

6
Lead Crewing
1 *20. Bomb* ✓ - - - -

HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

mm

Date 18 March 1945
13 CBW FO 73
13 CBW OPS 298
3 AD FO 613

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (BERLIN, GERMANY)

TO : Colonel Shuck. 95th

1. Information Concerning the Targets: a. The primary target (visual) for all Groups was a Railway Goods Station situated 2½ miles NE of the Tiergarten in BERLIN, GERMANY. This target is a vital link in the transportation facilities feeding supplies to the Russian front.

b. The secondary target for all Groups was the same as the primary. H2X technique was to be employed in the event of the primary target being overcast.

2. Narrative of the Attack:

a. 13 A Group - 95A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three Squadrons made a normal take off and climb to assembly altitude. Good Group formation was effected over Buncher 23 at 6000'. Wing assembly was effected over Ipswich at 0851 hours. 13A arrived at CP 1, at 0904 hours, one minute early, altitude 6000'.

(b) Route: The route across the North Sea was as briefed. CP 2 was crossed at 0943, on course, one minute early, altitude 13000'. Slight deviation from the flight plan was necessary in the Zuider Zee area in order to avoid interference with the 1st Division Column at the corridor in the Dummer Lake area. CP 3 was crossed at 1028 hours, altitude 21000'. Because of increasing wind velocities enroute to IP, 13A drifted left of course. The IP was overshoot several miles to the north before the turn onto the bomb run could be completed. The Squadrons peeled off at this point to make individual H2X runs on the target, but got together in Group formation before the BRL.

After bombs away the RP was made good. Reassembly into Group formation was somewhat hampered by interference from one Squadron in 100 Group, which apparently had cut short the RP. Good Group formation was effected shortly after departing the RP. The route out was essentially as briefed, except for minor deviations for echelon purposes. The Continental Coast was recrossed at 1407 hours, altitude 16000'. 13A leader aborted 10 miles from Southwold because of battle damage. The English Coast was recrossed at Southwold at 1457, altitude 2000'.

(c) Weather: Over the base area visual conditions made assembly very easy. Over the channel and enroute to the target a solid undercast with an occasional break in the target area was reported. A cirrus layer and D/P contrails were encountered in the vicinity of the IP. This made it necessary to climb an additional 500' to avoid splitting up the formation.

(d) Difficulties: The main difficulty was obtaining IP and target weather data from Kodak Red.

(e) PFF Narrative: Four PFF A/C were dispatched. 95A had poor radar definition, but the R/N was able to use the set for bombing. 95B and C sets operated satisfactorily. Bombing was by H2X technique.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 95A, B, C Squadrons: (8144, 8754, 8230)

<u>1.</u>	AL	Col. Shuck	N	Lt. Wilbourne
	P	Capt. Wilson	AN	Capt. Shirey
	CP	Lt. Krein	B	Lt. Long
			R/N	Lt. Owen

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Secondary	36	570x100 LB GP
			288x500 LB IB
	Jettisoning	1	18x100 LB GP
			8x500 LB IB
	Returning	1	18x100 LB GP
			8x500 LB IB

b. Bombing Altitude: 25100° True; 25000° Briefed

c. Time of Release: 1128

3. Run-in from IP to Target: The bomb run was started in Squadron formation but because of poor scope definition in 95B and faulty interphone between the R/N and bombardier in 95C, bombing was accomplished in Group formation.

After the maneuver at the IP, which was overshoot, the R/N took over and proceeded to set up course. The R/N picked up the target in the scope at 50 miles. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and seven subsequent rate checks were made. Bombs were released on a true heading of 132 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: a. The bombs from 95A, B, C Squadrons fell in a sparsely built-up suburban residential district and fields at Hohen Schonhausen, 3½ miles left of and 2½ miles beyond the assigned MPI.

b. Clouds obscure a portion of the bombs, but the approximate length and width of the Group pattern measured 4260°E x 2825°W.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: 95B: A/C 7783 had a mission failure and jettisoned 18x100 LB GP and 8x500 LB IB at 5223-0817½. 95C: A/C 8826 (spare) returned 18x100 LB GP and 8x500 LB IB to the base.

b. 13 B Group - 100A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: Squadron and Group assembly was made without difficulty. At Wing assembly 13B was echeloned to the right and behind 13A. This put them on the inside of the turn at Buncher 23. 13B was 2½ minutes early and about two miles South of briefed course at CP 1.

(b) Route: Between CP 1 and CP 2, 13B flew a dogleg to the South until proper interval was attained, then swung into position in trail of 13A. The route to 0900E was flown essentially as briefed. After this point 13B went slightly North of briefed route in an attempt to skirt the D/P contrails. At 1145E, 13B was back on course. Between the Pre-IP and IP, ME 262s attacked 13B. No peel off was made, consequently, at the IP, and the target was attacked in Group formation. These attacks persisted throughout the target area until after the RP was reached.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

D/P contrails after the target made visual contact so difficult that 13B turned inside 13A, automatically becoming the Division Leader. A weak radar set in 100A was sufficient reason for turning the Group lead over to 100B, which led the Group and Division during the remainder of the mission.

A gradual improvement of the weather along the westward route made it comparatively easy for 13B to stay on course. A change in winds from those briefed allowed 13B to lose part of the time previously gained on the route in. At CP 5, coast out, 13B was still 11 minutes early.

Back at the bases weather was good and landings were accomplished without difficulty.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A.

(d) Difficulties: D/P contrails prior to and at the target made visual contact extremely difficult.

(e) PFF Narrative: Three PFF A/C were dispatched. 100C is MIA, and no reports are available. 100A had low range on the withdrawal route and turned the lead over to 100B. Bombing was by H2X technique.

(f) Remarks: 100C leader was shot down during the fighter attacks but the Squadron assembled quickly behind the second element leader, maintaining its Group integrity in the meantime.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 100A, B, C Squadrons: (8009, 8226, 9963)

<u>1.</u>	AL	Maj. Craver	N	Lt. Browning
	P	Lt. Dawson	AN	Capt. Passen
	CP		B	Lt. Silva
			R/N	Lt. Rowland

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Secondary	37	216x1000 LB GP
	Jettisoning	1	6x1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 25200° True; 25000° Briefed

c. Time of Release: 1129

3. Run-in from IP to Target: Due to the presence of E/A in the target area, 100B and C bombed in formation with 100A.

Attacking on a true heading of 133 degrees the R/N took over and proceeded to set up course, picking up the target in the scope at 50 miles. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles, and subsequent rate checks of 10, 9, 8, and 7 miles were made. G-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: a. The bombs from 100A, B, and C fell 3½ miles beyond and 5 miles left of the assigned MPI in fields. There were 3 or 4 hits on a double track RR running NE from Berlin. A highway crossing the RR also received about 4 hits. A few houses were blanketed with many bombs.

b. Group Bomb Pattern: 6375°L x 2550°W.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: 100B: A/C 972: 6x1000 LB GP hung up over the target and were jettisoned at 5254-1331.

c. 13 C Group - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three Squadrons of 13C made a normal take off and assembly over Buncher 11 at 6000°. 13C followed through the assembly line abreast of 13B and departed CP 1 on course 4 minutes early, altitude 7500°.

(b) Route: Enroute to CP 2, across the North Sea, considerable "S"ing was encountered, which made it difficult to obtain good winds. CP 2 was reached on course, 4 minutes early, altitude 12500°. From CP 2 to the next turning point, 13C, while in trail of 13B, was at one time 8 miles North of course at 5249-0550. At this point a correction to course was made by the leader and the next turning point was made good. CP 3 was reached 5 miles South, 4 minutes early, altitude 22000°. The route was closely followed until just prior to the IP. At this time 13C swung 5 miles to the NW of the IP and passed over it in Group formation on course to the target. After bombs away, 390B did not reassemble until shortly after the RP, which was made good. The next turning point was overshoot 7 miles to the NW, and the course was paralleled 7 miles to the right to 5320-1229. At this point a correction to course was made and the briefed route was followed to CP 4, which was made good 4 minutes early, altitude 19000°. The course was followed to CP 5, which was made good 7 minutes early, altitude 14200°. The English Coast was recrossed at Southwold at 3700°.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A.

