

JST  
W.F.

PFF INTERPRETATION REPORT T-71

- (1) General Statement: Forty-nine sorties were received, twenty-two of which were plotted and a plot issued for seventeen of these.
- (2) See S.A. Reports 3398-3405 for additional information.
- (3) Summary of PFF missions on 17 MAR 1945 from photographs received through 1700 hrs on 18 MAR 1945.

1ST DIVISION

Mission to Attenburg

- SAT 457/121 - Not plottable - no blips.  
 " 457/122 - Not plottable - not enough check points.

Mission to Erfurt

- SAT 584/182 - Plotted - see bomb plot.  
 " 584/183 - Plotted - see bomb plot.  
 " 584/184 - Plotted - see bomb plot.

Mission to Jena

- SAT 351/166 - Plotted - see bomb plot.  
 " 351/167 - Plotted - see bomb plot.  
 " 351/168 - Plotted - see bomb plot.  
 " 381/115 - Not plotted - unable to orient.

Mission to Bohlen

- SAT 91/175 - Bombs away 31 miles E. of target.  
 " 91/176 - Not plottable - out of focus.  
 " 91/177 - Not plotted - A/C in bank on bomb run.  
 " 91/178 - Not plottable - not enough check points.  
 " 381/116 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 398/108 - Not plottable - out of focus.  
 " 398/109 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 398/110 - Not plottable - not enough check points.

Mission to Noblis

- SAT 306/161 - Plotted - see bomb plot.  
 " 306/162 - No bombs away - 3 minutes between last 2 prints.  
 " 401/180 - Plotted - See bomb plot, plotting doubtful.

2ND DIVISION

Mission to Hannover

- SAT 448/53 - Not plottable - not enough check points.  
 " 458/250 - Plotted - See bomb plot, plotting doubtful.  
 " 458/275 - Plotted - See bomb plot, plotting doubtful.  
 " 466/110 - Not plottable - not enough check points.  
 " 467/161 - Not plotted - unable to orient.  
 " 467/162 - Not plottable - not enough check points.

Mission to Munster

- SAT 44/194 - Not plottable gain too low.  
 " 399/112 - Plotted - See bomb plot.  
 " 392/124 - Not plottable - not enough check points

3RD DIVISION

Mission to Plauen

Mission to Bitterfeld

SAT 34/34 - No blips.  
 " 34/35 - Plotted - See bomb plot, plotting doubtful.  
 " 34/36 - Not plottable - not enough check points.  
 " 385/78 - " " " " " "  
 " 490/27 - Plotted - See bomb plot, plotting doubtful.  
 " 493/38 - No blips.

Mission to Cottbus

SAT 487/84 - Not plottable - not enough check points.

Mission to Ruhland

SAT 95/150 - Bombs away photo 7 mi. W. of target.  
 " 95/151 - Not plottable - gain too low.  
 " 96/159 - Last plottable print 10 miles north of Ruhland.  
 " 385/78 - Not plottable - not enough check points.  
 " 480/92 - Not plottable - no blips.  
 " 447/56 - Plotted - no plot issued; B.A. approx. 7½ mi. N. of tar.  
 " 447/57 - Plotted - No plot issued; B.A. approx. 5 mi. NE of tar.  
 " 447/58 - Not plottable - out of focus.  
 " 487/83 - Not plottable - not enough check points.

(4) Sorties Received:

SAT 34/34	SAT 351/166	SAT 398/110
" 34/35	" 351/167	" 401/180
" 34/36	" 351/168	" 447/56 447/57
" 44/194	" 381/115	" 447/58
" 91/175	" 381/116	" 448/53
" 91/176	" 384/182	" 457/121
" 91/177	" 384/183	" 457/122
" 91/178	" 384/184	" 458/250
" 94/248	" 385/73	" 458/275
" 95/150	" 388/42	" 466/110
" 95/151	" 389/112	" 467/161
" 96/159	" 390/91	" 467/162
" 100/35	" 390/92	" 487/83
" 305/282	" 392/124	" 487/84
" 306/161	" 398/108	" 490/27
" 306/162	" 398/109	" 493/38

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6  
1 Lead Group  
1 ea. Bomb Sq.  
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HEADQUARTERS  
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)  
APO 559

Date 17 March 1945  
13 CBW FO 72  
13 CBW OPS 297  
3 AD FO 612

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (RUHLAND AND PLAUEEN, GERMANY)

TO : Colonel Shuck - 95<sup>th</sup>

1. Information Concerning the Targets: a. The primary target (visual) for 13A & B was the Contact Oven Houses in the center of the Synthetic Oil Plant situated 2 miles NNE of Ruhland, Germany. That for 13C was the Water Gas Plant in the Ruhland Synthetic Oil Plant.

b. The secondary target for each Group was the same as the primary. H2X technique was to be employed in the event of the primary target being overcast.

c. The Tertiary target (visual) for 13A & B was the Pattern Shop and Foundry in the Vomag Maschinenfabrik A.G., 1½ miles SW of Plauen, Germany. That for 13C was the Spinning Mill in the Sachsische Zellwolle A.G., 1½ miles SW of Plauen, Germany.

d. The Tertiary target (H2X) for all Groups was the center of Plauen, Germany.

2. Narrative of the Attack:

a. 13 A Group - 95A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three Squadrons of 13A made a normal take off, and assembled over Buncher 23 at 7000'. At Felixstowe, 13A was cut off and forced to move out of the Wing assembly. Consequently, 13A was 1½ minutes late at this point. 13A was forced to cut short CP 1 because the Division leader announced that it would be 1 minute early, and departed CP 1 5 miles south, 1 minute early at 7000'.

(b) Route: The briefed route was followed across the channel. The Continental Coast was crossed at CP 2 4 minutes early, altitude 10000'. No difficulty was encountered until about 0500E when Kodak Red reported high cirrus clouds ahead. Shortly thereafter, 13A ran into the clouds and was unable to maintain visual contact with the Wing ahead or the Groups within the Wing. VHF contact was maintained, however, and by staying at the same altitude as the Wing ahead, 13A did not overrun or have any serious difficulty. CP 3 was reached at 19000' on course, 8 minutes early. 13A broke out of the clouds at 22000' at 5055-1234, and turned on a northerly heading to the Pre-IP. At this point, a Group from 1st Division was below them and on course to the left. The course was paralleled to the IP 6-8 miles right. The IP was made good and a Group H2X run was started on the secondary target. D/P contrails on the bomb run caused the Squadrons to lose visual contact with each other, and individual runs were made. The RP was made good by each Squadron, and the briefed route was followed and reassembly was effected at approximately 1200E. Enroute to CP 4, a wind shift was encountered, and a correction was made to course from 5 miles south of course near Frankfurt. CP 4 was made good 9 minutes early at 19000'. The briefed course was closely followed to the Continental Coast, which was crossed on course, altitude 5000'. The English Coast was recrossed at Southwold, altitude 1600'.

