

INTERSTATE REPORT S.A. 3482

ATTACK ON TARGETS IN HANNOVER ON 28 MAR 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 466, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8th AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1044 - 1120A hours.
- (d) Bombs : 4340 x 500 lb. G.P.
1108 x 500 lb. G.P.

(ii) STATEMENT ON THE TARGETS:

This report includes attacks on three targets in HANNOVER, GERMANY. They are: The VEREINIGTE LEICHTMETALLWERKE G.m.b.H., The GEBRUDER KORTING A.G., and the HANNOVERSCHE MASCHINENBAU A.G.

(iii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

(a) Eleven groups of H.E. bursts and at least four scattered groups of incendiary bursts are visible on 8/10 to 10/10 cloud obscured photographs with direct hits seen on VEREINIGTE LEICHTMETALLWERKE G.m.b.H., scattered H.E. bursts and incendiary bursts on GEBRUDER KORTING A.G., and incendiary bursts on the Northeast corner of HANNOVERSCHE MASCHINENBAU A.G.

(b) Hits are seen on the targets as follows:

1. VEREINIGTE LEICHTMETALLWERKE G.m.b.H.

A single concentration of bursts is seen blanketing the Northwest three-fourths of the factory and extending into the HANNOVER/LINDEN MARSHALLING YARD. Small fires can be seen burning later in the attack. Hits are seen on the factory and its facilities as follows. (numbers refer to the target illustration).

- Machine shop and office (23) : 3 direct hits.
- Machine shop (24) : 3 direct hits.
- Extruding and press shop (25) : 3, possibly 6, direct hits.
- Tube shop (26) : 3 direct hits.
- Hammer and press shop (29) : 1 direct hit.
- Foundry (28) : 1 probable direct hit.
- Alloy foundry (32) : 1 direct hit.
- Swaging and press shop (34) : 1 direct hit, several near hits
- Sorting sidings of Marshalling yard: 9 hits.

2. GEBRUDER KORTING A.G.

A group of approximately 50 bursts is seen just outside the Southern edge of the target area with six to eight scattered bursts reaching the target but extremely poor photographs prevent a definite statement as to hits by these bursts. A small cluster of incendiary bursts is seen across the extreme Southwest corner of the factory. Other bursts, with possible hits in the vicinity of the target, are seen through smoke which completely obscures the target area, again making further interpretation impossible. One group of at least 50 H.E. hits is seen on unidentified industrial site immediately North of the target.

3. HANNOVERSCHE MASCHINENBAU A.G.

A concentration of 55 H.E. bursts is seen on the North edge of the target with a near hit to the office. Incendiary bursts cover

(c) OTHER BURSTS: (Distances measured form the center of the HANNOVER/LINDEN MARSHALLING YARD).

5305

1. A group of approximately 45 bursts and a cluster of incendiaries on an industrial area 1000 yards Northeast.
2. A string of at least 50 H.E. bursts across the LEINE RIVER and residential buildings 300 yards North.
3. Approximately 60 H.E. bursts in a residential and park area 1750 yards East.
4. Thirty five H.E. bursts in a heavily built-up area 2500 yards Northeast.
5. Twenty five scattered H.E. bursts and incendiaries on a park area 2500 yards East.
6. Twenty five scattered bursts on a residential area 3000 yards Northeast.
7. Fifteen scattered bursts on a park and sparsely built-up section 2000 yards Northeast.
8. A group of approximately 50 bursts in open fields 3500 yards West.
9. About ten scattered bursts in a lightly built-up area 7000 yards North-Northeast.
10. Five scattered bursts in fields 3250 yards East.

(iv) ACTIVITY:

(a) HANNOVER/LINDEN MARSHALLING YARD.

1. The yard is covered on poor quality photographs.
2. The sorting sidings are heavily loaded, the remainder of the yard is lightly loaded.

(b) HANNOVER/SEELZE MARSHALLING YARD.

1. The yard is covered on partially cloud obscured photographs.
2. The sidings are moderately loaded.

(c) HANNOVER/ALAINHOLZ MARSHALLING YARD.

1. The yard is covered on poor quality photographs.
2. The sidings are heavily loaded.

(v) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(vi) BOMB PLOT: A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed.

(vii) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV	Date	Time	Location	Dimensions	Notes
SAV 34/759	28 MAR 1945	1057A hrs.	1/42,400(F.L.7")	24,900'	'C'
SAV 34/760	"	1100A "	1/25,400(F.L.12")	25,400'	'C'
SAV 92/995	"	1106A "	1/24,500(F.L.12")	24,500'	'B'
SAV 94/1585,1586,1588,1591	"	1050A "	1/42,000(F.L.7")	24,500'	'C'
SAV 95/1674,1675,1676,1677,1679	"	1109A "	1/42,800(F.L.7")	25,000'	'B & C'
SAV 96/1022,1025,1026	"	1120A "	1/25,050(F.L.12")	25,000'	'B'
SAV 100/1197,1195,1198,1199	"	1112A "	1/42,800(F.L.7")	25,000'	'C'
SAV 303/1844	"	1104A "	1/24,300(F.L.12")	24,300'	'C'
SAV 385/1192,1194	"	1108A "	1/46,200(F.L.7")	27,000'	'C'
SAV 385/1193	"	1107A "	1/25,900(F.L.12")	25,900'	'C'
SAV 388/1121,1123,1125	"	1113A "	1/44,100(F.L.7")	25,900'	'B & C'
SAV 390/1576,1578,1580,1583	"	1111A "	1/42,800(F.L.7")	25,000'	'B & C'
SAV 447/1155,1157,1158,1160	"	1044A "	1/42,300(F.L.7")	24,700'	'B & C'
SAV 452/1137,1138,1141	"	1118A "	1/42,300(F.L.7")	24,700'	'B'
SAV 486/1032,1034,1035	"	1056A "	1/42,300(F.L.7")	24,700'	'B'
SAV 487/985,986,990,988	"	1052A "	1/42,800(F.L.7")	25,000'	'B & C'
SAV 490/862,863,864,865,866,868	"	1100A "	1/43,500(F.L.7")	25,500'	'B & C'
SAV 493/831,833,834	"	1103A "	1/43,100(F.L.7")	25,250'	'B & C'
0 100/89-9	"	"	"	"	"

IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 4152

LOCALITY: HANNOVER/HAINHOLZ M/Y.

PERIOD COVERED: From 1100A hours on 27 MAR to 1520A Hours 30 MAR 1945.

ATTACKS:

	<u>Date</u>	<u>S.A.</u>	<u>Reported Weather</u>
U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE.	28 MAR 1945	-----	8 - 10/10 clouds.

PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE.

Some scattered bits of new damage to the lines and yards of this target can be seen. Repairs of earlier damage on thru lines are visible.

Details of Damage follow: (Numbers in parenthesis refer to III.6(d)(vi)100/a)

LOCOMOTIVE AND REPAIR FACILITIES

No change seen.

TERMINAL FACILITIES.

Goods Depot (6) : At least six new craters can be seen cutting tracks & derailling some wagons. No attempt appears to have been made to repair the large explosion area. Goods depot is 90% unserviceable. Transshipment shed is 80% unserviceable. Facilities are 71% unserviceable.

MARSHALLING YARD.

Sorting Sidings (2) : At least ten new craters cutting tracks can be seen. Several wagons are derailed.

Sorting Sidings are 15% unserviceable, M/Y 7% unserviceable.