(d) Difficulties: None.

(e) PFF Narrative: Three PFF A/C were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. Bombing was by a combination H2X-Visual technique.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 390A, B, C Squadrons: (784, 660, 447)

1.	AL	Capt. Brannen	N	Lt. Barrett
	P	Capt. Morris	AN	Lt. Yary
	CP	Lt. Riolo	B	Lt. Kellerhouse
			R/N	Lt. Flanagan

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a.	TO	36	203x1000 LB GP
			5xWG 42
			5xT 333
	Jettisoning	2	7x1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 25000° True; 25000° Briefed

c. Time of Release: 1130

3. Run-in from IP to Target: 390B and C bombed in formation with 390A because of the presence of E/A in the target area.

After the maneuver at the IP, the R/N identified the target in the scope at 40 miles and proceeded to set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles. After the 6 mile check, however, the bombardier was able to take over visually. As the primary target was covered by clouds the bombardier chose another M/Y for an AP and proceeded to synchronize. The bombardier was hit by flak immediately after bombs away and complete details are not available. Bombs were released on a true heading of 123 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: a. The bombs from 390A, B, and C fell in a park and on a RR choke point about 1 mile short (WNW) of and 1000' left of the assigned MPI. There are 3 direct hits and 3-4 probable hits upon the tracks leading into the Vorort-Stettiner Main Line and Underground Station, and 2 hits upon tracks leading to the west. There are 10-15 bursts in the park, 3 of which are direct hits to the roadway near the northern edge. There are 25 to 30 hits in the built-up area surrounding the park and M/Y. There is one burst in the center of the M/Y and 2 near the west end. A small cloud obscures the junction at the west end of the yards, which was undoubtedly hit since there are at least 5 bombs in the yards near this point.

b. Group Bomb Pattern: 2015°L x 2870°W.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: 390A: A/C 032 jettisoned 6x1000 LB GP at 5251-0943. 390B: A/C 660: Had 1 x 1000 LB GP hang up over the target and was jettisoned at 5300-1130.

3. Communications: a. VHF: (1) Col. Shuck led the 13th Wing. Discipline on Channel A was very poor, and communications on this channel were difficult. All necessary contacts within Groups and between Group Leaders were made, but with difficulty.

(2) Leader reported some difficulty contacting Kodak A/C. Division Ground Station could not be reached by Leader. Information received was transmitted successfully to other Groups.

(3) Wing Leader contacted fighters both visually and by VHF until IP was reached. 100 Group Leader called fighters several times but could not establish contact, and in 390 Group, neither Leader nor channel guards could reach fighters. In 100 Group, C Channel (701) Guard talked to fighters several times but could not make contact when requesting fighter aid. It was learned from 66th Fighter Wing that the 55th Fighter Group which was to give our Wing close support was vectored off to Frankfurt just as our Wing reached the IP. This accounts for no reply to the calls that were made in the target area.

(4) No distress messages were reported. Monitors maintaining watch on 66th Fighter Wing Channel (701) made only contacts with fighters established on this mission. These contacts were made prior to 10 degrees east. All necessary relays were made by monitors.

b. W/T: (1) Division W/T Station was received clearly most of the day. Some slight interference and short periods of weak reception were reported.

(2) Wing Leader sent Control Points and Strike Reports successfully.

(3) Control Points:

	CP 1	CP 2	CP 3	TRGT	CP 4	CP 5
Timings	0905	0945	1031	1141	1258	1410
A.T.A.	0904	0943	1028	1129	1250	1405

(4) Strike Reports:

95A	S B 5	1129
100A	S B 5	1129
390A	P A 2	----
390B	P A 3	1129
390C	P B 5	1129

4. Mission Camera Report: a. 95 Group installed 3 scope, 4 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras, 1, 4, and 7 of which took pictures: PFF A/C 8144, lead 95A: scope camera malfunctioned and no pictures were taken. PFF A/C 8667, #2 lead element 95A: scope camera malfunctioned. A/C 8826, #2 lead element 95C: returning spare. A/C 9175, lead of high

C O N F I D E N T I A L

b. 100 Group installed 2 16mm motion picture, 4 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras, 1, 3, and 8 of which took pictures: PFF A/C 8717, lead of 100C: 1 16mm motion picture, 1 oblique, and 1 K-21 camera lost with A/C.

c. 390 Group installed 2 scope, 1 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras 2, 1, and 3 of which took pictures: A/C 600, lead of high element in 390A: 1 K-21 was lost with A/C. 1 K-20 oblique was not used.

5. Planning and Execution of the Mission:

a. Group Order and Strength:

(1)	13 A, B, C Groups:		3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
			6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a)	95	18x100 GP 8xM17	1 x 12 A/C Squadron
		1 A/C 12x100 GP	2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
		assorted long delay	
		plus 8xM17	
(b)	100	6x1000 GP	1 x 12 A/C Squadron
			2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(c)	390	6x1000 GP	1 x 12 A/C Squadron
			2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(2)	4 A, B, C, D Groups:		12 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(a)	94	6x1000 GP	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(b)	486	18x100 GP 8xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(c)	487	18x100 GP 8xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(d)	447	18x100 GP 8xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(3)	93 A, B, C, D Groups:		12 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(a)	493	18x100 GP 8xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(b)	34	18x100 GP 8xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(c)	385	18x100 GP 8xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(d)	490	18x100 GP 8xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(4)	45 A, B, C Groups:		9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(a)	96	18x100 GP 8xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(b)	452	18x100 GP 8xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(c)	388	6x1000 GP	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons

b. A/C and C/C Available:

(1)	95	REG	44 A/C	54 C/C
		PFF	12 A/C	8 C/C
		MH	10 A/C	8 C/C
(2)	100	REG	45 A/C	52 C/C
		PFF	11 A/C	6 C/C
		MH	7 A/C	6 C/C
(3)	390	REG	43 A/C	65 C/C
		PFF	11 A/C	11 C/C
		MH	10 A/C	5 C/C

c. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

(1)	95	34 Plus 4 PFF
(2)	100	35 Plus 3 PFF
(3)	390	35 Plus 3 PFF

d. A/C Airborne: All Scheduled A/C Airborne.

e. Individual A/C Mission Failures:

(1) 95:

A/C 7783: 335 Sq "R" - Pilot Lt. Suttan - #4 prop feathered
Sortie. A/C 8826: 412 Sq "J" - Pilot Lt. O'Toole - #3 prop feathered -
No sortie.

f. A/C Landing Away From Base:

(1) 390:

A/C 868: 571 Sq "Y" - Pilot Lt. Baldwin - Landed at
Woodbridge - Severe battle damage - Sortie.

g. A/C Outstanding:

(1) 100: A/C 717: 351 Sq "J" - Pilot Capt. Swain.
A/C 295: 351 Sq "B" - Pilot Lt. Jensen.
A/C 861: 351 Sq "M" - Pilot Lt. Gevin.
A/C 521: 351 Sq "K" - Pilot Lt. King.

