

~~From Mac~~
Mac

302

CONFIDENTIAL
24 MAR 1945

IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 4103

LOCALITY: UNNA RAILWAY STATION AND JUNCTION
Ill. 5107/E/3/O.

95th

PERIOD COVERED: Up to 1450A hours on 23 MAR 1945.

ATTACK:

	<u>Date</u>	<u>S.A.</u>	<u>Reported Weather</u>
U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE	23 MAR 1945	3449	Clear

PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE:

Photographs taken a short time after the attack show many craters on the junction and in the eastern portions of the sidings, where many wagons have been damaged by near misses, and several have been set alight. At least six craters can be seen on the D.T. line to Hamm which probably undermine both tracks. The D.T. line to Soest has at least nine craters which cut tracks or weaken both embankments. The S.T. line to the south has been cut in at least five places. A number of craters can be seen on the lines between the station and junction cutting tracks.

Several fires were started in nearby business residential buildings and the Priority 2 Messingwerke Unna A.G. makers of Brass products. A large road bypassing the center of Unna has several craters on the roadway.

Notes from 'F' Section:

- M/Y sidings - 75% unserviceable.
- Through lines - 75% unserviceable.
- Terminal facilities - 5% unserviceable.
- Loading - moderate.

(Prints 2034-6)

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 14 Squadron.

SORTIE: US7/54C.

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 1450A hours on 23 MAR 1945.

SCALE: 1/9,000.

COVER AND QUALITY: Full cover, fair quality, smoke.

LAST REPORT: None.

COMPARATIVE SORTIE USED: Target illustration.

PRINT DISTRIBUTED: 2034 (to follow when available).

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WWS/RAC

DISTRIBUTION NO. 24-E

323 Copies

- (3) A group of at least 30 bursts is seen approximately 2-1/2 miles Northwest of the yard with several hits on small unidentified buildings in the vicinity of a quarry.
- (4) Several concentrations of incendiary bursts are seen across the East end of the yard and adjacent open areas. Small buildings have been blanketed and fires started.
- (5) At least six bursts are seen in a barracks area approximately 3-3/4 miles Northwest of the yard. At least three barracks appear to have received hits.
- (6) A concentration of more than 150 bursts is seen in mostly open area just Southeast of the road over rail bridge (13) with at least five hits in a small factory area.
- (7) Several concentrations may be seen late in the attack through smoke directly on the yards and adjacent areas.
- (8) At least ten bursts are seen in what appears to be a park 3-1/2 miles Northwest of the yard.

(iii) ACTIVITY:

1. HOLZWICKEDE MARSHALLING YARD:

The loading appears moderate to heavy.

2. DORTMUND AIRFIELD:

(a) No aircraft are visible on small scale, poor quality photographs.

Seven medium hangars and one large hangar are undamaged.

(b) The runway and landing ground appear serviceable.

(iv) ANNOTATED PRINT:

None prepared.

(v) BOMB PLOT:

A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed.

(vi) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV 94/1569	23 MAR 45	1331A hrs.	1/39,000	(F.L. 7")	22,900'	'A'
" 95/1651,	"	1350A "	1/39,400	"	23,000'	"
1653, 1654	"	1347A "	1/39,400	"	23,000'	"
" 390/1543-	"	1334A "	1/39,400	"	23,000'	"
1545	"	1332A "	1/37,700	"	22,000'	"
" 447/1140,	"	1340A "	1/37,700	"	22,000'	"
1142, 1143	"	1340A "	1/23,000	(F.L.12")	23,000'	"
" 486/1018,	"					
1020, 1021,						
1023						
" 437/971	"					
" 437/974	"					

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1653, 1654						
" 390/1543-	"	1347A "	1/39,400	"	23,000'	"
1545						
" 447/1140,	"	1334A "	1/39,400	"	23,000'	"
1142, 1143						
" 486/1018,	"	1332A "	1/37,700	"	22,000'	"
1020, 1021,						
1023						
" 487/971	"	1340A "	1/37,700	"	22,000'	"
" 487/974	"	1340A "	1/23,000	(F.L.12")	23,000'	"

6
Lead Crew ^{Tracy}
1 ea. Bomb ⁷

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ny

HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 23 March 1945
13 CBW FO 78
13 CBW OPS 303
3 AD FO 618

return to opp.
for file

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (UNNA, GERMANY)

TO : Colonel Shuck. 95th

1. Information Concerning the Targets: a. The 1st priority target (visual) for all Groups was the Railway Station and Junction at UNNA, GERMANY.

b. The 2nd priority target (visual) for all Groups was MESCHEDE, GERMANY.

c. The 3rd priority target (visual or H2X) for all Groups was the M/Y at MARBURG, GERMANY. This target was to be attacked as a 2nd priority only if one Squadron within a Group failed to bomb the 1st priority target.

2. Planning and Execution:

a. Order:	Bomb Load:	Force:	Assigned Target:
(1) 45 A,B,C:			Hengstey
(a) 388	34 x 100 GP 2 x M-17	36 A/C	
(b) 452	34 x 100 GP 2 x M-17	36 A/C	
(c) 96	18 x 250 GP 2 x M-17	36 A/C	
(2) 93 A,B,C,D:			Geisecke
(a) 493	34 x 100 GP 2 x M-17	36 A/C	
(b) 34	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C	
(c) 385	6 x 1000 M-13	36 A/C	
(d) 490	12 x 500 GP	36 A/C	
(3) 4 A,B,C,D:			Holzwickede
(a) 447	34 x 100 GP 2 x M-17	36 A/C	
(b) 94	34 x 100 GP 2 x M-17	36 A/C	
(c) 486	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C	
(d) 487	6 x 1000 GP	36 A/C	
(4) 13 A,B,C:			Unna
(a) 100	34 x 100 GP 2 x M-17	36 A/C	
(b) 390	34 x 100 GP 2 x M-17	36 A/C	
(c) 95	34 x 150 GP 2 x M-17	36 A/C	

b. Availability:

Airborne:

(1) 95 Reg: 42 A/C 51 C/C 34 A/C

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(2)	100	Reg:	40 A/C	51 C/C	34 A/C
		Lead:	11 A/C	7 C/C	4 A/C
(3)	390	Reg:	20 A/C	62 C/C	34 A/C
		Lead:	11 A/C	11 C/C	4 A/C

c. Non-effective Sorties and Returning Spares:

(1) 95:

A/C 8272: 336 Sqdn "F" - Pilot Lt. Gross - #4 engine out -
 No sortie. A/C 6522: 412 Sqdn "H" - Pilot Lt. Murphy - #1 engine out -
 Sortie.

(2) 390:

A/C 013: 568 Sqdn "H" - Pilot Lt. Nicola - Runaway - rop #4
 engine - No sortie.

d. Lead A/C Failures and/or Malfunctions:

(1) 95: A: H2X equipment inoperative.
 Gee set out.
 C: Bombsight malfunction.
 C-Deputy AFCE inoperative.
 D: H2X partially inoperative.

(2) 100: B: AFCE inoperative.

e. A/C Outstanding:

(1) 95:

A/C 6404: 336 Sqdn "X" - Pilot Lt. Dunwody - Mid-air
 collision over channel on return - 8 crew members accounted for.

(2) 100:

A/C 812: 351 Sqdn "P" - Pilot Lt. Guardino hit by flak
 over target.

f. Landing Away From Base:

(1) 95:

A/C 8333: 336 Sqdn "S" - Pilot Lt. Earley - Landed at
 A-92 - Co-pilot wounded - Returned to base - Sortie.

