

Date 19 February 1945
13 CBW FO 48
13 CBW OPS 275
3 AD FO 588

2
1 Lead Crew Team

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (OSNABRUCK AND MUNSTER, GERMANY)

TO : ~~TO : [REDACTED]~~

1. Information Concerning the Targets:

a. The primary target (visual) for today was the sidings in the Northern extremity of the Railway Marshalling Yards at OSNABRUCK, GERMANY.

b. The secondary target (Cat Mouse) was the Locomotive Shed and Turntable, situated in the western part of the Railway Marshalling Yards at OSNABRUCK, GERMANY.

2. Narrative of the Attack:

a. 13 A Group - 95A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The three Squadrons from 95 Group made a normal takeoff, but due to dense, persistent contrails, which prevailed over the base areas, it was necessary to climb to 20,000' before Group assembly could be accomplished. Randolph Weather A/C was apparently too eager to get back to base and was of no aid to the Groups during the assembly. Although the Group assembled slowly, good formation was achieved before reaching the Wing Assembly Line. The Wing and Division Assembly was as briefed. The English Coast was crossed at Southwold, CP 1, on time, altitude 20,000'.

(b) Route:

The Group was on course over the Channel. At times during the flight it was difficult for the Division Leader (13A Group Leader) to ascertain whether the weather ahead would hamper his climb. Although the Low Squadron was brushed off in the tops of the cloud bank, which straddled the bomber stream course, it was able to get back into good Group formation prior to reaching the Continental Coast, which was crossed by the Group at the briefed point, on time. The lead navigator was unable to check his course just after passing over the Zuider Zee because the Gee reception faded out of range. He received no aid with the mouse beam from the R/N, moreover, who was an M-H and experiencing difficulty receiving the cat beam. Because of this, consequently, the lead navigator was obliged to obtain fixes from the right wing A/C. Prior to reaching IP, the R/N notified the Air Leader of the equipment difficulties, and the decision was made to bomb the Tertiary target by H2X.

Having already drifted slightly N of course enroute to the IP, the navigator turned too late at this point, and overshot five miles. The R/N then identified the target and set up course for the bombardier. The high and low Squadrons peeled off and proceeded to make their own runs. The low Squadron, however, had difficulty with the cat beacon on the bomb run, and before the R/N could switch over to H2X he had passed over the target. In the meantime, the A and B

Squadrons bombed the Tertiary target, and proceeded to the RP. The C Squadron, which had gone beyond the target, had to make a 180 degree turn in order to get back to the RP. When they left here, consequently, they were considerably behind the A Group, and were obliged to follow the bomber stream until reaching 5230-0805, which was used as the IP for bombing a TO. The R/N picked up Haselunne and made a run on it. The route out was as briefed and uneventful.

(c) Weather:

The weather over the base areas made it necessary to climb to 20,000' in order to get out of the clouds, which prevailed in the area. Over the Channel, the Groups ran into a cloud bank which gave the Low Squadron of 13A Group some trouble. Over the Continental Coast the undercast was solid with an occasional small break. East of the Zuider Zee the Groups ran into another cloud layer which necessitated climbing above bombing altitude, but after passing over the layer the Groups were able to let down again to bombing altitude. Practically the same weather prevailed on return.

(d) Difficulties:

Ascertaining the actual weather conditions during assembly was made difficult because the Randolph Weather A/C did not give the necessary aid that the Groups required in order to assemble properly over the base areas. During the Channel crossing the Division Leader had difficulty in obtaining accurate weather data from the Kodak Control A/C, since the weather A/C was 2-3000' below the Division Column. Beacon reception was poor, and difficulty was experienced by the R/N's in picking up the cat beacon.

(e) Remarks:

Although the IP was overshot, navigation was very good.

(f) PFF Narrative:

This was a scheduled Micro-H, "cat and mouse" mission. Five PFF A/C were dispatched; one aircraft was assigned to the Chaff force. 95A was unable to receive the course beacon. 95B had an inoperative sweep delay mechanism and an absence of range marks on the 20 mile scan, which made a beacon run impossible. 95C had good beacon reception prior to the IP; however, after the turn onto the target run, the course beacon faded out of the scope completely. The radar navigator did not have sufficient time to switch to H2X operation, and the target was overrun. 95A and B Squadrons, meanwhile, made individual H2X sightings on the Tertiary target at Osnabruck. 95C finally made an H2X sighting on a last resort target at Haselunne, Germany.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 95A Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader	Col. Shuck	Nav	Lt. Wilbourne
	Pilot	Capt. Wilson	Asst Nav	Maj. Magness
	Co-Pilot	Lt. Hollyfield	M/O	Lt. Owen
			Bomb	Lt. Long

