

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Intelligence Officer

4 April 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Letter for the mission to Kiel, Germany on the  
above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - this Group took off to attack submarine installations at Kiel, Germany, which were bombed as a secondary target using pathfinder technique. Col. Shuck was in Command.

All A/C bombed the target:

A Squadron - Seven A/C plus two PFF A/C  
B Squadron - Ten A/C plus one PFF A/C  
C Squadron - Eight A/C plus one PFF A/C  
D Squadron - Eight A/C plus one PFF A/C

2. A/C 814 in 95B was damaged by flak at the target and diverted to Sweden according to a W/T message. No definite word has been received from Swedish authorities.

3. Further Intelligence Information is contained in the Operational Narrative.

For the Intelligence Officer:

*Arno A. Krause*  
ARNO A. KRAUSE, F.  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Engineering Officer

V-A-1

APO 559  
5 April 1945

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission of 4 April 1945

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), Attention:  
Operations Officer

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of 4 April 1945.

a. Thirty-eight (38) B-17 aircraft took-off as scheduled.


b. Thirty-seven (37) B-17 aircraft returned to base after completion of combat mission.

c. B-17G 43-38814 landed in Sweden.

2. There were no abortive aircraft.

3. Battle damage is as follows:

6993 - major battle damage  
7194 - major battle damage  
8281 - major battle damage  
7154 - skin damage  
8667 - skin damage  
8210 - skin damage  
8179 - skin damage  
7376 - skin damage  
6598 - skin damage  
8346 - skin damage  
6902 - skin damage  
9037 - skin damage  
8617 - skin damage  
8441 - skin damage  
6522 - skin damage

  
DONALD H. DOWLIN  
Capt., Air Corps  
Gp Engineering O

6  
1  
Lead Gen. J...  
ea. Power of - 050

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS  
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)  
APO 559

Wm

Date 4 April 1945  
13 CBW FO 88  
13 CBW OPS 310  
3 AD FO 631

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (KIEL, GERMANY)

TO : Col. SHUCK, 95th B.G.

1. Information Concerning the Targets: a. The 1st priority target (visual) for 13A, B, and C Groups was the Torpedo Boat Harbor situated 2 1/2 miles N of Kiel, Germany.

b. The 2nd priority target (H2X) for all Groups was the Ship Building and Repair Works of Deutsche Werke A.G. situated 1 1/2 miles ESE of the center of Kiel, Germany.

2. Planning and Execution:

a. Order: Bomb Load: Force: Assigned Target:

(1) 4 A,B,C,D: Kiel

(a)	486	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C
(b)	487	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C
(c)	94	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C
(d)	447	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C

(2) 13 A,B,C: Kiel

(a)	95	6 x 1000 MK-13	36 A/C
(b)	100	A,B: 6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C
		C,D: 12 x 500 GP	
(c)	390	6 x 1000 MK-13	36 A/C

(3) 93 A,B,C,D: Kiel

(a)	34	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C
(b)	385	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C
(c)	490	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C
(d)	493	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C

(4) 45 A,B,C: Kiel

(a)	388	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C
(b)	96	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C
(c)	452	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C

b. Availability: Airborne:

(1)	95	Reg: 45 A/C 58 C/C	33 A/C
		Lead: 11 A/C 6 C/C	5 A/C

(2)	100	Reg: 42 A/C 44 C/C	34 A/C
		Lead: 12 A/C 8 C/C	4 A/C

(3)	390	Reg: 43 A/C 56 C/C	34 A/C
		Lead: 11 A/C 10 C/C	4 A/C

c. Non-effective Sorties and Returning Spares:

(1) 100: A/C 811: 349 Sqdn "X" - Pilot Lt. Aubuchon - Severe

d. Lead A/C Failures and/or Malfunctions:  
 (1) 100A: H2X equipment partially inoperative on return route.  
 100B: H2X set range was weak on the over water route.  
 Rack malfunction - smoke bombs released, but bombs had to be salvaged.  
 100C: H2X equipment partially inoperative. Left rack  
 malfunction, bombs had to be salvaged.

(2) 390B: H2X equipment failure.  
 390D: H2X equipment failure.

e. A/C Outstanding:

(1) 95: A/C 8814: 336 Sqdn "N" - Pilot Lt. Tuss - Two engines  
 out - Heading for Sweden.

f. A/C Landing Away From Base: None.

3. Navigation:

Position	Flight Plan	AL: N:	13A (95) Col. Shuck Lt. Wilbourne	13B (100) Maj. Robinson Lt. Kirby	13C (390) Maj. Wilde Lt. Drew
BU 11	13000°		13000° 1 min. early 4 mi. left	13800° 2 min. early on course	14000° 2 min. early 3 mi. right
CP 1	14000°		13000° 1 min. early 3 mi. right	14800° 2 min. early 6 mi. right	15100° 3 min. early on course
CP 2	21000°		20000° 6 min. early on course	19500° 4 min. early 3 mi. left	20800° 5 min. early 3 mi. left
IP	25000°		25000° 5 min. early on course	24000° 1 min. early 5 mi. right	25600° 2 min. early 2 mi. right
TGT	25000°		25000° (2nd priority)	24000° (2nd priority)	25600° (2nd priority)
RP	24000°		24000° 5 min. early 2 mi. right	24000° on time 6 mi. over	24600° 1 min. late 16 mi. over
CONT COAST	16000°		24000° 4 min. late on course	19500° 9 min. late on course	23500° 9 min. late on course
CP 3	Minimum		9400° 5 min. early on course	8800° on time 1 mi. left	12000° 1 min. early 3 mi. right
ENG COAST	Minimum		8000° 17 min. early 4 mi. right	1500° 9 min. early 2 mi. right	1000° 14 min. early 3 mi. right

a. Assembly: 13A assembled over Buncher 23; 13B over Buncher 28  
 and 13C over Buncher 11. Assembly altitude was 12000°. Wing assembly  
 was completed at CP 1 and proper interval was taken in the Division Column.

b. Route: Enroute to CP 2 there was considerable "S"ing to avoid  
 over-running of the 4th Wing. The "S"ing continued after CP 2 and there  
 was interference from 4D, which was lagging. After the Pre-IP, which  
 was made good, the Wing leader was again forced to make a large "S" to  
 the North and West, because the Division leader overshot the Pre-IP and  
 turned due North. A 180 degree turn was made to the IP and the Groups  
 peeled off on individual H2X runs to the 2nd priority target. Bombing  
 altitude was reached at the IP by 13A and 13C. 13B, however, leveled  
 off at 24000° because it was pulling excessive power in the climb.  
 At the IP, 93C (490) out in between 13A and 13B and remained there until  
 shortly after the RP. After bombs away 93C (490) was abreast of 13B,  
 forcing 13B to overshoot the RP. The next turning point was out short  
 to reassemble the Wing. The briefed descent could not be made because  
 of a cloud deck at 20000° over the Continent. The briefed route was  
 followed from the Continental Coast to the bases.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

c. Weather: Over the bases at take-off there were 4-6/10 strato-cumulus at 2-3000' and 4-6/10 strato-cumulus at 6-7000'. Visibility was 4-6 miles. Enroute to the target, there were 5-8/10 strato-cumulus at 6-8000' over the North Sea becoming cumulus and strato-cumulus at 10-12000' East of 0900E. In the target area there were 7-8/10 cumulus at 10-12000' with thin alto-cumulus at 18-20000'. Downward visibility was 25-50 miles through breaks. Enroute to the bases, the weather was essentially the same as the route in until 0700E where strato-cumulus increased to 8-10/10 at 8000'. Over the bases on return there were 8-10/10 strato-cumulus at 4000' and 3-5/10 cumulus at 25000'. Visibility was 6 miles plus. Average winds enroute were 315/75K and 310/80K in the target area.

d. Failures: Equipment: None.