(c) Weather: A 10/10 strata-cumulus layer prevailed over the base areas during assembly. Tops of the layer was reported to be 6000'. A 10/10 layer was encountered over the major part of the route.

At 0600E, a high cirrus layer was encountered during the climb to bombing altitude, tops of which was reported to be at 22500'. This layer extended to 0900E and then broke off. At approximately 1200E, another cirrus layer was encountered with tops at 26500'. Heavy persistent contrails made visibility and visual contact difficult, and gave Groups some trouble with prop wash as they attempted to echelon properly.

(d) Navigational Difficulties: Adverse weather and D/P contrails were the only navigational difficulties encountered.

(e) PFF Narrative: Four PFF A/C were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily for navigation and bombing. H2X technique was employed to attack the secondary target.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 95G Squadron: (8210)

<u>1.</u>	AL Lt. Wright	N	Lt. Hadlock
	P Lt. Brown	AN	
	CP	B	Lt. Waters
		R/N	Lt. Urankar

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs D<sub>r</sub>opped

<u>a.</u>	Secondary	12	232x250 LB GP
	Returning	1	20x250 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 23000° True, 23000° Briefed

c. Time of Release: 1204½

3. Run-in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP, the R/N took over and proceeded to set up course. T/N The R/N picked up the target in the scope at 35 miles. The bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles, and subsequent rate checks of 9, 8, 7, and 6 miles were good. The R/N made two small course corrections on the approach to the target. Bombs were released on a true heading of 092 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 clouds.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 8676 (returning spare) returned 20x250 GP to the base.

(b) 95A Squadron: (8782)

<u>1.</u>	AL Maj. Frankosky	N	Lt. Ballatore
	P Capt. Gillen	AN	Lt. Rohn
	CP	B	Lt. Lytle
		R/N	Lt. Dement

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Secondary	12	224x250 LB GP
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b. Bombing Altitude: 24000° True, 23000° Briefed

c. Time of Release: 1205

3. Run-in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP, which was made good, the R/N took over and proceeded to set up course.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

The R/N picked up the secondary target in the scope at 35 miles. The bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles, and subsequent rate checks of 9, 8, 7, 6, and 5 miles were made. Bombs were released on a true heading of 100 degrees. Bomb run was flown by PDI as C-1 Auto-Pilot was inoperative.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 clouds.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(c) 95B Squadron: (8230)

1. AL	Capt. Jenkins	N	Lt. Fryer
P	Lt. Abwender	AN	
CP		B	Lt. Spinnenweber
		R/N	Lt. Baldie

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Secondary 13 252x250 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 25500° True, 23000° Briefed

c. Time of Release: 1205

3. Run-in from IP to Targets: Attacking on a true heading of 103 degrees, the R/N picked up the target in the scope at 35 miles, and proceeded to set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles, and subsequent rate checks of 9, 8, 7, 6, and 5 miles were made. Bombs were finally released on a true heading of 108 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 clouds.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

b. 13 B Group - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three Squadrons of 13B made a normal take off and assembled over Buncher 11 at 8000°. 13B was also cut out at Felixstowe, but was in trail of 13A at CP 1, which was departed 8 miles south; on time, altitude 7900°.

(b) Route: The route was followed across the channel to CP 2, which was reached 5 minutes early, altitude 12000°. CP 3 was made good 7 minutes early, altitude 20800°. Enroute to the turn before the Pre-IP, 13B was 12 miles North of course at 5051-1107. A correction was made to course, and the turn to the Pre-IP was made good. Enroute to the IP, 13B was 6-8 miles right of course because of an unidentified Group to its left. The IP was overshoot by 390A & B 7 miles to the North because of this unidentified Group being below them. 390C turned at the briefed IP, and individual H2X runs were made on the secondary target. 13B was reassembled at the RP, and followed the briefed route to CP 4, which was made good 2 minutes early, altitude 20000°. The Continental Coast was departed on course at 1534, altitude 2500°. The English Coast was recrossed at Southwold, altitude 1500°.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A.

(d) Navigational Difficulties: None.

(e) PFF Narrative: Three PFF A/C were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily for navigation and bombing. H2X technique was employed to attack the secondary target.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 390C Squadron: (837)

P	Lt. Goolsby	AN	
GP		B	Lt. Florman
		R/N	Lt. Sternberg

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
  - a. Secondary 12 140x500 GP  
Jettisoning 1 12x500 GP
  - b. Bombing Altitude: 25600° True, 23000° Briefed
  - c. Time of Release: 1208

3. Run-in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP, which was cut short about 1 1/2 miles, the R/N took over and proceeded to set up course. The R/N picked up the secondary target in the scope at 40 miles. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and subsequent rate checks of 10, 8, 7, 6, and 5 miles were good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 080 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 clouds.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 390: jettisoned 12x 500 LB GP at 5043-1240.

(b) 390A Squadron: (784)

1. AL	Capt. Stokes	N	Lt. Webster
P	Lt. Tracy	AN	Lt. McInerney
GP		B	Lt. Pace
		R/N	Lt. Robinson

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
  - a. Secondary 12 140x500 LB GP
  - b. Bombing Altitude: 26200° True, 23000° Briefed
  - c. Time of Release: 1212

3. Run-in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP, which was overshoot 7 miles, the R/N took over and proceeded to set up course. The secondary target was picked up in the scope at 20 miles. The bombardier was clutched in at 12 miles and subsequent rate checks of 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, and 6 miles were very good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 125 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 clouds.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(c) 390B Squadron: (660)

1. AL	Capt. Howe	N	Lt. Stevens
P	Lt. Babbitt	AN	
GP		B	Lt. Guekes
		R/N	Lt. Greves

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
  - a. Secondary 13 140x250 LB GP  
5xWG 34  
5xT 334



C O N F I D E N T I A L

b. Bombing Altitude: 28700° True, 23000° Briefed

c. Time of Release: 1214

3. Run-in from IP to Target: After maneuver at the IP, the R/N took over and proceeded to set up course. The target was picked up in the scope at 30 miles. The bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles and subsequent rate checks of 9, 8, and 7 miles were made. The 8 miles check was slow and required an adjustment. Bombs were released on a true heading of 146 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 clouds.