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Tertiary	12	134x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	1	2x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 24500'

c. Time of Release: 1344

3. Run-in from IP to Target:

After over-shooting the IP 5 miles, the M/O picked up the target on H2X and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles, and checks in rate were made at 9, 7 and 5 miles. All checks were accurate, and no rate corrections were necessary. When bombs were released on a true heading of 145 degrees, synchronization appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. The failure of the M/O to pick up the course beacon precluded attacking the secondary target on Micro-H.

4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 657: Rack malfunction, 2 bombs jettisoned in channel.

A/C 210: One bomb hung up momentarily - salvoed on target.

(b) 95B Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader	Lt. Col. Cumbaa	Nav	Lt. Pieper
	Pilot	Lt. Savage	Asst Nav	Lt. Malone
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Capt. Mitchell
			Bomb	Lt. Seferian

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Tertiary	13	146x500 LB GP
	TO	1	6x500 LB GP
	Returning	None	

b. Bombing Altitude: 24500'

c. Time of Release: 1344½

3. Run-in from IP to Target:

After over-shooting the IP 5 miles the M/O corrected 30 degrees back on course for the bomb run, and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles, and subsequent rate checks were reported to be extremely accurate. When bombs were released on a true heading of 125 degrees, synchronization appeared to be very good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. The failure of the M/O to pick up the course beacon precluded attacking the secondary target on Micro-H.

4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 993: Rack malfunction, 6 bombs were later dropped on a TO on lead A/C flare.

A/C 604: Rack malfunction, 6 bombs hung up momentarily, salvoed on target.

(c) 95C Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader	Lt. Morris	Nav	Lt. Fryer
	Pilot	Lt. Abwender	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Baldie
			Bomb	Lt. Spinnenweber

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	TO Haselunne, Ger.	11	128x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	1	12x500 LB GP
	Returning (Spare)	1	12x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 23500'

c. Time of Release: 1419

3. Run-in from IP to Target:

The M/O was able to pick up the cat and mouse beacons prior to the IP, but upon reaching the IP, the cat beacon was lost. The M/O stayed on M/H thinking that he would be able to pick up the cat beacon on the bomb run. Two thirds down the run he realized that he would not be able to raise the cat beacon and since there was insufficient time to bomb H2X, it was decided to bomb as a TO the town of Haselunne, Germany. Making good an IP at 5229N-0806E, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bomb run was rather poor, however, because the M/O experienced retaining the target in his scope. The bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles and the M/O was only able to give one check at 8 miles. After the 8 mile check the bombardier let his rate ride through. Bombs were released on a true heading of 311 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 154: aborted, 12 bombs jettisoned at 5223N-0320E.

b. 13 B Group - 100A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

Although B Squadron was slow in forming, the Group assembly, in general, was accomplished without incident. Able leader was early at Buncher 27, and Baker was compelled to cut Buncher 11 short to the East in an attempt to close up the gap. The Group made CP 1 on time and on course, but still trailed Able by a considerable interval.

(b) Route:

A proper Group interval between Able and Baker was attained on the route over the Channel. CP 2 was made good and on time. The route into the IP was flown essentially as briefed. Prior to the IP, B and C Squadrons reported poor beacon reception, which was unsuitable for bombing. A Squadron committed itself to a C/M run. C Squadron elected to bomb off A and made the bomb approach echeloned in formation to the right. On the C/M bomb run, the course beacon faded out completely, causing the radar navigator to switch to H2X in time to continue a sighting on a scope return, which he believed to be Osnabruck. The RN made appreciable corrections to the right. When bombs were away, Gee fixes and a Mickey fix from B Squadron indicated that the release was made on Munster. The H2X equipment in B Squadron was operative on the bomb run; but because of the Squadron's close proximity to A, a left turn towards the correct target was impossible. After the bomb release, the formation made a sharp turn to the right, then a gradual turn to the left, passing over the flak defenses South of Osnabruck before reaching the long West leg out of the Continent. The remainder of the route back to the bases was uneventful. B Squadron made an independent H2X sighting on the Tertiary target and later joined Able Group on the route back to the base.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A Group.

