

Kuo

HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 17 February 1945
13 CBW FO 46
13 CBW OPS 274
3 AD FO 586

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (FRANKFURT, GERMANY)

TO : CO, 95BG, APO 559

1. Information Concerning the Targets:

a. The primary target for all Groups today (visual only) was the Metal Works in Frankfurt, Germany.

b. The secondary target for all Groups today (H2X) was a point in Frankfurt equidistant from the two main Marshalling Yards.

2. Narrative of the Attack:

a. 13 A Group - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 390 Group made a normal take off, but had to make an instrument climb thru the low cloud layer, which extended over the base area, to 5000 feet where the A/C broke out into the clear. Another cloud layer was experienced at 6000 feet, so the Group Leader elected to assemble the Group at approximately 5500 feet between the two cloud layers. The Navigator had difficulty with his Buncher reception, apparently it was being jammed, so resorted to use DR and Gee to circle the area and get the Group in good formation. Contact was made with 13B and 13C and the Wing was formed at Buncher 23, at 5500 feet. The Wing assembly line was as briefed, except climbing as planned, since clouds prevented the Group from climbing thru. The English Coast was departed about 3 miles north of Southwold on time, slightly abreast of one of the Clambake Groups.

(b) Route:

The route from CP 1 to CP 2 was essentially as briefed. The climb while crossing the channel was still hampered by weather so that when the Continental Coast was crossed 13A was at 8000 feet, approximately 2½ minutes late, over Ostend.

Weather began to improve after crossing the Continental Coast which made it possible for the Wing Leader to increase the rate of climb to bombing altitude. Haze encountered during the climb cut down visibility which made it difficult to maintain contact with the Groups ahead. A W/T message received at 1115, at approximately 0500E, notifying the Wing Leader that Plan A was abandoned and that Plan B was in effect.

Since bombing altitude could not be reached in sufficient time prior to the target, the Air Leader decided to fly a leg to the South of the briefed route and gain altitude. The Group turned off at 5007-0602 at 1127. At 1139, 4948-0618, reached 19500 feet, then altered course to 5009-0710 where the briefed course was intercepted and

followed to the IP which was made good, reaching an altitude of 23000 feet. The Squadrons peeled off in good order and proceeded into the target of Frankfurt by H2X.

The Group was reassembled very quickly after bombs away. The RP was overshot slightly to the SE before turning to the north onto the briefed route. The Group paralleled the briefed route from the RP to 5025-0912 where the briefed course was made good and followed to the Continental Coast. The Group maintained bombing altitude and did not descend until crossing the front lines and reaching 5009-0602, CP 4. The Continental Coast was recrossed at 5117-0310 at 1415, at an altitude of 6000 feet.

(c) Weather:

A low strata layer, prevailed over the base area at take off, extending to 4000 feet. Another layer of clouds was encountered, bases being at 6000 feet. This condition prevailed thru out the assembly route and to approximately mid-channel, where the weather began to break up and allow the Groups to climb to bombing altitude. Contrails and haze made visibility rather poor at times while enroute over the Continent. The target area was covered, with occasional small breaks on the bomb run. The average winds obtained by Navigators were from 248 degrees at 24 knots.

(d) Navigational Difficulties: None.

(e) Remarks:

Navigation was very good. Excellent cooperation and coordination exhibited by the Group Lead Crew made this mission highly successful, despite changes and weather difficulties encountered during the mission.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. 390C leader is MIA. 390A and B made individual H2X runs on the secondary target at Frankfurt. The bombardier in B was able to kill rate on the ground before the target.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 390A Squadron:

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-----|--------------|----------|----------------|-----|--------------|------|------------|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Air Leader Maj. Engelbrecht <li style="padding-left: 2em;">Pilot Capt. Briggs <li style="padding-left: 2em;">Co-Pilot Lt. Taylor | <table border="0"> <tr> <td>Nav</td> <td>Lt. Wordling</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Asst Nav</td> <td>Lt. Buhrmaster</td> </tr> <tr> <td>M/O</td> <td>Capt. Hauser</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Bomb</td> <td>Lt. Martin</td> </tr> </table> | Nav | Lt. Wordling | Asst Nav | Lt. Buhrmaster | M/O | Capt. Hauser | Bomb | Lt. Martin |
| Nav | Lt. Wordling | | | | | | | | |
| Asst Nav | Lt. Buhrmaster | | | | | | | | |
| M/O | Capt. Hauser | | | | | | | | |
| Bomb | Lt. Martin | | | | | | | | |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. A/C Attacking: <li style="padding-left: 2em;">a. Secondary 12 <li style="padding-left: 2em;">b. Bombing Altitude: 22800' <li style="padding-left: 2em;">c. Time of Release: 1212 <li style="padding-left: 2em;">3. Run-in from IP to Target: | <p>Bombs Dropped</p> <p>118x500 LB GP</p> | | | | | | | | |

After a good turn at the IP, the M/O took over and set up course. Difficulty was experienced with definition throughout the run. The M/O, however, felt that the definition was good enough to warrant bombing. Setting up rate visually through breaks in the clouds the bombardier clutched in at 10 miles. Poor definition permitted only

one rate check which was at 8 miles. The 8 mile check was reported to be good, but rate was actually off when bombs were released on a true heading of 110 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- 4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 undercast.
- 5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(b) 390B Squadron:

- 1. Air Leader Capt. Wilkinson Nav Lt. Welsh
Pilot Lt. Tesler Asst Nav
Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Conroy
Bomb Lt. Liana

- 2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
 - a. Secondary 12 118x500 LB GP
Returning 1 10 Leaflet Containe:
 - b. Bombing Altitude: 23200'
 - c. Time of Release: 1211½
- 3. Run-in from IP to Target:

The maneuver at the IP was excellent, the B Squadron taking a 20 second interval behind the A Squadron. The M/O picked up the target and set up course. Setting up rate through a break in the clouds, the bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles. Checks in rate were made at 9, 8, 7, 6, 5 and 4 miles. Though rate was reported as good it was actually off, bombs being released too late to hit the assigned MPI. B Squadron released its bombs approximately 4 seconds before the A Squadron. Bombs were released on a true heading of 105 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was erratic and turned off, the run being flown manually.

