

CONFIDENTIAL
16 MAR 1945

SUPPLEMENT TO IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 3930

LOCALITY: DORTMUND

PERIOD COVERED: 1545 A hours on 19 FEB 1945 to 1400 A hours on 15 MAR 1945.

ATTACKS:

	<u>Date</u>	<u>S.A.</u>	<u>Reported Weather</u>
Dortmunderfeld M/Y U.S. 3TH AIR FORCE	10 MAR 1945	3362	10/10 cloud
Dortmund/Eving, M/Y U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE	10 MAR 1945	3362	10/10 cloud
Dortmund Sud Railway Centre U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE	19 MAR 1945	3362	10/10 cloud
Town Area R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND	12 MAR 1945	----	10/10 cloud

PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE:

Photographs of better quality confirm the damage reported on Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 3930 issued 14 MAR 45.

Additional damage is seen as follows:

Town Area

Additional industrial and business/residential damage is seen in the town area. Damage includes that to several industrial premises in the Eving district including additional damage to Hoersch AG over that seen on previous cover. The already gutted area around the main station has been further affected by H.E.

Dortmund Sud Railway Center

The whole south and west two thirds of the marshalling yard is completely closed by craters. Cover shows a path of craters and devastation running north-south across the west end of the yard causing destruction of sidings, facilities, rolling stock and storage depots. The already gutted adjacent town area is honey combed with craters.

Damaged facilities include the locomotive depot where one round house has been destroyed and the turntable of another damaged (Nos 3 and 4 on Illustration No 6 (d)(vi) 21/3). New craters and damage are seen in both the goods depots (7 and 8) and all the station sidings have been cut as well as all through lines. A considerable amount of wrecked or damaged rolling stock is visible.

(US 7GR 36C Prints 2056-7)

Dortmund Main Station

Considerable new damage is seen to the main station and station yards. Craters appear to have cut all communication through the yard and further damage is seen to the already severely affected Main Station building as well as to goods sheds, sorting and storage sidings. The locomotive depot (No 3 on Ill. No. 6 (d) (ii) 24/7) has been completely destroyed and craters are seen on the through line leading to Bochum.

(106G/4830 Prints 4322,4323)

Dortmund Eving M/Y

The target appears to have been effected to a moderate extent by the attacks. New concentrations of craters are seen in the northern part of the yard and at the south choke point of the North/south sorting sidings. Much of the damage has been repaired at the time of cover. It is probable that through communication is open.

Details of Damage:Facilities

Goods depot: - 80% unserviceable. New damage is seen to tracks and stock piles in the area.

M/Y Sidings

Main N-S yard: - 60% unserviceable. Craters at choke point block southern approach to yard making it unusable for through working. Access to the sidings from the North appears unhampered.

East-West sidings: - 50% unserviceable. Several tracks in the NE part of the yard have been cut and rolling stock damaged. 100% u/s for through working.

Holding sidings: - A few craters visible.

Working sidings: - 25% unserviceable. Craters seen cutting some tracks.

Loco and Rolling stock

Approximately 20 to 30 wagons seen damaged in E-W sidings.

Thru Running Lines

Approx 40% unserviceable.

Repairs

Activity is seen in the area of the East - West sidings.

Loading

Moderate.

(US 7 GR/46B - 4098-9)
(106G/4830 - 3264-5)

Dortmunderfeld M/Y

A group of at least eleven craters have cut a number of tracks in the holding sidings in the N.W. corner of the target area and also have damaged or destroyed several wagons in this section of the yard. The locomotive depot at the extreme N. end of M/Y has received moderate to severe roof and structural damage and a large unidentified building just S. of it has suffered very severe damage. There are two craters in the Southbound sorting sidings and one probable hit on the Northbound sorting sidings. Several small sheds and buildings within the target area have been severely damaged or destroyed. To the North a crater appears to have cut one of the E-W avoiding lines and fresh craters are seen on and near the lines leading N.W. to the main station and goods yard.

(Prints 3340-42)

Details of damage are as follows:

Facilities

1. Loco depot: Four areas of moderate to severe roof and structural damage.

Facilities are now considered to be 20% unserviceable.

M/Y Sidings

At least eleven hits in storage sidings have cut number of tracks. Two hits in Southbound sorting sidings and one probable hit in Northbound sorting sidings. The M/Y sidings 20% unserviceable overall.

Loco and Rolling Stock

Number of wagons damaged or derailed in the storage sidings and a

Through Running Lines

A group of fresh craters are visible on N.W. lines between the target and the main station and goods yard. Also an avoiding line to the N. of the M/Y appears to be cut.

The through running lines are 25% unserviceable overall.

Other Damage.

A few small buildings and one large building in the target area have been severely damaged or destroyed.

Repairs

Probable points of repair in East storage sidings and also on line between M/Y and main station.

Loading

Moderate.

Report subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

PHOTOGRAPHS BY: 13 Sq. and 542 Sq. 14 Sq.

<u>Sortie</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Scale</u>	<u>F.L.</u>	<u>Quality</u>
US 7GR/46B	1320 A	15 MAR 1945	1/12000	24	Good
US 7GR/36C	1515 A	15 MAR 1945	1/7500	36	Good
106G/4830	1400 A	15 MAR 1945	1/8000	36	Good

LAST REPORT: K 3930 (Immed)

COMPARATIVE SORTIES USED: 106G/1587
US 7 GR/60

PRINT DISTRIBUTED: 3342 of 106G/4830 (to follow when available)

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K/MF

DISTRIBUTION 91E

516 Copies.

J.P.
CWS

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11 MAR 1945

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3362

ATTACK ON DORTMUND ON 10 MAR 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 509, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8th AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1236 - 1305A hrs.
- (d) Bombs : 19,282 x 100 lb. G.P.
944 x 500 lb. I.B.