(d) Navigational Difficulties:

Interphone communication in 100A lead aircraft was out completely due to flak over the target.

(e) Remarks: Navigation was very satisfactory.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. 100B was unable to receive the course beacon although the mouse beacon came in strong. 100C did not receive the beacons at all. 100A had strong beacon reception prior to the IP; however, the course beacon was lost on the turn. The radar navigator then switched to H2X and began a run on Osnabruck, but misinterpreted the scope return and Munster was bombed instead. C Squadron dropped on A Squadron's smoke bombs. B Squadron made an individual H2X sighting on the Tertiary target. H2X operated satisfactorily in all Squadrons.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 100A, B Squadrons:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader Maj. Martin	Nav	Lt. Juhlin
	Pilot Capt. Jones	Asst Nav	Capt. Reesel
	Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Rhode
		Bomb	Lt. Grueschow

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	TO Munster, Ger.	25	292x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	None	
	Returning	1	6x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 24500'

c. Time of Release: 1349

3. Run-in from IP to Target:

Unable to hold the course beacon on the bomb run, the M/O switched over to H2X. Picking up what he thought to be Osnabruck in his scope, he set up course. Actually the M/O had picked up the city of Munster. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and the M/O gave him a 7 mile check. Apparently the M/O was wounded for the 7 mile check was the first and last check received by the bombardier. When bombs were released on a true heading of 200 degrees, synchronization was poor. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. When the B Squadron released off the A Squadron's smoke bombs it was 2700' in trail of A Squadron. THE LEAD PILOT OF THE B SQUADRON IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE POOR BOMB PATTERN BECAUSE HE DID NOT PROPERLY POSITION HIMSELF OFF THE A SQUADRON.

4. PI Report:

a. The bombs from A Squadron fell in fields and the Dortmund Ems canal, 3/4 mile East (left) of the center of the M/Y in Munster. Those from B Squadron fell in a fully built-up residential area about 1500' East (left) of the M/Y. The MPIs of the two bomb patterns was approximately 2700' apart.

<u>b.</u>	Bomb Pattern:	A Squadron:	2730°L x 1470°W
		B Squadron:	2100°L x 1260°W
		Group	: 3780°L x 3360°W

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 470: Rack malfunction, 6 bombs returned.

(b) 1000 Squadrons:

1.	Air Leader Maj. Stivers	Nav	Lt. Brewsing
	Pilot	Lt. Dawson	Asst Nav
	Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Rowland
		Bomb	Lt. Silva

2. A/O Attacking: Bombs Dropped

3.	Tertiary	13	152x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	None	
	Returning	None	

b. Bombing Altitude: 23600'

c. Time of Release: 1346

1. Run-in from IP to Target:

The IP was over-shot approximately 8 miles. Unable to pick up the course beacon, the M/O switched over to H2L, picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier slotted in at 10 miles and all subsequent rate checks were accurate. When bombs were released on a true heading of 140 degrees, synchronization appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

c. 13 O Group - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The three Squadrons of 390 Group made a normal take off and assembly at 20,000' over Buncher 11. The assembly altitude was changed from 18,500' because of the dense persistent contrails at that altitude. The first point of the Wing Assembly, Buncher 27, was made good in trail of 100 Group. At CP 1 the Group was 1 minute early in good Division order.

(b) Route:

The Group followed the briefed route to CP 2, arriving at this point 1 minute early. The run to the IP was as briefed. At the IP the Group maneuvered into formation so that the C Squadron, which was the only Squadron able to accomplish a C-M run, could take the Group to the targets. The lead Squadron echeloned to the left and the high Squadron echeloned to the right of the low. After bombs away the Group was quickly reassembled before the RP, with the lead Squadron reassuming the lead. As two Squadrons of 100 Group were making a run on Munster, 390 Group assumed the normal interval behind the Division leader. CP 3 was reached at 1441; altitude 16,500'. The route to the English Coast was as briefed, and the coast at Southwold was crossed at 1523½ at 6,000'.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A Group.

(d) Navigational Difficulties:

Gee was reported as being jammed in the A lead ship. B leader, however, had little trouble until the IP, at which time his Gee faded out also, returning at 5242-0723 on the way out. C leader's Gee worked very well enroute, at the IP, and on the bomb run.

