

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3469

ATTACK ON TARGETS IN GERMANY ON 24 MAR 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 19, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 0939 & 1744 A hours.
- (d) Bombs : 78 x 1000 lb. G.P.  
190 x 150 lb. G.P.  
38 x 100 lb. G.P.

(ii) STATEMENT ON THE TARGET

This report covers attacks on two targets of opportunity located at WITTMUNDHAFEN and BUSCHHUTTEN.

(iii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK

(a) WITTMUNDHAFEN/ARDORF AIRFIELD: G.S.G.S. 4416/L2-950500:

1. A concentration of at least 65 H.E. bursts is seen on the East/West runway 850 yards East of the intersection of the E/W. and the NE/SW runway and extending North and South on the Landing Area for 500 yards in each direction. Many hits are seen on the runway, the landing area and a taxi-track running North/South across the landing area.

2. Bursts are seen on the airfield and its facilities as follows:-

a. LANDING GROUND

- East/West runway - 9 hits and many near hits.
- Landing Area - At least 50 hits.

b. OTHER FACILITIES

- Taxi-tracks running N/S in East - 7 hits and several near Central part of landing area hits.

SAV 490/853 24 MAR 45 0939A hrs. 1/43,200 (F.L.7") 25,300' 'A'

(b) BUSCHHUTTEN (G.S.G.S. 4416/R2-190603: five miles North/Northwest of SIEGEN.

1. Approximately 75 bursts are seen, mostly in open areas, on the East side of a rail line. Some scattered bursts are seen on unidentified buildings and one or two probably hit the rail lines.

SAV 95/1672 24 MAR 1945 1744 A hrs. 1/41,100 (F.L.7") 24,000' 'A'

(iii) ACTIVITY

(a) WITTMUNDHAFEN/ARDORF AIRFIELD

1. The airfield is completely covered but the extreme end of the Southeast dispersal cannot be seen.

2. 14 aircraft are visible as follows:-

Type	N.E. disp.	S.W. disp.	S.E. disp.	S. (remote) disp.
14 medium/small a/c	3	3	7	1
covered shelters	16	1	3	

3. Serviceability

- NW/SE runway - Serviceable.
- NNE/SSW runway - Unserviceable.
- ENE/WSW runway - WSW end serviceable for 1500 yards.
- Landing ground - Serviceable strip along N.W. side.

(iv) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(v) BOMB PLOT: None prepared.

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HEADQUARTERS  
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)  
APO 559

Date 24 March 1945  
13 CBW FO 80  
13 CBW OPB 305  
3 AD FO 620

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (ZEIGENHAIN, GERMANY)

TO : Colonel Shuck - 95<sup>th</sup>

1. Information Concerning the Targets: a. The 1st priority target (visual) for all Groups was the A/D at ZEIGENHAIN, GERMANY.

b. The 2nd priority target was the same as the 1st priority. Micro-H technique was to be employed in the event the 1st priority target was overcast.

c. The 3rd priority target was the M/Y at SIEGEN, GERMANY. This target was to be attacked only by H2X technique.

2. Planning and Execution:

a. Order:	Bomb Load:	Force:	Assigned Target:
(1) 13 A,B,C:			Zeigenhain
(a) 100	14 x 500 GP	36 A/C	
(b) 95	A,B,C: 14 x 500 GP D: 38 x 150 GP	36 A/C	
(c) 390	A: 24 x 250 GP B,C,D: 38 x 150 GP	36 A/C	

b. Availability:	Airborne:
(1) 95	Reg: 40 A/C 51 O/C 34 A/C Lead: 11 A/C 6 O/C 4 A/C
(2) 100	Reg: 43 A/C 50 O/C 34 A/C Lead: 12 A/C 7 O/C 4 A/C
(3) 390	Reg: 40 A/C 60 O/C 34 A/C Lead: 12 A/C 11 O/C 4 A/C

c. Non-effective Sorties and Returning Spaces:

(1) 95: A/C 7204: 555 Sqn "B" - Oxygen system out - Pilot Lt. Fabiniak - No sortie.

(2) 100: A/C 005: 415 Sqn "Y" - #2 engine failure - Pilot Lt. Kane - No sortie.

(3) 390: A/C 807: 568 Sqn "O" - Internal engine failure - Pilot Lt. Dinwoodie - Sortie.

d. Lead A/C Failures and/or Malfunctions:

- (1) 95: C: No beacons received.  
D: Set inoperative for C-M run.
- (2) 100: A: PFF equipment inoperative.  
D: No beacons received.

3. Navigation:

Position	Flight Plan	AL: M:	13A (100) Lt. Col. Wallace Lt. Kirby	13B (95) Maj. Frankosky Lt. Pieper	13C (390) Capt. Stokes Lt. Sommer
BU 11	7000°		7000° 4 min. early on course	7000° 4 min. early on course	7000° 4 min. early on course
CP 1	7000°		7000° 4 min. early on course	7000° 4 min. early on course	8300° 5 min. early on course
CP 2	18000°		14000° 9 min. early on course	14000° 9 min. early on course	15000° 11 min. early on course
IP	26000°		25000° 15 min. early on course	25100° 13 min. early on course	25100° 14½ min. early on course
TGT	26000°		25000° (1st priority)	25100° (1st priority)	25100° (1st priority)
RP	25000°		24000° 14½ min. early on course	24000° 15 min. early on course	24000° 13 min. early 3 mi. right
CP 3	8000°		8000° 17 min. early 2 mi. right	8000° 18 min. early 28 mi. right	9500° 20 min. early 26 mi. right
ENG COAST	Minimum		3300° 17½ min. early on course	2000° 18 min. early on course	2000° 18 min. early on course

a. Assembly: 13A assembled over Buncher 28; 13B over Buncher 23; 13C over Buncher 11. Assembly altitude was 7000°. Wing assembly was completed at CP 1.

b. Route: The route was flown essentially as briefed to the IP. The Wing peeled off in Squadrons on individual runs to the 1st priority target. After bombs away the Wing was reassembled at the RP. 95D attacked the 3rd priority target and reassembled with 95A, B, C at 5015-0741. The briefed route was followed to the bases. The English Coast was recrossed at Southwold. Bombing altitude was not reached because 13A leader did not maintain standard rates of climb. Because of this, 13A leveled off enroute to the IP to allow 13B and C to regain the interval.

c. Weather: CAVU conditions were prevalent throughout the mission. Average winds were 220/40K, 190/30K and 165/26K in the target area.

d. Failures: (1) Equipment: None.