3. Navigation:

Position	Flight Plan	AL: N:	13A (100) Col. Sutterlin Lt. Kirby	13B (390) Capt. Rhodes Lt. Sommer	13C (95) Maj. Swinney Lt. Pieper
BU 11	15500°		Wing assembled 4 minutes early at Felixstowe and did not make Buncher 11 good while "S"ing to lose time, altitude 15000°		
CP 1	16250°		15000° on time on course	17000° 1 min. late 2 mi. left	16000° on time 4 mi. left
CP 2	20900°		20200° 8 min. late 6 mi. right	22000° 8 min. late 6 mi. right	20000° 10 min. late 5 mi. right
IP	23000°		23000° 17 min. late 2 mi. right	23600° 17 min. late 3 mi. right	23000° 18 min. late on course
TGT	23000°		23000° (1st priority) 20000° (3rd priority)	23300° (TO)	23000° (TO) (1st Priority)
RP	20500°		22000° 14 min. late on course	22500° 16 min. late 2 mi. left	20000° 17 min. late on course
CP 2	8000°		4300° 19 min. late 4 mi. right	8000° 10½ min. late on course	8000° 13 min. late on course
English Coast	Minimum		2000° 19 min. late 2 mi. right	3000° 7 min. late 1 mi. right	2000° 10 min. late 2 mi. left

a. Assembly: 13A assembled over Buncher 28, 13B over Buncher 11, and 13C over Buncher 23. Assembly altitude was 10000°. Wing assembly was completed at Felixstowe, and the proper interval was taken in the Division Column at CP 1.

b. Route: 13A, B, C were forced to "S" considerably while following 4D across the North Sea; this caused the Wing to be late at CP 2. Enroute to approximately 0720E, the Wing was 4 to 8 miles South of the briefed course following in the bomber stream. However, the course was corrected and the flak corridor at Koblenz was made good. Bombing altitude was reached 40 minutes prior to the IP. At the pre-IP, proper interval was taken, and the peel off was made at the IP for individual runs on the 1st priority target. After bombs away, 13A reassembled at the RP. Since 100D had not released its bombs on the 1st priority target, it made a run on the 3rd priority target. 100A and B completed two 360 degree turns west of the 3rd priority target, while 100D executed its run. At approximately 0730E 100A, B, and D reassembled and returned to the base. The briefed route was followed to the bases. The English Coast was crossed at Southwold. 100C joined 13B, which assumed the Wing lead on the return route, because it had lost the proper altitude for the RP without knowledge of the attack to be made on the 3rd priority target by 100D.

c. Weather: Nil cloud over the bases at take-off with visibility 2500-3900 yards. Enroute to the target there were nil low or middle clouds and 2/10 cirrus above 28000°. CAVU conditions existed in the target area with downward visibility 15-25 miles. The weather on return was the same as the route in. Average winds enroute were 185/20K, 135/20K, and 163/12K in target area.

d. Failures: (1) Equipment: 13C had vibrations in the Gee box, which could not be used.
(2) Personnel: 13B and C, excluding 95B navigators, did poor pilotage in the target area.

4. Bombing:

a.	Attacking:	Jettisoning:	Returning:
95	TO 27 A/C 918 x 150 GP 48 x 500 IB 1st P 10 A/C 340 x 150 GP 18 x 500 IB	1 A/C 34 x 150 GP 2 x 500 IB	
100	1st P 28 A/C 936 x 100 GP 47 x 500 IB 3rd P 10 A/C 340 x 100 GP 18 x 500 IB	2 A/C 4 x 100 GP 2 x 500 IB	1 A/C 14 x 100 GP 1 x 500 IB
390	TO 37 A/C 1207 x 100 GP 62 x 500 IB	1 A/C 17 x 100 GP 2 x 500 IB	1 A/C 34 x 100 GP 2 x 500 IB

b. 13A: (1) 100A Squadron: (8776)

(a)	AL Col. Sutterlin	N	Lt. Kirby
	P Capt. DePlanque	AN	Capt. Roefel
		B	Lt. Svensen
		R/N	Lt. Rhode

(b) After the maneuver at the IP, the bombardier took over and proceeded to set up course. Attacking on a true heading of 311 degrees, the bombardier picked up the target area at 8 miles and identified the assigned MPI $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the BRL. A normal sighting operation was completed and bombs were released on a final true heading of 310 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 23300° True, 23100° Indicated
- (d) Time of Release: 1343 $\frac{1}{2}$
- (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 100A fell 500° to 1500° beyond the assigned MPI. A heavy concentration of bombs fell on the M/Y, however, and all of the tracks were undoubtedly out in several places. About 25 goods wagons were smothered with bombs, and all these should be considered damaged or destroyed. The IBs completely covered the GP pattern and the portion of the M/Y containing goods wagons that were not hit.

2. Bomb Pattern: 1440°L x 1025°W; excludes about 19 scattered bombs on all sides of the pattern.

3. Bombing Errors: Range : 600°S
 Deflection: 575°L
 Radial : 800°

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the MPI: 46% & 95%.

5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: VERY GOOD.

6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: GOOD.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 841: jettisoned
1 x 500 IB and 2 x 100 GP in channel because of rack malfunctions.

(2) 100B Squadron: (8794)

(a) AL Maj. Cruver N Lt. Bittman
 P Capt. Blanding B Lt. Belimow
 R/N Lt. Jeni

(b) Weather throughout the bomb run was CAVU. After the IP, the bombardier proceeded to set up course by pin point pilotage. One minute from the BRL the bombardier identified the assigned MPI and completed a normal sighting operation. Bombs were released on a true heading of 307 degrees. C-1 was inoperative - run was flown by PDI.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 24200° True, 24000° Indicated
(d) Time of Release: 1344
(e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 100B fell 1000° to 2000° left of the assigned MPI in fields, on scattered residences, and a highway. The IBs covered the GP pattern.

2. Bomb Pattern: 1440°L x 1070°W: excludes
19 scattered bombs short and left of the pattern.

3. Bombing Errors: Range : 950°S
 Deflection: 1225°L
 Radial : 1525°

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000°
of the MPI: 10% & 84%.

5. Bombing Results in relation to damage
inflicted on the assigned target: NIL.

6. Bombing Results in relation to
sighting: POOR.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(3) 100C Squadron: (8344)

(a) P Lt. Ellis N Lt. Romanowski
 B Lt. Snyder
 R/N Lt. Turner

(b) After the maneuver at the IP, the bombardier took over and proceeded to set up course by pin point pilotage. The target area was picked up at 10 miles, and 8 miles from the BRL the bombardier identified the assigned MPI and completed a normal sighting operation. Synchronization at bombs away was very good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 300 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 22800° True, 22500° Indicated
(d) Time of Release: 1345
(e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 100C extended across the M/Y several hundred feet left (west) of the assigned MPI. The heavy concentration undoubtedly cut all of the tracks. Damage was also inflicted on two small RR buildings beside the yard, each of which received several hits. Bursts are visible in the smoke of 100A's bombs, and it should be assumed additional damage was inflicted in Western portion of the yards.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. Bomb Pattern: 1500°L x 965°W.
3. Bombing Errors: Range : 200°S
Deflection: 200°L
Radial : 500°
4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the MPI: 90% & 97%.
5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted to assigned target: VERY GOOD.
6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: VERY GOOD.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 649: jettisoned 2 x 100 GP and 1 x 500 IB, because of rack malfunctions, at 5108-0755. A/C 344: returned 14 x 100 GP and 1 x 500 IB because of rack malfunctions

(4) 100D Squadron: (8009)

- | | | | | |
|-----|----|-------------------|-----|-------------|
| (a) | AL | Capt. Lilienquist | N | Lt. Duncan |
| | P | Lt. Hellerich | E | Lt. Shiuba |
| | | | R/N | Lt. Clinton |

(b) The bombardier was unable to bomb the 1st priority target because the smoke caused by preceding Squadrons completely covered the assigned MPI and the target area. The bombardier then selected the RP for an IP to attack the 3rd priority target at Marburg, Germany. Pin point pilotage, on the approach to the target, was done until 3½ minutes from the BRL when the bombardier identified the assigned MPI and proceeded to synchronize. A normal sighting operation was completed. At bombs away, synchronization was excellent and bubbles were level. Bombs were released on a true heading of 120 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

If conditions did not permit the 1st priority target to be attacked, the 2nd priority target was not to be bombed unless by a Group. Consequently, 100D attacked the 3rd priority target.