5. Bombing Malfunctions. None.

e. 13 C Group - 100A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three Squadrons made a normal take off and climb to assembly altitude. Because of possible interference with clouds at assembly altitude, the Wing Leader requested the Groups in the Wing to assemble 2000° higher than briefed. The Group was assembled over Buncher 28 at 8000°. The Wing assembly at Felixstowe was somewhat hampered by interference from 13B, which made its own approach from the East, thus cutting off 13C, which was approaching from the SE. 13C was forced to cut Buncher 11 short in order to remain in the Wing column. The English Coast was crossed 9 miles South of CP 1, altitude 8000°, at 0918, one minute early.

(b) Route: 13C had to S slightly over the channel in order to gain proper Group interval behind 13B. CP 2 was crossed on course at 0944, 6 minutes early, altitude 10500°. 13C was forced to remain S of course over the Continent in order to remain in the bomber stream. At 0600E, where a high cirrus layer was encountered, 13C temporarily lost visual contact with 13B, but soon made contact with them again at 5007-0700 where the Group broke thru the undercast at 23000°. 13C negotiated the flak corridor over the front lines without incident and continued to follow 13B. Several deviations from course were necessary in order to echelon off 13B.

At 5043-1235, difficulty with high cirrus layer clouds was again experienced. This necessitated 13C leader to start climbing in order to keep out of the clouds and D/P contrails formed by the preceding Groups. Horizontal visibility became very poor because of contrails. In order to prevent interference with 13B at the IP 13C leader elected to follow, although 13B was about 10 miles right of course. The IP was overshot approximately 8 miles to the NE. After turning, the R/N notified the Air Leader that because of poor range the secondary target could not be attacked. The Air Leader decided to attack the last resort target of Plauen.

A round-about course was made good near Ruhland to avoid interfering with units which were on the bomb approach to Ruhland. 13C converged into the briefed route at approximately 5050-1350. From this point, 13C was having considerable difficulty with 486 Group, which was crowding it out of the bomber stream. The IP used for the LRT was 5028-1306. The Squadrons peeled off at this point for individual H2X runs on Plauen. Interference with 486 Group was still evident on the bomb run, but was alleviated somewhat when 13C reformed after bombs away and flew abreast the bomber stream.

At 0700E, 13C broke up in the cloud layer and returned by individual Squadrons.

(c) Weather: Described in 13A.

(d) Difficulties: Weather was main difficulty encountered on mission. 100A lead A/C had weak H2X equipment. 100B lead A/C





C O N F I D E N T I A L

(c) 1000 Squadron: (8344)

1. AL Capt. Liljenquist N Lt. Cheney  
P Lt. Raiford AN  
CP B Lt. Ruth  
R/N Lt. Pivonka

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped  
a. Last Resort 13 152x500 LB GP  
b. Bombing Altitude: 26000° True, 23000° Briefed  
c. Time of Release: 1306

3. Run-in from IP to Target: Starting the attack on a true heading of 278 degrees, the R/N picked up the target in the scope at 41 miles, and proceeded to set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 7 miles and rate checks of 6, 5, and 4 miles were good. Bombs were released on a final true heading of 281 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 clouds.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

3. Communications: a. VHF: (1) Major Frankosky led the 13th Wing. Communications on Channel A were fair. Weather difficulties caused a great deal of chatter and there was interference on all channels. This interference appears to be unintentional by German radio equipment near our VHF frequencies.

(2) Kodak A/C were contacted for weather satisfactorily until target time after which no contacts were made. Other Wing Leaders were contacted as required. 390 Group reported interference from static on channel B which cleared after crossing the Continental Coast.

(3) Both fighters and Ground Sector contacted satisfactorily by 95 and 100 Groups. 390 Group had difficulty.

(4) No distress transmissions were reported. Monitors relayed all messages as required.

b. W/T: (1) Division W/T Station was received well except for two periods of very short duration when reception was weak.

(2) The Strike Reports received from the three Squadrons of the 390 Group reported bombing as "P B 5". These Squadrons actually bombed the secondary target by H2X. The errors in the Strike Reports were made by the Command Pilots. The 95B made the same mistake. This has been brought to the attention of the Group Communications Officers.

(3) Control Points:

	CP 1	CP 2	CP 3	TRGT	CP 4
Timings	0915	0946	1108	1204	1405
A.T.A.	0914	0942	1037	1205	1357

(4) Strike Reports:

95A	S B 5	1205
95B	P B 5	1205
100B	L B 5	1305
100C	L B 5	1307
390A	P B 5	1212
390B	P B 5	1214

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4. Mission Camera Report: a. 95 installed 3 scope, 6 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras, 3, 6, and 8 of which took pictures: PFF A/C 8782, lead 95A; fuse blow in EXX control box after three exposures in the scope camera were made. The K-21 installed became inoperative also, and no exposures were made.

b. 100 installed 1 15mm motion picture, 2 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras, 1, 1, and 8 of which took pictures: A/C 7994, #2 lead element, 100C: the installed K-21 froze, and no pictures were taken. 1 K-21 oblique was on an A/C that landed in France. No camera was placed in the lead A/C of 100B. It was flown in the #3 A/C of the lead element.

c. 390 installed 2 scope, 2 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras, 1, 1, and 7 of which took pictures: A/C 901, #2 lead element, 390B: curtain malfunctioned, and no pictures were taken. A/C 887, #2 lead element, 390C: the bomb bay switch malfunctioned, and no pictures were taken. PFF A/C 6837, lead 390C: the focusing window was believed to have been left open, and all the negatives were fogged.