(e) Remarks: Navigation was excellent.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF A/C were dispatched. 390A and 390 B Squadrons were unable to receive beacons properly to make a beacon run. 390C received both beacons strongly and led the Squadrons in Group formation on a cat-mouse attack on the primary target. Results were unobserved. 390A and B sighted individually for rate by H2X technique. This practice should be discontinued because it is inaccurate to establish an H2X rate while following a cat and mouse circular course. Furthermore, cat and mouse technique is accepted as a more precise method of bombing than H2X.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 390C, A Squadrons:

1. Air Leader: Lt. Greene Nav : Lt. Sommer
Pilot : Lt. Presswood Asst Nav:
Co-Pilot : M/O : Lt. Mattson
Bomb : Lt. Buck

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Secondary 24 265 x 500 LB GP
10 Leaflet Containers
Jettisoning None
Returning 2 17 x 500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 24,000'

c. Time of Release : 1148

3. Prior to the IP, the C Squadron assumed the lead since it was the only Squadron that was able to pick up the cat and mouse beacons. Attacking in Group formation, the M/O picked up the cat beacon and the subsequent rate checks were reported as very good. When bombs were released on a true heading of 180 degrees, synchronization appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. A Squadron released off C Squadron's smoke bombs.

4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

C Squadron:

A/C 032: Rack malfunction; 5 bombs returned.

A/C 041: Aborted; 12 bombs were returned.

(b) 390B Squadrons:

1. Air Leader: Capt. Watts Nav : Lt. Webster
Pilot : Lt. Tracy Asst Nav:
Co-Pilot : M/O : Lt. Robinson
Bomb : Lt. Pace

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Tertiary 12 188 x 500 LB GP
10 Leaflet Containers
Jettisoning None
Returning 1 12 x 500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 23,800'

c. Time of Release: 1347½

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3. Run-in from IP to Target:

Although the target was attacked in Group formation the B Squadron released on its own H2X rate. While the C Squadron was flying a beacon course the B Squadron was attempting to set rate. This resulted in the B Squadron releasing 30 seconds before the C Squadron. Bombs were released on a true heading of 125 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was not reported being used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 904: Aborted, 12 bombs returned.

3. Planning and Execution of the Mission:

a. Group Order and Strength:

(1) 13 A, B, C Groups:	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	1 x 6 A/C Chaff Force
(a) 95 Group	2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	1 x 12 A/C Squadron
	1 x 6 A/C Chaff Force
(b) 100 Group	2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	1 x 12 A/C Squadron
(c) 390 Group	2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	1 x 12 A/C Squadron
(2) 45 A, B Groups:	6 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(a) 452 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(b) 96 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(3) 93 A, B, C Groups:	9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(a) 493 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(b) 385 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(c) 34 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(4) 4 A, B, C, Groups:	9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(a) 486 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(b) 447 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(c) 94 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons

b. A/C and C/C Available:

(1) 95 Group	REG 42 A/C	43 C/C
	PFF 11 A/C	7 C/C
	MH 6 A/C	5 C/C
(2) 100 Group	REG 51 A/C	45 C/C
	PFF 10 A/C	5 C/C
	MH 4 A/C	4 C/C
(3) 390 Group	REG 41 A/C	61 C/C
	PFF 7 A/C	7 C/C
	MH 6 A/C	5 C/C

c. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

(1) 95 Group	40 Plus 4 PFF
(2) 100 Group	35 Plus 3 PFF
(3) 390 Group	35 Plus 3 PFF

19 Feb. '45

d. A/O Airborne:

(1)	95 Group	40 Plus 4 PFF
(2)	100 Group	35 Plus 3 PFF
(3)	390 Group	35 Plus 3 PFF

e. A/O Abortive:

(1) 95 Group:

A/O 8288: 412 Sqdn "V" - Pilot Lt. Ristine - Lost oil in #3 - Could not feather engine - Landing gear partially extended - collapsed upon landing - No sortie.

A/O 7154: 334 Sqdn "F" - Pilot Lt. Willis - Mechanical failure - #4 engine - Sortie.

(2) 100 Group:

A/O 090: 418 Sqdn "R" - Pilot Lt. Bayley - Blew #4 engine cylinder - No sortie.

(3) 390 Group:

A/O 7904: 569 Sqdn "L" - Pilot Lt. Steele - Trouble with #2 and #4 superchargers - No sortie.