THROUGH RUNNING LINES

Line to Lehrte, from Hannover Main Station: At least 5 new craters on the line at a Crossover point, mostly already repaired.

Near the Rangier several new craters can be seen, again almost all appear repaired.

Through running lines are 25% unserviceable.

OTHER DAMAGE

Small sidings served by line under bridge (18) are cut by several craters.

LOADING

Moderate.

(Print 3127,4079-83)

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 22 Squadron.

SORTIE: US7/91D.

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 1520 A hrs. on 30 MAR 1945.

SCALE: 1/8,000 F.L.36"

COVER AND QUALITY: Full, good.

LAST REPORT: K 4134.

COMPARATIVE SORTIE USED: 106G/5125 3078-88-4078

PRINT DISTRIBUTED: 4086 (to follow when available)

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3484

ATTACK ON TARGETS IN GERMANY ON 28 MAR 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK

- (a) No. of aircraft : 13, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1029 - 1126A hours.
- (d) Bombs : 104 X 500 lb. G.P.
52 X 500 lb. I.B.

(ii) STATEMENT ON THE TARGETS

This report cover attacks on targets of opportunity located at MINDEN, HAMBEN, NEURUPPIN AND an unidentified town.

(iii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK

(a) MINDEN; G.S.G.S. 4416/N3 - 805106.

Bombs away are seen but no bursts are visible on completely cloud obscured photographs.

SAV 84/761 28 MAR 1945. 1123A hrs. 1/41,100 (F.L. 7") 24,000' 'C'

(b) HAMBEN; G.S.G.S. 4416/P4 - 110910

At least six H.E. bursts are seen in the partially built-up residential area in the Eastern section of town.

SAV 95/673 28 MAR 1945. 1126A hrs. 1/42,000 (F.L. 7") 24,500' 'B'

(c) NEURUPPIN; G.S.G.S. 4416/M7 - 405945

At least six H.E. bursts are seen in the lake immediately East of the town of NEURUPPIN.

SAV 92/997 28 MAR 1945. 1100A hrs. 1/39,400 (F.L. 7") 23,000' 'A'

(d) Bursts are seen on an unidentified small town.

(iv) ACTIVITY

NEURUPPIN AIRFIELD

(a) There are eighteen, possibly 20, aircraft visible on the airfield as follows:

Type	SW side	NE side
Medium/large	12	6, possibly 8

(b) The landing ground is serviceable.

(v) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(vi) BOMB PLOT : None issued.

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HEADQUARTERS 3D AIR DIVISION
APO 559

D-W-27

31 March 1945

SUBJECT: PFF Bomb Plot

TO : Commanding Generals, 4th, 13th, 45th and 93rd Combat Bombardment
Wings, APO 559. ATTENTION: A-2 & A-3
Commanding Officer, Each Bombardment Station, APO 559
ATTENTION: S-2 & S-3

1. The purpose of the attached PFF bomb plot is to provide information as to bomb strike when no SAV photographs showing strike or ground detail are available. These plots will be issued through regular bomb plot channels within 24 hours after each mission. PFF bomb plots are derived exclusively from scope photographs.

2. The center of each plot indicates impact of the lead a/c of formation it represents and can be considered accurate to within three-tenths of a mile. Twelve sorties from mission to Hannover on 28 March were plotted independently of any information from visual photographs. Results were then compared with P.I. results. Comparison of five scope plots with actual strike was possible showing three to have zero difference, one to have .4 miles and one to have .5 miles difference, the average discrepancy being .18 miles. Comparison of six plots with P.I. plots taken from SAV photos showing ground detail at bomb release with strike unobserved netted an average of .6 miles difference which is undoubtedly partially due to error encountered in plotting from the SAV photos.

3. The PFF bomb plot is an overlay of a 1:100,000 map. Center of concentric circles progressing by one nautical mile steps represents the assigned MPI for the largest number of groups attacking. Dotted area shows outline of built-up section of town. Circles of 1/4 mile radius are drawn around the computed point of impact to represent average area of a squadron pattern.

By command of Major General PARTRIDGE:

John P. Thomas
JOHN P. THOMAS
Major, Air Corps
Actg Adj Gen

1 Incl:

Incl 1 - PFF bomb plot, Hannover M/Y, 28 Mar 45, GSGS 4416-N4

- 1 -
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HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

27

Date 28 March 1945
13 CBW FO 83
13 CBW OPS 306
3 AD FO 624

SUBJECT: Supplement to Tactical Report (HANNOVER, GERMANY)

Colonel Truck - 950

1. Corrections:

a. Paragraph 2, c, (1), page 2: Change to read - A/C 8469: 33d Bdn "D" - Pilot Lt. Shaaf - #2 engine failure and runaway prop - Sortie.

b. Paragraph 2, c, (2), page 2: In addition - A/C 811: 418 Sq "D" - Pilot Lt. Kane - #1 engine on fire on the bomb run - Sortie.

c. Paragraph 2, c, (3), page 2: In addition - A/C 837: 569 Sq "D" - Pilot Lt. David - #4 engine failure - No sortie.

d. Paragraph 2, d, (1), page 2: Change to read - 950: H2X par inoperative. 95D: H2X set weak in range and definition.

e. Paragraph 2, d, (2), page 2: Change to read - 100A: Foreign error in operation of H2X equipment. 100C: H2X set failure.

f. Paragraph 2, d, (3), page 2: Change to read - 390A: H2X set definition. 390B: H2X set failure.

g. Paragraph 2, e, (1), page 2: Change to read - A/C 7257: 41 Bdn "L" - Pilot Lt. Durham - Landed on the continent - Crew is OK - A/C is out for maintenance.

h. Paragraph 3, a, page 3: Change to read - 13A assembled over Buncher C-1, 13B and 13C over Buncher C-12. Briefed assembly altitude was 18000' for 13A and 13B, and 15000' for 13C. However, because of clouds at the briefed altitude, assembly was raised to 21000' for 13A and 13B, and 21000' for 13C. Because of this change in altitude, the Division Leader delayed all timings 30 minutes. 13B was 5 minutes late at Buncher C-1, therefore it was necessary for 13C to turn to the left while 13B cut inside Buncher C-12 to make up this time. The Wing assembled shortly after Buncher C-15.

i. Paragraph 4, b, (2), (f), page 5: Change to read - A/C 9037 released its bombs in Hameln, Germany. The GP bombs hit in a sparse built-up factory district near the center of the city.

j. Paragraph 4, b, (2), (g), page 5: Change to read - A/C 9037 released 8 x 500 GP and 4 x 500 IB on a TO (bombight in A/C was used at Hameln, Germany, 5206-0922. Bomb bay doors could not be fully opened down in time to attack the 2nd priority. Bomb bay doors failed to open electrically. A/C 8469: had a mission failure (#2 engine out) and jettisoned 8 x 500 GP and 4 x 500 IB at 5100-0844.

k. Paragraph 4, b, (3), (e), page 5: Change to read - Bombing Altitude: 23910' True, 25000' Indicated.

l. Paragraph 4, b, (3), (g), page 5: Change to read - A/C 720 released 8 x 500 GP and 4 x 500 IB on a TO at 515-5225 upon a flare signal from the lead A/C. Bomb bay doors failed to open electrical and could not be cranked down in time to attack the 2nd priority target.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

n. Paragraph 4, c, (3), (c), page 7: Change to read - Bombing Altitude: 24000° True, 24650° Indicated. (The altimeter in the lead A/C was not correct. Consequently, the difference in altitude between 390A and 390B was too great. 390C had the proper altitude. This accounts for the differential in the indicated altitude between 390A and 390C.)

o. Paragraph 4, d, (3), (b), page 9: Change to read - After the maneuver at the IP, correct intervals for individual Squadron H2X runs were taken. The H2X equipment failed in 100C and the Squadron then "S"ed and took interval behind 100D, in order that they could drop on 100D's smoke bombs. Enroute to the BRL, 100D leader was hit by flak and left the formation. The deputy leader took over and completed the run. Because of no H2X equipment in either Squadron, 100D released on the smoke flares of 100B, and 100C released on the smoke flares of 100D.

p. Paragraph 4, d, (3), (c), page 9: Change to read - Bombing Altitude: 100D: 24000° True, 24000° Indicated.
100C: 24500° True, 24500° Indicated.