4. Bombing:

a.	Attacking:	Jettisoning:	Returning:
95	1st P 31 A/C 380 x 500 GP 114 x 150 GP	1 A/C 14 x 500 GP	
	3rd P 6 A/C 38 x 100 GP 190 x 150 GP		
100	1st P 37 A/C 502 x 500 GP	1 A/C 14 x 500 GP	
390	1st P 36 A/C 200 x 250 GP 988 x 150 GP		2 A/C 76 x 150 GP

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b. 13A: (1) 100A Squadron: (790)

(a)	AL	Col. Wallace	N	Lt. Kirby
	P	Capt. DePlanque	AN	Capt. Passen
			B	Lt. Svendsen
			R/N	Capt. Rhode

(b) After the maneuver at the IP, which was made good, the bombardier proceeded to set up course by pin-point pilotage. 10 miles from the BRL the bombardier picked up the target area. With 2 minutes for visual synchronization, the bombardier completed a normal sighting operation. The bombardier, however, had difficulty in identifying the assigned MPI. The actual AP he used was to the left of the assigned MPI. Bombs were released on a true heading of 030 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 24550° True, 25000° Indicated  
 (d) Time of Release: 1715½  
 (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 100A fell around the selected AP, which was approximately 1800° left (NW) of the assigned MPI. Three-fourths of the bombs dropped fell on the L/F.

2. Bomb Pattern: 1680°L x 1410°W.

3. Bombing Errors: Range : 450°0  
 Deflection: 50°L  
 Radial : 550°

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the MPI: 79% & 100%.

5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned target: VERY GOOD.

6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: GOOD.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(2) 100B Squadron: (344)

(a)	P	Capt. Blanding	N	Lt. Bittman
	CP	Lt. Rosenbaum	B	Lt. Belinow
			R/N	Lt. Jenista

(b) After the IP, the bombardier proceeded to set up course and picked up the target area 14 miles from the BRL. The bombardier experienced considerable difficulty in identifying the assigned MPI, consequently, the actual AP used was slightly right of the assigned MPI. The bombardier completed a normal sighting with 4 minutes of visual synchronization. Bombs were released on a true heading of 024 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 24900° True, 25400° Indicated  
 (d) Time of Release: 1716½  
 (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 100B fell approximately 300° to the right of the assigned MPI. All of the bombs fell on the L/F.

2. Bomb Pattern: 1725°L x 1280°W.

3. Bombing Errors: Range : 255°0  
 Deflection: 350°R  
 Radial : 425° :

C O N F I D E N T I A L

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the AP: 80% & 100%.
5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on target: VERY GOOD.
6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: GOOD.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(3) 100C Squadron: (696)

(a)	AL	Maj. Robinson	N	Lt. Romanowski
	P	Lt. Ellis	B	Lt. Snyder
	OTG	Lt. Beedle	R/N	Lt. Turner

(b) Attacking on a true heading of 021 degrees the bombardier took over and proceeded to set up course. 10 miles from the BRL, the bombardier picked up the target area. The bombardier experienced difficulty in identifying the assigned MPI. The actual AP used was left of the assigned MPI. A normal sighting operation was completed, and synchronization was good at bombs away. Bombs were released on a final true heading of 022 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 24100° True, 24500° Indicated
- (d) Time of Release: 1717
- (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI:  $\frac{1}{2}$ . The bombs from 100C fell on and over the selected AP, which was approximately  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile NW of the assigned MPI. Practically all of the bombs fell left of and over the L/F.

2. Bomb Pattern: Cannot ascertain, because the complete pattern is not visible.

3. Bombing Errors: Smoke prevents accurate measurements.

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the AP: 70% & 100%, excluding the bombs from one A/C that released late. These fell 4000° beyond the AP.

5. Bombing Results in relation to the damage inflicted on the assigned target: FAIR.
6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: PROBABLY VERY GOOD.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(4) 100D Squadron: (009)

(a)	P	Lt. Hellerich	N	Lt. Duncan
	OP	Lt. Whitney	B	Lt. Shurba
			R/N	F/O Clinton

(b) After the IP, the bombardier began to set up course by pin-point piloting. Because of the smoke from preceding Squadrons obscuring the MPI, synchronization was not started until 50 seconds from the BRL. The bombardier placed the cross-hairs on what he thought was the assigned MPI and released his bombs on a true heading of 025 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

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- (c) Bombing Altitude: 23550° True, 24000° Indicated
- (d) Time of Release: 1717½
- (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 100D fell around the selected AP, which was approximately ½ mile W of the assigned MPI. Practically all of the bombs fell on the L/F in the SW corner.

- 2. Bomb Pattern: 1800°L x 800°W.
- 3. Bombing Errors: Range : 120°S  
Deflection: 325°R  
Radial : 360°
- 4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the AP: 87% & 100%.
- 5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: VERY GOOD.
- 6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: VERY GOOD.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 005: had a mission failure and jettisoned 14 x 500 GP in the channel.

e. 13B: (1) 95A Squadron: (8230)

- (a) AL Maj. Frankosky N Lt. Pieper  
P Capt. Savage B Lt. Seferian  
R/N Lt. Burrows

(b) Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes prior to the IP. After the maneuver at the IP, the R/N assisted the bombardier in setting up course by beacons. Attacking on a true heading of 033 degrees, the bombardier picked up the target 12 miles from the BRL. With 3 minutes of synchronization, a normal sighting operation was completed. Bombs were released on a final true heading of 031 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 25000° True, 25300° Indicated
- (d) Time of Release: 1718½
- (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 95A fell on the L/F on and around the assigned MPI. Only 1 bomb failed to fall on the L/F.

- 2. Bomb Pattern: 1715°L x 1285°W.
- 3. Bombing Errors: Range : 0°  
Deflection: 200°R  
Radial : 200°
- 4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the MPI: 80% & 100%.
- 5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned target: EXCELLENT.
- 6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: EXCELLENT.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 7204: had a mission failure and jettisoned 14 x 500 GP in the channel on orders from the tower.

(2) 95B Squadron: (8210)

(a) AL Capt. Jensen N Lt. Flystad

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(b) Initiating the attack on a true heading of 019 degrees, the bombardier proceeded to set up course by pin-point pilstage. 14 miles from the BRL, the bombardier picked up the target and began synchronization. A normal sighting operation was completed and bombs were released on a final true heading of 023 degrees. G-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 25500° True, 25950° Indicated
- (d) Time of Release: 1719
- (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. About 14 bombs fell on the L/F. The remainder fell short in fields and woods.

2. Bomb Pattern: 2175°L x 1525°W.

3. Bombing Errors: Range            : 1450°S  
                           Deflection: 215°R  
                           Radial         : 1500°

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the MPI: 9% & 46%.

5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned target: NIL to FAIR.

6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: POOR.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(3) 950 Squadron: (8144)

(a)	P	Lt. Tessier	N	Lt. Whalen
	CP	Lt. Zwawik	B	Lt. Keyes
			R/N	Lt. Finfinger

(b) After the maneuver at the IP, the bombardier began to set up course by pin-point pilstage. The target was picked up 20 miles from the BRL. Because smoke from preceding Squadrons covered the MPI, the bombardier positioned the cross-hairs on the smoke using check points outside the target. The bombardier proceeded with synchronization and bombs were released on a true heading of 024 degrees. G-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 24000° True, 24500° Indicated
- (d) Time of Release: 1720
- (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 950 fell from 1000° to 1300° short of the assigned MPI on a portion of the L/F but mostly in woods. There were approximately 12 bursts on the L/F itself.

2. Bomb Pattern: 1475°L x 1250°W.

3. Bombing Errors: Range            : 1600°S  
                           Deflection: 0°  
                           Radial         : 1600°

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the MPI: 0% & 65%.

5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned target: NIL to FAIR.

