# HEADQUARTERS 13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H) APO 559

RUB

Date 14 February 1945 13 CBW FO 43 13 CBW OPS 272 3 AD FO 583

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (CHEMNITZ, GERMANY)

TO : CO, 95BG, APO 559

- 1. Information Concerning the Target:
- a. The primary target (visual) for today was the Marshalling Yard at Chemnitz. Germany.
- b. The secondary target for today was the same as the primary. H2X technique was to be employed.
- c. The last resort target (visual or H2X) for today was Plauen, Germany.
- 2. Narrative of the Attack:
  - a. 13 A Group 390A, B, C Squadrons:
    - (1) Navigation:
      - (a) Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 390th Group made a normal take off and climb to assembly altitude. The Group was assembled in good order ever the Buncher and at the same time making visual contact with the 13B and 13C Groups in the area. The Wing assembly was completed at Southwold at 10192, this also being CP 1.

#### (b) Route:

The briefed route was followed to 5226-0411, at which point the 13th Wing Leader made a double drift to the left in order to lese time and enable the 4th Wing, who was 4 minutes late, to close up their interval in the Division Column. CP 2 was made good and about 1 minute late. The route to CP 3 was essentially as briefed. Due to weather enroute to CP 4 the Group flew slightly right of course, essing at times to allow the 4th Wing to close up. A wind check was obtained between 0900E and 1000E and was found to be from 310 degrees at 80 knots.

The Air Leader requested the Lead Navigator to make several doglegs to lose time and allow the 4th Wing to close up into proper division order and spacing. The IP was identified visually and checked by H2X fixes. Due to equipment failure the C Squadron had to fly with the A Squadron. The B Squadron which had no equipment difficulties peeled off at the IP and fell in trail behind the A and C Squadrons. The Radar Navigator set up course for the Bombardier and gave rate checks on the bomb run. Several corrections to the left were made while adjusting course into the secondary target. After the Bombardier received the 6th rate check the Lead Bombardier of the A Squadron picked up what he believed to be the secondary target thru a hole in the undereast and made a sharp turn to the left. Due to insufficient time to synchronize the Bombardier held his bombs. A 270 degree turn to the right was made in an effort to bomb the last resort target of Plauen.

After completing the turn the A Squadron took a heading of 270 degrees and in doing so interferred with formations

on the bomb approach to Chemnitz. This maneuver forced the 100C Squadron to abandon the secondary target since the 390th A and C Squadrons cut thru the 100th Group formation. The 100th C Squadron had to turn off and later fell in trail of the 390th A and C Squadrons. After "S"ing back to the South, the Radar Navigator of the A Squadron picked up what he assumed to be the last resort target and passed the bearing to the target on to the Navigator, who then gave the heading to it. The Radar Navigator made several corrections to the left and gave rate checks to the Bombardier. After the 5th rate check the Bombardier picked up what appeared to be the last resort target and made a sharp turn to the right and bombed it. This target was later identified as Eger, Czecheslevakia, 25 miles SSE of Plauen. This indicates that the Radar Navigator misinterpreted the town of Eger for the town of Plauen.

Assuming that the last resort target was attacked the Radar Navigator gave fixes to the Lead Navigator which indicated that he was right of course on the route out from the target. Acting on this assumption the Lead Navigator promptly suspected a wind shift and found that the H2X fix confirmed that the metro winds were in effect so used them to correct into the briefed course by taking up a 250 degree heading. The Radar Navigator was unable to give any assistance after 1247 at which time he had given the Navigator a fix at 5039-1027. It was not until 1338 when the Navigator was able to do pinpoint pilotage and was checked by H2X fixes was he able to accurately orient himself at 4938-0955 South of Wurzburg. He was later assisted by fixes from Frankfurt which further established his position approximately 30 miles South of course. The briefed course was intercepted at Friedburg. From this point the briefed course was essentially as briefed to approximately 0500E where the course was altered slightly to right at the request of the Air Leader by passing Brussels to the North. The Continental Coast was crossed at 5023-0325 at 1607.

The 390th B, which had followed the A and C Squadrons on the bomb run, proceeded on the bomb run and bombed the secondary target by H2X. The B Squadron could not locate the A and C Squadrons at the RP so fell in formation with the 100th Group and followed them back to base.

#### (c) Weather:

During assembly a 1/10 to 3/10 middle layer of altocumulus, 12000-14000 feet was encountered. A high layer of cirrus at 21000-23000 was reported. Over channel mil to 5/10 low layer was reported. Main difficulty was experienced at 0800E where Groups ran into a high scud layer making visual contact impossible at times. In target area a 7/10 to 8/10 strata cumulus was reported, and a high cirrus layer over the target. Winds over Continent 310 degrees at 80 knots.

#### (d) Navigational Difficulties:

Low Squadron Fluxgate Compass became inoperative over Continent causing some difficulty for M/O and Navigator in keeping up accurate DR. "S"ing and sharp turns near target made it very difficult for the M/O to keep oriented with the ground. The High Squadron had difficulty in keeping in visual contact during mission due to high cirrus scud layer. Gee in B Squadron became inoperative during assembly.

#### (e) Remarks:

"S"ing and sharp corrections should be held to a minimum in order to give the M/O every possible chance to be of assistance to the Navigator and Bombardier. Much of the M/O's difficulty on this mission was due to loss of orientation with the ground. This caused fixes

obtained after leaving the secondary target to be unreliable and made it difficult for the lead navigator to do accurate navigation. It is rather difficult to do pinpoint thru breaks in clouds unless you have established yourself along the route by the other check points. Had the Bombardier gone in with the M/O's assistance on this mission it is assumed that the secondary target could have been attacked successfully. The navigation was very satisfactory.