By Command of Brigadier General MUGLIN:

Ernest A. Kiessling

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis.

3. Navigation:

Position	Flight Plan	AL: N:	13A (95) Lt. Col. Stuart Lt. Wilbourne	13B (390) Maj. Perry Lt. Yary	13C (100) Lt. Col. Lyster Lt. Cheney
BU C-1	18000'		24000' On time On course	24000' 5 min. late 5 mi. right	21000' 1 min. early On course
BU C-12	18000'		24000' On time On course	24000' 3 min. late 15 mi. right	22300' 3 min. early On course
CP-1	22350'		25000' 4½ min. late 5 mi. left	24000' 3 min. late 4 mi. left	24000' 3 min. late 6 mi. right
I.P.	25000'		25000' 5 min. late On course	25600' 3 min. late 2 mi. left	24500' 4 min. late 2 mi. left
TGT	25000'		25000' (2nd Priority)	25600' (2nd Priority)	24500' (2nd Priority)
R.P.	24000'		24000' 6 min. late On course	24600' 5 min. late On course	24000' 3 min. late 5 mi. left
CP-2	16000'		16000' 7 min. late 2 mi. left	16700' 3 min. late 1 mi. left	16800' 2 min. late 3 mi. left
ENG COAST	Minimum		5000' 9 min. late 7 mi. right	3600' 8 min. late 2 mi. right	3000' 6 min. late On course

a. Assembly: 13A assembled over Buncher C-1, 13B and 13C over Buncher A-68. Assembly altitude for 13A and 13B was 24000' and 21000' for 13C. The assembly altitude was raised 6000' because of clouds at the briefed altitude. The Division leader delayed all timings 30 minutes because of this additional altitude. 13B was 5 minutes late at Buncher C-1, therefore it was necessary for 13C to turn to the left while 13B cut inside Buncher C-12 to make up this time. The Wing was assembled shortly after Buncher C-15.

b. Route: The route was flown essentially as briefed to the Pre-IP. At this point 13B and 13C echeloned to the left in order to obtain the proper interval for the bomb run. The peel off was made at the IP and individual HZX runs were started on the 2nd Priority target. Bombing altitude was reached at CP 1, 54 minutes prior to the IP. 13A and 13C were reassembled shortly after the RP. However, since 390D was lagging on the bomb run, 13B was not reassembled until approximately 0830E. The briefed descent was not started until 0900E because of clouds and contrails. At 0700E 13A "S"ed 10 miles North of course to avoid contrails at 18000'. The briefed route was returned to at 0600E and followed to the bases.

c. Weather: In the base areas at takeoff there were 10/10 stratus, 5-800' with visibility 800-1200 yards in light rain and drizzle. To the assembly area, over the continent, there were 10/10 low and medium clouds in broken to overcast indefinite layers from 500' to 18-20000', with 5-6/10 cirrus above 26000'. Enroute to the target the medium cloud became definitely layered and gradually decreased to nil East of 0900E, with 6-7/10 strata-cumulus in large solid patches below 10000'. East of 0900E and scattered high cirrus above 28000'. In the target area there were 7/10 strata cumulus below 10000' with the immediate target area overcast. There were also traces of medium cloud below 20000' and scattered cirrus above 28000'. Downward visibility in the target area was 20-30 miles through breaks. Enroute to the bases, there were 7/10 strata cumulus below 8000', becoming 10/10 West of 0800E with a trace of medium cloud, increasing rapidly from 0830E to 10/10 layered below 17-18000' to mid channel becoming scattered to trace for remainder of route. There were scattered cirrus above 28000' becoming 7-10/10 above 20000' from 0800E to 0400E and then scattered above 25000' for the

C O N F I D E N T I A L

remainder of the route. There were 10/10 strata cumulus at 6-800' over the bases on return with visibility at 1400-2500 yards. Moderate semi-persistent contrails formed in medium clouds becoming moderate persistent above 22000' East of the Rhine. Moderate to severe rime icing was encountered in layered clouds on climb.

d. Failures:

(1) Equipment: 390A: Gee set was inoperative.

4. Bombing:

a.	Attacking:	Jettisoning:	Returning:
95	2nd P 33 A/C 240 x 500 GP 104 x 500 IB 24 x 100 Chaff Bombs 17136 Chaff Units T.O. 2 A/C 16 x 500 GP 8 x 500 IB	1 A/C 8 x 500 GP 4 x 500 IB	
100	2nd P 36 A/C 288 x 500 GP 125 x 500 IB	5 A/C 16 x 500 GP 11 x 500 IB	
390	2nd P 33 A/C 256 x 500 GP 112 x 500 IB	2 A/C 16 x 500 GP 8 x 500 IB	2 A/C 16 x 500 GP 8 x 500 IB

b. 13A: (1) 95A Squadron: (8709)

(a)	AL Lt. Col. Stuart	N Lt. Wilbourne
	P Capt. Wilson	B Lt. Long
	OTG Lt. Krien	R/N Lt. Burrow

(b) The bomb bay doors were opened 2 minutes prior to the IP, after which the R/N picked up the target on a true heading of 40 degrees, and proceeded to set up course. Pin pointing his way down the bomb run, the bombardier was able to sight for rate through breaks in the clouds prior to the clutch-in point. The R/N clutched the bombardier in at 11 miles and all subsequent rate checks were accurate. When bombs were released on a true heading of 043 degrees, synchronization appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 24900' True, 25000' indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1109.

(e) Method of Release: 100' train.

(f) PI: 1. A few bombs dropped by 95A appear in fields and a residential area adjacent to the North M/Y, 6000' NNE (left of the assigned MPI. Although clouds obscure the tracks, it is reasonable to assume that some bombs undoubtedly fell in the yards

2. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned MPI: Nil.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 7257: carrying 24 x 100 chaff bombs is outstanding - disposition of load unknown.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(2) 95B Squadron: (8230)

(a)	AL	Capt. Jenneman	N	Lt. Flygstad
	P	Lt. Thomas	B	Lt. Hathaway
	TG	Sgt. McGowen	R/N	Lt. Dechermis

(b) The R/N identified the target in the scope at 40 miles. Attacking on a true heading of 040 degrees, the R/N clutched the bombardier in at 11 miles and subsequent rate checks of 10, 9, 8, and 5 miles were made. Synchronization was checked through breaks in the clouds on the approach to the target. Bombs were released on a final true heading of 047 degrees. C-1 Auto Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 25400° True, 25000 indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1109

(e) Method of Release: 100° train.

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 95B fell in a fully built up residential area 7500° SW (left and short) of the assigned MPI.

A/C 9037 released its bombs in Bodenwoerded, Germany. The GP bombs hit in a sparsely built up factory district near the center of the city.