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

Marker, incendiary, and H.E. bombs are seen falling, but no bursts are visible on 10/10 cloud obscured photographs. For the approximate area of bursts see PTF INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. T-68.

(iii) ANNOTATED PRINT:

None prepared.

(iv) BOMB PLOT:

None prepared.

(v) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV 92/905,906	10 MAR 1945	1305A hrs.	1/42,000	(F.L.7")	24,500'	1C1
SAV 94/1494,1497,1499,1500	"	1241A	"	1/39,400	"	23,000' 1C1
SAV 95/1567,1570-1574	"	Unknown	"	1/41,100	"	24,000' 1C1
SAV 100/1381-1389	"	1236A	"	1/42,000	"	24,500' 1C1
SAV 306/1414,1415,1419	"	1302A	"	1/43,100	"	25,250' 1C1
SAV 388/1023-1025	"	1236A	"	1/41,100	"	24,000' 1C1
SAV 390/1467-1471	"	Unknown	"	1/41,500	"	24,250' 1C1
SAV 398/787	"	1254A	"	1/24,200	(F.L.12")	24,200' 1C1
SAV 447/1071,1073,1075	"	1245A	"	1/41,100	(F.L.7")	24,000' 1C1
SAV 457/1008,1013	"	1318A	"	1/41,800	"	24,400' 1C1
SAV 486/947-949,951	"	1255A	"	1/40,250	"	23,500' 1C1
SAV 487/897,898,900,902	"	1249A	"	1/40,250	"	23,500' 1C1

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HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 10 March 1945
13 CBW FO 66
13 CBW OPS 292
3 AD FO 606

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (DORTMUND, GERMANY)

TO : Colonel Shuck - 95th

1. Information Concerning the Targets: a. The primary targets (Visual) were in the Railway M/Y $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles W of the center of Dortmund, Germany. 13A's assigned MPI was the Choke point at the S end of the yard; 13B's was the center of the Sorting Sidings; and that of 13C the Rail-over-Road Bridges at the NE entrance of the yard.

b. The primary target (C/M) for 13A, B, and C was the center of the Sorting Sidings in the Dortmund M/Y.

c. The secondary target (Visual or H2X) for 13A, B, and C was the Dortmund sud Railway center SE of the center of the city.

2. Narrative of the Attack:

a. 13 A Group - 100A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three Squadrons of 13A made a normal take off and assembled over Buncher 11. Wing assembly was effected at Felixstowe. Buncher 11, on the Wing assembly line, was cut short in order to pick up time. 13A crossed the English Coast at 1109 hours, 3 miles S of CP 1, altitude 20000⁰.

(b) Route: 13A was 4 miles left of course over the North Sea. CP 2 was crossed at 1146 hours, on course, altitude 24000⁰. In the Zuider Zee area, the last Group of the 45th Wing began to lag behind the Wing Leader and vector to the left of course. To avoid interfering with this Group at the turn at the Pre-IP, the 13A Leader also vectored to the left of course. At 0730E, 13A vectored to the right when the Group ahead made no attempt to correct into the Pre-IP. 13A turned approximately 3 miles NE of the Pre-IP, and 3 miles E of IP where the RN's took over for individual runs.

The RP was cut short approximately 6 miles. The route out was essentially as briefed, except for minor deviations for echelon purposes. The Continental Coast was crossed at 1432 hours, altitude 7000⁰. Beachy Head was crossed at 1452 hours, altitude 7000⁰. After bombs away, the Group was reassembled very quickly. The briefed RP was cut short approximately 6 miles short. The briefed course was intercepted at 5041-0748. The route out was essentially as briefed. The Continental Coast was crossed at 5032-0135, 1432 hours, altitude 7000⁰.

(c) Weather: Over the base areas a low stratus layer prevailed, reported tops to be at 5000⁰. A 10/10 undercast was reported throughout the entire route. Some high cirrus clouds were reported, but no difficulty was experienced with these at altitude.

(d) Difficulties: Difficulty was experienced with the 45th Wing in the Zuider Zee area.

(e) PFF Narrative: Four PFF A/C were dispatched. 100A, B, and C received beacons, and made C/M sightings on the primary. 100A-deputy was not able to receive beacons. 100A allowed course to get too far on outside of curvature C/M course, and as a result had difficulty in making bomb run.

(2) Bombings:

(a) 100A Squadron: (8717)

1. AL	Cpl. Satterlin	N	Lt. Kreplaman
P	Capt. Brown	AN	Capt. Passen
GP		RN	Lt. Lentz
		B	Maj. Ventris

Bombs Dropped

2. A/C Attacking:			
a. Primary	12	456x100 GP	
		22x500 IB	

b. Bombing Altitude: 24000'

c. Time of Release: 1234

3. Run-in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP, the RN proceeded to set up a C/M course. The RN encountered difficulty, however, at the beginning of the run in killing course because the briefed GP was not made good. Subsequent rate checks, nevertheless, were good and bombs were released on a true heading of 217 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(b) 100B Squadron: (8209)

1. AL	Capt. Gibbons	N	Lt. Romanewski
P	Lt. Ellis	AN	
GP		RN	Lt. Turner
		B	Lt. Snyder

Bombs Dropped

2. A/C Attacking:			
a. Primary	13	531x100 GP	
		23x500 IB	
Returning	1	9x100 GP	
		1x500 IB	

b. Bombing Altitude: 24500'

c. Time of Release: 1235

3. Run-in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP, the RN proceeded to set up a C/M course. The bombardier was clutched in at the first check and two subsequent rate checks (the third and fifth) were good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 193 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 521: Had 9x100 GP and 1x500 IB hang up. These were returned to base.

