96/1082 - 9) Shows concentration of bursts across runway and smoke from first phase of the attack.

5. BOMB PLOT:

A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed..

6. PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV 95/1726 - 1729	7 April 1945	1358 B hrs.	1/30,000 (F.L.7")	17,500	A-B
" 96/1078	"	1331 B hrs.	1/18,095 (F.L.12")	18,095	B
" 96/1090, 1082	"	1322 B hrs.	1/30,900 (F.L.7")	18,000	A-B
" 388/1161, 64, 65	"	1325 B hrs.	1/30,900 "	18,000	A-B
" 452/1186, 87, 90	"	1331 B hrs.	1/30,900 - "	18,000	B

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HEADQUARTERS
 13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
 APO 559

Date 7 April 1945
 13 CBW FO 91
 13 CBW OPS 313
 3 AD FO 634

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (BUCHEN AND KALTENKIRCHEN, GERMANY)

TO : *Colonel Shuck - 95*

1. Information Concerning the Targets: a. The 1st priority target (visual only) for 13A and B was the Oil Storage Area at Buchen, Germany.

b. The 1st priority target (visual only) for 13C was the A/F at Kaltenkirchen, Germany.

c. The 2nd priority target (visual or H2X) for all Groups was the Main Rail Station at Neumunster, Germany.

2. Planning and Execution:

a. Order:	Bomb Load:	Force:	Assigned Target:
(1) 45 A, B, C:			
(a) 388	8 x 500 GP 4 x M-17	36 A/C	Kaltenkirchen
(b) 452	20 x 250 GP	36 A/C	Kaltenkirchen
(c) 96	38 x 150 GP	36 A/C	Kaltenkirchen
(2) 13 C, A, B:			
(c) 95 A, B, C: D:	10 x 500 GP 38 x 100 GP	36 A/C	Kaltenkirchen
(a) 390	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C	Buchen
(b) 100	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C	Buchen
(3) 93 A, B, C, D:			
(a) 385	8 x 500 GP	36 A/C	Gustrow
(b) 493	4 x 1000 GP 4 x M-17	36 A/C	Gustrow
(c) 34	8 x 500 GP	36 A/C	Gustrow
(d) 490	4 x 1000 GP 4 x M-17	36 A/C	Gustrow
(4) 4 A, B, C, D:			
(a) 487	38 x 100 GP	36 A/C	Parchim
(b) 486	38 x 100 Frag	36 A/C	Parchim
(c) 447	38 x 150 GP	36 A/C	Parchim
(d) 94	8 x 500 GP	36 A/C	Parchim

b. Availability:

Airborne:

(1) 95:	Reg: 43 A/C 50 C/C Lead: 12 A/C 6 C/C	34 A/C 4 A/C
(2) 100:	Reg: 42 A/C 45 C/C Lead: 12 A/C 7 C/C	34 A/C 4 A/C
(3) 390:	Reg: 41 A/C 58 C/C Lead: 12 A/C 12 C/C	34 A/C 4 A/C

C O N F I D E N T I A L

c. Non-effective Sorties and Returning Spares:

(1) 95: A/C 2455: 336 Sqdn "Z" - Pilot Lt. Galbraith - Feathered #1 engine - Oil leak - No sortie.

d. Lead A/C Failures and/or Malfunctions:

(1) 950: H2K equipment failure. Maintenance report short circuit in cable linking remote scope with indicator unit, this caused no return in scope.

(2) 390A: API erratic.

e. A/C Outstanding:

(1) 100: A/C 334: 349 Sqdn "B" - Pilot Lt. Howard - Lost to enemy A/C. A/C 071: 418 Sqdn "P" - Pilot Lt. Calder - Lost to enemy A/C.

(2) 390: A/C 225: 570 Sqdn "L" - Pilot Lt. Ketter - Attacked by enemy A/C - 8 chutes seen.

f. A/C Landing Away From Base: None.

3. Navigation:

Position	Flight Plan	AL: N:	13A (390) Maj. McHenry Lt. Yary	13B (100) Maj. Gibbons Lt. Graham	13C (95) Capt. Jenkins Lt. Flygstad
BU 11	8000°		8500° 2 min. early on course	8000° 1 min. late on course	8000° on time on course
CP 1	8000°		8500° 1 min. late 13 mi. left	8000° on time 2 mi. left	8000° 1 min. late 4 mi. left
CP 2	12000°		13500° 1 min. early on course	12000° 1 min. early 1 mi. left	13500° 2 min. early on course
CP 3	15000°		15600° on time 2 mi. left	15000° 2 min. late on course	17000° on time 1 mi. right
IP	13A,B-15000° 13C-18000°		15600° 1 min. early 2 mi. left	15000° 3 min. late 3 mi. left	18000° 3 min. late on course
TGT	13A,B-15000° 13C-18000°		15600° (2nd P)	15000° (1st P)	18000° (1st P)
RP	13A,B-15000° 13C-18000°		None used	15500° 2 min. late 3 mi. left	19000° 4 min. late 3 mi. left
CP 4	12000°		12000° 6 min. late 1 mi. right	19000° 2 min. late 2 mi. right	15500° 1 min. late on course
ENG COAST	Minimum		1500° 1 min. early on course	2500° 20 min. early on course	3000° 18 min. early on course

a. Assembly: 13A assembled over Buncher 11, 13B over Buncher 28, and 13C over Buncher 23. Assembly altitude was 8000°. 13C, which was flying as the last Group of 45 Wing, was to be the first Group in Wing assembly. On the approach to Felixstowe 13A was 2 minutes early and cut off 13C forcing 13C behind them. 13A then made a wide turn North of Southwold to allow 13C to obtain its proper position in the bomber stream.

b. Route: The briefed route was flown essentially as briefed by 13A, B, C to their respective IPs. 13A and B started their runs on the 1st priority target in Group formation, because of enemy fighters in the area. 13A was unable to release on the 1st priority target, because of a cloud over the MPI, and went on to attack the 2nd priority

C O N F I D E N T I A L

target. However, 13B was able to attack its 1st priority target. 13C attacked its 1st priority target and reassembled at the RP. After bombs away 13A made a 360 degree turn in order to gain altitude for the Kiel Canal Flak Corridor which was to be crossed at 21000'. Consequently, 13A was behind 13B on the return route. The route was flown essentially as briefed to the English Coast.

c. Weather: Over the bases at take-off there were 10/10 stratus clouds with bases at 1200'. Visibility was 2-3000 yards. Enroute to the target there were 10/10 strato-cumulus clouds below 5000', breaking at 0600E and becoming 3-4/10 East of 0800E. There were also 3-5/10 cirrus above 25000' East of 0800E. In the target area there were 3-4/10 strato-cumulus below 6000' and 3-5/10 cirrus above 25000'. Downward visibility was 20-30 miles. Enroute to the bases there were 3-4/10 strato-cumulus below 6000' becoming 10/10 over North Sea and East Anglia. Over the bases on return there were 10/10 strato-cumulus with bases at 800-1200'. Visibility was 2-3 miles. Average winds enroute were 060/21K and 060/25K in the target area.