2. Bomb Pattern: 1750°L x 1200°W.

3. Percent of Bombs within 1000° & 2000° of the MPI: 0% & 0%

4. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned target: Nil.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 9037: released 8 x 500 GP and 4 x 500 IB on a T.O. at Badwendger, Germany. Bombsight in A/C was used.

A/C 8469: jettisoned 8 x 500 GP and 4 x 500 IB at 5100-0844 because of a mission failure.

(3) 95D Squadron: (8782)

(a)	P	Lt. Parrish	N	Lt. Manzie
	TG	Sgt. Dement	B	Lt. Watt
			R/N	Lt. Baldie

(b) Bomb bay doors were opened prior to the turn at the IP. Attacking on a true heading of 040 degrees, the R/N picked up the target in the scope at 25 miles. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and several subsequent rate checks were made. Synchronization was checked through breaks in the clouds on the approach to the target. Bombs were released on a final true heading of 047 degrees. C-1 Auto Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 22910° True, 23000 indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1109½.

(e) Method of Release: 100° train.

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 95D fell in fields and a sparsely built up residential area 7500° W (short and left) of the assigned target.

2. Bomb Pattern: 1760°L x 1000°W

3. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the MPI: 0% & 0%

C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: N:

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 7204: released 8 x 500 GP and 4 x 500 IB on a T.O. at 0848-5225 upon a flare signal from the lead A/C.

(4) 950 Squadron: (8210)

(a) P Lt. Jensen	N Lt. Sorensen
TG Sgt. Olsen	B Lt. Zultz
	R/N Lt. Painter

(b) After maneuver at the IP, the R/N picked up the target in the scope at 35 miles and proceeded to set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and rate checks of 10, 9, 8, and 7 miles were made. Breaks in the clouds, on the approach to the target, enabled the bombardier to check synchronization visually. Bombs were released on a true heading of 050 degrees. C-1 Auto Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 24700° True, 24800° indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1110.

(e) Method of Release: 100° train.

(f) PI: 1. No bursts of any bombs dropped by 950 are visible. According to computations based on the bomb trajectory chart and the location of the smoke bombs in late pictures of the camera sorties, the bombs hit on or in close proximity to the Misburg Oil Refinery, 4 3/4 miles E of the assigned target.

2. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: Probably Nil.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 8831: landed on the continent. Disposition of bombs unknown.

c. 13B: (1) 390A Squadron: (784)

(a) AL Maj. Perry	N Lt. Yary
P Capt. Morris	AN Capt. Lewis
OTG Lt. Howell	B Lt. Phalen
	R/N Lt. Flanagan

(b) The R/N identified the target in the scope at 45 miles. After the maneuver at the IP, the R/N took over and proceeded to set up course. Rate checks from 11 to 6 miles were made and bombs were released on a true heading of 035 degrees. C-1 Auto Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 25500° True, 25600 indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1111 1/2.

(e) Method of Release: 100° train.

(f) PI: 1. No bursts of any bombs dropped by 390A are visible. According to computations based upon the bomb trajectory chart, the bombs probably fell in the vicinity of the sports plaza area 9000° ESE (left) of the assigned MPI.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: Probably Nil.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 565: landed on the continent. Disposition of bombs unknown.

(2) 390B Squadron:

(a) P Lt. Goolsby	N Lt. Drew
TG Sgt. Miller	B Lt. Florman
	R/N Lt. Sternberg

(b) Attacking on a true heading of 050 degrees, the R/N indentified the target in the scope at 35 miles and proceeded to set up course. 2½ minutes prior to the BRL, however, the radar equipment failed, the bombardier took over and by using pilotage check points, he proceeded to maintain course. At the BRL he positioned the cross hairs on the clouds, which covered the target, using check points outside the target and released his bombs on a final true heading of 035 degrees. C-1 Auto Pilot was not used on the bomb run. Not knowing that S.O.P calls for all bomb runs to be flown on C-1 Auto Pilot, the pilot made the run on PDI.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 25200° True, 25300° indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1112.

(e) Method of Release: 100° train.

(f) PI: 1. No bursts of any bombs dropped by 390B are visible. According to computations based upon the bomb trajectory chart, the bombs probably fell in fields 9000° NNE (right) of the assigned MPI.

2. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: Probably Nil.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(3) 390C Squadron:

(a) AL Capt. Maxwell	N Lt. Stevens
P Lt. Babbitt	B Lt. Gueskes
TG Sgt Ellstrom	R/N Lt. Groves

(b) Bomb bay doors were opened immediately after the turn at the IP. Initiating the attack on a true heading of 032 degrees, the R/N picked up the target in the scope at 35 miles and proceeded to set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and subsequent rate checks were good. Synchronization was checked through breaks in the clouds on the approach to the target. Bombs were released on a final true heading of 046 degrees. C-1 Auto Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 24600° True, 24650° indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1111.

(e) Method of Release: 100° train.

(f) PI: 1. No bursts of any bombs dropped by 390C are visible. According to computations based on the bomb trajectory chart, the bombs probably fell in fields 12600° NNE (over and left) of the assigned MPI.

2. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: Probably Nil.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 6134 and 945: had

C O N F I D E N T I A L

A/C 023 had mission failure and jettisoned entire load in the channel.

(4) 390D Squadron:

(a) AL Capt. Morris	N Lt. Hilker
P Lt. McDonald	B Lt. Strickland
TG Sgt. Boss	R/N F/O Zebell

(b) The attack was initiated on a true heading of 039 degrees. The R/N picked up the target in the scope at 45 miles and after the turn at the IP he proceeded to set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and 7 subsequent rate checks were made. The bombardier was able to check synchronization through breaks in the clouds on the approach to the target. Bombs were released on a final true heading of 032 degrees. C-1 Auto Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 25200° True, 24250° indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1111½

(e) Method of Release: 100° train.

(f) PI: 1. No bursts of any bombs dropped by 390D are visible. According to computations based on the bomb trajectory chart, the bombs probably fell 4800° ESE (left) of the assigned MPI in a sparsely built-up area containing a rail road track.

2. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: Probably Nil.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 837 had a mission failure and jettisoned entire load in the channel.

d. 13C: (1) 100A Squadron: (8719)

(a) AL Lt. Col. Lyster	N Lt. Cheney
P Capt. Raiford	AN Maj. Crosby
OTG Lt. Wendling	B Lt. Ruth
	R/N Lt. Pivenka

(b) After the IP, the R/N took over and proceeded to set up course picking up the target in the scope at 35 miles. The bombardier was able to give assistance for course as breaks through clouds made pin-point pilotage possible. Because of a personnel error on the part of the R/N, rate checks beyond the 3rd check were not given the bombardier, however, considered rate good enough for a release. The indice were allowed to run up and bombs were released on a true heading of 071 degrees. C-1 Auto Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 24995° True, 25000° indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1111

(e) Method of Release: 100° train.

(f) PI: 1. No bursts of any bombs dropped by 100A are visible. According to computations based on the bomb trajectory chart and the location of the smoke bombs in the camera sorties taken, the bombs fell in woods and fields 16500° SE (right and over) the assigned MPI.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. Results in relation to damage inflicted on assigned target: Probably Nil.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 865 and 972: each had 1 x 500 IB hang up, both were jettisoned 9 minutes after the target.

A/C 015: had 1 x 500 IB hang up and was released 8 minutes after the target.

