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Authority 745005

By EC/NARA Date 9/16/07

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3086

US 7GR/7B 3MAR.45 F36//25,000 13SQ

IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 3834

LOCALITY: BRUNSWICK

- (a) WILHELMITOR - Wilkewerke A.G. (Constructional Steelwork)
 (b) BUSSING (N.A.G. Armanents and W/T)
 (c) Marshalling Yards

PERIOD COVERED: (a) From 1230B hrs. on 6 AUG 1944 to 1650A hours on 3 MAR 1945.
 (b) From 1245A hrs. on 29 OCT 1944 to 1630A hours on 3 MAR 1945.
 (c) From 1245A hrs. on 20 OCT 1944 to 1630A hours on 3 MAR 1945.

ATTACK:

	<u>Date</u>	<u>S.A.</u>	<u>Reported Weather</u>
U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE	3 MAR 1945	(a) 3327	Clear to one tenth
		(b) 3326	

PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE:

(a) WILKEWERKE A.G. WILHELMITOR:

Considerable additional damage has been caused to this works, where extensive repair of severe previous damage had been executed. The press and forging shop together with medium sized shop adjacent to South side have been partly destroyed and are still burning at time of photography. The roof covering to the large boiler smithery has been shattered and destroyed. The Eastern end of a building adjoining boiler house possibly a generator hall has been severely damaged and small areas of roof destruction are seen to the annealing furnace building and a machine shop on the Western side of site.

(b) N.A.G. WORKS BUSSING:

Moderate fresh damage to this plant has occurred. An area situated in North central portion of large main workshop has been severely damaged and the roof covering about one-tenth of total area at Eastern end has been destroyed. Slight damage is seen to one corner of a workshop immediately to North of the main shop and the Eastern third of a medium building on the Southern boundary has been severely damaged.

(c) RAILWAY FACILITIES AND MARSHALLING YARDS:

A number of fresh craters are seen to have cut tracks leading to the main station from the South and from the West end of the marshalling yards.

Notes from "F" Section:

Details of Damage:FACILITIES:

- Terminal facilities - 5% unserviceable.
 Goods Depot - 5% unserviceable.
 Loco Depot - not covered.

M/Y SIDINGS:

- Sorting Sidings - 30% unserviceable.
 Marshalling Sidings - 20% unserviceable.

(c) OTHER DAMAGE:

Some moderate fresh damage has been caused to unidentified industrial premises lying to the Southwest of the main railway station and a number of fires can be seen among business and residential property to the North, East and Southeast of the railway station.

(Prints 3087 and 4085)

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 13 Squadron.

SORTIE: US7GR/7B.

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 16304 hours on 3 MAR 1945.

SCALE: 1/8,400 (F.L.30").

COVER AND QUALITY: The targets are fully covered on photographs of good quality slightly obscured by smoke and long shadows.

LAST REPORT: (a) K. 2859, dated 8 AUG 1944 and K.S. 1002 dated 17 FEB 1945.
(b) K. 3293 dated 4 NOV 1944.

COMPARATIVE SORTIE USED: (a) 106G/1962 (Prints 3030 and 3045).
(b) US7GR/3545 (Prints 4045-6).

PRINTS DISTRIBUTED: 3087 (to follow when available).

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A.C.I.U.
SCT/RAC

DISTRIBUTION NO. 24-E

325 copies

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3326ATTACK ON BRUNSWICK (BUSSING) on 3 MAR 1945TXF
003

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|
| (a) No. of aircraft | : | 77, with full fighter escort. |
| (b) Command | : | U.S. 8th AIR FORCE. |
| (c) Time | : | 1020 - 1036 A hours. |
| (d) Bombs | : | 521 x 500 lb. G.P.
48 x 250 lb. G.P.
396 x 500 lb. I.B. |

(ii) STATEMENT ON THE TARGET:

The target is the works of BUSSING-NATIONALE AUTOMOBIL GESELLSCHAFT (N.A.G.) VEREINIGTE NUTZKRAFTWAHREN A.G., located about one mile South of the center of BRUNSWICK.