#### (f) PFF Narrative:

Four PFF A/C were dispatched. 390C A/C had fluxgate compass insperative and dropped off of 390A Squadron. 390B made an H2X sighting on the secondary target. 390A began an H2X sighting on the secondary, however, at the six mile check point the bombardier located the target visually and made a radical correction to the left. The target was lost, however, and the decision was made to bomb the last resort target. An H2X run was eventually made on Eger, Czecheslovakia, with a visual assist. 390A radar navigator was not properly eriented on this run due to excessive turning of the aircraft.

#### (2) Bombing:

#### (a) 390A, C Squadrons:

1.	Air Leader	Col. Moller	Na 🕶	Lt. Rawlins
*****		Capt. Rohr		Capt. Arbin
	Co-Pilot	Lt. Arnold	<b>M/</b> 0	Lt. Epton
			Bomb	Lt. Matteson

## 2. A/C Attacking:

#### Bombs Dropped

9.	TO Eger, Czech.	24	224x500 LB GP
	TO	1	8x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	1	10x500 LB GP
	Returning	1	2x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 21200'

c. Time of Release: 1234

#### 3. Run In from IP to Target:

M/O picked up the target and set up course. After the 6 mile check the bombardier picked up visually what he thought to be the secondary target and made a sharp turn to the left. It is believed that the M/Y at Blauchau was picked up in error. The run, however, was too short, consequently, the bombs were held. The turn to RP resulted in the A and C Squadrons interfering with 1000 Squadron's bomb run. The M/O then picked up what he thought to be the last resort target and proceeded to set up course. Actually the target was the M/Y at Eger, Czechoslovakia. The bombardier clutched in at 10 miles and checks in rate were made at 9, 8, 7, 6 and 5 miles. After the 5 mile check the bombardier picked up the target visually, which gave him approximately 30 seconds to synchronize. A large course correction was made to the left in order to get on the M/T. The bombardier over corrected and while he was in the process of making a correction to the right, bombs were released. When bombs were released on a true heading of 178 degrees, rate was good but deflection was off to the left. Twenty-two degrees of drift was experienced on the bomb run. C-1 Auto-Pilot was not used on the bomb run. C Squadron released off of A Squadron's smoke bombs.

#### 4. PI Report:

a. 390A and C Squadrons bombed a TO at the village of Eger, Czechoslavakia.

Two separate, fairly compact patterns appear in an open area 1800 feet Northeast of 5 large and 3 medium sized hangars, and 1950 feet East of a small but well-loaded M/Y.

b. Since no AP was reported by the two Squadrons, no attempt has been made to determine percentages within 1000' and 2000' of an MPI.

c. A Squadron's main concentration is nearly circular, slightly wider than long, the diameter being 1088'. There are at least 16 stray bursts from A Squadron. Six of these hit among the hangers, resulting in 3 direct hits and I near miss on a large workshoptype hanger, and 3 near misses on a large arch-roofed hanger.

d. One A/C (#481) of 390A bombed open fields in a locality reported to be 5020-1155.

e. C Squadron's pattern is considerably losser than A's. It is roughly triangular in shape, length: 1571', width: 1965'. There are 9 near misses and direct hits on buildings in the scattered settlement which lies to the East and NE of the M/Y.

f. At least 72 A/C appear on the A/F. They are of two types: (1) At least 38 very large S/E A/C, or gliders, widely dispersed, and (2) 24 small S/E type A/C, all but one of which are closely parked among a long line of revetments which extends eastward from the large hangars. These A/C closely resemble the ME 163 (S/E Jet).

g. 390B Squadron's photographs are 10/10 clouds.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 481: 8 bombs released on a TO at 5020N-1155E.
A/C 134: Rack malfunction - 2 bombs returned.
A/C 265: Aborted - 10 bombs jettisoned at 5232N-

0336E.

## (b) 390B Squadron:

l. Air Leader Major Brown Nav Lt. Eusner Pilot Capt. Kenny Asst Nav Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Wilcox Bomb Lt. Wosczyk

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Secondary 11 108x500 LB GP
Jettisoning 1 6x500 LB GP
Returning 1 4x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 22100'

c. Time of Release: 12232

3. Run In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a true heading of 34 degrees, the M/O picked up the target without difficulty and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 10, 8 and 6 miles. When bombs were released synchronization appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- 4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 clouds.
- 5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 058: Jettisoned 6 bombs and returned 4.

- b. 13 B Group 100A, B, C Squadrons:
  - (1) Navigation:
    - (a) Assembly:

A normal take sef and Group assembly was made over Buncher 28 at 9000 feet. On advice from 134 the Group tacked on near Buncher 11 and made the Wing assembly and Division assembly good in trail of the leader.

#### (b) Route:

CP 1 was made good at 10000, 12 minutes early. Briefed course was flown to CP 3 at which time thick cirrus clouds were encountered and visual contact was lost with 13A. A frozen pitot tube in 100A leader caused the air speed indicator to fluctuate. contact was regained at 1000K and the Group remained in trail of 13A on course. The decision was made for 100B to assume lead of 13B and that Squadron dropped down to 23000 with 100A leader echeloned to right and 100C echeloned to their right. The IP was made good and an H2X run was made to the secondary target. On the bomb run 1000 was forced to abandon their run to the target by 390 A and C and elected to bomb the last resort. Rather than be a lone Squadron a decision was made to join the two Squadrons of 13A. A TO was attacked at 5002-1229 and they then joined 390A and C near RP at 4955-1210. Poor range made the H2X set unavailable as a navigational aid and as Gee was also out DR had to be used until a definite pinpoint was found near Wurzburg. A turn to the right was made and they converged with the briefed route in the Frankfurt-Koblenz flak corridor, 100B took over the Division lead at the briefed RP and 390B formed with them and followed the briefed route back leaving the Continental Coast at 1611 at 5125-0325 at 8000. The English Coast was crossed at 1652.