(2) 100B Squadron: (8009)

(a) AL Capt. Robbs N Lt. Remanowski
P Lt. Ellis B Lt. Snyder
TG S/Sgt. Kendig R/N Lt. Turner

(b) The R/N took over after the maneuver at the IP. Picking up the target in the scope at 50 miles the R/N proceeded to set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and subsequent rate of 10, 9, and 7 were made. After the last rate check, the bombardier was able to make one visual rate correction on what appeared to be the M/Y. Bombs were released on a true heading of 046 degrees. C-1 Auto Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 25300' True, 25300' indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1112.

(e) Method of Release: 100° train.

(f) PI: 1. Photographs taken by 100C show the well developed bomb pattern of 100B, which covered the choke point of 3 railroads 15600' SSE (right) of the assigned MPI.

2. Bomb Pattern: It is impossible because of the developed state of the bursts to measure accurately the pattern.

3. Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the MPI: 0% & 0%.

4. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: Nil.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 811: had a mission failure and jettisoned 8 x 500 GP and 4 x 500 IB at 5105-0909.

A/C 817: had a mission failure and jettisoned 8 x 500 GP and 4 x 500 IB in the channel.

(3) 100D Squadron: (834)

(a) P Lt. Fellows N F/O Useff
TG Sgt. Church B Lt. Kelly

100C Squadron: (8794)

P Capt. Dawson N Lt. Browning
TG Sgt. Henion B Lt. Silva
R/N Lt. Rowland

(b) The lead A/C in 100D was hit by flak on the bomb run prior to bombs away. The deputy leader took over and, because of no radar equipment, the bombardier released his bombs on the smoke flares of 100B. Bombs were released on a true heading of 056 degrees. Radar equipment in 100C failed on the bomb run. The bombardier released his bombs from the smoke flares of 100D.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 24000' True, 24000' indicated.

(d) Time of Release: 1112½

(e) Method of Release: 100' train.

(f) PI: 1. 100D: No bursts are visible. According to computation based on the bomb trajectory chart, the bombs probably fell 12000' SSW (short & right) in fields and a sparsely built-up residential area.

2. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: Probably Nil.

3. 100C: A few bombs dropped by 100C are visible in photographs taken by this Squadron. These appear in a fully built residential area. 7200' SSE (right) of the assigned MPI. Another small concentration of bombs appear 3600' S (right) of the target by the lake. These might belong to 100C.

4. Bomb Pattern: The complete pattern is not visible.

5. Percent of Bombs within 1000' & 2000' of the MPI. 0% & 0%.

6. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: Nil.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

e. PFF Narrative: (1) 13A: Four PFF aircraft were dispatched. In 95C the target broke up after the 7 mile rate check was given to the bombardier. 95D had a faulty pressure system which caused poor range and definition, but the R/N was able to make a sighting. 95A and 95B had no difficulty. All sightings were entirely H2X.

(2) 13B: Four PFF aircraft were dispatched. 390A had poor definition at altitude, but was able to make a sighting. 390B set went out of calibration at the 7 mile check point. The R/N was unable to adjust the calibration in time to give the bombardier the final check points, and the sighting was completed visually. 390C and 390D had no difficulty. All sightings, except 390B, were entirely H2X.

(3) 13C: Four PFF aircraft were dispatched. 100A lost the bomb circle after 9 mile check point. This was the radar navigator's error. 100C set was out of calibration causing a jumping scope picture. R/N elected to follow 100D Squadron on the run. 100D aircraft (344) landed on the continent. 100B had no difficulty. All sightings, except 100B, were entirely H2X.

5. Communications: a. VHF: (1) Channel A communications were very unsatisfactory during this mission. The assembly was made on the continent in very bad weather which necessitated more transmissions than normal. The nine (9) A/C Squadron formation was flown which gives twelve (12) air leaders in the Wing a more free access to the use of VHF. A noticeable increase in VHF traffic can be expected when flying the nine (9) A/C formation. The number of transmissions of all nature that were attempted during this mission were just too numerous for one frequency to handle efficiently.

(2) It is doubtful if the weather scouting force was airborne. Route weather was received from one Kodak White A/C but no contact was made with Kodak Red. The mosquito chaff aircraft relayed target weather

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to Hotshot who then passed it back to 13 Wing leader. Communications with 3D Air Division ground station were not established until on the route out.

(3) Fighter support was not contacted satisfactorily at first. Ground sector control "Nuthouse" informed Fireball Leader of the fighter support in the area.

b. W/T: (1) Poor net discipline, bad frequencies and the weather conditions resulted in 390A and 100A not getting in their progress reports to the base HF/DF stations. Strike reports came in much better with the exception of 100D.

(2) Control Points:

13A - 95	CP1	TGT	CP2
Flight Plan	1011	1103	1229
ATA	1016	1109	1236
TOD	1023	1115	1242

(3) Strike Reports:

					TOD
95A	S	B	5	1109	1115
B	S	B	5	1109	1135
C	S	B	5	1110	1135
D	S	B	5	1109	1207
390A	S	B	5	1111	1225
B	S	B	5	1110	1210
C	S	B	5	1110	1220
D	S	A	5	1110	1215
100A	S	B	5	1111	1225
B	S	B	5	1112	1225
C	S	B	5	1113	1225

6. Photography: a. 95 Group installed 3 scope, 4 oblique, and 8 vertical cameras, 2, 4, and 8 of which took pictures: PFF A/C 8782: #1 95D: no returns were obtained on the remote scope, and no pictures were taken. 2 sets of H2X scope photographs were received, 1 of which is plottable. The remaining set is unplotable because of swept out photographs.

b. 100 Group installed 1-15mm motion picture scope, 1 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras, 1, 1, and 8 of which took pictures: A/C 8344: Lead 100D: Missing in action.

c. 390 Group installed 1 scope, 2 oblique, and 12 vertical cameras, 1, 2, and 9 of which took pictures: A/C 565: #2 390A: landed on continent. A/C 945: #2 390B: mission failure. A/C 784: #1 390A: fuse blew out and no pictures were taken. 1 set of H2X plottable scope photographs was received.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

Ernest A. Kiessling

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis.

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
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)

HANNOVER, GERMANY

28 MARCH 1945

NOTE: COMPUTATIONS FOR 100A, 100D, 390A, 390B, 390C AND 390D WERE BASED ON THE BOMB TRAJECTORY CHART. 95C, WHICH IS NOT SHOWN ON BOMB PLOT, BOMBS FELL ON OR ADJACENT TO MISBURG OIL REFINERY, 5 MILES EAST OF HANNOVER. ALL RUNS WERE HEX EXCEPT 100B AND 390B, WHICH WERE COMBINATION HEX-VISUAL.

SCALE-1:52,000




FOUR HUNDRED TWELFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
APO 559

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion.

TO : Office of the Squadron Commander, 412th Bomb Sqdn (H), 95th Bomb Gp (H),
APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. Pilot Durham of A/C No. 42-97257 on this date aborted at 5032N - 0745E at 1024 hours, being at an altitude of 24,500 feet.
2. Oxygen system from radio room back leaked and dropped off at such a rate that the pilot knew he could not continue mission. At time of abortion pressure in ball, both waist positions and tail was below 100 pounds.
3. Upon leaving formation No. 3 propeller ran away and was unable to feather it. Vibration of that engine was such that the cowling shook off and the nose section cracked.
4. Both pilot's and bombardier's airspeed indicator gave improper readings. Starting at time of rendezvous and until landing the pilot's indicator read approximately 20 mph slow and bombardier's read approximately 10 mph slow. Pitot heat was turned on at take off.
5. Bombs were dropped from left racks only. Position was 5030N - 0730E. Chaff bombs were carried.
6. Aircraft landed at E-58, Belgium, at 1200 hours. Aircraft was left on continent.