(iii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

- (a) Of four groups of H.E. bursts, one group is seen across the target, one concentration immediately Southeast, and the remaining bursts extend 2000 yards South. Approximately 150 bursts are seen from the 569 H.E. bombs dropped. Incendiary bursts are visible in a wide area South of the target.
- (b) Bursts are seen on the target as follows:
(Numbers refer to the accompanying bomb plot)
- 1 - one possible hit.
 - 2 - one near hit.
 - 3 - two hits, one near hit.
 - 4 - one hit.
- (c) Other bursts are seen as follows:
(Distances measured from the target)
1. Rail lines leading West from the East marshalling yard - 3 hits.
 2. Rail lines leading West from the South marshalling yard - 4 hits.
 3. One, possibly 2, hits on an unidentified industrial type building 800 yards Southwest.
 4. A concentration of 60 H.E. bursts extending South into fields from the target with 10 hits or near hits on buildings just South of the marshalling yard.
 5. A group of 40 H.E. bursts in fields 2100 yards South with probable hits on a roadway, residential and barracks type buildings.
 6. A small group of H.E. bursts seen through smoke 2000 yards Southeast.
 7. Approximately 10 H.E. bursts in the densely built-up section of the city 2000 yards Northeast.

(iv) ACTIVITY:

1. EAST MARSHALLING YARD

- a. The loading is exceptionally light.
- b. One locomotive is seen in steam.

2. SOUTH MARSHALLING YARD

- a. The loading is moderate in the sorting sidings and exceptionally light in the reception/forwarding sidings.
- b. One locomotive is seen in steam.

(v) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(vi) BOMB PLOT: A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed.

FBI
C-3

CONFIDENTIAL
4 MAR 1945

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3327

ATTACK ON BRUNSWICK (WILKEWERKE A.G.) ON 3 MAR 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- | | | | |
|-----|-----------------|---|--|
| (a) | No. of aircraft | : | 53, with full fighter escort. |
| (b) | Command | : | U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE. |
| (c) | Time | : | 1018 to 1036 A hours. |
| (d) | Bombs | : | 362 x 500 lb. G.P.
300 x 500 lb. I.B. |

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

- (a) Five concentrations and scattered groups of bursts are seen extending from the heart of the old city of BRUNSWICK to the BRUNSWICK/BROITZEM AIRFIELD with three groups of bursts blanketing the WILKEWERKE A.G. (constructional engineering works) and scoring many hits on the adjoining targets of MUEHLENBAU INDUSTRIE A.G. (fighter aircraft component factory), railway sorting sidings and junctions, the town gas depot, the Main Railway Station and the airfield. One aircraft is visible on the landing ground and does not appear damaged.

Of the 362 H.E. bombs dropped, approximately 325 bursts are visible on almost clear photographs.

- (b) Bursts are seen on the targets and their facilities as follows:-

1. WILKEWERKE A.G. (Numbers refer to target illustration):

- | | | |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| Power Plant (1) | - | Two near hits. |
| Stock Yard (2 & 5) | - | Five hits. |
| Boiler Smithery (4) | - | At least two direct hits - seen burning. |
| Annealing furnace (7) | - | 1 direct hit. |
| Machine Shop (8) | - | At least two direct hits. |
| Press and Forging Shop (9) | - | At least one direct hit - seen burning. |
| Steel Shop (10) | - | Several near hits. |

2. MUEHLENBAU INDUSTRIE A.G. (Numbers refer to target illustration)

- | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|
| Large workshop (8) | - | Three direct hits. |
| Power Station (9) | - | Two near hits. |
| Large Workshop (10) | - | Two direct hits. |
| Cycle Sheds (4) | - | One direct hit. |
| Stores (3) | - | One direct hit. |
| Large Workshop (6) | - | At least one direct hit - seen burning. |

3. BRUNSWICK/BROITZEM AIRFIELD:

Northeast portion of landing ground and the Eastern half of the hangar and barracks area is seen blanketed by at least 50 bursts with three near hits on hangars and at least three direct hits on the barracks.