4. PI Report:

a. A tiny portion of land, water and streets is visible in the 9th picture of SAV-390B/1342. This has been identified as an area 3½ miles almost due E of the assigned MPI. The bombs probably fell in fields and a sparsely built-up suburban district 2½ miles SE of the assigned MPI.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 048: Returned 10 leaflet containers.

(c) 390C Squadron:

- 1. Air Leader Lt. Stone Nav Lt. Miller
Pilot Lt. Kennedy Asst Nav
Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Keelan
Bomb Lt. Hale

- 2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
 - a. Secondary 13 128x500 LB GP
 - b. Bombing Altitude: 22200'
 - c. Time of Release: 1211
- 3. Run-in from IP to Target:

The lead A/C of the C Squadron did not return to base, having caught fire and crashed into the channel on the route back.

It was learned, however, that maneuver at the IP was excellent, the C Squadron positioning itself approximately 20 seconds in trail of the B Squadron. The C Squadron was reported as having dropped 10 seconds before the B Squadron.

4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

b. 13 B Group - 95A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

A normal take off and Group assembly was made over Buncher 23. Wing assembly point was made good 1 minute early in trail of 13A in excellent Wing formation. Division assembly, CP 1, was made good 1 minute early. An undercast and an overcast did not hinder the Group in making an excellent assembly line at the briefed altitude.

(b) Route:

CP 1 was left 1 minute early and the route was flown as briefed to CP 2. An overcast layer prevented the briefed climb across the channel and the Continental Coast was crossed at 6700 at 1042, 1 minute late. Just prior to CP 3 the Division Leader was notified by Arrowswift that Plan A was to be abandoned and Plan B was in effect. Because of the altitude at which the Group was at they followed the bomber stream to the right of course in order to gain enough altitude to cross the front lines. At 1140 a 360 degree turn was executed at 4948-0616 and a track was made good to converge with the briefed course. This convergence was made at 5009-0733 at 1158 at an altitude of 21900. The run to the IP was made and the IP was made good. However, after turning on the bomb run the flux gate compass fuse blew out and two Groups of aircraft were running a collision course at them on a heading of 340 degrees. This forced them to the north and a new IP of 5024-0805 was used. After bombs away at the secondary target, at 23000 at 1213½, two more Groups of aircraft were seen coming out of the contrails ahead on a collision course and forced them to abandon the route to the RP. A 180 degree turn to the left was made over the flak defenses at Hanau and converged with course at 5017-0841 with the Group in good formation. The remainder of the route was without incident and the Continental Coast was crossed at 1355 at 6000. The English Coast was crossed at Southwold at 1434 at 3500.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A Group.

(d) Navigational Difficulties:

Flux gate fuse blew out at IP.

(e) Remarks:

Navigation was very satisfactory and the lead navigator should be commended on the execution of this mission.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. All radar sets operated satisfactorily; however, the fluxgate compass in 95A was inoperative and azimuth stabilization off was used. The bombardier assisted in killing course in 95A. The Squadrons made H2X runs on the secondary. From strike photos, 95A's bombs were plotted in the target area.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 95A Squadron:

| | | | |
|-----------|-------------------------|------------|------------------------|
| <u>1.</u> | Air Leader Maj. Swinney | Nav | Lt. Inman |
| | Pilot | Lt. Gillen | Asst Nav Lt. Ballatore |
| | Co-Pilot | M/O | Lt. Dement |
| | | Bomb | Lt. Lytle |

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Secondary 12 116x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 23100'

c. Time of Release: 1213½

3. Run-in from IP to Target:

The IP was overshoot approximately 8 miles in order to avoid a collision course with unknown Group. Shortly after the maneuver at the IP, the flux gate compass went out, consequently, the M/O was unable to set up course. The bombardier took over and proceeded to set up course and rate visually through intermittent breaks in the clouds.

The bombardier, coordinating with the M/O, released his bombs on M/O's bombing circle, checking it with the rate and course previously killed approaching the target. Bombs were released on a true heading of 115 degrees, with 2 degrees left drift being experienced on the bomb run. AFCE was used on the bomb run.

4. The bombardier on this crew did excellent work in setting up course and rate. The crew cooperation was of a superior nature.

4. PI Report:

a. Sufficient terrain is visible in SAV pictures taken by this Squadron to identify the position of one A/C during the bomb run. No bursts are visible, but the bombs probably fell on or adjacent to the Eastern M/Y in Frankfurt.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

(b) 95B Squadron:

| | | | |
|-----------|-------------------------|------------|--------------|
| <u>1.</u> | Air Leader Lt. Garrison | Nav | Lt. Pieper |
| | Pilot | Lt. Savage | Asst Nav |
| | Co-Pilot | M/O | Lt. Mitchell |
| | | Bomb | Lt. Seferian |

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Secondary 13 123x500 LB GP
Returning 1 3x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 23300'

c. Time of Release: 1214½

3. Run-in from IP to Target:

After over-shooting the IP 8 miles, the M/O set up course to the target. Setting rate visually through breaks in the clouds, the bombardier was clutched in at 10 miles, and all subsequent rate checks were accurate. When bombs were released on a true heading of 113 degrees, synchronization was good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on bomb run.

4. PI Report:

a. No bursts are visible, but the bombs probably fell on or in proximity to the Eastern M/Y in Frankfurt.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 946: Rack malfunction, 3 bombs returned.

