

HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date: April 1945
13 CBW FO 87
13 CBW FO 309
3 AD FO 610

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (KIEL, GERMANY)

TO: Colonel Shuck - 95

1. Information Concerning the Targets: a. The 1st priority target (visual only) for 13A Group was the Ship Building Slips and Timber Stores of the Fried Krupp Germania Werft A.G., situated on the East side of the Harbor at Kiel, Germany.

b. The 1st priority target (visual only) for 13B and C Groups was the Erecting and Testing Shop of the Fried Krupp Germania Werft A.G., situated on the East side of the Harbor at Kiel, Germany.

c. The 2nd priority target (H2X) for all Groups was the Dry Dock in the Deutsche Werke A.G., situated on the East side of the Harbor at Kiel, Germany.

2. Planning and Execution:

| a. Order: | Bomb Load: | Force: | Assigned Target: |
|-----------------|-------------|--------|------------------|
| (1) 45 A,B,C: | | | Kiel |
| (a) 452 | 12 x 500 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (b) 388 | 12 x 500 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (c) 96 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (2) 4 A,B,C,D: | | | Kiel |
| (a) 486 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (b) 94 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (c) 447 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (d) 487 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (3) 93 A,B,C,D: | | | Kiel |
| (a) 493 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (b) 34 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (c) 385 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (d) 490 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (4) 13 A,B,C: | | | Kiel |
| (a) 390 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (b) 100 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |
| (c) 95 | 6 x 1000 GP | 36 A/C | |

| b. Availability: | Airborne: |
|------------------|---|
| (1) 95 | Reg: 44 A/C 59 C/C Lead: 11 A/C 9 C/C |
| (2) 100 | Reg: 42 A/C 45 C/C Lead: 13 A/C 10 C/C |
| (3) 390 | Reg: 45 A/C 57 C/C Lead: 12 A/C 10 C/C |

C O N F I D E N T I A L

c. Non-effective Sorties and Returning Spares:

(1) 95 Group: A/C 9052: 335 Sqdn "S" - Pilot Lt Dillon - #2 engine failure - No sortie. A/C 2455: 336 Sqdn "Z" - Pilot Lt. Nelson - #2 engine failure - No sortie.

(2) 100 Group: A/C 297: 350 Sqdn "X" - Pilot Lt. Alvo - #4 engine failure - No sortie.

(3) 390 Group: A/C 9013: 568 Sqdn "H" - Pilot Lt. Sloan - #3 engine running rough - No sortie.

d. Lead A/C Failures and/or Malfunctions:

(1) 100B: H2X equipment not usable for bombing.

(2) 390D: H2X not used for bombing (personnel error).

e. A/C Outstanding:

(1) 100 Group: A/C 992: 351 Sqdn "S" - Pilot Lt. Baldwin.

f. A/C Landing Away From Base:

(1) 95 Group: A/C 6475: 336 Sqdn "L" - Pilot Lt. Snyder - Landed at Halesworth - Low on gas - returned to base later - Sortie.

3. Navigation:

| Position | Flight Plan | Altitude | AL: M: | 13A (390) Lt. Col. Waltz Lt. Webster | 13B (100) Col. Sutterlin Lt. Wild | 13C (95) Lt. Col. Cumber Lt. Pieper |
|---------------|-------------|----------|--------|--|---|---|
| BU 11 | 19150' | | | 20600' on time on course | 20900' on time on course | 20900' on time on course |
| CP 1 | 19750' | | | 20800' on time on course | 21500' 1 min. early on course | 21500' 1 min. early 3 mi. right |
| CP 2 | 25000' | | | 25800' 1 min. late 19 mi. left | 26000' 5 min. late 18 mi. left | 25000' 3 min. late 25 mi. left |
| IP | 25000' | | | 25850' 15 min. late on course | 26000' 14 min. late on course | 25000' 16 min. late 2 mi. right |
| TGT | 25000' | | | 25640' (2nd priority) | 26000' (2nd priority) | 25200' (2nd Priority) |
| RP | 24000' | | | 25000' 16 min. late 10 mi. left | 25000' 16 min. late 11 mi. right | 25000' 20 min. late on course |
| CONT COAST | 14000' | | | 24500' 15 min. late 5 mi. right | 24700' 15 min. late 5 mi. right | 24500' 14 min. late on course |
| CP 3 | Minimum | | | 24500' 2 min. late 7 mi. left | 24500' 4 min. late 6 mi. left | 24600' 9 min. late 10 mi. left |
| ENG COAST | Minimum | | | 2400' 13 min. early 5 mi. left | 2000' 16 min. early 2 mi. right | 2000' 14 min. early 6 mi. right |

a. Assembly: 13A assembled over Buncher 11, 13B over Buncher 28, and 13C over Buncher 23. Assembly altitude was raised from 16000' to 17000' to avoid interference with clouds at the briefed altitude. The Wing assembly was completed 5 miles North of Felixstowe. Proper interval was taken in the Division Column at Southwold.

b. Route: The route was flown essentially as briefed to 0500E. The bomber stream started to the left of course at this point and continued further from course until 5450-0745. At this point, which was 40 miles North of course, a correction was made to the briefed course.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Bombing altitude was reached 72 minutes prior to the IP. The peel off was made at the IP for individual H2X runs to the 2nd priority target. After bombs away, the Wing was reassembled near the RP. The briefed route was followed until departure from the Continental Coast. Enroute across the North Sea, after passing Helligoland, the Wing was 10-12 miles left of course in order to avoid weather on course. The briefed descent was not made until 0430E in order to stay above the weather.