4. Railway Sorting Sidings and Adjacent Junctions:

At least 36 hits on the tracks several of which were on the junctions. An explosion is seen on the line just West of the junction originating from a train on that track.

5. Main Railway Station:

At least five direct hits are seen on buildings in the yard while approximately 30 bursts are scattered on the tracks.

Nac

F I L E N U M B E R

MAP OF THE AREA (U)

MAP OF THE AREA, CONTINUED


MARCH 1950

UP:

(red dots)	12 x 81 x 100 GP's & 16 x 500 IB's.
(blue dots)	12 x 81 x 100 GP's & 9 x 500 IB's.
IRON: (blue dots)	12 x 80 x 100 GP's & 12 x 500 IB's.
IRON: (purple dots)	12 x 77 x 100 GP's & 12 x 500 IB's.
(green dots)	13 x 91 x 100 GP's & 8 x 500 IB's.
IRON: (green dots)	12 x 84 x 100 GP's & 72 x 500 IB's.
IRON: (red dots)	12 x 85 x 100 GP's & 16 x 500 IB's.
(red dots)	1 x 100 GP's & 1 IB's.
(red dots)	13 x 92 x 100 GP's & 72 x 500 IB's.

CIRCLES - 1000' & 2000' FROM MPIs OF PRIMARY TARGETS. SCALE - 1:25,000

MAP OF THE AREA, CONTINUED
LONG ISLAND
30



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6
Lead crew being
each 30 min

un

COMBAT METERS
WING (II)
APO 19

Date 3 March 1945
13 CBW TO 60
13 CBW OPS 287
AD FO 600

Subject: Tactical Report (FRANKENBERG, GERMANY)

To: Col. Shuck - 95 cb

1. Information Concerning the Targets: a. The primary target (visual) for 13A & B was the BUSCHING-NATIONALE ANTRAKOITZ-GESELLSCHAFT (N.A.G.), situated about 1 mile south of the center of FRANKENBERG, GERMANY.

b. The primary target (visual) for 13C was the Power Plant of the N.A.G., near the Main Railway Station in FRANKENBERG, GERMANY.

c. The secondary target (visual) for 13A & B was Coke Ovens in the iron works at Bille Dorf, near Bunsdorf, GERMANY. The primary target was a Coke Oven in the same works.

2. Narrative of the Attacks:

a. 13A Group - 100A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three Squadrons made a normal take off and climb to a normal assembly altitude. The Group was formed at 10000'. Some difficulty was experienced with Arrowswift Control as to which altitude the Group was to assemble. The first request was for 13A to raise the assembly altitude to 10000', later the altitude was lowered to 9000'. This gave the Lead Navigator quite a time for a while. The Wing Leader, however, compromised and let down to 9000', which was maintained throughout the assembly.

A B-24 formation caused the 13A to cut short at Bunsdorf. This caused the Group to abort the Bunsdorf mission 4 minutes early. The Lead Navigator was able to lose time on the wing and follow the route and make CP 1 on time.

(b) Routes: The route across the North Sea was essentially as briefed to the Coastal Coast. The Coast was crossed at 2000'. The flight corridor was made good, although it seemed that some difficulty would be encountered with the B-24 formations at the same altitude at this point. Because of changes in wind velocities, the Group had to drift south of course approximately 10 miles. At this low altitude, the navigator attempted to correct back to the briefed course but found he was just paralleling course. With the aid of the R/N he was able to make good the IP and derived a wind for the homing run. An interesting phase of this flight was the wind changes, especially the velocities. The winds at the coast were from 350 degrees at 78 knots and increased progressively to 350 degrees at 101 knots as the Group flew along to the IP. It is apparent that as the navigator used his latest derived wind to bring him back on course, he only paralleled it because his correction did not counteract the progressive change in wind velocity along the route.