6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: POOR.

(4) 95D Squadron: (8217)

(a) P Lt. Newman N Lt. Boyes  
OP Lt. Munson B F/O Messinger  
R/N Lt. Lowry

(b) Because of improper Group interval on the bomb run, 130 formation over-ran 95D and forced it to abandon its run on the 1st priority target. As 95D broke off from its run, 3 A/C from this Squadron joined 130 and attacked the 1st priority target.

95D, using the RP as an IP for the 3rd priority target, which was a M/Y at Siegen, proceeded to set up the course by pin-point pilotage. The course was directly into the sun and haze made target identification so difficult that the bombardier could not pick up the target. A second run was initiated, but difficulty was again experienced in picking out the target. The bombardier proceeded with synchronization and bombs were released on a true heading of 234 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 24000° True, 24200° Indicated  
(d) Time of Release: 1744  
(e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from the 6 A/C that attacked Siegen, Germany, fell in a loose pattern 3 miles NNW of Siegen in fields.

2. Bomb Pattern: Too irregular.

3. Bombing Errors: Gross.

4. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on target attacked: NIL.

5. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: POOR.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: 3 A/C in 95D bombed the 1st priority with 130.

4. 130: (1) 390A Squadron: (660).

(a) AL Capt. Stokes N Lt. Eusner  
P Lt. Fresswood AN Lt. Sommer  
OP Lt. Rink B Lt. Buck  
R/N Lt. Mattson

(b) Initiating the attack on a true heading of 030 degrees, the bombardier ~~was~~ and proceeded to set up course by pin-point pilotage. The R/N pushed with course at the beginning of the run. 18 miles from the MPI, the bombardier identified the assigned MPI and with 4 minutes for visual synchronization, a normal sighting operation was completed. Bombs were released on a final true heading of 033 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 24800° True, 24200° Indicated  
(d) Time of Release: 1721  
(e) Method of Release: 100° Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 390A fell on and left of the assigned MPI. None fell outside the boundaries of the L/F.

2. Bomb Pattern: 2130° L x 1275° W.

3. Bombing Errors: Range 8 0°  
Deflection 8 500° L  
Radial 8 500°

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000°



**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned target: **EXCELLENT**.
6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: **GOOD**.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: **None**.

(2) 390B Squadron: (660)

(a) Lt. Fredericks  
Lt. Florman  
R/N Lt. Sternberg

(b) Bomb bay doors were opened at the IP. After the IP, the bombardier took over and proceeded to set up course by pin-point pilotage. Violent prop wash was experienced on the bomb run because of the close interval. Consequently, the gyro was caged and the C-1 Auto-Pilot was turned off. After clearing the prop wash, the C-1 was set up again. The bombardier proceeded to synchronize and a normal sighting operation was completed. Bombs were released on a true heading of 032 degrees.

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 24700° True, 24100° Indicated
- (d) Time of Release: 1721
- (e) Method of Release: 100° Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 390B fell over and right of the assigned MPI in fields near a tiny village.

2. Bomb Pattern: 2070°L x 826°W.

3. Bombing Errors: **Gross**.

4. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned target: **NIL**.

5. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: **POOR**.

6. Late bursts in the photos indicate that perhaps the 3 A/C of 95 Group bombed with 390B or 390C. 1 A/C's bombs are shown falling in the village, and another in the woods and a third in fields about 1 mile over.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 807: had a mission failure and returned 38 x 150 GP.

(3) 390C Squadron: (750)

(a) AL Capt. Howe                    N    Lt. Stevens  
P    Lt. Babbitt                    B    Lt. Guekes  
   R/N Lt. Groves

(b) After the turn at the IP, the bombardier began to do pin-point pilotage. 4 minutes from the BRL, the bombardier picked up the target and proceeded to synchronize. A normal sighting operation was completed and bombs were released on a true heading of 030 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 24300° True, 23850° Indicated
- (d) Time of Release: 1721
- (e) Method of Release: 100° Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 390C fell in the smoke over the target area. Only a few bursts are visible, and these appear in the center of the L/F.

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(g) Bombing Malfunctions: Lead A/C accidentally released a smoke bomb over channel while testing bomb bay doors. A/C 0648 returned 38 x 150 GP because of rack malfunctions.

(4) 390D Squadron: (749)

(a)	AL Capt. Greene	N	Lt. Keder
	P Lt. McKellar	B	Lt. Wills
		R/N	Lt. Heaton

(b) Attacking on a true heading of 031 degrees, the bombardier began to do pin-point pilotage. 15 miles from the BRL, the bombardier picked up the target area. With 2 minutes for synchronization, the bombardier completed a normal sighting operation. Bombs were released on a true heading of 030 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 23500° True, 22850° Indicated  
 (d) Time of Release: 1721  
 (e) Method of Release: 100° Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 390D hit on and around the assigned MPI on the L/F.

2. Bomb Pattern: 1675°L x 1250°W.

3. Bombing Errors: Range 8 300°0  
 Deflection: 0°  
 Radial 8 300°

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the MPI: 95% & 100%.

5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned target: EXCELLENT.

6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: EXCELLENT.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

5. PFF Narrative: (1) 13A: Four PFF A/C were dispatched. 100A set was turned off, because hot wax smoking. Cause is undetermined. 100D had no beacon reception. 100B and 100C had weak and intermittent beacon reception. Bombing was entirely visual.

(2) Four PFF A/C were dispatched. 95C had no beacon reception. 95A had good reception, but a sweep delay malfunction made a C/N run impossible. 95A and B had strong beacon reception. 95A assisted the bombardier in setting up course. Bombing was visual.

(3) 13B: Four PFF A/C were dispatched. All Squadrons had strong beacon reception. Bombing was entirely visual.

5. Communications: a. VHF: (1) Lt. Col. Wallace led the 13th Wing on this mission. VHF communications on Channel A were satisfactory, however, some static and unnecessary transmissions causing interference took place.

(2) Kodak A/C were contacted readily for weather, and all Control Point messages were sent to Division Ground Station satisfactorily.

(3) Both fighters and Ground Sectors were contacted successfully.

(4) An A/C of 390 Group contacted MF/DF Section reporting another A/C ditching at 5153N-0201E and received acknowledgement of message. Pilot monitored VHF Channel D (665) and heard the emergency call.

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

b. W/T: (1) Division W/T Station was received clearly. Wing Leader sent all Control Point messages and the Strike Reports.