(c) 95C Squadron:

| | | | |
|----------------------|--------------|----------|-----------------|
| <u>1.</u> Air Leader | Lt. Wright | Nav | Lt. Doherty |
| Pilot | Lt. Hamilton | Asst Nav | |
| Co-Pilot | | M/O | Lt. Burrow |
| | | Bomb | Lt. Assperoclas |

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

| | | |
|---------------------|----|---------------|
| <u>a.</u> Secondary | 12 | 116x500 LB GP |
| Jettisoning | 1 | 10x500 LB GP |

b. Bombing Altitude: 21800'

c. Time of Release: 1215

3. Run-in from IP to Target:

The IP was over-shot 3 miles in order to avoid a collision with an unknown Group. After the maneuver at the IP the M/O set up course to the target. The bombardier clutched in at 10 miles and all subsequent rate checks were good. When bombs were released on a true heading of 110 degrees, synchronization appeared to be good. Bombing altitude was not reached until after the IP, consequently, C-1 Auto-Pilot was not used.

4. PI Report:

a. Terrain in photographs taken by this Squadron indicate that the Squadron overshoot. The bombs probably fell about 5 miles SE of the assigned MPI.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 272: Spare, jettisoned 10 bombs in channel.

c. 13 C Group - 100A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The assembly was accomplished as planned after the Group broke out of the clouds at 5000 feet altitude. The coast was departed at an altitude of 6000 feet on time and four miles North of the briefed CP 1.

(b) Route:

The route into the Continent was flown essentially as briefed until approximately 0600E, where the flight plan was changed via radio channels by 3rd AD. A triangular course was flown at this point in order to gain the altitude necessary to attack the target at Frankfurt. Kodak reported 10/10 cloud coverage in the target area, and

preparations were made to make PFF approaches by Squadrons. C Squadron's radar equipment was temporarily out, so the Squadron followed A in formation on the bomb run. The IP was made 10 miles to the north because of formation difficulties. On the bomb approach, A leader aborted, and the formation lost 5000 feet during the abortion maneuver; as a result the two Squadrons did not release their bombs on the target. Meanwhile, B Squadron made an H2X run. C leader then took over the lead of A and C Squadrons, and decided to attack the last resort target at Giessen. The 5000 feet of altitude was gained before the IP at 5040N-0913E was reached. By this time, the radar set in C was working properly, and the RN was able to assist on the bomb run, however, after the 8 mile radar check, the bombardier turned the formation sharply to the right and synchronized on what he thought was the last resort target. Actually, it was the town of Staufenberg, six miles to the North; ground haze made identification difficult. The route back to the base was uneventful. B Squadron joined the Division Column independently, and the return was also uneventful.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A Group.

(d) Navigational Difficulties:

Persistent clouds and contrails at altitude.

(e) Remarks: None.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. 100C had fading returns which became usable again on the run on the last resort target. 100A leader aborted on the bomb run on the secondary target, causing 100C and A Squadrons to attack the last resort. 100B made a successful H2X sighting on the secondary.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 100C, A Squadrons:

| | | | |
|-----------|-------------------------|----------|-------------|
| <u>1.</u> | Air Leader Maj. Staples | Nav | Lt. Johnson |
| | Pilot Lt. Murray | Asst Nav | |
| | Co-Pilot Lt. Temnes | M/O | Lt. Bohrer |
| | | Bomb | Lt. Swan |

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

| | | | |
|-----------|----------------|----|---------------|
| <u>a.</u> | TO-Staufenberg | 25 | 237x500 LB GP |
| | Jettisoning | 1 | 5x500 LB GP |

b. Bombing Altitude: 21600'

c. Time of Release: 1306

3. Run-in from IP to Target:

Prior to the IP the A Squadron was notified by C Squadron that it would release on the lead Squadron's smoke bombs. The lead aircraft in A Squadron aborted while on the bomb run. There was insufficient time for the C Squadron to take over and make a run on the target. The Air Leader then decided to bomb the last resort target. Using the town of Ashfeld for an IP, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 10 miles, and at the 9 mile check saw a town which he took to be Geissen, off to the right. A 10 degree course correction was made to get on the target. The bombardier attempted to set up course and rate, but there was insufficient time for good synchronization. When bombs were released on a true heading of 270 degrees, course was good but rate was off. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report:

a. The bombs from both Squadrons fell in open fields and woods in a loose pattern 6 miles NNE of Giessen, Germany, and about 3/4 mile beyond (W) Staufenberg, Germany, on which the run was made.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 812: Right bomb bay would not release, 5 bombs jettisoned in channel.

(b) 100B Squadron:

| | | | |
|----------------------|-------------|----------|----------------|
| <u>1.</u> Air Leader | Capt. Craft | Nav | Lt. Krepisman |
| Pilot | Capt. Brown | Asst Nav | |
| Co-Pilot | | M/O | Lt. Lentz |
| | | Bomb | Capt. Ventriss |

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Secondary 13 126x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 21950'

c. Time of Release: 1308

3. Run-in from IP to Target:

Attacking on a true heading of 134 degrees, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 10 miles, and subsequent rate checks were good. When bombs were released synchronization appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report:

a. Photographs taken by this Squadron show a small unidentified farm area and residences in the lower corner of the first picture in one set. No bursts are visible.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

3. Planning and Execution of the Mission:

a. Group Order and Strength:

| | | |
|-----|--------------------|----------------------|
| (1) | 93 A, B Groups: | 6 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| | (a) 34 Group | 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| | (b) Comp Group | 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| (2) | 13 A, B, C Groups: | 9 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| | (a) 390 Group | 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| | (b) 95 Group | 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| | (c) 100 Group | 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| (3) | 4 A, B Groups: | 6 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| | (a) Comp Group | 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| | (b) 486 Group | 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| (4) | 45 A, B Groups: | 6 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| | (a) Comp Group | 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons |
| | (b) Comp Group | 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons |

b. A/C and C/C Available:

| | | | | |
|-----|-----------|-----|--------|--------|
| (1) | 95 Group | REG | 44 A/C | 46 C/C |
| | | PFF | 11 A/C | 5 C/C |
| | | MH | 6 A/C | 5 C/C |
| (2) | 100 Group | REG | 44 A/C | 49 C/C |
| | | PFF | 10 A/C | 5 C/C |
| | | MH | 4 A/C | 4 C/C |
| (3) | 390 Group | REG | 37 A/C | 61 C/C |
| | | PFF | 8 A/C | 7 C/C |
| | | MH | 6 A/C | 5 C/C |

c. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

| | | |
|-----|-----------|---------------|
| (1) | 95 Group | 35 Plus 3 PFF |
| (2) | 100 Group | 35 Plus 3 PFF |
| (3) | 390 Group | 35 Plus 3 PFF |

d. A/C Airborne:

| | | |
|-----|-----------|---------------|
| (1) | 95 Group | 35 Plus 3 PFF |
| (2) | 100 Group | 35 Plus 3 PFF |
| (3) | 390 Group | 35 Plus 3 PFF |

e. A/C Abortive:

