

Date 15 March 1945
13 CBW FO 70
13 CBW Ops 296
3 AD FO 610

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (ORANIENBURG, GERMANY)

TO :

Col. Schuck, 95th Bomb Group

1. Information Concerning the Target: a. The primary target (visual) for all Groups was the Railway M/Y in the S center of ORANIENBURG, GERMANY.

b. The secondary target (visual only) for all Groups was the Durener Metalwerke, situated 5 miles NW of the center of BERLIN, GERMANY.

c. The tertiary target (H2X) for all Groups was an Armament Factory situated 5 miles NW of the center of BERLIN, GERMANY.

d. The suggested alternate tertiary target (visually or H2X) for all Groups, was one of the Locomotive Depots in the Railway M/Y near WITTENBERGE, GERMANY.

2. Narrative of the Attack:

a. 13 A Group (100 A, B, C Squadrons)

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three Squadrons of 13A, made a normal take-off and assembled quickly over Buncher 28 at 3000'. Enroute to Felixstowe, 13B was in trail, and a good Wing assembly was effected 1 minute early. 13A crossed over Buncher 11 enroute to Southwold but was forced to swing north of CP1 to miss 93D, which was late. CP1 was departed 1 minute late at 5000', 6 miles north.

(b) Route: 13A was 4 - 6 miles north of course while crossing the North Sea, but reached CP2 on course 1 minute early, altitude 12500'. The briefed route was closely followed to CP3, which was reached 2 minutes early, altitude 19000'. The turning point before the pre-IP was overshot slightly to the east in order to echelon to the left and to pick up a good interval for a visual run on the primary. The pre-IP was out short 2 miles to the north. The IP was made good and individual visual runs were started on the primary target. After bombs away, 100 A and B were quickly reassembled at the RP, and 100C rejoined them soon on the next leg. 100A attacked the alternate last resort target, since it had not been able to attack the primary. After bombs away a right turn was made to return to the bomber stream. The route out was as briefed to CP4, which was reached 2 minutes early, altitude 18000'. The Dummer Lake flak corridor was made good and the Continent Coast was departed on course at 1711, altitude 16000'. The English Coast was recrossed at Southwold at 1757, altitude 4500'.

(c) Weather: Over the bases at take-off there was a low haze, which broke at 2000'. Over the North Sea and the continent conditions were CAVU, except for a ground haze persisting over the entire route. Ground haze in the target area restricted slant visibility to 2 - 3 miles.

(d) Difficulties: None.

(e) PFF Narrative: Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. Bombing was visual except in 100A, which made a complete H2X sighting on the alternate last resort target. 100C RN gave course assistance to bombardier.

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(2) Bombing:

(a) 100B Squadron: (1530)

AL Capt. Gibbons N Lt. Browning
(P) Lt. Dawson AN
CP RN Lt. Roland
(B) Lt. Silva

2. A/C Attacking:

Bombs Dropped

- a. Primary 13 152 x 500 lb. GP
b. Bombing Altitude: 23600' true; 22000' briefed.
c. Time of Release 1457½

3. Run in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at IP, which was made good, the bombardier proceeded to pin-point himself on known check points, as dense ground haze restricted slant visibility to 4 miles. Continuing to do pin-point pilotage, the bombardier identified the target 15 seconds from the BRL and made a short sighting operation. Bombs were released on a true heading of 090°. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: The bombs from 100B fell in a fully built up residential area 1 to 1½ miles south (right) of the assigned MPI.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(b) 100C Squadron: (8717)

1. AL Capt. Albrecht N Lt. Kowmanowski
P Lt. Ellis AN
CP RN Lt. Turner
B Lt. Snyder

2. A/C Attacking:

Bombs Dropped

- a. Primary 13 152 x 500 lb. GP
b. Bombing Altitude: 22300' true; 22000' briefed.
c. Time of Release: 1458.

3. Run in from IP to Target: Slant visibility throughout the entire bomb run was very poor because of dense ground haze. The RN proceeded to set up course by H2X technique. Half way down the bomb run, 100C was forced to "S" to avoid overrunning the preceding Squadron. The 10 miles check, consequently, could not be made. Five miles from the BRL, however, the bombardier identified the target and proceeded to synchronize. A course correction was immediately made, increasing the drift from 2 to 8 degrees left. Because of insufficient time, synchronization (which was 30 seconds) is not good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 064°. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: The bombs from 100C fell in a sparsely built up residential area approximately 3000' south (right) and 1800' west (short) of the assigned MPI.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(c) 100A Squadron: (8209)

1. AL Col. Lyster N Lt. Wild
P Capt. Williams AN Capt. Paffen

1. A/O Attacking: 7

Bombs Dropped

a. ~~Alternate Last~~
Resort 12 140 x 500 lb. GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 20400° true; 22000° briefed.

c. Time of Release: 1528.

2. Run in from IP to Target: Because of dense ground haze the bombardier was unable to attack the primary. He could not identify the target until it was too late for any visual synchronization. The alternate last resort, consequently, was bombed. Dense ground haze again prevented the bombardier from performing any visual synchronization. The R/N slotted the bombardier in at 70°, and subsequent rate checks of 69, 75, 62, 58, and 52 degrees were good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 281°. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run.

3. PI Reports: The bombs from 100A fell in woods approximately 3500' short of the M/Y at Wittenberge. One or two bombs that were released late fell on a factory building adjacent to the M/Y.

4. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

b. 13 B Group (390A, B, C Squadrons): 7724

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three squadrons of 13B made a normal take-off and assembled over Buncher II at 3000°. 13B contacted 13 A and fell in trail of it enroute to Felixstowe. 13B swung wide of CP1 in trail of 13A and departed this point 2 minutes late, altitude 6500°.

(b) Route: Enroute to CP2, 13B was slightly left of course and reached this point 3 minutes early, altitude 13800°, 2 miles north. The briefed route was closely followed to CP3, which was reached on course 4 minutes early, altitude 21000°. Enroute to the IP, 13B was slightly left of course. The IP was made good, and individual visual runs were initiated on the primary target. After bombs away, 13B was quickly reassembled at the RP. 390A did not release on the primary, and a visual run was started on a T/O, Neu Ruppin. Unable to synchronize on this T/O, a run was made on a T/O, Havelburg. After bombs away, a right turn was made to return to the briefed route. A reassembly was effected with 390B and C at 5300 - 1155. The briefed route was followed to CP4, which was reached 2 minutes early, altitude 19000°. The continental coast was departed on course at 1715, altitude 16000°. The English Coast was recessed at 1806, altitude 3500°, 7 miles south of Southwell.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A.

(d) Difficulties: None.

(e) PFF Narrative: Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. 390C had the receiver-indicator cathode ray tube out; consequently, the R/N was unable to use the set for bombing or navigation. The R/N, however, attempted to use the remote scope for navigation. 390A and B sets operated satisfactorily on the penetration route and in the target area. 390A had decreasing range on the return route.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 390B Squadron: (784)

1. AL Lt. Denne
P Lt. Baffiatt
CP

N Lt. Stevens
AN
RN Lt. Srows
B Lt. Guakes

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2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- a. Primary 13 70 x 1000 lb. GP
3 x WG34
2 x T329
5 x T302
- b. Bombing Altitude: 24600° true; 22000° briefed.
- c. Time of Release: 1459.