(c) 100C Squadron: (7636)

1. AL	Capt. Albrecht	N	Lt. Cheney
P	Lt. Rayford	AN	
GP		RN	Lt. Pivenka
		B	Lt. Ruth

Bombs Dropped

2. A/C Attacking:

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Jettisoning 1 1x500 IB
Returning 1 1x100 GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 23500'

c. Time of Release: 1236

1. Run-in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP the RN picked up the beacons and proceeded to set up a C/M course. The bombardier was clutched in on the first check. Five subsequent rate checks were good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 179 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 841: 1 500 IB failed to release at target. It later fell through the bomb bay doors at 5036-0743 at 1252 hours. A/C 334: Had 1x100 GP hang up and was returned to base.

b. 13 B Group - 95A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three Squadrons of 13B made a normal take off and assembly over Buncher 23. Wing and Division assembly points were made on time and on course in trail of 13A. GP 1 was departed at 1110, at 20000'.

(b) Route: The briefed course was closely followed while crossing the North Sea and GP 2 was reached 1 minute early, at 24000'. 13B remained on course and made the next turning point good. On the run to the IP the Air Leader noticed that 13A was vectoring to the right of course but still elected to follow him. However, as the RN informed the Air Leader that 13B was not going to make the IP good, the decision was made to allow the RN to take over and attack the target. A heading of 090 degrees was taken to intercept the briefed course. An IP was established at 5155-0725 and a C/M run was made to the primary with 95C in formation with 95A. 95B made the IP good and started a C/M run to the primary, releasing its bombs before the leader. The RP was made good and 95B "S"ed on the next leg in order to effect a reassembly. The briefed route was closely followed and the Continental Coast crossed at Le Touquet, at 1432, at 6500'. The English Coast was crossed at 1453, at 6500', 6 miles to the right of course.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A.

(d) Navigational Difficulties: None.

(e) FFF Narrative: Three FFF A/C were dispatched. 95A and B had strong beacon reception. 95C had no beacon reception. 95A and B made C/M sightings on the primary.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 95B Squadron: (8754)

1. AL Capt. Morris N Lt. Pieper
P Capt. Savage AN
GP RN Lt. Finfinger
B Lt. Seferian

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Primary 7 284x100 GP
12x500 IB
Composite Sqdn
Primary 6 220x100 GP
9x500 IB
21x100 GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 25000'

c. Time of Release: 1235 1/2

3. Run-in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP, the RN picked up beacons and proceeded to set up a C/M course. The bombardier was clutched in on the first rate check and subsequent rate checks, except the second and third, were good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 188 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: Composite Sqdn: A/C 297: Had 11x100 GP and 2x500 IB hang up and were returned to base. A/C 945: Had 21x100 GP and 1x500 IB jam in the bomb bays over the target. These bombs accidentally fell through bomb bay doors at 5028-0242 in France at 1417 hours. Bombs were "safe."

(b) 95A, C Squadrons: (8144, 8364)

1.	AL	Maj. Swinney	N	Lt. Doherty
	P	Capt. Hamilton	AN	Lt. Rohn
	CP		RN	Lt. Burrow
			B	Lt. Asprocolas

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a.	Primary	24	987x100 GP
			44x500 IB
	Returning	2	43x100 GP
			2x500 IB

b. Bombing Altitude: 24000'

c. Time of Release: 1236

3. Run-in from IP to Target: Attacking on a true heading of 175 degrees the RN picked up beacons and proceeded to set up a C/M course. The bombardier was clutched in on the first check. All subsequent rate checks, except the last were good. Bombs were finally released on a true heading of 191 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. 95C bombed in formation with 95A because of peer beacon reception.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 8741: Returned 42x100 GP and 2x500 IB. (Returning spare) A/C 6902: Returned 1x100 GP because of a rack malfunction.

c. 13 C Group - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: 13C assembled 2000' lower than 13A over Buncher 11. 13C assembled and began the climb to bombing altitude at 1025'. The Wing leader, apparently, started to climb, because 13C had difficulty in keeping in Wing formation. CP 1 was made good on time and on course. The altitude was 19200'.

(b) Route: CP 2 was reached on time and on course. 13C was echeloned to the left on the route across the Zuider Zee, and on the pre-IP turn was crowded still further to the left causing a wide sweeping turn 10 to 15 miles E of the pre-IP. From this point, the IP

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was made good, and C/M runs by 390A, with 390C in formation, and 390B were begun on the primary. After the left turn off the target, 13C reassembled into Group formation. The formation went slightly to the E of course to allow the lead A/C of 390C to drop bombs, which had hung up, on the primary bomb run. Because of a VHF misunderstanding, however, the bombs were not dropped on the secondary at Siegen, and were brought back to the base. 13C lost 13B temporarily on the withdrawal route, and "S"ed considerably to get into Wing position when the Group was finally located. The Continental Coast was departed at 1434 at 8000' approximately 10 miles north of course. The English Coast was entered in the Hastings area.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A.

(d) Difficulties: None.

(e) PFF Narrative: Three PFF A/C were dispatched. 390A retained beacons 7 miles from the target, only after both course and rate kept fading in and out at the beginning of the run. 390B had strong beacon reception. 390C received intermittent, fading beacons, which were not reliable for bombing. 390A and B made C/M sightings on the primary.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 390A, G Squadrons: (571; 833)

<u>1.</u>	AL	Capt. Jones	N	Lt. Sommer
	P	Lt. Presswood	AN	Lt. Lewis
	CP	Lt. Arnold	RN	Lt. Matteson
			B	Lt. Buck

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Primary	24	918x100 GP
			41x500 IB
	Returning	4	122x100 GP
			5x500 IB

b. Bombing Altitude: 24000'

c. Time of Release: 1237

3. Run-in from IP to Target: Bomb bay doors were opened prior to the IP. After the maneuver at the IP the RN picked up beacons and proceeded to set up a C/M course. Rate and course beacons faded on the bomb run, consequently, the bombardier was not clutched in until the 7 mile check. All subsequent rate checks were good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 215 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. 390C bombed in formation with 390A because of poor beacon reception.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: 390C: A/C 447 had 37x100 GP hang up and were returned to base. A/C 393 returned 17x100 GP and 1x500 IB because of rack malfunctions. A/C 932 had mission failure and returned 42x100 GP and 2x500 IB. A/C 048 returned 26x100 GP and 2x500 IB because of rack malfunctions.