4. Bombing:

a.	Attacking:	Jettisoning:	Returning:
95	2nd P 38 A/C 228 x 1000 GP		
100	2nd P 37 A/C 108 x 1000 GP 228 x 500 GP		1 A/C. 6 x 1000 GP
390	2nd P 36 A/C 216 x 1000 GP 12 x 1000 GP TO 2 A/C 12 x 1000 GP		

b. 13A (95)

Squadrons:	A	B	C	D
Lead A/C No.	8709	8210	8548	8179
Target:	2nd P	2nd P	2nd P	2nd P
A.P.	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned
A/C Releasing:	9	11	9	9
Bomb Load:	6x1000 GP	6x1000 GP	6x1000 GP	6x1000 GP
Method of Release:	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo
Altitude: True:	24200	24700	23700	23200
Ind:	25000	25500	24500	24000
True Heading:	097	082	102	063
Drift:	7 R	13 R	10 R	12 R
Trail Change:	Added 3 mils	Added 3 mils	Added 3 mils	Added 3 mils
Ground Speed:	305	285	295	300
Tan. D.A.	.67	.68	.67	.65
Time of Release:	1033½	1034	1035	1036½
C-1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pattern: Length:				1460°
Width:				1300°
Errors: Range:				
Def:				
Radial:				
Percent: 1000°				
2000°				
Crew: AL:	Cpl. Shuck	Capt. Wright	Capt. Garrison	Lt. Stanborough
P:	Capt. Wilson	Lt. Taylor	Lt. Seeburg	Lt. Oehlert
TG:	Lt. Krein	Lt. Berry	Sgt. Laughlin	Lt. Morgan
N:	Lt. Wilbourne	Lt. Arterburn	Lt. Pile	Lt. Gresham
AN:	Capt. Shirey			
(No. of Leads) B:	Lt. (23) Long	Lt. (11) Carter	Lt. (1) Spears	Lt. (2) Schetky
(Missions) RN:	Lt. (21) Owens	Lt. (22) Webber	Lt. (22) Burrows	Lt. (5) Heald

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 95A: The R/N picked up the target in the scope at 50 miles. After the turn at the IP, the R/N clutched in the bombardier at 11 miles and rate checks at 9, 7, and 5 miles were made. The last rate check was not good and required an adjustment. Prior to the clutch-in point, the bombardier was able to set up rate visually through a break in the clouds. This, however, was the only visual assistance possible. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.

PI: The bursts are cloud obscured, but the craters are visible in photographs of 100D. The pattern was approximately 2 3/4 miles South (short and right) of the 2nd priority target in fields.

95B: After the turn on the IP, the R/N proceeded to set up course initiating the attack on a true heading of 090 degrees. The bombardier was clutched in at 70 degrees and rate checks at 65 and 60 degrees were made. 30 seconds from the BRL, the bombardier was able to give assistance for rate and course as he could identify the target area. H2X equipment operated excellent the entire operation.

PI: The bombs fell in the area occupied by Fried Krupp Germania Werft A.G. An explosion and subsequent fire occurred on or in proximity to the Boiler Shops. One bomb hit in the M/Y, while the remaining visible bombs blanketed various installations in the Krupp Werft. Clouds obscure a portion of the pattern and prevent a more detailed analysis. The MPI of the pattern was approximately 5300° SE (short and left) of the 2nd priority target.

95C: The R/N picked up the target in the scope at 45 miles. After the turn on the IP, the R/N took over and proceeded to set up course initiating the attack on a true heading of 088 degrees. The bombardier was clutched in at 70 degrees and subsequent rate checks at 65, 60, 55, and 50 degrees were made. Only the last rate check required an adjustment. Weather conditions on the bomb run prevented the bombardier from giving any visual assistance. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.

PI: The bursts are cloud obscured. New craters in 100A's photographs appear in the same area determined by the use of the bomb trajectory chart, which was 3000° ESE (over and right) of the 2nd priority target.

95D: After the turn on the IP, the R/N proceeded to set up course by H2X technique initiating the attack on a true heading of 058 degrees. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and rate checks at 9, 8, 7, and 6 miles were made. The 6 mile check was not good and required an adjustment. The bombardier was not able to give visual assistance because of existing weather conditions. H2X equipment operated excellent the entire operation.

PI: The bombs fell in the Kiel Harbor 3 3/4 miles NNE (over and left) of the 2nd priority target.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

CONFIDENTIAL

o. 13B (100)

Squadrons:	A	B	C	D
Lead A/C No.	183	696	705	776
Target:	2nd P	2nd P	2nd P	2nd P
A.P.	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned
A/C Releasing:	8	10	9	10
Bomb Load:	6x1000 GP	6x1000 GP	12x500 GP	12x500 GP
Method of Release:	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo
Altitude: True:	23200	23800	22900	22600
Ind:	24000	24400	23700	23400
True Heading:	074	086	083	110
Drift:	15 R	5 R	10 R	11 R
Trail Change:	Added 5 mils	Added 5 mils	None	Added 5 mils
Ground Speed:	315	320	321	300
Tan. D.A.	-----NOT REPORTED-----			
Time of Release:	1038	1039	1039	1040
C-1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pattern: Length:			2140°	
Width:			1715°	
Errors: Range:				
Def:				
Radial:				
Percent: 1000°				
2000°				
Crew:	Maj. Robinson	Maj. Stivers		
AL:	Capt. DePlanque	Capt. Murray	Capt. Hutchinson	Lt. Hellerich
P:	Lt. Keen	Lt. Tiams	Sgt. Kemper	Sgt. Platzner
TG:	Lt. Kirby	Lt. Johnson	Lt. Graham	Lt. Duncan
N:	Lt. Crotty			
AN:	Lt. (19) Svendsen	Lt. (10) Crichton	Lt. (4) Tolliver	Lt. (3) Shiurba
(No. of Leads)	Lt. (28) Rhode	Lt. (22) Bohrer	Lt. (11) Courdier	Lt. (5) Clinton
(Missions) RN:				



C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 100A: After the turn on the IP, the R/N picked up the target at 32 miles and initiated the attack on a true heading of 090 degrees. The bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles and subsequent rate checks of 9, 8, 7, 6, and 5 miles were good. Because of existing weather conditions, the bombardier was unable to give any visual assistance. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily on the route in, but on the withdrawal route the inverters were erratic causing interference in the scope.

PI: The bombs fell 3000° NE (over) of the 2nd priority target in the Innenhafen and a fully built-up factory and residential area. Clouds obscure a portion of the pattern.

100B: The R/N picked up target at 45 miles and proceeded to set up course on a true heading of 095 degrees by H2X technique. The bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles and subsequent rate checks of 9, 8, 7, 6 and 5 miles were made. 10 seconds prior to bombs away the bombardier was able to make a correction for rate as it was possible to recognize the immediate target area. He positioned the cross hairs on the clouds covering the target using check points outside the target area. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily but range over water was weak.

PI: The bombs fell 9000° SSE (short and right) of the 2nd priority target in fields. There were several hits on two separate RR tracks leading E and SW from Kiel. Clouds obscure a portion of the pattern.

100C: After picking up the target in the scope at 40 miles the R/N proceeded to set up course by H2X technique, initiating the attack on a true heading of 095 degrees. The bombardier was clutched in at 9 miles and subsequent rate checks at 8, 7, 6, and 4 miles were made. Due to existing weather conditions, the bombardier was not able to give visual assistance. R/N experienced poor returns throughout the operation. AFC was out, therefore, the R/N was compelled to tune manually. After bombs were released the 5-30 mile scan went out; this was probably due to improper sweep adjustment.

PI: The bombs fell in the Schreven Teich lake, the Hehenzellern Park area, and among scattered residences 7250° NW (short) of the 2nd priority target.

100D: Attacking on a true heading of 100 degrees, the R/N picked up the target in the scope at 45 miles and proceeded to set up course by H2X technique. After the clutch in point, the bombardier received 4 rate checks. 10 seconds from the BRL, the bombardier was able to identify the immediate target area and made a correction for rate. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.

PI: The bombs fell in fields 13,500° South (right and slightly over) the 2nd priority target. Clouds obscure most of the pattern.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

100A: A/C 811 had a mission failure (engine trouble) and returned 6 x 1000 GP.

100B: A/C 696: because of rack malfunctions the bomb load failed to release at the BRL. The smoke bombs, however, did not hang up and the Group released on this signal. The bombs were salvoed a few seconds later in the target area.