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 21010° True, 21000° Indicated
- (d) Time of Release: 1406
- (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The visible bombs from 100D fell on the NW portion of the M/Y. Two explosions occurred from direct hits on a goods wagon and building. About 15 of the visible bombs hit in the yards, probably damaging at least 4 tracks in several places and approximately 12-15 goods wagons. From 5 to 8 bombs hit in a residential area adjacent to the tracks.

2. Bomb Patterns: Only the bombs from approximately 1 A/C are visible.

3. Bombing Errors: Range : 1075°S
Deflection: 1260°L
Radial : 1600°
4. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned target: PROBABLY GOOD.
5. Bombing Results in relation to sightings: PROBABLY POOR.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

2. Bomb Pattern: 1500°L x 965°W.
3. Bombing Errors: Range : 200°S
Deflection: 200°L
Radial : 500°
4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000°
of the MPI: 90% & 97%.
5. Bombing Results in relation to damage
inflicted to assigned target: VERY GOOD.
6. Bombing Results in relation to
sighting: VERY GOOD.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 649: jettisoned
2 x 100 GP and 1 x 500 IB, because of rack malfunctions, at 5108-0755.
A/C 344: returned 14 x 100 GP and 1 x 500 IB because of rack malfunctions

(4) 100D Squadron: (8009)

- | | | | | |
|-----|----|-------------------|-----|-------------|
| (a) | AL | Capt. Lilienquist | N | Lt. Duncan |
| | P | Lt. Hellerich | E | Lt. Shiuba |
| | | | R/N | Lt. Clinton |

(b) The bombardier was unable to bomb the 1st priority target because the smoke caused by preceding Squadrons completely covered the assigned MPI and the target area. The bombardier then selected the RP for an IP to attack the 3rd priority target at Marburg, Germany. Pin point pilotage, on the approach to the target, was done until 3½ minutes from the BRL when the bombardier identified the assigned MPI and proceeded to synchronize. A normal sighting operation was completed. At bombs away, synchronization was excellent and bubbles were level. Bombs were released on a true heading of 120 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

If conditions did not permit the 1st priority target to be attacked, the 2nd priority target was not to be bombed unless by a Group. Consequently, 100D attacked the 3rd priority target.

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 21010° True, 21000° Indicated
- (d) Time of Release: 1406
- (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The visible bombs from 100D fell on the NW portion of the M/Y. Two explosions occurred from direct hits on a goods wagon and building. About 15 of the visible bombs hit in the yards, probably damaging at least 4 tracks in several places and approximately 12-15 goods wagons. From 5 to 8 bombs hit in a residential area adjacent to the tracks.

2. Bomb Patterns: Only the bombs from approximately 1 A/C are visible.
3. Bombing Errors: Range : 1075°S
Deflection: 1200°L
Radial : 1600°
4. Bombing Results in relation to damage
inflicted on the assigned target: PROBABLY
GOOD.
5. Bombing Results in relation to
sighting: PROBABLY POOR.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 23550° True, 23300° Indio.
- (d) Time of Release: 1347
- (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The MPI of 390B's pattern was approximately 1800' left of the center of the M/Y in fields. Smoke over the target prohibits precise measurements.

2. Bomb Pattern: 1175°L x 1775°W; approximate pattern; smoke obscures a portion of the bombs.

3. Since no specific AP was used in the M/Y, no bombing errors can be determined.

4. Bombing results in relation to damage inflicted on the selected target: NIL.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(3) 390C Squadrons (571)

(a)	AL	Lt. Denne	N	Lt. Donahue
	P	Lt. Allen		Lt. Smith
			R/N	Lt. Anderson

(b) Attacking on a true heading of 214 degrees the bombardier picked up the wrong target (Holzwickedo, Germany), which had been hit by preceding Squadrons, and proceeded to synchronize. Because the target was covered by smoke no definite M/I was used. Bombs were released on a final true heading of 293 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. Although there were excellent check points on the bomb run it is apparent, however, that the bombardier played "follow the leader" and exhibited a very poor performance of pin point pilotage.

- (c) Bombing Altitude: 23000° True, 22850° Indicate.
- (d) Time of Release: 1347
- (e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. About $\frac{1}{2}$ of the bombs from 390C are obscured by smoke over the target area. A concentration is visible on the W end of the M/Y and in adjacent fields on both sides. Undoubtedly the tracks at this particular point were well hit, since the outlines of the visible pattern indicate that many bombs probably fell on and close to the tracks. Pictures taken by 390D show new bursts developing in the smoke at this section of the tracks for a length of about 1500'.

2. It is impossible to ascertain bombing errors, the bomb pattern, and estimations of damage inflicted and the results of the sighting.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(4) 390D Squadron (750)

(a) AL Lt. Proffatt N Lt. Koder
P Lt. McKellar B Lt. Wills
R/N Lt. Beddow

(b) After the maneuver at the IP, the bombardier proceeded to set up course by pin point pilotage. He identified the wrong target, Holzwickede, Germany, which had been hit by preceding Squadrons, and proceeded to synchronize as well as was possible. Because of the smoke covering the target no definite MPI was used. Bombs were released on a true heading of 298 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 22780° True, 22500° Indicated
(d) Time of Release: 1347
(e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. Only a few bombs released by 390D are visible, and these burst in the same area of 390C's bombs. The few visible bursts indicate that a portion of the pattern probably fell on the extreme W end of the M/Y.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 013: had a mission failure and returned 34 x 100 GP and 2 x 500 IB.

d. 130: (1) 95B Squadron: (8230)

(a) AL Capt. Jenkins N Lt. Flygstad
P Lt. Thomas B Lt. Hathaway
R/N Lt. Painter

(b) After the maneuver at the IP, which was made good, the bombardier picked up the 1st priority target 15 miles from the BRL. A normal sighting operation was completed and bombs were released on a true heading of 306 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 23900° True, 23600° Indicated
(d) Time of Release: 1349
(e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. The bombs from 95B fell short and right of and partially on the assigned MPI. A heavy concentration of bombs fell on the choke point at the E end of the M/Y and two strings of goods wagons. The tracks at this place were undoubtedly all out and between 40 and 50 goods wagons damaged and/or destroyed. There were three hits and several close misses on the large RR factory building adjacent to the yards on the N. A fire was started in one corner of this building.

2. Bomb Pattern: 1225°L x 950°W: excludes about 25 bombs beyond and short of the pattern length that would extend the dimension about 700°. The pattern was loose, and indicates that the low element was out of position.

3. Bombing Errors: Range : 575°S
Deflection: 400°R
Radial : 725°

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the MPI: 85% & 98%.

5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the assigned target: GOOD.

6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: FAIR.

(f) PI: 1. The bombs dropped by 95C fell left and short of the M/Y in fields and on a small building which caught on fire. There may have been some hits on the M/Y by bombs not present in the photos. The end of the visible pattern ends at the tracks.