3. Run in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP, which was made good, the R/N proceeded to set up course. The target was picked up in the scope at 45 miles. Dense ground haze made slant visibility very poor throughout the entire run. The bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles and several subsequent rate checks were made. Ten seconds from the BRL, however, the bombardier was able to pick up the target in the sight and made as many corrections as was possible. Synchronization, nevertheless, was not good at bombs away. Bombs were released on a true heading of 062°. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: The bombs from 390B fell approximately 4500° southeast (right) of the assigned MPI in fields and a sparsely built up residential area. There was one direct hit or close miss on the railroad tracks leading into Oranienburg from the southeast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(b) 390C Squadron: (447)

1. AL Maj. Black N Lt. Donahue
P Lt. Allen AN
CP RN F/O Anderson
B Lt. Smith

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- a. Primary 13 76 x 1000 lb. GP
- b. Bombing Altitude: 22450° true; 22000° briefed.
- c. Time of Release: 1459½

3. Run in from IP to Target: Dense ground haze throughout the entire run made slant visibility very poor. The bombardier proceeded to pin-point himself on known check points on the approach to the target. The R/N was unable to give assistance as the radar equipment was inoperative. Continuing to do pin-point piloting, the bombardier made corrections to the right. 25 seconds from the BRL, he identified the target and proceeded to synchronize. When the target was picked up in the sight, however, cross hairs were on the left edge of the M/Y. Synchronization was poor when bombs were released on a true heading of 084°. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: (a) The bombs from 390C fell short and left of the target in a factory district. There were about nine hits on factory installations in this area.

b. Bomb Pattern: Complete pattern not visible. Only about 14 bombs burst.

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g. Bombing Errors: Range : 1750° S
Deflection: 1550° L
Radial : 2300°

These figures are in relation to the AP, which was approximately 1700° northwest (left) of the assigned MPI.

d. Percent of bombs within 1000° and 2000° of the AP: 0% and 50%.

e. Bombing results in relation to damage inflicted on primary target: NIL.

f. Bombing results in relation to sightings: Poor.

g. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(c) 390A Squadron: (571)

1. AL	Capt. Watts	N	Lt. Sommer
P	Lt. Presswood	AN	Lt. Lewis
CP		RN	Lt. Mattson
		B	Lt. Buck

2. A/G Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. TO 12 70 x 1000 lb. GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 22300° true; 22000° briefed.

c. Time of Release: 1525.

3. Run in from IP to Target: Dense ground haze throughout the entire bomb run made slant visibility very poor. The bombardier, consequently, could not pick up the primary until it was too late for any synchronization. A T/O was attacked by H2X technique. The R/N picked up the target in the scope at 20 miles. The bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles and subsequent checks from 9 to 6 miles were made. Dense ground haze prevented the bombardier from giving any visual assistance. Bombs were released on a true heading of 270°. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run.

390A Squadron flew 2000° above the briefed altitude on the bomb run to the primary. Air Leaders should always fly at briefed altitudes.

4. PI Report: The bombs from 390A fell in woods approximately 2½ miles northeast (short) of Havelburg, Germany.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

c. 130 Group (95A, B, C Squadrons)

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: There was no difficulty with assembly. CP1 was reached at 1243, altitude 6000°.

(b) Route: CP2 was made good at 1320, altitude 12500°. The penetration route was uneventful. At the IP, 130 followed preceding Groups on the turn and swung 5 to 7 miles north of the briefed IP. On the withdrawal route, 95A and C Squadrons vectored 6 miles south of course in order to allow B Squadron to make an H2X sighting on Wittenberge, Germany. The Squadrons remained at bombing altitude and reformed after the sighting operation. This delay caused 130 to begin descent later than briefed, and some difficulty was encountered with other formations on the withdrawal route. The coast was departed at 1717, 2 to 3 miles north of the briefed point, altitude 17000°. The English Coast

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was reached at 1801, altitude 5000'.

(c) Difficulties: None

(d) Weather: Same as 13A.

(e) PFF Narrative: Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. 95G set became inoperative prior to the IP because of inverter difficulty. 95A and C sets operated satisfactorily.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 95A Squadron: (8210)

<u>1.</u>	AL	Maj. Gooding	N	Lt. Ballatore
	P	Capt. Siller	AN	
	CP		RN	Lt. Dement
			B	Lt. Lytle

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Primary	10	20 x 2000 lb. GP
			18 x 1000 lb. GP
	TO	1	2 x 2000 lb. GP
			2 x 1000 lb. GP
	Alternate	1	2 x 2000 lb. GP
	Last Resort		2 x 1000 lb. GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 22100' true; 22000' briefed

c. Time of Release: 1500

3. Run in from IP to Target: Dense ground haze throughout the entire bomb run made slant visibility very poor. The R/N proceeded to set up course by H2X, while the bombardier did pinpoint pilotage. Ten seconds from the ERL the bombardier picked up the target and made as many corrections as was possible. When bombs were released on a true heading of 094°, synchronization was not good. The bomb run was flown on PDI as the C-1 auto-pilot was inoperative.

4. PI Report: a. The bombs from 95A fell in a factory and residential area right and short of the assigned MPI. An explosion occurred from a direct hit on an unidentified factory building. About 24 bombs are shown exploding.

b. Bomb Pattern: 960°L x 2190°W

c. Bombing Errors: Range : 950'S
Deflection: 2460°R
Radial : 2600°

d. Percent of Bombs within 1000° and 2000° of the MPI: 0% and 13%.

e. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the target: NIL.

f. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: Poor.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 7257; released 2 x 2000 lb. GP and 2 x 1000 lb. GP on a T/O at 5242-1030. A/C 8741

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... 2 of 1000 lb. GP on last resort with 95B
... up over the primary target.

950 Squadron: (8667)

1.	AL	N	Lt. Whaler
	P Lt. Lesnier	AN	
	GP	RN	Lt. Finfinger
		B	Lt. Keyes

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Primary 13 26 x 2000 lb. GP
24 x 1000 lb. GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 21700° true; 22000° briefed.

c. Time of Release: 1501.

3. Run in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP, the bombardier proceeded to do pin-point piloting, as dense clouds had prevailed throughout the bomb run. The bombardier was unable to receive aid from the R/W as the radar equipment was inoperative. Continuing to pin-point himself from known check points, the bombardier was able to pick up the target area 30 seconds from the BRL. Because the target was covered by smoke from preceding Squadrons, the bombardier positioned the cross hairs on the smoke, using check points outside the target. Bombs were released on a true heading of 100°. C-1 autopilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: a. The bombs from 950 fell in a fully built-up residential area 1 1/2 miles south (right) of the assigned MPI.

b. Bomb Pattern: 1860° L x 1860° W.

c. Bombing Errors: Gross.

d. Percent of Bombs Within 1000° and 2000° of the MPI: 0% and 0%.

e. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted on the target: NIL.

f. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: Poor.

g. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

950 Squadron: (8754)

AL	Lt. Green	N	Lt. Hadlock
P	Lt. Brown	AN	
GP		RN	Lt. Urzaker
		B	Lt. Walters

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Alternate Last Resort 10 20 x 2000 lb. GP
20 x 1000 lb. GP

Jettisoning 3 6 x 2000 lb. GP
4 x 1000 lb. GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 21700° true; 22000° briefed

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g. Time of Release: 1532h

3. Run in from IP to Target: The primary was not attacked because the bombs in the lead aircraft failed to release. The alternate last resort, consequently, was bombed. Throughout the entire bomb run, dense ground haze was encountered. The R/W took over and proceeded to set up course. The bombardier was slatched in at 9 miles and rate checks of 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 miles came out good. The bombardier was unable to pick up the target a few seconds from the BRL. At the time for bombs away, a flare was shot and the remainder of the formation released on a true heading of 274°. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. BX Reports: a. The bombs from 95B fell on and near the south portion of the M/Y. The following installations were hit: Railroads coming into the M/Y from the S and W, 1 hit on the frog at the junction, and 3 hits from 50 to 500' N of this point; railroad spurs leading into factory installations; 3 hits on two separate spurs; residences and streets; 20 hits on residences and streets just west of M/Y. The remainder of the bombs fell in cleared areas.

b. Bomb Pattern: 2600°L x 2230°W; The bomb pattern was extremely loose. The bombs from at least two aircraft fell 1850° beyond the main pattern.

c. Bombing Errors: No sighting was made.