100C: A/C 705: left bomb bay hung up because of rack malfunctions but were immediately salvoed again a few seconds later in the target area.

CONFIDENTIAL

a. 13C (390)

Squadrons:	A	B	C	D
Lead A/C No.	784	837	127	750
Target:	2nd P	2nd P	2nd P	2nd P
A.P.	Selected	Assigned	Assigned	Assigned
A/C Releasing:	9	8	9	10
Bomb Load:	6x1000 GP	6x1000 GP	6x1000 GP	6x1000 GP
Method of Release:	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo	Salvo
Altitude: True:	25400	24120	24000	24050
Ind:	25200	24900	25000	24650
True Heading:	095	100	091	090
Drift:	4 R		5 R	
Trail Change:	Added 3 mils		None	
Ground Speed:	326		291	
Tan. D.A.	.62		.68	
Time of Release:	1040 $\frac{1}{2}$	1040 $\frac{1}{2}$	1040	1040
C-1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Patterns Length:			1240 $^{\circ}$	1240 $^{\circ}$
Width:			850 $^{\circ}$	850 $^{\circ}$
Errors: Range:				
Def:				
Radial:				
Percent: 1000 $^{\circ}$				
2000 $^{\circ}$				
Crew:	Maj. Wilds	Maj. Black	Capt. Greene	Capt. Morris
AL:	Capt. Fisher	Lt. McKellar	Lt. McDonald	Capt. Shade
P:	Lt. Klar	Sgt. Duff	Sgt. Seabolt	Sgt. Trindle
TG:	Lt. Drew	Lt. Kedar	Lt. Hilker	Lt. Kirby
H:	Capt. Lewis			
AN:	Lt. (13) Liana	Lt. (5) Wills	Lt. (7) Strickland	Lt. (1) Park
(No. of Leads) B:	Lt. (25) Conroy	Lt. (5) Baddow	P/O (8) Zabill	Lt. (12) Keelan
(Missions) RN:				

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 390A: After the turn at the IP, the R/N proceeded to set up course by H2X technique on a true heading of 082 degrees. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and subsequent rate checks to 5 miles were made. One minute from the BRL, the bombardier was able to take over visually. As the assigned MPI was covered by smoke from preceding Squadrons the bombardier selected an AP. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.

390B: H2X set was good on search operation, but was inoperative on H2X operation because of a defective range unit tube. Squadron released its bombs on the smoke bombs of 390A.

PI: The bombs fell on the selected AP, which was approximately in the center of the large Marine Arsenal, 3000° NE of the 2nd priority target. One explosion and a subsequent fire occurred in one of the factory buildings. Approximately 8 bombs fell short of the Arsenal in the Arsenal Hafen, while the remainder dropped in a concentrated pattern on nine small to large size buildings in the area. Smoke obscures a portion of the Squadron's patterns. No bursts are visible from any bombs dropped by 2 A/C on the Eggebek A/D, but according to computations based on the bomb trajectory chart, the bombs probably fell on or to the slightly right of the L/F.

390C: The R/N took over after the turn at the IP, and proceeded to set up course on a true heading of 97 degrees by H2X technique. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and subsequent rate checks were made to 6 miles. The bombardier was unable to give visual assistance on the bomb run due to existing weather conditions. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.

390D: H2X equipment worked good on the route in. Prior to the IP, the R/N switched to the 30 mile scan but no returns were received, for this reason, an H2X bomb run was not possible. The cause for this malfunction is not determined at present. Bombs were released on the smoke bombs of 390C.

PI: The bombs from 390C fell on the RR tracks leading S out of the Kiel M/Y to Altona and Lubeck, on a small M/Y and RR station E of these tracks, and on several small unidentified buildings. An explosion occurred from a direct hit on one, and subsequent pictures show a large column of smoke arising. The bombs from 390D fell short of C's pattern on the W side of the tracks in a residential area. There may have been some hits on or close hits on a small Acetylene Works. Smoke and clouds prevent a more detailed analysis. The patterns were approximately 9000° SW (right and short) of the 2nd priority target.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

390A: A/C 927: Toggler failed to release on the 2nd priority target because the A/C was in a bank at the BRL. A visual run was made on a TO, Eggebek, Germany, at 5437-0931 and 6 x 1000 GP were released on signal from the lead A/C.

390B: A/C 024: Toggler failed to release on the 2nd priority target as A/C was in a bank at the BRL. A visual run was made on a TO, Eggebek, Germany, at 5437-0931 and 6 x 1000 GP were released on signal from the lead A/C.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

5. Communications: a. VHF: (1) VHF communications on Channel A (790) were good and discipline was fair. Part of the extra traffic was caused by the Wing leader constantly essing right after the Wing assembly.

(2) Channel B communications were very satisfactory. The frequency was clear and the Kodak Scouting Force was prompt in answering calls from the Group leaders.

(3) Fighters were contacted very satisfactorily; three calls from fighters were relayed to Wing leader.

(4) No distress calls were instigated.

b. W/T: (1) Progress and Strike Reports were received as follows:

95A		GP1	GP2	TGT	GP3
Flight Plan		0845	0944	1039	1212
ATA		0844	0938	1034	
TOD		0850	1003	1105	

95A	S B 5	1034	TOD	1105	100A	S B 5	1038	TOD	1111
B	S B 5	1038	TOD	1110	B				
C	S B 5	1036	TOD	1120	C	S B 5	1039	TOD	1115
D					D	P B 5	1040	TOD	1125

390A	S B 2	1040	TOD	1129
B	S B 5	1040	TOD	1130
C	S B 5	1040	TOD	1112
D	S B 5	1041	TOD	1134

(2) 95D lead radio operator reported he sent strike report in to W/T ground station but it was not receipted for. Radio equipment was not properly tuned.

100B lead radio operator had an equipment failure: power amplifier tube failed

6. Photography: a. 95 installed 2 scopes, 5 oblique, and 8 vertical cameras, 2, 5, and 7 of which took pictures: A/C 9175, #2 A/C lead element 95D, with K-21 installed: fuse blown. 2 sets of H2X scope photos were taken, both of which are plottable.

b. 100 installed 3 16mm scopes, 2 oblique, and 8 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures.

c. 390 installed 3 scopes, 2 oblique, and 8 vertical cameras, 2, 2, and 7 of which took pictures: PFF A/C 660 with scope and K-21 cameras installed: failed to take off. 2 sets of H2X scope photos were taken, both of which were plottable.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

*Ernest A. Kiessling*

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Director of Training & Analysis.

13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)

KIEL, GERMANY

4 APRIL 1945

NOTE: 95A & C approximate bomb fall as computed with aid of the Bomb Trajectory Chart.

95B, 100A, B, D, & 390D patterns partially obscured by smoke or clouds.

95D (not shown) bombs fell in Harbour 3 3/4 miles N. of H2X Tgt.

95A - H2X-Vis.  
100A - H2X  
390A - H2X-Vis.


95B - H2X-Vis.  
100B - H2X-Vis.  
390B - dropped on A.

95C - H2X  
100C - H2X  
390C - H2X

95D - H2X  
100D - H2X-Vis.  
390D - dropped on C.

Scale - 1:52,000

Circles - 1 mile from H2X Target.



CG. 15TH COMBAT WING  
CO. 100TH BOMB GROUP  
CO. 390TH BOMB GROUP

XXX

HQ. 95TH BOMB GP.

XXXX

4-4-45 17:10 8-2

OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE 95TH KIEL, GERMANY 4 APRIL 1945

1. LEAPLETS: None

2. BOMBING RESULTS:

A Squadron - secondary - H2X - hot prints show no bomb bursts - RN identified target and estimates results fair.

B Squadron - secondary - H2X with visual assist - hot prints show a pattern developing on the Fried Krupp Germania Werft A.G. Building submarines - also an explosion seen at the edge of cloud bank - results definitely good.

C Squadron - secondary - H2X - no bombs bursting in hot prints - RN estimates bombs hit short and left of MPI - results good.

D Squadron - secondary - H2X - hot prints show a pattern of bombs developing in a wooded area across the frond from the seaplane station at Kiel/Holtenau - results poor.