4. Bombing:

a.	Attacking:	Jettisoning:	Returning:
95	1st P 37 A/C 280 x 500 GP 308 x 100 GP 34 x 150 GP	1 A/C 10 x 500 GP	
100	1st P 36 A/C 216 x 1000 GP		
	2 A/C (each carrying 6 x 1000 GP) were lost to enemy A/C prior to the IP.		
390	2nd P 36 A/C 216 x 1000 GP	1 A/C 6 x 1000 GP	
	1 A/C (carrying 10 leaflet containers) was lost to enemy A/C prior to the IP.		

b. 13A (390)

Squadrons:	A (#798)	B (#127)	C (#784)	D (#749)
Target:	2nd P	2nd P	2nd P	2nd P
A.P.O.	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned
A/C Releasing:	9	8	9	10
Bomb Load:	6 x 1000 GP	6 x 1000 GP	6 x 1000 GP	6 x 1000 GP
Method of Release:	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo
Altitude: True:	15800°	15800°	15860°	15590°
Ind:	15600°	15600°	15660°	15500°
True Heading:	340	334	333	333
Drift:	8 L			
Trail Change:	None			
Ground Speed:	192			
Tan. D.A.	.54			
Time of Release:	1340½	1340½	1340½	1340½
C-1	Yes			
Pattern: Length:	2650°			
Width:	1350°			
Errors: Range:	1350°B		Bombing was	
Def:	0		accomplished in	
Radial:	1350°		Group formation	
Percent: 1000°	10			
2000°	99			
Crew:	AL:	Lt.	Capt.	Maj.
	McHenry	Juren	Watts	Black
	Capt.	Lt.	Lt.	Lt.
	Morris	Geelsby	Presswood	Goodwin
	Lt.	Sgt.	Sgt.	Sgt.
	Howell	Miller	Keller	Strickland
	Lt.	Lt.	Lt.	Lt.
	Yary	Fredrick	Sommer	Kent
	Capt.			
	McInerney			
(No. of Leads)	Capt. (18)	Lt. (5)	Lt. (13)	Lt. (3)
	B: Phalen	Flerman	Buck	Johnson
	Lt. (24)	Lt. (6)	Lt. (15)	Lt. (6)
(Missions) RN:	Flanagan	Sternberg	Mattson	Cude

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 390A,B,C,D: The decision was made to bomb in Group formation because of enemy A/C in the target area.

Because of weather at the 1st priority target, an attack on the 2nd priority target was initiated on a true heading of 325 degrees. The R/N proceeded to set up course, however, 14 miles from the BRL, the bombardier was able to pick up the target visually. A normal sighting operation was completed. At bombs away, course was good but rate was fast. 390B,C,D bombardiers did not sight for rate.

PI: The bombs from all Squadrons fell in a compact pattern 1350° short of the assigned MPI in a fully built-up residential and factory area. There were about 8 direct hits on the railroad tracks 1500° S of the passenger station. A large unidentified factory building near the station received a heavy concentration of bombs. The second rail over road bridge S of the station may have received direct hits.

H2X scope photo plots indicate bombfall
3600° SE of MPI.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 225 (carrying 10 leaflet containers) was lost to enemy A/C prior to the IP.

A/C 9023 jettisoned 6 x 1000 GP at 5337-1040 at 1327 hours because a swinging nose gun hit the toggler causing an accidental release.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

e. 13B (100)

Squadrons:	A (#794)	B (#696)	C (#719)	D (#849)
Target:	1st P	1st P	1st P	1st P
A.P.	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned
A/C Releasing:	9	9	9	9
Bomb Load:	6x1000 GP	6x1000 GP	6x1000 GP	6x1000 GP
Method of Release:	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo
Altitude: True:	15220°	15400°	14810°	15150°
Ind:	15000°	15200°	14600°	14950°
True Heading: (008)	010	015	010	021
Drift:	0			
Trail Change:	None			
Ground Speed:	160			
Tan. D.A.	.515			
Time of Release:	1327	1327	1327	1327
C-1	Yes			
Pattern: Length:				
Width:				
Errors: Range:		1 1/2 mi. S		
Def:		1 mi. R		
Radial:	1 1/2 miles	1 3/4 miles	1 1/2 miles	1 3/4 miles
Percent: 1000°				
2000°				
Crew:	AL: Maj. Gibbons	Capt. Willison		
	P: Capt. Hutchinson	Lt. Ellis	Lt. Hellerich	Lt. Wieland
	S/Sgt. Kasper	S/Sgt. Kendig	Sgt. Platzner	S/Sgt. Appleby
	TG: Lt. Graham	Lt. Romanowski	Lt. Duncan	Lt. Pranger
	N: Lt. Cretty			
(No. of Leads)	B: Lt. Zenske (10)	Lt. Snyder (12)	Lt. Shiurby (3)	Lt. Tolliver (6)
	Lt. Cordier (13)	Lt. Turner (22)	P/O Clinton (6)	Lt. Decker (15)
(Missions) RN:	Cordier	Turner	Clinton	Decker

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 100A,B,C,D: Because of the presence of enemy A/C in the target area, the decision was made to bomb in Group formation.

After the maneuver at the IP, the attack was initiated on a true heading of 014 degrees. Because 8/10 undercast conditions prevented the bombardier from picking up the target, he proceeded on the run by pin-point pilotage. Synchronization for rate and course was accomplished on check points short of the target area on the approach to the BRL. Because a cloud covered the MPI, the bombardier positioned the cross hairs on the cloud, using check points outside the target and released the bombs. The R/N assisted with course and the bombardier also used the Grid method of bombing on the run. Bombardiers in 100B,C,D did not sight for rate. To obtain close Group formation on the bomb run, 100D flew 1000' above the briefed altitude.

PI: No bursts from any bombs dropped are visible. According to computations based on bomb trajectory tables, the bombs probably fell in the approximate positions:

100A: It is impossible to employ the bomb trajectory tables to determine the bombfall of this Squadron, since the first pictures are cloud obscured. According to the position of the smoke bombs in the last picture taken, the pattern would probably fall $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles short in fields and on the railroad tracks running SE from the target.

100B: $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles short and 1 mile right in fields, a river, and on railroad tracks running SE from the target.

100C: $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles short in fields and woods.