5. Bombing Misstatements: A/O 7783 (returning spare) jettisoned 2 x 2000 lb. GP at 5255 - 1120. A/O 7783 (returning spare) jettisoned 2 x 2000 lb. GP and 2 x 1000 lb. GP at 5223 - 0244. A/O 7783 had a mission failure and jettisoned 2 x 2000 lb. GP and 2 x 1000 lb. GP at 5223 - 0244.

3. Communications: a. VHF: (1) Lt. Col. Lyster led the 13th Wing. Communications on Channel A within Groups and between Groups in the Wing was highly satisfactory. Discipline was very good except for some chatter at the IP. Continuous keying was reported for a short time during assembly.

(2) Leader reported contacts made at will on B Channel. Kodak weather was well received and passed to Group leaders. Division Ground Station was contacted satisfactorily.

(3) Fighters were contacted both visually and by VHF. Fighters were advised of one aircraft returning early, and support was directed to accompany it.

(4) One aircraft of 95 Group requested help from Air Sea Rescue, but couldn't get through. Two fixes were sent to MF/DF Section. They were later cancelled.

b. W/T: (1) Leader sent all Control Points and Strike Reports to Division W/T Station. Interference on the Division frequency was reported at 1600 hours, and 95 Group reported reception very weak from 1330 to 1430.

(2) Control Points:

	GP1	GP2	GP3	TOT	GP4
Timings	1237	1319	1406	1503	1618
A.T.A.	1238	1318	1404	1528	---

(3) Strike Reports:

100A LB5	1528	95A PA3	1500	390A OB5	1525
100B PA5	1458	95B LB5	1514	390B PA2	1458
100C PA5	1458	95C PA5	1501	390C PA2	1459

6
Lead crew
1st. Bomb

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HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 15 March 1945
13 CBW FO 70
13 CBW OPS 296
3 AD FO 610

SUBJECT: Supplement to Tactical Report (Oranienburg, Germany)

TO : Colonel Shuck - 95th

1. Navigation:

	Flight Plan	13A (100)	13B (390)	13C (95)
Air Leader		Lt. Col. Lyster	Capt. Watts	Maj. Gooding
Navigator		Lt. Wild	Lt. Sommer	Lt. Ballatore
CP 1	5250	1 min. late 5000 5 mi. left	2 min. late 6500 7 mi. left	2 min. late 6000 5 mi. left
CP 2	14000	1 min. early 12500 1 mi. left	3 min. early 13800 2 mi. left	3 min. early 12500 1 mi. right
CP 3	20000	2 min. early 19000 on course	4 min. early 21000 on course	2 min. early 21000 3 mi. right
Target	22000	22500 (primary) 20000 (last resort)	23500 (primary) 22000 (T/O)	22500
CP 4	19000	4 min. early 18000 on course	2 min. early 19000 on course	5 min. early 18300 3 mi. right
Continental Coast	16000	16000 on course	16000 on course	17000 3 mi. right
English Coast	Minimum	4500 3 mi. right	3500 7 mi. left	5000 3 mi. right

2. IP - BRL:

- 100A - Lt. Orenderff - not synchronized at BRL - no release - good judgment.
- 100B - Lt. Silva - not synchronized at BRL - poor judgment.
- 100C - Capt. Albrecht - S^{ed} to avoid overrunning - poor leadership.
Lt. Snyder - not synchronized at BRL - poor judgment.

- 390A - Lt. Buck - not synchronized at BRL - no release - good judgment.
Capt. Watts - 1500 feet above briefed altitude on run to primary - breach of flight plan.
- 390B - Lt. Guekes - not synchronized at BRL - poor judgment.
- 390C - Lt. Smith - not synchronized at BRL - poor judgment.

95A - Lt. Lytle - not synchronized at BRL - poor judgment.
Maj. Gooding - C-1 not used.

3. Communications: Some irresponsible person again reported "Bandits" when none were airborne.

4. Photography: a. 95 Group failed to install camera in #2 A/C of B Squadron. One scope camera failed and H2X equipped with scope camera failed.

b. 100 Group flew no scope camera A/C.

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c. 390 Group secured one set of plottable scope prints. One H2X equipped with scope camera failed.

5. Wing Commander's Comments: a. This operation was the nearest to complete failure the Wing has had for some time. Visibility conditions in the target area were almost completely responsible for failures of visual sighting. However, errors of leadership and bombardier performance occurred.

b. Air Leaders were careless about making good briefed altitudes both along route and on bombing run. The flight plan is not followed when altitudes are not made good. One Air Leader did not properly space himself at IP and consequently had to "S" on bombing run. Air Leaders are independent commanders from IP to RP.

c. Six bombardiers released their bombs knowing synchronization was not completed. Such performance is inexcusable and is equivalent to jettisoning. Bombs must be released as a result of a proper and complete sighting operation. Two Group lead bombardiers did well to carry their bombs on to attack some other target. One bombardier had a release malfunction but apparently did not take indicated emergency action to get bombs away on the target.

By Command of Brigadier General HUGLIN:

Ernest A. Kiessling

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Lt. Col., Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis.

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INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3397

ATTACK ON ORANIENBURG MARSHALLING YARD ON 15 MAR 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 612, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U. S. 8TH AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1451 - 1536A hours.
- (d) Bombs : 123 x 2000 lb. G.P.
764 x 1000 lb. G.P.
4004 x 500 lb. G.P.
714 x 500 lb. I.B.

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

- (a) Several concentrations and groups of H.E. bursts, mixed with incendiaries, are seen covering the Central portion of the marshalling yard and adjacent industrial and business/residential areas. In the target area near hits are seen on the rail over road bridge at the North end and in the center of the marshalling yard, on the carriage shed, carriage sidings and sorting sidings. Other probable hits in the target area cannot be plotted since it becomes obscured by smoke early in the attack. The industrial area just West of the target, including the gas mask factory of AUERGESELLSCHAFT A.G. ^{received many hits} causing at least two explosions and starting numerous fires. Many hits and two fires are observed in the hutted camp just East of the South end of the target. Most of the Central and Southern business/residential areas of ORANIENBURG are covered by H.E. and incendiary bursts. One group of H.E. and I.B. bursts is seen $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles West Southwest of the target blanketing the South-eastern half of the town of GERMENDORF and extending into the area of the aircraft component factory of ERNST HEINKEL FLUGZEUWERKE with hits and near hits on large workshops and office buildings. Of the 4891 H.E. bombs dropped, approximately 500 bursts can be seen on poor quality and smoke obscured photographs.

Six, possibly seven, aircraft are visible on the ORANIENBURG AIRFIELD. None of the aircraft appear damaged.

- (b) Bursts are seen on the marshalling yard as follows:
(Annotations used refer to Interpretation Report No. F. 686)

Carriage Shed (f) - 1 very near hit.

Locomotive Depot (c) - possible hits and near hits.

Station Sidings (d) - several probable hits.

Carriage Sidings (e) - probable hits.

Rail over Road Bridge (k) - 2 probable hits.

Other bombs falling into the target area cannot be plotted due to smoke obscuring the area.