3. E/A: NONE

4. FIAX:

A. Damage ~~Final~~ Final.  
95A 1A  
95B 5A -- 1 AC IP to HRL  
95C 3A  
95D 2A

B. Operation

1. None
2. "
3. "
4. "

C. Amount, Acc, Etc.

1. Target Moderate, Generally, inaccurate, Tracking & Barrage. Accurate on High squadron (encountered)
2. Accurate on high Squadron, Generally, inaccurate, T & B.
3. None
4. About 100 burst observed from Schleswig A/F and 16 gun battery at 5418N-0905
5. None

D. Phenomena. None

5. WEATHER; 7/10TH SCATTERED CLOUD IN TARGET AREA PREVENTED BOMBING PRIMARY.

6. OBSERVATIONS:

1038 5426N-0908 3/4 Large M/V's seen off coast

1038 5423N-1010 Smoke screen.

1037 5423N-1010E Two large M/V in Kiel Harbor, one was anchored and one was moving out to sea - 4 smaller M/V's anchored. Flames and heavy black smoke rising from oil dump near M/Y as result of previous bombing.

1040 5438N-1035E Very large M/V appeared to be a transport in Flensburg Harbor.

1100 5428N-0932 Saw bombs hit Schleswig A/D

1103 5428N-0950 Smoke screen at Echernfords

1105 5440N-0955 Smoke screen at Kappeln

1113 5432N-0922 8 A/C on Eggebek A/D believed SEF's.

1119 5430N-0902 About 50 SEF's on Husum A/D on runways.

1140 5412N-0755 4 large M/V in harbor - also 2 SS - Heligoland

1145 5412N-0702 (DR) yellow raft seen on water - not phoned as hot news because sighting was radioed to MF/DF station, and PBV seen one hour later headed toward that spot.

7. OTHER INFORMATION: Fighter support was generally considered very good. The only departures from briefed course occurred on the route in and they were necessitated by conflict between this group and a preceding group which was flying an improper interval. Otherwise the mission was flown primarily as planned.

~~W. J. P.~~  
~~Library~~  
Mac

JXP

CONFIDENTIAL  
IC 4224

AMENDMENT TO SUPPLEMENT TO INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 4176

LOCALITY: KIEL

- (a) Fried. Krupp Germania Werft A.G.
- (b) Deutsche Werke Kiel, A.G.
- (c) Naval Dockyard.
- (d) Wik Harbour.

PERIOD COVERED: From 1235A hours on 22 MAR 1945 to 1230B hours on 7 APR 1945.

Delete "(d) No damage is seen to either the HIPPER or the EMDEN."

Insert "(d) No damage is seen to either the HIPPER or the ADMIRAL SCHEER."

(A statement on the later capsizing of the ADMIRAL SCHEER is included in Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 4224 issued on 11 APR 1945).

CONFIDENTIAL  
A.C.I.U.  
K/RAC

DISTRIBUTION NO. 24-C

344 copies



~~SECRET~~  
CONFIDENTIAL  
11 APR 1945

SUPPLEMENT TO IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 4176

LOCALITY: KIEL

- (a) Fried. Krupp Germania Werft A.G.
- (b) Deutsche Werke Kiel A.G.
- (c) Naval Dock Yard
- (d) Wik Harbour

PERIOD COVERED: From 1235 A hours on 22 MAR 1945 to 1230 B hrs. on 7 APR 1945.

ATTACKS:

	<u>Date</u>	<u>S.A.</u>	<u>Reported Weather</u>
U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE	3 APR 45	3497	8/10-10/10 Cloud
U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE	4 APR 45	3499	3/10-10/10 Cloud

PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE.

Further examination reveals the following damage to shipping in addition to that previously reported.

- (a) Sunk: 1 P.F. U-Boat 250'  
1 Passenger Pocket 150'-200'  
1 large tug  
Several small vessels, some of which may be E/R Boats.  
  
Probably damaged: 1 U-Boat - 1200 tons  
Liner 420' DOGU L 103  
1 M/V 250'-300'
- (b) In addition, 6 floating docks have been damaged, one at the Germania Yard, one in the Schwentine River, two at Howaldts Yard, and two now lying in Heikendorfer Bay. One of the latter was at Howaldts Werke on 30 MAR 45.
- (c) Further examination of the photographs shows that the light cruiser EMDEN which was reported as possibly damaged by a near miss in FORM WHITE has not, in fact, been damaged.
- (d) No damage is seen to either the HIPPER or the EMDEN.
- (e) The 520' M.V. ORANJEFONTEIN (M.185), which is lying at Wik Commercial Harbour, and on the cloudy and hazy photographs taken during the bombing raid of 3 APR 45 and 4 APR 45 was reported as on fire does not appear to be damaged. The state of the buildings on the adjacent quay suggests that it was in fact, a building on fire with the smoke blowing over the ship.

(Extract from Interpretation Report No. 7451 9 APR 1945)

(Prints 3065, 4007, 4060)

---

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

---

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 542 Squadron.

SORTIE: 106G/5199

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 1230 B hrs. on 7 APR 1945.

SCALE: 1/8,000 (F.L. 36").

COVER AND QUALITY: All targets are covered on prints of excellent quality. Smoke obscures a small part of the Deutsche Werke Kiel, A.G., in the area of the slipways.

LAST REPORTS: K. 3927 issued on 13 MAR 1945 and Supplement (24 MAR 45)

COMPARATIVE SORTIE USED: US7GR/73D & 106G/4403.

PRINT DISTRIBUTED: 4060 (to follow when available.)

*Mac* *JAP*  
*003*  
CONFIDENTIAL  
7 APR 1945

SUPPLEMENT TO INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3499

ATTACK ON KIEL on 4 APR 1945

For paragraphs one and two see the original report. This supplement is being issued to cover the shipping in the port at the time of the attack and just previous to it. This information has been compiled from shipping Interpretation Reports No. 7422 and 7441 issued by Z-2 Section, A.C.I.U.

**ACTIVITY**

**(a) NAVAL SHIPPING**

1. HIPPER (heavy cruiser) is seen in dry dock #5.
2. ADMIRAL SHEER (pocket battleship) and EMDEN (light cruiser) remain at their previous berths.
3. The MAAS class destroyer has moved and is not visible in any other part that is covered.
4. The following naval units are seen at the berths they occupied on 30 MAR 1945.

Depot ship ex-AMAZONE class D.32 at Blucher's Jetty

Obsolete cruiser BERLIN at Wik

Coastal Defense Vessel PEDERSKRAM at Stickenhorn

" " " NIELS JUUL at Stickenhorn

Fishery Protection Vessel INGOLF at Stickenhorn

Depot Ship ST.DENIS D.28 at Stickenhorn

Target Ship HESSEN in mid-fjord at Stickenhorn

5. The following ships of the 'D' series are new arrivals since 23 MAR 1945.

A Radar ship 430' TOGO type D.63 now lying in the Friedrichsort anchorage.

A Depot ship 420' FREIBURG D.18 now lying in the Schwentine river.

6. There has been an increase in the number of T.L.C. type I in the port. Six are now seen compared with one on 22 MAR 1945. The new arrivals are probably evacuees from Baltic ports.
7. The number of E/R boats in the part visible shows a slight decrease.
8. Other minor naval units show a normal turnover since 22 MAR 1945.
9. In the parts visible there has been a decrease in the number of U-Boats. The total number of U-Boats apart from those in the slips, is 57.

**(b) MERCHANT SHIPPING**

1. The following vessels have left their berths of 22 MAR 1945 and are not seen elsewhere in the parts visible.

Tanker 580' ALTHARK T.57 Departed from a quay on the East side of the fjord.

Tanker 485' ex-PENNA T.13: Departed from Friedrichsort anchorage and subsequently photographed at COPENHAGEN on 30 MAR 1945.

Tanker 405' T.77

" 400' ex-NAPHTHA SHIPPER T.50

" 350' ex-JULIUS SCHWINDER T.76

M/V 520' CRANNE FONTEIN M.185. Departed from Wik.

5 M/Vs 200/350.

/2. The following vessels

2. The following vessels are new arrivals in the port, all are lying in the Friedrichsort anchorage.

1 M/V 470' Standard type M.452.

1 M/V 460' HOECH TRADER type M.141.

Tanker 400' BEAUMONT type T.82.