c. Weather: Over the bases at take-off there were 7-9/10 cumulus and strata-cumulus at 2-3000° with visibility 8-12 miles, and scattered light showers. Enroute to the target there were 7-9/10 cumulus at 15-17000°, with isolated tops at 20-22000° over the Continent. There were nil middle clouds to 4-5/10 thin alto-stratus associated with cumulonimbus over the Continent and target area. In the target area there were 8-10/10 cumulus and strata-cumulus at 10-12000° and 4-6/10 alto-stratus at 18-20000°, with a large break just to the North of the target over water. Enroute to the bases there were 7-9/10 cumulonimbus at 20-22000°, lowering to 15-17000° at Frisian Islands, then becoming low strata-cumulus. Over the bases on return there were 3-4/10 cumulus and strata-cumulus at 3000° with visibility 6-8 miles. There were light non-persistent contrails at 25-26000° in the target area. Average winds enroute were 292/51K, 253/42K with 235/55K in the target area.

d. Failures: (1) Equipment: None.

4. Bombing:

| a. | Attacking: | Jettisoning: | Returning: |
|-----|---|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 95 | 2nd P 36 A/G 213 x 1000 GP | 3 A/G 15 x 1000 GP | |
| 100 | 2nd P 37 A/G 214 x 1000 GP | | 1 A/G 6 x 1000 GP |
| 390 | 2nd P 37 A/G 207 x 1000 GP 5 x WG 49 5 x T 351 | 2 A/G 7 x 1000 GP | |

C O N F I D E N T I A L

b. 13A (390)

| Squadron: | A | B | C | D |
|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Lead A/G No. | 749 | 571 | 660 | 784 |
| Target: | 2nd P | 2nd P | 2nd P | 2nd P |
| A.P. | Assigned | Assigned | Assigned | Assigned |
| A/C Releasing: | 10 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Bomb Load: | 6x1000 GP | 6x1000 GP | 6x1000 GP | 6x1000 GP |
| Method of Release: | Salvo | Salvo | Salvo | Salvo |
| Altitude: True: | 24750° | 24140° | 25000° | 24500° |
| Ind: | 25600° | 25200° | 25000° | 24500° |
| True Heading: | 085 | 091 | 090 | 095 |
| Drift: | 3 L | 4 L | 4 L | 3 L |
| Trail Change: | None | None | None | None |
| Ground Speed: | 279 MPH | 273 MPH | 277 MPH | 278 MPH |
| Tan. D.A. | .65 | .64 | .65 | .65 |
| Time of Release: | 1742½ | 1743½ | 1743 | 1743 |
| C-1 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pattern: Length: | | | | |
| Width: | | | | |
| Errors: Range: | | | | |
| Def: | | | | |
| Radial: | | | | |
| Percent: 1000° | | | | |
| 2000° | | | | |
| Grew: | AL: Lt. Col. Waltz | | Capt. Hanneld | Lt. Ellis |
| | P: Capt. Tracy | Lt. Allen | Lt. Babbitt | Lt. McKinney |
| | TG: Lt. Riolo | Sgt. Lambrecht | Sgt. Elstrom | Sgt. Gaeto |
| | N: Lt. Webster | Lt. Donahue | Lt. Stevens | Lt. Barrett |
| | AN: Capt. Arvin | | | |
| (No. of Leads) | B: Lt. (19) Pace | Lt. (11) Smith | Lt. (10) Guekes | Lt. (2) Goldstein |
| (Missions) RN: | Lt. (22) Robinson | Lt. (9) Anderson | Lt. (9) Groves | Lt. (3) Wolfert |

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 390A: The R/N picked up the target in the scope at 45 miles. Initiating the attack on a true heading of 073 degrees, the R/N clutched in the bombardier at 11 miles. Subsequent rate checks at 10, 9, and 8 miles were good. Bombardier was unable to give any visual assistance. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.
PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

390B: The target was identified in the scope at 50 miles. After the turn at the IP, the attack was begun on a true heading of 122 degrees. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and subsequent rate checks of 10, 9, 8, and 7 miles were good. No visual assistance was given on the bomb run. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.
PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

390C: The R/N identified the target at 50 miles. After the maneuver at the IP, the R/N clutched the bombardier in at 11 miles. Subsequent rate checks of 10, 9, 8, and 7 miles were good. No visual assistance was given on the bomb run. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily the entire operation.
PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

390D: The H2X bomb circle was out of calibration. The R/N failed to check the calibration prior to the bomb run; consequently the rate checks established by the PFF equipment were in error. The bombardier caught the mistake and dropped on the smoke bombs of 390A.
PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

390A: A/G 479 jettisoned 1 x 1000 GP at 5408-0908 because of a rack malfunction over the target.

390B: A/G 9013 had a mission failure (#3 engine running rough) and jettisoned 6 x 1000 GP at 5220-0230.

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o. 13B (100)