(2) Control Points:

	CP1	CP2	TGT	CP3
Flight Plan	1507	1550	1730	1907
ATA	1503	1546	1716	1850
TOD	1508	1547	1720	1853

(3) Strike Reports:

100A	P A 2	1716	TOD	1720
100B	P A 3	1716	TOD	1756
100C	P A 2	1717	TOD	1753
100D	P A 5	1718	TOD	1812
95A	P A 1	1718	TOD	1746
95B	P A 3	1720	TOD	1819
95C	P A 1	1720	TOD	1834
95D	T A 4	1744	TOD	1806
390A	P A 1	1744	TOD	1806
390B	P A 5	1720	TOD	1840
390C	P A 5	1716	TOD	1759
390D	P A 2	1721	TOD	1822

6. Photography: a. 95 installed 3 scope, 5 oblique, and 8 vertical cameras, 3, 5, and 8 of which took pictures. All 3 sets of H2X scope photos were received and all are plottable. Only 1 set of pictures taken by 95A and B was printed for this Headquarters.

b. 100 installed 2 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 1 and 8 of which took pictures. PFF A/C 8709: electrical system failure in H2X camera. A/C 9162, #3 in lead element of D Squadron: K-21 vertical camera was frozen. One 16 mm negative roll was received. No camera was placed in the deputy lead A/C of 100A, B, and D, and no camera was placed in the lead of 100C.

c. 390 installed 1 scope, 2 oblique, and 12 vertical cameras, 1, 2, and 12 of which took pictures. 1 set of scope photos was received. Photos are not plottable because the remote scope was out of focus.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

*Ernest A. Kiessling*  
**ERNEST A. KIESSLING**  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Director of Training & Analysis.

*Library*

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15TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)









STEENWIJK A/D, HOLLAND

24 MARCH 1964

CIRCLES - 1000' AND 2000' FROM THE ASSIGNED NPIs.

RP: 390A: 1:25,030  
 B: 1:24,550  
 C: 1:24,404  
 D: 1:22,600

100A: 1:24,413  
 B: 1:25,200  
 C: 1:25,200  
 D: 1:22,697



*W. R. ...*  
*J. ...*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*AKK*  
*CHB*

13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)

ZIEGENHAIN A/F, GERMANY

24 MARCH 45

P.M.


CIRCLES - 1000' AND 2000' FROM MPIs. THE BOMBS DROPPED BY 95D FELL 3 MILES NNW OF SIEGEN IN FIELDS; (NOT SHOWN).

RF. -

390A: 1:41160  
B: 1:41340  
C: 1:42651  
D: 1:40285

100A: 1:42000  
B: 1:42685  
C: 1:41660  
D: 1:40370

95A: 1:42500  
B: 1:43714  
C: 1:42857



335TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)  
95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
APO # 559

24th March 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion Of Aircraft # 7204

TO : Commanding Officer, 335th Bombardment Squadron

1. Aircraft # 7204 aborted at 1610 hours, altitude 18,000 feet, position 05 18 East.

2. At 18,000 feet the Ball turret man did not respond very promptly to an oxygen check. He was told to get out of the turret and an investigation revealed that a line was broken and his oxygen was gone. Following immediately right waist and tail position oxygen systems ran out. The ball turret, right waist and tail gunners changed to the left system, which rapidly decreased in pressure till it fell to 100 pounds.

3. As briefed time on oxygen was approximately three and a half hours, I decided to abort.

4. Bombs were jettisoned visually, 40 miles east of Southwold, as instructed by Base.

*Raymond A. Fabiniak*  
RAYMOND A. FABINIAK  
2nd. Lt. A.C.

1st. Ind.

HEADQUARTERS: 95th Bombardment Group, APO # 559, AAF 119, 24th March 1945

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, APO # 559

1. This abortion considered justified.

*John F. Losee*  
JOHN F. LOSEE  
Lt. Col. A.C.  
Commanding Officer











**HEADQUARTERS**  
**NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)**  
**Office of the Intelligence Officer**

24 March 1945

**SUBJECT:** S-2 Report for the mission to Ziegenhain, Germany for the above date.

**TO :** Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - this is the second attack on A/D's today in support of Field Marshall Montgomery's drive across the Rhine River, with the 95th Group flying as 13B Combat Group - Major Frankosky was group leader.

A Squadron - eight A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the lead squadron and eight A/C attacked the primary target. A/C 7204 returned as a spare from 5048N 0518E at 1610 hours because oxygen was out.


B Squadron - Ten A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the high squadron and all A/C attacked the primary target.

C Squadron - eight A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the low squadron and all A/C attacked the primary target.

D Squadron - eight A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the low-low squadron, three A/C bombing the primary target with the 390th Group. As noted in the Operational Narrative, five A/C and the PFF A/C attacked the tertiary target Siegen.

2. Further Intelligence Information may be obtained from the Operational Narrative.

For the Intelligence Officer:



**ARNO A. KRAUSE,**  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

*File*

*JX*  
*CMB*

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE  
AAF STATION 101  
APO 634

: SECRET  
: By Authority of :  
: C.G. Eighth Air Force:  
: Initials: *B.A.G.* .....  
: Date: 24 March 1945 :  
.....

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 328

*lum*

PERIOD: 0001 hours 24 March to 2400 hours 24 March 1945.

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Total Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>OT</u>	<u>Totals</u>	<u>NYR</u>
Heavy Bomber Atks.v	1747	1712	4088.8(b)	1-0-0-A	0	23	3	26	5
Fighter Escort	103	95	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Sweeps(a)	1227	1158	3.5	53-0-12A 0-0-4 G	3	1	0	4	5
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	38	38	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	29	28	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	27	27	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>35</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	3206	3092	4092.3	54-0-12A 0-0-4 G	3	24	4	31	10

(a) Includes groups based on Continent.

(b) Does not include 582.3 tons of supplies dropped in Assault Area.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

1747 a/c (1267 B-17s, 480 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied against sixteen A/Fs in western and northwestern Germany and on a supply dropping mission to Assault Area east of the Rhine.

MORNING: 1298 a/c (267 B-17s, 182 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied in five forces against twelve A/Fs and supply dropping east of the Rhine. 1269 a/c dropped 3083.7 tons (2980.2 GP, 103.5 IB) on assigned A/Fs and several T/O's, and dropped 582.3 tons of supplies in assigned areas.

SECRET

S E C R E T

All bombing visual. Weather: CAVU at all targets. E/a Opposition: 1 FW-190 encountered east of Osnabruck; 1 u/i jet a/c sighted near-Zuider Zee; 1 Me-163 sighted near Wesel. Claims: 1-0-0 Air. Losses: 26 a/c (18 B-24s, 8 B-17s - 23 to AA; 3 to unknown causes).

AFTERNOON: 449 a/c (267 B-17s, 182 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied in three forces against four A/Fs in northwestern Germany. 443 a/c dropped 1108.6 tons GP on assigned targets and a third priority target, a tertiary target and a T/O. Weather: CAVU at targets. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

S E C R E T

First Force

Five group formations (179 B-17s - 1st Air Division) sortied against Vechta A/F. 176 a/c dropped 482.6 tons GP and 102.0 tons IB on assigned target and one T/O at 0849-0855 hours from 24,000-25,600 feet. All bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Vechta A/F. Weather: CAVU. Flak: nil. Battle Damage: nil. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of Bomber Attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Target</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I.B.</u>	
Vechta A/F	179	175	480.6	102.0	Fair
<u>Other Target</u>					
Rheine A/F	—	1	2.0	1.5	Unobserved
Totals	179	176	482.6	103.5	