(b) 390B Squadron: (750)

<u>1.</u>	AL	Lt. Maxwell	N	Lt. Drew
	P	Lt. Fisher	AN	
	CP		RN	Lt. Conroy
			B	Lt. Liana

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2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Primary	12	499x100 GP
Returning	1	22x500 IB
		1xBB-1
		3xWG 34
		1xT321
		5xT325

3. Bombing Altitude: 25500'

4. Time of Release: 1237½

3. Run-in from IP to Target: Bomb bay doors were opened prior to the IP. After the maneuver at the IP, the RN picked up beacons strong and clear and proceeded to set up a C/W course. The bombardier was slouched in and all rate checks except the first were good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 187 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photos show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 945 had a mission failure and returned 10 leaflet containers.

3. Communications: a. VHF: (1) Col. Sutterlin led the 13th Wing. Interference which consisted mainly of continuous keying made communications on Channel A very unsatisfactory. Throughout assembly, Wing Leader had little or no contact with aircraft of his own Group or other Groups in the Wing. The channel cleared up over the Continent.

(2) Channel B was reported as satisfactory; the first two control points were sent, but number three was not.

(3) Wing Leader was unable to contact fighter escort, but reached the ground sector. 95 Leader established communications with fighters and talked to them freely.

(4) No distress transmissions were reported. All Guards performed duties satisfactorily.

b. W/T: (1) Control Points and Strike Reports were transmitted successfully to Division W/T Station.

(2) Control Points:

	CP 1	CP 2	TRGT	CP 3	BASE
Timings	1108	1146	1233	1320	1536
A.T.A.	1109	1146	1236	1325	1545

(3) Strike Reports:

100	P B 5	1236
95	P B 5	1236
390	P B 5	1237

4. Mission Camera Report: a. 95 installed 1 scope, 4 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras, 0, 4, and 9 of which took pictures: PFF A/C 8144 with scope camera installed: Failed to take pictures, cause undetermined.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

b. 100 installed 1 scope, 1 oblique, and 10 vertical cameras, 1, 1, and 9 of which took pictures: A/C 8344 with K-21 installed: camera frozen.

c. 390 installed 2 scope, 2 oblique, and 9 vertical cameras, 2, 1, and 8 of which took pictures: PFF A/C 447 with scope and K-21 cameras installed: Failed to drop bombs. A/C 904 with oblique camera: Camera not used.

5. Planning and Execution of the Mission:

a. Group Order and Strength:

(1)	93 A, B, C, D Groups:		12 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(a)	490	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(b)	493	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(c)	34	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(d)	385	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(2)	45 A, B, C Groups:		9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(a)	96	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(b)	452	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(c)	388	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(3)	13 A, B, C Groups:		3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a)	100	42x100 GP 2xM17	1 x 12 A/C Squadron 2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(b)	95	42x100 GP 2xM17	1 x 12 A/C Squadron 1 x 13 A/C Squadron 1 x 7 A/C Comp Squadron 1 x 6 A/C Comp Squadron
(c)	100 390	42x100 GP 2xM17	1 x 12 A/C Squadron 2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(4)	4 A, B, C, D Groups:		12 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(a)	94	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(b)	447	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(c)	487	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(d)	486	42x100 GP 2xM17	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons

b. A/C and C/G Available:

(1)	95	REG 30 A/C PFF 11 A/C MH 7 A/C	50 C/G 7 C/G 7 C/G
(2)	100	REG 45 A/C PFF 11 A/C MH 5 A/C	59 C/G 7 C/G 6 C/G
(3)	390	REG 41 A/C PFF 10 A/C	54 C/G 9 C/G

C O N F I D E N T I A L

6. Controller's Log:

a. 1840 from 3 AD: (1) Alert (2) Force & Order.
b. 1945 from 13CW: (1) Alert.
c. 2000 from 3 AD: (1) Force & Order (2) Targets (3) Zero Hour
(4) RBA (5) DAP (6) Route (7) Assembly Altitude
(8) Bombing Altitude.
d. 2035 from 13CW: (1) Force & Order (2) Zero Hour (3) RBA
(4) Assembly Line & Altitude. (4)
e. 2045 from 3 AD: (1) Route Change (2) Targets.
f. 2115 from 13CW: (1) AW to 13 CBW FO 65.
g. 2142 from 3 AD: (1) Diver Zone (2) Assembly Altitude.
h. 2145 from 3 AD: (1) AW to 3 AD FO 606.
i. 2205 from 3 AD: (1) Leaflet Load.
j. 2210 from 13CW: (1) Leaflet Load.
k. 2210 from 13CW: (1) Diver Zone.
l. 2240 from 3 AD: (1) Scrub Plan (2) Check T/O Times.
m. 2245 from 13CW: (1) Scrub Plan (2) Hold Gas Load.
n. 2250 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 1 to AW to 3 AD FO 606.
o. 2256 from 13CW: (1) Annex 1 to AW to 13 CBW FO 65.
p. 2355 from 3 AD: (1) A-2 Conference.
q. 2357 from 13CW: (1) Same as p.
r. 0000 from 13CW: (1) C/M Mission.
s. 0005 from 3 AD: (1) Bomb Load (2) T/I (3) Method of Loading
(4) Zero Hour (5) RBA (6) Time Control
(7) Targets (8) Force & Order (9) Assembly
Altitude (10) Assembly (11) Route (12) Bombing
Altitude.
t. 0050 from 13CW: (1) Bomb Load (2) Zero Hour (3) RBA (4) Gas
Load.
u. 0100 from 13CW: (1) Targets.
v. 0105 from 3 AD: (1) Leaflet Load.
w. 0128 from 13CW: (1) FO 66.
x. 0148 from 3 AD: (1) Targets.
y. 0155 from 3 AD: (1) Timings (2) Assembly Altitude.
z. 0200 from 13CW: (1) Targets.
aa. 0230 from 13CW: (1) Timings (2) Assembly Altitude (3) Bombing
Altitude.
bb. 0240 from 3 AD: (1) 3 AD FO 606.
cc. 0307 from 3 AD: (1) A-2 Annex to 3 AD FO 606.
dd. 0350 from 3 AD: (1) Timings.
ee. 0442 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 606.
ff. 0550 from 3 AD: (1) MH Info to 3 AD FO 606.