2. Bomb Pattern: About 1/3 of the complete pattern is not shown because of insufficient photo coverage. The visible pattern is 1200°L x 800°W.

3. Bombing Errors: Range : 950°S
Deflection: 200°L
Radial : 1000°

4. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° & 2000° of the AP: 48% & 98%.

5. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on selected target: NIL to PROBABLE FAIR.

6. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: POOR.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: No malfunctions except that the bombsight in lead A/C, and the AFCE and PDI in the deputy A/C were inoperative.

(4) 95D Squadron: (8782)

(a) AL Lt. Wright N Lt. Whalen
P Lt. Tessier B Lt. Keyes
R/N Lt. Finfinger

(b) Attacking on a true heading of 304 degrees, the bombardier proceeded to set up course. The bombardier, however, picked up the wrong target, which was a M/Y at Holzwickede, Germany, and began synchronization 2½ minutes from the BRL. A normal sighting operation was completed and bombs were released on a final true heading of 290 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

Although there were excellent check points on the bomb run it is apparent that the bombardier played "follow the leader" and exhibited a very poor performance of pin point pilotage.

(c) Bombing Altitude: 22300° True, 22000° Indicated
(d) Time of Release: 1352
(e) Method of Release: Minimum Train

(f) PI: 1. Only a few bombs dropped by 95D are visible and these appeared in the center of the M/Y, where direct hits on goods wagons caused either two or three big explosions and subsequent fires. In all probabilities, the main impact of the bombs covered this central portion of the M/Y.

(g) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

e. PFF Narrative: (1) 13A: Four PFF A/C were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. 100D R/N gave slight course assistance to bombardier. Bombing in all Squadrons was visual.

(2) 13B: Four PFF A/C were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. H2X was not used on the bomb runs.

(3) 13C: Four PFF A/C were dispatched. 95A set was out due to a burned out resistor in the range unit. 95D set was out because of a malfunction of the altitude potentiometer unit. 95B and C sets operated satisfactorily. H2X was not used on the bomb runs.

5. Communications: a. VHF: (1) Col. Sutterlin led the 13th Wing. Channel A communications were reported very satisfactory until target time, after which VHF discipline was bad.

(2) Kodak A/C were contacted on Channel B. Control Points were sent to Division Ground Station by Wing Leader with the exception of CP 3, which was not sent.

(3) Fighter communications were unusually good. Communications were established prior to rendezvous, and VHF as well as visual contact were maintained.

(4) One A/C, 95 Group contacted MF/DF Section G giving a fix of chutes in the water, and received a satisfactory reply. Replies were also received by A/C calling to XDI and Air/Sea Rescue on VHF Channel D. Emergency dinghies were tossed out, and four A/C circled the area until aid arrived.

b. W/T: (1) No excessive interference was reported on Division W/T Frequency, and Wing Leader sent Control Point messages and Strike Reports successfully.

(2) Control Points:

	CP1	CP2	TGT	CP3
Flight Plan	1128	1159	1329	1500
ATA	1128	1207	1358	1519
TOD	1142	1216	1408	1525

(3) Strike Reports:

100A	P A 2	1343	TOD	1349
100B	P A 2	1343	TOD	1350
390A	P A 2	1347	TOD	1352
390B	P A 5	1347	TOD	1352
390C	P A 1	1347	TOD	1353
390D	P A 5	1347	TOD	1354
95A	P A 2	1349	TOD	1400
95B	P A 2	1350	TOD	1402
95C	P A 5	1351	TOD	1405
95D	P A 2	1352	TOD	1305

6. Photography: a. 95 installed 4 scope, 6 oblique, and 8 vertical cameras, 1, 6, and 7 of which took pictures: PFF A/C 8782, 95D lead: H2X set out. PFF A/C 8754, 95A lead: H2X set out. PFF A/C 8667, 95C lead: Insufficient brilliance. No scope pictures were taken by these 3 A/C. The one set received is plottable. PFF A/C 8782, 95D lead: The K-21 vertical camera malfunctioned and no pictures were taken. Only one set of SAV pictures from each Squadron was printed for this Headquarters.

b. 100 installed 2 16mm motion picture scope, 2 obliques, and 9 vertical cameras, 1, 2, and 8 of which took pictures: PFF A/C 8776, 100A lead: The scope malfunctioned and no pictures were taken. A/C 8963, 100D, #4 A/C in lead element: A/C aborted. The two sets of pictures taken by 100A do not show any bursts. A/C 8776's pictures show the MPI up to the 8th picture. A turn off the target prevented photographing the bombs. A/C 649's pictures were taken when one IP was released over unidentified terrain. 100A's bombs were photographed by 100B. Of the two sets of printed pictures taken by 100B, only one set - SAV 1472 - shows this Squadron's bombs. It is the same set that shows 100A's. The A/C taking the other set turned away from the target before the pattern appeared.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

about 1 A/C's bombs appear in the sortie taken by 1000. The lack of photographic coverage precluded precise interpretation. In 1000, C, and D, a camera was placed in the #1 A/C of the lead element instead of the deputy lead.

c. 390 installed 3 scope, 2 oblique, and 12 vertical cameras, 1, and 11 of which took pictures: A/C 749, 390A lead. The installed #22 malfunctioned and no pictures were taken. Of the three sets of scope pictures received, 1 is plottable. The other two are not plottable because of swept photographs and insufficient identifiable returns.


By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

Ernest A. Kiessling


ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis

C O N F I D E N T I A L


st area




A M/Y (1st PT)




100D
MARBURG M/Y (S)



C.D
WICKED M/Y (TO)



390A
SCHWERT M/Y



e covers
st area

FILE

FOUR HUNDRED TWELFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
APO 559

23 March 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion

TO : Office of the Squadron Commander, 412th Bomb Sqdn (H), 95th Bomb Gp (H),
APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. Just before reaching the front lines, No. 1 engine started vibrating excessively and finally had to be feathered. By this time the A/C was over the lines and permission was obtained to drop the bombs.

2. Bombs went away at 1318 hours - mag. heading 067 at 21,500 feet. The position was 5053N - 0737E. The bombs were seen to hit in and around two small towns, several hitting a main highway. Several fires were started.

3. At this time the supercharger went out on No. 2 making it impossible to rejoin the formation. The route back to base was over the briefed route and was uneventful.

4. Aircraft number is 44-6522.

John W. Murphy
JOHN W. MURPHY
2nd Lt., Air Corps, *95.9.*
Pilot.

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, 412TH BOMB SQDN (H), 95TH BOMB GP (H), APO 559, U. S. Army, 24 Mar 45.

TO: Commanding Officer (Attn: Gp Ops. Off.), 95th Bomb Gp (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.

1. Pilot had no choice but to abort. Crew did a good job of dropping bombs on target of opportunity.

2. Disciplinary action taken: None.

James O. Frankosky
JAMES O. FRANKOSKY
Major, Air Corps,
Commanding.

THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
OFFICE OF THE OPERATIONS OFFICER
APO 559


23 March 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion of Aircraft No. 8272

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559 U.S.Army.
(attention operations officer)

1. We took off in aircraft No. 8272 at 0950 on mission.

2. We were in formation over France at 5106° N and 0437° E with a power setting of 2300 RPM and 37" when the master cylinder of # 4 engine exploded and blew through the top of the nacelle. I called fireball Baker and reported I was aborting. We could not feather the engine for several min. We had lost quite a bit of altitude in this time. We managed to feather the engine, only #3 prop. control was out due to tension, caused when the cylinder exploded. We headed for the French coast to dispose of our bombs, and return to France to land, as our load consisted of over 6000 lbs. The bombs were dropped safe, but two of them seemed to explode. We were holding altitude, so set a course towards S.E. England. We crossed the coast at 5117° N and 0122° E at 1326 hrs. We returned to the base and landed at 1415 hrs.