Second Force

Fourteen group formations (527 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against A/Fs at Steenwejk, Zwischenahn, Varrell, Varrelbusch and Plantlunne. 515 a/c dropped 1721.0 tons GP on assigned targets and three T/Os at 0924-0945 hours from 12,280-26,700 feet. All bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Varrelbusch, Varrell, Steenwejk and Plantlunne. Weather: CAVU at target, few patchy high clouds over Zuider Zee. Flak: nil to meager, inaccurate. Battle damage: 2 minor. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 B-17s to causes unknown. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I.B.</u>	
Steenwejk A/F	114	114	303.4		Good
Zwischenahn A/F	77	74	253.1		Fair
Varrell A/F	107	88	397.5		Fair
Varrelbusch A/F	115	113	339.2		Good
Plantlunne A/F	114	111	382.5		Good
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Wittmundhafen A/F	—	13	39.0		Unobserved
2 T/Os	—	2	6.3		"
Totals	527	515	1721.0		

S E C R E T

Third Force

Eight group formations (294 B-17s, 1st Air Division) sortied against A/Fs at Rheine, Hopsten, Furstenau/Vechtel, Achmer and Hesepe. 280 a/c dropped 654.9 tons GP on assigned targets and one T/O at 1005-1045 hours from 23,500-25,500 feet. All bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Furstenau and Hopsten. Weather: CAVU. Flak: moderate, accurate. Battle Damage: 75 minor, 25 major, 1 cat "E". E/a Opposition: 1 Fw 190 encountered E of Osnabruck. Claims: 1-0-0A. Losses: 6 B-17s (5 to AA, 1 to causes unknown). NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>G.P.</u>	<u>Results</u>
Rheine A/F	36	36	103.0	Good
Hopsten A/F	76	62	114.5	Fair
Furstenau/Vechtel A/F	73	72	133.5	Good
Achmer A/F	73	73	227.9	Good
Hesepe A/F	36	36	69.0	Fair
<u>Other Targets</u>				
Wiedenbruck	—	<u>1</u>	<u>2.0</u>	Unobserved
Totals	294	280	654.9	

Fourth Force

Six squadron formations (58 B-24s, 2nd Air Division) sortied against Nordhorn A/F. 58 a/c dropped 121.7 tons GP on assigned target at 1034-1037 hours from 20,000-21,000 feet. All bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Nordhorn A/F. Weather: CAVU. Flak: nil. Battle Damage: nil. E/a Opposition: nil. One u/i jet a/c sighted near Zuider Zee. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Target</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Nordhorn A/F	58	58	121.7	Good

Fifth Force

Twenty-seven squadron formations (240 B-24s, 2nd Air Division) sortied on supply dropping mission to American and British assault areas east of Rhine. 240 a/c dropped 582.3 tons of supplies in assigned area at 1305-1335 hours from

S E C R E T

100 to 600 feet. Weather: CAVU in target area, Flak: small arms fire machine gun, 20 mm, encountered - moderate and accurate. Battle Damage: 94 minor, 9 major, 1 Cat. "E", E/a Opposition: 1 Me-163 sighted in target area. Claims: nil. Losses: 18 a/c (to AA). NYR: 5 a/c.

Details of dropping mission as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage of Supplies</u>	<u>Results</u>
American Assault Area	120	122	312.0	Dropped in assigned area.
British Assault Area	120	118	270.3	
Totals	240	240	582.3	

Fighter Support (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Forces):

Fighter support was in the nature of area support and patrol and armed reconnaissance. (See Fighter Sweeps, below).

Sixth Force

Eighteen squadron formations (182 B-24s - 2nd Air Division) sortied against A/Fs at Stormede and Kirtof. 181 a/c dropped 416.2 tons GP of assigned primaries, one tertiary and a T/O at 1719-1728 hours from 19,100-22,200 feet. Bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Stormede and Treysa. Weather: CAVU. Flak: nil at target, meager, inaccurate over battle line. Battle Damage: 16 minor, E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Stormede A/F	95	96	229.0	Very Good
Kirtof A/F	87	65	114.0	Very Good
Ziegenhain A/F (Tertiary)		9	19.4	Good - Very Good
<u>Other Target</u>				
Treysa M/Y		11	23.8	Unobserved
Totals	182	181	416.2	

Seventh Force

Three group formations (114 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against Ziegenhain A/F. 110 a/c dropped 343.7 tons GP on primary target and Siegen M/Y



S E C R E T

(3rd priority) at 1715-1721 hours from 23,700-26,000 feet. Bombing visual. Weather: CAVU. Flak: nil at target. Battle damage: 2 minor. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Ziegenhain A/F	111	101	327.6	Good
Siegen M/Y (3rd Priority)	—	6	16.1	Unobserved
Totals	111	110	343.7	

Eighth Force

Four group formations (153 B-17s, 1st Air Division) sortied against Twente Enschede A/F. 152 a/c dropped 348.7 tons on primary at 1731-1756 hours from 21,000-22,900 feet. Bombing visual. Weather: CAVU. Flak: meager to moderate, generally inaccurate. Battle Damage: 16 minor, 4 major. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Target</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Twente Enschede A/F	153	152	348.7	Good

2. Fighter Escort

Four groups (35 P-47s, 68 P-51s - 103 a/c) sortied in support of three bomber forces on afternoon mission. Up 1435-1552 hours; down 1905-1935 hours. 95 effective sortied. E/a Opposition: nil. Two groups strafed. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Miscellaneous Ground Claims:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Trucks	10	6
Staff Cars	1	0
Medium Tank	0	1
Oil Cars	0	6

3. Fighter Sweeps

Fifteen groups, including two groups based on Continent (24 P-47s, 1203 P-51s - 1227 a/c) sortied in four forces on area patrol and armed reconnaissance in support of bomber forces in following general areas: Zwolle, Enschede, Munster, Siegen, Pflaumburg, Gutersloh, Osnabruck, Furstenau, Orange Canal, Eeld, Dummer Lake, Lengor N of Ziegenhain. Four patrols. Up 0556-1529 hours; down 1100-1933 hours. 1158 effective sortied. One group dive bombed a military camp (W 3038) dropping 3.5 tons.

S E C R E T

M/a Opposition: 1 u/1 jet sighted Meppel area; 2 u/1 jets seen Lingen area;  
20 Me-109s engaged W of Gutersloh A/F; 15 Me-109s bounced over Eikeln A/F;  
15 P-51s, 15 Me-109s encountered W of Kassel; 1 Me-109 destroyed S of Soest.  
E/a Claims: 53-0-12 Air; 0-0-4 Ground. Losses: 4 P-51s - 3 to a/a, 1 to AA.  
MYR: 5 P-51s (believed safe on Continent).