At the IP, interference with the B-24's was experienced and hampered the Squadron peel off, which necessitated 1000' to bring the Group from the IP and get back on course to the target. In this maneuver, the 1000 got ahead and bombed second. The Group was reformed at the RP, and the route back was essentially as briefed.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

3 Mar. '45

(c) Weather: A 6/10 to 9/10 low strata-cumulus layer billowed over the most of the route in and out. At the target a cloud coverage was reported. Kodak predicted visual bombing conditions at the target. Bombardiers, however, could not get a good sight thru the breaks over the target. Winds varied in velocity 340 degrees/86 knots to 350 degrees/101 knots over the target.

(d) Navigational Difficulties: 13A out off earlier than planned at Buncher 11. This resulted in departing from Buncher 4 minutes early. 13A was hampered at IP turn by a B-24 unit.

(e) PFF Narrative: Five PFF A/C were dispatched. 100A had voltage surging in radar set which caused the range and definition to be poor. All other sets operated satisfactorily. One PFF A/C was assigned to the Chaff Force; this A/C is MIA.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 100A Squadron:

<u>1.</u> Air Leader	Lt. Col. Wallace	Nav	Lt. Krepsman
Pilot	Capt. Brown	Asst Nav	Capt. [unclear]
Co-Pilot	Lt. Batterman	R/N	Lt. Lentz
		Bomb	Maj. Ventress

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u> Primary	12	81x500 LB GP
		69x500 LB IB

Jettisoning	None
Returning	None

b. Bombing Altitude: 21450'c. Time of Release: 1017

3. Run-in from IP to Target: Kodak Red reported that the target was clear. When the Group Leader reached the IP, consequently, it was decided to bomb the primary target visually. The R/N proceeded to set up course, while the bombardier did pin point pilotage. Approximately 50 seconds from the BRL the bombardier picked up the assigned MPI off to his left. Cranking out 10 degrees of drift he set up course, but did not have sufficient time to set up a proper rate, because of a very high ground speed. When bombs were released on a true heading of 135 degrees, rate was slow. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. 345 MPH ground speed was experienced on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: a. This Squadron's bombs fell over the MPI, blanketing 3 rail-over-road bridges and the Southwest end of the M/Y. There are 6-8 hits and several near misses on the RR tracks in the vicinity of the bridges. There are 8-10 hits among the Factory Buildings South of the yards and 6 bursts in the Park to the west. There were no hits on buildings in the target area.

b. Bomb Pattern: 1434°L x 771°W: Excludes a few stray bombs which would extend the pattern 1000°.

<u>c.</u> Bombing Errors:	Range	:	1285°0
	Deflection:	:	385°R
	Radial	:	1328°

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By EUNARA Date 9/14/07

a. Primary 12

88... LB
74... LB

Jettisoning None
Returning None

b. Bombing Altitude: 23800'

c. Time of Release: 1013

3. Run-in from IP to Target: Attacking on a true heading of 153 degrees, the R/N picked up the target and set up course. Bombardier identified and picked up the assigned MPI through a big break in the clouds, approximately 18 miles from the target, and synchronized. When bombs were released, synchronization was reported as being good. The bombing run was accomplished on PDI. C-1 Auto-Pilot was switched off when the bombardier caught a part of his flak suit on the turn control knob and caused the A/C to make a few violent turns.

4. PI Report: a. A small cloud obscures the main pattern of bombs dropped by this Squadron, however, a few scattered bursts are visible in the park short and right of the MPI. The main pattern fell in the vicinity of the Railroad Junction 1/2 mile SW of the MPI.

b. It is impossible to ascertain the Errors, Measurements, Percentages, Results in relation to damage inflicted, and Results in relation to sighting, for this Squadron.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

b. 13 B Group - 95A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: Assembly was accomplished as briefed. CP 1 was departed on time and on course.