Tanker 310' TEXPHATE type T.25.

9 M/V's 200/350'.

3. In addition to the above vessels, two large vessels have arrived and have tentatively been identified as the MONTE OLIVIA, a Hospital ship, and the ORANJEFONTEIN. The MONTE OLIVIA was believed to have been on fire and on later photographs appears to be overturned.

4. The 505' tanker 5.62 has now moved out of Dry Dock No. 6 and occupies the previous berth of the NIPPA at South Yard Quay.

5. The only other internal movement noted is that one of the DEXTER HUGO SPINES type 300' lighters has moved from the southern part of the fjord to the Friedrichsort anchorage.

CONFIDENTIAL  
A.C.I.U.  
JDM/CBS/CS

DISTRIBUTION NO. 11-C

243 COPIES

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3499

ATTACK ON KIEL ON 4 APR 1945

1. INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 505, fully escorted.
- (b) Command : U. S. 8TH AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1021 - 1049 hours.
- (d) Bombs : 2223 x 1000 lb. G.P.  
1544 x 500 lb. G.P.

2. DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

(a) All photographs received are 3/10 to 10/10 cloud covered. The KIEL Smoke Screen is in effective operation.

The combination of these two, accompanied by ground haze, renders interpretation very difficult.

(b) Bursts are seen on targets in the KIEL area as follows:

(i) GERMANIA WERFT A.G. (Fried. Krupp).

Bursts blanket the Southern 2/3 of the area where one explosion is seen.

A large cloud of smoke is seen rising from the area late in the attack.

(ii) DEUTSCHE WERKE KIEL A.G.

Scattered bursts, from a large concentration which fell on the West side of the harbor, extend into the South and West portions of this area.

(iii) NAVAL ARSENAL

Bursts blanket the Northeast quarter of this area and extend 1 1/2 miles East/Southeast. Bursts are seen under clouds in an area just across the SCHWENTINE RIVER Northeast of the NAVAL ARSENAL.

(c) OTHER BURSTS: (Distances are measured from the NAVAL DOCKYARDS)

(i) One group of approximately 20 bursts is visible in the water on the Eastern edge of the harbour near HEIKENDORF, 2 3/4 miles North.

(ii) Approximately 40 bursts are seen in open fields 2 1/3 miles Southwest with probable hits on a railway line.

(iii) Approximately 80 bursts in a heavily built up area and a park 2 miles West.

(iv) A group of more than 38 bursts are seen through smoke on the Western shore of the harbour and a built up area 1 1/2 miles Southwest.

(v) Approximately 20 bursts are visible in fields near OPPENDORF, 1 3/4 miles East.

(vi) At least 28 bursts near the railway junction 3 miles Southwest with one direct hit on a rail line.

(vii) A concentration of approximately 100 bursts is seen blanketing the railway lines and junction leading to the main railway station, 2 1/2 miles Southwest.

3. SMOKE SCREEN:

The KIEL Smoke Screen is in effective operation.

4. ACTIVITY:

(a) KIEL/HOLTENAU AIRFIELD

(i) Coverage is on small scale poor quality photographs.

(ii) No aircraft are visible.

(iii) The landing ground appears serviceable.

(b) KIEL MARSHALLING YARD

(i) The sidings are moderately loaded.

5. ANNOTATED PRINT:

None to be issued.

6. BOMB PLOT:

None to be issued.

7. PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV	Serials	Date	Time	Altitude	Camera	Count	Notes
SAV	34/790-792	4 APR 45	1037B hrs.	1/43,500 (F.L.7")		25,500	'B'
"	94/1614,1617,1618	"	1027B "	1/41,100 "		24,000	'C'
"	94/1615	"	1025B "	1/25,000 (F.L.12")		25,000	"
"	95/1705-1707,1709	"	1035B "	1/41,500 (F.L.7")		24,250	'B'
"	96/1057,1058	"	1049B "	1/42,000 "		24,500	'C'
"	96/1054,1059	"	1048B "	1/25,000 (F.L.12")		25,000	"
"	100/1522,1524,1527,1528	"	1039B "	1/41,100 (F.L.7")		24,000	'B'
"	385/1211,1212,1214	"	1036B "	1/42,800 "		25,000	"
"	388/1045,1147,1148	"	1044B "	1/43,500 "		25,500	"
"	390/1617-1619-1622	"	1040B "	1/41,100 "		24,100	"
"	447/1147-1190	"	1030B "	1/42,000 "		24,500	"
"	452/1171	"	Unknown	1/43,500 "		25,500	"
"	486/1058,1060,1062,1064	"	1021B "	1/39,000 "		22,700	"
"	487/1015 (KIEL MARSHALLING YARD)	"	1022B "	1/42,000 (F.L.12")		23,200	"
"	487/1017,1018,1022	"	"	1/42,000 (F.L.7")		24,500	"
"	490/894-898	"	1023B "	1/42,000 (F.L.12")		25,000	"
"	493/856-888 A/S, WEDGEMINT	"	1024B "	1/42,000 (F.L.12")		25,400	"
O-	486-400,401	"	Unknown	Oblique (F.L.6.3/6")		25,000	"
O-	94-100	"	"	"		24,000	"

CONFIDENTIAL  
A.C.I.U.  
TEP/RMS/MOL

DISTRIBUTION NO. 116  
243 COPIES.

*HP  
Rau*

FFF INTERPRETATION REPORT T-76

(1) General Statement: Thirty-nine sorties were received, five of which were taken with 16 mm movis camera and were not plotted because of broken projector. These five are not listed below. Of the remaining thirty-four sorties fourteen were plotted.

(2) See S.A. Report 3498-3505 for additional information.

(3) Summary of FFF missions on 4 APR 1945 from photographs received through 1700 hours 5 APR 1945.

1st DIVISION

Mission to Unterluz

SAT 303/131 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.

Mission to Hamburg

SAT 305/183 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.

SAT 385/303 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.

Mission to Fassberg

SAT 91/204 - Not plottable - No bomb run.  
 " 305/304 - Plotted - Track only - See bomb plot.  
 " 305/305 - Not plottable - Interference.  
 " 351/183 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 384/209 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 401/196 - Plotted - See bomb plot.

2nd DIVISION

Mission to Parchim

SAT 389/126 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.  
 " 389/127 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.

Mission to Perleberg

SAT 445/106 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.  
 # 458/294 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.  
 " 458/296 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.

Mission to Wesendorf

SAT 453/160 - Plotted - See bomb plot.

3rd DIVISION

Mission to Kiel

SAT 34/55 - Not plottable - Bombs away print only received.  
 " 34/56 - Not plottable - Bombs away prints only received.  
 " 34/57 - Not plottable - Set malfunction.  
 " 94/272 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.  
 " 94/273 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 94/274 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.  
 " 95/178 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.  
 " 95/179 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.  
 " 385/107 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 388/48 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.  
 " 390/114 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 390/115 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.  
 " 447/75 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 447/76 - Plotted - See bomb plot. Plotting doubtful.  
 " 487/99 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 487/100 - Plotted - See bomb plot. Plotting doubtful.  
 " 490/42 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 493/47 - Plotted - Plotted-Track only - See bomb plot.  
 " 493/48 - Not plottable - Not enough check points.

(4) Sortias Received:

SAT	34/55	SAT	100/53	SAT	390/115	SAT	490/42
"	34/56	"	303/131	"	401/196	"	493/47
"	34/57	"	305/303	"	445/106	"	493/48
"	91/204	"	305/304	"	447/75		
"	92/87	"	305/305	"	447/76		
"	94/272	"	351/183	"	452/15		
"	94/273	"	384/309	"	452/16		
"	94/274	"	385/107	"	453/160		
"	95/178	"	388/48	"	458/294		
"	95/179	"	389/126	"	458/296		
"	100/51	"	389/127	"	487/99		
"	100/52	"	390/114	"	487/100		

CONFIDENTIAL  
ACB/RR/cmb

DISTRIBUTION

40 COPIES

~~SECRET~~  
mar

FFF INTERPRETATION REPORT T-75

- (1) General Statement: Thirty-two sorties were received. Five sorties taken with 16 mm movie camera were not plotted because of broken projector and are not listed below. Of the remaining twenty-seven sorties nineteen were plotted.
- (2) See S.A. Report 3497 for additional information.
- (3) Summary of FFF missions on 3 APR 1945 from photographs received through 1700 hours 4 APR 1945.