| Squadron: | A | B | C | D |
|--------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Lead A/C No. | 719 | 794 | 183 | 849 |
| Target: | 2nd P | 2nd P | 2nd P | 2nd P |
| A.P. | Assigned | Assigned | Assigned | Assigned |
| A/C Releasing: | 9 | 10 | 8 | 10 |
| Bomb Load: | 6x1000 GP | 6x1000 GP | 6x1000 GP | 6x1000 GP |
| Method of Release: | Salvo | Salvo | Salvo | Salvo |
| Altitude: True: | 25600' | 24900' | 24700' | 25000' |
| Ind: | 26000' | 26200' | 25000' | 25700' |
| True Heading: | 080 | 081 | 072 | 088 |
| Drift: | 1 R | 1 R | 2 R | 5 R |
| Trail Change: | 1 mil | 1 mil | 5 mils | 1 mil |
| Ground Speed: | 280 MPH | 290MPH | 290MPH | 290 MPH |
| Tan. D.A. | .55 | | .71 | .50 |
| Time of Release: | 1743½ | 1743½ | 1744 | 1744 |
| C-1 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pattern: Length: | | | | |
| Width: | | | | |
| Errors: Range: | | | | |
| Def: | | | | |
| Radius: | | | | |
| Percent: 1000' | | | | |
| 2000' | | | | |
| Crew: | AL: Col. Sutterlin | Maj. Staples | | Lt. Kodas |
| | Capt. Williams | Capt. Blanding | Lt. Weiland | Lt. Wolford |
| | Lt. Blockson | Lt. Biesser | Egt. Appleby | Sgt. Uvice |
| | Lt. Wile | Lt. Bittman | Lt. Pranger | Lt. Frumia |
| | AN: Lt. Pferffer | | | |
| (No. of Leads) | B: Lt. (19) Orendorff | Lt. (17) Belimow | Lt. (3) Taliver | Lt. (2) Paterna |
| (Missions) RN: | Lt. (22) Cately | Lt. (16) Jenista | Lt. (27) Becker | Lt. (13) Wells |

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(1) Narrative: 100A: After the maneuver at the IP, the R/N proceeded to set up course by H2X technique. The bombardier was clutched in at 12 miles and subsequent rate checks at 11, 10, 9, 7, and 6 miles were made. The rate checks at 11 and 10 miles were not good and required adjustments. No visual assistance was given on the bomb run. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.

PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

100B: The range and definition of the H2X set was too weak and could not be used for bombing. 100B released its bombs on the smoke flares of 100A. The cause for the H2X equipment failure is undetermined at the present time.

PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

100C: The R/N identified the target in the scope at 47 miles. After the turn on the IP, the R/N clutched in the bombardier at 11 miles. Subsequent rate checks of 9, 8, 7, 6, and 5 miles were made. The 7 mile check was not good and an adjustment was required. The bombardier could not give any visual assistance on the bomb run. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily. PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

100D: The target was identified in the scope at 40 miles. After the turn at the IP, the attack was initiated on a true heading of 064 degrees. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and subsequent rate checks at 10, 9, 8, and 7 miles were made. Rate checks of 10 and 9 miles were not good and required adjustments. No visual assistance was given on the bomb run. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.

PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

100G: A/C 297 had a mission failure (#4 engine failure) and returned 6 x 1000 GP

C O N F I D E N T I A L

a. 13C (95)

| Squadron: | A | B | C | D |
|--------------------|----------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Lead A/C No. | 8210 | 8548 | 8782 | 8179 |
| Target: | 2nd P | 2nd P | 2nd P | 2nd P |
| A.P. | Assigned | Assigned | Assigned | Assigned |
| A/C Releasing: | 8 | 11 | 8 | 9 |
| Bomb Load: | 6x1000 GP | 6x1000 GP | 6x1000 GP | 6x1000 GP |
| Method of Release: | Salvo | Salvo | Salvo | Salvo |
| Altitude: True: | 24600° | 25600° | 24100° | 24900° |
| Ind: | 25000° | 26000° | 24500° | 25300° |
| True Heading: | 090 | 094 | 088 | 083 |
| Drift: | 4 L | 9 L | 5 L | 3 L |
| Trail Change: | -2 miles | -2 miles | -2 miles | -2 miles |
| Ground Speed: | 308 | 295 | 299 | 288 |
| Tan. D.A. | .695 | .67 | .675 | .63 |
| Time of Release: | 1748 | 1749 | 1748½ | 1750 |
| C-1 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pattern: Length: | | | | |
| Width: | | | | |
| Errors: Range: | | | | |
| Def: | | | | |
| Radial: | | | | |
| Percent: 1000° | | | | |
| 2000° | | | | |
| Crew: AL: | Lt. Col. Cumbaa | Capt. Morris | Lt. Stanborough | Lt. Wright |
| P: | Capt. Savage | Lt. Taylor | Lt. Jensen | Lt. Oehlert |
| TC: | Lt. Evans | Sgt. Munroe | Sgt. Olsen | Sgt. Mandelberg |
| N: | Lt. Pieper | Lt. Arterburn | Lt. Sorenson | Lt. Graham |
| AN: | Lt. Inman | | | |
| (No. of Leads) B: | Lt. (9) Asprocolas | Lt. (10) Carter | Lt. (12) Zultz | Lt. (1) Scherty |
| (Missions) RN: | Lt. (20) Derohernias | Lt. (21) Weber | Lt. (28) Painter | Lt. (4) Heald |

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(1) Narrative: 95A: The R/N picked up the target in the scope at 45 miles. After the maneuver at the IP, the bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles. The bombardier, on the approach to the target, was able to set up rate visually through a break in the clouds prior to clutch in point. Bombardier was unable to give further visual assistance on the bomb run. Rate checks of 10, 9, 8, and 7 miles were excellent. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.

PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

95C: After the maneuver at the IP, the R/N identified the target in the scope at 35 miles. Because of weak reception on the route to the target, 95C took proper interval behind 95A. In the event the H2X equipment should fail, 95C was to drop on the smoke flares of 95A. Subsequent rate checks of 10, 9, 8, and 7 miles were good. H2X worked satisfactorily on the bomb run. Bombardier was not able to give visual assistance because of existing weather conditions.

PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

95B: The target in the scope was identified at 45 miles by the R/N. After the turn at the IP, the bombardier was clutched in at 70 degrees and subsequent rate checks at 65, 60, 55, 50, and 45 degrees were good. Because of existing weather conditions the bombardier was unable to give visual assistance. H2X equipment operated satisfactorily.

PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

95D: Because of poor scope definition, the R/N was not able to pick up the target until 25 miles from the BRL. The bombardier was clutched in at 70 degrees and subsequent rate checks of 65, 60, 55, 50 and 45 degrees were made. The range was low on the H2X equipment due to low pressure in the system. However, the set was satisfactory on the bomb run. Because of weather conditions, bombardier was unable to give any visual assistance. It was contemplated that H2X equipment would not operate properly on the bomb run. Consequently, 95D raised its altitude in anticipation of dropping with 95B.

PI: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

(2) Bombing Malfunctions:

95A: A/C 9052 jettisoned 6 x 1000 GP at 5241-0257 because of a #2 engine failure. A/C 7783 jettisoned 1 x 1000 GP at 5340-0520 because of rack malfunctions over the target.

95C: A/C 2455 jettisoned 6 x 1000 GP at 5230-0310 because of #2 engine failure.

Communications: a. VHF: (1) There was a slight interference on Channel A (790) during the assembly, but messages could be intelligibly read. The interference was maximum when the formation was directly over Bungay II at 2000°. At 11000°, the steady tone was not heard anymore. The source of this interference is still unknown.

(2) The channel B monitor A/C received the calls from the Scouting Force one hour prior to target time. Fireball Leader was notified, and after receiving the target weather information, he passed it back to the other Group Leaders. There was very satisfactory contact between Wing Leaders on this channel.

(3) The fighter A/C assigned to guard the fighter-bomber frequency were very alert in answering calls from Fireball Leader. Fireball Baker (95A) did not need close fighter aid, as the Group Leader did not make contact.

(4) There were no distress messages sent to Air/Sea Rescue.

b. W/T: (1) One A/C from 95 (336-L) was in distress and sent an SOS message to the Wing Ground Station. Radio Operator could not contact the proper MF/DF section because someone on the crew had jettisoned the tuning units. This is evidence of poor crew discipline and especially bad judgement on the part of the radio operator.

(2) Following is the tabulation of Strike and Progress Reports:

| 390A | CP1 | CP2 | TGT | CP3 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|
| Flight Plan | 1557 | 1659 | 1727 | 1854 |
| ATA | 1557 | 1650 | 1743 | 1856 |
| TOD | 1606 | 1713 | 1800 | 1912 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------|-------|------|-----|------|------|-------|------|-----|------|
| 390A | S B 5 | 1743 | TOD | 1810 | 100A | S B 5 | 1744 | TOD | 1830 |
| B | S B 5 | 1744 | TOD | 1755 | B | | | | |
| C | S B 5 | 1743 | TOD | 1844 | C | S B 5 | 1743 | TOD | 1858 |
| | | | | | D | | | | |

95A

| | | | | |
|---|-------|------|-----|------|
| B | S B 5 | 1748 | TOD | 1928 |
| C | S B 5 | 1748 | TOD | 1847 |
| D | | | | |

(3) The large difference between target time and time of dispatch is due to the extreme range of this particular target. The radio operators were unable to get the strike reports in until they had returned to a point in range of the ground station transmitter.

6. Photography: a. 95 installed 2 scope, 4 oblique, and 8 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures. 2 sets of H2X scope photos were received, 1 of which is plottable; remaining set is not plottable because brilliance was too low.

b. 100 installed 1-16mm scope, 2 oblique, and 8 vertical cameras, 1, 2, and 6 of which took pictures. A/C 8313; #4 A/C 100B, with K-21 installed: camera well doors were closed by the crew. A/C 8836, #2 A/C 100A, with K-21 installed: camera was frozen. 1 roll 16mm film taken.

c. 390 installed 2 scope, 2 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures. 2 sets of plottable H2X scope photos were received.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

Ernest A. Kiessling

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis

THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
OFFICE OF THE ENGINEERING OFFICER

April 3, 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion Report, Aircraft Number 43-39052.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559

1. The subject aircraft aborted from the combat mission of April 3, 1945.
2. The pilot reported that the No. two (2) engine was throwing an excessive amount of oil out of the breather, the oil pressure started to rise then dropped and the oil temperature became excessive. The pilot feathered the propeller.
3. Upon examination on the ground it was found that the cuno had fine metal filings on it and also the sump plug, indicating that the engine had failed internally.

Edward J. Flanagan
EDWARD J. FLANAGAN
Captain, A. C.
Engineering Officer

THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) C-B-1
OFFICE OF THE OPERATIONS OFFICER
APO 559

4 April 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion of aircraft No. 2455

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.
(attention operations officer)

1. I took off in aircraft No. 2455 on mission of 3 April 1945.

2. At 1710 and $54^{\circ} 30'$ N and 0700° E my No. 2 engine started smoking furiously while onley pulling $35''$ and 2300 RPM. Slight smoke puffs were noticed before this time but the engine kept running smooth and I was not worried about it. How ever I tried reducing the power setting on No. 2 at the first sign of its acting up. Smoke came out of the engine for about five minutes when oil started accumulating on the nacelle at which time the engine started vibrating and knowing it wouldn't be of any further use I immediately feathered the prop. No. 3 engine's maximum output at the time of abortion was $34''$ and was not dependable either. Altitude was 24,400 ft. I returned to base and landed at 2015 hours.

Rudolph W. Nelson
RUDOLPH W. NELSON
1st. Lt. A. C.
Pilot

1st. Ind.

336th Bomb Sqdn., 95th Bomb Gp (H), APO 559, U.S. Army, 4 April 1945.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.
(attention operations officer)

1. I consider the action taken justifiable.

2. For your information.

Joseph D. Garrison
JOSEPH D. GARRISON
Capt. A. C.
Asst. Operations Off.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Intelligence Officer

3 April 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the mission to Kiel, Germany on above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - this Group formed the 13C Combat Group to attack SS installations at Kiel, Germany. Lt. Col Cumbaa was Group Leader.