For the Commanding General:

Ernest A. Kiessling

ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Major, Air Corps,
Director of Training & Analysis.

- DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
- CBW B GROUP 95B GP. LEADER Lt. Morris A/C 8754 W/T WOC-Z
POSITION High DEPUTY LDR. Lt. Ryan A/C 8657 W/T WOC-V
- EST. TAXI TIME EST. T.O. 1ST A/C ETD BASE

- DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
- CBW B GROUP 95A GP. LEADER Maj. Swinney A/C 8144 W/T JHZ
POSITION Lead DEPUTY LDR. Lt. Setchum A/C 8942 W/T TXO-Y
- EST. TAXI TIME EST. T.O. 1ST A/C ETD BASE
ETR BASE
- NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 12 NUMBER OF SPARES INCLUDED
INCLUDED 1
- TIME 1ST T.O. LAST T.O. TIME 1ST LANDING
LAST LANDING
- SQUADRON 334 NO. OF A/C CALL SIGNS: W/T WOC

A/C	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
REM'S.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

SQUADRON 335 NO. OF A/C 8 CALL SIGNS: W/T TXO

	<u>Y</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>G</u>											
A/C	<u>8942</u>	<u>8269</u>	<u>7782</u>	<u>7204</u>	<u>6838</u>	<u>9052</u>	<u>8255</u>	<u>6902</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	<u>842</u>	<u>854</u>	<u>855</u>	<u>856</u>	<u>857</u>	<u>928</u>	<u>857</u>	<u>858</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	<u>1540</u>	<u>1545</u>	<u>1547</u>	<u>1600</u>	<u>1546</u>	<u>1546</u>	<u>1612</u>	<u>1547</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
REM'S.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

SQUADRON 336 NO. OF A/C 1 CALL SIGNS: W/T JHZ

A/C	<u>8144</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	<u>901</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	<u>1545</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
REM'S.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

SQUADRON 412 NO. OF A/C 3 CALL SIGNS: W/T LLO

	<u>J</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>																	
A/C	<u>8526</u>	<u>6946</u>	<u>8741</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	<u>859</u>	<u>900</u>	<u>901</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	<u>1535</u>	<u>1529</u>	<u>1258</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
REM'S.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

7. EXPLANATION: Aircraft F.T.O., R.E., Landed away from base, and Outstanding.


FOUR HUNDRED TWELFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
APO 559

10 March 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion

TO : Office of the Squadron Commander, 412th Bomb Sqdn (H), 95th Bomb Gp (H),
APO 559, U. S. Army.


1. Tanks were checked before starting engines and found normal.
2. Fuel was not draining into No. 2 main tank. Upon reaching 5243N - 0437E at 1153 hours. No. 2 tank read 45 gal. and the left hand feeder had 180 gal. Due to a wing change pilot thought gas was not draining into No. 2.
3. Pilot called leader asking if it would be alright to continue on mission and land in France to refuel. Pilot was advised it was best to abort. Pilot stayed with formation to see if there was any change in fuel but later aborted
4. Aircraft aborted because of malfunction of fuel system at 5243N - 0437E at 1154 hours.
5. Aircraft number is 44-8741.


LEE R. YOUNG
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Pilot.

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, 412TH BOMB SQDN (H), 95TH BOMB GP (H), APO 559, U. S. ARMY, 10 Mar 45.
TO: Commanding Officer (Attn: Gp Ops. Off.), 95th Bomb Gp (H), APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. The gauge on the No. 2 feeder tank of this ship was faulty and gave the pilot a bad indication.
2. The pilot had in mind to go ahead with the formation to the target and land in France to gas up there. However, with the bad weather present; the formation leader advised him to return to base and not take chances.
3. The gauges and tanks on this ship are being thoroughly checked by engineering.
4. Disciplinary action taken at this time: None.


JAMES O. FRANKOSKI
Major, Air Corps,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY-FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Intelligence Officer

APC 559
10 March 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the Mission to Dortmundfeld, 10 March.
TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APC 559.

1. The Mission: The 95th Group flew as 13B Combat Group to attack the marshalling yard at Dortmundfeld, Germany. All three squadrons bombed the primary target on Micro-H. 95B was the first squadron to bomb. 95C radar navigator couldn't pick up the beacons, consequently 95C bombed with 95A in group formation.

95A - Eleven A/C plus one PFF took off forming the lead squadron. Ten A/C plus the PFF bombed the primary target. One spare A/C, 8741, turned back at 5243-0427 at 1154 hours because the fuel was not draining to No. 2 tank.

95B - Six A/C plus one PFF took off and formed the lead element of the lead section and the high element, the remainder of the high squadron being furnished by the 100th Group. All our A/C bombed the primary target.

95C - Twelve A/C plus one PFF took off and formed the low squadron. All A/C bombed the primary target.