A/O 9041: 570 Sqdn "U" - Pilot Lt. Alberts - Runaway prop on #4 engine - No sortie.

f. A/C Attacking - 13 A Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1)	Tertiary	15	280x500 LB GP
	TO Haselunne, Ger.	11	128x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	1	2x500 LB GP
	Returning	None	

(2) Method of Bombing: H2X

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

g. A/C Attacking - 13 B Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1)	Tertiary	13	152x500 LB GP
	TO Munster, Ger.	25	286x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	None	
	Returning	1	6x500 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: H2X

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

h. A/C Attacking - 13 C Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1)	Secondary	24	265x500 LB GP
	Tertiary	12	10 Leaflet Containers
	Returning	3	128x500 LB GP
			10 Leaflet Containers
			29x500 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Micro-H & PFF

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

4. Communications:

a. VHF:

(1) Colonel Shuck led the 13th Wing. Communications within the lead Group was reported good for most of the mission. From Dummer Lake area to IP, however, Channel A was jammed. 100 Group O Squadron leader

had difficulty contacting A leader due to peer discipline.

(2) Contact with Arrowswift and Kodak on Channel B was reported to be very good.

(3) Good contacts were made with fighters and ground sector.

b. W/T:

(1) Control Points:

	CP 1	CP 2	TGT	CP 3	BASE
Timings	1232	1305	1345	1436	
A.T.A.	1232	1304	1344	1440	

(2) Strike Reports:

95A S B 5 1334

(3) Possible jamming of Division Ground Station at target time was reported, as well as moderate voice interference on 95 HF D/F Station (4215 KC) on return of mission to UK. 100 Group HF D/F Station was jammed by a voice in German, which caused difficulty in getting base weather until the formation had gotten close to the base.

5. Mission Camera Report:

a. The 95 Group installed 3 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 2 and 8 of which took pictures:

PFF A/C 8144: Blank film; cause undetermined.
A/C 8364: K-21 ran off on ground.

b. The 100 Group installed 9 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures.

c. The 390 Group installed 1 scope and 9 vertical cameras, and 8 of which took pictures:

A/C 032 with K-21 installed: Did not drop its bombs.

6. Controller's Log:

a. 1830 from 3 AD: (1) Force and Order (2) Targets (3) Bombs Loaded.

b. 1835 from 13CW: (1) Alert (2) Bombs Loaded

c. 1854 from 3 AD: (1) Leaflet Lead.

d. 1905 from 13CW: (1) Wing Order and Strength (2) Division Order and Strength.

e. 1912 from 3 AD: (1) Group Order.

f. 2005 from 3 AD: (1) Leaflet Lead.

g. 2008 from 3 AD: (1) Force and Order - Task Forces (2) Zero Hour (3) RBA (4) Targets and MPIs (5) DAP and Approaches (6) Bombing Altitude (7) Weather A/C (8) Chaff Force (9) Time Control.

h. 2029 from 13CW: (1) Zero Hour (2) RBA (3) C/M Leads

(4) Chaff Force (5) Bombing Altitude
(6) Assembly Altitude (7) Time Control
(8) Fuel (9) Task Force (10) Leaflet Load.

- i. 2035 from 13CW: (1) Targets.
- j. 2108 from 3 AD: (1) AW to 3 AD FO 588.
- k. 2113 from 13CW: (1) AW to 13 CBW FO 48.
- l. 2145 from 3 AD: (1) A-2 Annex to 3 AD FO 588.
- m. 2210 from 3 AD: (1) Preliminary Timings (2) Bombing Altitude
(3) Start Climb Time.
- n. 2242 from 3 AD: (1) Target Change (2) Zero Hour (3) Time
Control (4) Bomb Lead (5) Bombing Altitude.
- o. 2302 from 13CW: (1) New Zero Hour (2) Bomb Lead (3) Assembly
Altitude (4) Start Climb Time (5) Timings.
- p. 2322 from 13CW: (1) Annex 1 to AW to 13 CBW FO 48.
- q. 0104 from 3 AD: (1) 3 AD FO 588.
- r. 0150 from 3 AD: (1) MH Information for 3 AD FO 588.
- s. 0155 from 3 AD: (1) Route Correction.
- t. 0155 from 13CW: (1) 13 CBW FO 48.
- u. 0156 from 13 CW: (1) Route Correction.
- v. 0210 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 588.
- w. 0245 from 3 AD: (1) Final Winds Delay.
- x. 0405 from 3 AD: (1) Final Timings.
- y. 0510 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 2 to 3 AD FO 588.
- z. 0715 from 95BG: (1) WX A/C Airborne.
- aa. 0733 from 95BG: (1) Weather Report.