5. Planning and Execution of the Mission:

a. Group Order and Strength:

(1)	45 A, B, C Groups:		9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 388	20x260 Frags	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(b) 96	12x500 GP	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(c) 452	12x500 GP	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(2)	13 A, B, C Groups:		3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 93	20x250 GP	1 x 12 A/C Squadron 2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	(b) 390	12x500 GP	1 x 12 A/C Squadron 2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	(c) 100	12x500 GP	1 x 12 A/C Squadron 2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(3)	4 A, B, C, D Groups:		2 x 9 A/C Squadrons 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 447	12x500 GP	4 x 9 A/C Squadrons
	(b) 94	12x500 GP	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(c) 486	20x250 GP	4 x 9 A/C Squadrons
	(d) 487	12x500 GP	4 x 9 A/C Squadrons
(4)	93 A, B, C, D Groups:		12 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 490	8x500 GP	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(b) 493	plus	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(c) 34	4xM17 IB	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(d) 385		3 x 12 A/C Squadrons

b. A/C and G/C Available:

(1)	95	REG	44 A/C	47 G/C
		PFF	12 A/C	6 G/C
		MH	10 A/C	6 G/C
(2)	100	REG	48 A/C	57 G/C
		PFF	12 A/C	6 G/C
		MH	5 A/C	6 G/C

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(3) 390

REQ	44 A/C	66 C/C
PFF	11 A/C	10 C/C
MH	11 A/C	5 C/C

e. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

(1)	95	32 Plus 4 PFF
(2)	100	33 Plus 3 PFF
(3)	390	33 Plus 3 PFF

d. A/C Airborne: All Scheduled A/C Airborne.

e. Individual A/C Mission Failures:

(1) 95:

A/C 8676: 336 Sq "Y" - Fuel pressure on #3 engine very high (30 lbs.) - No sortie - Pilot Lt. [unclear].

f. A/C Landing Away From Base:

(1) 100:

A/C 616: 418 Sq "Z" - Landed A-89 - One engine out - Low on fuel - Crew OK - Pilot Lt. Fresholt. A/C 650: 418 Sq "X" - Landed at A-92 - Two engines damaged - Crew OK - Pilot Lt. Marasco.

g. A/C Outstanding:

(1) 95:

A/C 283: 334 Sq "C" - Pilot Lt. Vermillion - Sortie.

h. A/C Attacking - 13 A Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Secondary	37	708x250 LB GP
Returning	1	20x250 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: H2X

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

i. A/C Attacking - 13 B Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Secondary	37	420x500 LB GP
Fortissing	1	5xWG 34
		5xT 334
		12x500 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: H2X

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

j. A/C Attacking - 13 C Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Last Resort	38	444x500 LB GP
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(2) Method of Bombing: H2X

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

6. Controller's Log:

a. 1800 from 3 AD:	(1)	Alerted.
b. 1810 from 13GW:	(1)	Alerted.
c. 1830 from 3 AD:	(1)	Force & Order of Wings (2) Zero Hour
	(3)	RBA.
	(1)	Force & Order of Groups & Wings (2) & (3)



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e.	1910 from 3 AD:	(1) Plan A & B Targets (2) Bombing Altitudes for A & B.
f.	2040 from 13GW:	(1) AW to 13 GBW FO 72 Plan A.
g.	2045 from 13GW:	(1) Plan A & B Targets.
h.	2057 from 13GW:	(1) AW to 13 GBW FO 27 Plan B.
i.	2055 from 3 AD:	(1) AW to 3 AD FO 612 Plan A.
j.	2155 from 3 AD:	(1) Leaflet Load.
k.	2200 from 13GW:	(1) Leaflet Load.
l.	2305 from 3 AD:	(1) Cancel Plan B (2) Bomb Load (3) RBW.
m.	2330 from 13GW:	(1) Bomb Load (2) Fuel Load (3) Cancel Plan B.
na.	2342 from 3 AD:	(1) A-2 Annex to 3 AD FO 612 Plan A.
nb.	2348 from 13GW:	(1) Annex 1 to AW to 13 GBW FO 72 Plan B.
p.	2350 from 13GW:	(1) Assembly Timings (2) Assembly Altitude.
q.	2355 from 3 AD:	(1) Change in 13A Bomb Load.
r.	2358 from 13GW:	(1) Same as q.
s.	0120 from 13GW:	(1) 13 GBW FO 72 Plan A.
t.	0155 from 3 AD:	(1) 3 AD FO 612 Plan A.
u.	0255 from 3 AD:	(1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 612.
v.	2114 from 3 AD:	(1) AW to FO 612 Plan B.
w.	2120 from 3 AD:	(1) Change in route.
x.	2155 from 3 AD:	(1) Leaflet Load.
y.	2200 to Groups:	(1) Leaflet Load.
z.	2305 from 3 AD:	(1) Plan B Cancelled (2) Bomb Load (3) T/I Targets (5) RBW (6) Assembly Alt. (7) Timings
aa.	2330 to Groups:	(1) Bomb Load (2) Fuel (3) Plan B Cancelled.
bb.	2342 from 3 AD:	(1) A-2 Annex to FO 612.
cc.	2348 from 13GW:	(1) Annex 1 to FO 72.
dd.	2350 from 13GW:	(1) Timings (2) Altitude.
ee.	2355 from 3 AD:	(1) Change in Bomb Load.
ff.	0120 from 13GW:	(1) FO 72.
gg.	0155 to Groups:	(1) Final Timings.
hh.	0155 from 3 AD:	(1) FO 612 Plan A.
ii.	0255 from 3 AD:	(1) Annex 1 to FO 612.
jj.	0450 to Groups:	(1) Correct Timings.
kk.	0710 from Grps:	(1) Weather Info.
ll.	0715 to 3rd AD:	(1) Weather Info.
mm.	0740 from Grps:	(1) Fleet A/B Airborne.

For the Commanding General:

*Ernest A. Kiessling*

**ERNEST A. KIESSLING,**  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Director of Training & Analysis.

THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)  
OFFICE OF THE OPERATIONS OFFICER  
APO 559

C-B-1

17 March 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion of Aircraft No. 8676.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.  
(attention operations officer)

1. I took off in Aircraft No. 8676 at 0805 on mission of 17 March 1945.

2. On take off the fuel pressure on No. 3 engine went up to 25 lbs. Booster pump was turned off but showed no drop in pressure. At 2,000 ft. I leveled off dropped the R.P.M. on No. 3 engine down to 1500 and brought the manifold pressure down to 20. The fuel pressure dropped to 18 lbs. We resumed our climb but after increasing the R.P.M. and manifold pressure the fuel pressure went again to 25 lbs. We repeated the dropping of R.P.M. and manifold pressure to bring the fuel pressure down. We made assembly altitude and got in formation but could not stay with out using over boost on other three engines. Rather than take a chance on loosing the engine later and making a fire hazard possible. I aborted at 0902 at 52° 50' N and 1° 22' E. I returned to the field. On the way back under reduced R.P.M. and manifold pressure the fuel pressure on No. 3 went down to 18 Lbs. We tried once more to climb but the pressure started up again. After instructions from the tower we circled the field for two hours and landed at 1100 with our bombs.