- (c) Weather: Same as 13A Group.
- (d) Navigational Difficulties:

Weather encountered at 0800E in the form of thick cirrus clouds and dense persistent contrails and clouds in the target area made navigation difficult. The Gee Box was out in the 1000 Squadron which also had poor H2X reception.

(e) Remarks:

Navigation was excellent expecially in the lead and high Squadrons.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF A/C were dispatched. 100C was unable to make an H2X run, because range was too poor; bombed a TO instead, by visual means. 100A and 100B made H2X sightings on the secondary target. Results were unobserved.

- (2) Bombing:
  - (a) 100B Squadron:
    - Pilot Lt. DePlanque Asst Nav Capt. Frye Bomb Lt. Svendsen

2. A/C Attacking:

- Bombs Dropped
- a. Secondary 12 113x500 LB GP Jettisoning 1 10x500 LB GP Returning 1 3x500 LB GP
- b. Bombing Altitude: 21570'
- c. Time of Release: 1225
- 3. Run In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a true heading of 34 degrees, the M/5 picked up the target without difficulty and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and all rate checks were good. When bombs were released synchronization appeared to be good and bubbles level. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- 4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 clouds.
- 5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 840: Two stations were frozen and 2 bombs had to be jettisoned manually at the RP.

A/C 865: Rack malfunction - 1 bomb jettisoned.

A/C 865: Hack malfunction - 1 bomb jettisoned.

A/C 297: Aborted and 10 bombs jettisoned on a flak
installation at 5235N-0732E.

- (b) 100A Squadron:
  - 1. Air Leader Major Cruver Nav Lt. Wild Pilot Lt. William Asst Nav Capt. Andersen Go-Pilot Lt. Blackson M/O Lt. Cately Bomb Lt. Orendorff
  - 2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
    - a. Secondary 12 116x500 LB GP
    - b. Bombing Altitude: 21574\*
    - c. Time of Release: 12251
  - 3. Run In from IP to Target:

After a good turn at the IP the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 70 degrees and cheeks in rate were made at 65 degrees, 62 degrees, 58 degrees, and 53 degrees. Throughout the run only one slight rate correction was required. When bombs were released on a true heading of 54 degrees; synchronization appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- 4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 clouds.
- 5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.
- (c) 100C Squadron:
  - Air Leader Capt. Wooten Nav Lt. Johnson Pilot Lt. Murray Asst Nav Co-Pilot M/O Capt. Frye Bomb Lt. Swan
  - 2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
    - a. To Bridge, Doubrava, 13 126x500 LB GP Czechoslovakia

- b. Bombing Altitude: 21600'
- c. Time of Release: 1239

#### 3. Run In from IP to Target:

After the turn at the IP and half way down the bomb run, the Squadron was forced off the run as a result of interference from the 390 A and C Squadrons. It was decided to bomb the last resort target, but the M/O was unable to make a run because of insufficient time. The Command Pilot decided to follow the 390th A and C Squadrons and instructed the bombardier to pick up a TO or release on the 390th A and C Squadrons' smoke bombs. The bombardier was further instructed to be sure and release when the 390th smoke flares were reached or the bombs would have to be jettisoned as it was imperative that they get back into the bomber stream. Knowing that they were trailing the 390th by a considerable distance, the bombardier felt that the smoke flares would be unreliable as a release point, consequently, elected to bomb a bridge as TO. The run was short, subsequently, the bombardier had insufficient time to completely synchronize. Bombs were released on true heading of 220 degrees. C-l Auto-Pilot was not used on the bomb run.

The selection of the bridge as a TO was a poor one, in view of the time with which the bombardier had to synchronize. Bombardiers will hold their bombs until a good target opportunity presents itself before releasing their bombs - unless the Command Pilot assumes the responsibility for the selection of the TO to be bombed.

## 4. PI Report:

a. Terrain at bomb release point cannot be identified owing to haze and cloud. However, print No. 9 centers about a mile ENE of Doubrava (5002-1229) on a heading of approximately 260 degrees true. No bomb bursts can be seen.

- 5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.
- c. 13 C Group 95A, B, C Squadwans:
  - (1) Navigation:
    - (a) Assembly:

The Group assembled without difficulty at an altitude of 9000 feet. The Coast out point was made 10 miles to the South and 1 minute early.

#### (b) Route:

the Continent was flown essentially as briefed, however, in the vicinity of 0700E the Squadrons became separated due to persistent clouds. There was no visual contact between the Squadrons until 1100E where the formations broke out of the clouds. The turn at the IP was made approximately 5 miles Southeast of the briefed IP. Due to VHF difficulties and clouds on the bomb run the Squadrons were not properly advised as to what formation to assume on the run, however, all three Squadrons did make individual H2X sightings on the secondary target at Chemnitz. After the target, 95B Squadron was unable to contact the Group and followed another Group back to the base. 95A and C flew essentially the briefed route out of the Continent. The return was uneventful.

- (c) Weather: Same as 13A Group.
- (d) Navigational Difficulties:

Gee jammed in 95A A/C at 0600E.

(e) Remarks:

Navigation as a whole was very good. Good crew coordination.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF A/C were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. Each Squadron made an individual H2X sighting on the secondary target. Results were unobserved.