Miscellaneous Ground Claims:	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/Vs	46	33
Light Tanks	1	1
Automobiles	18	9
Locomotives	8	8
Oil Trucks	10	2
Observation Tower	1	0
Buildings	4	1
Trucks	74	12
Radar Towers	1	2
Goods Wagons	3	132

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil

5. Photo Reconnaissance

38 a/c (917 P-51s, 15 F-5s, 5 Spitfires, 2 Mosquitoes) sortied as follows: -

- 6 a/c sortied on D/A photos in eastern Germany.
  - 3 a/c sortied on mapping mission over Kassel and Neuruppin areas.
  - 7 a/c sortied on activity study over eastern and central Germany.
  - 3 a/c sortied for research photos.
  - 17 P-51s sortied as escort.
  - 2 Mosquitoes sortied on night photography over Altenbeken.
- Losses: nil.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

29 a/c (20 P-51s, 6 B-17s, 3 Mosquitoes) sortied as follows:

- 2 B-17s completed routine weather flights over sea to NW of Lands End.
  - 1 B-17 completed routine flight to Position 13.
  - 1 B-17 completed routine flight to the Azores.
  - 3 Mosquitoes completed weather reconnaissance over N Germany, Holland, UK, S of Ireland, W France and the Atlantic.
- 22 a/c (20 P-51s, 2 B-17s) as weather scouts for bombers. 21 Effective sorties.
- Losses: nil.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

27 a/c (23 P-47s and 4 OA-10s) sortied on patrols and searches.  
2 incidents. 1 pilot rescued. No losses.

8. Special Operations

35 a/c (22 B-24s, 8 P-51s, 5 Mosquitoes) sortied as follows:

4 Mosquitoes sortied on special operation for 1st, 2nd, 3rd Air Divisions. No losses.

9 a/c (1 Mosquito, 8 P-51s as escort) sortied special mission.  
Losses: 1 Mosquito.

12 B-24s sortied on UHF mission, jamming 0447-0900 hours; 1224-1613 hours. No losses.

10 B-24s sortied on leaflet dropping mission over Holland and Germany.  
1 a/c aborted. No losses.

S E C R E T

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

In spite of CAVU weather the GAF made very little effort to hinder any part of today's multiple operations and it is possible that the recent bombing of airfields in NW Germany was a major factor in keeping the enemy on the ground.

The only attack experienced by the bombers was by an FW-190 which shot down a straggling B-17, 5 to 10 miles E of Osnabruck at 1021 hours, before being itself destroyed. Two FW-190s were also seen in the First Division target area but these made no attacks.

Fighter groups patrolling throughout the day and flying a maximum number of sorties encountered relatively few e/a and only report three engagements with enemy formations. The first of these was at 1210 when a squadron of P-51s flying at 2,000 feet observed 20 Me-109s west of Gutersloh flying on the deck towards the front. P-51s engaged and in a combat lasting 20 minutes destroyed 16 and damaged 4. The second was at 1300 hours W of Hamm where P-51s at 12,000 feet observed 15 Me-109s circling airfield and apparently preparing to land - e/a fought aggressively when bounced but our fighters had the advantage of higher altitude and in a combat ranging from 6,000 to the deck, twelve were destroyed and two damaged.

The third took place NW of Kassel at 1525 until 1600 hours. P-51s attacked 15 FW-190s and 15 Me-109s flying at 3,000-6,000 feet. E/A were aggressive and experienced and fought from 10,000 to the deck. Claims however are 24-0-6 for the loss of one P-51.

A further Me-109 was destroyed at 1600 hours 5 miles S of Soest at 3000 feet - a P-51 is also thought to have been lost in this engagement.

Two other Me-109s were sighted at 0925 hours W of Munster flying North at 10,000 feet but were too far off to be engaged.

Only three jet a/c were sighted, one at 0930 on a southerly course at 30,000 feet in the Meppel area and two others at 1000 on a SW course at 30,000 feet in the Lingen area.

2. Flak

Rhine - meager, accurate.  
Hopsten - moderate, accurate.  
Munster - intense, accurate  
Bielefeld - meager, accurate.  
Furstenau - moderate, inaccurate.  
Achmer - meager, inaccurate.  
Varoll - meager, inaccurate, tracking.  
Zwischenahn - meager, inaccurate, barrage.

3. Observations

14 a/c observed on the ground at A/F, 2 miles E of Dummer Lake. Military installation of about 12 buildings seen at approximately 5245-0735 E.

M/Y at Hereford appeared very crowded.

M/Y at Arnhem well filled with approximately 150 cars.

M/Y at Enschede crowded.

M/Y at Mülholland full of rolling stock.

M/Y at Betsenbruck with considerable traffic.

Quackenbruck M/Y filled with freight cars.

Groningen M/Y with considerable activity.

Lingen M/Y much activity reported.

Heavy concentration of fortification reported at 5300N-0630E.

Small factory at Borken (5104N-0917E) with three stacks, all billowing black smoke in complete defiance of our air power. 20-30 box cars in small M/Y adjacent to factory.

Radio station circled by 6 towers with another in center of 4 RV 3961.

Train with 25 plus cars stationary at entrance of tunnel RB0462.

Red Cross train with 15 plus cars stationary at 4 RB 2458.

Oldenburg M/Y filled with 300-400 freight wagons.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Vechta A/F - Good to Very Good Results

15 concentrations of mixed GP and IB bombs fell into target area. Three flight hangars - direct hits. Photos showed 2 hangars on fire and the third is 5% destroyed. Control tower, 2 direct hits and burning. Large repair hangar center target area 3 direct hits left it severely damaged. Seven small workshops destroyed or on fire. Motor transport area large workshop severely damaged and on fire; 1 small workshop on fire. Barracks area heavily hit. Of 34 barracks 18 severely burning - 3 severe damage resulted. Smoke covers remainder of hangars and it is impossible to estimate other damage, in this area. 130 hits on main runway - severely damaged. Concentration of bombs fell across main field area and post holed field throughout. At least 12 a/c were visible on the field at time of attack. 7 of these a/c were damaged or destroyed.

Furstenau/Vechtel - Very Good Results

Six concentrations of GP blanketed landing ground. Main weight of bombs in target area. One large hangar, 3 small workshops direct hits. 8 a/c on field - 7 destroyed or damaged. Damage to landing ground severe.

Hesepe A/F - Good Results

to one of 2 concentrations on NW portion of landing field with E-W and S W runways. 18 hits on E W Runways, 54 hits on NW-SE runways. Main weight of bombs on landing field adjacent to runways. One concentration fell across the main highway 1 mile SE of A/F.

Hopsten A/F - Good Results

Three full and 1 partial concentration GP fell in target area. 150 bursts on E W Runway. 35 hits on N S runway, 1 concentration one mile N of center and open area. Second concentration extended to E edge of A/F. 15 hits E end of EW Runway. 14 a/c on field - none damaged.

Achmer A/F - Fair to Good

Four GP concentrations bursts on landing field and across three main runways - E-W 53 hits NE-SW; NW-SE 18 and 21 hits respectively. Heaviest concentration at three junctions eliminating the use of runways. Main weight fell on landing ground. 1 concentration fell on and across rail line E edge of A/F. 1 small hangar received direct hits with 18 hits on rail line. 350 bombs in dispersal area. 4 direct hits S SE center A/F. 2 a/c shelters direct hits. 13 a/c on field not hurt.

Rhaine A/F - Fair Results.

Three concentrations in area adjacent to SW dispersal area and ; three covered direct hits and many near misses to our shelters. 2 small workshops and two open shelters damaged. At least 3 small explosive fires visible in area. Runways N S and NW-SE hit by ten bombs. 4 a/c on field at time of attack. None damaged. Photos showed much damage previously inflicted on runways and landing field.

Enschede - Very Good Results

Good concentration of bombs on A/F. All runways severely damaged, Covered junction of three runways.