*Tom Tower*  
TOM J. TOWER  
1st. Lt. A. C.  
Pilot

1st. Ind.

336th Bomb Sqdn., 95th Bomb Gp. (H), APO 559, U.S. Army, 17 March 1945.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U.S. Army.  
(attention operations officer)

1 I consider the action questionable.

2 I do not consider the high fuel pressure on one engine sufficient cause for an abortion. However, the pilot was told to use his own judgement and has shown in his report that to the best of his knowledge he did the right thing.

3 The aircraft was flown several hours later and proved all right.

4 For your information.

*Harold F. Jeneman*  
HAROLD F. JENEMAN  
Capt. A. C.  
Operations officer

336 BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)  
OFFICE OF THE ENGINEERING OFFICER  
AAF 119 APO 559


17 March 1945

SUBJECT: Airplane Abortions.

TO : Whom It May Concern.

1. Airplane #43-38676 returned early from a combat mission on this date because of a high reading (25psi) on number three fuel pressure gage.

Ground check--The engine was run up after landing and the instrument showed 15-17psi with fuel boost pump both on and off. The plane was test flown and the fuel pressure on number three engine was normal.

  
ROBERT E. BAXTER,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Engineering Officer.



HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY-FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Intelligence Officer

APO 559  
17 March 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the Mission to Ruhland, Germany, 17 March 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. The Mission: The 95th Group led the 13th Combat Group to attack the synthetic oil refinery at Ruhland, Germany. Despite the bad weather conditions over the target all three squadrons bombed the secondary target on H2X. Major Frankosky was the Wing Leader.

a. 95A - Ten A/C plus two PFF A/C took off and formed the lead squadron. All A/C bombed the secondary target on H2X.

b. 95B - Twelve A/C plus one PFF A/C took off and formed the high squadron. All A/C bombed the secondary target. A/C 8283 is outstanding.

c. 95C - Twelve A/C plus one PFF A/C took off and formed the low squadron. Eleven A/C plus one PFF A/C bombed the secondary target. One spare A/C, 8676, turned back at 5205-0122 at 0902 hours because of mechanical failure, and returned bombs to base.

2. For further information reference is suggested to the Operational Narrative teletype of the Intelligence Section.

For the Intelligence Section:

*F. X. Pierce*

F. X. PIERCE  
1st Lt., Air Corps  
Ass't, S-2 Officer

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY-FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Intelligence Officer

APO 559  
17 March 1945

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For the Intelligence Section:

F. X. PIERCE  
1st Lt., Air Corps  
Ass't. S-2 Officer

CG, 15TH CRW  
CO, 390TH B  
SO, 100TH BG

XXX

95TH B

XXX

17 MAR 46 1845 3-2

5-2 OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE 95TH BOMB GROUP RHINLAND, GERMANY 17 MARCH 1945.

1. Leaflets: None.

2. Bombing Results:

A Squadron - secondary - HZI - hot prints cloud covered - target identified and R/N reports MPI hit.

B Squadron - same as A Squadron.

C Squadron - Same as A Squadron.

3. R/A: None.

4. Flak:

A. Damage and Losses:

95A 2A On route out.

95B None

95C None (Final Report)

B. Operations:

1. None

2. None

3. None

C. Amount, Accuracy, & Type of Fire:

1. Target - meagre, inaccurate, tracking and barrage.

2. Target - meagre, inaccurate, tracking and barrage.

3. None

4. 5027-0915 - Meagre, inaccurate, barrage (encountered).

5015-0856 - Meagre, inaccurate, tracking (encountered).

5. None.

D. Phenomena: None.

5. Weather: Target obscured by high cirrus cloud and dense persistent contrails.

6. Observations: 1255 - 5034-1141 - 100 barrage balloons covering a lake.

7. Other Information: Fighter support good. Despite very bad weather the briefed course was flown except for the return leg past Frankfurt when the Group drifted five miles south of course and observed the Frankfurt flak. Weather (see paragraph 5) so limited visibility that squadrons lost one another on bomb run.

*3/10/45*

*XP  
0263*

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE  
AAF STATION 101  
APO 634

.....  
:SECRET :  
:By Authority of :  
:C.G., Eighth Air Force:  
:Initials *J.F.A.*.....  
:Date 17 March 1945 :  
:.....

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 321

PERIOD: 0001 hours 17 March 1945 to 2400 hours 17 March 1945.

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Total</u> <u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective</u> <u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>			<u>Totals</u>	<u>NYR</u>
					<u>E/A</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>OT</u>		
Heavy Bomber Atks.	1322	1275	3464.2	0-0-0	0	1	15	16	0
Fighter Escort (a)	691	640	0	0-0-0	0	0	2	2	8
Fighter Sweeps (b)	86	79	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Reconnaissance	14	11	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	42	36	0	0-0-0	0	0	1	1	0
Air/Sea Rescue	18	18	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>72</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	2245	2128	3464.2	0-0-0	0	1	18	19	8

- (a) Includes 352nd Group based on Continent.
- (b) Includes 361 Group based on Continent.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

I. Bomber Attacks

1322 a/c (976 B-17s, 346 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied in three forces against Bohlen and Ruhland Synthetic Oil Plants and flak batteries nearby, against a benzol plant and power station near Bohlen, a jet engine components plant N of Leipzig, two tank plants in Hannover area, and Munster M/Y. Nine assigned primaries. 1275 a/c dropped 3464.2 tons (3122.6 tons GP, including 140.2 tons Frag., and 341.6 tons IB) on five primaries, two secondaries, two other assigned targets and several T/Os. All bombing on PFF, with results unobserved. Weather: 10/10 cloud over all targets; dense persistent contrails and high cirrus encountered. E/A opposition: nil. One t/e jet believed Me-262, sighted Plauen area - no attack. Claims: nil. Losses: 16 B-17s (1 to AA, 1 to accident, 14 to unknown causes).