100D: $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles short in fields and woods.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 334 and A/C 071 (each carrying 6 x 1000 GP) were lost to enemy A/C prior to the IP.

d. 13C (95)

Squadrons:	A (#8548)	B (#8210)	C (#8040)	D (#8667)
Target:	1st P	1st P	1st P	1st P
A.P.	Assigned	Selected	Assigned	Assigned
A/C Releasing:	9	11	8	9
Bomb Load:	10x500 GP	10x500 GP	10x500 GP	38x100 GP
Method of Release:	100°	100°	100°	100°
Altitude: True:	18000°	18480°	17520°	17060°
Ind:	18000°	18500°	17500°	17000°
True Heading: (304)	303	306	290	285
Drift:	8 L	10 L	4½ L	5 L
Trail Change:	None	None	None	None
Ground Speed:	210	222	210	210
Tan. D.A.	.55	.57	.54	.549
Time of Release:	1337	1337	1338	1340
C-1	Yes		Yes	Yes
Pattern: Length:		1425°		
Width:		800°		
Errors: Range:		No		
Def:		Sighting		
Radial:				
Percent: 1000°		40		
2000°		60		
Crew: AL:	Capt. Jenkins	Lt. Wright		Maj. Weaver
P:	Lt. Thompson	Lt. Parrish	Lt. Oehert	Lt. Newman
TG:	Lt. Balzer	S/Sgt. Danet	S/Sgt. Manbelberg	S/Sgt. Lee
N:	Lt. Flygstad	Lt. Manzler	Lt. Cresham	Lt. Boges
AN:	Maj. Magness			
(No. of Leads) B:	Lt. (16) Hathaway	Lt. (6) Watt	Lt. (4) Schetky	F/O (4) Messenger
(Missions) RN:	Lt. (22) Decherniss	Lt. (22) Baldie	Lt. (7) Heald	Lt. (24) Shuster

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 95A,B: Because of the presence of enemy A/C in the target area, the decision was made to bomb in two formations; 95B with 95A, and 95D with 95C.

After the maneuver at the IP, the bombardier took over and initiated the attack on a true heading of 306 degrees. The bombardier proceeded with pin-point pilotage as 4-5/10 clouds prevented picking up the target immediately after the turn on the IP. 16 miles from the BRL, the bombardier picked up the target and completed a normal sighting operation. Synchronization at bombs away was very good. The bombardier in 95B sighted far rate to the right of the assigned AP because the Squadron echeloned right of 95A. Rate appeared to be good at the BRL.

PI: Clouds over the A/D prevent precise interpretation. No bursts of 95A are visible, but the bombs probably fell short of and on the SW portion of the runway. The bombs from 95B fell short of the runway in woods by the barracks area and on the L/F adjacent to the runway. The MPI of the pattern was 1125° short of the assigned MPI.

95C: Bomb bay doors were opened 2 minutes prior to the IP. After the turn at the IP, the bombardier took over and began the attack on a true heading of 303 degrees. The bombardier proceeded to do pin-point pilotage and 15 miles from the BRL, he identified the target and completed a normal sighting operation. Synchronization appeared to be good at bombs away.

PI: Clouds and smoke over the target prevent precise interpretation. About 15 bombs of 95C are visible, and these fell 6600° left of the assigned MPI in fields.

95D: The interval taken by 95D was sufficient to allow the bombardier to kill course as well as rate on the bomb run. After the turn at the IP, the bombardier proceeded to set up course on an initial true heading of 304 degrees. 14 miles from the BRL, the bombardier identified the target and completed a normal sighting operation. Synchronization appeared good at bombs away.

PI: No bursts of any bombs dropped by 95D are visible, but according to the position of the smoke bombs in late pictures of camera sorties, and computations based on bomb trajectory tables, the bombs probably fell in fields 1 mile left of the assigned MPI.

H2X scope photo plots indicate bombfall 2500° South of the MPI.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 2455 had a mission failure and jettisoned 10 x 500 GP in the channel on orders from the tower (#1 engine was feathered).

C O N F I D E N T I A L

5. Communications: a. VHF: (1) Channel A (790) was good and clear for communications between Group and Squadron Leaders. 13A and 13B had exceptional communications with each other most of the time. The heaviest traffic resulted during the period of enemy fighter attacks. 13C, who flew with the 45th Wing, had very excellent communications with the Wing. Each Squadron Leader and Deputy Leader carried the 45th Wing's Channel A crystal.

(2) Kodak Red called Fireball Leader on Channel B (809) and gave a very accurate target weather report. Other Wing Leaders were contacted satisfactorily and communication with "Arrowswift" was good.

(3) The fighter support was contacted just prior to the IP and communications with them were satisfactory. 13A reported that the fighters were engaged for a time during the bomb run and during this interval calls for aid went unanswered. 13B experienced the same difficulty while 13C reported continuous direct contact during attacks.

(4) No distress transmissions were made.

b. W/T: (1) The 3rd AD operational frequency was jammed from 1120 to 1230 making transmission during this period very difficult. The Wing HF/DF ground station had the usual voice interference. 13A and 13B bombed in Group formation.

(2)	13A	CP1	CP2	CP3	TGT	CP4
	Flight Plan	1039	1130	1214	1325	1416
	ATA	1040	1129	1237	1340	1422
	TOD	1051	1134	1241	1347	1430

	13C	CP1	CP2	CP3	TGT	CP4
	Flight Plan	1036	1127	1211	1334	1413
	ATA	1038	1126	1211	1337	1420
	TOD	1042	1132	1217	1358	1428

(3)	13A	S A 3	1340	1347	95B	P A 2	1337	1346
	13B	P B 5	1327	1514	95C	P A 1	1338	1402
	13C	P A 1	1337	1358	95D	P A 2	1340	1408

6. Photography: a. 95 installed 6 oblique, 3 scope, and 8 vertical cameras, 6, 2, and 8 of which took pictures. PFF A/C 040, #1 95C; H2X equipment inoperative. 2 sets of H2X scope photos received, one of which is plottable and one not plottable because of the too high brilliance on remote scope.

b. 100 installed 1 oblique and 8 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures. All H2X camera A/C were grounded.




c. 390 installed 2 oblique, 1 scope, and 9 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures. H2X photos received and all are plottable.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

Ernest A. Kiessling

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis.

9: A and B ...
 KAMENKRUHIN A ...
 ...
 ...



BOMB TRAJECTORY TABLES WERE USED TO DETERMINE THE POSITION OF THE BOMB FALLS FOR ... AND ... WAS CALCULATED FROM THE POSITION OF THE SMOKE BOMBS IN LATE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE CAMERA SORTIES. THE SAME PROCEDURE WAS USED TO DETERMINE THE APPROXIMATE POSITION ...

6 Sea. (New York)
ca. amb. of

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

nm

8 April 1945

SUBJECT: Supplements to Tactical Reports (KIEL, GERMANY - 3 April 1945)
(KIEL, GERMANY - 4 April 1945)
(NURNBERG, GERMANY - 5 April 1945)
(LEIPZIG, GERMANY - 6 April 1945)
(BUCHEN AND KALTENKIRCHEN,
GERMANY, 7 April 1945)

TO

Colonel Shuck. 95

1. KIEL, GERMANY (3 April 1945)

a. Corrections: (1) Paragraph 4, b, (1), page 5: In addition - The H2X bomb circle error in A/C 784 was caused by a malfunction of the step delay mechanism which affected the calibration of the bomb circle. The R/N might have corrected the error by (1) checking the calibration prior to the bomb run, (2) making the proper adjustment on the range unit box.