#### (2) Bombing:

- (a) 95A Squadron:
  - Goop. NG
    1. Air Leader Major, Graver Nav Lt. Wild Donerty
    Pilot Lt. Williams Asst Nav Lt. Andersen Frei
    Co-Pilot Lt. Blackson M/O Lt. Gatele Burzows
    Morr Bomb Lt. Orendorff Jones
  - 2. A/C Attacking:

Bombs Dropped

- a. Secondary 11 106x500 LB GP Returning 1 10x500 LB GP
- b. Bombing Altitude: 22150'
- c. Time of Release: 1227
- 3. Run IN from IP to TARGET:

After overshooting the IP 4 miles the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 9 miles and all rate checks thereafter were good. When bombs were released on a true heading of 030 degrees, synchronization appeared to be good and bubbles level. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- 4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 clouds.
- 5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.
- (b) 95B Squadron:
  - 1. Air Leader Major Swinney Nav Lt. Pieper Pilot Lt. Savage Asst Nav Co-Pilot Lt. Bunin M/O Lt. Mitchell Bomb Lt. Seferian
  - 2. A/C Attacking:

Bombs Dropped

- a. Secondary
- b. Bombing Altitude: 22700'
- c. Time of Release: 1228
- 3. Run In from IP to Target:

As a result of poor VHF communication, 95B stayed with 95A on the turn at the IP. Shortly after the turn, however, proper interval was taken up and the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 9 miles and checks in rate were made at 8, 7, 6, and 5 miles. Synchronization appeared to be good when bombs were released on a true heading of 008 degrees. C-l Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

- 4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 clouds.
- 5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.
- (c) 950 Squadron:
  - LT. GARRISON

    LT. GARRISON

    LT. GARRISON

    Lt. Johnson FRYER

    Pilot Lt. Murray Asst Nav

    Co-Pilot ATWENORR M/O Lt. Bohrer BALPILE

    Bomb Lt. Swan Spinnenwerer
  - 2. A/C Attacking:

Bombs Dropped

- a. Secondary 13 126x500 LB GP
- b. Bombing Altitude: 21100'
- c. Time of Release: 12282
- 3. Run In from IP to Target:

The IP was overshot 4 miles due to this Squadron following the lead. The weather was 10/10 undercast throughout entire bomb run. The M/O took over and made a H2X run; the bombardier being clutched in at 9 miles. All subsequent rate checks were good, moreover, bombs away time for the bombardier agreed with the M/O's bombing circle at the BRL. Bombs were released on a true heading of 028 degrees and AFCE was used on the bomb run.

- 4. PI Report: Photographs show 10/10 clouds.
- 5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.
- Planning and Execution of the Mission:
  - a. Group Order and Strength:

3.

(1)	13 A, B, C Groups:	9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 390 Group (b) 100 Group (c) 95 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(2)	4 C, D, E Groups:	9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 486 Group (b) 94 Group (c) 385 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(3)	93 A, B, C Groups:	9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 34 Group (b) 490 Group (c) 493 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(4)	45 A, B, C Groups:	9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 388 Group (b) 96 Group (c) 452 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
(5)	4 A, B Groups:	6 x 12 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 447 Group (b) 487 Group	3 x 12 A/C Squadrons 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons

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     b. A/C and C/C Available:
                                                        54 C/C
5 C/C
5 C/C
         (1)
                                              48 A/C
                95 Group
                                       REG
                                               9 A/C
9 A/C
                                       PFF
                                        MH
                                                        57 C/C
         (2)
              100 Group
                                       REG
                                              49 A/C
                                       PFF
                                               9 A/C
                                                         7 C/C
                                        MH
                                               4 A/C
                                                         4 C/C
                                                        67 C/C
         (3)
              390 Group
                                       REG
                                              44 A/C
                                       PFF
                                               9 A/C
                                                        11 C/C
                                               5 A/C
                                        HM
                                                         7 C/C
         A/C Scheduled to Take Off:
                                       35 Plus 3 PFF
35 Plus 3 PFF
         (1)
                95 Group
         (2)
               100 Group
         (3)
               390 Group
                                       34 Plus 4 PFF
         A/C Airborne:
    d.
                                       35 Plus 3 PFF
35 Plus 3 PFF
         (1)
               95 Group
          2)
               100 Group
                                       34 Plus 4 PFF
         (3)
               390 Group
        A/C Abortive:
       (1)
               95 Group:
               A/C 4946:
                            412 Sqdn "F" - Oxygen leak - Pilot Lt. Twining -
No sortie.
               A/C 0810:
                            336 Sqdn "L" - Oil leak - Pilot Lt. Shore - No
sortie.
         (2)
              100 Group:
              A/C 297: 350 Sqdn "X" - Internal engine failure on #1 engine
Pilot Lt. Hanson - No sortie.
              390 Group:
         (3)
              A/C 265: 570 Sqdn "C" - Fire in #2 engine - Pilot Lt.
Hitchcock - No sortie.
        A/C Outstanding:
    f.
         (1)
              390 Group:
                         569 Sqdn "R" - Pilot Lt. Gaik.
570 Sqdn "O" - Pilot Lt. Hassig - Landed on
              A/C 079:
              A/C 849:
Continent.
              A/C 306:
                         569 Sqdn "H" - Pilot Lt. Geers - Landed at A-82.
        A/C Attacking - 13 A Group:
                                                          Bombs Dropped
    g.
                                                          108x500 LB GP
         (1)
                                             11
              Secondary
                                                          224x500 LB GP
              TO Eger, Czechoslovakia
                                              24
                                                          10 Leaflet Containers
                                                          24x500 LB GP
              Jettisoning
                                               2
                                                          6x500 LB GP
              Returning
         (2) Method of Bombing: PFF & PFF with Visual Assist
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(3) Method of Release: Salvo

A/C Attacking - 13 B Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1)24 Secondary 229x500 LB GP TO Bridge, Doubrava 13 126x500 LB GP Jettisoning 2 12x500 LB GP