(1) 95 Group:

A/C 272: 336 Sqdn "P" - Blew cylinder in #1 engine - Pilot Lt. Toss - No sortie.

f. A/C Landing Away from Base:

(1) 100 Group:

A/C 696: 349 Sqdn "W" - Landed in France - Pilot Lt. DePlanque - Sortie.

g. A/C Ditching:

(1) 390 Group:

A/C 566: 569 Sqdn "C" - Ditched on return trip - Pilot Lt. Kennedy - Sortie.

h. A/C Attacking - 13 A Group:

Bombs Dropped

| | | | |
|-----|-----------|----|-----------------------|
| (1) | Secondary | 38 | 364x500 LB GP |
| | Returning | 1 | 10 Leaflet Containers |

(2) Method of Bombing: PFF

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

i. A/C Attacking - 13 B Group:

Bombs Dropped

| | | | |
|-----|-------------|----|---------------|
| (1) | Secondary | 37 | 355x500 LB GP |
| | Jettisoning | 1 | 10x500 LB GP |
| | Returning | 1 | 3x500 LB GP |

(2) Method of Bombing: PFF

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

- | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|---------------|---------------|
| j. A/C Attacking - 13 C Group: | | Bombs Dropped | |
| (1) | TO | 25 | 237x500 LB GP |
| | Secondary | 13 | 126x500 LB GP |
| | Jettisoning | 1 | 5x500 LB GP |
| (2) | Method of Bombing: PFF with Visual Assist | | |
| (3) | Method of Release: Salvo | | |

k. Remarks Relative to the Planning of the Mission:

(1) Weather reports from Division Headquarters after the late weather conference gave no indication that difficulty would be encountered during assembly, and that Plan A would not be successfully run as briefed. Plan A, therefore, was put into effect and Plan B, which called for assembly at a higher altitude of 15000 feet, was cancelled. No indication was subsequently given that Plan B would be contemplated again or used. No target information relative to Plan B, consequently, was taken by crews in the air. Weather conditions, however, were not conducive for all units to assemble at 5000 feet, which was the prescribed altitude under Plan A. Some units were obliged to go as high as 18000 feet in order to assemble properly, which precluded their possibility - because of limited amount of fuel and oxygen - of executing Plan A. Plan B was ordered, subsequently, to be carried out, but the units did not receive instructions relative to this order until a position a few miles West of the enemy lines was reached. The instructions further required all units to reach a minimum altitude of 21000 feet before crossing the enemy lines. To execute these orders, some units were forced to make 360 degree turns and others a triangular pattern. The result of all this was unnecessary confusion, which prevented proper interval in the Division Column and dissipated the fighter support as well. If the weather reports and forecasts were conducive to the use of Plan A, it was logical, then, to scrub Plan B. But if there was any doubt of Plan A being used, and there certainly must have been, then Plan B should not have been dispensed with in a finality that indicated to all persons concerned that it would not be employed.

4. Communications:

a. VHF:

(1) Major Englebrecht led the 13th Wing. Communications within the Group and between the Groups is reported satisfactory for most of the mission, however, from the IP to the target and until approximately the same position as the IP on the route out all channels were jammed by a squeal. There were some cases of unnecessary transmissions jamming Channel A.

(2) Communications on Channel B with Kodak was excellent; with other Wing Leaders, Arrowswift and Relay, satisfactory.

(3) Assigned fighters were not contacted, but satisfactory contact was made with ground sectors. 100 Group B Squadron made contact with fighters.

(4) Colgate was notified on Channel 701 of Fireball Green Low's crash and that four men had parachuted into the sea. Colgate asked Fireball Able to call on Channel 665, but this channel was not carried. Distress messages were sent to MF/DF Sections H and G and BW1 by other aircraft and were acknowledged.

b. W/T:

(1) Control Points:

| | CP 1 | CP 2 | CP 3 | TGT | CP 4 | Bases |
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Timings | 1005 | 1039 | 1143 | 1318 | 1431 | |
| ATA | | 1042 | | 1212 | | |

(2) Strike Reports:

| | | |
|------|-------|------|
| 390A | S B 5 | 1212 |
| 390B | S B 5 | 1211 |
| 390C | S B 5 | 1211 |
| 95A | S B 5 | 1213 |
| 95B | S B 5 | 1214 |
| 100C | L B 4 | 1306 |

5. Mission Camera Report:

a. The 95 Group installed 2 scope and 9 vertical cameras, all of which took pictures.

b. The 100 Group installed 9 vertical cameras, 8 of which took pictures:

The B-5 developing assembly ruined the film in one camera.

c. The 390 Group installed 3 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 2 and 8 of which took pictures:

PFF A/C 566 with a K-21 installed: **MIA.**

6. Controller's Log:

- a. 1630 from 3 AD: (1) Standby.
- b. 1632 from 13CW: (1) Standby.
- c. 2240 from 3 AD: (1) Wing Order and Strength (2) Bomb Load.
- d. 2300 from 13CW: (1) Bomb Load.
- e. 2310 from 13CW: (1) Wing Order and Strength (2) Bomb Load (3) Division Order.
- f. 2350 from 3 AD: (1) Targets (2) Division Assembly (3) Routes (4) Zero Hour (5) T/I (6) RBA (7) RBW (8) Time Control (9) Second Runs (10) Assembly Altitude.
- g. 0010 from 13CW: (1) Assembly Altitude (2) T/I (3) RBA (4) RBW (5) Zero Hour.
- h. 0024 from 13CW: (1) Targets.
- i. 0025 from 3 AD: (1) Leaflet Load.
- j. 0045 from 13CW: (1) Wing Leader.
- k. 0055 from 13CW: (1) AW to 13 CBW FO 46.
- l. 0120 from 3 AD: (1) AW to 3 AD FO 586.
- m. 0140 from 3 AD: (1) Route (Corrected) (2) Bombing Altitude (3) Scouting Force (4) Routes for Secondary and L/R (5) Plan B (6) Targets (7) Wing Order and Strength (8) Zero Hour (9) Bombing Altitude (10) Division Assembly (11) RBA (12) RBW (13) Route (14) Time Controls (15) Leaflet Load (16) Coast Out Altitude.