For the Commanding General:

Ernest A. Kiessling
ERNEST A. KIESSLING,
Major, Air Corps,
Director of Training
and Analysis.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

13A GROUP: H2X RUNS WERE MADE BY ALL SQUADRONS.

95 A SQUADRON: 12 x 134 x 500 GP : PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 10/10 UNDERCAST
 95 B SQUADRON: 13 x 146 x 500 GP : " " " " " " " "
 95 C SQUADRON: 11 x 128 x 500 GP : " " " " " " " "


13B GROUP: H2X RUNS WERE MADE BY ALL SQUADRONS.

100 A SQUADRON: (Purple dots): 12 x 134 x 500 GP MUNSTER WAS ATTACKED & BOMBED
 100 B SQUADRON: (Green dots): 13 x 152 x 500 GP IN GROUP FORMATION (A & B).
 100 C SQUADRON: 13 x 152 x 500 GP: PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 10/10 UNDERCAST.

13C GROUP: C MADE A M/H RUN & A DROPPED OFF C; B MADE AN H2X RUN.

390 A SQUADRON: 12 x 140 x 500 GP: PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 10/10 UNDERCAST.
 390 B SQUADRON: 12 x 128 x 500 GP: PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 10/10 UNDERCAST.
 390 C SQUADRON: 12 x 125 x 500 GP: PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 10/10 UNDERCAST.

95 A & B, 100 C, and 390 A, B, & C SQUADRONS ALL BOMBED OSNAEROCK, THE P.T.
 95 C BOMBED HASSELDORF, a TO, and 100 A & B BOMBED MUNSTER, a TO.



"A"

FORM 3

STATION

119

DATE

19 February 1945

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					LST	ACT	EST	ACT	
35	J	8210	Wilson ✓	✓		1001		1548	
"	W	8364	JENSEN ✓	1001 ✓		1001		1549	
34	V	8657	RYAN ✓	✓		1003		1534	
"	R	8438	BRAMLETT ✓	✓		1022		1530	
"	K	8317	CUMMINGS ✓	✓		1026		1551	
"	L	9175	MOZLEY ✓	✓		1023		1549	
"	D	8640	CORBEN Hiv ✓	✓		1024		1553	
35	E	6838	CALICURA ✓	✓		1025		1554	
"	S	9052	NELSON, R.A. ✓	✓		1027		1608	
34	X	8990	SCOTT he ✓	✓		1028		1556	
"	U	8525	ROY ✓	✓		1029		1557	
"	A	2447	ADDISON ✓	✓		1030		1555	

"B"

FORM 3

STATION

119

DATE

19 February 1945

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
36	O	8144	SAVAGE ✓	✓	1004	1557			
"	U	8469	MILLER ✓	✓	1010	1558			
35	N	6598	DILLON ✓	✓	1011	1607			
36	X	8604	THOMAS ✓	✓	1012	1600			
"	E	8106	ROSS ✓	✓	1013	1559			
"	Q	8617	MILLSAUGH ✓	✓	1014	1558			
412	A	6801	BUSSE ✓ Hi	✓	1015	1602			
36	W	6993	SCHAFF ✓	✓	1016	1606			
"	R	7844	NELSON, RW ✓	✓	1017	1605			
35	A	8255	DEHIERT ✓	✓	1018	1601			
36	Y	8676	TOWER ✓ Lo	✓	1019	1604			
"	A	8584	TUSS ✓	✓	1020	1605			
"	T	9037	JACKMAN ✓	✓	1021	1603			

STATION

119

FORM 3

DATE 19 February 1945

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
34	S	8779	ABWENDER	✓	✓	1005	1609		
412	H	6522	WEISZ	✓	✓	1031	1610		
35	G	6902	OLSON	✓	✓	1031	1613		
412	B	8774	SUTKOWSKI	✓	✓	1032	1612		
"	Y	9177	HAIL	✓	✓	1033	1612		
"	F	6946	KECUYER	✓	✓	1034	1611		
"	E	8067	LAYL	✓	✓	1035	1614		
"	D	8922	BEARD	✓	✓	1039	1545		
35	H	7376	YOUNG	✓	✓	1035	1548		
412	V	8288	RISTINE	NO	✓	1036	1255	Aborted	
"	J	8826	O'TOOLE	✓	✓	1037	1614		
"	M	8741	NEWMAN	✓	✓	1038	1614		
374	F	7154	WILLIS	NO	✓	1038	1946	Aborted Eng Failure.	