(c) OTHER BURSTS:

(Distances are measured from the center of the marshalling yard)

1. Immediately adjacent to the West edge of the target area - more than 100 H.E. bursts, mixed with I.B., blanket the industrial area, including the gas mask factory of AUERGESELLSCHAFT A.G., scoring many hits on buildings and starting at least five fires and causing two explosions.
2. The hutted camp at the South end of the target is covered by a mixed group of H.E. and I.B. bursts. Two fires are seen in the area late in the attack.

3. One mile Northwest - 13 scattered in an unidentified industrial area with 5 hits on two large buildings. A fire is seen in this area later in the attack.
4. Three and one-half miles West Southwest - approximately 40 are seen in the Southeast half of GERMENDORF and extending into the area of the aircraft components factory of ERNST HEINKEL FLUGZEWERKE with hits seen as follows: two hits and two near hits on large workshops, one near hit on an office building, one hit on the rail line leading into the main stores and one probable hit on the rail line leading into the factory area.
5. One-half mile South Southwest - 50 extend across a canal into the edge of an industrial area.
6. Twenty five in business/residential areas 1250 yards West.
7. 700 yards East - 50 mostly in the HOHENZOLLERN CANAL and extending into the hutted camp area.
8. 1500 yards North - five widely scattered H.E. bursts in a business/residential area.
9. 1500 yards South - 45 widely scattered H.E. and I.B. bursts in a sparsely built-up residential area with two near hits on the rail line to KREMMEN.
10. One and one-half mile Southeast - 30 scattered bursts are seen across the HOHENZOLLERN CANAL and extend into residential areas.
11. 1200 yards Southeast - 12 H.E. bursts in a business/residential area with two near hits on the rail line to BERLIN.
12. Two miles South - 50 in a business/residential area.
13. Four miles South Southeast - ten in open fields.
14. Four and one-half miles South Southeast - six in a built up area.

(iii) ACTIVITY:

(a) ORANIENBURG MARSHALLING YARD

- (i) The yard is fully covered on small scale hazy photographs.
- (ii) The yard appears lightly loaded.

(b) ORANIENBURG AIRFIELD

- (i) The airfield is fully covered on large scale but very hazy photographs.
- (ii) Six, possibly seven, aircraft are seen as follows:

Type	<u>Northeast</u>	<u>East</u>	<u>South</u>
Large	1	1	
Medium	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	2 possibly 3
	3	1	3

(iv) ANNOTATED PRINT:

None prepared.

(v) BOMB PLOT:

A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed.

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17 MAR 1945

IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. E. 5986

LOCALITY: ORANIEBURG M.Y.

PERIOD COVERED: Up to 1425 hrs on 16 MAR 1945.

DETAILS:

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Sgt.</u>	<u>Reported Weather</u>
U.S. 8th AF.	15 MAR 1945	5397	Clear.

PROVINCIAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE.

Cover of the northern one half of the marshalling yard and the area extending to the canal on the west and south, shows several large craters in the marshalling yard and a very large one in the area with heavy damage to industrial, commercial, and residential buildings.

In the marshalling yard, all thru trainage is out in the vicinity of the passenger station and several wagons are derailed. The passenger platform covered here been slightly damaged.

Industrial establishments adjacent on the west to the southern two thirds of the yard are almost completely demolished or damaged. At least five houses in the area are sunk or damaged.

The concentration of craters extends across the river, thru the scattered buildings of the area and reach almost to the canal at a point opposite the airfield. Scattered craters and damage are also seen to the north east of the river.

Twenty eight aircraft are seen on the western half of the airfield.

(print 4105-10)

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 541 Squadron.

SOURCE: 1066/2858.

TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 1425 hrs. on 16 MAR 1945.

SCALE: 1/8,500.

COVER AND QUALITY: Northern half of M.Y. and area to the west are covered on good quality prints.

LAST CHECK: None.

ALL INFORMATION SOURCE: 1066/952 (4103-9).

PRINT DISTRIBUTION: 4109 (to follow when available).

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4.C.1.U.

MEG/CJ

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333 Copies

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JX

Mar

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3395

ATTACK ON TARGETS IN GERMANY ON 15 MAR 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 90, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U. S. 8TH AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1327 - 1531A hours.
- (d) Bombs :
 - 46 x 2000 lb. G.P.
 - 30 x 1000 lb. G.P.
 - 244 x 500 lb. G.P.
 - 10 x 300 lb. G.P.
 - 478 x 250 lb. G.P.
 - 152 x 500 lb. I.B.

(ii) STATEMENT ON THE TARGETS:

- (a) The WITTENBERGE RAILWAY CENTER, GUSEN, STENDAL MARSHALLING YARD, DIEPHOLZ RAILWAY CENTER, and GARDELEGEN RAILWAY TRAFFIC CENTER were the targets attacked and are covered in this report.

Of the 808 H.E. bombs dropped, a total of approximately 436 bursts can be seen on very hazy photographs.

(iii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

- (a) WITTENBERGE RAILWAY CENTER; G.S.G.S. 4416/M6-700965
(All numbers refer to target illustration)

A group of at least 12 bursts are seen extending across the rail lines and two of the locomotive depots with probable hits on the rail lines and locomotive depots (4) and (6).

At least seven scattered bursts are seen in a sparsely built-up industrial area and across a rail line, 200 yards North and Northwest of the bridge (10), with one hit on the rail line.

One group of approximately 24 bursts are visible in a business/residential area, 600 yards Southwest of the locomotive depot (6).

Approximately 12 bursts are seen in open fields, 1400 yards East; four bursts in woods, 17 miles West; one group of approximately 18 in marshlands, 19 miles Southeast; four bursts in sparsely built-up area, 1500 yards West of the railover road bridge (10).

SAV	95/1592,1595,1598	15 MAR 45	1531A	hrs.	1/36,800	(F.L.7")	21,500'	'B'
"	100/1417	"	1528 $\frac{1}{2}$ A	"	1/44,500	"	26,000'	"
"	388/1061	"	1527A	"	1/39,900	"	23,100'	"
"	390/1496	"	1525A	"	1/38,600	"	22,500'	"

- (b) GUSEN; G.S.G.S. 4416/N6-902262

A concentration of at least 80 H.E. bursts are seen extending across two secondary roads and open fields into a sparsely built-up area of residential type buildings, 600 yards East of the GUSEN ROAD BRIDGE.

SAV 448/1296 15 MAR 1945 1448A hrs. 1/34,400 (F.L.7") 20,000' 'B'

- (c) STENDAL; G.S.G.S. 4416/N6-795520

A concentration of about 70 H.E. bursts and scattered I.B.'s are visible extending across the rail lines into the partially built-up area at the extreme Eastern end of the STENDAL MARSHALLING YARD. Three direct hits and numerous possible hits are seen on the rail lines and a roadover rail bridge has received three near hits. Other probable hits are visible on several small unidentified buildings adjacent to the tracks and there are possible hits on secondary roads.

SAV 379/1083 15 MAR 1945 1527 $\frac{1}{2}$ A hrs. 1/39,400 (F.L.7") 23,000' 'B'

(d) DIEPHOLZ; G.S.G.S. 4416/N3-483460

Four H.E. bursts are visible near the rail lines at the Southern end of the DIEPHOLZ RAILWAY TRAFFIC CENTER. Probable hits are seen on small unidentified buildings adjacent to the lines and a possible near hit on a road. Other bombs can be seen falling but no other bursts are visible.