(b) Route: The route across the North Sea was flown as briefed. In the vicinity of Heligoland, there was some "winging". CP 2 was reached 2 minutes late. The bomber stream was south of course in the Wesermunde area, and some flak was encountered by 13B. On the leg into the IP, the route was flown consistently to the south, and at 0950E, 13B made a near 90 degree left turn, coming out 8 miles North of the briefed IP. The Squadrons were in trail on course to the target and passed over the briefed IP. The radar navigators of the Squadrons set up course to the target. 13B had no difficulty on the route back to the base.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A.

(d) Navigational Difficulties: None.

(e) PFF Narrative: Three PFF A/C were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. Bombing was by combination H2X-Visual technique.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 95A Squadron:

1. Air Leader	Capt. Wright	Nav	Lt. Ballatore
Pilot	Lt. Gillen	Asst Nav	Lt. Rohn
Co-Pilot		R/N	Lt. Dement
		Bomb	Lt. L. el

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

3 Mar. '45

- 2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
 - a. Primary 12 77x500 LB GP
6x500 LB IB
 - Jettisoning 1 7x500 LB GP
6x500 LB IB
 - Returning None
 - b. Bombing Altitude: 24700'
 - c. Time of Release: 1020

3. Run-in from IP to Target: Attacking on a true heading of 165 degrees, the R/N picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles, and after the 5 mile check picked up the target usually for a 20 second run. One large course correction was all that could be made before bombs were released. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: a. The bombs from this Squadron fell approximately one mile to the right of the target (south) in a line from in front of on a few scatterers, ranging from

- b. Bomb Pattern: Too irregular.
- c. Bombing Errors: Gross.
- d. Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the MPI: 0% & 0%.
- e. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted: NIL.
- f. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: Poor.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: A/C 946: Spare - 13 bombs jettisoned at 5335N-0650E

(b) 95B Squadron:

- 1. Air Leader Lt. Morris Nav Lt. Doherty
Pilot Capt. Hamilton ASST Nav
Co-Pilot R/ Lt. Barrow
Bomb Lt. Asprocolas

- 2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
 - a. Primary 13 91x500 LB GP
2x500 LB IB
 - b. Bombing Altitude: 24800'
 - c. Time of Release: 1020½

3. Run-in from IP to Target: After the maneuver at the IP, the R/N picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 9 miles and after the 7 mile check, picked up the assigned MPI through a break in the clouds. With approximately 20 seconds to synchronize, the bombardier made several bell corrections and when bombs were released synchronization was believed to be good. Bombs were released on a true heading of 170 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: a. Clouds obscure a portion of 95B's

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Mar. '45

at 12 bombs are visible in the built-up area adjacent to the on the south. The approximate width of the pattern is about 1/2

- b. Bomb Pattern: Cannot be accurately measured.
 - c. Bombing Errors: Cannot be accurately measured.
 - d. Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the MPI: 14% & 34%.
 - e. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted: NIL to FAIR.
 - f. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: FAIR.
5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(c) 950 Squadron:

<u>1.</u> Air Leader	Nav	Lt. Smith
Pilot	Ast Nav	
Co-Pilot	R/N	Lt. Rowery
	Bomb	Lt. Babiak

- 2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- a. Primary 12 84x500 LB GP
72x500 LB IB
- b. Bombing Altitude: 23800'
- c. Time of Release: 1021

3. Run-in from IP to Target: Attacking on a true heading of 155 degrees, the R/N picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and after the 7 mile check, the assigned MPI was picked up visually through breaks in the clouds for a 15 second run. The bombardier attempted to set up course and rate, but bombs were away before synchronization was completed. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: a. Clouds and smoke obscure part of 950's scattered pattern, which was short and right of the MPI. The visible bursts are in fields south of the Woitzen A/F in the vicinity of RR tracks, which sustained at least 2 direct hits. Although the tracks leading from the M/Y are obscured by smoke, it is safe to assume from the visible bursts, that the branch line, which passes near the A/F was hit.