TR, 17 Feb. '45

- n. 0203 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 586 Plan A.
- o. 0210 from 13CW: (1) Plan B.
- p. 0210 from 3 AD: (1) Plan B Assembly.
- q. 0215 from 13CW: (1) Targets.
- r. 0235 from 3 AD: (1) MPI Change (2) Final Timings Plan B
(3) Final Timings Plan A (4) Route Change.
- s. 0250 from 13CW: (1) AW to 13 CBW FO 46 Plan B.
- t. 0250 from 3 AD: (1) Wing Leader.
- u. 0250 from 13CW: (1) Targets.
- v. 0255 from 3 AD: (1) AW to 3 AD FO 586 Plan B.
- w. 0310 from 13CW: (1) Final Timings Both Plans (2) Assembly
Altitude Both Plans (3) Bombing Altitude Both
Plans (4) Start Climb Times Both Plans.
- x. 0335 from 13CW: (1) Flares.
- y. 0340 from 13CW: (1) 13 CWB FO 46 Plan A.
- z. 0348 from 3 AD: (1) 3 AD FO 586 Plan A.
- aa. 0355 from 13CW: (1) WEATHER.
- bb. 0402 from 13CW: (1) 13 CBW FO 46 Plan B.
- cc. 0405 from 3 AD: (1) A-2 Annex to 3 AD FO 586 Plan A.
- dd. 0411 from 3 AD: (1) A-2 Annex to 3 AD FO 586 Plan B.
- ee. 0412 from 13CW: (1) Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO Plan A.
- ff. 0418 from 13CW: (1) Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO 46 Plan B.
- gg. 0440 from 3 AD: (1) Timings.
- hh. 0440 from 13CW: (1) Timings.
- ii. 0440 from 3 AD: (1) 3 AD FO 586 Plan B.
- jj. 0500 from 3 AD: (1) Final Timings (2) Plan Decision not made
yet.
- kk. 0517 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 2 to 3 AD FO 586 Plan B.
- ll. 0528 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 2 to 3 AD FO 586 Plan A.
- mm. 0530 from 3 AD: (1) Fighter Control.
- nn. 0535 from 13CW: (1) Annex 2 to 13 CBW FO 46 Plan B.
- oo. 0540 from 13 CW: (1) Fighter Control.
- pp. 0540 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 586 Plans A & B.
- qq. 0550 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 3 to 3 AD FO 586 Plan B.
- rr. 0635 from 13CW: (1) Which Plan in Effect?
- ss. 0640 from 3 AD: (1) Diversion Fields.
- tt. 0648 from 13CW: (1) Diversion Fields.

TR, 17 Feb. '45

uu. 0650 from 3 AD: (1) Plan A Will Run.
vv. 0653 from 13CW: (1) Plan A Will Run.
ww. 0653 from 3 AD: (1) Weather.
xx. 0715 from 13CW: (1) Annex 3 to 13 CWB FO 46 Plan B.
yy. 0715 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 3 to 3 AD FO 586.
zz. 0721 from 13CW: (1) Annex 2 to 13 CBW FO 46 Plan A.
aaa. 0740 from 95BG: (1) Weather.
bbb. 0745 from 100G: (1) Weather.
ccc. 0750 from 390G: (1) Weather.
ddd. 0805 from 100G: (1) Weather.
eee. 0815 from 13CW: (1) Weather Conference.
fff. 0820 from 100G: (1) Weather.
ggg. 0828 from 13CW: (1) Assembly.
hhh. 1103 from 3 AD: (1) W/T Message on Operations.
iii. 1103 from 13CW: (1) Change in Plans.
jjj. 1123 from 13CW: (1) Change in Plans.
kkk. 1230 from 13CW: (1) Annex 4 to 13 CBW FO 46.
lll. 1325 from 3 AD: (1) Weather Conference.
mmm. 1414 from 3 AD: (1) Diversion Fields.

For the Commanding General:

Ernest A. Kiessling
ERNEST A. KIESSLING
Major, Air Corps,
Director of Training
and Analyses.

13TH A GROUP:

- 390 A SQUADRON: 12 x 118 x 500 GP : Photographs show 10/10.
 B SQUADRON: 12 x 118 x 500 GP : No bursts are visible, but
 the bombs fell around the designated area below.
 C SQUADRON: 13 x 128 x 500 GP : Photographs show 10/10.

13TH B GROUP:

- 95 A SQUADRON: 12 x 116 x 500 GP : No bursts of A & B Squadrons
 B SQUADRON: 13 x 123 x 500 GP: : are visible, but the bombs
 from both Squadrons probably fell in the designated area below
 C SQUADRON: 12 x 116 x 500 GP : No bursts are visible, but
 the bombs probably fell around the area designated below.

13TH C GROUP:

- 100 A SQUADRON: 12 x 111 x 500 GP: The bombs from these Squadrons
 C SQUADRON: 13 x 126 x 500 GP: fell in fields and woods about
 one-half mile beyond (west) Staufenberg, Ger., a T.O. C Squad-
 ron made an H2K & Visual run, and A dropped off C Squadron.
 B SQUADRON: 13 x 126 x 500 GP: Photographs show 9 to 10/10
 undercast, and no bursts are visible. The PT was attacked.