95A - Eight A/C plus one PFF A/C flew as the lead squadron, all but one A/C attacking the secondary target Kiel by H2X. Spare A/C 9052 returned from 5418N-0800E at 1705 hours because of #3 engine failure.


95B - Ten A/C plus one PFF A/C flew as the high squadron and all A/C bombed the secondary target.

95C - Eight A/C plus one PFF A/C flew as the low squadron and all but one A/C attacked the secondary target. Spare A/C 2455 turned back at 1710 hours at 5430N-0700E because of #2 engine failure.

95D - Eight A/C plus one PFF A/C flew as the low-low squadron and all A/C bombed the secondary target.

2. Further Intelligence Information has been reported in the Operational Narrative TWX.

For the Intelligence Officer:


ARNO A. KRAUSE,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

oper

13 COMBAT WING

*390th Bomb Gp.
100th " "*

XXXX

XXXX

3-4-45

8-2

OPERATIONAL NAME. KIEL, GERMANY 3 APRIL 1945

1. NONE

**2. A SQUADRON - SECONDARY PFF - PHOTO CLOUD COVERED - R N IDENTIFIED
TARGET - VERY GOOD RESULTS.**

**B. SQUADRON - SECONDARY PFF - PHOTO CLOUD COVERED - R N IDENTIFIED
TARGET - EXCELLENT RESULTS**

**C SQUADRON - SECONDARY PFF - PHOTO CLOUD COVERED - R N IDENTIFIED
TARGET - RESULTS UNKNOWN**

**D SQUADRON - SECONDARY PFF - PHOTO CLOUD COVERED - R N IDENTIFIED
TARGET - VERY GOOD RESULTS**

3. NONE

4. FLAK

A. DAMAGE FINAL

95A 4A IP TO BRL

95B 2A IP TO BRL

95C NONE 95D NONE

B. OPERATIONS

1. NONE 2. NONE 3. NONE

C. AMOUNT, ACCURACY

2. TARGET - MEASURE TO MODERATE - ACCURATE FOR LEAD SQUADRON.

TRACKING & BARRAGE (ENCOUNTERED)

3. NAME AS NO ONE

4. NONE ENCOUNTERED - MEASURE PLAK OBSERVED AT HELGOLAND

5. NONE

6. NONE

D. PHENANEMA - NONE

8. WEATHER - 8/10 LOW TOPS 6/8000' - 6/10 MIDDLE CLOUD. MOD PERSISTENT
CONTRAILS.

9. OBSERVATIONS

1750HRS KILL SMOKE SCREEN

1755HRS KILL FICORD AS MANY AS 30 MERCHANT VESSELS IN CONVOY IN
LINE TWO ABREAST. HEADING WEST.

1810HRS 5428-0955 LOADS OF SHIPPING CEASING AROUND LIKE WATER BUGS.
LARGER VESSELS WERE FURTHER OUT IN BAY.

7. FIGHTER SUPPORT WAS PAIR. THE ONLY DEPARTURE FROM BRIEFED COURSE
OCCURRED WHEN THE WING LEADER MISSED THE PRE - IF TURNING POINT BY FLYING
ABOUT FIFTEEN MILES NORTH. THEN THE WING RETURNED TO BRIEFED COURSE
AND THE MISSION WAS OTHERWISE FLOWN AS PLANNED. ORDER OF BOMBING WAS
A, C, B, D.

CONFIDENTIAL
4 APR 1945

772

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3497

ATTACK ON KIEL ON 3 APR 1945

1. INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 719, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1639 - 1750 B hours.
- (d) Bombs : 3127 x 1000 lb. G.P.
2710 x 500 lb. G.P.
74 x 500 lb. I.B.

2. DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

- (a) Photographs received are partially cloud and smoke obscured making accurate plotting of bursts difficult. Groups and concentrations of H.E. bombs are seen bursting across the Southern edge of the TORPEDO BOAT HARBOR, The Eastern edge of DEUTSCHE WERKE A.G. SHIP-BUILDING YARD, and the Eastern edge of KIEL/HOLTENAU AIRFIELD.
- (b) Bursts are visible on the docking area and built-up areas of KIEL as follows: (Distances are measured from the NAVAL DOCKYARD unless otherwise specified).
 - (i) Two groups of at least 60 across the Southern section of the TORPEDO BOAT HARBOR with scattered bursts extending across the adjacent wharf area, among small buildings, and roads approximately two miles Northwest.
 - (ii) A group of at least 15 across the extreme Eastern edge of the KIEL/HOLTENAU AIRFIELD $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles North-Northwest with possible hits on facilities in that area.
 - (iii) A group of at least 15 in the water immediately East of the KIEL/HOLTENAU SEAPLANE STATION AND AIR PARK, three miles North-Northwest.
 - (iv) Approximately 70 extend from the edge of the INNER DOCKYARD BASIN of DEUTSCHE WERKE A.G. and over a business/residential and open area a mile to the Southeast. Possible hits are visible within the basin.
 - (v) Scattered groups of bursts totalling approximately 140 on the West bank of KIEL HARBOR (at a point immediately South of BLUCHER JETTY) and extending $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the West with hits on business/residential areas.
 - (vi) A group of approximately 30 in the waters of KIEL HARBOR $\frac{1}{2}$ mile Northwest.
 - (vii) Approximately 50 in a lightly built-up area three miles South-Southwest with at least 10 hits on rail lines.
 - (viii) A group of at least 50 in a sparsely built-up area approximately three miles Northwest with probable hits on small buildings.
- (c) Other bursts:

Approximately 25 in open fields and across the Southern end of the PAS SADER SEE, $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles Northeast of KIEL.