Varnell A/F - Good Results

All patterns except two fell on the field. Most of the patterns centered on or near the NW-SE runway with one pattern extending into the barracks area. 7 small a/c probably fighters were noted, incl. one Me-163 - none were

Plantlunne A/F - Fair to Good

Bombed by 9 squadrons carrying 500 GP and SAP bombs. Patterns blanketed the NW one-half of the A/F with most of the bombs on the field.

5. Ground Situation

6th Army Group : First French Army: Nothing to Report.

7th U.S. Army: Thrust by armor and infantry to line R 3954, 4658, 4465, 3561, 2960 and the thrust into Speyer 5180 has broken the enemy bridgehead west of the Rhine between Ludwigshafen and Karlsruhe and into three parts, each of which are being rapidly cleared.

12th Army Group : 3rd U.S. Army: In addition to clearing the remaining enemy West of the Rhine with 7th U.S. army now having a substantial bridgehead E of the Rhine on the line M-4637, 5337, 5539, 5443, 4749, 4444 with elements at 5634, 5934.

1st U.S. Army: The Remagen bridgehead is now expanded to the line F-8102, 8206, 8406, 8409, 8310, 8113, 8118, 7920, 7722, 7523, 7526, 7428, 7531, 7232, 7435, 7239, 7040, 6742, 6843, and line of Sieg River to junction with Rhine.

21st Army Group : 9th U.S. Army: Bridgehead over Rhine being established against light opposition. Right sector of Rhine A 2926, 3027, 3029, Left sector on Rhine 2335, 2337, 2137. Railway line crossed in center at 2732.

2nd British Army: Wesel captured. Right line on Rhine, 1541, 1544, 1345. Left Sector on Line, 0854, 0554, 0354. Strong opposition in Rees, 0752 - Airborne operation in connection with these crossing has gone according to plan. Airborne Divisions have established contact with ground forces in the area of Schuttwiok, 1644 and Dierssordt, 1744. Airborne elements also at 2048. Approximately 2500 P/Ws captured.

6. RAF Activity over England

0001 - 2400 hours - 24 March 1945

	<u>Launched</u>	<u>Landfall</u>	<u>Greater London</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>
Flying Bombs	5	4	1	0

D. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Ninth Air Force	2865	4-0-0 A 24-2-28 G	11 a/c
First U.S. T.A.F.	1105	2-0-0	1 a/c
Second TAF	Unavailable		
RAF Fighter Command	Unavailable		
Totals	3970	6-0-0 Air 24-0-28 Ground	12 a/c

Ninth Air Force

Night 23/24 March

Sorties : 31 Intruder Patrol  
10 Attack Communication Centers  
41 a/c

E/A Claims : 1-0-0

Losses : 1 a/c

Day - 24 March 1945

Sorties : 1787 Fighters and Fighter Bombers  
770 Bombers  
267 Reconnaissance  
2824 a/c

Mission : 9th Bomb Division: 770 a/c sortied on two missions bombing flak positions, A/Fs, 3 RR bridges and 3 communication centers.

9th, 19th, 29th TACs: 1787 sorties. Supported the ground forces in break through area E of Rhine.

E/A Claims : 3-0-0 Air 24-2-28 Ground

Losses : 11 a/c (9 Fighters, 2 Bombers)

Misc. Ground Claims:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T	442	556
AFV	11	25
RR Cars	394	415
Locomotives	24	18
Buildings	166	86
Gun Positions	29	33



1st U.S.T.A.F.

Night - 23/24 March

Sorties : 10 a/c on Intruder Defensive Patrol

Claims & Losses: Nil.

Day - 24 March 1945

Sorties : 916 Fighters and Fighter Bombers  
171 Bombers  
8 Reconnaissance  
1095 a/c

Missions : 42nd Bomb Wing: 171 sorties. Attacked RR Bridges, RR embankments, RR viaducts, RR stations and a M/Y in tactical area.

12th TAC : 653 sorties. Armed Reconnaissance in support of ground forces attacked rail and road movement supply dump, troop concentration E of Rhine.

1st French TAF : 263 sorties. Fighter sweeps in support of ground forces. Escort to bombers. Rail interdiction.

Western French Air Force: 8 Sorties. Tactical Recon.

E/A Claims : 2-0-0

Losses : 1 Fighter

Second TAF

Unavailable.

RAF Fighter Command

Unavailable.

2. Fifteenth Air Force

23 March 1945

171 B-17s and 231 P-51s sortied.

163 B-17s escorted by 211 P-51s dropped 427 tons on Ruhland Oil Refinery, 18 tons on Budejovice M/Y. Losses: 3 B-17s and 1 P-51.

62 B-24s and 38 P-38s sortied.

56 B-24s escorted by 38 P-38s dropped 102 tons on St. Valentin M/Y and 2 tons on T/Os. Losses: nil.

69 B-24s and 13 P-38s sortied.

67 B-24s escorted by 12 P-38s dropped 118 tons on St. Polten South M/Y. Losses: nil.

95 B-24s and 48 P-38s sortied.

87 B-24s escorted by 45 P-38s dropped 156 tons on Kagran Oil Refinery and 8.7 tons on T/Os. Losses: 5 B-24s.

150 B-24s and 31 P-38s sortied.

146 B-24s escorted by 27 P-38s dropped 276 tons on Gmund M/Y. Losses: nil.

165 B-24s and 29 P-38s sortied.

161 B-24s escorted by 27 P-38s dropped 437 tons on St. Valentin Tank Works and 11 tons on T/Os. Losses: 6 B-24s.

Operational Highlights: Program of disabling all remaining operative oil refineries within range was continued by the attacks on Ruhland and Karwan Oil Refineries. The Ruhland attack was closely phased to permit minimum fighters to provide maximum cover and also to allow mutual protection against the bomber formations. Active tank production at Valentin hampered by successful attack will produce immediate advantages on fighting fronts by curtailment of tank delogeries. Austrian communication targets are gradually assuming vital importance due to the continually increasing restrictions on transportation system in this area. The use of closely matched routes to all targets with staggered attacks on Valentin to allow clearance of bomb smoke plus minimum efficient time in the target areas coupled with the same general return route permitted the relatively small number of fighters not needed for the Ruhland penetration to give the remaining 4 wings the best possible target cover in Austria. Very good weather conditions apart from slight haze permitted all groups to bomb visually except 3, which bombed offset method due smoke screen or bomb smoke.