OVERLAY FOR RAF TARGET MAP No. 6 (d) (vi) 46

SCALE 1: 63,360

M/Y and RR in PURPLE

GREEN CROSS AREA: WOODS

IN GREEN



HATCHED AREA: CITY

"A"

STATION

119

FORM 3

DATE

17 Feb. 45

| | LET | SHIP | PILOT | TARGET | TIME OFF | | LANDING | | REMARKS |
|-----|--------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------|----------|-----|---------|------|---------|
| | | | | | EST | ACT | EST | ACT | |
| 334 | M | 8230 | Gillen | ✓ | ✓ | 831 | | 1510 | |
| 335 | O | 7194 | Dillon | ✓ | ✓ | 832 | | 1513 | |
| " | G | 6902 | I. Hamitto | ✓ | ✓ | 833 | | 1508 | |
| " | N | 6598 | Bradley | ✓ | ✓ | 850 | | 1510 | |
| " | H | 7376 | Purdy | ✓ | ✓ | 857 | | 1506 | |
| " | R | 7783 | Palmer | ✓ | ✓ | 852 | | 1508 | |
| 334 | T | 8996 | Rosenzweig | ✓ | ✓ | 855 | | 1509 | |
| " | L | 9175 | Parrish | ✓ | ✓ | 856 | | 1459 | |
| " | U | 8525 | Cummins | ✓ | ✓ | 857 | | 1509 | |
| 335 | S | 9052 | Shaw | ✓ | ✓ | 853 | | 1504 | |
| " | A | 8255 | Duncan | ✓ | ✓ | 854 | | 1503 | |
| 334 | R | 8438 | PLACE | ✓ | ✓ | 858 | | 1509 | |
| | E | 6838 | Jensen | ✓ | ✓ | 858 | | 1509 | |

"B"

FORM 3

STATION 119

DATE 17 Feb - 45

| | LET | SHIP | PILOT | TARGET | TIME OFF | | LANDING | | REMARKS |
|-----|-----|------|----------|--------|----------|-----|---------|------|---------|
| | | | | | EST | ACT | EST | ACT | |
| 335 | J | 8210 | Savage | ✓ | ✓ | 834 | | 1457 | |
| 412 | V | 8288 | Ristine | ✓ | ✓ | 836 | | 1455 | |
| " | F | 6946 | L'Eauyer | ✓ | ✓ | 838 | | 1457 | |
| " | A | 6801 | Busse | ✓ | ✓ | 839 | | 1456 | |
| 334 | X | 8990 | Jhail | ✓ | ✓ | 841 | | 1454 | |
| 412 | L | 7257 | Beh | ✓ | ✓ | 840 | | 1451 | |
| " | E | 8067 | Layl | ✓ | ✓ | 842 | | 1447 | |
| " | M | 8741 | Newman | ✓ | ✓ | 843 | | 1446 | |
| " | H | 6522 | Willis | ✓ | ✓ | 844 | | 1517 | |
| " | D | 8922 | Beard | ✓ | ✓ | 847 | | 1444 | |
| " | J | 8826 | Walter | ✓ | ✓ | 845 | | 1449 | |
| " | B | 8774 | Jimminy | ✓ | ✓ | 845 | | 1450 | |
| " | Y | 9177 | Crystal | ✓ | ✓ | 846 | | 1448 | |

"C"

FORM 3

STATION

119

DATE

17 Feb-45

| | LET | SHIP | PILOT | TARGET | TIME OFF | | LANDING | | REMARKS |
|-----|--------------|-----------------|------------|--------|----------|-----|---------|------|-------------|
| | | | | | EST | ACT | EST | ACT | |
| 334 | S | 8179 | W. Hamilla | | ✓ | ✓ | 835 | 1526 | |
| 336 | U | 8469 | Miller | | ✓ | ✓ | 859 | 1533 | |
| " | T | 9037 | Gross | | ✓ | ✓ | 859 | 1522 | |
| " | Y | 6583 | Ross | | ✓ | ✓ | 900 | 1522 | |
| 335 | A | 6838 | Schaaf | | ✓ | ✓ | 904 | 1526 | |
| " | Q | 8617 | Sutton | | ✓ | ✓ | 902 | 1519 | |
| " | X | 8604 | Glonick | | ✓ | ✓ | 903 | 1512 | |
| " | P | 8272 | Juss | | (NO) | ✓ | 905 | 1152 | Engine Out, |
| " | W | 6993 | Nelson | | ✓ | ✓ | 906 | 1511 | |
| " | V | 8676 | Tower | | ✓ | ✓ | 907 | 1525 | |
| " | A | 8584 | Tackman | | ✓ | ✓ | 904 | 1515 | |
| 334 | D | 8640 | Halgren | | ✓ | ✓ | 908 | 1514 | |
| " | J | 7201 | Addison | | ✓ | ✓ | 909 | 1516 | |

Walt Brown
Mac

CONFIDENTIAL
18 FEB 1945

OK
CWB

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3221

ATTACK ON FRANKFURT/OST MARSHALLING YARD on 17 FEB 1945

95th Raid

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

(a) No. of aircraft : 260, with full fighter escort.
(b) Command : U.S. 8th AIR FORCE.
(c) Time : 1158 - 1220 A hours.
(d) Bombs : 1204 x 500 lb. G.P.
2724 x 250 lb. G.P.