1st DIVISION

Mission to Kiel

SAT 92/85	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
SAT 92/86	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
SAT 303/129	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
SAT 305/302	-	Not plotted - Not enough check points.
SAT 306/178	-	Plotted - See bomb plot, plotting doubtful.
SAT 306/179	-	Plotted - See bomb plot, track only, plotting doubtful.
SAT 384/207	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
SAT 384/208	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.

3rd DIVISION

Mission to Kiel

SAT 34/54	-	Last plottable print 3½ nau. mi. W of Kiel.
SAT 94/270	-	Plotted - See bomb plot, plotting doubtful.
SAT 94/271	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
- SAT 95/176	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
- SAT 95/177	-	Not plotted - Gain low.
SAT 96/175	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
SAT 96/176	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
SAT 385/106	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
SAT 390/112	-	Plotted - See bomb plot, track only.
SAT 390/113	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
SAT 447/72	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
SAT 447/73	-	Plotted - See bomb plot.
SAT 447/74	-	Plotted - See bomb plot, plotting doubtful.
SAT 487/96	-	No bomb run.
SAT 487/97	-	No bomb run.
SAT 487/98	-	No bomb run.
SAT 490/40	-	Not plotted - gain low.
SAT 490/41	-	Not plotted - gain low.
SAT 493/46	-	Not plottable. - Heavy interference.

(4) Sorties Received:

SAT 34/54	SAT 303/129	SAT 447/73	SAT 490/41
SAT 92/85	SAT 305/302	SAT 447/74	SAT 493/46
SAT 92/86	SAT 306/178	SAT 452/12	
SAT 94/270	SAT 306/179	SAT 452/14	
SAT 94/271	SAT 384/207	SAT 486/143	
- SAT 95/176	SAT 384/208	SAT 486/144	
- SAT 95/177	SAT 385/106	SAT 487/96	
SAT 96/175	SAT 390/112	SAT 487/97	
SAT 96/176	SAT 390/113	SAT 487/98	
SAT 100/50	SAT 447/72	SAT 490/40	



man

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE  
AAF STATION 101  
APO 634

.....  
:SECRET :  
:By Authority of :  
:C. G., Eighth Air Force :  
:Initials: J. F. G. :  
:Date 4 April 1945 :  
:.....

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 339

PERIOD: 0001 hours 4 April to 2400 hours 4 April 1945.

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Total Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>			<u>Totals</u>	<u>NYF</u>
					<u>E/A</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>OT</u>		
Heavy Bomber Atks.	1407	928	2597	6-4-6 A 0-0-0 G	5	1	4	10	1
Fighter Escort (a)	806	798	0	14-0-20 A 9-0-3 G	2	1	5	8	1
Fighter Sweeps	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	35	34	0	1-0-0 A	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	26	24	0	0-0-1A	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	41	41	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>79</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>99</u>	0-0-0 21-4-27A	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	2394	1898	2696	9-0-3 G	8	2	9	19	2

- (a) Includes the two groups based on Continent.
- (b) Includes 16-4-26 Me-262s.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

1407 a/c (969 B-17s, 438 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied in three forces against six operational A/Fs for jet a/c in N Germany, three U-boat yards, the torpedo boat harbor and an oil storage depot at Kiel. 928 a/c dropped 2597 tons (2448.5 GP, 148.5 IB) on three of the assigned A/Fs, three second priority A/Fs, one third priority A/F (2 a/c only), on the Deutsche Werke U-boat yards and port at Kiel, and two T/Os. Kiel bombed on PFF, all other bombing

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Second Force

Twelve group formations (443 B-17s - 1st Air Division) sortied against jet operational A/Fs at Rheinsehlen, Rotenburg and Fassberg, S and SW of Hamburg. 262 a/c dropped 722.2 tons (573.7 tons GP, 148.5 tons IB) on Fassberg A/F, Hoya and Dedelstorf A/Fs (2nd priority targets) and two T/Os visually at 1032-1202 hours from 11,500-15,500 feet. Some formations were unable to bomb targets visually and therefore returned to base with their bombs. Weather: 8/10-10/10 in target areas, with some breaks; tops at 12,000-15,000 feet. Flak: meager to moderate, very accurate at Hoya, meager and inaccurate at Fassberg. Battle damage: 44 minor, 14 major, 2 Cat. "E". E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 B-17 to AA.

Fighter Support: Four groups, including one group based on Continent (232 P-51s) sortied. Up 0741-0809 hours, down 1310-1419 hours, 220 effective sorties. E/a opposition: 6-8 u/i S/e a/c, believed e/a, sighted E of target areas; 3 JU88s sec E of Zwolle. No combat. One loco destroyed and 2 freight cars damaged in strafing. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 P-51s to mechanical causes. NYR: 1 P-51, safe on continent.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Rheinsehlen A/F	105	Not Attacked			
Rotenburg A/F	113	Not Attacked			
Fassberg A/F	225	149	321.7	62.0	Poor-Fair
Hoya A/F (Sec)		37	105.0		Good
Dedelstorf A/F (Sec)		13	26.0	13.0	Unobserved
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Unterluss Fcty area		39	76.0	38.0	Unob. to Good
u/i T/O		24	45.0	35.5	Unobserved
Totals	443	262	573.7	148.5	

Third Force

Fourteen group formations (526 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against three U-Boat Yards, an oil storage depot and the Torpedo boat harbor at Kiel. 507 a/c dropped 1503.5 tons GP on the Deutsche Werke U-Boat yards and port at Kiel (505 a/c) and Eggebek A/F (2 a/c) at 1019-1054 hours from 23,000-26,300 feet. Bombing by H2X, with a few squadrons making visual corrections through breaks in clouds. Leaflets dropped over Kiel. Weather: 8/10-10/10 cloud over Kiel, with tops at 17,000-18,000 feet. Flak: meager to moderate, inaccurate. Battle damage: 42 minor, 8 major. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 B-17s (2 to collision over North Sea, 1 to unknown causes). NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Four groups (223 P-51s) sortied. Up 0830-0852 hours, down 1255-1357 hours. 208 effective sorties. E/a opposition: 2 Me-262s chased unsuccessfully from N. Ameland to 5300N-0610E (SE of Leuwarden). 2 Me-262s seen over Ameland, heading N. No combat. Claims: nil. Losses and MYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Kiel Monkeberg Oil Stge	77	Not Attacked			
Kiel Howaldt's U-Boat Yd	78	Not Attacked			
Kiel Torpedo Boat Harbor	114	Not Attacked			
Kiel Krupp Germania U-Boat	114	Not Attacked			
Kiel Deutsche Werke U-Boat	143	Not Attacked			
Kiel Deutsche Werke (sec)		505	1497.5		Fair-poss. good
Eggebek A/F (3rd Priority)		2	6.0		Unknown
Totals	526	507	1503.5		

2. Fighter Escort

Fourteen groups, including the two groups based on the Continent (748 P-51s, 58 P-47s - 806 a/c) sortied in support of three bomber forces. Up 0700-0852 hours, down 1214-1419 hours. 798 effective sorties. E/a opposition: Escort to First Force engaged some 45 Me-262s in general target areas, and along bomber routes N, E and SE of Hamburg; several FW-190s W of Leipzig and on Ludwiglust, Wittenburg areas. 5 t/e e/a strafed in wooded area NE of Tribsee (54.05N-124.5E); several t/e and m/e a/c on SE edge of Muritz Lake and on ground in Rechlin, and transports and m/e a/c on A/Fs at Wismar at Tarnewitz. Also miscellaneous ground targets strafed. E/a claims: 14-0-20 air (incl. 10-0-19 Me-262s), 9-0-3 t/e and M/e a/c, ground and water. Losses: 8 a/c (7 P-51s, 1 P-47 - 2 to e/a, 1 to AA, 2 to mechanical, 3 to unknown causes). NYR: 1 P-51, safe on Continent.