Bombers

Fighters

Sorties : 712 a/c (171 B-17s, 541 B-24s)  
Eff. Sorties: 680 a/c (163 B-17s, 517 B-24s)  
Tonnage : 1555.7  
Claims : Nil.  
Losses : 14 a/c (3 B-17s, 11 B-24s)

Sorties: 390 a/c (231 P-51s, 159 P-38s)  
Eff. Sorties: 360 a/c (211 P-51s, 149 P-38s)  
Claims : Nil.  
Losses : 1 P-51

Fifteenth Air Force

24 March 1945

169 B-17s and 227 P-51s, 62 P-38s sortied.

150 B-17s, escorted by 214 P-51s, 58 P-38s dropped 356 tons on Berlin Marienfeldeda Imler Benzol Tank works. Claims: 8-6-0 Air. Losses: 4 a/c (3 B-17s 1 P-51), NYR 10 a/c (6 B-17s, 4 P-51s)

283 B-24s and 75 P-38s sortied.

272 B-24s escorted by 70 P-38s dropped 565 tons on Neuberg Airdrome, Claims: 20-0-0 Ground. Losses: Nil.

150 B-24s and 30 P-38s sortied.

147 B-24s escorted by 27 P-38s dropped 331 tons on Munich Reim A/F and a T/O. Claims and Losses: Nil.

94 B-24s sortied.

92 B-24s dropped 164 tons on Budenovice M/Y and a T/O. Claims & Losses: Nil.

Operational Highlights:

Fortresses have made deepest penetration in 15th Air Force Histry to attack most important objective in our range. Ruhland, St. Valentine and Kagrau attacks have left no known gas producers in our operational area. Enemy now known to be short of fuel and strong on aircraft so counter air effort included to prevent possible hoarding of reserves for all out comittment of air power. Careful conservation of fuel plus minimum engine time on ground plus rapid rendezvous plus slow climb plus direct route to target plus alert crews allowed 1500 mile round trip to Berlin. Five fighter groups assigned to fortresses to afford strong target cover and light escort on penetration and withdrawal.

Bombers:

Sorties : 696 (427 B-24s, 159 B-17s)  
Eff. Sorties: 661  
Tonnage : 1413  
Claims : 0-0-0  
Losses : 4 B-17s

Fighters

Sorties: 304 (227 P-51s, 167 P-38s)  
Eff. Sorties: 369  
Claims 8-6-0 A -20-0-0 Ground  
Losses: 1 P-51

3. R.A.F. Bomber Command

Day - 24 March 1945

Target

Losses

153 Halifaxes	Gladbeck Troop Concentration	1
16 Lancasters		0
6 Mosquitoes		0
155 Halifaxes	Sterkrade M/Y	0
17 Lancasters		0
6 Mosquitoes		0
89 Lancasters )	Dortmund/Hanpenerweg	4
6 Mosquitoes )	Oil Refinery	0
84 Lancasters	Mathias Stinnes Benzol	0
6 Mosquitoes	Plant nr. Bottrop	0
538 a/c		5

Night - 24/25 March 1945

67 Mosquitoes	Berlin	0
8 Mosquitoes	Northeim M/Y	0
2 Mosquitoes	Siren Tour	0
1 Mosquito	Weather Recon.	0
33 Mosquitoes	Bomber Support	0
22 Halifaxes		
7 Liberators		
6 Fortresses		
1 Halifax )	Signals Investigation	0
2 Mosquitoes )	Patrol	0
149 a/c		0

4. First Allied Airborne Army

Ninth TCC

906 C-47 towing 897 gliders sortied dropping the 17th U.S. Airborne Division in assigned dropping zones from 1000-1059 hours with satisfactory results. Weather: CAVU with smoke and haze in target area. Flak: moderate, intense. E/A Opposition: 10-15 u/i a/c sighted in assigned areas - no combat. Losses: 32 a/c NYR: 47 a/c.

52nd T.C. Wing

243 C-47s, C-53s and 399 glider tug combinations sortied dropping the Sixth British Airborne Division in assigned areas from 1000-1056 hours. Weather: CAVU with ground haze. E/A Opposition: nil. Losses: 13 a/c.

38th Group

320 glider tug combinations sortied dropping the 6th British Airborne Division with satisfactory results. E/A Opposition: Nil. Losses: 6 a/c.

46th Group

120 glider tug combinations sortied supporting the 6th British Airborne Division operations. E/A Opposition: Nil. Losses: 1 a/c.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary information and is not to be used for record purposes.

CHARLES Y. BANFILL  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Director of Intelligence.

Date 24 March 1945  
13 CBW FO 80  
13 CBW OPS 305  
3 AD FO 620

SUBJECT: Supplement to Tactical Report (Zeigenhain, Germany)

TO : *Col Shuck, 95.*

1. Corrections:

a. Paragraph 4, b, (3), (g), page 4: Change to read - One A/C released late and bombs fell 4000' beyond the AP. (This late release was not reported by the Group bombardier or the officer tail gunner.

b. Paragraph 4, b, (4), (b), page 4: Change to read - After the IP, the bombardier began to set up course by pin-point pilotage. Because smoke from preceding Squadrons obscured the MPI, the bombardier synchronized short, and not until 50 seconds from the BRL could he place the cross hairs on what he thought was the assigned MPI. Bombs were released on a true heading of 025 degrees. C-1 auto pilot was used on the bomb run.

2. Tabulation of Bombing:

Bomb Load:	100		14 x 500 GP Min train		
	95 A, B, C:		14 x 500 GP Min train		
			D: 38 x 150 GP Min train		
	390		A: 24 x 250 GP 100' train		
			B, C, D: 38 x 150 GP 100' train		

Group:	Length:	Width:	1000'	2000'	Remarks
100A:	1680'	1410'	79%	100%	MPI
B:	1725'	1280'	80%	100%	Well selected AP
C:	Cannot measure		70%	100%	Poorly selected AP
D:	1800'	800'	87%	100%	Well selected AP
Average:	1735'	1163'	79%	100%	
95A:	1715'	1285'	80%	100%	MPI
B:	2175'	1525'	9%	46%	MPI
C:	1475'	1250'	0	65%	MPI
D:			0	0	Tertiary Target
Average:	1788'	1353'	22%	53%	
390A:	2130'	1275'	73%	100%	MPI
B:	2070'	826'	0	0	MPI
C:	Bombs in smoke of previous attacks				
D:	1675'	1250'	95%	100%	MPI
Average:	1958'	1117'	56%	67%	
13 CBW Average:					
	1827'	1211'	52.3%	73.3%	

The above table is not a correct comparison of pattern length or of percentages because 95 and 390 Groups have rewired the bomb bays so that the bombs in train release drop simultaneously from each bay. The width of the pattern in 100 and 95 Groups (except 100D) is excessive, and probably indicates a lack of knowledge on the part of the pilots as to the correct way to fly the line A/C formation. 390 Squadrons fly a "V" of "V's" and the average pattern width is approximately what is expected. The length for 100 and 95 Groups also appears excessive.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The air leaders, pilots, and bombardiers making these errors are as follows:

100C: Major Robinson	Lt. Ellis	Lt. Snyder
95B: Capt. Jeneman	Lt. Thomas	Lt. Hathaway
95C:	Lt. Tessier	Lt. Heyes
95D:	Lt. Newman	F/O Messinger
390B: Lt. Proffatt	Lt. Gobsby	Lt. Floorman

*But*  
Lt. Tessier and crew (95C) had flown the first mission and possibly did not have time to be properly briefed for the second mission although the directive was the same. Possibly 95 Group could have selected and briefed an air leader to accompany this crew for the second mission. Bombs must be released as a result of a proper sighting operation. The effect of the attacks of 95C and D and 390B was nil and the whole effort wasted because of poor lead crew and air leader performance.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

*Ernest A. Kiessling*

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Director of Training & Analysis.