3. SMOKE SCREEN: The KIEL smoke screen is seen in effective operation.

4. ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

5. BOMB PLOT: None prepared.

/6. PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

S E C R E T

First Force

Six group formations (224 B-17s - 1st Air Division) sortied against U-Boat concentrations and dockyard facilities, and Monkeberg Oil Storage Depot, two assigned targets in Kiel area. 220 a/c dropped 687.5 tons total (669.0 GP, 18.5 IB) on second Priority target, Kiel Deutsche Werke U-Boat Yards and a T/O (Flensburg A/F) at 1538-1654 hours from 24,300-26,700 feet. Secondary bombed using H2X technique, visual on T/O. Leaflets dropped on Kiel. Weather: 9/10-10/10 undercast at Kiel. Flak: meager, inaccurate. Battle Damage: 2 minor, E/a opposition: 3 Me-163s, 1 Me-262 seen at 5440N-0931E - no combat. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Three groups (175 P-51s) sortied. Up 1442-1453 hours, down 1912-1946 hours. 157 effective sortied. E/a opposition: 3 Me-262s encountered vicinity Flensburg, 5-6 possible jets sighted west of Kiel. Claims: 1-0-0, Me-262 Air. Losses: 1 a/c (oxygen failure) NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

| <u>Assigned Targets</u> | <u>Sorties</u> | <u>Effective Sorties</u> | <u>Tonnage</u> | | <u>Results</u> |
|--|----------------|--------------------------|----------------|-----------|----------------|
| | | | <u>GP</u> | <u>IB</u> | |
| Kiel Port Area | 147 | Not Attacked | | | |
| Kiel/Monkeberg Oil Storage Depot | 77 | Not Attacked | | | |
| Kiel-Deutsche Werke U-Boat Yards (Sec) | | 218 | 663.0 | 18.5 | Unobserved |
| <u>Other Target</u> | | | | | |
| Flensburg A/F | | 2 | 6.0 | | Unobserved |
| Totals | 224 | 220 | 669.0 | 18.5 | |

Second Force

Fourteen group formations (528 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against Krupp-Germania, Deutsche Werke, Howaldts Werke, U-Boat Yards in Kiel area. 499 a/c dropped 1572.0 tons GP total on assigned targets, Krupp Germania U-Boat Yards not attacked due to cloud cover over target, at 1713-1750 hours from 23,700-26,400 feet. Target bombed mostly on H2X; some visually and combination H2X and visual technique. Leaflets dropped in Kiel area. Weather: 8/10-10/10 cloud at Kiel, tops 10,000-15,000 feet, moderate haze through breaks. Flak: moderate, fairly accurate. Battle damage: 20 major, 99 minor. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 a/c (unknown reasons) NYR: 1 a/c (believed landed in Sweden).

Fighter Support: Seven groups (394 P-51s) sortied. Up 1506-1529 hours; down 1930-2005 hours. 360 effective sortied. E/a Opposition: nil.

SECRET

Claims: nil. Losses: 2 a/c (1 mechanical failure, 1 to accident), 1 Cat. "E" (crashed at take-off). NFR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

| <u>Assigned Targets</u> | <u>Sorties</u> | <u>Effective Sorties</u> | <u>Tonnage</u> | <u>Results</u> |
|---|----------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Kiel-Howards Werke U-Boat Yards | 211 | 21 | 72.0 | Fail |
| Kiel-Krupp Germania Werke U-Boat Yards | 152 | Not Attacked | | |
| Kiel-Deutsche Werke U-Boat Yards | 262 | 195 | 1500.0 | Fail |
| Totals | 625 | 199 | 1572.0 | |

2. Fighter Escort

Ten groups (569 P-51s) sortied in support of two bomber forces. Up 1112-1529 hours; down 1912-2005 hours. 517 effective sorties. Ena Opposition: 3 Me-262s encountered vicinity of Flensburg. 5-6 possible jets seen diving on unidentified target west of Kiel. Claims: 1-0-0 Me-262 Air. Losses: 3 a/c (1 to oxygen failure, 1 mechanical failure, 1 to accident). 1 a/c Cat "E", crashed at take off. NFR: nil.

3. Fighter Sweep

Two groups, one 301st, based on Continent, (100 P-51s) sortied on area support to bombers. Up 1112-1515 hours; down 1910-2030 hours. 98 effective sorties. Ena opposition: nil. Entrailed Kiel area to Danish coast uneventfully. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. 1 Cat "E" (crashed due to rough engine). NFR: nil.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil

5. Photo Reconnaissance

6 a/c (4 P-51s, 1 Mosquito, 1 P-5) sortied as follows:

1 Mosquito sortied on night photo mission over Belgium, S. Germany and France.

1 P-5, 4 P-51s escort, sortied for D/A photos in Hamburg, Bremen, Barge, Kiel areas.

Losses: nil.

S E C R E T

6. Weather, Reconnaissance

29 a/c (18 P-51s, 7 Mosquitoes, 4 B-17s) sortied as follows:

- 1 B-17 flew routine weather flight to the Azores.
- 2 B-17s flew weather flights over sea to NW of Lands End.
- 1 B-17 flew routine weather flight to the position 13 and return.
- 7 Mosquitoes flew weather flights over U.K., Atlantic, Northern Germany, NW Germany, N Sea, Denmark, Holland, Germany, Southern Belgium and France.
- 18 P-51s sortied as weather scouts for bombers, 17 effective.

Losses: 2 P-51s (1 to unknown reason, 1 to mechanical failure).