<u>Miscellaneous Ground Claims</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Locos	3	3
Ammo Cars	8	0
Goods Cars	0	14
Flak Positions	0	2

3. Fighter Sweeps

Nil

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

S E C R E T

5. Photo Reconnaissance

35 a/c (8 F-5E's, 2 P-38s, 25 P-51s as escort) sortied as follows:

- 4 F-5Es on D/A mapping of Dessau and Leipzig areas.
- 3 F-5Es on D/A missions over N and Central Germany.
- 1 F-5E on activity study of Central Germany. 2 s/e a/c attempted interception of this F-5, but escort broke up attack.
- 17 P-51s from 7th Photo Grp. as escort to above.
- 8 P-51s as escort to 2 P-38s PRU a/c on missions to Berlin and Hamburg areas. 2 FW-190s attacked in Potsdam area, but were driven off.

Total effective sorties: 34  
Claims : 1-0-0 FW-190, air  
Losses : nil

6. Weather Reconnaissance

26 a/c (4 B-17s, 3 Mosquitoes, 19 P-51s) sortied as follows:

- 2 B-17s on routine weather flight over sea NW of Lands End.
- 1 B-17 on flight from Azores.
- 1 B-17 on flight to Mid-Atlantic and return.
- 3 Mosquitoes on light weather reconnaissance over North Sea, N Germany, Denmark, U.K. and W of Ireland.
- 19 P-51s as weather scouts for bomber forces. 1 Me-262 claimed damaged.

Total effective sorties: 24  
Claims : 0-0-1 Me-262 air.  
Losses : nil

7. Air/Sea Rescue

41 a/c (22 P-47s, 1 PBV, 2 B-17s, 16 P-51s as escort) sortied. One pilot picked up 12 miles E of Lowestoft. The 6 men that went down on 30 March also picked up. No losses.

8. Special Operations

79 a/c (26 B-24s, 27 B-17s, 12 Mosquitoes, 14 P-51s) sortied as follows:

- 11 B-24s on special dropping operation, night 3/4 April. 2 a/c aborted.
- 4 B-24s on VHF, jamming from 0500-0825 hours.
- 11 a/c (1 B-17, 10 B-24s) on leaflet missions, 10 a/c successful, dropping leaflets over Germany, Holland and France.
- 12 a/c (10 P-51s, 1 B-17, 1 B-24) as radio relays.
- 4 P-51s as escort to B-24 as radio relay a/c.
- 1 B-17 on radar scope reconnaissance, night 3/4 April.
- 9 Mosquitoes as chaff a/c for 1st and 3rd Air Divisions.
- 2 Mosquitoes on special operations for 2nd and 3rd Air Divisions.
- 1 Mosquito on experimental navigational flight over S Germany and France. Mosquito lost to Me-262 attack vicinity of 5325N-1215E.

S E C R E T

3. Special Operations (cont'd)

24 B-17s - 1st Air Division - sortied on special bombing operation against the Finkenwarder U-Boat shipbuilding yard at Hamburg. 22 a/c dropped 99 tons of 4500 lb. RP/CP bombs on primary by H2X with unobserved results at 0919-0920 hours from 20,000-20,900 feet. Claims and losses: nil.

Total effective sorties 73. Losses 1 Mosquito.

C. INTELLIGENCE1. Enemy Air Opposition

Weather over Germany was favorable for e/a operations, with sufficient ceiling and breaks in low cloud for enemy to put up a maximum t/e jet reaction. At least 50 Me-262s are believed to have been involved in sporadic though aggressive efforts to intercept the first force (B-24s) from 0920 in the Hamburg area to 1000 hours in the Parchim-Perleberg target area. For the first time Me-262s were reported using external wing tanks which were jettisoned prior to attacks. In addition to normal types of attacks, some e/a were reported making steep climbing as well as diving passes at the bombers. Escorting and sweeping fighters curtailed ability of jets to deliver strongly coordinated attacks, dispersing and engaging Me-262s over a wide area for claims of 11-0-19. Bombers reported attacks from 25 - 30 e/a resulting in losses of five B-24s and claims of 6-4-6. E/a concentrated on the bombers and used clouds to advantage in avoiding combat with our fighters.

The entire opposition of the Luftwaffe was thrown at the bulk of leading force of bombers (B-24s) which attacked the most easterly targets, Perleberg and Parchim. Bombers reported most attacks being made in the target areas from 0930 to 0955 hours by lots of one, two and three e/a, approaching usually from 6 o'clock and slightly low. Apparently several attempts were made by e/a to attack in waves of five to eight a/c, but escort was able in most instances to break up enemy formations, resulting in smaller uncoordinated attacks from a number of directions - principally 6 o'clock. Most vicious attacks appear to have been made during or near the bombing runs. Escort reported e/a made no contrails, and some confusion was caused by the considerable number of friendly fighters trying to engage e/a in the same area.

Some Me-262s were significantly reported carrying auxiliary wing tanks which were observed being jettisoned before e/a went into attack. Generally, e/a evaded combat when turned into by our fighters, using high speed to reach clouds or deck. In one instance, a P-51 attacking Me-262s diving into cloud had to throttle back to avoid over-shooting, and in damaging one jet in a pursuit on the deck, fighters reported speed of e/a much less at minimum altitude than at 27,000 feet where originally engaged. In two instances Me-262s attempted to bounce separated flights of P-47s.

The P-51 group sweeping the target area some 30 minutes before arrival of bombers discovered 7 Me-262s at 6000 feet over Parchim A/F and very successfully engaged for claims of 3-0-1. Another Me-262 bounced at Kummerower Lake was chased at 1000 - 2000 feet to Rostock where it was destroyed after being overtaken in a shallow turn. A further single Me-262 was destroyed at comparatively low altitude, 8,000 feet in the Perleburg vicinity.

There was no opposition from conventional s/e e/a, although a few were encountered. P-51s destroyed one of four long-nosed FW-190s sighted at Ludwigslust at 1000 feet at 0935 hours. Fighters of the same group later engaged 4 FW-190s west of Leipzig around 1010 hours and destroyed three of them in addition to an u/i pusher-type s/e near Wittenberg. Five FW-190s sighted flying at 500 feet west of Magdeburg at 0950 hours evaded, using cloud cover.

P-51 relay a/c unsuccessfully chased 2 Me-262s near Ameland Island at 1010 hours; these e/a were flying on a NE course.

A P-51 escorting an early returning fighter sighted 3 JU-88s flying a 30-degree course at 700 feet east of Zwolle, but could not engage because of oil on canopy.

## 2. Flak

Perleberg - meager to moderate, accurate.

Kiel - meager to moderate, inaccurate, tracking and barrage.

Cuxhaven - meager to moderate, very accurate.

Fassburg - meager, inaccurate.

Hamburg - meager to moderate, inaccurate to accurate.

## 3. Observations

Rheinsehlen A/F - s/e fighters seen in revetments on A/F - all revetments were full.

Several s/e a/c were seen on the Fassberg A/F.

75-100 e/a on A/F approximately 5230N-1030E.

C a/c observed on A/F at 5433N-0901E.

No a/c observed on Schleswig A/F, but tracks led off A/F to dispersal area where 10 FW-190s were parked.

12 e/a (possibly JU-88s) on A/F at 5430N-0903E.

20 (possible t/e) silver a/c on Eggebek A/F (5437N-0921E);

50 e/a reported on Jusum A/F.

7 silver e/a on A/F at 5428N-0932E.

## 4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Kiel Harbor Area - Fair, possibly Good.

Target bombed by 49 squadrons carrying 500 and 1000 lb. GP bombs. Approximately one-third of the pattern can be seen, three patterns of 1000 lb. GP bombs can be noted on the NE part of the Deutsche Werke A.G., one pattern of 1000 lb. GP fell on the extreme south end of the harbor, and across the Krupp Germania Works A.G., causing two explosions. Part of another pattern fell on the shops and dry docks between these works and the previous mentioned works

S E C R E T

and hit the harbor area. One and perhaps two patterns fell on the RR junction immediately south of the main station and parts of three patterns fell across the main RR junction point just north of the M/Y south of the city. Other patterns were noted in the suburban and built-up part of the area and all evidence available indicated that almost all bombs fell on and close to the city area. Three patterns are  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -4 miles from the target and in open areas.