SAV	96/959	15	MAR	1945	Unknown	hrs.	Unknown	(F.L.7")	Unknown	'B'
"	458/972	"	"	"	1327A	"	1/31,700	"	18,500'	"

(e) GARDELEGEN; G.S.G.S. 4416/N6-493420

Three concentrations totalling at least 200 H.E. bursts and four large groups of incendiary bursts are visible across the Eastern and Central portions of the GARDELEGEN RAILWAY TRAFFIC CENTER and extending approximately 1000 yards into the Southern portion of the town of GARDELEGEN. Several probable direct hits and possible near hits are seen on the rail lines at the East end of the traffic center. Many incendiary bursts are visible on the small sidings, rail lines and workshop type buildings in the Central part of the traffic center. One concentration of about 100 H.E. bursts and a large group of incendiaries, is seen in the residential area approximately 500 yards to the North. A number of incendiaries are seen in fields just to the South of the lines and probable H.E. hits on roads leading into GARDELEGEN from the South. Ground haze and smoke makes accurate interpretation difficult.

SAV	453/1318	15	MAR	1945	1457A	hrs.	1/10,000	(F.L.24")	20,000'	'B'
"	453/1326	"	"	"	1458A	"	1/20,000	(F.L.12")	"	"
"	453/1322	"	"	"	"	"	1/35,200	(F.L.7")	20,500'	"

(iv) ACTIVITY:

(a) MARSHALLING YARDS

(1) WITTENBERGE

- a. The yard is fully covered on small scale, hazy, partially smoke obscured photographs.
- b. The loading in the entire yard appears moderate to heavy.

(2) STENDAL

The sorting sidings appear moderately loaded while the remainder of the yard appears lightly loaded.

(b) AIRFIELDS

(1) DIEPHOLZ

- a. No aircraft are visible.
- b. The landing ground appears unserviceable.

(2) GARDELEGEN

- a. The airfield is completely covered except for the North-east corner.
- b. One possible large aircraft is visible in the North dispersal area.
- c. The landing ground appears serviceable.

(v) SMOKE SCREENS: The smoke screen at WITTENBERGE is operating ineffectively.

(vi) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(vii) BOMB PLOT: None prepared.

13A GROUP: BOMBS WITH DELAYED FUZINGS WERE RELEASED.

- 100A: H2X (purple dots): 12 x 140 x 500lb GP: ALTERNATE LR ATTACKED
- B: VISUAL (" "): 13 x 152 x 500lb GP: PT ATTACKED
- C: V & H2X (green dots): 13 x 152 x 500lb GP: PT ATTACKED

13B GROUP: BOMBS WITH DELAYED FUZINGS WERE RELEASED.

- 390A: H2X (not shown): 12 x 70 x 1000lb GP: TO ATTACKED (HAVEBERG)
- B: V & H2X (green dots): 13 x 70 x 1000lb GP: PT ATTACKED
- C: VISUAL (green dots): 13 x 76 x 1000; b GP: PT ATTACKED



13C GROUP:

- 95A: V & H2X (red dots): 10 x 20 x 2000 & 18 x 1000lb GP: PT ATTACKED
- B: H2X (green dots): 10 x 20 x 2000 & 20 x 1000lb GP: ALTERNATE LR
- C: VISUAL (red dots): 13 x 26 x 2000 & 24 x 1000lb GP: PT ATTACKED


NOTE: 390A's Bombs fell in woods 2 1/2 miles short of HAVEBERG, a TO. Because of the nature of the fuzing, the complete patterns for Squadrons 13A, 13B, and 13C are not shown.

ASSIGNED MESS...
SELECTED AP FOR 390 A ONLY:
CENTER OF GREEN CIRCLES.

BUILT-UP AREAS: OUTLINED IN PURPLE



ORANIENBURG, GER.
SCALE 1: 25,000



ORANIENBURG, GER. SCALE 1:63,360

15 March 1945

3 - 2 - 2 - 3 - 7 - 2

to Tactical Report (Hannover, Germany) dated 14 March

The following corrections will be made in subject report:

a. Page 2, (b) 95B Squadron, 1:

AL
P Lt. Tassler
OP Lt. Lavigne

Change to read -

AL Capt. Brittingham
P Capt. Hamilton
OP Lt. Nett

b. Last Plot:

(1) "95B: Main Pattern obscured by ..."

Change to read -

"95B: Main pattern obscured by ..."

By Command of Brigadier General EGLIN:

Ernest A. Kieseling
ERNEST A. KIESELING,
Major, Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis.

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6. Controller's Log:

a.	2010 from 3AD:	(1)	Force required and order.
b.	2020 from 13CBW:	(1)	Alerted
		(2)	Force required and order.
c.	2100 from 3AD:	(1)	Primary target.
		(2)	New order of Wings.
		(3)	Bombing altitude.
		(4)	Zero Hour.
		(5)	R.B.A.
		(6)	R.B.W.
		(7)	Leaflet load.
d.	2120 from 13CBW:	(1)	Primary target.
e.	2130 from 13CBW:	(1)	Zero Hour.
		(2)	R.B.A.
		(3)	R.B.W.
		(4)	Assembly line and altitude.
		(5)	Leaflet load.
		(6)	Gas load.
		(7)	New Wing order.
f.	2152 from 3AD:	(1)	Advanced Warning to 3AD F.O. No. 610.
g.	2210 from 3AD:	(1)	Preliminary timings.
h.	2227 from 13CBW:	(1)	Advanced Warning to 13 CBW F.O. No. 70.
i.	2247 from 3AD:	(1)	Intelligence Annex to 3AD F.O. No. 610.
j.	2320 from 3AD:	(1)	Bomb load.
		(2)	Train setting.
k.	2355 from 13 CBW:	(1)	Bomb load.
		(2)	Train setting.
l.	0030 from 3AD:	(1)	Secondary target.
		(2)	Tertiary target.
m.	0100 from 13CBW:	(1)	Assembly timings, altitude and start climb times.
n.	0135 from 13CBW:	(1)	Annex No. 1 to Advanced Warning to 13CBW F.O. No. 70.
o.	0205 from 13CBW:	(1)	Secondary and Tertiary targets.
p.	0218 from 13CBW:	(1)	Annex No. 2 to Advanced Warning to 13CBW F.O. No. 70.
q.	0258 from 3AD:	(1)	3AD F.O. No. 610.
r.	0310 from 3AD:	(1)	Second Intelligence Annex to F.O. No. 610.
s.	0325 from 13CBW:	(1)	13 CBW F.O. No. 70.
t.	0347 from 3AD:	(1)	Annex No. 1 to 3AD F.O. No. 610.
u.	0517 from 3AD:	(1)	Annex No. 2 to 3AD F.O. No. 610.
v.	0604 from 3AD:	(1)	Annex No. 3 to 3AD F.O. No. 610.
w.	0750 from 3AD:	(1)	Lower altitude to fly out.
x.	0810 from 3AD:	(1)	Annex No. 4 to F.O. No. 610.
y.	0755 from 13CBW:	(1)	Lower altitude to fly out.
z.	0820 from 3AD:	(1)	New zero hour.
aa.	0825 to the Groups:	(1)	Request for visibility reports.
bb.	0830 from the Groups:	(1)	Visibility reports.
cc.	0830 from 3AD:	(1)	Annex No. 5 to F.O. No. 610.
dd.	0835 to the Groups:	(1)	Annex No. 1 to F.O. No. 70.
ee.	0900 from the Groups:	(1)	Visibility reports.
ff.	0920 from 3AD:	(1)	New zero hour.
gg.	0925 to the Groups:	(1)	New zero hour.
hh.	0930 from the Groups:	(1)	Visibility reports.
ii.	0937 from 3AD:	(1)	Annex No. 6 to F.O. No. 610.
jj.	0950 to the Groups:	(1)	Target and mission information.
kk.	0955 to 3AD:	(1)	Take-Off clearance for diver area.
ll.	1000 from the Groups:	(1)	Visibility report.
mm.	1005 from 3AD:	(1)	Divers area clearance.
nn.	1015 from the Groups:	(1)	Diversion fields.
oo.	1030 from the Groups:	(1)	Visibility reports.
pp.	1100 from the Groups:	(1)	Visibility reports.
qq.	1111 from the Groups:	(1)	1st aircraft airborne.