7. Air/Sea Rescue

33 a/c (16 P-47s, 1 GA-10, 1 B-17, 15 P-51s from four fighter groups) sortied on routine search and patrol mission.

Losses: nil.

8. Special Operations

45 a/c (20 B-24s, 11 Mosquitoes, 10 P-51s, 4 B-17s) sortied as follows:

10 B-24s on leaflet mission to Germany, Holland and France. 9 a/c effective.

9 B-24s on VHF screening, jamming from 0449-0745 hours; 1155-1520 hours - search 0509-0740 hours.

3 B-17s on H2X scope reconnaissance of Wilhelmshaven and Ulm.

6 Mosquitoes as screening force for heavy bombers. 1 NYR.

5 Mosquitoes flew special operation for 3rd Air Division. 1 a/c aborted.

12 a/c (10 P-51s, 1 B-24, 1 B-17) as radio relays.

Losses: nil.

NYR: 1 Mosquito.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Weather over Northern Germany was generally 8/10 cumulus cloud, base 2,000-3,000 feet, tops 15,000-18,000 feet. Visibility 2 to 3 miles. Occasional tops rose to 25,000 feet and there were cloud breaks between showers.

No organized opposition was put up by the GAF, the only encounter being 3 Me-262s which attempted to bounce a fighter - these o/a were flying on a N.E. course at 26,000 feet near Flensburg at 1630 hours and attempted to bounce a fighter escorting the 2nd force. A second P-51 pilot fires at o/a and destroyed one.

Another fighter group, escorting the 1st force, sighted 5 - 6 possible jets West of Kiel at 27,000 feet at approximately 1700 hours but were unable to engage.

2. Flak

Kiel - Meager to moderate, accurate,
Flensburg - Meager, inaccurate barrage.

3. Observations

No observations of military importance.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Port Area and Dockyard Facilities at Kiel - Fair Results

Smoke and haze make interpretation difficult. As nearly as can be determined there are two 1000 lb. GP bomb patterns on the entrance to the inner boat basin and adjacent to the work shop buildings of the Deutsche Werke. Some evidence that part of a pattern at least fell on one corner of the inner boat basin and adjacent dock area. There are two other patterns on the torpedo boat harbor on the west side of the bank and adjacent dock area. Six patterns fell on the west side of the town, one, possibly two, on the southern side of the town and one in the east suburbs. One pattern observed in the water in the central part of the harbor just north of the Deutsche Werke. Another pattern noted in the bay north of the Naval Dock Yard on the east side of the harbor.

5. Ground Situation

21st Army Group

- The advance into Holland beyond Emmerich continues towards the Zuider Zee. The Twenty Canal and the River Issel have been crossed and Lang Kappelle and Hummel occupied. U.S. troops have occupied Munster. Bieloefeld has been bye-passed and Herford has been reached. Rhein and Nordhorn have also been occupied and Paderborn has been reached.

12th Army Group

- Armored columns made further progress in the Eisenach area against stiffening resistance and have reached Oberkatz and Lichtenau. Heavy fighting continues in Kassel. There is no effective enemy resistance north of the Road Gelnhausen-Fulda. Advances have also been made by First U.S. Army between Wurzburg and Marburg and reached Willebadessen. Mopping-up operations are continuing and several counter-attacks have been repulsed.

6th Army Group

- French troops to the north of Karlsruhe have extended their bridgehead eastwards, occupying Brouchsel and the road and railway to the north. U.S. troops hold a line from a point 15 KM. North of Brouchsel eastwards including Sinsheim and Wimpfen. There is an unconfirmed report the Heilbronn has been occupied. Another unconfirmed report claims that an armored thrust along the south bank of the Main is now halfway to Nurnburg. An advance to a depth of 8 KM has been made to the NE of Aschaffenburg.

D. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

| | <u>Sorties</u> | <u>Claims</u> | <u>Losses</u> |
|------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|---------------|
| Ninth Air Force | 768 | 4-4-3 Air 4-0-6 Ground | 1 |
| 1st U.S.T.A.F. | 187 | 0-0-0 | 0 |
| 2nd TAF | 664 | 0-0-0 | 6 |
| R.A.F. Fighter Command | 254 | 2-0-0 Air | 0 |
| Totals | 1883 | 6-4-8 Air 4-0-6 Ground | 7 |

Ninth Air Force

Night-2/3 April

No operations due to weather.

Day -3 April 1945

Sorties : 477 Fighters and Fighter Bombers
227 Bombers
64 Reconnaissance
768 a/c

Mission : 9th Bomb Division - 227 sorties. Dropped 400 tons on three M/Ys in tactical area in support of ground forces.

9th TAC. - 183 sorties, Escort to medium bombers, A/F cover. Armed Reconnaissance in Ruhr area.

19th TAC - 212 sorties, Air cooperation with 12th and 20th Corps, Armed reconnaissance over 3rd Army front.

29th TAC - 82 sorties, Air cooperation with 19th Corps, Air support to advanced armored elements.

E/A Claims : 4-4-8 Air 4-0-6 Ground

Losses : 1 Fighter NYR: 4 Bombers

| Ground Claims : | <u>Destroyed</u> | <u>Damaged</u> |
|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| M/T | 148 | 91 |
| Armored Vehicles | 5 | 11 |
| Locomotives | 7 | 8 |
| Buildings | 32 | 38 |
| RR Cars | 35 | 84 |

First U.S.T.A.F.

Night - 2/3 April

Sorties : 5 a/c Intruder Patrol

Claims and Losses: Nil.

S E C R E T

Day - 3 April 1945

Sorties : 177 Fighters and Fighter Bombers
5 Reconnaissance
182

Mission : 42nd Bomb Wing: Nil.