(2) Paragraph 6, a, page 10: Last sentence, change to read - 2 sets of H2X scope photos were received, 1 of which is plottable; remaining set is not plottable because brilliance was too low. The R/N might have tuned up the remote scope brilliance.

(3) Paragraph 6, b, page 10: In addition - A/C 8313, #4 A/C 100B, with K-21 camera installed: camera well doors were closed by the crew prior to take off and were not opened again for the bomb run.

b. Report on H2X Failures:

(1) 100B: The cause for weak returns in A/C 794, which was not usable for bombing, was a defective 715 (amplifier) tube. The tube was replaced.

(2) 390B: This malfunction might have been remedied by the R/N by checking the calibration prior to the bomb run, and making the proper adjustments on the range unit box.

(3) 95D: Malfunction of MK 23 pressure pump in A/C 8179 caused poor definition and range. The pump has been replaced.

2. KIEL, GERMANY (4 April 1945)

a. Corrections: (1) Paragraph 2, d, (1), page 2: In addition - 100B: A/C 696, rack malfunction and bombs had to be salvaged. 100C: A/C 705, rack malfunction of the left bomb bay. Bombs had to be salvaged.

(2) Paragraph 4, c, (1), page 7: Change to read - 100B - The R/N picked up the target at 45 miles and proceeded to set up course on a true heading of 095 degrees. The bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles and subsequent rate checks of 9, 8, 7, 6, and 5 miles were made. 10 seconds prior to the BRL, the bombardier realized that the bombs would not hit the assigned AP on the 2nd priority target on this approach. Therefore, the bombardier changed his AP to the railway tracks running N and SW from the city of Kiel. This AP was short and right of the 2nd priority target. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily, but over the North Sea range and definition was weak.

b. Report of H2X Failures:

(1) 100A: Ground checks of A/C 183 revealed that there was H2X voltage difficulty caused by poor adjustment of inverter. The adjustment can be made in the air.

C C N F I D E N T I A L

(2) 100B: Ground checks of A/C 696 indicate defective pre-amplifier tube in the H2X set. This tube was replaced. This can only be accomplished on the ground.

(3) 100C: Ground checks of A/C 705 H2X set indicate poor adjustment of sweep on the 50 to 100 mile scan. The R/N might have made this adjustment in the air.

(4) 390B: Ground checks of A/C 837 revealed the 24 to 1 divider tube out. This caused the range unit to be inoperative in the air. The tube was replaced. This could only be accomplished on the ground.

(5) 390D: Ground checks and an altitude flight of A/C 750 revealed electrical trouble in A/C's entire system. This may have accounted for the H2X failure.

3. NURNBERG, GERMANY (5 April 1945)

a. Corrections: (1) Paragraph 2, c, (1), page 2: Non-effective Sorties - In addition - A/C 8229, Pilot Lt. Banks failed to assemble with 13 CBW and flew with 96 Group. This Group failed to release its bombs on the target. A/C 8229 jettisoned the entire bomb load in the channel because it was low on fuel.

(2) Paragraph 3, b, page 3: In addition - On the let down through the clouds, 100D leader turned to the right to avoid possible collision with other A/C. The navigator used a wind that he had obtained at altitude for D.R., which was inaccurate. When 100D broke out of the clouds, it was over Schammen Islands and although the navigator pin pointed himself at this point, it was too late to turn away.

(3) Paragraph 4, b, (1), page 5: Narrative 100D: Add the following PI report: A/C 1530, #2 lead element, released late, and bombs fell 6000' over on the railroad tracks leading NE from the target.

(4) Paragraph 4, b, (2), page 5: 100C: Photos indicate 1 A/C released late. This A/C was not reported in the report from the Group.

(5) Paragraph 4, d, (1), page 9: The following PI report should be included and the others deleted: Photographs taken by 95C and D show that these Squadrons bombed almost simultaneously. The visible pattern, which probably belongs to both 95C and D, was 3000' right of the 2nd priority target. An unidentified factory area was hit. There was a concentration of bursts on all of the 8 to 10 buildings. An explosion and subsequent large fire occurred. Photos taken by 95A and B show that these two Squadrons bombed almost simultaneously and after 95C and D. The bombs fell left of, short of, and on C's and D's pattern in a fully built-up area adjacent to the assigned 2nd priority target. It is impossible to distinguish A's pattern from B's.

b. Report of H2X Failures:

(1) 95A: Ground checks of A/C 8210 indicate T.R. tube out. This can only be repaired on the ground.

(2) 390B: Ground Checks of A/C 571 revealed that the A-29 tube (pulse forming mechanism) was out. This can only be remedied on the ground. The R/N, however, might have helped the set by adjusting the local oscillator for higher crystal current.

4. LEIPZIG, GERMANY (April 6 1945)

a. Corrections: (1) Paragraph 2, b, (1), page 1: Correct to read - A/C Airborne - 31 Regular, 5 Lead.

(2) Paragraph 2, b, (1), page 1: In addition: 5 regular A/C and 1 lead A/C were scheduled as spares (2 of these regular A/C were to

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(3) Paragraph 2, b, (3), page 1: In addition: A spare A/C was available but it was not airborne.

5. BUCHEN AND KALTENKIRCHEN, GERMANY (April 7 1945)

a. Corrections: (1) Paragraph 4, b, page 4: Correct to read: Bombing Pattern: Length: 1350', Width: 2650'.

b. To be included: Paragraph 7: Enemy Aircraft Opposition: Approximately 15 to 20 E/A made individual attacks of opportunity against bombers of 13A and B. P-51 fighter escort intercepted E/A and broke up their formation before they could make mass attacks. ME-109s, FW-190s, and ME262s were reported in the area East of Hamburg and intercepted the bombers before the target.

(1) 13A: Approximately 10 ME-262s approached this Group from the 3 o'clock position. P-51 escort intercepted the E/A and dispersed their formation. Only 1 ME-262 was aggressive enough to break through fighter screen and attack the bombers from 6 o'clock high. Gunners were alert and began firing at maximum range. E/A made a fly through attack on the high element of the lead Squadron, and continued the attack passing through the formation. E/A broke down into cloud cover. 1 B-17 was lost to the attack. Gunners claim this ME-262 destroyed.

(2) 13B: Attacks on this Group began at 1253 hours at 5234-0950, just after the IP. Attacks were made by 10 to 15 E/A. The attacking A/C were mostly ME-109s, but a few FW-190s and ME-262s were sighted. There was no definite pattern to the attacks made by the E/A. The attacks varied and came from all the clock positions except the 12 o'clock position. Both pursuit and fly through attacks were employed against the bombers. The first attack was made by 1 ME-262 from 2 o'clock high. This was a strafing attack on the high Squadron. The E/A continued down through the formation and into cloud cover. Gunners opened fire at maximum range and destroyed this A/C. 4 pursuit curve attacks beginning at 9 o'clock, continuing to 6 o'clock and followed by a break-away to 3 o'clock were made. ME-109s and FW-190s pressed this attack to within 100 yards of the bombers and came in in-trail. After breaking away, they re-newed their attack from the 3 o'clock position. Several attacks from the 6 o'clock position followed and the E/A broke away down into the clouds. 1 ME-262 was observed to pass back and forth across the bomber formation. This E/A was a decoy and did not attack the bombers. All attacking E/A made excellent use of cloud cover which was approximately 1500' below the bomber formations. 1 ME-109 began an attack from 7 o'clock level. Gunners began firing at 800 yards, and tracked him all the way in. This E/A collided with the #5 A/C in the high Squadron.