First Force

Fourteen group formations (527 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against Ruhland Synthetic Oil Plant, a flak battery nearby, and a jet engine components plant at Muldenstein. 510 a/c dropped 1414.7 tons (1281.7 tons GP, incl. 96.6 tons Frag., 133.0 tons IB) on Ruhland Oil Plant, Bitterfeld I.G. Farben Industries (secondary), Plauen/Vomag Tank Plant (last resort) and several T/Os at 1201-1258 hours from 24,200-28,200 feet. Bombing by H2X. Leaflets dropped on Ruhland and Bitterfeld. Weather: 10/10 cloud over all targets; dense persistent contrails. Flak: nil at Bitterfeld, meager to moderate and inaccurate at Ruhland and Plauen. Battle damage: 38 minor, 8 major. E/A opposition: 1 t/e jet seen Plauen area - no attack. Claims: nil. Losses: 6 B-17s (1 to AA, 1 to accident, 4 to unknown causes).

Fighter Support: Five groups (280 P-51s) sortied. Up 0901-0951 hours, down 1520-1535 hours. 252 effective sorties. E/a opposition: one Arado 234 seen at IP (Torgau) flying parallel to bomber stream; P-51s chased e/a but latter evaded. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51 to mechanical failure. NYR: 2 P-51s, believed safe.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Flak Btry. nr Ruhland	38	Did not attack			
Muldenstein	144	Did not attack			
Ruhland Syn. Oil	345	214	594.3+		Unobserved
Bitterfeld I.G. Farben Ind. (sec.)		138	249.0	132.0	Unobserved
Plauen/Vomag Tank Plant (LR)		125	350.9++		Unobserved

Other Targets

Fulda (city)		19	46.5		Unobserved
Cottbus		11	33.0		Unobserved
3 T/Os	—	—3	8.0	1.0	Unobserved
Totals	527	510	1281.7	133.0	

+ Includes 35.1 Frag.  
++ Includes 61.5 Frag.

S E C R E T

Fighter Support: A/c from three groups (128 P-51s) sortied. Up 1209-1223 hours, down 1630-1640 hours. 122 effective sorties. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Munster M/Y	173	170	343.8	76.5	Unobserved
Hannover-Hannomag Tank Plant	88	146	297.2	90.0	Unobserved
Hannover-Linden Tank Plant	85	Did not attack			
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Herford(City)	—	9	25.5	—	Unobserved
Totals	346	325	666.5	166.5	

2. Fighter Escort

A/c from thirteen groups, including one group based on Continent (691 P-51s) sortied in support of three bomber forces. Up 0901-1223 hours, down 1500-1640 hours. 640 effective sorties. E/a opposition: one Ar-234 seen over Torgau, was chased but evaded into undercast. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 P-51s (to mechanical causes). NYR: 8 P-51s - 2 known safe, 6 believed safe on Continent.

3. Fighter Sweeps

A/c from two groups (86 P-51s, including 57 P-51s from 361st Group, based on Continent) sortied on free-lance patrol of Dessau area and of Brunswick, Steinhuder Lake and Dummer Lake areas. Up 0953-1213 hours, down 1440-1633 hours. 79 effective sorties. E/a opposition: Nil. 2 u/i jets seen N of Leipzig - no attacks. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. (1 P-51 Cat. "E").

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.



5. Photo Reconnaissance

14 a/c ( 2 F-5s, 1 Spitfire, 11 P-51s as escort) sortied as follows:

2 a/c (1 F-5, with 1 P-51 as escort) on photo mapping mission over Frankfurt-Wiesbaden area. P-51 returned early.

12 a/c (1 F-5, 1 Spitfire, with 10 P-51s as escort) on D/A over Gutersloh, Bitterfeld, Ruhland, Hannover, Munster areas and reconnaissance over Kothen area (F-5). Also D/A over Leipzig, Ohrdruf, Bretingen, Bohlen and Molbis areas, and activity reconnaissance over Iutzkendorf, Merseburg and Moblis. 2 P-51s aborted. Total effective sorties: 11.

Losses: nil.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

42 a/c (5 B-17s, 5 Mosquitoes, 32 P-51s) sortied as follows:

2 B-17s on heavy weather reconnaissance over sea to NW of Lands End. 1 B-17 missing, cause unknown.

3 B-17s on routine Azores reconnaissance. 1 a/c aborted due to mechanical failure.

5 Mosquitoes on light weather reconnaissance over Holland, N, E and Central Germany, Belgium and the Atlantic.

32 P-51s as weather scouts for bomber forces. 28 a/c effective.

Total effective sorties: 36.

Losses: 1 B-17 missing, cause unknown.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

18 a/c (16 P-47s, 2 PBVs) on routine search and patrol.

No losses.

8. Special Operations

72 a/c (54 B-24s, 10 Mosquitoes, 7 B-17s, 1 P-38) sortied as follows:

22 B-24s on special dropping operation. 20 a/c completed missions - night 16/17 March.

12 B-24s on leaflet mission over Germany, Holland and France - night 16/17 March. All successful.

14 a/c (6 B-24s, 8 Mosquitoes) on chaff dispensing missions for 1st and 2nd Air Divisions.

14 a/c (13 B-24s, 1 P-38) on ECM, jamming from 0600-1300 hours.

3 a/c (2 B-17s, 1 B-24) as radio relays.

5 B-17s on radar mission. 1 a/c returned early. 4 a/c took radar scope photos of various bomb runs on Augsburg, Munich and Stuttgart-night 16/17 March.

2 Mosquitoes on special operation for 2nd Air Division.

No losses.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

The GAF put up no opposition and sightings only total 4 jet a/c. The First Force bombers sighted a jet a/c, thought to be an Me-262 in the Plauen area at 1259 and one group of P-51s escorting this Force sighted an AR 234 flying at 22,000 feet below and parallel to the bomber stream near Torgau at 1150 hours. When chased latter e/a rolled over and dived into the undercast. Another group of P-51s sweeping ahead of the First Force sighted 2 u/1 jets at 1150 in the Leipzig area flying at 27,000 feet but were unable to engage.

Weather over Germany was generally 9/10-10/10, base 1,000-2,000 and tops 8,000-10,000 rising in some cases to 15,000 feet. Above this there was layered cloud up to 20,000-25,000 feet. There were also moderate rime icing conditions in the low cloud.

2. Flak:

Munster - meager to moderate, inaccurate.  
Hannover - nil to moderate, inaccurate.  
Molbis - meager to moderate, inaccurate.  
Bohlen - meager to moderate, inaccurate.  
Jena - meager, inaccurate.  
Erfurt - meager, inaccurate.  
Frankfurt area - meager, fairly accurate.  
Wiesbaden area - meager, fairly accurate.  
Bitterfeld - nil  
Ruhland - meager to moderate, inaccurate.  
Plauen - meager to moderate, inaccurate.