JOHN W. GROSS
1st. Lt.A.C.
Pilot


1st. Ind.

336th Bomb Sqdn., 95th Bomb Gp. (H). APO 559 U.S.Army. 23 March 1945.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H) APO 559 U.S.Army.
(attention operation officer)

1. I consider the action taken justifiable.

2. For your information.



HAROLD F. JENEMAN
Capt. A.C.
Operations officer

THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON(H)
OFFICE OF THE OPERATIONS OFFICER
APO 559


23 March 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion of Aircraft No. 8333.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group. (H) APO 559 U.S.Army.
(attention operations officer)

1. We took off in Aircraft No. 8333 at 09:50 hrs.

2. We joined the formation and flew to $51^{\circ} 52''$ N. and $08^{\circ} 40''$ where we were hit by flak. The co-pilot was seriously wounded and No.2 manifold pressure went out. The amplifier was changed but that did not help. We called the leader and aborted. Due to serious bleeding of the co-pilot we landed at St.Tronde, Belgium, and checked our engines. The manifold gauge was out and engine o.k. We received about 400 gallons of gas and returned to base. We aborted at $51^{\circ} 52''$ N and $8^{\circ} 40''$ E at 23,000 ft. at 13:25 hrs. The bombs were returned to base. We landed at 18:00.



CLARENCE EARLEY
1st. Lt. A.C.
Pilot

1st. Ind.

336th Bomb Sqdn., 95th Bomb Gp. (H). APO 559 U.S.Army 23 March 1945

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group.(H) (23 March 1945.

1. I consider the action taken justifiable.
2. For your information.


HAROLD F. JENEMAN
Capt. A.C.
Operations officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE _____

335 *dr*

LEAD

HAMILTON Capt. Wright

82 | 10

Seaburg
6838

Richardson
6902

HIGH

Bradley
9052

LOW

Nelson RA
8269

Palmer
7783

Markey
9177

Turner
7376

Volz
8346

Legg
8441(412)

Hansen
(412) 8140

Crawford
8942

Leahy
555
- 605

550
600

0315
0500
0550
0605
0615
US Base

00 - 0200

9052
6475
8469
7522
8774
9177
8776

EXTRA SHIPS

334 8754 - PFF
335 _____
336 _____
412 6946 8774

95A

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE _____

335th

LEAD

HAMILTON Capt. Wright

82|10

Seaburg
6838

Richardson
6902

LOW

Nelson RA
82|69

HIGH

Bradley
9052

412 Markey Turner
91|77 73|76

Volz
83|46

Palmer
77|83

Legg
84|41(412)

Hansen Crawford
(412) 81|40 89|42

Lead
605
- 605

5.50
6.00

BRIEFING 0315
READINESS 0500
STATIONS 0550
TAXI 0605
TAKE-OFF 0615
RENDEZVOUS Base

21.000 - 0200

9052
6475
8469
7522
8774
9177
8776
0000

EXTRA SHIPS

334 8754-PFF
335 _____
336 _____
412 6946 8774

95 B
334th

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE _____

LEAD

JENSEN (Capt. Green)
8230

LOW

Crystal (412)
~~8774~~
6946
Dalle (412) Young (412)
8331 8281

Roy
9152

Sharrar (412)
8826

HIGH

Willis (412) Maj Alend.
6522

Rivet
8776

Helgeson
8990

Comings
8996

Johann
~~9195~~
8774

Brown
7201

Shepard
7154

BRIEFING 0315
READINESS 0500
STATIONS 0540
TAXI 0555
TAKE-OFF 0605
RENDEZVOUS Bose

EXTRA SHIPS

334 8754
335 _____
336 _____
412 8774

22 000 1000

95 B
334th

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE _____

LEAD

JENSEN (Capt. Green)
8230

LOW

Chrystal (412)
~~8774~~
6946
Dalle (412) Young (412)
8331 8281

Roy
9152

Sharar (412)
8826

HIGH

Willis (412) Maj Alendier
6522

Rivet
8776

Helgeson
8990

Cummings
8996

Johann
~~9195~~
8774

Brown
7201

Shepard
7154

BRIEFING 0315
READINESS 0500
STATIONS 0540
TAXI 0555
TAKE-OFF 0605
RENDEZVOUS Base

EXTRA SHIPS

334 8754
335 _____
336 _____
412 8774

22000-0800

95 C
336 *at*

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE _____

LEAD

TESSIER (Lt. Wright)
87|82

LOW
DUNWODT
~~Schoof~~
86|76

Coleman Ross
~~87|82~~ 81|06

HIGH

(412) 87|41 Salvo
Gross 84|69


Gibwick Maj. Weaver
83|33

(412) Beard Galbraith
68|01 24|47

Gross Sutton
~~Koppert~~ 64|75
69|93

Gibson Jackman
1867(334) 8317(334)

Cridlin (412)
72|57



BRIEFING 0315
READINESS 0515
STATIONS 0600
TAXI 0615
TAKE-OFF 0635
RENDEZVOUS Base

EXTRA SHIPS

334 8754
335 _____
336 _____
412 8774


20.000 0000

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

95 C Squadron

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 23 March 1945



BRIEFING _____
 READINESS _____
 STATIONS _____
 TAXI _____
 TAKE-OFF _____
 RENDEZVOUS _____

EXTRA SHIPS


334 _____
 335 _____
 336 _____
 412 _____

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

95 A Squadron

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 23 March 1945



BRIEFING _____
READINESS _____
STATIONS _____
TAXI _____
TAKE-OFF _____
RENDEZVOUS _____


EXTRA SHIPS
334 _____
355 _____
336 _____
412 _____

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

95 B Squadron

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 23 March 1945



BRIEFING _____
 READINESS _____
 STATIONS _____
 TAXI _____
 TAKE-OFF _____
 RENDEZVOUS _____

EXTRA SHIPS
 334 _____
 335 _____
 336 _____
 412 _____

**HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer**

APO 559.
23 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Lead Crew Officer Personnel Flying Mission 23 March 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The following named lead crew officer personnel are flying the mission 23 March 1945.

95 "A" SQUADRON

Command Pilot - Maj. J. U. Swinney
Pilot - Capt. G. L. Savage
Navigator - 1st Lt. F. Pieper
Bombardier - 1st Lt. V. Seferian
Radar Navigator - 1st Lt. W. A. Owens Jr.

95 "B" SQUADRON

Command Pilot - Capt. W. S. Jenkins
Pilot - 1st Lt. H. B. Thomas
Navigator - 1st Lt. D. R. Flygstad
Bombardier - 1st Lt. B. F. Hathaway
Radar Navigator - 1st Lt. L. I. Painter

95 "C" SQUADRON

Command Pilot - 1st Lt. Z. T. Stanborough
Pilot - 1st Lt. R. M. Brown
Navigator - 1st Lt. E. C. Hadlock
Bombardier - 1st Lt. C. E. Waters
Radar Navigator - 2nd Lt. J. S. Urankar

95 "D" SQUADRON

Command Pilot - 1st Lt. J. A. Wright
Pilot - 1st Lt. A. L. Tessier
Navigator - 2nd Lt. L. B. Whalen
Bombardier - 2nd Lt. D. O. Keyes
Radar Navigator - 2nd Lt. R. T. Finfinger

NOEL T. CUMBAA,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Intelligence Officer

23 March 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the mission to Unna, Germany for the above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - the 95th Group took off to attack the M/Y at Unna, Germany, but as noted in the Operational Narrative, only the B squadron attacked the primary target, the other squadrons attacking a target of opportunity, the M/Y at Holzwickede, Germany. Major Swimney was Group Leader of 13C Combat Wing.