(3) 13C: E/A were sighted but no attacks were made on this Group.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

Ernest A. Kiessling

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis.

THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) C-B-1
OFFICE OF THE OPERATIONS OFFICER
APO 559

7 April 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion of Aircraft No. 2455.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.
(attention operations officer)

1. I took off in Aircraft No. 2455 on mission of 7 April 1945.

2. Climbed S.O.P. with power setting of 2250 RPM and 36 inches. We broke out of the clouds and continued our climb. The engineer called my attention to oil leaking out of number 1 engine just off of the cowling. We kept close watch of it from then until we thought it advisable to feather it. Intended to continue our climb until the leak got worse since oil started to flow from all around the cowling. Decided we could not continue to the target with the engine and took into consideration the fact the field weather was bad and thought it was best to feather it before the oil got too low. We dropped our bombs 40 miles east of Southwold as instructed by the tower. We returned to the base and landed at 1115 hours.

James E. Galbraith
JAMES E. GALBRAITH
2nd Lt. A. C.
Pilot

1st. Ind.

336th Bomb Sqdn., 95th Bomb Gp. (H), APO 559, U.S. Army, 7 April 1945.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.
(attention operations officer)

1. I consider the action taken justifiable.

2. For your information.

Harold E. Jeneman
HAROLD E. JENEMAN
Capt. A. C.
Operations Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Intelligence Officer

7 April 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the mission to Kaltenkirchen, Germany for the above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - The 95th Group flew as 13C Combat Group to attack the Kaltenkirchen A/D. The first priority target was bombed visually by all squadrons. Due to the possibility of E/A attacking, 95A and 95B bombed together with 95A sighting for both rate and course and 95B sighting for rate only. However 95C and 95D made separate runs. Capt. Jenkins was Group leader.

95A - Eight A/C plus one PFF took off and formed the lead squadron. All A/C bombed the first priority target.


95B - Ten A/C plus one PFF took off and formed the high squadron. All A/C bombed the first priority target.

95C - Eight A/C plus one PFF took off and formed the low squadron. Seven A/C plus the PFF bombed the first priority target. One spare A/C #2455 turned back over field because of mechanical difficulties and jettisoned bombs in channel.

95D - Eight A/C plus one PFF took off and formed the low-low squadron. All A/C bombed the first priority target.

2. For further information reference is suggested for the Operational Narrative teletype of the Intelligence Section.

For the Intelligence Officer


FRANCIS X. PIERCE,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

15 COMBAT WING
890TH BOMB GP.
100TH BOMB GP.

XXXX

XXXX

7-4-45

S-2

OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE HOLTENHIRCHEN, GERMANY 7 APRIL 1945

1. LEAFLETS - NONE

2. BOMBING RESULTS -

A & B SQUADRONS - PRIMARY VISUAL - PRINTS SHOW BOMBS BEGINNING TO BURST JUST SHORT OF KPI BUT CLOUDS COVER MOST OF PATTERN - GOOD RESULTS

C SQUADRON - PRIMARY VISUAL - PHOTOS CLOUD COVERED - BOMBARDIERS ESTIMATE VERY GOOD RESULTS.

D SQUADRON - PRIMARY VISUAL - PHOTO CLOUD COVERED - BOMBARDIER ESTIMATE VERY GOOD RESULTS.

3. E/A - AN AVERAGE OF 5 - 7 ME 262, 4-5 FW190 AND 3-4 ME 109 WERE OBSERVED FROM 1236 TO 1535 HOURS FROM 5221-0830E TO 5338-1040E. THERE WAS A RUNNING BATTLE DURING THIS TIME. ESCORT P51'S DID A GOOD JOB IN KEEPING THE FIGHTERS AWAY FROM THE BOMBERS. AT 1300HRS NEAR 0958-5255W AN ME262 PULLED ALONGSIDE THE FORMATION AND FLEW PARALLEL WITH LOW FLIGHT OF A SQUADRON FOR A SHORT TIME AND THEN PULLED AHEAD AND DOVE DOWN INTO CLOUDS. E/A WAS APPARENTLY TRYING TO EVAD ATTACK BY P-51'S. AT 1310HRS NEAR 5258-1030E ONE ME 262 PASSED IN FRONT OF FORMATION FROM RIGHT TO LEFT. YELLOW MARKINGS WERE NOTICED ON VERTICAL STABILIZER. ME109'S WERE OBSERVED IN MIXED PAIRS; THE ME 262'S WERE TOOLING AROUND SINGLY.

4. FLAK:

A. DAMAGE: FINAL

95A & B - NONE

95C - 1AC 2A RP TO BASE

95D - 1A " " "

B. OPERATIONS:

1. NONE 2. NONE 3. NONE

C. AMOUNT, ACCURACY

1. NONE

2. NONE

3. 5238-0914 MEMORIE, INACCURATE, TRACKING (ENCOUNTERED)

5249-0958 " " " "

5240-1028 " " " "

5308-1038 " " " "

5517-1039 " " " "

4. 5407-0920 MEMORIE, ACCURATE, TRACKING (ENCOUNTERED)

5. NONE

D. PHENOMENA; NONE

5. WEATHER - 3/10 CLOUDS BELOW 6,000'

6. OBSERVATIONS-

1150HRS - 5235-0650 5 VESSELS ANCHORED

1150 " - 5250-0600 A/D INK WITH S/E A/C TAKING OFF.

1220 " - MUNSTER AREA 3 CHUTES - 2 FROM E/A, ONE FROM P-51

1235 " - 5228-0855 SAW CHUTE AT 13,000'

1302 " - 5256-1015 ONE CHUTE TO LEFT AT 18,000'. DIDN'T SEE WHERE IT CAME FROM.

1305HRS - 5254-1012 OVER 25 A/C ON A/D. Silver with A COUPLE OF DARK A/C ON RUNWAY.

1309HRS - 5258-1033 PILOT BAILED OUT OF UNIDENTIFIED FIGHTER.

1310HRS - 5258-1033 M/Y HALF FULL.

1316HRS - 5315-1028 12 JET A/C ON FIELD

1318HRS - 5315-1024 M/Y HALF FULL

1318HRS - 5315-1025 EFFECTIVE SMOKE SCREEN.