3. Observations

Nil, due to 10/10 undercast.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

10/10 cloud over all targets makes damage assessment impossible.

5. Ground Situation

21st Army Group : Patrol activity continues.

12th Army Group : At the northern end of the Remagen bridgehead an attack by U.S. infantry was opened at 0600 hours. By 0930 hours they met heavy artillery fire at F 7128 after crossing autobahn at that point. Enemy tanks were engaged at 6933. F 7031 - 6832 also reached.

: Homningen has been cleared, Hausen, F 7616, captured and a bridge at F 7716 taken intact. Our troops are at Strodt, F7322, and Vittelschoss, where artillery fire was encountered; other elements at 7226 and 7227. At 1500 hours the rail bridge at Remagen fell into the river due to weakening from previous attacks. Elements of the Third U.S. Army are in the outskirts of Coblenz. The Rhine has been reached at Boppard, at L 9278 and at Weiler, 9277. Blankenrath, 6959, and Panzweiler, 6958, have been cleared and troops have reached 7158. A bridge at M 0132 has been captured and elements are at Hollgarten, Hochslattern, Furfeld and Hockenheim. Area of bridgehead over Nahe river is being consolidated. Southeast of Trier infantry have captured Bochum, Q 2598, and have entered Broldorf, Q 2397.

6th Army Group

: Seventh U.S. Army troops have advanced into the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line, finding them lightly held. The line Q 5471, 5771, 5969, 6371, 6665, 6867, Hornbach, 7760 reached. Camp de Bitche was captured. Q 8347 reached against a withdrawing enemy. Our troops in outskirts of Niederbronn, but are held up by blown bridge vicinity of Gunstett. Only light contact reported north of Hagenau.

B. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Ninth Air Force	1146	2-0-2 A	2
First US T.A.F.	451	9-0-0	3
Second T.A.F.	533	3-0-0 A	6
R.A.F. Fighter Command	357	0-0-1 A 0-0-1 G	1
	2790	5-0-3 A* 0-0-1 G	12
<u>Ninth Air Force</u>		* Includes 1-0-0 Flying Bomb.	

Day - 17 March

Sorties : 760 Bombers  
 686 Fighters, incl. recon. a/c  
1146

Missions 9th Bomb Division: 760 sorties, 658 effective. W/Ys at Siegen, Kaiserslautern, Neustadt, Frankenburg, Albenkirchen Comm. center, Dillenburg rail center, Biedorf Comm. center, Giessen Ord Depot, attacked with unobserved results.

9th T.A.C.: 183 sorties, 181 effective. Armed reconnaissance E of Cologne, Air cooperation to ground forces, escort to medium, cover to Remagen bridgehead.

19th T.A.C.: 191 sorties, 190 effective. Armed reconnaissance in Giessen-Kassel area, air cooperation ground forces, interception patrols in Coblenz, Limburg areas, escort to mediums.

29th T.A.C.: 222 sorties, 218 effective. Armed reconnaissance, Hamm, Dortmund Wuppertal areas, alert flights and escort to mediums.

90 a/c on reconnaissance for Ninth Air Force. 1 a/c lost to AA.

SECRET

Ninth Air Force (continued)

E/A Claims : 2-0-2 Air

Other Claims : Destroyed Damaged

M/T	353	321
RR Cars	408	403
Locos	7	3
AFV	13	22
HDV	80	70
Gun Positions	12	0
Rail Cuts	8	0
Hwy. Cuts	2	0

Losses : 2 a/c

S E C R E T

First U.S. T.A.F.

Night 16/17 March

Nil

Day - 17 March

Sorties : 20 Bombers (abortive)  
434 Fighters

454 a/c

Missions : 42nd Bomb Wing: 20 a/c abortive.

12th T.A.C.: 415 sorties. 414 Effective. Air Cooperation mission; Comm. Centers and strong points dive-bombed; Armed Recon. in Saarbrucken, Kaiserslautern, Heidelberg, Landau areas; Recon.

1st French T.A.C.: 19 sorties. Greissheim and Nerdiegen dive-bombed effectively.

Western French Air Force: No operations due to weather.

E/A Claims : Nil

Other Claims	Destroyed	Damaged
RR Cars	62	31
M/T	18	13
Locos	0	9
AFV	4	4
HDV	7	4
Gun Positions	0	6
Rail Cuts	5	0

Losses : 3 a/c

Second T.A.F.

Night 16/17 March

Sorties : 24 Armed Recon. (Oldenburg, Osnabruck, Hamm areas).  
10 Interception Patrols

34 a/c



S E C R E T

E/A Claims : 1-0-0 Flying Bomb

Other Claims : 

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T	0	14
Rail Cuts	2	

Losses : Nil

Day - 17 March

Sorties : 75 Medium Bombers  
42 Light Bombers  
114 Fighter-Bombers  
198 Fighter Operations  
70 Recon.  
499 a/c

Mission : Ahaus RR Center, Bergsteinfurt RR Center,  
Isselburg, Two Nazi Hqs attacked; fighter sweeps,  
etc.

E/A Claims : 2-0-0 A in.

Other Claims : 

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T	2	5
Rail Cuts	7	0
RR Cars	0	12
Barges	0	1
Tugs	0	1
Ferry Boats	0	1

Losses : 6 a/c

R.A.F. Fighter Command

Night - 16/17 March

Sorties : 21 Bomber Support over W Germany  
13 Interception Patrol  
34 a/c

E/A Claims : 0-0-1 Air; 0-0-1 Ground

Losses : Nil



2. Fifteenth Air Force

Day - 16 March

116 B-17s and 19 P-38s sortied. 108 B-17s, escorted by 11 P-38s, dropped 27 1/2 tons on Fliedersdorf Oil Refinery, 21 tons on Amstettin M/Y, 15 tons on Saint Viet M/Y, 2 tons on T/Os. Losses: 1 B-17.

61 B-24s and 12 P-51s sortied (AAF and RAF). 60 B-24s, escorted by 11 P-51s, dropped 257 tons on Monfalcone Shipyard and Harbor installations. Losses: nil.