JOHN G. DURHAM
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Pilot.

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, 412TH BOMB SQDN, 95TH BOMB GP (H), APO 559, U. S. ARMY, 31 Mar 45.

TO: Commanding Officer (Attn: Gp Ops. Off.), 95th Bomb Gp (H), APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. Pilot had no choice but to abort. Pilot was forced to land A/C at nearest field.
2. Disciplinary action taken: None.


JAMES O. FRANKOSKY
Major, Air Corps,
Commanding.

FOUR HUNDRED TWELFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
APO 559

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion.

TO : Office of the Squadron Commander, 412th Bomb Sqdn (H), 95th Bomb Gp (H),
APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. Pilot Murphy of A/C 44-8831 on this date aborted at 4918N - 0420E at 0850 hours.
2. No. 3 engine vibrated excessively, tearing out several oil lines. The engine could not be feathered. The wings were heavily coated with ice and altitude could not be maintained. Gee box and radio were out so no definite fix could be made.
3. A/C landed at B-54, which was located through a break in the clouds, at 1020 hours.
4. Bombs were left in the aircraft.
5. Aircraft was left on the continent.

John W. Murphy
JOHN W. MURPHY
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Pilot.

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, 412TH BOMB SQDN (H), 95TH BOMB GP (H), APO 559, U. S. ARMY, 31 Mar 45.

TO: Commanding Officer (Attn: Gp Ops. Off.), 95th Bomb Gp (H), APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. Pilot had no choice but to abort. Pilot was forced to land A/C at nearest field.
2. Disciplinary action taken: None.

James O. Frankosky
JAMES O. FRANKOSKY
Major, Air Corps,
Commanding.

THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) C-B-1
OFFICE OF THE OPERATIONS OFFICER
APO 559

30 March 1945

SUBJECT: Failure to drop Bombs on assigned target with Squadron.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.
(attention operations officer)

1. On 28 March 1945 I took off in aircraft No. 9037.

2. The take off and assembly were accomplished as instructed and our position of deputy lead was made good. Upon turning on the I.P. the bomb bay door motor was found to be inoperative. The engineer was instructed to crank the doors open manually. The bomb load for the mission interfered with the operation of the crank so that it was necessary for the engineer to remove crank and re-insert it after each half turn. The bomb run was eight minutes and the bomb bay doors were not opened at the bomb release point. After the bomb release point, I endeavored to contact Capt. Jeneman the squadron leader for further instructions but because of excessive radio transmission was unable to get the message through. After approximately ten minutes I decided to drop the bombs on a target of opportunity. We swung to the right of the formation and made a fifty second bomb run on the town of Bodenwerde. Strike photos and observation of ball turret gunner indicated a good hit on a built up section of the city. The bomb bay doors were cranked closed quickly as possible and we rejoined formation. The return to the base was uneventful.

Robert C. Coleman
ROBERT C. COLEMAN
2nd Lt. A. C.
Pilot

1st, Ind.

336th Bomb Sqdn., 95th Bomb Gp. (H), APO 559, U.S. Army, 30 March 1945.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.

1. For your information.

Harold F. Jeneman
HAROLD F. JENEMAN
Capt. A. C.
Operations Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Intelligence Officer

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the mission to Hanover, Germany on a above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - the 95th group led the 13th Combat Wing in an attack on the Locomotive & Tank Works of Hanoversche Marchinebau A.G. However because of weather conditions the secondary target the Marshalling Yard at Hanover was attacked by all four squadrons on H2X. Order of bombing was 95A,B,D, and 95C. Lt. Col. Stuart was Wing Leader.

95A Nine A/C plus one PFF⁺ took off and formed the lead squadron. Five A/C plus one PFF⁺ bombed the secondary target, three other A/C of this squadron broke away at the IP and preceded group over target dispensing chaff. A/C 7257, a chaff ship turned back ten minutes prior to the IP and landed on the continent. No further word has been received on this A/C.

95B Nine A/C plus one PFF⁺ took off and formed the high squadron. Seven A/C plus one PFF⁺ bombed the secondary target. A/C 9037 could not open bombay doors over secondary target and bombed a T.O. at 5155N-0940E with good results. A/C 8469 turned back at 5128N-0910E at 1048 hours because of mechanical difficulties and jettisoned bombs at 5100N-0844E at 1053 hours.

95C Eight A/C plus one PFF⁺ took off and formed the low squadron. Seven A/C plus one PFF⁺ bombed the secondary target. One spare A/C 8331 turned back over France and landed at B-54. No further information on this A/C.

95D Eight A/C plus one PFF⁺ took off and formed the low-low squadron. Seven A/C plus one PFF⁺ bombed the Secondary target. A/C 7204 bombed a T.O at 5205N-0848 at 1138 hours dropping on flares fired by lead A/C.

2. For further information reference is suggested to the Operational Narrative teletype of the Intelligence Section.

For the Intelligence Officer:

Francis X. Pierce
FRANCIS X. PIERCE,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

CG, 13TH CBW
CO, 390TH GP
CO, 100TH GP

XXX

95TH BOMB GP

XXX

REF 28/3/45 1745 3-2

3-2 OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE - 95TH GROUP - HANNOVER - 28 MARCH

1. None.
2. A Squadron - Secondary, PFF - Photos cloud covered - R/N thinks bombs hit town. Good Results.
B Squadron - Secondary, PFF - Photos cloud covered - R/N thinks bombs hit target. Good results.
C Squadron - Secondary, PFF - Photos cloud covered - R/N thinks bombs hit target. Good results.
D Squadron - Secondary, PFF - Photos cloud covered - R/N thinks bombs hit target. Good results.
3. None.
4. A. 95A / 3A (Final).
B. Operations:
 1. None.
 2. See Chaff Report.
 3. None.C. Amount, Accuracy, & Type of Fire:
 1. Target - meagre, inaccurate, tracking.
 2. Target - meagre, inaccurate, tracking.
 3. None.
 4. None.
 5. None.D. Phenomena: None.
5. 7/10ths low clouds in target area.
6. 1050 - 5115-0848 - Large factory with smoke coming out of chimney.
1124 - 5145-0845 (Paderborn) - Large smoke screen.
7. Fighter support good. RN in 95A, B, & C squadrons picked up target at 40 miles and bombardiers report all good checks. 95D squadron HXX was not functioning properly. Picked up target at 25 miles and was able to give two checks. Bombardiers in all squadrons were able to get visual check before bombs away. Briefed route flown. Chaff force of 3 A/C flew with 95A and preceded group over target. Order of bombing was 95A, B, D, and C.