For the Commanding General:

Ernest A. KieSSLing
ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Major, Air Corps.

Mac

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

.....
:By Authority Of :
:C.G. Eighth Air Force:
:Initials *C.M.O.* :
:Date 15 March 1945 :
:

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 319

PERIOD: 0001 hours 15 March 1945 to 2400 hours 15 March 1945.

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Total Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>			<u>Totals</u>	<u>NYR</u>
					<u>E/A</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>OT</u>		
Heavy Bomber Atks.	1347	1304	3337.2	0-0-0	0	9	3	12	4
Fighter Escort (a)	782	717	0	(b)1-0-0A	0	0	5	5	5
Fighter Sweeps	9	9	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	42	39	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	37	36	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	12	12	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>48</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	2277	2162	3337.2	1-0-0A	0	9	8	17	9

- (a) Includes groups based on Continent.
- (b) Me-163

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

1347 a/c (372 B-24s, 975 B-17s) from three Air Divisions sortied in four forces against Oranienburg M/Y and Zossen Army Headquarters (nr Berlin). 1304 a/c dropped 2529 tons GP and 808.2 tons IB - (total 3337.2 tons) on assigned targets and several T/Os. Majority bombed visually, some bombed on H2X with visual assists. Weather: clouds nil but very heavy ground haze and

and smoke made target identification difficult. E/A opposition: nil. 13 jet a/c sighted S of Berlin - no combats. Claims: nil. Losses: 12 B-17s (9 to AA, 3 to causes unknown). NYR: 4 B-24s believed safe on Continent.

First Force

Thirty-seven Squadron formations (372 B-24s - 2nd Air Division) sortied against Zossen Army Headquarters (nr Berlin). 353 a/c dropped 478.1 tons GP and 290.2 tons IB on the assigned target and four T/Os at 1417-1500 hours from 19,000-23,500 feet. All bombed visually. Leaflets dropped on Zossen. Weather: heavy ground haze in target area made target identification difficult. Flak: nil in target area. Battle damage: 31 minor, 1 major. E/A opposition: nil. Sighted 13 jet a/c in target area, 10-12 u/i e/a N of Magdeburg - no combats. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: 4 B-24s believed safe on Continent.

Fighter Support: Five groups, including 361st Group based on Continent (54 P-47s, 220 P-51s - 274 a/c) sortied. Up 1130-1211 hours. Down: 1659-1825 hours. 255 effective sorties. E/A opposition: nil. Sighted 3 jet a/c N of Nijmegen, 1 twin jet a/c S of Hannover, 1 twin jet SE of Zuider Zee, 3 jet a/c vicinity Rheine, 2 Me-163s near Dresden, 3 u/i jets near Enschede, 1 FW-190 and 2 u/i e/a W of Lingen - no combats. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 P-51s to causes unknown. NYR: 4 P-51s believed safe on Continent.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Zossen Army Hq.	372	308	416.1	250.7	Fair
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Gardlingen RR Center		31	44.0	27.0	Fair
Parey RR Br. (5221-1159)		11	15.7	10.0	Unobserved
2 T/Os		<u>3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.5</u>	Unobserved
Totals	372	353	478.1	290.2	

Second Force

Eight Group formations (300 B-17s - 1st Air Division) sortied against Zossen Army Headquarters (nr Berlin). 292 a/c dropped 407.9 tons GP and 339.5 tons IB on the assigned target and 4 t/Os at 1438-1536 hours from 21,200-24,800 feet. All bombed visually. Leaflets dropped on Zossen. Weather: clouds nil, heavy ground haze and smoke in target area. Flak: nil to meager, inaccurate. Battle damage: 17 minor, 3 major. E/A opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 B-17s to causes unknown. NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Three groups (156 P-51s) sortied. Up 1154-1216 hours. Down: 1746-1755 hours. 142 effective sorties. E/A opposition: Engaged 2 Me-163s in Wittenberg area. Sighted 3 Me-163s in Cottbus area, 1 twin jet vicinity Zuider Zee, 2 u/i jets a/c vicinity Oschbruck, 7 Me-163s in Leiszig-Kassel-Remagen area - no combats. Claims: 1-0-0 Air (Me-163). Losses: 1 P-51 due to mechanical failure. NYR: 1 P-51 believed safe on Continent.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Zossen Army Hq.	300	276	383.9	322.5	Unobserved to good
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Stendal M/Y		13	19.5	13.0	Fair
Nienburg		1	1.5	1.0	Unobserved
Vechta		1	1.5	1.5	Unobserved
T/O at 5159N-1301E		1	1.5	1.5	Unobserved
Totals	300	292	407.9	339.5	

Third Force

Fourteen group formations (526 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against Oranienburg M/Y. 514 a/c dropped 1464.5 tons GP on assigned target and six T/Os at 1448-1532 hours from 21,000-25,000 feet. Bombed both visually and on H2X with visual assists. Leaflets dropped on Oranienburg. Weather: very heavy ground haze made target identification difficult. Flak: moderate to intense, accurate. Battle damage: 183 minor, 50 major. E/A opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 8 B-17s (7 to A., 1 to causes unknown) NYR: nil.

S E C R E T

Fighter Support: Five groups (254 P-51s) sortied. Up: 1224-1230 hours
 1753-1820 hours. 238 effective sorties. E/A opposition: nil. 2 jet
 sighted in Munster area, 4 jet a/c near Dummer Lake area - no combat,
 claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51 to causes unknown. NYR: nil

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Oranienburg M/Y	526	467	1327.5		Unobserved to good
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Wittenberge		31	91.0		Unobserved
Durstadt M/Y		1	3.0		Unobserved
Mellendorf M/Y		1	3.0		Unobserved
Mavelberg		12	35.0		Unobserved
Schmarrau		1	2.0		Unobserved
Dedelstorf A/P		1	3.0		Unobserved
Totals	526	514	1464.5		

Fourth Force

Four group formations (149 B-17s - 1st Air Division) sortied against
 Oranienburg M/Y. 145 a/c dropped 178.5 tons GP and 178.5 tons IB on the
 assigned target at 1523-1531 hours from 21,000-24,500 feet. All bombed
 visually. Leaflets dropped on Oranienburg. Weather: heavy ground haze and
 smoke in target area. Flak: moderate, accurate to inaccurate at Oranienburg.
 Battle damage: 32 minor, 23 major, 1 Cat. "E". E/A opposition: nil. Claims:
 nil. Losses: 3 B-17s to AA. NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Two groups, including 352nd Group based on Continent
 (90 P-51s) sortied. Up: 1302-1310 hours. Down: 1800-1813 hours. 82 effective
 sorties. E/A opposition: nil. Sighted 2 w/i e/a and 1 Me-262 near Zuider Zee,
 1 Me-262 vicinity Hengelo. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51 due to mechanical
 failure. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Effective Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Oranienburg M/Y	149	145	178.5	178.5	Unobserved to good

S E C R E T

2. Fighter Escort

Fifteen groups, including groups based on Continent (54 P-47s, 728 P-51s - 728 a/c) sortied as support to bomber forces. Up: 1130-1310 hours. Down: 1659-1825 hours. 717 effective sorties. E/A opposition: 2 Me-163s engaged in Wittenberg area. Sighted 3 jet a/c N of Nijmegen, 1 twin jet a/c S of Hannover, 3 jets vicinity Rheine, 2 Me-163s near Dresden, 3 u/i jets near Enschede, 7 Me-163s in Leipzig-Kassel-Remagen area, 2 jet a/c near Munster, 4 jets near Dummer Lake, 1 Me-262 near Zuider Zee, 1 Me-262 vicinity Hengelo. - no combats. Claims: 1-0-0 Air (Me-163). Losses 5 P-51s (2 due to mechanical failure, 3 to causes unknown). NYR: 5 P-51s believed safe on Continent.