1347 HRS - 8354-0910 SMOKE SCREEN

1345 HRS - 8354-0908 2 A/C LATTER THEN 2/3 SEEN ON GRASS CLEARING. NO RUNWAYS SEEN.
WINGS OF A/C LOOKED LIKE B-111.

1305 HRS - 8300-1040 REPORTS OF HEARING FIRE COMING FROM E/A, BUT WERE UNABLE TO
SEE THE A/C. FIRING WAS ABOUT 3,000' OFF.

7. OTHER INFORMATION - FIGHTER SUPPORT WAS SUPERB, PROBABLY THE BEST EVER ENJOYED
BY THIS GROUP. DUE TO POSSIBILITY OF E/A ATTACKS 95A AND 95B BOMBED TOGETHER. 95C
AND 95D HOWEVER BOMBED SEPARATELY. THERE WERE NO SIZEABLE DEPARTURES FROM BRIEFED
COURSE AND THE MISSION WAS FLOWN PRIMARILY AS PLANNED.

mac

AK
CMB

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

SECRET
By authority of
C.G., 8th Air Force
Initials
Date 7 April 1945

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 342

PERIOD: 0001 hours 7 April to 2400 hours 7 April 1945

A. STATISTICS

	Total Sorties	Effective Sorties	Tonnage	Claims	Losses			Totals	NYR
					E/A	AA	OT		
Heavy Bomber Atks.	1311	1257	3451.7	40-18-17A	15	2	3	20	2
Fighter Escort (a)	844	778	0	64-1-11 A	0	0	3	3	3
Fighter Sweeps	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	37	34	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	41	41	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	15	15	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>25</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Totals	2273	2149	3451.7	104-19-28(b)	15	2	6	23	6

(a) Includes 352 and 361 Groups based on continent.

(b) Includes 9-3-8 t/e jets air.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

1311 a/c (971 B-17s, 340 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied in three forces against five A/Fs, two munition plants, two oil storage depots and an ordnance depot in central and northern Germany. 10 assigned primaries. 1257 a/c dropped 3451.7 tons total (3213.7 tons GP, 238.0 tons IB) on nine primary targets, four secondary targets, one third priority target and two T/Os. Bombing visual, except one secondary H2X with visual assists. E/A Opposition: 1st Division had one attack near Wesendorf A/F, 2nd and 3rd Divisions encountered

S E C R E T

60-75 Me-109s, FW-190s and 25-35 Me-262s making very aggressive attacks from IP through targets. Claims: 36-16-15 s/e, 4-2-2 t/e jet, air. Losses: 20 a/c (13 B-17s, 2 B-24s to E/A, 2 B-17s to AA, 2 B-17s, 1 B-24 to unknown causes). NYR: 2 a/c (1 B-24, 1 B-17).

First Force

Fourteen group formations (529 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against Kaltenkirchen A/F, Parchim A/F, Buchen Oil Storage, Gustrow Ordnance Depot. 503 a/c dropped 1239.1 tons GP, 204.0 tons IB on all primaries, two secondaries and a third priority target at 1325-1441 hours from 14,000-18,500 feet. All bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Gustrow and Schwerin. Weather: 3/10-6/10 cloud over targets. Flak: Neumunster-meager, inaccurate, nil at other targets. Battle Damage: 83 minor, 34 major, mostly due to e/a. E/A Opposition: 45-50 Me-109s, FW-190s and 13-15 Me-262s made aggressive attacks from Steinhuder Lake through targets. Claims: 26-10-10 s/e air. Losses: 14 a/c (13 to E/A, 1 to unknown causes). NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Six groups including 352nd Group based on continent (338 P-51s) sortied. Up 1011-1103 hours, down 1520-1620 hours. 317 effective. E/A Opposition: 40-50 Me-109s and FW-190s with 7 Me-262s engaged in running fight in Steinhuder Lake, Hamburg, Nienburg, Salzwedel areas. Claims: 33-0-3 s/e, 1-1-5 t/e jets, air. Losses: 3 a/c (1 to unknown reasons, 1 to mechanical failure, 1 to faulty recognition). NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Kaltenkirchen A/F	153	143	375.5	35.0	Good
Buchen Oil Storage	76	36	108.0		Unknown
Gustrow Ord. Depot	108	104	198.0	102.0	"
Parchim A/F	192	134	323.7	67.0	"
Neumunster M/Y (Sec.)		37	111.0		Fair
Schwerin M/Y (Sec.)		48	117.9		Fair
Salzwedel A/F (3rd Priority)		1	5.0		Unknown
Totals	529	503	1239.1	204.0	

S E C R E T

Second Force

Thirty-four squadron formations (340 B-24s - 2nd Air Division) sortied against Duneberg and Krummel ammunition plants near Hamburg. 322 a/c dropped 872.8 tons GP on two assigned primaries and a second priority target (Neumunster M/Y) at 1256-1322 hours from 17,000-21,500 feet. All bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Krummel and Duneberg. Weather: 2/10-4/10 cloud over targets; 6/10 en route. Flak: nil at primary targets; meager, inaccurate enroute. Battle Damage: 38 minor, 6 major - mostly due to e/a. E/A Opposition: 10-20 Me-262s, 15-25 Me-109s and FW-190s encountered from IP through targets. Claims: 10-6-5 s/e, 4-2-1 jets, air. Losses: 3 a/c (2 to e/a, 1 to unknown causes). NYR: 1 a/c, believed safe.

Fighter Support: Five groups (229 P-51s, 55 P-47s - 284 a/c) sortied. Up 1000-1020 hours, down 1458-1550 hours. 252 effective. E/A Opposition: one t/e jet, twin-fins and rudders, believed He-280, seen in target area; one AR-234 seen attempting to attack bombers at target; 12 Me-262s engaged 20 miles west of Soltau; 7-8 Me-262s attacked from Nienburg to Hamburg; 15 Me-109s, 4 FW-190s engaged vicinity of Lüneburg; 20 plus Me-109s encountered south of Bremen; 10 Me-109s and FW-190s engaged in Ulzen Salzwedel areas; 10 Me-109s bounced west of Fassburg. Claims: 26-0-2 s/e, 4-0-5 jets, air. Losses: nil. (1 Cat. "E" - crashed on take-off, pilot O.K.). NYR: 3 P-51s, believed safe on continent.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Krummel Explosive Plant	148	128	350.0	Very Good
Duneberg Explosive Plant	192	168	452.8	Very Good
Neumunster M/Y (Sec.)	—	26	70.0	Very Good
Totals	340	322	872.8	

Third Force

Twelve group formations (442 B-17s - 1st Air Division) sortied against Reinschler A/F, Kohlenbissen A/F, Wesendorf A/F and Hitzacker Oil Storage. 432 a/c dropped 1101.8 tons GP, 34.0 tons IB on three primaries (Reinschler A/F not attacked due to 10/10 cloud), a secondary and two T/Os at 1519-1604 hours from 14,200-16,600 feet. Bombing visual on primaries, secondary bombed on H2X and visual. Leaflets dropped on Hitzacker, Kohlenbissen and Wesendorf. Weather: generally 3/10-8/10 cloud, large breaks, good visibility. Flak: Hitzacker - meager, fairly accurate; meager, inaccurate at Wesendorf; nil at other targets. Battle Damage: 13 minor, 14 major. E/A Opposition: 2 Me-262s made one pass Wesendorf area. Claims: 0-0-1 jet, air. Losses: 3 a/c (2 to AA, 1 to unknown causes). NYR: 1 a/c, believed safe.