- b. Bomb Pattern: Cannot be accurately measured.
 - c. Bombing Errors: Cannot be accurately measured.
 - d. Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the MPI: 0% & 0%.
 - e. Bombing Results in relation to damage inflicted: NIL.
 - f. Bombing Results in relation to sighting: POOR.
5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

3 Mar. '45

1. 13 C Group - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation: (a) Assembly: The three Squadrons of 13C a normal take off and assembly over Buncher 11 at 10000'. The assembly altitude was raised from 3000' upon advice from 13A leader. As much as 13A announced that it would be 4 minutes early at Wing assembly, 13C made this point accordingly. 13A was actually 7 minutes early, and as it made a dog leg to lose time, 13C out Buncher 7 short and fell in trail of 13A & B. CP 1, Great Yarmouth, was departed on course, on time.

(b) Routes: Enroute to CP 3, across the North Sea, no deviation was made from the briefed course. CP 3 was reached 1 minute early at 25000'. From CP 3 to the IP, 13C was slightly south of course and turned 3 miles North of the IP. Individual visual runs were made on the primary. 390C did not release at the primary and stayed with the Group until it was approaching the Tertiary. Using 5150-0912 as an IP, 390C made an R2X run on the tertiary. The bombardier picked up the target visually, but it was covered with smoke and haze, and he changed his synchronization to a TO at Herford. After bombs away, 390C rejoined 13C. The briefed route was closely followed to the Dutch Coast, which was departed 3 miles south of course at 16000', at 12400'. The English Coast was crossed at Southold at 1322 at 6700'.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A.

(d) Navigational Difficulties: None.

(e) PFF Narrative: Three PFF A/C were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. Bombing was visual.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 390A Squadron:

1.	ABW Leader	Capt. Jones	Nav	Lt. Drew
	Pilot	Capt. Kenny	Asst Nav	Lt. Easner
	Co-Pilot	Lt. Sowpell	R/W	Lt. Wilcox
			Bomb	Lt. Wosczyk

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Primary 12 85x500 LB GP
65x500 LB IB

b. Bombing Altitude: 24200'

c. Time of Release: 1022 1/2

3. Run-in from IP to Target: Attacking on a true heading of 165 degrees, the RN picked up the target and set up course. After several rate checks, the bombardier picked up the target through a break in the clouds, approximately 1 minute from the BRL. Unable to identify the assigned MPI because of smoke from the previous Group's bombs, the bombardier synchronized short and displaced his cross-hairs on the approximate position of the assigned MPI. When bombs were released synchronization was believed to have been good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.


4. PI Report: a. 390A & B bombed almost simultaneously, and it is impossible to separate one's pattern from the other. The bombs from these two Squadrons fell into and around the target area causing more extensive damage to the adjacent Miag...

"A" Squadron

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 3 March 45



BRIEFING _____
 READINESS _____
 STATIONS _____
 TAXI _____
 TAKE-OFF _____
 RENDEZVOUS _____


EXTRA SHIPS

334 _____
 335 _____
 336 _____
 412 _____

95 B Squadron NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 3 March 1945



Tavis lost position on low run - fell behind
Turner saw Duncan in prop wash and hit
Tavis off his (Turner's) left wing. Tavis' wing was damaged and
Duncan's tail popped off apparently from the strain on
it from evasive action he encountered in the
prop wash. Saw no chutes from
Duncan's ship.
Happened after R.P. evasive action was apparently over.

- BRIEFING _____
- READINESS _____
- STATIONS _____
- TAXI _____
- TAKE-OFF _____
- RENDEZVOUS _____

- EXTRA SHIPS
- 334 _____
- 355 _____
- 336 _____
- 412 _____


95C Squadron

Authority 745005
By ewNARA Date 9/16/07

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 3 March 1945



BRIEFING _____
 READINESS _____
 STATIONS _____
 TAXI _____
 TAKE-OFF _____
 RENDEZVOUS _____

EXTRA SHIPS
 334 _____
 335 _____
 336 _____
 412 _____

STATION WEATHER OFFICE
AAF STATION 119
APO 559

T-C-2

4 March 1945

SUBJECT: Meteorological Interrogation Summary for Mission of 3 March 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, Hq., 95th Bomb Group(H), APO 559, U. S. Army.