12th TAC: 145 sorties. Air support to 15th and 21st Corps. Armed Reconnaissance East of Karlsruhe.

1st French TAF: 32 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in support of ground forces.

Western French TAC: 5 Sorties. Visual and weather Reconnaissance.

E/A Claims and Losses: Nil.

| Ground Claims | | <u>Destroyed</u> | <u>Damaged</u> |
|---------------|-----------|------------------|----------------|
| | M/T | 19 | 5 |
| | RR Cars | 21 | 18 |
| | Buildings | 26 | 13 |
| | Rail Cuts | | 4 |

2nd TAF

Night - 2/3 April

Sorties : 90 Armed Recon.
10 Intruder Patrols
12 Reconnaissance
112

Mission : Armed Reconnaissance in Northwestern Germany - attacked road movement.

Claims and Losses: Nil.

Day - 3 April

Sorties : 310 Armed Recon.
6 Medium Bombers
28 Immediate Support
61 Reconnaissance
147 Interception and A/Sea Rescue.
552 a/o

S E C R E T

Mission : Medium bombers attacked Dunkirk dropping 12 tons.
Fighters - Armed Reconnaissance Holland and NW Germany
A/C on immediate support attacked road traffic in
Lingen area.

E/A Claims : Nil.

Losses : 6 a/c

| | | | |
|-----------------|-----|------------------|----------------|
| Claims(Ground): | | <u>Destroyed</u> | <u>Damaged</u> |
| | M/T | 84 | 154 |
| | HDD | 9 | 2 |

RAF Fighter Command

Night - 2/3 April

Sorties : 22 a/c Intruder and Long Range Patrol over Germany

Claims : 1-0-0 Air

Losses : Nil.

Day - 3 April

Sorties : 24 Offensive Patrol
16 Interception Patrol
188 Escort to Bomber Command
12 Escort to Coastal Command
2 Weather Reconnaissance
242 a/c

Mission : Attacked rail, road and water traffic in Hague area.

E/A Claims : 1-0-0 Air

Losses : Nil.

91

S E C R E T

2. Fifteenth Air Force

2 April 1945

168 B-17s, 126 B-24s and 51 P-51s sortied.

167 B-17s and 121 B-24s, escorted by 50 P-51s, dropped 753 tons on Graz M/Y and 2 tons on a T/O. 12 of escorting fighters flew uneventful sweep of Graz Zagreb area. Claims and Losses: Nil.

129 B-24s and 36 P-38s sortied.

126 B-24s escorted by 36 P-38s dropped 284 tons on Aulm River RR Bridge (4655N-1533E) and 17 tons on Zeltweg M/Y, Claims and Losses: Nil.

89 B-24s and 54 P-51s sortied.

87 B-24s escorted by 53 P-51s dropped 201 tons on St. Polten M/Y and 6.5 tons on other targets with good results. Claims and Losses: Nil.

112 B-24s and 52 P-51s sortied.

105 B-24s escorted by 47 P-51s dropped 253 tons on Krems M/Y with good results. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 B-24s.

34 P-38s sortied.

34 P-38s flew uneventful air sweep West of Vienna, Claims: nil.
Losses: 1 a/c.

95 a/c (40 P-38s and 55 P-51s) sortied.

92 a/c (37 P-38s and 55 P-51s) flew a fighter sweep in southern Germany and Yugoslavia. Numerous ground claims, Claims: 4-1-0 Air, Losses: 5 a/c (2 P-38s, 3 P-51s)

39 P-38s sortied.

38 P-38s dropped 36 tons on Wildon RR Bridge (4654N-1538E) with fair results, Claims: nil, Losses: 2 P-51s.

12 P-38s sortied on an unsuccessful sweep on an A/F in Yugoslavia.

Losses: Nil.

Bombers

Sorties : 624 a/c (168 B-17s, 456 B-24s)
Eff. Sorties: 606 a/c (167 B-17s, 439 B-24s)
Tonnage : 1309
Claims : Nil
Losses : 2 B-24s

Fighters

Sorties : 372 a/c (211 P-51s, 161 P-38s)
Eff. Sorties: 350 a/c (205 P-51s, 145 P-38s)
Tonnage : 36
Claims : 4-1-0 Air
Losses : 8 a/c (5 P-51s, 3 P-38s)

S E C R E T

3 April 1945

102 P-38s sortied.

97 P-38 dive bombed Tannah Stein Railroad Bridge dropping 87 tons on target. E/A Claims and Losses: Nil.

Operational Highlights

A frontal system lying in the northern Adriatic precluded the possibility of even small formations of heavy bombers making attacks on German targets, therefore because of their maneuverability and high rates of climb fighters were dispatched.

3. RAF Bomber Command

Day - 3 April

| | <u>Targets</u> | <u>Losses</u> |
|----------------|--------------------------------|---------------|
| 247 Lancasters | Nordhausen (Military Barracks) | 3 |
| 9 Mosquitoes | | |
| 256 a/o | | |

Night - 3/4 April

| | | |
|---------------|----------------|---|
| 94 Mosquitoes | Berlin | 0 |
| 8 Mosquitoes | Flauen | 0 |
| 6 Mosquitoes | Siren Tour | 1 |
| 9 Lancasters | Minelaying | 0 |
| 16 Mosquitoes | Bomber Support | 0 |
| 133 a/o | | 1 |

NOTE: THE FOREGOING IS BASED ON PRELIMINARY REPORTS AND IS NOT TO BE USED FOR RECORD PURPOSES.

CHARLES Y. BANFILL
Brigadier General, USA
Director of Intelligence.

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S E C R E T