(2) 390: A/C 600: 568 Sq "S" - Pilot Lt. Berryman - Possibly
landed on continent.
A/C 265: 570 Sq "C" - Pilot Lt. Wroz.
A/C 571: 571 Sq "O" - Pilot Lt. Freeman.

h. A/C Attacking - 13 A Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Secondary 36 570x100 LB GP
288x500 LB IB
Jettisoning 1 18x100 LB GP
8x500 LB IB
Returning 1 18x100 LB GP
8x500 LB IB

(2) Method of Bombing: H2X

(3) Method of Release: 100° Train

i. A/C Attacking - 13 B Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Secondary 37 216x1000 LB GP
Jettisoning 1 6x1000 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: H2X

(3) Method of Release: 150° Train

j. A/C Attacking - 13 C Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) TO 36 203x1000 LB GP
5xWG 42
5xT 333
Jettisoning 2 7x1000 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Combination Visual and H2X

(3) Method of Release: 150° Train

6. Controller's Log:

a. 1822 from 3 AD: (1) Alert (2) Force & Order (3) Targets (4)
Route (5) Zero Hour (6) RBA (7) Division Order
(8) Chaff Force (9) Bombing Alt. (10) Assembly.

b. 1849 from 3 AD: (1) RBW.

c. 1859 from 13CW: (1) Alert (2) Force & Order (3) Zero Hour
(4) RBA (5) Bombing Altitude (6) RBW.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

d.	1915	from 13CW:	(1)	Targets.
e.	1945	from 13CW:	(1)	Targets.
f.	2000	from 13CW:	(1)	Assembly.
g.	2000	from 13CW:	(1)	AW to 3 AD FO 613.
h.	2010	from 3 AD:	(1)	Targets.
i.	2018	from 3 AD:	(1)	Leaflet Load.
j.	2020	from 13CW:	(1)	Leaflet Load.
k.	2030	from 13CW:	(1)	Fuel.
l.	2034	from 13CW:	(1)	AW to 13 CBW FO 73.
m.	2045	from 13CW:	(1)	Targets.
n.	2058	from 13CW:	(1)	Annex 1 to AW to 13 CBW FO 73.
o.	2140	from 3 AD:	(1)	A-2 Annex to 3 AD FO 613.
p.	2300	from 3 AD:	(1)	Bomb Load (2) Possible Continental Assembly
			(3)	Time Controls.
q.	2314	from 13CW:	(1)	Bomb Load.
r.	2348	from 13CW:	(1)	Annex 2 to AW to 13 CBW FO 73.
s.	0045	from 3 AD:	(1)	Route (2) Timings (3) Routes for Continental
				Assembly.
t.	0102	from 3 AD:	(1)	Bomb Load.
u.	0105	from 3 AD:	(1)	2nd A-2 Annex to 3 AD FO 613.
v.	0118	from 3 AD:	(1)	Start Climb Turn.
w.	0130	from 13CW:	(1)	Targets.
x.	0147	from 3 AD:	(1)	3 AD FO 613.
y.	0150	from 13CW:	(1)	Timings (2) Assembly Altitude (3) Start
				Climb Times (4) Routes (5) Bombing Altitude
			(6)	Continental Bunchers.
z.	0220	from 3 AD:	(1)	Continental Bunchers.
aa.	0225	from 13CW:	(1)	Continental Bunchers (2) New Assembly
				& Timings.
bb.	0229	from 13CW:	(1)	13 CBW FO 73.
cc.	0300	from 13CW:	(1)	Conserve Gas (2) Clear Dunkirk.
dd.	0300	from 3 AD:	(1)	Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 613.
ee.	0317	from 3 AD:	(1)	Scrub Alternate Plan.
ff.	0320	from 13CW:	(1)	Same as ee.
gg.	0330	from 13CW:	(1)	Final Timings.
hh.	0330	from 13CW:	(1)	Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO 73.
ii.	0338	from 3 AD:	(1)	Annex 2 to 3 AD FO 613.
jj.	0405	from 3 AD:	(1)	Annex 3 to 3 AD FO 613.
kk.	0720	from Grps:	(1)	First A/C Airborne.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

Ernest A. Kiessling

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis.

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9/11

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VXP
CWB

COMBAT BOMB WING (H)

BERLIN, GERMANY - TRANSPORTATION

18 MARCH 1945

GROUP - 95TH - (green dots) : 36 x 570 x 100 lb GPs and 288 x 500 lb IBs. Attacked the Secondary Target by H2X in Group formation.


GROUP - 100TH - (purple dots) : 37 x 216 x 1000 lb GPs. Attacked the Secondary Target by H2X in Group formation.

GROUP - 390TH - (red dots) : 36 x 203 x 1000 lb GPs. Attacked a Target of Opportunity by H2X with Visual assist in Group formation.

les - 1 mile radii from Secondary Target.

Scale - 1:63,360

Legend - River -  Railroad Tracks -  Woods & park - 



TIERGARTEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) C-B-1
OFFICE OF THE OPERATIONS OFFICER
APO 559

18 March 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion of Aircraft No. 7783.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.
(attention operations officer)

1. I took off in Aircraft No. 7783 at 0810 on mission of 18 March 1945.

2. Joined formation at wing rendezvous. At 07° 55' E element leader fell in trail of high squadron and we hit severe prop wash. A few minutes later the ball turret gunner called and said gasoline was pouring out of No. 4 engine behind the cowl flaps. The No. 4 fuel pressure dropped to zero and the engine began sputtering, so we feathered it immediately. Got permission of high squadron leader to drop our bombs, as we were losing altitude at about 300 ft. per minute with an airspeed of 135 to 140 M.P.H. Dropped bombs on an airfield near Bohme at 08° 18' E 52° 23' N with the aid of Gee Box and visual checks through breaks in clouds. Bomb hits were unobserved. After bombs away No. 3 tachometer went out. Return to home base was uneventful. We landed at 1235.

John E. Sutton
JOHN E. SUTTON
2nd Lt. A. C.
Pilot

1st. Ind.

336th Bomb Sqdn., 95th Bomb Gp. (H), APO 559, U.S. Army, 18 March 1945.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.
(attention operations officer)

1. I consider action taken justifiable.

2. For your information.

Harold F. Jeneman
HAROLD F. JENEMAN
Capt. A. C.
Operations Officer

THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
OFFICE OF THE OPERATIONS OFFICER
APO 559

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion of Aircraft No. 8469.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group. (H) APO 559 U.S.Army.
(attention operations officer)

1. We took off in aircraft No. 8469 at 06:55 hrs. onmission.

2. We left the English coast at Southwold at 3,000 ft. and climbed on course to rendezvous at Buncher C-1 at 4918° N and 0402° E. Joined the formation on time and proceeded to 5128° N. and 0910° E. We aborted due to No.2 engine failure, at 1048 hrs. we proceeded to 5100° N. and 0844° E. dropped visually on Ernsthausen at 1053 hrs. We returned to the base and landed at 1325 hrs.

John E. SchAAF

JOHN E. SCHAAF
1st. Lt. A.C.
Pilot

1st. Ind.

336th Bomb. Sqdn., 95th Bomb Gp.(H). APO 559 U.S.Army 28 March 1945

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group.(H) 28 March 1945

1. I consider the action taken justifiable.

2. For your information.

Harold F. Jenemam

HAROLD F. JENEMAM
Capt. A.C.
Operations officer


336 BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
OFFICE OF THE ENGINEERING OFFICER
AAF 119 APO 559

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Aircraft Abortions.

TO : When It May Concern.

1. Airplane #45-38469 returned early from a combat mission of this date. The pilot saw oil throwing from the breather and feathered the propeller. A ground check showed that the engine had failed internally.


ROBERT E. BAXTER,
Captain, Air Corps,
Engineering Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Intelligence Officer

18 March 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the mission to Berling, Germany on the above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - The 95th Group lead the Third Division in attacking a Marshalling Yard at Berlin, Germany. Because of clouds over the primary target, the secondary target which was the same as the primary was attacked on H2X. Because of interphone difficulties in 95C they bombed with 95A in Group formation. 95B Radar Navigator had difficulty with H2X equipment on bomb run and dropped on smoke bombs of 95A.

95A - Ten A/C plus two PFF took off and formed the lead squadron. All A/C bombed the Secondary target.

95B - Twelve A/C plus one PFF took off and formed the high squadron. Eleven A/C plus the PFF bombed the secondary target. A/C 7783 turned back at 5225N-0818E at 1028 hours because of mechanical failure and bombed a target of opportunity, the Bohmte A/D at 5222N-0817E.

95C - Twelve A/C plus one PFF took off and formed the low squadron. Eleven A/C plus the PFF bombed the secondary target. The spare A/C 8826 turned back over Ipswich because of mechanical difficulties and jettisoned bombs in the channel.

2. For further information reference is suggested to the Operational Narrative teletype of the Intelligence Section.

For the Intelligence Officer:

Francis X. Pierce
FRANCIS X. PIERCE,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

Mae

AK
CRB

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

.....
SECRET
.By authority of
.C.G., Eighth Air Force.
.Initials. *M.H.*
.Date 18 March 1945
.....