3. Fighter Sweeps

One Squadron of 361st Group based on Continent (9 P-51s) sortied to patrol Bonn - Koblenz area. Up: 1538 hours. Down: 1840 hours. 9 effective sorties. E/A opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

42 a/c sortied as follows:

2 Mosquitoes on night photo mission in Altenbeken area.

20 a/c (16 P-51s, 4 Spitfires) obtained D/A photos of targets in Central, eastern and western Germany.

8 P-51s, on mapping mission in Regensburg, Nurnburg and Frankfurt area.

12 P-51s as escort to PRU a/c. 9 effective sorties. E/A opposition: nil.

Losses: nil.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

37 a/c dispatched (3 B-17s, 4 Mosquitoes and 30 P-51s) as follows:

2 B-17s flew routine reconnaissance to the Azores.

1 B-17 flew weather reconnaissance over Sea to NW of Lands End.

4 Mosquitoes flew weather reconnaissance over Berlin and Leipzig area, North Sea, Denmark, N. Germany, U.K., and Ireland.

30 P-51s as scouts for bomber forces. 1 a/c returned early.

Losses: nil.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

12 a/c (10 P-47s, 2 PBVs) sortied on search and patrol mission. One rescue incident. All a/c returned safely.

8. Special Operations

48 a/c sortied as follows:

10 a/c (1 B-17, 1 B-24 and 8 P-51s) as radio relays.

6 B-17s as screening force for bomber operations.

5 B-24s on RCM jamming from 0825-1215 hours. 4 effective sorties.

3 B-17s on Scope reconnaissance of Grafenworf - night 14/15 March.

Leaflets dropped on Fulda.

16 B-24s sortied against Munster RR Station - night 15/16 March.

14 a/c dropped 19.5 tons GP, 16.2 tons IB on assigned target at 2020-2026 hours from 18,000 feet. Weather: clear with slight haze. Flak: meager to moderate, inaccurate. E/A opposition: nil.

8 Mosquitoes on chaff dispensing for 1st and 2nd Air Divisions.

Losses: Nil.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Although jet and rocket e/a were sighted widely scattered over the whole route, these were unaggressive and offered no organized opposition to either fighters or bombers. No Allied aircraft were lost to e/a and only one Me-163 was destroyed. First Force bombers were the only ones to see any e/a. There were several rocket and jet propelled a/c sighted in the area south of Berlin.

Escorting fighters sighted an estimated 11 Me-163s in the Berlin-Leipzig-Cottbus area, and a further two in the Hildesheim area. Sightings were as follows: Two near Leipzig at 1450 hours at 15,000 feet. When chased by P-51s, one climbed at 75 degrees to 40,000 feet and the other climbed to 28,000 feet and then dived at terrific speed and was lost in the haze at 10,000 feet. In the same area at the same time another Me-163 attempted to bounce some P-51s, but peeled up and disappeared without doing any damage. Two more were sighted circling in the Wittenberg area at 20,000 feet, 1455 hours. These were chased by P-51s and one destroyed. At 1450 hours in the Cottbus area, three Me-163s were seen apparently taking off but were too far off to be attacked. Three more attempted to bounce a flight of P-51s from 28,000 feet near the First Force target area. When sighted, however, e/a climbed and made no further attacks. At 1530 hours, two Me-163s were sighted in the distance in the Hildesheim area.

Some 20 jet a/c were sighted over northwest Germany, these made no attempts to attack and it seems probable that they were engaged on tactical and reconnaissance activity. These were sighted as follows: One on a westerly course at 1456 hours at 35,000 feet in the Zuider Zee area. Three flying on a southerly course at 23,000 feet 15 miles north of Nijmegen at 1300 hours. Two east of Meppel at 30,000 feet at 1255 hours. Three near Rhine at 29,000 feet at 1300 hours. One Me-262 at 1400 hours on a westerly course near Hengelo at 28,000 feet. One at 1515 hours, 24,000 feet, 15 miles south of Hanover and another at 1550 at 24,000 feet southeast of the Zuider Zee. A further two at 1530 at 35,000 feet near Osnabruck. Two more in the Munster area at 1630 at 28,000 feet. These were chased by P-51s but were too far off. The same P-51 group also observed four jets between Dummer Lake and the Zuider Zee at 20,000 feet possibly on the look out for stragglers.

The only orthodox s/e e/a seen by the fighters were three (1 FW-190 and 2 u/1 a/c) which trailed some escorting fighters at 1245 hours, 30,000 feet near Bingen but made no attacks.

2. Flak

Oranienburg - moderate to intense, fairly accurate.
Dummer Lake area - meager to moderate, fairly accurate.
Stendal - meager, inaccurate.
Zossen - meager, inaccurate.

SECRET

3. Observations

30 plus t/e a/c observed on Finsterwalde A/F.

30 plus s/e and t/e, including two black jets, seen on A/F at Waggum.

7 t/e a/c on Ehra A/F.

75 plus e/a of all types were observed dispersed in woods around an A/F at Parchim.

An A/F north of target and believed to be east of Parchim with single E-W runway containing 20 plus He-111s and one B-24.

A/F located at 5240-1100 with approximately 40 s/e a/c.

A/F at 5227-0757 with 16 a/c.

M/Y at Lingen observed to be heavily loaded.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Oranienburg M/Y (3rd Air Division) - Unobserved to Good Results.

Most of the bombs were D.A. bombs, so bursts are not visible with the exception of a few bombs of each pattern which appeared to have exploded upon impact. Analysis is not yet complete, but there are about five squadrons which dropped across the M/Y. Balance of patterns appear to lie in residential area east and west of the yard. The first group which dropped bombs started large fires in area adjoining M/Y and adjoining residential area. Ground haze prevents accurate examination of yard at time of attack.

Oranienburg M/Y (1st Air Division) - Unobserved to Good Results.

Target attacked by another Division prior to our attack. Smoke from large fires prevented complete assessment of results. Eight complete and partial concentrations of GP and IB's bursting in central and southern portions of Oranienburg. One concentration of bombs fell just west of railway sidings in business and industrial district. A portion of this concentration will probably extend into central part of sidings and also into the gas mask factory of Auergesellschaft A.G. Damage should be severe throughout this part of town. Two concentrations could be plotted 500 yards southeast of railway sidings. Damage will result to rail lines, to a hatted camp along eastward edge of railroad. Through heavy smoke it is possible to see three partial concentrations in residential areas near a road over canal bridge about one mile SE of main station. Two other concentrations could be plotted in residential area 1500 yards SW and 3100 yards S-SW of main station resp. Additional bombs could be seen falling toward target area - no bursts could be observed due to smoke. Central portion of the town of Oranienburg should be severely damaged from blast and fires. A final concentration of GP and IB bombs blanketed eastern portion of town of Germendorf situated 3 1/2 miles W-SW of Oranienburg. A few bursts could be seen among buildings of the bomber aircraft component factory of Ernst Heinkel.