Mac

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

SECRET
By authority of
C.G., Eighth Air Force
Initials *JFA*
Date: 28 March 1945

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 332

PERIOD: 0001 hours 28 March to 2400 hours 28 March 1945

A. STATISTICS

	Total Sorties	Effective Sorties	Tonnage	Claims	Losses			Totals	NYR
					E/A	AA	OT		
Heavy Bomber Atks.	965	891	2520.6	0-0-0	0	1	4	5	21(a)
Fighter Escort (b)	371	331	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	16
Fighter Sweeps	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	12	11	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	18	14	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	1
Air/Sea Rescue	1	1	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>33</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Totals	1400	1279	2520.6	0-0-0	0	1	4	5	39

- (a) Majority believed safe on continent.
- (b) Includes the two groups based on continent.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

965 B-17s from two Air Divisions sortied in two forces against an armament plant and a tank factory in Berlin area and a tank plant, and AFV plant in Hannover area, and three oil refineries to E and NW of Hannover. Seven assigned primaries. 891 a/c dropped 2520.6 tons (1864 tons GP, 656.6 IB) on both Berlin primaries, on Hannover (central) M/Y and several T/Os. Most formations bombed by H2X; 5 squadrons only used combination H2X and visual techniques. Weather: 5/10-8/10 cloud in Hannover area, 10/10 over Berlin. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 5 B-17s (1 to AA, 4 to unknown causes). NYR: 21 B-17s, majority believed safe on Continent.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

First Force

Twelve group formations (446 B-17s - 1st Air Division) sortied against an armament plant and a tank factory in Berlin area. 411 a/c dropped 1116.5 tons (751 tons GP, 365.5 tons IB) on both primaries, on Stendal and several other T/Os at 1009-1123 hours from 22,900-26,950 feet. Bombing by H2X. Leaflets dropped in Berlin area. Weather: 10/10 over targets with ground haze. Flak: generally moderate to intense, accurate on some formations. Battle damage: 107 minor, 26 major, 5 Cat. "E". E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 B-17 to AA. NYR: 21 a/c, majority believed safe on Continent.

Fighter Support: Six groups, including 352nd group based on Continent, (272 P-51s) sortied. Up 0720-0945 hours, down 1300-1405 hours. 245 effective sorties. E/a opposition: nil. One u/i jet sighted near Mulhouse, 2 jets seen heading E from Goch area. No combat. Claims: nil. Losses: nil (2 a/c Cat. "E", pilots safe). NYR: 16 P-51s (9 known safe, 7 believed safe on Continent).

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Berlin/Spandau	372	318	597	279.5	Unobserved
Berlin/Falkensee	74	65	111	50.5	Unobserved
Stendal(Tert.)		6	12	8.0	Unobserved
<u>OTHER TARGETS</u>					
Hannover		1	2	1.0	Unobserved
Scattered T/Os		21	29	26.5	Unobserved
TOTALS	446	411	751	365.5	

Second Force

Fourteen group formations (519 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against a tank plant and an AFV plant in Hannover area, and three oil refineries to E and NE of Hannover. 480 a/c dropped 1404.1 tons (1113 tons GP, 291.1 tons IB) on Hannover central M/Y (secondary - 431 a/c), Hannover-Linden tank plant (primary - 34 a/c), and six T/Os at 1049-1122 hours from 22,900-27,000 feet. Bombing mostly by H2X; combination H2X and visual technique used by 5 squadrons only. Leaflets dropped in Hannover area. Weather: 5/10-8/10 cloud with ground haze in target area. Flak: moderate, generally inaccurate Hannover area. Battle damage: 50 minor, 16 major. E/a opposition nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 4 B-17s to unknown causes.

SECRET

Fighter Support: Two groups, including 361st group based on Continent (99 P-51s) sortied. Up 0833-0841 hours, down 1323-1331 hours. 86 effective sorties. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Nienhagen Oil Ref.	73	Not Attacked			
Dedenhausen Oil Ref.	79	Not Attacked			
Peine Ref. & Steel Plant	142	Not attacked			
Hannover/Hannomag AFV Plant	149	Not Attacked			
Hannover/Linden Tank Plant	76	34	67.0	33.8	Good-pos. V. Good
Hannover M/Y and City		431	1016.0	242.3	Prob. good

OTHER TARGETS

Minden		10	20.0	10.0	Unobserved
Ahlen (5146-0755)		1	2.0	1.0	Unobserved
Scherfede (5133-0902)		1	2.0	1.0	Unobserved
Luchtringen (5148-0924)		1	2.0	1.0	Unobserved
2 u/i T/Os		2	4.0	2.0	
TOTALS	519	480	1113.0		

2. Fighter Escort

Eight groups, including the two groups based on the Continent, (371 P-51s) sortied. Up 0720-0945 hours, down 1300-1405 hours. 331 effective sorties. E/a opposition: nil. 1 u/i jet sighted near Mulhouse, 2 jets seen Goch area. No combat. One group swept Osnabruck-Munster area uneventfully. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. (2 P-51s Cat. "E" - 1 crashed on take-off, 1 crash-landed due to power failure; pilots safe). NYR: 16 P-51s (9 known safe, 7 believed safe on Continent).

3. Fighter Sweeps

Nil.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

12 a/c (3 F-5s, 9 P-51s as escort) sortied as follows:

2 F-5s on day photo missions to Germany were unable to obtain photos due to clouds, in one case, and interception by u/i e/a S of Fulda, in the others.

1 F-5 obtained some photos of assigned targets in Hannover-Berlin area, 9 P-51s as escort to two of FRU a/c. Eight effective sorties.

Losses: nil.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

18 a/c (4 B-17s, 4 Mosquitoes, 10 P-51s) sortied as follows:

4 B-17s on routine weather flights over Atlantic and to and from Azores.

4 Mosquitoes on special weather flights over Holland, Central Germany, the U.K., North Sea and Denmark.

10 P-51s as weather scouts for bomber forces. 6 effective. 1 P-51 NYR, believed safe on Continent.

Losses: nil. NYR: 1 P-51.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

1 OA-10 on routine patrol. No incidents.

8. Special Operations

33 a/c (7 Mosquitoes, 9 P-51s, 10 B-24s, 7 B-17s) sortied as follows:

7 Mosquitoes as chaff a/c with bomber forces. 1 Mosquito NYR.

9 P-51s as radio relays

10 B-24s sortied on leaflet missions over Germany and Holland. Night-27/28 March. 1 a/c aborted.

7 B-17s sortied on radar reconnaissance, taking radar scope pictures of front line routes and area of Schweinfurt - Night 27/28 March. Equipment worked well and good pictures are expected. Leaflets dropped on Solingen, Borken, Marburg, Fulda, Frankfurt and Stuttgart.

Losses: nil. NYR: 1 Mosquito.

S E C R E T

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Only the fighters sighted any e/a. Two jets were observed on an easterly course at 25,000 feet in the Goch area and another at 1115 near Mulhausen at 24,000 feet.

Over Germany there was 6-9/10 low cloud, base 800-1200 feet and tops 6,000-8,000 feet. In the Hannover area there was 6-8/10 patchy cirrus cloud from 23-26,000 feet breaking to 2/10-4/10 from 28,000-30,000 feet over Berlin.

2. Flak

Hannover - moderate, generally inaccurate.
Berlin - moderate to intense, accurate to inaccurate.
Brunswick - moderate, inaccurate.
Stendal - moderate, inaccurate.
Hamndorf - meager, accurate.
5152-1020 - moderate, inaccurate.