IMM. INT. REPT NO. K. 3788 (cont'd)

LOADING

Moderate.

KLOCKNER-WERKE A.G.

21. Rolling mills: Small hole in roof.
Shed (South of stores and despatch): Hole in roof at North end.
Some repairs seen.

A. 3009-11; 4009-11

(Prints: B. 3027-37, 4030-36)

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: A. 13 Squadron.
B. 540 Squadron.

SORTIE: A. US7GR/3966
B. 106G/4408

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: A. 1400 A hrs. on 21 FEB 1945
B. 1445 A hrs. on 21 FEB 1945

SCALE: A. 1/11,500 (F.L. 24")
B. 1/9,000 (F.L. 36")

COVER AND QUALITY: Full cover on good quality prints.

LAST REPORT: Immediate K. 3467 on 25 DEC 1944.

COMPARATIVE SORTIE USED: 106G/3854 (4004-5, 4022-3, 4037-40)

PRINT DISTRIBUTED: US7GR/3966 3010, (to follow when available).

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20 FEB 1945

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3224

95
Haid

ATTACK ON OSNABRUCK MARSHALLING YARD on 19 FEB 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 155, with full fighter escort
- (b) Command : U.S. 8th AIR FORCE
- (c) Time ; 1344 - 1352 A hours
- (d) Bombs : 1712 X 500 lb. G.P.

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

Bombs are seen falling through 10/10 cloud cover which obscures all bursts and ground detail.

(iii) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(iv) BOMB PLOT: None prepared.

(v) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV	95/1443, 1446	19 FEB 45	1344 A hrs.	1/41,000 (F.L.7")	24,000 'C'
"	96/843,845,846	"	1352 " "	1/42,000 "	24,500 "
"	100/1253	"	1346 " "	1/40,000 "	23,600 "
"	390/1350, 1352, 1355	"	1347 " "	1/41,000 "	24,000 "
"	452/932,935,937	"	1349 " "	1/41,000 "	24,000 "

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~~Handwritten scribbles and signatures in the top left corner.~~

*AK
Lum*

CONFIDENTIAL
20 FEB 1945

*95th Aird.
CAB*

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3233

ATTACK ON TACTICAL TARGETS IN GERMANY ON 19 FEB 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 10, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8th AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1419A hrs.
- (d) Bombs : 146 x 500 lb. G.P.

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

Bombs away are seen, but no bursts are visible on 10/10 cloud obscured photographs, over what is reported to be HASELUNNE, GERMANY.

(iii) ANNOTATED PRINT:

None prepared.

(iv) BOMB PLOT:

None prepared.

(v) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV 95/1445 19 FEB 1945 1419A hrs. 1/40,250 (F.L.7") 23,500' 'C'

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13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)

OSNABRUCK, GERMANY
MUNSTER, GERMANY

19 FEBRUARY 45

from

13A GROUP: HEX RUNS WERE MADE BY ALL SQUADRONS.

95 A SQUADRON:	12 x 194 x 500 GP	:	PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 10/10 UNDERCAST
95 B SQUADRON:	13 x 146 x 500 GP	:	" " " " " "
95 C SQUADRON:	11 x 128 x 500 GP	:	" " " " " "

13B GROUP: HEX RUNS WERE MADE BY ALL SQUADRONS.

100 A SQUADRON:	(Purple dots):	12 x 134 x 500 GP	MUNSTER WAS ATTACKED & BOMBED
100 B SQUADRON:	(Green dots):	13 x 152 x 500 GP	IN GROUP FORMATION (A & B).
100 C SQUADRON:		13 x 152 x 500 GP:	PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 10/10 UNDERCAST.

13C GROUP: C MADE A M/H RUN & A DROPPED OFF C; B MADE AN HEX RUN.

390 A SQUADRON:	12 x 140 x 500 GP:	PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 10/10 UNDERCAST.
390 B SQUADRON:	12 x 128 x 500 GP:	PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 10/10 UNDERCAST.
390 C SQUADRON:	12 x 125 x 500 GP:	PHOTOGRAPHS SHOW 10/10 UNDERCAST.

95 A & B, 100 C, and 390 A, B, & C SQUADRONS ALL BOMBED OSNABRUCK, a TO. 95 C BOMBED HASSELDORF, a TO, and 100 A & B BOMBED MUNSTER, a TO.