1. Base at take-off: Time was 0620-0651 hours. Clear. Visibility 4 miles.
2. Route to target: Clear sky over England becoming 3-5/10 stratocumulus over North Sea increasing to 6-8/10 over continent tops 7000 ft. Cloud was patchy with large breaks over continent. Visibility unrestricted aloft.
3. Target area: Brunswick, Germany. Time was 1020 hours. 6/10 stratocumulus below 7000 ft. Visibility unrestricted.
4. Return route: 6-8/10 stratocumulus with large breaks over continent becoming 4-5/10 over England tops 7-8000 ft., base 3-4000 ft. 2-3/10 altocumulus over England base 13-14,000 ft. Nil high.
5. Base on return: Time was 1313-1359 hours. 4-6/10 cumulus base 3000 ft. Visibility 8 miles.
6. Remarks: L/N/P/ contrails at flight level.

Ralph E. Lewis,
RALPH E. LEWIS,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Asst Weather Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Engineering Officer

V-A-1

APO 559
3 March 1945

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission of 3 March 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H). Attention:
Operations Officer.


1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of 3 March 1945.

- a. Thirty-seven (37) B-17 aircraft took off as scheduled.
- b. Thirty-four (34) B-17 aircraft returned to base after completion of combat mission.
- c. B-17G 42-102450 is missing.
- d. B-17G's 43-39175 landed at Mansten; 42-97376 landed at Woodbridge.

2. There were no abortive aircraft.

3. Battle damage is as follows.

- a. 43-38657 - Major battle damage
- b. 44-6598 - Major battle damage (rt inner wg panel chg)
- c. 43-38942 - Major battle damage
- d. 44-8667 - Skin damage
- e. 43-38774 - Skin damage
- f. 44-8741 - Skin damage


DONALD H. DOWLIN
Capt., Air Corps
Gp Engineering O

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Armament Officer

APO 559
3 March 1945

SUBJECT: Mission Expenditure Report for 3 March 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Following are the expenditures for the mission of 3 March 1945.

A. Station AAF 119
B. Unit 95th Bombardment Group (H)
C. Type of Ammunition Cal. 50 API&I-TIEI
D. Gun locations and number of guns

74 Ball Turret Guns	740
74 Upper Turret Guns	740
37 Left Waist Guns	370
37 Right Waist Guns	370
37 Left Nose Guns	370
37 Right Nose Guns	370
74 Chin Turret Guns	740
74 Tail Guns	740

E. Total number of guns.....444
F. Total number of rounds of ammunition fired.....4440 rounds.
G. Aircraft number 2450 reported missing loaded with 7- 500 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs, 6- 500 lb. M 17 Incendiary Bombs and 5000 rds, Cal. 50 API&I-TIEI Ammunition.
H. Total amount of ammunition expended.....9440 rounds.
I. Total number of bombs expended.....272- 500 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs.
210- 500 lb. M 17 Incendiary Bombs.
6- CHB M 1 Sky Markers.

Leonard F. Dawson
LEONARD F. DAWSON
Capt. Air Corps
Group Armament Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Intelligence Officer

3 March 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the Mission to Brunswick, Germany on the above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - The 95th Group flew as 13B Combat Group to attack Brunswick AFV Factory. All three squadrons bombed the primary target on H2X with a visual assist. At 1024 hours at 5209N-1048E A/C 2450 in 95B was lost due to a mid-air collision with A/C 7376 also in 95B.


95A - Eleven A/C plus one PFF took off and formed the lead squadron. Ten A/C plus the PFF bombed the primary target. One spare A/C 6946 turned back at 5405N-0750E because of mechanical trouble and jettisoned bombs in North Sea.

95B - Twelve A/C plus one PFP took off and formed the high squadron. All A/C bombed the primary target.

95C - Twelve A/C plus one PFF took off and formed the low squadron. All A/C bombed the primary target.

2. Reference is suggested to the operational narrative teletype for further information.

For the Intelligence Officer:


FRANCIS X. PIERCE,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.