-3-

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Fighter Support: Four groups including 361st Group based on continent (222 P-51s) sortied. Up 1203-1258 hours, down 1717-1818 hours. 209 effective. E/A Opposition: u/i jet seen vicinity Osnabruck; 2 Me-262s, 3 FW-190s sighted south of Bremen - no combat. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Reinschler A/F	113	Not Attacked			
Hitzacker Oil Storage	116	115	284.0		Good
Kohlenbissen A/F	105	93	261.4		Good
Wesendorf A/F	108	107	214.0	34.0	Good
Luneburg M/Y (Sec)		92	266.9		Good
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Ulzen M/Y		13	41.6		Fair
Fassburg A/F		12	33.9		Fair
Totals	442	432	1101.8	34.0	

-4-
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

2. Fighter Escort

Fifteen groups including continental based groups (789 P-51s, 55 P-47s-844 a/c) sortied in support of three bomber forces. Up 1000-1258 hours, down 1458-1818 hours. 778 effective. E/A Opposition: 40-50 Me-109s, FW-190s, 7 Me-262s engaged in Steinhuder Lake, Hamburg, Nienburg, Salzwedel areas. One t/e jet, twin-fins and rudders, seen near Dunsberg. One AR-234 sighted making a pass at bombers in Dunsberg area; 12 Me-262s engaged 20 miles west of Soltau; 7-8 Me-262s attacked from Nienburg to Hamburg; 15 Me-109s, 4 FW-190s engaged vicinity of Lunsberg; 20 plus Me-109s encountered south of Bremen; 10 Me-109s and FW-190s engaged in Ulzen Salzwedel areas; 10 Me-109s bounced west of Fassburg; u/i jet seen vicinity Osnabruck; 2 Me-262s, 3 FW-190s sighted south of Bremen - no combat. Claims: 59-0-5 s/e, 5-1-6 jet, air. Losses: 3 P-51s (1 mechanical, 1 unknown, 1 faulty recognition). 1 Cat. "B" - crashed on take-off, pilot safe. NYR: 3 P-51s, believed safe on continent.

3. Fighter Sweeps

Nil.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

37 a/c (12 F-5s, 25 P-51s) sortied as follows:

10 F-5s on D/A missions over central, western Germany.

2 F-5s on mapping missions over Chemnitz area.

25 P-51s as escort to above missions. 23 effective.

No losses.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

41 a/c (29 P-51s, 5 Mosquitoes, 7 B-17s) sortied as follows:

2 B-17s routine flight over Sea to NW of Lands End.

2 B-17s routine flight to Position 13 and return.

5 Mosquitoes special weather reconnaissance over U.K., Holland, Denmark and Belgium,

32 a/c (29 P-51s, 3 B-17s) weather scouts for heavy bombers.

No losses.

SECRET

7. Air/Sea Rescue

15 a/c (14 P-47s, 1 OA-10) on routine search and patrol. No losses.

8. Special Operations

25 a/c (16 P-51s, 8 B-24s, 1 B-17) sortied as follows:

4 B-24s on VHF jamming from 0501-1200 hours. 3 effective.

18 a/c (16 P-51s, 1 B-17, 1 B-24) radio relays.

3 B-24s on special night mission 6/7 April. NYR: 1 B-24.

No losses. NYR: 1 B-24.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

After a lapse of several weeks during which conventional s/e e/a have largely been non-active partners in the air war and even when encountered have shown very little fighting spirit, today, in excellent flying conditions, the GAF put up a force of some 115-130 s/e e/a supplemented by 50 plus jets. From all reports it appears that this was a desperation attempt on the part of the enemy and although e/a fought aggressively and made determined efforts to get through to the bombers our losses were comparatively light while more than half the enemy force was destroyed or damaged. Signs of desperation are evidenced by the fact that FW-190 pilots deliberately rammed the bombers, baling out before their planes went into the bomber formations and making fanatical attacks through a murderous hail of fire. Tactics were thrown to the wind and attacks were made from all positions, mainly in ones and twos. A few attempts were made to draw off fighter escort but P-51s and P-47s were not fooled and did a good job of dispersing and destroying e/a.

Enemy reaction was chiefly against the first force with moderate opposition against the second force while the third force was virtually ignored.

Reverting to his old policy of attacking in the area of Dummer and Steinhuder Lakes the enemy met the leading groups of the first force at 1230 with some 105-120 Me-109s, FW-190s and 30 plus Me-262s flying between 18 and 30,000 feet. Of these only some 45-50 s/e e/a and 15 jets managed to approach, the bombers destroying eleven while the B-17s claim 26-10-10 s/e e/a. E/a were persistent and continued their attacks as far as Hamburg and Salzwedel in spite of the beating they were taking.

S E C R E T

Opposition to the second force was mainly in the Hamburg area where uncoordinated attacks took place between IP and the target and only two bombers were shot down. Some 12 Me-262s made two passes at the B-24s from 9 and 6 o'clock at 1225 west of Soltau. E/a operated in elements of two but were dispersed by escorting fighters. Thirteen plus jets also attacked in small formations from 1210-1245 hours at area SE Bremen-Nienburg-Hamburg. Attack on this force by conventional s/e e/a appear to have been made by a/c which had already been chased away from the first force as attacks were uncoordinated and some e/a flew through the bomber formations without firing. One fighter group escorting this force successfully broke up some ten plus s/e e/a with auxiliary tanks which were forming up near Ulzen at 1240.

Two Me-262 of which the bombers damaged one, made a pass at the third force in the Wesendorf area and escorting fighters sighted scattered jets over a wide area but had no combats.

From today's reaction it would appear that although the enemy is fighting a losing battle, the GAF is preparing to fight to a finish in a fanatical and suicidal manner.

2. Flak

Neumunster - meager, inaccurate.
Hitzacker - meager, fairly accurate.
Wesendorf - meager, inaccurate.
Lunenburg - meager, inaccurate.

3. Observations

4 e/a on Neumunster A/F.
5+6 t/e a/c on A/F at 5252-0813.
5-6 a/c on A/F at 5350-1000.
3 e/a on west side of A/F at 5302-0650.
20 e/a at Cloppenburg A/F.
Several e/a on A/F at 5252-0804.
12 a/c on Voehtha A/F.
8 s/e and 1 t/e a/c on A/F at 5257-0756.
Jet planes on A/F at 5353-0945.
21 jet planes on A/F at 5354-1012.
3 Me-262s on A/F near Soltau 5236-0946.
10 a/c on Bomlitz A/F.
M/Y at Winschoten about half full.
Full M/Y at 5253-0916.
100 cars in M/Y 6 miles south of Groningen.
30 ships in harbor at Kiel.
Heavy shipping in Lubeck Harbor.
6 large ships including one of heavy cruiser size in mouth of Elbe River 5354-0845.
Smoke screens at Kiel, Brunsbuttelkoog, Wilhelmshaven.