A Squadron - eight A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the lead squadron, and seven A/C bombed the T.O. A/C #272 returned at 1235 hours from 5106N-0437E with #2 and #4 engine trouble, a spare A/C.

B Squadron - ten A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the high squadron and all but one A/C attacked the primary target. This A/C #6522 bombed the town of Haiger, Germany, as a T.O.

C Squadron - Eight A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the low squadron and all A/C bombed the T. O. Holzwickede.

D Squadron - eight A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the low-low squadron and all A/C bombed the T.O. Holzwickede.

2. For further Intelligence Information refer to the Operational Narrative.

For the Intelligence Officer:

Arno A. Krause

ARNO A. KRAUSE,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

:.....
: SECRET
: By Authority of :
: C.G. Eighth Air Force :
: Initials: P.W. :
: Date: 23 March 1945 :
:.....

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 327

PERIOD: 0001 hours 23 March to 2400 hours 23 March 1945.

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Total Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>Losses</u>			<u>Totals</u>	<u>NYR</u>
						<u>AA</u>	<u>OT</u>			
Heavy Bomber Atks.	1276	1244	3440.5	0-0-0	0	7	2	9	2	
Fighter Escort *	241	232	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0	
Fighter Sweeps *	215	196	0	1-0-0A 0-0-1G	0	0	0	0	0	
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0	
Photo Recon.	38	36	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	1	
Weather Recon.	31	29	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0	
Air/Sea Rescue	17	17	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0	
Special Operations	<u>40</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	
Totals	1858	1792	3440.5	1-0-0A 0-0-1G	0	7	2	9	3	

* Includes groups based on Continent.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

1276 a/c (319 B-24s, 957 B-17s) from three Air Divisions sortied in three forces against M/Ys in northwest Germany. 1244 a/c dropped 3042.3 tons GP, 398.2 tons IB - total 3440.5 tons - on all primaries and several T/Os. Weather: CAVU with a slight ground haze. E/a Opposition: nil. Losses: 3 B-24s, 6 B-17s (7 to AA, 2 to causes unknown). NYR: 2 B-24s believed safe on Continent.

S E C R E T

First Force

Thirty-two squadron formations (319 B-24s, 2nd Air Division) sortied against M/Ys at Osnabruck, Rheine and Munster. 303 a/c dropped 796.8 tons GP and 112.5 tons IB on assigned targets and one T/O at 1042-1123 hours from 19,000-24,500 feet. All bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Rheine and Munster. Weather: CAVU with slight ground haze. Flak: generally moderate accurate. Battle damage: 89 minor, 6 major. E/a Opposition: nil. Sighted 5 Me-109s vicinity of Rheine - no combat. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 B-24s to AA. NYR: 2 B-24s believed safe on Continent.

Fighter Support: Three groups, including 361st Group based on Continent (80 P-51s) sortied. Up 0845-0915 hours; down 1200-1440 hours. E/a Opposition: nil. Sighted one jet a/c vicinity of Hamm. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Rheine Bridge	84	79	163.8	52.5	Good
Osnabruck M/Y	86	80	215.0	31.0	Good
Munster M/Y & Junctions	149	142	415.0	26.0	Good
<u>Other Target</u>					
Hoya A/F (T/O)	—	2	3.0	3.0	Unobserved
Totals	319	303	796.8	112.5	

Second Force

Fourteen group formations (519 B-17s, 3rd Air Division) sortied against M/Ys at Hengstey, Geisecke, Holzwickede and Unna-Dortmund. 510 a/c dropped 1041.3 tons GP and 174.2 tons IB on assigned targets and several T/Os at 1306-1406 hours from 20,100-25,900 feet. All bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Geisecke, Hengstey and Holzwickede. Weather: CAVU with a moderate ground haze. Flak: generally moderate and accurate at all targets. Battle damage: 152 minor, 26 major, 1 Cat. "E". E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 5 B-17s (3 to AA, 2 to causes unknown. NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Three groups (82 P-51s) sortied. Up 1043-1107 hours; down 1519-1625 hours. 82 effective sorties. E/a opposition: nil. Sighted 1 Me-262 vicinity Iserlahn - no combat. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

S E C R E T

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Hengstey M/Y	114	113	225.7	55.7	Very Good
Geishecke M/Y	137	91	208.9	23.5	Very Good
Holzwickede M/Y	154	184	335.0	60.0	Very Good
Unna/Dortmund M/Y	114	38	73.0	16.5	Good
Siegen M/Y (Sec)		31	68.6	9.5	Poor
Meschede (Sec)		19	56.0		Good
Marburg M/Y (Sec)		10	16.3	4.5	Fair
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Herdecke		13	39.0		Very Good
Halger		1	2.6	.5	Unobserved
Schwerte		10	16.2	4.0	Fair
Totals	519	510	1041.3	174.2	

Third Force

Twelve group formations (438 B-17s, 1st Air Division) sortied against M/Ys at Coesfeld, Gladbeck and Recklinghausen. 431 a/c dropped 1204.2 tons GP and 111.5 tons IB on assigned targets and 2 T/Os at 1316-1346 hours from 23,500-26,400 feet. All bombing visual. Leaflets dropped on Coesfeld, Gladbeck and Recklinghausen. Weather: CAVU with slight ground haze. Flak: moderate accurate at Recklinghausen and Gladbeck. Battle damage: 93 minor, 37 major. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 B-17 to AA. NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Three groups (79 P-51s) sortied. Up 1111-1203 hours; down 1450-1544 hours. 71 effective sorties. E/a Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Coesfeld	147	145	409.5	38.5	Good-Very Good
Recklinghausen	147	120	327.6	29.0	Good
Gladbeck M/Y	144	141	396.0	38.0	Good
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Westerholt M/Y		13	38.8		Fair - Good
Hochfeldt		12	30.3	6.0	Fair - Good
Totals	438	431	1204.2	111.5	

2. Fighter Escort

Nine groups, including 361st Group based on Continent (241 P-51s) sortied to support bomber forces. Up 0845-1203 hours; down 1200-1625 hours. 232 effective sorties. E/a Opposition: nil. Sighted 1 Me-262 vicinity of Iserlahn. 1 jet a/c near Hamm - no combats. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

3. Fighter Sweeps

Five groups, including 352nd Group based on Continent (131 P-51s) sortied to sweep in the Bremen-Kassel-Magdeburg-Regensburg-Stuttgart and Strasbourg areas. Up 0839-1140 hours; down 1340-1639 hours. 125 effective sorties. E/a Opposition: Engaged 2 Arado 96's east of Ulzen, attempted to engage 2 Me-163s between Dessau and Halle; e/a evaded. Strafed landing strip south of Ulzen. Claims: 1-0-0 Air; 0-0-1 Ground. Losses: nil. NYR: nil

352nd and 361st Groups based on Continent (84 P-51s) sortied on Anti-GAF patrols in conjunction with Ninth Air Force. Up 1115-1432 hours; down 1540-1921 hours. 71 effective sorties. Mission uneventful. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil

5. Photo Reconnaissance

38 a/c sortied as follows:

19 a/c (4 Spitfires, 15 F-5s), escorted by 16 P-51s, obtained photographs in central and western Germany. 1 a/c unsuccessful due to mechanical difficulty. 2 Me-262s made unsuccessful pass in vicinity of Gerthin.