REPORT SUMMARY NO. 322

PERIOD: 0001 hours 18 March to 2400 hours 18 March 1945

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Total Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>Losses</u>			<u>NYR</u>
						<u>AA</u>	<u>OT</u>	<u>Totals</u>	
Heavy Bomber Atks.	1327	1262	3190.3	7-1-1A	6	6	16	28	1
Fighter Escort (a)	691	632	0	14-0-4A	0	1	4	5	1
Fighter Sweeps	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Reconnaissance	23	21	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Reconnaissance	41	37	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	12	12	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>42</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	2136	2005	3190.3	21-1-5A(b)	6	7	20	33	2

(a) Includes two groups based on continent

(b) Includes 6 Me-262s

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

1327 a/c (980 B-17s, 347 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied in three forces against two RR Stations and two Tank Plants in the Berlin area. 1262 a/c dropped 3190.3 tons (1613.7 tons GP, 1576.6 tons IB) on all primaries and ten other targets. Bombing by H2X with visual assists. Weather: varied from 2/10 to 10/10 cloud over target area. E/A Opposition: Attacks by 10-15 Me-262s and 1 Me-109 in target area; 12 Me-262s made single attack from 5252N-1051E to target and 2 possible Me-410s attacked straggler in target area. 7 s/e e/a sighted in target area and 2 Me-262s seen in Lunenburg area. Claims: 7-1-1 air. Losses: 28 a/c (25 B-17s, 3 B-24s). NYR: 1 B-24 believed safe on continent.

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First Force

Twelve group formations (450 B-17s, 1st Air Division) sortied against Berlin/Schleisischer Station. 435 a/c dropped 1103.3 tons (470 tons GP, 633.3 tons IB) on primary and two other targets at 1106-1135 hours from 24,000-27,800 feet. Bombing by H2X with visual assists. Leaflets dropped on Berlin. Weather: 4/10-10/10 cloud in target area. Flak: moderate to intense, generally accurate. Battle Damage: 196 minor, 72 major, 1 Cat. "E". E/A Opposition: attacks by 10-15 Me-262s and 1 Me-109 in target area. Claims: 6-0-0 Me-262s air. Losses: 14 B-17s (2 to e/a, 12 to unknown reasons). NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Four groups (199 P-51s) sortied. Up 0824-0848 hours, down 1400-1437 hours. 179 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: combat with 4 FW-190s over Zackerick A/F; with 3-4 Me-109s near Joachimsthal Lake; with composite a/c (FW-190 and He-111) over Schwerin A/F; with 8-10 Me-262s 15 miles NW of Berlin. Attack by an AR-234 vicinity Havelberg. Claims: 4-0-2 air. Losses: 1 P-51 to engine failure. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Berlin/Schleisischer Station	450	421	461.6	605.8	Unobserved
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Zehdmuk (10 miles N of Berlin)		13	7.8	25.5	Unobserved
Vechta		1	.6	2.0	"
Totals	450	435	470.0	633.3	

Second Force

Fourteen group formations (530 B-17s, 3rd Air Division) sortied against Berlin North Goods Station. 501 a/c dropped 1435.9 tons (731.9 tons GP, 704 tons IB) on the primary, Ludwigslust M/Y and 3 T/Os at 1128-1201 hours from 24,400-29,000 feet. Bombing visual and by H2X. Leaflets dropped on Berlin. Weather: 2/10-7/10 cloud over target; persistent contrails above 27,000 feet. Flak: moderate to intense, accurate over Berlin. Battle Damage: 243 minor, 76 major. E/A Opposition: 12 Me-262s made single aggressive attack from 5252N-1051E to target. 7 s/c e/a sighted in target area. 2 possible Me-410s attacked stragglers in target area. Claims: 1-1-1 air. Losses: 11 B-17s (3 to AA, 4 to E/A, 4 to other reasons). NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Five groups (238 P-51s) sortied. Up 0905-0919 hours, down 1420-1526 hours. 219 effective sorties. One group provided area support. E/A Opposition: combat with 6 long-nosed FW-190s SW of Kassel; 1 Me-262 and 20 FW-190s N of Berlin; 2 Me-109s vicinity Drossen; 2 Me-109s and 1 Me-262 at Wreizen. 1 t/e jet chased in Dummer Lake area. Observed 3 Me-262s vicinity

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Neustadt and 1 u/i jet east of Berlin. Claims: 7-0-1 air. Losses: 2 P-51s to mechanical failure. NYR: 1 P-51 believed landed in Russian occupied Germany.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Berlin North Goods Station	530	495	726.8	692.5	Unob-Fair
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Ludwigslust M/Y		3	2.4	6.0	Unobserved
Brohmpo A/F		1	.9	1.5	"
Neustadt		1	.9	2.0	"
Diepholz		1	.9	2.0	"
Totals	530	501	731.9	704.0	

Third Force

Thirty-five squadron formations (347 B-24s, 2nd Air Division) sortied against two tank plants in the Berlin area. 326 a/c dropped 651.1 tons (411.8 tons GP, 239.3 tons IB) on both primaries and 4 T/Os at 1125-1305 hours from 19,500-24,000 feet. Bombing by H2X with visual assists. Leaflets dropped on Berlin. Weather: 4/10-6/10 cloud in target area. Flak: moderate to intense, accurate over Berlin. Battle Damage: 126 minor, 1 major. E/A Opposition: 2 Me-262s seen in Luneburg area. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 B-24s to AA. NYR: 1 B-24 believed safe on continent.

Fighter Support: Five groups (254 P-51s, including 50 P-51s from 362nd Group based on continent) sortied. Up 0830-0948 hours, down 1430-1555 hours. 234 effective sorties. One group provided area support. E/A Opposition: combat with 20 FW-190s north of Berlin. One Ju-88 observed attacking straggling B-24 vicinity of Ulzen- e/a evaded. 8 Me-262s sighted south of Ludwigslust; 1 u/i jet seen north of Berlin. Claims: 3-0-1 air. Losses: 2 P-51s (1 to unknown reasons, 1 to AA). NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Berlin/Hennigsdorf Tank Plant	174	80	110.0	74.5	Good
Berlin/Tegel Tank Plant	173	225	258.8	162.1	Excellent

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<u>Other Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Oranienburg		9	21.0		Fair
Ulzen		9	19.5		Poor
Wittstock		2		2.7	Poor
Damme RR Junction		<u>1</u>	<u>2.5</u>		Poor
Totals	347	326	411.8	239.3	

2. Fighter Escort

Fourteen groups (691 P-51s), including two groups based on continent, sortied as support to bomber forces. Up 0824-0948 hours, down 1400-1555 hours. 632 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: combat with 4 FW-190s over Zackerick A/F; 8-10 Me-262s 15 miles NW of Berlin; 6 FW-190s SW of Kassel; 1 Me-262 and 20 FW-190s N of Berlin; 2 Me-109s vicinity Drossen; 2 Me-109s and 1 Me-262 at Wreissen and 20 FW-190s N of Berlin. One Ju-88 observed attacking straggling B-24 vicinity of Ulzen- e/a evaded. 1 t/e jet chased in Dummer Lake area. Observed 3 Me-262s vicinity Neustadt; 1 u/i jet E of Berlin; 8 Me-262s S of Ludwigslust and 1 u/i jet N of Berlin. Attack by an AR-234 vicinity Havelberg. Claims: 14-0-4 air (0-0-2 Me-262s). Losses: 5 P-51s (3 due to mechanical failure, 1 to AA and 1 to unknown reasons). NYR: 1 P-51 believed landed in Russian occupied Germany.

3. Fighter Sweeps

Nil.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

23 a/c (5 F-5s, 12 P-51s, 6 B-17s) sortied as follows:

5 F-5s, with 12 P-51s as escort, obtained photos in Berlin, Hamburg, Kiel and Ruhr areas. 15 sorties.

6 B-17s on H2X photo mission to Brunswick, Kassel, Dessau area.

No losses.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

41 a/c (30 P-51s, 6 B-17s, 5 Mosquitoes) sortied as follows:

4 B-17s on routine flights over the Atlantic to west and southwest of England.

5 Mosquitoes on special flights over the continent. 4 sorties.

32 a/c (30 P-51s, 2 B-17s) as weather scouts for bombers. 29 sorties.