2. For further information reference is suggested to the S-2 Operational Narrative TWX.

For the Intelligence Officer:



F. X. PIERCE
1st. Lt., Air Corps
Ass't. S-2 Officer

CG, 13TH CBW
CO, 100TH BG
CO, 390TH BG

XX

95TH BOMB GP XX

10 MAR 1945 1845 S-2

S-2 OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE 95TH BOMB GROUP DORTMUNDFELD 10 MAR 1945

1. Leaflets - None.
2. Bombing Results -
B Squadron - primary, Micro-H - Photos all clouds. Beacons registered early, excellent run, good results says R/N.
A Squadron - primary, Micro-H. Photos and beacon returns as in B Squadron. R/N says results good.
C Squadron - primary. Dropped in group formation on A Squadron. (See paragraph 7). Photos cloud covered. Results estimated good.
3. E/A - None.
4. Flak:
95A - 4A, 5AC, IP-BRL
95B - None.
95C - 3A, 2AC, IP-BRL
Final Report
B. Operations:
 1. 95A and C squadrons followed group ahead which went off course between pre-IP and IP, but regained course shortly after IP was reached. Damage by these squadrons was picked up while off course.
 2. None.
 3. None.C. Amount, Accuracy and Type of Fire.
 1. 5210-0720 moderate, accurate, tracking.
 2. Target moderate, accurate, tracking.
 3. Target moderate, accurate, tracking.
 3. None.
 4. None.
 5. None.D. Phenomena: None.
5. Weather - 9/10ths below 8,000 feet.

(continued)

6. Observations -

1304 hrs - 5007-0735 - Several hundred white shiny objects seen at stream about ground in an irregular pattern-objects larger than an average house in size.

7. Friendly fighter support was excellent, being particularly close during the bomb run. Briefed route was followed to pre-IP turning at 5246-0650 then 13A drifted off to the right. 95B made good the IP and bomb run as briefed, rallied over Arusberg, 5124-0804, then eased to allow 95A and 95C to catch them. 95C R/N couldn't get beacons so 95C dropped with 95A in group formation. 95A and 95C followed 13A to about 5200-0712 which was used as an IP for a good run. In attempting to return to briefed route after following 13A off course for a considerable distance, 95A and 95C were subjected to considerable accurate flak at about 5205-0715.

Mar

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

SECRET
By Authority Of
G. G. Eighth Air Force
Initials *M.H.*
Date 10 March 1945

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 314

PERIOD: 0001 hours 10 March to 2400 hours 10 March 1945

A. STATISTICS

	Total Sorties	Effective Sorties	Tonnage	Claims	Losses			NYR
					E/A	AA	OT	
Heavy Bomber Atks.	1359	1332	3207.4	0-0-0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Escort (a)	487	468	0	0-0-0	0	0	3	3
Fighter Sweeps	150	144	0	2-0-1A 0-0-0G	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	16	16	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	39	39	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	15	15	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>62</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>31.5</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	2128	2069	3238.9	2-0-1A 0-0-0G	0	0	3	3

(a) Includes 351st and 362nd Groups based on Continent.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

1359 a/c (983 B-17s, 376 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied in three forces against seven M/Ys, two RR centers and two RR viaducts in western Germany. 1332 a/c dropped 3207.4 tons (2697.2 tons GP, 510.2 tons IB) on all primaries, one secondary and one T/O. Bombing by PFF. Weather: 9/10-10/10 over all targets. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil (1 a/c cat. "E"). NYR: nil.

First Force

Thirty-six squadron formations (376 B-24s - 2nd Air Division) sortied against two RR viaducts and a M/Y east of the Ruhr. 368 a/c dropped 977.6 tons (921.1 tons GP, 56.5 tons IB) by PFF on Arnsberg and Bielefeld RR Viaducts, Paderborn and Bielefeld M/Ys at 1004-1210 hours from 18,500-23,200 feet. Leaflets dropped on Arnsberg, Paderborn and Bielefeld. Weather: 10/10 undercast over all targets. Flak: nil. Battle Damage: 1 minor. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

SECRET

S E C R E T

Fighter Support: Three groups (155 P-51s) sortied. Up 0930-0952 hours; down 1410-1455 hours. 146 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Arnsberg RR Viaduct	118	115	320.2	.5	Unobserved
Paderborn M/Y	130	129	263.4	56.0	Unobserved
Bielefeld RR Viaduct	128	114	310.0		Unobserved
Bielefeld M/Y (secondary)	—	<u>10</u>	<u>27.5</u>	—	Unobserved
Totals	376	368	921.1	56.5	

Second Force

Fourteen group formations (526 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) sortied against four M/Ys at Dortmund and Soest. 511 a/c dropped 1256.0 tons (1023.1 tons GP, 232.9 tons IB) by PFF on all primaries at 1228-1255 hours from 21,500-27,000 feet. Leaflets dropped on Soest and Dortmund. Weather: 9/10-10/10 undercast over all targets. Flak: meager to moderate, generally inaccurate, tracking barrage over targets. Battle Damage: 39 minor, 5 major, 1 cat. "E". E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Three groups (158 P-51s) sortied. Up 1030-1100 hours; down 1440-1500 hours. 152 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51, believed shot down by friendly B-17; pilot safe. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Soest M/Y	144	138	287.3	64.0	Unobserved
Dortmund/Sud M/Y	110	109	212.8	49.3	Unobserved
Dortmunderfeld M/Y	114	111	221.5	48.8	Unobserved
Dortmund/Eving M/Y	<u>158</u>	<u>153</u>	<u>301.5</u>	<u>70.8</u>	Unobserved
Totals	526	511	1023.1	232.9	