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

- (a) Two concentrations of bursts are seen across the Northern and central portion of the target area and another large concentration of bursts is visible 250 yards East of the Northern portion of the target area and extends for approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles in an Easterly direction across the built-up area of FECHENHEIM. Two concentrations and four groups of bursts are seen within a four mile radius of the target area with possible hits on MAYER and SCHMIDT and the FRIEDRICH SCHMALTZ ENGINEERING WORKS located in OFFENBACH. Of the 3928 H.E. bombs dropped, a total of approximately 1000 bursts can be seen on poor quality and cloud obscured photographs. (Note: A single burst seen on a photograph may be the result of the explosion of more than one bomb).
- (b) A concentration of at least 70 bursts is seen on the Northern portion of the Marshalling Yard and extending East Southeast into open fields, with at least seven hits on the tracks. Another concentration of an undetermined number of bursts is seen across the central portion of the yard and probably extends across the East Harbor area. Due to haze and clouds the exact position of the bursts cannot be plotted.
- (c) Other bursts:
1. An undetermined number of bursts is seen through clouds on a built-up residential/business area in the vicinity of MAYER & SCHMIDT and the FRIEDRICH SCHMALTZ ENGINEERING WORKS, which is located approximately $2\text{-}3/4$ miles Southeast of the target area at OFFENBACH. Although not visible because of clouds there is a possibility that a portion of the bomb pattern extended onto the above mentioned engineering works.
 2. Approximately 400 bursts are seen 250 yards East of the Northern portion of the Marshalling Yard and extending East Southeast across the I.G. FARBEN-INDUSTRIE A.G. located at MAINKUR, residential/business area of FECHENHEIM, the RIVER MAIN, and in open fields and on a small residential area on the opposite bank. At least 20 are in the I.G. FARBEN-INDUSTRIE A.G. area with hits on approximately four unidentified buildings.
 3. A concentration of an undetermined number of bursts is seen through clouds on the built-up residential/business area approximately $1\text{-}3/4$ miles Southeast of the target area.
 4. A group of at least 18 bursts is seen in open fields and in the RIVER MAIN approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles Southeast of the target area.
 5. Two groups totalling at least 30 bursts are seen in open fields and on the small town of RUMPENHEIM which is located approximately $1\text{-}3/4$ miles East Northeast of the target area.
 6. A group of at least 20 bursts is seen in open fields $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles East Southeast of the target area.
 7. A group of 25 bursts is seen on the Eastern edge of the small town of MUELHEIM which is located approximately four miles East of the target area.

(iii) ACTIVITY:

FRANKFURT/OST MARSHALLING YARD.

COVER

The Eastern half of the yard is covered on poor quality and cloud obscured photographs.

LOADING

The loading appears light.

(iv) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(v) BOMB PLOT: None prepared.

(vi) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------|-----------|-----------|------|----------------------|----------|-----|
| SAV | 34/555-557 | 17 FEB 45 | Unknown A | hrs. | 1/40,700 (F.L. 7") | 23,800' | 'C' |
| " | 94/1370 | " | 1212 A | " | 1/40,250 | 23,500' | 'B' |
| " | 95/1434,1436 | " | | | | | |
| | 1439 | " | 1214 A | " | 1/40,600 | 23,700' | 'C' |
| " | 96/839,840 | " | 1159 A | " | 1/44,000 | 25,700' | 'B' |
| " | 100/1245 | " | 1215 A | " | 1/37,600 | 219,500' | 'C' |
| " | 385/1051 | " | 1158 A | " | 1/36,000 | 21,000' | " |
| " | 388/911 | " | 1208 A | " | 1/41,000 | 22,900' | 'B' |
| " | 390/1342-1343 | " | | | | | |
| | 1347 | " | 1212 A | " | 1/42,300 | 23,700' | 'C' |
| " | 452/929 | " | 1208 A | " | 1/39,400 | 23,000' | 'B' |
| " | 452/928 | " | 1158 A | " | 1/23,600 (F.L. 12") | 23,600' | " |
| " | 486/834,837,839 | " | 1220 A | " | 1/43,000 (F.L. 7") | 25,200' | " |
| " | 487/780 | " | 1220 A | " | 1/38,600 | 22,500' | " |
| " | 490/643 | " | 1158 A | " | 1/36,800 | 21,500' | " |
| " | 0-486-301 | " | Unknown A | " | Oblique(F.L. 6-3/8") | 23,000' | 'A' |

CONFIDENTIALA.C.I.U.LS/GS/GSDISTRIBUTION NO. 11-C

234 Copies.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 293

PERIOD: 0001 hours 17 February to 2400 hours 17 February 1945

A. STATISTICS

| | (b) <u>Total</u> <u>Sorties</u> | <u>Effective</u> <u>Sorties</u> | <u>Tonnage</u> | <u>Claims</u> | <u>Losses</u> | | | | <u>NYR</u> |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|------------|
| | | | | | <u>E/A</u> | <u>AA</u> | <u>OT</u> | <u>Tot.</u> | |
| Heavy Bomber Atks. | 895 | 331 | 811.8 | 0-0-0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 0 |
| Fighter Escort (a) | 167 | 151 | 0 | 0-0-0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Fighter Sweeps | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-0-0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Fighter Bombing | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0-0-0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Photo Recon. | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0-0-0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Weather Recon. | 21 | 21 | 0 | 0-0-0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Air/Sea Rescue | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0-0-0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Special Operations | <u>11</u> | <u>10</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0-0-0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> |
| Totals | 1107 | 517 | 811.8 | 0-0-0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 3 |

(a) Groups based on Continent did not operate.

(b) According to USSTAF Regulations 80-6B, 20 January 1945, (1) "A 'sortie' is an aircraft airborne on a mission against the enemy (synonymous with terms: aircraft dispatched, aircraft airborne and aircraft taking off, previously used)"; (2) "An 'effective sortie' is a sortie which carries out the purpose of the mission". This applies to fighters and bombers. (See said regulations for further explanations.) In accordance with the above the terms "dispatched" and "attacking", formerly used, have been eliminated.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

895 a/c (607 B-17s, 288 B-24s) from three Air Divisions sortied in three forces against synthetic oil plants in Germany. Due to adverse cloud conditions causing difficulties in assembly and a forecast of adverse base conditions upon return, the 1st and 2nd Air Divisions were recalled. The 3rd Air Division, having had no difficulties in assembly, continued in nine group formations (346 B-17s) against Frankfurt M/Y and Frankfurt/Hederheim VDM Casting Plant, targets of the alternate plan. 331 a/c dropped 811.8 tons

S E C R E T

GP on Frankfurt M/Y and several T/Os at 1153-1308 hours from 22,000-25,500 feet. Bombing on H2X with some visual assists. Leaflets dropped on Frankfurt and Hanau. Weather: 8/10-10/10 enroute; 5/10-8/10 over Frankfurt with tops at 6000 feet. Flak: meager to moderate, accurate. Battle Damage: 92 minor, 14 major, 1 Cat. "E". E/A Opposition: nil. Three Me-262s sighted - one in the Frankfurt area and two NE of Hanau; one Me-410 sighted SE of Coblenz. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 B-17s (1 to AA, 1 ditched, 1 to unknown causes) and 2 B-24s of the 2nd Air Division (1 ditched, 1 to unknown causes).