3 Mosquitoes on night photography missions to Altenbeken. 2 effective sorties.

Losses: nil.

NYR: 1 P-51 - believed safe on Continent.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

31 a/c sortied as follows:

2 B-17s completed routine flights to and from the Azores.

1 B-17 on routine reconnaissance to positions over Atlantic.

1 Mosquito flew special reconnaissance over U.K. and western France.

27 P-51s as weather scouts for bomber operations. 25 effective.

Losses: nil.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

17 a/c (14 P-47s, 3 PBV's) sortied on routine search and patrol.
All a/c completed mission. Losses: nil.

8. Special Operations

40 a/c sortied as follows:

Night - 22/23 March

2 B-17s on Radar reconnaissance. Scope photos obtained of battle lines in area north from Coblenz. Leaflets dropped in Essen and Bonn areas.

10 B-24s sortied to drop leaflets over Holland and Germany. 1 a/c unsuccessful.

Day - 23 March

1 P-38 on Radar search mission.

12 B-24s sortied on VHF and Radar screening and search patrol in support of bomber operations; jamming from 0625-1150 hours. 11 effective sorties.

1 B-17, escorted by 4 P-51s, on special test bombing mission on landing ground near Ettinghausen. 2 tons GP and leaflets dropped on assigned target.

8 Mosquitoes on chaff dispensing missions in support of bomber formations.

2 Mosquitoes on special operations for 2nd and 3rd Air Divisions.

Losses: nil.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Weather was generally CAVU, with occasional slight haze.

The G.A.F. offered no opposition to bombers or fighters, and e/a sightings were virtually negligible. One P-51 group destroyed one of two AR-96s encountered 10 miles east of Ulzen; the second e/a evaded by flying over A/F. The same group chased two Me-163s between Dessau and Halle but were unsuccessful due to speed of e/a. Two other jet e/a were sighted, one near Hamm and one (a Me-262) southeast of Dortmund. A P-51 group sweeping in vicinity of Malsheim A/F at 1430 hours forced two Me-109s to make emergency landings to avoid combat, one of the e/a ground-looping due to excessive speed.

2. Flak

- Gladbeck - moderate to intense, accurate.
- Goesfeld - Meager, inaccurate.
- Recklinghausen - Meager to moderate, fairly accurate.
- Rheine - Moderate, accurate.
- Osnabruck - Moderate to intense, accurate.
- Munster - Moderate to intense, accurate.
- Geisheck - Meager to moderate, inaccurate to accurate, tracking.
- Hongstoy - Meager to moderate, accurate, tracking.
- Holzwickede - Meager to moderate, inaccurate to accurate.

3. Observations

A/F with rebuilt runways and 11 hangars 10 miles east of Zwolle.

20 plus s/e and T/e a/c on Langensalza A/F.

Approx. 36 jet a/c on Giebelstadt A/F. Field appeared to be out of service due to heavy bomb damage.

18 u/i s/e and 6 u/i t/e a/c on Kirtorf landing ground.

25 plus s/e and t/e e/a on A/Fs at Rheine, Lingen, Bielefeld, west of Reuthen and Bramsche.

Extensive activity and numerous cars observed in M/Ys at Hamelin,

Ibbenburen, Osnabruck and Munster.

5 miles south of Ulzen. 100 plus s/e and t/e a/c dispersed in woods to north of landing ground.

100 plus e/a on Halle A/F.

100 plus e/a on Dessau A/F.

200 plus e/a on two A/Fs north of Celle.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Munster M/Y - Good Results.

Rail lines in the M/Y and bridges, heavily built-up industrial area adjacent to the M/Y, passenger station and goods depot well hit.

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Osnabruck M/Y - Good Results.

Locomotive sheds and turntable, locomotive repair shop, wagon repair shop, rail lines, heavily built-up industrial area and buildings adjacent to the M/Y blanketed.

Phoine M/Y - Good Results.

Passenger station hit by G.P. and I.B. bombs. Rail lines, heavily built-up industrial area and buildings, sorting sidings and lines leading into the sidings also hit.

Pecklinghausen M/Y - Good Results.

Ten concentrations of G.P. and I.B. in and adjacent to target area. Hits on rail lines and cars in M/Y. Photography late in attack shows the yard severely damaged, many cars derailed and on fire. Main station - three hits and on fire. Depot on fire. Town area adjacent to western edge of yard heavily hit; at least 15 intense fires burning in area at end of attack.

Coesfeld - Good to Very Good Results.

At least 10 concentrations in and adjacent to target area. Direct hits on rail lines and cars in yards. Photographs show cars derailed and on fire. At time of attack this target was already damaged, particularly through station siding area. Combined with the attack of 1st Division, these yards can be considered very severely damaged and there should be cessation of activity for a long period of time.

Gladbeck M/Y - Good Results.

Nine concentrations of G.P. and I.B. bombs in target area. Target markers from two other squadrons indicate their bombs also in area. Smoke from previous bombing prevents actual plotting of all strikes. The northerly sidings area, at least 35 direct hits. Severe damage seen on railroad embankment and over-pass. Choke point received at least 10 direct hits. At least 40 bursts on rail lines and cars in south sidings area. Rail-over-road bridge near junction of the sidings area received probable direct hit. Many cars seen derailed or on fire; in the town area adjacent to yards fires burning and damage seen. A large u/1 plant area probably a coking or benzol plant, received many direct hits.

Westerholt (T/O) - Fair to Good Results.

Direct hits in a synthetic oil plant. Three work shops hit, one explosion visible. Direct hits on rail lines and cars on an area adjacent to a storage sidings area.

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Hochfeldt (T/O) - Fair to Good Results.

Bombs seen bursting on rail lines and u/i industrial area. Hits pinpointed on rail lines. Four small and two large shops in industrial area hit.

Hangstey M/Y - Very Good Results.

The M/Y is almost completely blanketed by eight of the nine patterns and the other pattern fell 8/10 of a mile north across the river. Approx. 1/3 of the bombs actually fell on the yard, the balance falling on fields, woods and river along side of the M/Y.

Geisocks M/Y - Very Good Results.

Eight patterns of G.P. and I.B. bombs blanket the western 2/3 of the yard. Two patterns of G.P. and I.B. lie just outside of the yard. The yard appeared to be inoperative from a previous attack which cut the lines.

Holzwickede M/Y - Very Good Results.

Smoke makes interpretation of part of the attack difficult but it is estimated that 12 squadrons hit the yard. The choke point at the southwestern end of the yard was partly well hit by 1000 lb. bombs. The remainder of the yard was quite well blanketed by smaller bombs and incendiaries and numerous fires are noted in it. Sidings were heavily loaded at the beginning of the attack.

Unna/Dortmund M/Y - Good Results.

Three patterns blanket the east 2/3 of the target and a pattern lies in the edge of town 2/10 of a mile south.

Siegen M/Y - Poor Results.

One pattern of G.P. has one or two bursts on the rail line north of the M/Y. The other two patterns lie in the town just NW of the yards.

Maschade Honselwarka A.G. (Secondary) - Good Results.

Target neatly blanketed by a tight pattern of G.P. bombs. It is estimated that probably most of the buildings in the area are hit.

Marburg M/Y - Fair Results.

Pattern of G.P. and I.B. seen in the center of the M/Y 2/10 of a mile north of the MPI. Yard appears unusable before attack.

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Hardecke (T/O) - Very Good Results.

Doc squadron bombed the main line at the edge of town with pattern of G.P. resulting in two, possible three explosions, and starting small fires at that location.

Schwartz M/I (T/O) - Fair Results.