3. Observations

M/Y at Korback crowded with cars.
M/Y at Hollendorf crowded.
Marburg (5129N-0909E) heavily loaded.
Hoxter (5147N-0923E) very active.
M/Y at 5145N-0900E, approximately 70 freight cars.
M/Y at 5158N-0930E active.
M/Y at 5132N-0905E active.
M/Y at 5040N-0814E active.
5228N-0757E (probably Hesepe A/F) 2 e/a painted black parked on runway.
5228N-0817E, A/F west of Bohnte now appears to be fully serviceable.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Berlin/Spandau Armament Plant - Unobserved Results

Clouds of 5-10/10 covered target. This factor, in addition to smoke from fires started earlier in the attack, made it impossible to plot majority of concentrations dropped through heavy cloud. It was possible to see one concentration of 60 GP bombs bursting through break in residential area adjacent to west edge of target, possible direct hit on road-over-canal bridge. Additional bursts could be seen south of target in open areas. Fires were burning in the industrial and residential area approximately one mile NW of target. Bombs and spot markers could be seen following toward Siemens Schuckertwerke A.G. situated two miles due east of target. Bursts could not be plotted due to smoke and clouds. Approximately 60 GP bombs could be seen in open areas in Frierichsfelde district about 6 1/2 miles east of center of Berlin.

Hannover-Linden AFV Works (Gebruder Korting AG) - Good, possibly very good

Target was attacked by four squadrons carrying 500 pound GP and IB bombs. Smoke and haze makes interpretation difficult, but target was probably squarely hit by one squadron. Patterns from other squadrons fell in area.

Hannover-Hannomag Plant and Vereinigte - Fair
Leichtmetallwerke

One Squadron dropped a pattern across the one target with a few bombs across SE corner of second target and the eastern part of intervening M/Y. Poor photographs prevent accurate assessment of damage.

Town of Hannover (incl M/Y) - unobserved, but probably good

Target was bombed by 43 squadrons carrying 500 lb GP and IB bombs. Of these, it is estimated that two patterns fell on the city, four fell on a suburb, fifteen in open country. These squadrons had 10/10 cover. Estimate one pattern fell on M/Y at NW part of the city and one squadron was plotted on the main station which was the MPI.

5. Ground Situation

21st Army Group - Ninth Army breaking into Ruhr industrial area against stiffening opposition. Troops are at A3122, 3622, 3727, 4430, 4535, 4340. British armored thrusts supported by airborne troops are reported at A4546, 4450, 4560, 2456. Resistance continues north of Rees. Canadian troops moving west along north bank of Rhine reached E9960.

12th Army Group - The Third Army is across the Main from M9063 exclusive of Frankfurt. Hanau cleared. Armored thrust northward to Munzenburg (G7406). Infantry in southern approaches of Wiesbaden (M3462). First Army closing on Wiesbaden from north with leading troops at M1161, 2371, 2278, 4174. Armored column also at Marburg (G7346) and northeastward to G8248.

6th Army Group - Seventh Army at M6708, 7315, 6930, 9741, 9947.

6. G.A.F. Activity over England

Flying Bombs - to 0004 29 March

	<u>Launched</u>	<u>Landfall</u>	<u>Gr. London</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>
0125-0754	10	3	2	5
2035-0004	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>
Totals	13	4	2	8

D. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Ninth Air Force	1173	2-0-3 Air	9
First U.S.T.A.F.	62	0-0-0 12-1-5 Air	0
Second TAF	1114	1-0-1 Grd	5
RAF Fighter Command	<u>28</u>	0-0-0 <u>14-1-8</u> Air	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	2377	1-0-1 Grd	14

Ninth Air Force

Day - 28 March

Sorties : 273 Bombers
 900 Fighters & Fighter-Bombers
 1173 a/c

Mission : 9th Bomb Division - 273 sorties, 191.77 tons dropped on oil storage depots at Nevenheerse and 38.1 tons on oil storage depot at Erbach with unobserved results.

9th TAC - 195 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in Siegen, Bonn, Hitdorf areas; escort to mediums, reconnaissance.

19th TAC - 347 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in Dorsten, Erfurt, Hamm and Ruhr area; escort to mediums, interception patrols.

E/A Claims : 2-0-3 Air

Other Claims :	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T	716	285
RR Cars	321	304
AFV	16	5
Rail Cuts	8	
Highway Cuts	14	

Losses : 9 a/c (plus 2 Cat. "E").

First U. S. T. A. F.

Night 27/28 March - nil, due to weather.

Day - 28 March

Sorties : 62 a/c

Mission : 42nd Bomb. Division and 1st French TAF - nil.

12th TAC - 60 sorties. Armed reconnaissance and cooperation to ground forces in Worms area.

Western French Air Force - 2 sorties. Coastal Command mission.

Claims : nil

Losses : nil

Second TAF

Night - 27/28 March

Sorties : 24 Armed Reconnaissance
28 Interception Patrols
52 a/c

Missions : Armed reconnaissance in Coesfeld, Dulmen area.

Claims : 1-0-0 Air, flying bombs 2-0-0

Losses : 1 a/c

Day - 28 March

Sorties : 84 Medium Bombers
24 Light Bombers
421 Armed Reconnaissance
162 Prearranged & Immediate Support
371 Interception Patrols, Sweeps, Escort, etc.
1062 a/c

Missions : Attacked RR centers at Olpe (77 tons), Attendorn (33 tons) and Gelsenkirchen (60 tons), with unobserved results in case of Olpe, good in case of other two. Armed reconnaissance in northern battle area. Rail interdiction against flying-bomb and military traffic in Zutphen - Deventer area.

Losses : 2
 15
 Mail Cuts

Losses : 1 a/o

R.A.F. Fighter Command

Night - 27/28 March

Sorties : 8 Offensive Patrol
 12 Interception Patrol
 4 Flying-Bomb Interception Patrol
 24 a/o

Claims : nil
 Losses : nil

Day - 28 March

Sorties : 4 Interception Patrols and Shipping Reconnaissance

Claims : nil
 Losses : nil

(No Offensive Operations due to weather.)

2. Fifteenth Air Force

28 March

No offensive operations due to weather.

3. R.A.F. Bomber Command

Day - 28 March 1945

	<u>Losses</u>
1 Mosquito - Weather Reconnaissance	0
<u>2 Mosquitoes - Weather Reconnaissance</u>	<u>0</u>
3 a/o	0

Night - 28/29 March

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary information and is not to be used for record purposes.

CHARLES Y. BANFILL
 Brigadier General, U.S.A.
 Director of Intelligence.

THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FOURTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
Office of the Squadron Operations Officer
APO 559

21 March 1945

SUBJECT : Abortion of Aircraft #8774.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H),
Station 119, APO 559.

1. After starting out to runway for takeoff, the radio operator called advising that he detected a strong gasoline odor. Just prior to takeoff, the tail gunner also reported fumes in the tail.
2. Took off expecting fumes to dissipate, but at an altitude of 1000 feet, fumes had been reported from every position in the plane. Opened bomb bays and windows, continueing climb to 2500 feet, where we contacted Bezel, requesting permission to land. Enginner had been unable to find anything out of order with the fuel transfer system.
3. After landing, the crew chief checked the fuel system reporting that he found a loose cap in the right wing, and said he thought aircraft was safe for flight. Restarted engines and taxied out on perimiter, and received calls that the fumes were again building up. Cut the inboards at this and returned the aircraft to it's proper hardstand.
4. Bezel advised that they had no additional spares.

M. I. Johann
M. I. Johann
2nd Lt. Air Corps,

M. I. Johann
O.T.

1st Ind
COMMANDING OFFICER, 334TH BOMB SQUADRON, 95TH BOMB GROUP (H), APO 559.
21 March 1945.

TO: Air Executive, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559.

1. Investigation shows that on preceding missions, the prescence of gas fumes in this plane had been noted, especially in the Radio Room. However, the Pilot was not notified of this condition, therefore without further investigation, it would be hard to determine if this was Pilot Error.

Harold E. Gooding
HAROLD E. GOODING,
Major, Air Corps,
Commanding.