Third Force

Twelve group formations (457 B-17s - 1st Air Division) sortied against two M/Ys and two RR centers in the Ruhr. 453 a/c dropped 973.8 tons (753.0 tons GP, 220.8 tons IB) by PFF on all primaries, Dortmund/Sud M/Y (secondary) and Hamm at 1153-1324 hours from 23,000-26,000 feet. Leaflets dropped on Sinsen, Hamm, Dortmund and Schwerte. Weather: 10/10 undercast over all targets. Flak: meager, inaccurate. Battle Damage: 21 minor, 5 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Fighter Support: Two groups (100 P-51s) sortied. Up 1112-1115 hours; down 1440-1720 hours. 98 effective sorties. 359th Group patrolled Remagen area after completing escort. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 P-51s, believed hit by friendly flak over Remagen. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Eff. Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Sinson RR Center	111	89	143.1	41.5	Unobserved
Goesfeld RR Center	117	38	64.4	18.8	Unobserved
Schwerte M/Y	116	116	192.7	56.7	Unobserved
Hagen M/Y	113	41	69.2	20.5	Unobserved
Dortmund M/Y (secondary)		136	228.3	67.3	Unobserved
<u>Other Target</u>					
Hamm	---	<u>33</u>	<u>55.3</u>	<u>16.0</u>	Unobserved
Totals	457	453	753.0	220.8	

2. Fighter Escort

Ten groups (487 P-51s, including 74 P-51s from two groups based on Continent supporting Ninth Air Force) sortied as follows:

Support to Eighth Air Force

Eight groups (413 P-51s) sortied in support of three bomber forces. Up 0930-1115 hours; down 1410-1720 hours. 396 effective sorties. One group patrolled Remagen area after completing escort. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 P-51s (one believed shot down by friendly B-17, two believed hit by friendly flak over Remagen). NYR: nil.

Support to Ninth Air Force

Two groups based on Continent (74 P-51s) sortied in support of Ninth Air Force bombers. Up 1144-1235 hours; down 1405-1705 hours. 72 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: 1 P-51 believed safe.

3. Fighter Sweeps

Four groups (127 P-51s, 23 P-47s - 150 a/c) sortied on free lance support to bombers and area patrol. Up 0957-1452 hours; down 1452-1909 hours. 144 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: combat with 4 - 5 FW-190s and 6 bomb-laden Me-109s east of Remagen. Claims: 2-0-1 air. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

S E C R E T

5. Photo Reconnaissance

16 a/c (7 F-5s, 4 Spitfires, 5 P-51s) sortied as follows:

3 F-5s mapped LaRochelle area.

4 F-5s on Photo reconnaissance of Ruhr and St. Nazaire areas.

4 Spitfires on DA mission to Ruhr and Western Germany and activity study in Lorient area.

5 P-51s as fighter escort to PRU a/c.

Losses: nil.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

39 a/c (7 B-17s, 4 Mosquitoes and 28 P-51s) sortied as follows:

2 B-17s on weather flights over sea NW of Lands End.

1 B-17 on flight to Azores.

1 B-17 on flight from Azores.

4 Mosquitoes on weather flights over North Sea, Norway, Denmark, Germany,

31 a/c (3 B-17s, 28 P-51s) as weather scouts for bomber forces. 1 P-51 abortive.

Losses: nil.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

15 a/c (13 P-47s, 2 PBYS) sortied on routine search and patrol missions.

Losses: nil.

8. Special Operations

62 a/c (17 B-17s, 38 B-24s and 7 Mosquitoes) sortied as follows:

3 Mosquitoes on special operations.

12 B-17s and 4 Mosquitoes on chaff dispensing for bomber forces.

4 B-24s on RCM, jamming from 0658-1140 hours.

1 B-24 on search patrol, jamming from 0754-1140 hours.

5 B-17s on Radar reconnaissance.

13 B-24s attacked Munster Goods Yard, dropping 31.5 tons by PFF at 2036-2048 hours with unobserved results. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

11 B-24s dropped leaflets on Holland, Germany and France, night of 9/10 March.

9 B-24s on special operations. 2 a/c successful. Night 9/10 March.

Losses: nil.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

The G.A.F. again completely ignored the very strong forces of escorted heavy bombers making shallow penetrations over Western Germany. No e/a were sighted, although a few sightings of contrails indicate possible jet e/a activity.

One squadron of a group of our P-47s assigned to patrol the Remagen bridgehead area engaged a formation of six bomb-carrying Me 109s accompanied by some 4-5 Fw 190s without bombs. These e/a, flying at 3,000 to 4,000 feet, were engaged around 1525-1530 hours in the vicinity of the bridgehead. E/a were forced to jettison their bombs (described as larger than belly tanks) and disperse, the P-47s claiming 2-0-1.

2. Flak

Sinsen, Schwerte, Hagen - meager, inaccurate.

Dortmund - meager to moderate, generally inaccurate, tracking and barrage.

Soest - meager, inaccurate, tracking and barrage.

3. Observations

Many vehicles parked in rows, believed to be tanks, seen through break in undercast at approximately 5042N-0821E.

At 5007N-0735E (SW of Coblenz) several hundred light shiny objects observed. Crews state they were larger than an average house and strewn about ground in an irregular pattern.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

10/10 cloud cover prevents assessment of damage.

5. Ground Activity

21st Army Group - 1st Canadian Army - After enemy troops re-entered Veen, it has been again cleared by Canadian armor. British infantry have cleared Xanten and Luttingen.

9th U. S. Army - Infantry cleared Ossenburg and Drupt, continuing to meet very heavy opposition.

12th Army Group - 1st U. S. Army - Infantry advanced southeast, clearing Konigsfeld F6111 and patrols moved south, making no contact with the enemy. The Remagen bridge was damaged by artillery fire but later repaired. Armor has cleared the area to the Rhine in the sector south of Bonn and the town itself has been cleared by infantry.