Pattern seen at the edge of the town in the NW side of the yard 2/10 of a mile from the selected aiming point. The yard appears to be completely beat up before attack. The pictures before our bombs hit showed the yard to be inoperative.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

5. Ground Activity

21st Army Group - Heavy artillery fire and night patrolling on both sides.

12th Army Group - Resistance still heavy in Ludwigshafen. Third U.S. Army formations regrouping.

6th Army Group - Elements of 7th U.S. Army are moving into area E 2983 (west of Speyer).

Miscellaneous - SS Influence in German Universities.

The extension of SS rule in all fields in Germany has led to the occupation of most of the professorial chairs at Universities either by active SS members or men with strong SS leanings. Appointment to all chairs of medicine is in the hands of Prof. Dr. Paul Rostock, who was appointed to this authority through party influence. He ruthlessly supports the SS thirst for power and, as a result, many "Professors" have no knowledge of their subject, being merely political exponents of the Party.

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6. G.A.F. Activity over England

<u>Flying Bombs</u>	<u>Launched</u>	<u>Landfall</u>	<u>Gr. London</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>
0001 hours - 23 March to 2400 hours - 23 March.	6	2	0	3

S E C R E T

D. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Ninth Air Force	2399	23-1-6 A 8-0-5 G	14
First U.S. T.A.F.	1213	5-4-2 G	4
Second T.A.F.	1368	0-0-0	0
R.A.F. Fighter Command	381	1-0-5 A 3-0-1 G	1
Totals	5361	23-1-11A 16-4-10G	19

Ninth Air Force

Night - 22/23 March

Sorties : 20 Intruder Patrols
6 Interception Patrols
16 Photo Recon.

Totals 42

Mission : Patrolled in the Cologne - Hanau - Mannheim area.

Claims & Losses : Nil.

Day - 23 March 1945

Sorties : 842 Bombers
1515 Fighters
2357 a/o

Mission : 9th Bomb Division - Bombed communication centers at Ahaus, Gross, Reken, Schornbeck, Sudlohn, Halten, Borkum, Dinslaken.

9th T.A.C. - Carried out armed reconnaissance in the Siegen - Kassel - Limburg areas. Air cooperation with 3rd and 7th Corps.

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19th T.A.C. - Air cooperation with 12th and 20th Corps, Armed reconnaissance in the Wetzlar, Limburg, Giessen, Neustadt areas.

29th T.A.C. - Report not available.

Claims (E/A) : 22-1-6 air
 8-0-5 ground

Miscellaneous ground claims:	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
MT	270	228
Locos	64	44
RR Cars	759	1374
Guns	52	14
Rail Cuts	28	

Losses : 1 bomber, 13 fighters.

First U.S. T.A.F.

Night - 22/23 March

Sorties : 8 Intruder Patrols

Claims & Losses : Nil.

Day - 23 March

Sorties : 171 bombers
1034 fighters
1205 a/c

Mission : Bombers attacked M/Y at Heidelberg and RR bridges at Neckarelz and Neckargemung. Fighters carried out armed reconnaissance in Karlsruhe - Mannheim area and escorted bombers.

Claims(E/A) : 5-4-2 ground

Miscellaneous ground claims:	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
MT	44	61
Locos	15	15
RR Cars	236	126
Barges	7	87
Guns	7	15
Rail Cuts	85	

Losses : 1 bomber, 3 fighters.

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Second T.A.F.

Night - 22/23 March : 60 Armed Reconnaissance
37 Interception Patrol
17 Reconnaissance

114 a/o

Claims and losses : Nil.

Day - 23 March 1945 : 96 Medium bombers
46 Light bombers
264 Armed Reconnaissance
347 Pre-arranged support
377 Escort to bombers, fighter sweeps
124 Reconnaissance

1254 a/o

Mission : Bombed cities north of Ruhr (Rhede, Dingen, Raefeld). Carried out armed reconnaissance in NW Germany.

Claims and Losses : Nil.

Miscellaneous ground claims:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
MT	37	46
Locos	4	2
RR Cars	102	71
Rail Cuts	24	

R.A.F. Fighter Command

Night - 22/23 March

Sorties : 3 Offensive Patrols
6 Flying bomb interception Patrol
12 Interception Patrol

21 a/o

Mission : Attacked Neuburg and Landau A/Fs.

Claims : 3-0-3 ground
Losses : Nil.

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Day - 23 March

Sorties : 132 Offensive Patrol
172 Escort to bombers
28 Escort to Coastal Command
24 Flying bomb interception Patrol
4 Reconnaissance

360 a/c

Mission : Rail interdiction on rocket supply routes in The Hague area, attacked a Flying Bomb site at Ypenburg in The Hague area.

Claims : 1-0-5 air

Losses : 1 a/c

2. Fifteenth Air Force

Day - 22 March 1945

169 B-17s, 51 P-38s, 157 P-51s sortied. 165 B-17s, escorted by 50 P-38s and 157 P-51s, dropped 331.7 tons on Ruhland Oil Refinery, 30 tons on Kralupy Oil Refinery, 15 tons on Zeltweg M/Y, 15 tons on Klagenfurt M/Y, 14 tons on T/O's. Claims of 4-3-6 air. Losses: 13 B-17s.

160 B-24s, 26 P-38s sortied. 140 B-24s, escorted by 23 P-38s, dropped 267.7 tons on Ojenna Southeast RR Communications, 1.5 tons on T/O. Losses: 3 B-24s.

87 B-24s, 31 P-38s sortied. 79 B-24s, escorted by 29 P-38s, dropped 89.2 tons on Kagrán Oil Refinery, 50.2 tons on Florisdorf Oil Refinery, 13 tons on Graz M/Y, 7.2 tons on T/O's. Claims: 2-0-0 air; 9-0-0 ground. Losses: 1 B-24.

162 B-24s, 29 P-38s sortied. 143 B-24s, escorted by 26 P-38s dropped 327.5 tons on Heiligenstadt M/Y. Losses: 6 B-24s.

165 B-24s, 34 P-38s, 50 P-51s sortied. 160 B-24s, escorted by 31 P-38s and 48 P-51s, dropped 287.5 tons on Kralupy Oil Refinery, 16 tons on Wels M/Y, 14.5 tons on Nerotavice M/Y, 30.5 tons on Libis (town), 16.5 tons on Vsetaty (town), 2 tons on T/O. Losses: 1 B-24.

BOMBERS

Sorties : 743 a/c (169 B-17s, 574 B-24s)
Effoc. Sorties : 687 a/c (165 B-17s, 522 B-24s)
Tonnage : 1529
Losses : 24 a/c (138 B-17s, 11 B-24s)

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FIGHTERS

Sorties : 378 a/c (171 P-38s, 207 P-51s)
 Effec. Sorties : 364
 Claims : 6-3-6 air
 9-0-0 ground
 Losses : Nil

3. R.A.F. Bomber Command

Day - 23 March 1945

<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>Losses</u>
118 Lancasters	Bremen (RR Bridge)	2
11 Lancasters	Bad Oeyenhausen RR Bridge	0
80 Lancasters	Wesel (City)	0
<u>209 a/c</u>		<u>2</u>

Night - 23/24 March

195 Lancasters	Wesel	0
23 Mosquitoes		
65 Mosquitoes	Berlin	2
23 Mosquitoes	Aschaffenburg M/Y	0
45 Lancasters	Diversiory Sweep	0
31 Halifaxes		0
41 Mosquitoes	Bomber Support	0
27 Halifaxes		0
6 Liberators		0
4 Fortresses		0
1 Halifax	Signal Investigation	0
1 Mosquito		0
<u>462 a/c</u>		<u>2</u>

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

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