No losses.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

12 a/c (10 P-47s, 2 PBVs) on routine search and patrol. No losses.

8. Special Operations

42 a/c sortied as follows:

9 B-24s on leaflet mission over Germany, Holland and France- night 17/18.
All successful.

10 a/c (8 P-51s, 1 B-24, 1 B-17) as radio relays.

13 B-24s on RCM, jamming between 0601-1010. 12 effective sorties.

10 Mosquitoes on special operations for 1st and 2nd Division.

No losses.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

A combination of well coordinated and aggressive t/e jet attacks, plus cloud and contrail conditions which favored enemy tactics and hindered escort, resulted in a limited though noteworthy success for G.A.F. jet interceptors. The loss of at least six bombers is attributed to e/a action.

The First Force reported losing two bombers to attacks by some 15 to 20 Me 262s from approximately 1110 to 1130 in the target area. Most of the attacks made by the jets were from the I.P. to the target. E/a used contrails from which to launch attacks which were aggressively pressed home against the last two groups. In one instance to as close as 50 yards. There were several concentrated attacks made by flights of 2 to 4 e/a each, other e/a coming in singly. One attack was made by a single Me 109. Jet e/a skillfully used their superior speed, and although escorting fighters engaged these e/a, they succeeded in damaging only one of them. First Force bombers claimed 6-0-0 Me 262s.

The Second Force was strongly attacked by some 12 to 15 Me 262s from 1105 to 1130 hours in the area extending from just west of Salzwedel to Berlin. E/a attacks, though not continuous, were aggressive and skillful. Contrail cover was effectively used, and four bombers went down to the enemy jets. Weather conditions aggravated the escort problem; bomber crews reported they were unable to contact escort during the attacks. The first attack came some 20 minutes before target when the enemy singled out the low squadron of the second group in the column. This squadron at the time was strung out and in poor formation. Four Me 262s in a formation similar to that used by our P-51s came out of the clouds and bomber contrails from 5 o'clock low, closing to from 75 yards to almost point blank range to badly damage three bombers in the first pass. A second attack, made by 3 Me 262s from 6:30 to 7 o'clock low to level, resulted in the entire tail section of one B-17 being shot off. A few other smaller scale attacks were made, e/a generally breaking off when fired on at ranges of 500 yards and above. A straggler hit in the first attack was reported shot down later near Berlin by two believed Me 410s (possibly Me 262s). P-51s escorting the Second Force engaged one Ar 234 and a number of Me 262s in lots of one to eight, but due to poor visibility and evasive speed of the jets they were only able to damage one e/a. A straggling B-24 was attacked by a lone Ju 188 which evaded when P-51s appeared. Bombers of this Force claimed 2-2-3.

The engagement between a P-51 group with 20 long-nose Fw 190s at 20,000 feet at 1230 in the Dummer Lake region suggests a possible abortive effort to oppose withdrawing bombers. These e/a never reached the bombers; P-51s chased them through two layers of cloud to claim 3-0-1. Six other long-nose Fw190s observed at 6,000 feet north of Marburg during the penetration attempted to attack a Spitfire. They were dispersed after an inconclusive 10 minute dogfight.

P-51s had slight contact with tactical e/a opposing the Russian Front. After being "led" over Zaackerick A/F (north of Kustrin) by two u/i a/c (later identified as Yak 9s) our P-51s attacked and destroyed 1 of 4 Fw 190s observed strafing the Allied airfield. Claims of 1-0-1 resulted from an encounter with 3 to 4 Me 109s near Joachimstahl (NNE of Berlin).

One group surprised and shot down both components of a composite e/a (Helll and Fw190) observed taking off from Schwerin A/F at 1230.

Today's concerted attacks by jet t/e, small-scale though they were, indicate progress by the G.A.F. in developing tactics to bring down heavy bombers. Coordinated attacks by formations of 3 to 4 jet e/a will probably continue. And as enemy jet strength increases and operational experience accrues larger mass attacks may be attempted. A touch of the old Hun cunning and aggressive spirit was apparent today in the advantage taken of cloud and contrail cover for launching attacks and in directing his attention to a vulnerable, strung-out formation.

2. Flak

Berlin - moderate to intense, accurate.
Hennigsdorf - moderate and accurate.

3. Observations

40 plus Ju 88s and Me 410s on Prenzlau A/D.

100 plus jets, Me 410s, Ju 88s, Me 109s and Fw 190s on Neubrandenburg A/D.

2 u/i a/c (believed Me 262s) on Vechta A/D.

20 plus a/c on Rechlin/Larz grass A/F.

Long runways, one appearing to be new, and 12 plus a/c seen on Rechlin A/D.

Eberswalde M/Y filled, factories on canal E and W of town undamaged, working

10 plus flying boats at southern end of Murtitz Lake.

50 plus s/c a/c on grass A/F south of Wittstock (U-2308). Many buildings on the field.

4 Me 262s on Berlin/Gatow A/D.

Numerous a/c on Wutermark A/D.

12 He 111s and 7 He 177s in front of hangars and in northeast dispersal of Schonwalde A/D. East/west runway completed.

33 Ju 88s/188s plus 6 light gun sites on Neurippen A/D.

20 plus Ju 88s/188s and a few high wing s/e a/c on Glienecke A/D.

50 plus s/e and t/e a/c on Oranienburg A/D.

3 u/i jets and 75 plus t/e and s/e a/c on Strausberg A/D.

50 plus u/i e/a on grass A/D at Finow (V-0588). 12 to 15 a/c in center of field, remainder around perimeter. A/D had dirt runways.

3 Ju 52s and 4 Ju 88s/188s on grass field vicinity Damme (5320N-1401E).

Locomotive hauling fifty plus tank cars (every other car prominently displaying red cross) moving S to Berlin from Anklam (5352N-1335E).

Fortified area in woods about 1-1/2 by 2-1/2 miles just NE Dummer Lake with criss-crossing concrete roads, several fortified pillboxes and many gun positions.

Over-abundance of rail and road traffic in area W of Stettin and N of Berlin

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Berlin/Schleisischer Station - H2X - Unobserved.

Unable to pin-point any concentrations on this target. Total of 23 partial concentrations plotted, most of which fell on various parts of Berlin including Templehof M/Y and A/F. Installations in northwestern corner of A/F could be seen burning late in attack. Friedrichshain Park flak battery hit, as well as built-up area adjacent to the park, where damage should be severe. 3 partial concentrations each plotted in Neukolln and Rummelsburg sections of city.

Berlin/Hennigsdorf Tank Plant - Good

1 squadron blanketed south end of the plant; most of the bursts were 1 to 2 miles east in a partially built-up area.

Berlin/Tegel Tank Plant - Excellent

Total area seen burning upon leaving target. Bursts seen on tank assembly plant, large assembly type buildings, engineering buildings and auxiliary works as well as adjacent city areas.

Oranienburg - Fair

Bursts seen in partially built up areas.

Berlin North Goods Station - Unobserved to Fair

Most of plotted bursts hit average of two miles from MPI. A number of visual strikes within the built up area were plotted but the extent of the damage could not be assessed.

5. Ground Activity

21st Army Group - Nothing to report.

12th Army Group - In the Remagen bridgehead U.S. Infantry is meeting with heavy opposition at F-739227 but villages at F-7224, 7326 and 7227 have been cleared. In the Moselle sector infantry now hold a line L-9967, 9882, 9851, 9756, M-0151, L-8578, 8278, 8281. Armored spearheads are mopping up at M-0938 and are being counter-attacked at M-1136. A new armored thrust south from the Moselle has reached the line L-7240, 7746.

6th Army Group - U.S. Infantry elements have cleared Leiderscheidt (Q-8258) and have reached Schwix (Q-8358). Fighting is going on in Roppeviller (Q-8355). To the east, the advance was held up at R-0629, but other units advanced through the woods to clear Walbourg (R0431) and Biblisheim (R-0432). Woerth (R0037) and Froeschweiler (Q-9938) were also cleared. In the Hagenau sector elements reached R-1819 and are fighting in Sessenheim (R-1822). Soufflenheim (R1625) and the Soufflenheim-Hagenau road have been cleared.