None Returning

- (2) Method of Bombing: PFF
- (3) Method of Release: Salvo

A/C Attacking - 13 C Group:

Bombs Dropped

- (1)Secondary 37 358x500 LB GP Jettisoning None 1 (Spare) Returning 10x500 LB GP
- (2) Method of Bombing: PFF
- Method of Release: (3) Salvo

#### Communications:

#### VHF: 8.

- (1) Col. Moller led the 13th Wing. Communications within the Group and between Groups was reported good. Fireball Yellow discipline was not good on homeward trip and Fireball Red discipline was not good There was continuous keying on Channel A probably caused on outward trip. by a defective set.
- (2) Contact with 4th Wing Leader on Channel B was good. Unable to contact other Wing Leaders due to limited range of set. Could not reach Arrowswift at CP 2 or remaining points by VHF. Kedak Red and Kodak Control received good. Information passed freely.
- Fighter contact was made by High Squadron leader on VHF. Channel C and Channel D were busy most of the mission with fighter chatter. 100th Group A and C Squadrons tried to contact fighters but gave up when they made visual contact with fighters.
- (4) Upon apparent distress of A/C 10 minutes before CP 2, a call was made to Colgate by 390th Low Squadron leader with no result. Several A/C were designated to contact MF/DF and contact is reported to have been made. The MF/DF station called 3AD Flying Control who contacted Air Sea Rescue.

#### W/T: b.

(1)Control Points:

	CP 1	CP 2	CP 3	CP 4	$\mathbf{TGT}$	CP 5	BASES
Timings	1020	1053	1125	1209	1232	1442	1705
A.T.A.	1019	1054	1125	1203	1226		1700

(2) Strike Reports:

> 1234 13A 0 A 4 P B 5 1226 13C

# Mission Camera Report:

The 95 Group installed 3 scope, 9 vertical and 4 oblique cameras, 3, 8 and 4 of which took pictures:

A/C 8774, A Squadron, K-21 installed, turned on other than at bombs away. - 11 -

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The 100 Group installed 0 scope, 9 vertical and 1 oblique cameras, 0, 8 and 1 of which took pictures:

One K-21 camera froze.

The 390 Group installed 4 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 9 and 3 of which took pictures:

Of the 4 scope cameras, the one in A/C 566 had bombs away negative, but set was not used from IP.

#### 6. Controller's Log:

- Force (2) Order (3) 1730 from 3 AD: (1)Zero Hour (4) RBA (5) Bomb Load Info.
- (1) (5) Force (2) Order (3) 1745 to Groups: Zero Hour (長) RBA b. Bomb Load Info.
- (1) Targets & MPIs for Plans A & B (2) Two Task Forces Order and Force (Plan A) (3) I vision Assembly (4) B Task Force Route (5) C. 1755 from 3 AD: Plan B Force and Route. Plan Route (6)
- (1)Wing Force and Order (2) d. 1930 to Groups: Weather A/C.
- (1)Targets for A & B Plans. е. 1940 to Groups:
- (1)Fuel Loads and Instructions. 1950 to Groups: ſ.
- (1)Chaff Force. 2005 from 3 AD: g.
- (1)AW to 13 CBW FO 43 Plan A. 2020 to Groups: h.
- i. 2025 to Groups: (1)Fuel Loads and Instructions (2) Load, Fuses, and Instructions (3) Chaff Force.
- 2030 from 3 AD: (1)AW to 3 AD FO 583 Plan A. j.
- New Last Resort Targets (2) AW to 3 AD k. 2050 from 3 AD: (1)Fo 583 Plan B.
- 1. 2056 to Groups: (1)New Last Resort Targets.
- 2057 from 3 AD: (1)Annex 1 to AW to 3 AD FO 583 Plan A. m.
- (1)AW to 13 CBW FO 43 Plan B. 2105 to Groups: n.
- (1)Annex 1 to AW to 13 CBW FO 43 Plan A. 2116 to Groups: 0.
- Annex 1 to AW to 3 AD FO 583 Plan B. **(1)**: 2125 from 3 AD: p.
- (1)A-2 Info on Targets. 2145 from 3 AD: q.
- 2214 from 3 AD: (1)Leaflet Load. r.
- 2215 to Groups: (1)Leaflet Load. ø.
- 2230 from 3 AD: (1)MH Info to FO 583. t.
- (1)2300 from 3 AD: Assembly Altitude (Both Plans & Forces) u.
  - Bombing Altitude (Both Plans & Forces(  $\binom{2}{3}$
  - Change in Route.
- Bomb Loads & Fuses & T/I (2) Change in 2323 from 3 AD: (1)v. Force Order & Strength (3) Additional Target Bombing Altitudes (5) Assembly Alts