3rd U. S. Army - Armored elements have cleared Schweich L3138 and Beckond L3340 and advanced three miles north-east. Infantry have advanced three miles clearing Musweiler and a cavalry group captured Dreis L3449; troops widening the salient eastward advanced six miles on a four mile front, clearing Manderscheid L3366 and Udersdorf. Armor pushing southwest have cleared Hambuch L6080 and Montonich 6980, these towns are south of Mayen and north of the Moselle River. Other troops advancing from their positions on the Moselle in the Kobern sector have cleared Gondorf to the south and Winnigen to the east. Armor pushing north have cleared Andernach 7604 on the Rhine and contact has been made with the 1st Army troops at Hanebach 5805. Turning eastwards this armor reached the Rhine north of Andernach 7604. Enemy resistance in this area has collapsed and many thousands of p/w's have been taken. Troops are wiping up the enemy resistance and the pocket formed by the contact of the 1st and 3rd Armies in Hanebach 5805 and it is expected that this pocket will be cleared today.

Miscellaneous - Coal shortage repercussions on Industry

Due to fuel shortage, the Rheinmetal-Borsig Armaments factory at Luneburg, which employs over 4,000 workers, was reliably reported to be on the point of closing down on the 10th February. Output had been steadily falling off for some time. If the fuel issuing authorities in Hanover are unable to make the essential minimum allocations for February and March (600 tons coal and 300 tons coke) the plant will have no alternative but to close down. (E.T. & S. Summary, 21 A/Grp. 1105/2)

D. OPERATIONS OF OTHER AIR FORCES

1. Tactical Air Forces

	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Ninth Air Force	1182	0-0-0	6
First US T.A.F.	337	0-0-0	0
Second T.A.F.	325	0-0-0	4
RAF Fighter Command	<u>247</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	2091	0-0-0	10

Ninth Air Force

Sorties - 419 Bombers
763 Fighters
1182 a/c

S E C R E T

Night - 9/10 March

Sorties - 14
Mission - Intruder Patrols east and west of Rhine
Claims & Losses- Nil

Day - 9 March

Missions - 9th Bomb Div.: 419 sorties. Railway centers and cities in central battle area including Coblenz, Siegen, Lennep; unobserved results. E/A Opposition: 1 Me-262 sighted - no combat.

9th T.A.C.: 302 sorties. Armed reconnaissance east of Rhine in Cologne-Bonn area; interception patrols in Remagen area.

19th T.A.C.: 336 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in Coblenz, Homburg, Mainz areas; air cooperation for ground forces.

29th T.A.C.: 111 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in Northern Ruhr; air cooperation and bomber escort.

E/A Claims - Nil

Other Claims		<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T		122	74
Locomotives		30	10
RR Cars		23	48
Gun Positions		9	11
Rail Cuts		12	

Losses - 6 Fighters and Fighter-Bombers

RAF Fighter Command

Night - 9/10 March

Sorties - 13
Missions - Interception Patrols
Claims & Losses- Nil

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Day - 10 March

Sorties - 234

Missions - 117 sorties. Rocket sites, railways, communications and facilities in the Hague area. 24 sorties on interception patrols. 89 a/c - escort to bombers. 2 a/c - escort to transport aircraft. 2 a/c - weather reconnaissance.

Claims & Losses- Nil

Second TAF

Night - 9/10 March

Sorties - 111

Missions - 63 a/c on armed reconnaissance east of Rhine. 36 a/c on interception patrols. 12 a/c on reconnaissance. Flying bomb traffic also attacked.

E/A Claims - Nil

Other Claims - M/T 7 destroyed 15 damaged

Losses - 4 a/c

Day - 10 March

Sorties - 214

Missions - 32 a/c on armed reconnaissance north of Ruhr. 60 a/c on pre-arranged support. 67 a/c on interception patrols. 39 a/c on reconnaissance. 16 a/c on Air/Sea Rescue patrols.

E/A Claims - Nil

Other Claims - M/T 2 destroyed 3 damaged
Rail Cuts 1 destroyed

Losses - Nil

First US T.A.F.

Night - 9/10 March

Sorties - 4

Mission - Intruder and Interception

Claims & Losses- Nil

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Day - 10 March

Sorties - 33 Bombers
300 Fighter-Bombers
333 a/c

Missions - 42nd Bomb Wing: 21 a/c attacked supply dump R-1166.

12th T.A.C.: 229 sorties. Armed reconnaissance in the southern battle area and air cooperation.

1st French T.A.C.: 69 sorties. Dive-bombed Freiburg. Armed reconnaissance in Nuremburg-Lowrech area.

Western French A.F.: 12 bombers attacked A/F at Puyravaut. 3 fighter a/c on reconnaissance.

E/A Claims - Nil

Other Claims -	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
M/T	29	0
RR Cars	13	25
Rail Cuts	10	
Highway Cuts	4	

Losses - Nil

2. Fifteenth Air Force

125 B-17s, 84 B-24s, 93 P-38s and 88 P-51s sortied. 115 B-17s and 77 B-24s escorted by 84 P-38s and 82 P-51s dropped 533 tons GP on Verona Parone RR Bridge; 3 tons GP on Voghera M/Y. Losses: 1 P-38.

Narrative: 4 of the P-51s made pre-raid reconnaissance on Verona Bridge because photo reconnaissance on R.A.F. attack of previous night was lacking. Operational Highlights: Groups were briefed to bomb visually after positive target identification was accomplished by individual boxes in order to allow for maximum number of range and deflection sightings.

3. R.A.F. Bomber Command

Day - 10 March

<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>Losses</u>
155 Lancasters	Scholven Buer Synthetic Oil Plant at Gelsenkirchen	0

S E C R E T

Night - 10/11 March

60 Mosquitoes	Berlin	0
4 Mosquitoes	Gotha	0
4 Mosquitoes	Weimar	0
4 Mosquitoes	Jena	0
10 Mosquitoes)	Bomber Support	0
2 Stirlings)		0
18 Halifaxes)		0
6 Fortresses)		0
4 Liberators)		0
2 Mosquitoes)	R.C.M.	0
<u>3</u> Halifaxes)		<u>0</u>
117 a/c total		0

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

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