141 B-17s and 15 P-38s sortied. 105 B-17s, escorted by 39 P-38s, dropped 207 tons on Schwabach Oil Refinery, 35 tons on Weiner Neustadt M/Y. Losses: 3 B-17s.

72 B-24s and 50 P-38s sortied. 59 B-24s, escorted by 17 P-38s, dropped 38 tons on Kornauberg Oil Refinery, 58 tons on Amstettin M/Y, 18 tons on Graz M/Y, 3 tons on T/Os. Losses: nil.

110 B-24s and 18 P-51s sortied. 108 B-24s escorted by 15 P-51s dropped 169 tons on Moosbierbaum Oil Refinery, 30 tons on Amstettin M/Y, 1 ton on T/Os. Losses: 1 B-24.

78 B-24s sortied, 61 B-24s dropped 121 tons on Amstettin M/Y. Losses: nil.

113 B-24s and 35 P-51s sortied. 138 B-24s, escorted by 32 P-51s, dropped 256 tons on Weiner Neustadt M/Y, 12 tons on Varadin M/Y. Losses: 1 B-24.

159 B-24s and 41 P-51s sortied. 153 B-24s, escorted by 34 P-51s, dropped 345 tons on Amstettin M/Y, 7 tons on T/Os. Losses: nil.

59 P-51s sortied. 52 P-51s strafed rail communications from Vienna - Linz - Passau - Regensburg - Munich and Mettenheim A/F. Claims: 1-0-0 air, 4-0-13 ground and various other ground targets. Losses: 4 P-51s.

Bombers

Sorties	:	850 a/c (227 B-17s, 623 B-24s)
Effective Sorties	:	792 a/c
Tonnage	:	1932
Claims	:	nil
Losses	:	6 a/c (1 B-17a, 2 B-24s)

Fighters

Sorties	:	389 a/c (144 P-38s, 195 P-51s)
Effective Sorties	:	301 a/c
Claims	:	1-0-0 air; 4-0-13 ground.
Losses	:	4 P-51s.

Fifteenth Air Force (continued)

Day - 17 March

103 P-38s sortied against PTUJ rail bridge. 93 P-38s attacked as follows: 52 P-38s dropped 43 tons of 500 and 1000 lb. RDX bombs on primary dive-bombing from 6000-500 feet. 24 P-38s dropped 17 tons on KLINCA-SELO M/Y SW of Zagreb; 17 P-38s dropped 15 tons on ZAGREB rail bridge, 5 P-38s dropped 3 tons on SISAK rail bridge and M/Y. Results good to excellent. No losses.

Narrative: Post attack reconnaissance photos show wide gaps cut in Ptuj rail bridge in two places and structure badly shattered; 30 foot gap cut in north approach. Rail bridge over road to Nolso cut and extensive damage to nearby M/Y. Fifteenth Air Force reported: "Ptuj rail bridge mission is one of most outstanding dive-bombing attacks of this Air Force."

3. R.A.F. Bomber Command

Day - 17 March

	<u>Targets</u>	<u>Losses</u>
77 Lancasters	Dortmund-Gneisenau Benzol Plant	0
90 Lancasters	Huls-August Viktoria Benzol Plant	0
<u>1</u> Mosquito	Weather Reconnaissance	<u>0</u>
168 a/c		0

Night - 17/18 March

38 Mosquitoes	Berlin	0
29 Mosquitoes	Nurnberg	0
2 Mosquitoes	Mannheim & Stuttgart	0
66 Lancasters	Diversiory Sweeps	0
30 Halifaxes		0
1 Fortress		
1 Liberator		
15 Mosquitoes	Bomber Support	1
1 Mosquito	Special Investigation Patrol	0
<u>1</u> Halifax		<u>0</u>
194 a/c		1



4. 21st Bomber Command

9 March 1945 - TOKYO

282 B-29s attacked Urban industrial areas of Tokyo with incendiaries, and 17 B-29s bombed T/O's. Bomb load ranged from 4.2 to 7 tons with 3 squadrons carrying M47 IB's and balance of squadrons loaded with Eh6 and E28 incendiary clusters. Bombing was accomplished at night by both visual and radar methods from altitudes of 5 to 9,000 feet and by individual a/c. 1/10-7/10 cloud over target. Fighter opposition was slight and not aggressive. Light and heavy caliber AA fire encountered was meager to intense and generally inaccurate. Results of attack were excellent with 16.7 square miles of city destroyed. 3 a/c were lost over the target, 4 ditched and 5 are missing. Ditched crews were picked up.

11 March 1945 - NAGOYA

284 B-29s attacked industrial area of Nagoya at night by both visual and radar means from altitudes of 5800-9000 feet. Bomb load ranged from 5.1 to 7 tons per a/c. 2 squadrons carried M47 incendiaries and remainder were loaded with M69 incendiary bombs. Target weather was 1/10 cumulus, base 2500 feet, top 4000 and 2/10 altostratus, base 8000 and top 10,000. Visibility reduced due to smoke and haze. Heavy and medium AA fire encountered was meager to intense and generally inaccurate. Fire was continuously pointed and predicted. 10 phosphorous bombs with streamers and green bursts were observed. Results of mission were good with approximately 47 million square feet burned throughout the city. Many industrial targets destroyed or damaged. One a/c missing on this mission.

13/14 March 1945 - OSAKA

- 275 B-29s attacked urban industrial area of Osaka from altitudes of 5000-9600 feet by both radar and visual methods. 5 a/c bombed targets other than primary. 9 PFF a/c carried M47 I.B.'s bombs but main force was loaded with M69's. Target weather was 5/10 stratocumulus, and 6/10 altostratus with visibility at 10 miles. Enemy fighters encountered numbered 30 to 40 s/e and t/e a/c in Osaka area, which made about 25 to 30 attacks, most of which were ineffective, with one possible ramming reported. E/a Claims: 1-0-0. Medium to heavy AA fire encountered was meager to moderate and generally inaccurate. Some phosphorous bomb bursts were observed. Results of bombing were good to excellent with fires in target area visible for 60 miles. Reports indicate wide conflagration concentration in center of city. Not confirmed but highly probable is complete destruction of Osaka Arsenal. 1 B-29 is missing from this operation.

S E C R E T

21st Bomber Command (continued)

Bombers

Effective Sorties : 858 B-29s

Estimated Tonnage : 5576

Claims : 1-0-0 Air

Losses : 14 a/c, 7 of which are listed as "missing".

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

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S E C R E T