- (6) Division Departure Points (7) Final Route for Plan B.
- w. 2330 to Groups: (1) Bomb Load & Instructions (2) Changed Division Order.
- x. 0015 to Groups: (1) New Target Info.
- y. 0034 to Groups: (1) Annex 1 to AW to 13 CBW FO 43 Plan B.
- z. 0036 to Groups: (1) Annex 2 to AW to 13 CBW FO 43 Plan A.
- aa. 0045 to Groups: (1) New Assembly & Bombing Altitude (2) T/I.
- bb. 0058 from 3 AD: (1) 3 AD F0 583 Plan A.
- cc. Ollo from 3 AD: (1) Preliminary Timings (2) Control Points.
- dd. 0145 to Groups: (1) Assembly Times (2) Assembly Altitudes (3) Bombing Altitudes (4) Start Climb Timings.
- ee. 0205 to Groups: (1) 13 CBW FO 43 Plan A.
- ff. 0210 from 3 AD: (1) FO 583 Plan B.
- gg. 0225 to Groups: (1) 13 CBW FO 43 Plan B.
- hh. 0300 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 1 to FO 583 Plan A.
- ii. 0305 from 3 AD: (1) New Assembly & RP Altitude
- jj. 0320 to Groups: (1) Final Assembly Timings (2) Change in Assembly Altitude.
- kk. 0340 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 1 to F0 583 Plan B.
- 11. 0340 to Groups: (1) Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO 43 Plan A.
- mm. 0347 to Groups: (1) Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO 43 Plan B.
- nn. 0348 to Groups: (1) Bomb Line Info (2) Friendly Fighter Markings.
- oo. 0358 from 3 AD: (1) A-2 Annex to FO 583 Plan A.
- pp. 0359 from 3 AD: (1) Plan B to Run (2) Bomb Fusing (3) Fuel Load (4) Russian Signals (5) Cancel Chaff Force.
- qq. 0400 to Groups: (1) Plan B to Run (2) Bomb Fusing (3) Fuel Load (4) Russian Signals (5) Cancel Chaff Force.
- rr. 0401 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 2 to FO 583 Plan A.
- ss. 0410 from 3 AD: (1) A-2 Annex to FO 583 Plan B.
- tt. 0415 from 3 AD: (1) No Change in Times.
- uu. 0417 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 2 to FO 583 Plan A.
- vv. 0420 to Groups: (1) Annex 2 to 13 CBW FO 43 Plan A.
- ww. 0430 from 3 AD: (1) Correction in Timings on 3 AD FO.

# CONFIDENTIAL

#### TR, 14 Feb. 145

- xx. 0603 from 3 AD: (1) Change in Zero Hour.
- yy. 0608 to Groups: (1) Change in Zero Hour.
- zz. 0625 to Groups: (1) Annex 2 to 13 CBW FO 43 Plan B.
- aaa. 0627 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 4 to 3 AD Fo 583 Plan B.
- bbb. 0920 from 13CW: (1) Annex 3 to 13 CBW FO 43.

# For the Commanding General:

FRANK B. MCLAUGHLIN, Major, Air Corps,

Operations Officer.

19TH COMBAT BOMB WING (M) MGER, CZECHOSLOVAKIA (T.O.) 14 February 1948

15 A GROUP: BONDED IN SQUADRON FORMATION: PFF WITH VISUAL ASSIST.


590 A SQUADROW ( RED DOTS ):  $11 \times 106 \times 500$  GP 590 C SQUADROW ( GREER DOTS):  $13 \times 116 \times 500$  GP & 10 LEAFLET CONTAINERS

PURPLE: BUILT UP AREAS - ROADS

GREEK . RA - RIVER

HO ASSIGNED MPI OR AP.

RF: 1 + \$2,000 APPROX.



ARCH-ROOF HANGARS

WORESHOP-TYPE MARRAMA

W

AIR STRIP

STATION

DATE	14	Feb.	1945	-

7	ET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME			DING	REMARKS
<b>-</b>				LARWIN	LST	ACT	EST	ACT	
134	M	82.30	Hamilton		V	835		1649	
112 ]	$B \mid$	8774	Suthowski		/	837		1649	
I			Weiss		/	834		1648	
/ I			Busse		<b>√</b>	847		1651	
" 1	E	8067	O'Toole		$\sqrt{}$	8 48		1652	
1	- 1	1.50	Olson		1	847	ĺ	1650	
		94 A S	Ristine	Hi	/	849	i i	1654	
,	i		Willia		1	850		1655	
			Beard			853		1653	
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			Crystal			903		1655	
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	Stati	ON	119			<u>F</u>	0 R.M 3	DATE 14 Feb. 1945
	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TILE IST	OFF ACT	LAUDING EST ACT	REMARKS
412	N	8040	Sarage		V	837	1700	
335	Я	8255	Getchins		V	838	1701	
"	$\mathcal{B}$	7204	Hamilton	, J		839	1659	
<b>?</b> *	G-	6902	Richardson	<u> </u>	1	840	1702	
336	Х	8604	Palmer	and the same of	/	845	1703	
335	Ó	7/94	Dillon			841	1702	
p .	Н	7376	Tregoning	Hi	· K	841	1705	
1 11	F	1887	Dellert	V	· /	542	1706	
1,	Z	2455	Purdy	and the state of t	1	843	1658	
,,	K	8269	Bradley	and the second s	/	947	7/07	- Carrier
336 658	JY.	105%	Skaw	<i>F</i> 0		844	4/2	Oil feel.
335	E		Calicura		V	845	1707	
,	N	6598	Relson	*	/	846	1706	
•				*				
						-		
		1				1		

DATE 14 Feb. 1945 STATION LANDING EST | ACT SHIP PILOT TARGET ACT 1709 R 8438 Branlett 854 1710 8996 Rosenzwei 855 1639 B 8776 Driffin 855 1635 A 2447 Rivet V 856 1711 857 V 8657 addison 1712 858 D 8640 Corbin 1716 V 858 9175 Koekler 7201 Schulling V 859 1715 X 8990 Scott 1900 U 8525 Parish 701 902 P 9152 Cumming 1718 707 336 5 8333 Millspangh 171.4

F O R.M 3

T-360-P

CG, 1STH CBW CO, 100TH BG CO, 590TH BG

XXX

95TH BG

XXX

14/2/45 2045 8-2

#### INTILLIGENCE OPERATIONAL WARRATIVE 95TH BOMB GROUP CH.MNITZ 14 FEBRUARY 1945

1. LEAFLETS -- None

2. BCMBING RESULTS -- Bombing of secondary target due to weather-hot prints are cloud-covered. Bombing by MZK by squadrons in order A,B,C-results good for each squadron. M/O of 95A picked up target at 40 miles and believes bombs on the MPI. M/O of 95B picked up target at 45 miles and also believes he hit the MPI. M/O of 95C picked up target at 20/25 miles and believes bombs are a little right of MPI.