Details of attack as follows:

| <u>Assigned Targets</u> | <u>Sorties</u> | <u>Effective Sorties</u> | <u>Tonnage</u> | <u>Results</u> |
|---|----------------|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Frankfurt M/Y Frankfurt/Hederheim VDM Casting Plant | 346 | 260 Not Attacked | 641.6 | Unobserved |
| <u>Other Targets</u> | | | | |
| Geissen M/Y | | 45 | 109.1 | Poor |
| Aschaffenburg | | 12 | 29.9 | Fair-Good |
| Hanau | | 10 | 22.4 | Fair |
| T/O's | | 4 | 8.8 | Unobserved |
| Totals | 346 | 331 | 811.8 | |

2. Fighter Escort

Three groups (167 P-51s) sortied in support of heavy bombers. Up 1009-1020 hours, down 1500-1520 hours. 151 effective sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. One u/i jet observed in the distance NE of Coblenz. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 a/c (unknown cause); 1 Cat. "E". NYR: 2 a/c (believed safe on Continent). All groups strafed with ground claims as follows:

| | <u>Destroyed</u> | <u>Damaged</u> |
|---------------------|------------------|----------------|
| Locomotives | 22 | 1 |
| Goods Wagons | 10 | 137 |
| Motor Transports | 7 | 1 |
| Oil Cars | 5 | 0 |
| Factory | 0 | 1 |
| Tractor | 1 | 0 |
| Observation Tower | 0 | 1 |
| Observation Balloon | 1 | 0 |

3. Fighter Sweeps

Nil. Groups based on Continent did not operate.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil

5. Photo Reconnaissance

9 a/c (5 F-5s, 3 P-51s and 1 Spitfire) sortied as follows:

- 3 a/c on D/A photos in Western and Northwestern Germany.
- 2 a/c on mapping missions over Northwest Germany.
- 1 a/c on mapping mission in Eastern Germany.
- 3 a/c as escort for PRU a/c.

all a/c effective; no losses.

ADDENDUM TO INTOPS FOR 16 FEBRUARY:

Report received 2230 hours 17 February.

2 F-5s sortied on mapping missions over Southern Germany. Both effective; no losses.

4 P-51s as escort for PRU a/c. 3, effective sorties; no losses.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

21 a/c (3 B-17s, 6 Mosquitoes and 12 P-51s) sortied as follows:

- 1 B-17 completed routine weather flight over sea NW of Lands End.
- 1 B-17 completed a routine flight from the Azores.
- 1 B-17 completed a routine flight to the Azores.
- 6 Mosquitoes completed special weather reconnaissance over the U.K., Holland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, France and Belgium.
- 12 P-51s as weather scouts for bomber forces.

All effective; no losses.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

4 P-47s on search and patrol. All effective; no losses.

8. Special Operations

11 a/c (6 B-24s, 4 P-51s and 1 Mosquito) sortied as follows:

- 6 B-24s to form VHF screen, jamming from 0707-1000 hours. All effective.
- 4 P-51s as relay a/c. All effective.
- 1 Mosquito on a special operation was recalled before completing mission.

No losses.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Although a small number of jet a/c were airborne, weather conditions were such that it would probably have been difficult for s/e e/a to take off. Neither the fighters nor the bombers experienced any attacks. The bombers sighted 3 Me-262s and 1 Me-410 in the Frankfurt area and one fighter group sighted one u/i jet in the distance near Coblenz on withdrawal. It is probable that these a/c were on reconnaissance.

S E C R E T

2. Flak

Frankfurt - meager to moderate, accurate, tracking and barrage.
Giessen - moderate, accurate, tracking.
Coblentz - meager, inaccurate, tracking.

3. Observations

Hana M/Y - about 100 freight cars in it.
Friedburg M/Y (5018N-0846E) - filled with rolling stock.
Moderate rail and road traffic immediately north and northeast of Frankfurt moving north and northeast.
A large number of barges reported on Rhine River at 5008N-0745E at 1231 hours.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Frankfurt Marshalling Yard - Unobserved Results

Bombing by 21 squadrons carrying 500 and 250 lb. GP bombs. 10/10 cloud covered photos in the early part of the attack and part cloud covered in the latter part make interpretation difficult. 2 patterns are seen in the built-up part of the town of Offenbach, 3-1/2 miles east-southeast of the MPI. 5 squadron patterns are seen in the built-up area of Fechenheim, 3-7/10 miles east of the MPI., 2 of these patterns lying across the through line to the marshalling yard. 1 pattern is seen in the outskirts of the small village of Rumpenheim, 5 miles east of the MPI. The balance of the patterns are not seen but rough tracks plotted for five squadrons indicate they crossed the built-up area of Frankfurt and some disturbance visible through the clouds indicate bombs probably fell in the eastern part of the city.

Giessen Marshalling Yard - Poor Results

Bombing by 3 and part of another squadron carrying 500 and 250 lb. GP bombs. Of the squadrons bombing, only one came within a mile of the MPI. No bombs fell in the marshalling yards, but some damage was probably caused in the residential areas.

Hanau - Fair Results

Hanau Marshalling Yard was bombed by one squadron and part of another carrying 250 lb. GP bombs. One pattern was seen on the yard with possibly a third of the bombs inside the target area.

Aschaffenburg - Fair to Good Results

Scattered pattern of bursts, 1/2 to 1/3 of which fell in the built-up area of town, one direct and several near hits on the road bridge leading into the town across the river.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.