S E C R E T

Kohlenbissen A/F - Good Results

Seven concentrations of approximately 2800 GP bursting in target area, Photography late in attack shows major portion of all landing field post-holed. One additional concentration in a wooded area adjacent to NW dispersal. 4 barracks type building received direct hits. At least 44 a/c visible at time of attack, 4 of these will be damaged or destroyed.

Hitzacker Oil Storage - Good Results

Three concentrations of approximately 350 GP bursting on southern rail sidings. At least 50 direct hits on rail lines in the yard. Tankers in yard at time of attack have been derailed and at least 3 fires can be seen burning. Approximately 280 GP bursting in western rail siding area, cloud covers a portion of some of these bursts but it is possible to see at least 30 direct hits on rail lines in the area. Some damage can be expected to tankers in the siding at time of attack. Although the N rail siding area was covered by cloud, photography late in attack showed entire area scorched from bomb blast. Some direct hits could be seen across rail lines which were severely hit before this attack.

Fassberg - Fair Results

Approximately 200 GP in SE portion of landing ground, cloud covers most of the area however, it is possible that concentrations may extend into the hangar area.

Ulzen M/Y - Fair Results

Approximately 100 GP in and adjacent to northern end of M/Y, although main weight of these bombs are adjacent to yard at least 20 direct hits could be seen on rail lines. 2 small explosions were visible in the area.

Kaltenkirchen A/F - Good Results

At least 2/3 of runway is blanketed by 4 patterns of 100 and 500 GP, the larger part of the landing ground was post-holed by two group patterns of GP and IB bombs and the southern 2/3 of the storage and headquarters building area was blanketed by 500 GP and IB. Part of one pattern 5000 GP and IB seen NW 1 1/2 miles, at least 2 squadrons bombed into smoke cloud 1/2 to 1 mile SW. Of the 12 a/c noted possibly 8 are in area blanketed by attack.

-9-

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Schwerin A/F - Fair Results

Four squadrons attacked line and highway junction in southern part of town. All patterns are long and extended E and W in densely built up area on either side of rail lines.. One squadron attacked M/Y one mile north of the H2X MPI, part of the pattern covered choke point and 4 sidings holding approximately 60 cars.

Neumunster M/Y - Fair Results

Group pattern of 1000 GPs in built up area 3 miles south of the MPI.

SECRET

Ninth Air Force

Night 6/7 - Nil

Day 7

Sorties : 1240 Fighters & Fighter Bombers
274 Medium Bombers
203 Reconnaissance
1717

Missions : 9th Bomb Division - 274 sorties. Attacked Northeim, Göttingen M/Ys dropping 418 tons.

9th TAC - 413 sorties. Armed reconnaissance pocket area. Air cooperation with forward armored elements of First Army.

19th TAC - 395 sorties. Armed reconnaissance Magdeburg, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Halle areas. Air support to VIII, XII and XI Corps.

29th TAC - 432 sorties. Armed reconnaissance Stadthagen area. Air alert patrols. Escort to bombers, air-ground support to XVI Corps.

E/A Claims : 17-3-2 s/e air, 97-10-111 ground

Losses : 9 a/c (7 Fighters, 2 Reconnaissance)

Ground Claims:

Destroyed Damaged

M/T	482	322
Armored Vehicles	68	83
Locos	40	29
RR Cars	625	325
Buildings	267	138
Gun Positions	18	36
Rail Cuts		30

Second TAF

Night 6/7

Sorties : 96 Armed Reconnaissance
31 Interception Patrols
127 a/c

S E C R E T

Missions: : Armed reconnaissance Emden, Lubeck Berlin areas,

Losses : 3 a/c

Day 7

Sorties : 1 Medium Bomber
517 Armed Reconnaissance
335 Immediate and Pre-arranged Support
272 Interception and ASR Patrols
198 Reconnaissance
1323 A/C

Missions : Bombed Dunkirk, armed reconnaissance Zuider Zee, Emden area. Swept NW Germany. Attacked defended area, supporting First Canadian and 2nd British Armies.

Losses : 1 a/c

Ground Claims :	Destroyed	Damaged
M/T	105	168
RR Cars	6	104
Locos	0	25
Armored Vehicles	3	7
Barges	0	3

RAF Fighter Command

Night 6/7 - N11

Day 7

Sorties : 52 a/c escort to bombers and Coastal Command

E/A Claims : 2-0-1 Air

Losses : 1 Fighter

-13-

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

First US TAF

Night 6/7-Nil

Day 7

Sorties : 2

Missions : 42nd Bomb Wing- nil

12 TAC- report unavailable.

1st French Air Force - 2 sorties. Weather reconnaissance.

Western French Air Force - report unavailable.

Claims & Losses: nil.

-14-

S E C R E T

2. Fifteenth Air Force

7 April

192 B-17s, 476 B-24s and 214 P-51s sortied.

67 B-17s, 53 B-24s, escorted by 200 P-51s dropped 75 tons on Adige/Mezzacorona Railroad Bridge, 98 tons on Verona/Parona RR Bridge, 49 tons on Klagenfurt M/Y, 78 tons on Innsbruck M/Y, 20 tons on Highway Bridge 2 miles north of Mezzacorona and 2.5 tons on T/O. No losses.

84 P-38s sortied.

82 P-38s dive bombed Tannachstein RR Bridge (4637N-1433E) dropping 73 tons. No losses.

74 P-38s sortied against RR bridge in southern Austria.

Impenetrable route weather and complete overcast prevented all a/c from reaching target. All bombs jettisoned in Adriatic.

No losses.

Bombers

Sorties	: 668 a/c (192 B-17s, 476 B-24s)
Eff. Sorties	: 120 a/c (67 B-17s, 53 B-24s)
Tonnage	: 322.5
Losses	: 0

Fighters

Sorties	: 372 a/c (158 P-38s, 214 P-51s)
Eff. Sorties	: 282 a/c (82 P-38s, 200 P-51s)
Tonnage	: 73
Losses	: 0

3. RAF Bomber Command

Day		Losses	
15 Lancasters) Ijmuiden Sperr Brecker	0	
2 Mosquitoes		0	
3 Mosquitoes	Weather Reconnaissance	0	
Night			
175 Lancasters) Molbis Oil Refinery	1	
10 Mosquitoes		nr. Leipzig	0
15 Mosquitoes		Bomber Support	0
4 Halifaxes) Signal Investigation	0	
1 B-24		0	
2 B-17s		0	
3 Halifaxes		0	
3 Mosquitoes		0	
<u>213</u>		<u>1</u>	

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

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