5. E/A - None

4. FLAK -- 5010-0818 Meagre-Accurate-Tracking.

5019-0717 Meagre-Accurate-Tracking

5020-0824 Meagre-Accurate-Tracking

5005-0748 Meagre-Accurate-Barrage

5. WEATHER -- 10/10 flow cloud in target area with large breaks, but no breaks over primary target. Continent to the W of target generally clear.

6. OBSERVATIONS -- (A/D to north of M/Y with 1153 5059-1101 S trains and lots of activity in M/Y. (26 SEF lined up. 1204 5056-1101 Large huts along autobaha, not near city. 1210 5100-1050 Large amphitheatre with lots of vehicles in it. 1210 5050-1144 Smoke screen covering objects floating on lake.

1215 5109-1149 Smoke screen at Naumberg.

1230 5025-1245 15/20 car train headed EW.

1255 5045-1250 5 bridges--all serviceable--at Zwickau.

1245 5013-1252 M/Y with rolling stock (Karlsbad) and 2 locomotives.

1247 5020-1255 P-51s strafing-strafed generally all the way from tafget.

1300 5014-1156 Large camp along river 8 miles 8 of town of Hof.

1501 5019-1155 700 cars in M/Y-serviceable. A/D serviceable.

1302 5022-1110 M/Y crowded with 8 trains.

1505 5030-1209 M/Y filled with rolling stock at Planen.

1315 5016-1058 Some Po51s shot up and destroyed a locomotive W of Coblens

1825 5025-0950 P-51s strafing oil carse-lets of explosions.

1335 5021-1014 Train standing still.

1535 5054-1025 Several engines and 60/70 cars in M/Y at Meiningen.

1849 5038-0940 M/T at Fulda pretty well wrecked--appeared not in use.

1549 5025-0940 S/E Fighter hit two locomotives and they blew up.

1400 5028-0940 Large camp 5 miles west of Fulda.

1405 5022-0845 M/Y at Bad Mauheim and Freidburg packed with goods cars. Two engines under steam in M/Y.

1409 5000-1014 Heavy smoke screen covering Mains.

1410 5025-0900 Large storage depot--large 4-winged nissen hut and large hangarlike building and supplies piled nearby--next to a RR.

1417 4958-0755 Smoke screen seemed to cover bridges across Khine.

1419 5013-8820 3 horseshoe-shaped piles of earth dug in the hills on banks of Rhine, 2 on East side, and 1 on West.

1422 5005-0840 Smoke screen at Frankfurt.

1424 5006-0744 20 small barges on Rhine.

1424 5022-0746 2 bridges across Rhine are OK at Coblens.

1434 V-2 rocket went up SE of Aachen. 1451 V-2 rocket went up SE of Aachen.

1840 5022-0647 Unusual site--RR tracks ran through woods to a long concrete strip with a sort of chute in the center, and a box-like structure

to the side of the strip

4 barrage balloons.

F360-D

1451 5023-0620 8 shutes far below, but no A/C seen.
1606 5113-0255 011 dump blew up-saw smoke to 10,000 feet over Ostend.

7. OTHER INFORMATION -- Fighter support was excellent except in Frankfurt erea a P-51 flew a pursuit curve and closed in to 200 yards, behind group. Gunners fired to left and underneath and P-51 peeled off and down. Suggest friendly escort be briefed not to fly pursuit curve into formation. Formation flew briefed course with the exception of ever-running IP xm 2-4 miles and "essing" to get back on course. Lead and high squadroms over-ran RP slightly. Briefed course followed all the way back. 958 lost rest of group in soup over target and couldn't find them to reform, so came back with another group. 95A and 96C came back together.



# HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE AAF STATION 101 APC 634

#### INTOPS SUMMARY NO, 290

PERIOD: 0001 hours 14 February to 2400 hours 14 February 1945.

## A. STATISTICS

					* . *	1	Loss	es	S	
	Disp.	Sorties	Atkg.	Tonnage	Claims	E/1	ΙAΛ	OT	<u> Totals</u>	NYR
Heavy Bomber Atks.	1377	1327	1293	3203.9	1-0-01	1	2	4	7	57(a)
Fighter Escart (b)	857	784	0,	.0	20-1-94	O	1	4	5	18
Fighter Sweeps	49	44	0	· 0	0-0-0	Ò	0	0	0	Ο,
Fighter Bombing	,0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	Ó	0
Photo Recon.	56	56	0.	0	0-0-0	0	1	0	1	0
Weather Recon,	40	36	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	. 0	0	0
Air/Sea Resoue	<b>1</b> 6	. 16	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	32	26	0	0	0-0-0	<u>o</u>	0	<u>o</u> .	<u>o</u> -	0
Totals	2427	2289	1293	3203.9	21-1-9A	1	4	8	13	75.

<sup>(</sup>a) Majority believed safe on continent.

# B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

# 1. Bomber Attacks

1377 a/c (1002 B-17s, 375 B-24s) from three Air Divisions dispatched in four forces against Dresden M/Y, Chemnitz M/Y, Magdeburg Synthetic oil plant and rail and road bridges at Wesel. 1293 a/c dropped 2264.1 tons GP and 939.8 tons IB on assigned targets and several T/Os. Targets bombed visually and on PFF. Weather: generally 3/10 - 10/10 over all targets. E/a opposition: 3 FW-190s made single attack on force in Dresden area; one early return attacked by one Me-262 east of Zuider Zec. Claims: 1-0-0 air. Losses: 7 a/c (6 B-17s, 1 B-24 - 1 to e/a, 2 to AA, 4 to causes unknown). NYR: 57 B-17s, majority believed safe on continent.