Wesendorf A/F - Unobserved to Fair Results.

A few bursts are observed across landing ground and on perimeter track.

Unterluss - Munitions Factory - Unobserved to Good Results

Cloud of 5/10 to 10/10 density covers target. Four concentrations of GP and one of frag bombs bursting in and adjacent to munitions factory. The large-multi-bay building south of RR servicing the plant was hit by both GP and frag bombs, and many other buildings in area. Many hits on road and rail lines in vicinity of plant. Smoke prevents complete assessment.

Hoya Landing Ground - Good Results

Through heavy cloud it was possible to see two concentrations of bombs blanketing south and central portions of target. Some bombs fell among station buildings but the main weight of bombs fell on the landing ground, and will post hole it effectively.

Fassberg A/F - Poor to Fair Results

Cloud of 6/10 - 10/10 density covered most of the A/F at time of attack. No bursts could be seen in target area. However, from bombs-away photography it is highly probable that some bombs fell near center of A/F.

5. Ground Situation

21st Army Group

: Canadian army has advanced NE to A 0298, E 9494, 9080, 8572, 8863 and north to E 7773, 6876, 5875. The enemy are out of contact.

Second British Army spearheads report at B 0899, V 2600, 1807, 3015. Enemy resisting and counter attacking west of Osnabruck.

Ninth U.S. Army spearheads reported at B 7867, 6876, W 7802, 6605, B 5188, 2191. US troops have broken in Hamm and have crossed the river southwards.



S E C R E T

12th Army Group

: Third U.S. Army spearheads reported at J 0520, H 9770, 7890, 5599. Enemy opposition reported in Fulda. Mopping up continues. Other spearheads reported at G 0332, B 9038.

6th Army Group

: The capture of Heilbronn has not been confirmed by the Seventh US Army. US patrols driven out by counter attacks. Heavy fighting reported in Wurzburg. 17 weak German divisions are reported to be trapped between the 12th and 21st Army Groups.

Osnabruck was by-passed by tank divisions and captured by airborne troops.

6. G.A.F. Activity over England

Up to 2400 hours - 0909 hours 4 April, 1 e/a sighted approximately 75 miles east of Sturhead flying east, 32,000 ft., at over 500 M.P.H. Royal Observer Corps state this e/a was first located by them over Scunthorpe flying at over 30,000 ft and that they identified it as an Me-262.

D. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Ninth Air Force	1380	9-0-6 Air 22-3-16 Cd	8
First US T.A.F.	239+	0-0-0	0
Second T.A.F.	1048	0-0-0	10
RAF Fighter Command	229	0-0-0	1
Totals	2896	9-0-6 Air 22-3-16 Cd	19

Ninth Air Force

Sorties

: 358 Bombers  
886 Fighters and Fighter-Bombers  
136 Reconnaissance

1380 a/c

Missions

: 9th Bomb Division: -358 bombers. 328 a/c effective dropping 615 tons on M/Y, a supply depot, a POL dump and barracks area in Stuttgart, Heilbronn area, with unobserved results. 3 a/c lost to causes unknown.

9th T.A.C: 186 sorties. Armed recon. in the Ruhr; escort to 9th Bomb. Div. and to C-47s on resupply mission; air and ground cooperation to First US Army. A/F at Esterstedt attacked - 26 tons dropped. Unobserved Results.

19th T.A.C: 451 sortied. Air and ground cooperation to 12th and 20th Corps; fighter sweeps in Leipzig-Chebnitz area. Armed recon. in Halle - Weimar area. A/Fs at Merseburg, Schweinfurt, Jena, Nordhausen bombed and strafed. 18 tons and six Napalm tanks dropped. 25 - 30 s/c e/a encountered in Weimar-Mulhausen area.

29th T.A.C: 249 sortied. Armed recon. in the Ruhr; cover given to a Ninth US Army armored column; escort to 9th Bomb Div. 51 tons and 72 Napalm tanks dropped on casual targets.

136 a/c on reconnaissance for Ninth Air Force. 89 effective.

E/A Claims

: 9-0-6 Air; 22-3-16 Ground.

Other Claims

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T	196	121
RR Cars	364	100
Locos	30	25
AFV	11	11
Gun Positions	11	3
Rail Cuts	9	
Hwy Cuts	3	

Losses

: 8 a/c (3 bombers - 5 fighters)

NYR

: 1 Fighter.

First U.S. T.A.F.

Night - 3/4 April

Sorties : 5 Intruder Patrols

Claims & Losses : nil

Day - 4 April

Sorties : 42 Bombers  
192 Fighters.

234 a/c

Missions : 42nd Bomb Wing: 42 sorties. 38 a/c attacked town of Offenheim, unobserved results.

12th T.A.C.: Report unavailable.

1st French Air Force: 180 sorties. Armed recon. in Ludwigsburg, Stuttgart area; air coop. in Karlsruhe, Baden Baden, Stuttgart area.

Western French Air Force: 12 sorties. Installation at Port St. Vivien attacked; Coastal Command mission in Royan, St. Nazaire area.

E/A Claims & Losses : nil

Losses : nil

Second T.A.F.

Night - 3/4 April

Sorties : 97 Armed Reconnaissance  
9 Interception Patrols  
10 Reconnaissance

116 a/c

Missions : Armed recon. in Oldenburg, Bremen, Hannover, Magdeburg, Deventer areas.

E/A Claims : nil

S E C R E T

Second T.A.F. (continued)

Other Claims	:		<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
		M/T	17	45
		RR Cars		80
		Barges		7

Losses : 1 Mosquito

Day - 4 April

Sorties : 27 Medium bombers  
495 Armed Recon.  
16 Prearranged support  
46 Immediate Support  
219 Interception Patrols, A/S Rescue, etc.  
129 Reconnaissance  
932 a/c

Missions : Mediums attacked from positions near Deventer, unknown results; corn storage at Dunkirk. Armed recon. in Holland and NW Germany. Typhoons attacked a Hq. at V 8226, and other a/c attacked concentrations of enemy transport at Schattdorf.

E/A Claims : nil

Other Claims	:		<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
		M/T	96	215
		Locos	3	18
		RR Cars	2	12
		AFV	3	3
		HDV	5	6
		Barges	1	23

Losses : 9 Fighters

R.A.F. Fighter Command

Night - 3/4 April

Sorties : 15 Intruder Patrols over Holland, NW Germany,  
4 Interception Patrols (& Czechoslovakia)

19 a/c

E/A Claims & Losses : nil.

S E C R E T

R.A.F. Fighter Command (continued)

Day - 4 April

Sorties : 20 Escort to Bombers  
          6 Reconnaissance  
          210 a/c

Claims : nil

Losses : 1 a/c

S E C R E T

2. Fifteenth Air Force

4 April 1945

A very turbulent frontal system in the north Adriatic prevented heavy bomber operations. A small fighter force was dispatched to fly under this frontal system and strafe objectives in southern Germany.

3. R.A.F. Bomber Command

Day - 4 April

243 Lancasters  
9 Mosquitoes  
252 a/c

Targets  
Nordhausen - town and  
barracks

Losses  
1  
1 a/c

Night - 4/5 April

256 Lancasters

Lutzkendorf Synthetic Oil  
Plant - NE Halle

6

327 Lancasters  
15 Mosquitoes

Merseburg/Leuna Syn. Oil Plant

3

277 Halifaxes  
36 Lancasters  
15 Mosquitoes

Harburg-Rhenania Oil Ref, nr  
Hamburg

2  
2

35 Mosquitoes  
31 Mosquitoes  
30 Lancasters  
77 Mosquitoes  
35 Halifaxes  
9 Fortresses  
12 Liberators

Berlin  
Magdeburg  
Minelaying  
Bomber Support

0  
2  
3

3 Mosquitoes  
9 Halifaxes

R.C.M.

1182 a/c

18 a/c

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

CHARLES Y. BANFILL,  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,  
Director of Intelligence.