6. G.A.F. Activity over England

2100-2302 hours Saturday

18 a/c on Intruder operations. 11 over land bombing and strafing.

Flying Bombs - 2100 17th to 2400 18th

Launched	Landfall	Greater London	Claims
5	1	0	0

D. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Ninth Air Force	2080	7-2-1A 7-2-1G	18 a/c
First US T.A.F.	1558	3-0-1A	11 a/c
Second T.A.F.	841	0-0-0	4 a/c
R.A.F. Fighter Command	<u>302</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>1 a/c</u>
Totals	4781	10-2-2A 7-2-1G	34 a/c

Ninth Air Force

Night - 17/18

Sorties : 28 a/c on intruder patrols and interception patrols in battle area.

Claims & Losses: Nil.

Day - 18

Sorties : 1305 fighters
747 bombers
2052 a/c

Missions : 9th Bomb Division: 747 sorties. Worms comm. center, Wetzlar and Kreuztal M/Ys, Bad Durklem. Claims: nil. Losses: 7 bombers.

9th T.A.C.: 266 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in battle area. Air cooperation with 3rd U.S. Army, leaflet dropping, interception patrols and escort. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 a/c to AA.

19th T.A.C.: 777 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in battle area. Air cooperation with 12th and 20th Corps. Fighter-Bombing. Interception Patrols, escort and reconnaissance. Claims: 7-2-1 air. Losses: 8 a/c.

29th T.A.C.: 262 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in Ruhr area. Interception Patrols, bomber escort and reconnaissance. Claims: 7-2-1 ground. Losses: 2 a/c.

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Other Claims :	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T	614	458
Locos	39	26
RR Cars	242	703
Buildings	129	28
M/Ys	0	17
Gun Positions	19	43
Tanks & AFV	42	48
Horse Drawn Vehicles	262	118
Rail Cuts	44	
Highway Cuts	17	

First US T.A.F.

Night - 17/18

Sorties : 6 Intruder Patrols in Kaiserslautern-Karlsruhe area.

Claims & Losses: Nil.

Day - 18

Sorties : 206 Bombers
1346 Fighters
 1552 a/c

Missions : 42nd Bomb Wing: 206 sorties against M/Ys, road junctions and a railway bridge in 6th Army Group area. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

12th T.A.C.: 1023 sorties. Air cooperation with 7th U.S. Army. Armed reconnaissance in battle area. Sweeps and reconnaissance. Claims: 2-0-1 air. Losses: 8 fighters to AA.

1st French T.A.C.: 320 sorties. Air cooperation with First French Army. Fighter sweeps, reconnaissance in battle area. Claims: 1-0-0 air. Losses: 3 fighters.

Western French Air Force: 3 Coastal Command sorties. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

Other Claims ::	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T	191	171
Locos	27	35
RR Cars	622	530
AFV	21	31
Guns	13	24
Buildings	204	93
Rail Cuts	88	
Bridges	2	7

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Second T.A.F.

Night - 17/18

Sorties : 117 a/c
Mission : Armed reconnaissance in battle area; Bocholt attacked.
Claims : Nil.
Losses : 1 Mosquito.

Day - 18

Sorties : 72 a/c
Mission : Attacked Bocholt with unobserved results; destroyed bridge at Bocholt; attacked Bocholt; attacks on military supplies; fighter patrols.
Claims : Nil.
Losses : 3 fighters.
Other Claims : RR Car 16-18, RR Car 55.

R.A.F. Fighter Command

Night - 17/18

Sorties : 21 a/c on Interception Patrols and Flying-bomb Interception.
Claims & Losses : Nil.

Day - 18

Sorties : 151 Fighter-bombers
107 escort
6 Reconnaissance
17 Flying-bomb Interception
281 a/c.
Targets : Rocket sites, railway junctions, bridges in Holland
Claims : Nil.
Losses : 1 Spitfire.

2. Fifteenth Air Force

18 March 1945

103 P-38s sortied. 98 P-38s dived bombed Ptuj Rail Bridge droppin 43 tons at 1200 hours from 6000 feet with good results, 17 tons on Klinca-M/Y southwest of Zagreb at 1215 hours with good results, 15 tons on Zagreb with hits at far end of rail bridge, 3 tons on Sisak with 1 direct hit on bridge and hits in M/Y. No losses.

3. R.A.F. Bomber Command

<u>Day 18</u>	<u>Losses</u>
50 Lancasters Langendreer/Bruchstrasse Benzol Plant near Bockum	0
50 Lancasters Hattingen/Heinrichshutte Benzol Plant near Bockum	0
2 Mosquitoes Weather Recco.	0
<u>102</u>	<u>0</u>
 <u>Night 18/19</u>	
277 Lancasters	
9 Mosquitoes Hanau	
259 Halifaxes	
44 Lancasters	
18 Mosquitoes Witten	
30 Mosquitoes Berlin	0
24 Mosquitoes Kassel	
18 Mosquitoes Nurnburg	
2 Mosquitoes Witten	
10 Halifaxes	
60 Lancasters Diversionary Sweeps	
85 a/c Bomber Support	
8 a/c Signal Investigation Patrol	
1 Mosquito Weather Recco.	
<u>845 a/c</u>	

ADDENDUM

The following incidents relevant to Russo-American Air Recognition were reported by fighter groups supporting today's bomber attacks on Berlin.

359th Fighter Group

After leaving the Berlin area, 12 P-51s of "A" Group proceeded down the Oder River toward Konigsberg (S of Schwedt) where they saw two u/i a/c (later identified as Yak 9s). P-51 pursued Yaks to Zackerick A/F N of Kustrin, where they found 4 Fw 190s strafing. The Fws had already started a fire at W end of field. One Fw 190, seen by 2 pilots to bear white crosses, were shot down in combat at 1130-1140 hours from 2,000 feet to deck. 15-20 Russian aircraft were milling around when suddenly one crashed in the middle of the airfield. At once the ground gunners shot up intense and accurate light flak to 5,000 feet. Acting "A" Group leader, Captain Cox, withdrew the P-51s and instructed "B" Group leader not to bring up his force. The Russian aircraft were identified as Yak 9s and Lagg 3s (painted blue exactly like identified Germans). Meanwhile "B" Group had encountered 12 plus Russian aircraft (believed Lagg 5s) northeast of Berlin and dove on them but did not attack. It was then that "B" received "A's" warning and rejoined the bombers.

In the melee over Zackerick Airfield P-51 pilots waved hands and American flags at the Russians. One of them waved back. Another Yak fired, but without effect. In the dogfight a P-51 closed on a bogie, identified it as a Yak 9, and did not fire. But his wing man came up, closer, identified it as an Me 109G and attacked the e/a, getting some strikes before breaking off.

Recognition signals were ineffective. Haze and patchy cloud also complicated recognition.

353rd Fighter Group

One flight attacked from the rear, high, at 10,000 feet and fired upon by two Lagg 5s 40 miles northeast of Berlin. The flight rocked its wings in recognition, but the Russians made a second firing attack, at which point the P-51s broke into them. The flight leader fired a few warning rounds at the Russian element leaders aircraft. Whereupon the Soviet pilots headed due east, after firing upon a straggling B-17, and the P-51s broke away over the Oder River. There was a number of P-51s in the area at the time. The Russian ships were described as "blue with red noses, plenty fast, but not too maneuverable".

357th Fighter Group

One flight, escorting one B-17 to N of Stettin on way to Sweden, was fired upon by 3 Yak fighters, who broke away after identifying the P-51s.

352nd Fighter Group

Observed 6 Yaks vicinity of Zielenzig at 1200 hours at 10,000 feet. Russian recognition signals successful.

Note: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

Berlin 3-18-45

SECRET

* CAMERA AND BOMBSIGHT

95 "A" LEAD SQ.

HAMILTON *
8210 I-J

NELSON, R.A. SEABURG
8269 I-K 6838 I-E

RICHARDSON * BRADLEY *
6902 I-G 9052 I-S

MARKEY TURNER PALMER HANSEN CRAWFORD
9177 A-Y 7376 I-H 7783 I-R 8140 A-C 8942 I-Y

VOLZ LEGG
8346 I-X 8441 A-P

95 "B" HIGH SQ.