Zossen Army Hq. (1st Air Division) - Unobserved to Good Results.

Attacked by aircraft of another Division before being attacked by 1st Air Division, and numerous fires were started in both GHQ areas and the two most northerly barracks areas. The smoke from these fires prevented the

plotting of all concentrations and pin-pointing of individual bursts. Six partial concentrations of mixed GP and IB seen in target, three of which were in and near southern barracks area. One concentration of bombs bursting in storage depot and barracks area in central part of target, while two other concentrations fell in and near the Army GHQ to the north of the storage depot. Many additional fires were started in all of these areas and the target was completely blanketed by smoke at end of attack. Numerous barracks, administrative and storage buildings should either be damaged or destroyed. Three partial concentrations seen in residential areas south of Mellensee approximately three miles W-SW of target. An additional three concentrations fell into the town of Rehagen $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles W-SW of target. Possible direct hits on rail lines and roads in vicinity, some damage in residential areas. Partial concentration could be seen in open areas $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles SW, $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles SW and $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles W-SW of central portion of target.

Stendal - Fair Results

One concentration of GP and IB bombs seen bursting on and near rail lines approximately 600 yards east of M/Y and 1/2 mile SE of RR work shops. Direct hits on rail lines in this vicinity.

Zossen Army Hq (2nd Air Division) - Fair Results

Headquarters buildings, roadways, through rail line, barracks, training buildings well hit.

Gardlingen - Fair to Good Results.

RR lines were well hit.

5. Ground Situation

21st Army Group - Nothing to report.

12th Army Group - First U.S. Army: In the Remagen bridgehead, the town of Honnef is now completely clear of the enemy. Further progress has been made to the north and also to the south against heavy resistance.
Third U.S. Army: Enemy pocket to the north of the Moselle River is now completely cleared. The bridgehead across the Moselle has been extended and the villages of Lutz, Oppenheim and Noriershausen captured. Three "class 40" bridges have been constructed. South of Trier have been made to L 3306, also 3320-3321 and 3115-3117.

6th Army Group

- Seventh U.S. Army: An attack was opened at 0100 hours 15 March and the first objectives had been reached by 0500 hours. In the Haguenau sector, the bridgehead over the Moder River has been expanded and a counter attack repulsed. With the exception of small pockets, the enemy is cleared from the south of the Saar River to the north-west edge of Bois Saarbrucken.

6. G.A.F. Activity over England

Flying Bombs - From 0001 hours to 2400 hours - 15 March 1945.

<u>Launched</u>	<u>Landfall</u>	<u>Greater London</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>
3	0	0	0

D. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Ninth Air Force	2328	700-0A 6-0-9G	3
1st U.S. T.A.F.	1655	0-0-1A	5
2nd T.A.F.	893	0-0-0	4
RAF Fighter Command	<u>199</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>
	5075	7-0-1A 6-0-9G	12

Ninth Air Force

Night - 14/15 March

Sorties : 3 Bombers
7 Intruder Patrols
5 Defensive Patrols
15 a/c

Mission : Attacked Bonn A/F, RR Center at Altenkirchen.

Claims : 1-0-0 Air

Losses : Nil

Day - 15 March

Sorties : 486 Bombers
 1546 Fighters
281 Reconnaissance
 2313 a/c

Mission : 9th Bomb Division: Attacked Communication Centers at Pirmasens and Neunkirchen and M/Y at Erbach.

9th T.A.C.: Provided air cover for Remagen bridge, swept Bonn-Coblenz area, carried out armed reconnaissance in Bonn-Cologne-Dusseldorf areas.

19th T.A.C.: Air Cooperation with 12th and 20th Corps, swept Coblenz, Bingen area, dive-bombed rail bridges, ammo dumps, storage depots in battle area.

29th T.A.C.: Carried out armed reconnaissance in NW Germany, provided escort for medium bombers.

Claims : 7-0-0

Losses : 1 fighter
 2 Recon. a/c.

Ground Claims	:	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T		522	341
AV and Tanks		59	33
Locos		45	25
RR Cars		1129	1073
Bldgs.		165	88

1st U.S. T.A.F.

Night - 14/15 March

Sorties : 2 Intruder Patrols

Day - 15 March

Sorties : 298 Bombers
 1233 Fighters
122 Reconnaissance
 1653 a/c

S E C R E T

Mission : Air Cooperation with 6th, 15th, 21st Corps; swept Strasbourg, Mannheim areas; carried out armed reconnaissance in Freiburg, Pforzheim areas, Attacked defense areas in Homburg, Pirmasens area.

Claims : 0-0-1 Air

Losses : 1 Bomber - 4 Fighters.

Ground Claims		<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
	M/T	68	62
	RR Cars	213	231
	Locos	16	3
	Guns	9	24
	Rail Cuts	45	

2nd T.A.F.

Night - 14/15 March

Sorties : 6 Light Bombers
44 Offensive Patrols
22 Interception Patrols
72 a/c

Mission : Attacked Bocholt, carried out armed reconnaissance in Frankfurt, Hildesheim area.

Claims & Losses : Nil

Day - 15 March

Sorties : 169 Medium and Light Bombers
60 Armed Reconnaissance
282 Fighter Support
222 Fighter Sweeps
147 Reconnaissance
1 Air/Sea Rescue
821 a/c

Mission : Attacked M/Ys at Holtern, Dorsten, Dulmen; carried out armed reconnaissance and swept Munster, Hamm, Dummer Lake area.

Claims : Nil

Losses : 1 Bomber - 3 Fighters

RAF Fighter Command

Night - 14/15 March

Sorties : 17 Offensive Patrols
4 Intruder Patrols
1 Flying Bomb Patrol

22 a/c

Mission : Carried out Offensive Patrols in NW Germany.

Claims and Losses : Nil

Day - 15 March

Sorties : 22 Fighter-Bombers
8 Offensive Patrols
2 Interception Patrol
8 Flying Bomb Patrol
137 Escort to Bombers

177 a/c

Mission : Attacked rocket sites, communication centers in the Hague area.

Claims & Losses : Nil

2. Fifteenth Air Force

Reports not available.

3. RAF Bomber Command

<u>Day - 15 March</u>	<u>Targets</u>	<u>Losses</u>
80 Halifaxes	Mathias-Stinnes	1
8 Lancasters	(Benzol Plant at Botrop)	0
12 Mosquitoes		0
70 Halifaxes	Kastrop Rauxel (Benzol Plant)	0
7 Lancasters		0
12 Mosquitoes		
16 Lancasters	Arnsberg RR Viaduct	0
<u>1</u> Mosquito		<u>0</u>
206 a/c Total		1

S E C R E T

<u>Night - 15/16 March</u>	<u>Targets</u>	<u>Losses</u>
257 Lancasters 9 Mosquitoes	Misburg (Oil Ref.)	4 0
122 Halifaxes 134 Lancasters 12 Mosquitoes	Hagen	2 6 0
55 Mosquitoes	Berlin	0
22 Mosquitoes	Erfurt	0
10 Mosquitoes	Hagen (Second Attack)	0
16 Mosquitoes	Mannheim	0
5 Mosquitoes	Siren Tour	0
40 Mosquitoes 34 Halifaxes 6 Fortresses 5 Liberators	Bomber Support	0 0 1 0
5 Halifaxes	R.C.M.	0
732 a/c		13

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

CHARLES Y. BANFILL,
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