JENSEN *
8230 N-M

CRYSTAL SHARAR * WILLIS *
8946 A-F 9152 N-P 8826 A-J 6522 A-H

DULLE YOUNG RIVET JOHANN BROWN
8331 A-G 8281 A-Z 8776 N-B 9175 N-L 7201 N-J

HELGESON CUMMINGS SHEPARD
8990 N-X 8996 N-T 7154 N-F

95 "C" LOW SQ.

TESSIER *
8782 A-R

DUNWODY COLEMAN ROSS * GLOVICK *
8676 L-V 8741 A-M 8106 L-E 8333 L-S

BEARD GAILBRAITH SALVO GIBSON JACKMAN
6801 A-A 2447 L-H 8469 L-U 1867 N-O 8317 N-K

CRIDLIN GROSS SUTTON
7257 A-L 6993 L-W 6475 L-L

	<u>LEADERS</u>	<u>"A" SQ.</u>	<u>"B" SQ.</u>	<u>"C" SQ.</u>	<u>EXTRA AIRCRAFT:</u>
READINESS		0500	0500	0515	FFF----8754 N-Z
STATIONS	0535	0550	0540	0600	ILG---8774 A-B
TAXI	0550	0605	0555	0615	
TAKE-OFF	0600	0615	0605	0625	LAST TAKE-OFF TIME 0715
RENDEZVOUS	0800	0800	0800	0800	ZERO HOUR 0800
OVER	BASE	BASE	BASE	BASE	
AT		21,000	22,000	20,000	MAX MIN. BOMB. ALT.--20,000
BOMB. ALT. (TRUE)		24,000	24,500	23,500	VIS MIN. BOMB. ALT. 22,000

	<u>"A" SQ.</u>	<u>"B" SQ.</u>	<u>"C" SQ.</u>
SHIPS TO MONITOR:			
CHANNEL B	HANSEN A-C	JOHANN N-L	GIBSON N-O
CHANNEL C 8TH AF	VOLZ I-X	HELGESON N-X	GROSS L-W
CHANNEL C 66TH WG.	TURNER I-H		
COMAND #2 (5295)	MARKEY A-Y	DULLE A-G	BEARD A-A
M/F D/F	MARKEY A-Y	DULLE A-G	CRIDLIN A-L
CONTROL POINTS:	RICHARDSON I-G		
	CRAWFORD I-Y		
STRIKE MESSAGES:	RICHARDSON I-G	JENSEN N-M	TESSIER A-R
	CRAWFORD I-Y	SHARAR A-J	ROSS L-E
		SHEPARD N-F	JACKMAN N-K

R/T COLLECTIVE CALLSIGNS AND FLAME COLORS:

	<u>"A" SQ.</u>	<u>"B" SQ.</u>	<u>"C" SQ.</u>
13B 390TH	FIREBALL JOHNNY--GG	FIREBALL JOHNNY HI--GG	FIREBALL JOHNNY LO--GG
13C 95TH	FIREBALL BAKER---RR	FIREBALL BAKER HI---RR	FIREBALL BAKER LO---RR

VHF AUTHENTICATOR--GRAVEL
 DIVISION RECALL--THE BURLINGTON ZEPHER
 WING RECALL--BIRMINGHAM JAIL
 INDIVIDUAL ABORTION--FOREVER AMBER
 REFERENCE BASE ALTITUDE--22,000
 REFERENCE BASE WIND-- 290 Degrees
 75 Knots

COLORS OF THE DAY:

TIME	FL.	CHALL.	REPLY
0100-0700	RRR	X XRAY	M MIKE
0700-1300	RR	Q QUEENIE	C CHARLIE
1300-1900	RR	O OBOE	B BAKER

KODAK AUTHENTICATOR

VHF CALLSIGNS:

BOOMBERS-----VINEGROVE TWO FOUR
 FIGHTERS----BALANCE TWO TWO
 GROUND 66TH FTR. WG.---OILSKIN
 8TH AF-----COLGATE
 3RD DIV.-----ARROWSWIFT
 13 CBW-----HONEYPOT

BAKER	19
CHARLIE	37
WILLIE	06
TOMMY	02
JASON	42
RONALD	05
FREDDIE	87
KARLO	84
GEORGE	10
HICKEY	15

EMERGENCY AIRFIELD--B-53 (5037-0239)
 EXTREME EMERGENCY---A-78 (5014-0439)

SCOUTING FORCE:

4 F-51's--KODAK YELLOW--TGT. W/X FOR TASK
 FORCE "2" AND "3" 20 MINS. PRIOR TO TGT TIME.

IF 5 TGT 6

FIGHTER SUPPORT:

359 GP. (P-51's) R/V 5238-0600
 WITH 13B AND C GPS.
 CALLSIGNS--BALANCE TWO TWO

GEOGRAPHICAL CHECK POINTS:

O ZWOLLE
 R DULLER LAKE
 I STENDEL
 E DRESDEN
 N SAALFELD
 T FULDA

CONTROL POINTS:

C.P. 1--ENGLISH COAST
 C.P. 2--ENEMY COAST

PROCEDURE TO FOLLOW WHEN LANDING ON THE CONTINENT:

1. Whenever possible, land at a field at which 8TH AF Service Command Service Center facilities are located.
2. Have radio operator contact base giving necessary information. Pilot can contact ground station on VHF.
3. After landing, pilot will (a) arrange for medical assistance, if necessary, (b) fill out "Forced Landing Card" from rear of pilot's or co-pilot's seat (c) safeguard all secret and confidential items on ship, (d) contact nearest 8TH AF Service Command Service Center representative, if one isn't on the field, and (e) contact home base. (Use VHF or W/T in the air or on the ground.)
4. Crew members will be responsible for individual flying equipment.

19 MAR 1945

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3406ATTACK ON BERLIN ON 19 MAR 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK

- (a) No. of aircraft : 932, with full fighter escort.
 (b) Command : U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE.
 (c) Time : 1107 - 1221A hours.
 (d) Bombs : 1391 X 1000 lb. G.P.
 10062 X 100 lb. G.P.
 5328 X 500 lb. I.B.

(ii) STATEMENT ON THE TARGET

This report covers the targets attacked in the central area of BERLIN on 18 MAR 1945 by the U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE. The attack extended over a large area of the city and in order to make this report clear and concise, the central portion of BERLIN has been divided into four parts; namely the Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, and the Southwest. For other attacks on targets near BERLIN on the same day refer to S.A. REPORTS 3407 and 3408.

(iii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK

- (a) H.E. and incendiary bursts are visible throughout the city area of BERLIN on photographs that are from 3/10 to 10/10 cloud obscured. Direct hits are seen on the TEMPLEHOF MARSHALLING YARD, NORTH GOODS STATION RAILWAY CENTER, and numerous industrial areas.

- (b) Hits are seen on targets are as follows:

1. NORTHEAST (Distances are measured from the North Goods Station)

a. North Goods Station Railway Center.

Two concentrations totalling at least 150 bursts are seen blanketing the Western end of the railway center and adjacent built-up areas. Hits are seen on the Goods Station and its facilities as follows (numbers refer to annotation on target illustration):-

GESUNDBRUNNEN Passenger Station (2) - one probable hit.

Road over Rail Bridge (6) - three probable hits and several near hits.

Road over Rail Bridge (7) - two near hits.

Flyover (13) - at least four hits and several near hits.

Through running lines - at least eight hits and several near hits.

Rail intersection 1000 yards North of Goods Station -

At least eight hits and eleven near hits. Also blanketed by incendiary bursts.

- b. A group of at least 35 bursts is seen in a heavily built-up area adjacent to the East end of the Goods Station with one near hit to a road over rail bridge and many hits on residential type buildings.
- c. A group of an undetermined number of H.E. bursts and many incendiary bursts are seen approximately $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles Southeast in a heavily built-up area. Scattered bursts are seen extending into the area of the Machine Tool and Electron Works of C. KARGER FABRIK fur WERKZEUG MASCHINEN A.G.
- d. A group of at least 20 bursts is seen $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles East in a heavily built-up area with at least two bursts seen in the area of the Gas Works of BERLINER STADTISCHE GASWERKE A.G.
- e. A concentration of approximately 50 H.E. bursts and many incendiary bursts are seen one mile North in a partially built up factory/residential area. At least three large fires have been started near a large unidentified factory.
- f. A concentration of mixed bursts is seen in a built-up area $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles Southeast. Numerous fires have been started and smoke obscures the extent of the patterns of bursts.

- g. Approximately 40 H.E. and many incendiary bursts are seen 1-3/4 miles Southwest. Incendiary bursts are seen extending into the areas of the STETTINER Railway Traffic Center, the torpedo components works of BERLINER MASCHINENBAU A.G. and the carburetor and electric fuel pump works of PASSAS-APPARATE G.m.b.H.
- h. Approximately 100 H.E. bursts are seen blanketing the village of HOHENSCHONHAUSEN four miles East, with three probable hits on the rail line passing through the village. Another 100 bursts extend into nearby open fields. Incendiary clusters are visible falling in this same area.
- i. Over 30 H.E. bursts in residential areas three miles East-Northeast.
- j. A small cluster of incendiaries is seen on stores type buildings beside a rail line three miles Southeast.
- k. Approximately 100 H.E. bursts in a sparsely built-up area just East of the village of FALKENBERG, 5 1/2 miles East-Northeast.
- l. At least 20 H.E. bursts in a residential area 4-3/4 miles Northeast.
- m. An undetermined number of H.E. bursts in a residential area 2-3/4 miles Southeast.
- n. An unknown number of H.E. bursts in a built-up area five miles East.
- o. An undetermined number of H.E. bursts in a lightly built-up residential area 5 1/2 miles East-Southeast.

2. SOUTHEAST

- a. Two concentrations of both H.E. and I.B. bombs are seen bursting across the Northern third of the TEMPELHOF MARSHALLING YARD and on adjacent heavily built-up business/residential areas. The following hits can be plotted on the marshalling yard and its facilities: (numbers refer to annotations on target illustration)
 - Anhalter locomotive sheds (7) - bursts in the area.
 - Potsdamer locomotive sheds (11) - bursts in the area.
 - Carriage repair shops (6) - blanketed by bursts.
 - Anhalter goods sheds (8) - bursts in the area.
 - Potsdamer goods yard (10) - at least four hits on sidings.
 - Anhalter goods yard (9) - at least five hits on sidings.
 - Dresdener goods yard (12) - at least ten hits on sidings.
 - Metropolitan railway bridge - possibly one hit.
(Over Potsdamer goods yard)
 - Road bridge over Anhalter goods yard - two near hits.
- b. A group of bursts is visible across rail lines at the Eastern entrance to GORLITZER RAILWAY STATION with one possible hit on a rail over canal bridge.
- c. Two groups of I.B. bursts can be seen on the Northwest edge of TEMPELHOF AIRDROME and adjoining built-up areas starting fires.
(The following distances and directions are measured from the center of TEMPELHOF AIRDROME):
- d. H.E. bursts of an undetermined number are seen across the rail junction at the West end of the RUMMELSBURG MARSHALLING YARD approximately four miles Northeast. Possible hits are seen on the rail lines and several workshop type buildings adjacent to the lines.
- e. Fires are seen in a built-up business/residential area two miles East-Northeast.

(e) BERLIN/TEMPELHOF AIRFIELD

1. Only the South and Southwest perimeter is visible on smoke and cloud obscured photographs.
2. No aircraft are visible.
3. No statement on serviceability is possible.

(f) BERLIN/JOHANNISTHAL AIRFIELD

1. The airfield is covered on hazy photographs.
2. Four possible aircraft are visible as follows:

Type	South side	North side
4 medium	1	3

3. A strip along the Southwest edge of the landing ground is serviceable.

(v) ANNOTATED PRINT: None to be issued.

(vi) BOMB PLOT : A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed.

(vii) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED

SAV	34/708,709	18 MAR 1945.	1144A	hrs.	1/43,700	(F.L. 7")	25,600'	'A'
"	34/710	"	1142A	"	1/27,900	(F.L. 12")	27,900'	'B'
"	92/938,941	"	1116A	"	1/25,000	"	25,000'	'A'
"	94/1543-46	"	1135A	"	1/44,500	(F.L. 7")	26,000'	"
"	95/1609,11,12	"	1128A	"	1/45,200	"	26,400'	"
"	100/1435,37,39	"	1128A	"	1/43,200	"	25,300'	"
"	303/1774,1776	"	1109A	"	1/47,000	"	27,500'	"
"	303/1779,1780	"	1107A	"	1/26,400	(F.L. 12")	26,400'	"
"	306/1249,1251	"	1121A	"	1/46,200	(F.L. 7")	27,000'	"
"	306/1458,1459	"	1122A	"	1/44,500	"	26,000'	"
"	351/1115-1117	"	1122A	"	1/26,400	(F.L. 12")	26,400'	"
"	379/1101-1104	"	1109A	"	1/42,000	(F.L. 7")	24,500'	"
"	379/1100	"	1109A	"	1/24,600	(F.L. 12")	24,600'	"
"	381/1241,1243	"	1135A	"	1/40,100	(F.L. 7")	23,400'	"
"	381/1246	"	1113A	"	1/26,000	(F.L. 12")	26,000'	"
"	384/1503	"	1107A	"	1/25,700	"	25,700'	"
"	384/1504	"	1107A	"	1/42,800	(F.L. 7")	25,000'	"
"	385/1150-1152	"	1148A	"	1/44,500	"	26,000'	"
"	388/1068,1074	"	1153A	"	1/44,100	"	25,750'	"
"	390/1509,10,12	"	1130A	"	1/42,800	"	25,000'	"
"	398/830,32,33	"	1110A	"	1/45,700	"	26,700'	"
"	398/854	"	1114A	"	1/26,700	(F.L. 12")	26,700'	"
"	401/1223,1225	"	1120A	"	1/46,200	(F.L. 7")	27,000'	"
"	447/1108-10,12	"	1145A	"	1/44,500	"	26,000'	'B'
"	448/1510	"	1221A	"	1/38,600	"	22,500'	"
"	452/1080,1082	"	1200A	"	1/43,500	"	25,500'	'A'
"	457/1057,1060	"	1122A	"	1/42,800	"	25,000'	"
"	457/1062	"	1122A	"	1/25,000	(F.L. 12")	25,000'	"
"	466/1063-1065	"	1206A	"	1/54,400	(F.L. 7")	20,000'	'C'
"	486/985,87,90	"	1140A	"	1/43,500	"	25,500'	'A'
"	487/947,948	"	1142A	"	1/48,000	"	28,000'	'B'
"	487/946	"	1140A	"	1/26,700	(F.L. 12")	26,700'	'A'
"	490/814,815	"	Unknown	"	1/46,200	(F.L. 7")	27,000'	'C'
"	493/787,789	"	1145A	"	1/43,500	"	25,500'	'A'
SAO	95/445	"	Unknown	"	Oblique	(F.L. 6-5/8")	21,700'	"
"	96/29	"	"	"	"	"	26,400'	"
"	100/77,79	"	"	"	"	"	25,500'	"
"	446/239	"	"	"	"	"	22,000'	"
"	458/263	"	"	"	"	"	21,800'	"
"	486/568-371	"	"	"	"	"	25,000'	"

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2. No aircraft are visible.
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"	401/1223,1225	"	1120A	"	1/46,200	(F.L. 7")	27,000'	"
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"	448/1510	"	1221A	"	1/38,600	"	22,500'	"
"	452/1080,1082	"	1200A	"	1/43,500	"	25,500'	'A'
"	457/1057,1060	"	1122A	"	1/42,800	"	25,000'	"
"	457/1062	"	1122A	"	1/25,000	(F.L.12")	25,000'	"
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"	100/77,79	"	"	"	"	"	25,500'	"
"	446/259	"	"	"	"	"	22,000'	"
"	458/263	"	"	"	"	"	21,800'	"
"	486/368-371	"	"	"	"	"	25,000'	"