<sup>(</sup>b) Includes groups based on continent.

#### First Force

Twelve group formations (461 B-17s, 1st Air Division) dispatched against Dresden M/Y. 435 a/c dropped 678.3 tons GP, 400 tons IB on assigned target and several T/Os at 1216-1332 hours from 20,000 - 29,400 feet. Assigned target bombed visually and on H2X with some visual assists. Leaflets dropped on Prague and Dresden. We ther: generally 7/10-9/10 clouds over Dresden. Flak: nil to meager, inaccurate at Dresden. Battle damage: 34 minor, 20 major. E/a opposition 3 FW-190s made single pass near target area. Claims: 1-0-0. Losses: 1 B-17 to e/a. NYR: 57, majority believed safe on continent.

Fighter Support: Five groups, including one group based on continent, (316 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0942-0955 hours, down 1532-1630 hours. 281 sorties. E/a opposition: 25-30 FW-190s and Me-109s engaged in Chemnitz and Dresden area; one Me-262 of a flight of three engaged east of Strasbourg. Strafed miscellaneous ground targets. Claims: 10-1-6 air (includes one Me-262 damaged). Losses: 3 P-51s (1 to AA, 2 to causes unknown). NY R: 11 P-51s.

#### Details of attack as follows:

Assigned Target	Dispatched	<u>Attacking</u>	Tonnage GP IB	Results
Dresden M/Y	461	311	474.5 296.5	UnobFair
Other Targets				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Prague Brux Pilsen u/i T/Os		62 25 12 25		Fair Good Unobserved Unobserved
Totals	. 461	435	678.3 400.0	

# Second Force

Twelve group formations (457 B-17s, 3rd Air Division) dispatched against Ghemnitz M/Y. 441 a/c dropped 759.5 tons GP and 328 tons IB on assigned secondary and numerous T/Os at 1223-1327 hours from 19,900-25,500 feet. Secondary and one T/O bombed on H2X, other T/Os bombed visually. Leaflets dropped on Chemnitz, Eger and Hof. Weather: 8/10-10/10 clouds in Chemnitz area. Flak: meager to moderate, accurate at Koblenz. Battle damage: 88 minor, 15 major. E/a opposition: an early return attacked by one Me-262 east of Zuider Zee. One Me-163 sighted east of Zwolle; one Me-163 sighted in Plouen area - no combats. Claims: nil. Losses: 4 B-17s (2 to AA, 2 to causes unknown). NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: Four groups (238 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0958-1020 hours, down 1600-1630 hours. 224 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. Sighted two Me-109s south of Fulda, one Me-163 north of Giessen - no combat. Numerous ground targets strafed. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: 4 P-51s.

#### Details of attack as follows:

Assigned Target	Dispatched	Attacking	Tonnage GP TB	Results
Chemitz M/Y	457	294	501.0 217.5	Unobscrved
Other Targets				
Eger //F Bomberg	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	38 33	94.2 57.3 30.0	Fair Fair
Sonnoberg Tachau		23 24	34.5 23.0 36.0 24.0	Fair Fair
Hof M/Y T/O 5036-1234		12 13	16.5 11.0 13.0 19.5	Poor Unobserved
4 u/1 T/0s		<u> </u>	7.0 3.0	Unobserved
Totals	<b>457</b>	T/ 441	759.5 328.0	

#### Third Force

Thirty-six squadron formations (375 B-24s, 2nd Air Division) dispatched against Magdeburg Synthetic Oil Plant. 344 a/c dropped 609.8 tons GP and 211.8 tons IB on assigned secondary and several T/Os at 1152-1313 hours from 21,000 - 28,000 feet. Magdeburg M/Y (secondary) bombed on H2X. Leaflets dropped on Magdeburg. Weather: 8/10-10/10 clouds at target. Flak: meager to moderate, fairly accurate. Battle damage: 16 minor, 2 category "E". E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 B-24, to causes unknown. NYR: Nil.

Fighter Support: Five groups (273 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1025-1050 hours down 1530-1625 hours. 253 sorties. E/a opposition: engaged 35 FW-190s and Me-109s SW of Berlin. Sighted 13 Me-109s NW of Hannover, one twin jet west of Zwolle - no combat. Claims: | 10-0-3. Losses: 2 P-51s to causes unknown. NYR: 3 P-51s.

#### Details of bomber attack as follows:

Assigned Targets	Dispatched	Attacking	Tonnage CP IB	Results
Magdeburg Syn. Oil Plant Magdeburg M/Y (Sec.)	<b>37</b> 5	Not Attack	ed /:	Unob Fair
Other Targets  Emlicheim Meppen Bodenteich A/F 5233N-0747E		1 1 1	2.0 .5 2.0 .5 1.5 1.5 2.0 .5	Unobserved Unobserved Unobserved Unobserved
Totals	<b>37</b> 5	344	609.8 211.8	

SECRET

#### Fourth Force

Two group formations (84 B-17s, 3rd Air Division) dispatched against .Wesel Rail and Road Bridges. 73 a/c dropped 216.5 tons GP on Wesel road bridge, Dulzen oil depot (secondary) and one T/O at 1125-1135 hours from 25,000-26,000 feet. Wesel road bridge bombed visually, Julmen oil depot bombed on Micro-H. Weather: 3/10-5/10 clouds at target. Flak: meager, inaccurate at Wesel. Battle damage: 9 minor, 6 major. L/a opposition: nil. Two e/a sighted taking off from Wesel A/F - no combat. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 B-17 to causes unknown. NYR: nil.

Fighter Support: One group, based on continent (30 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0937 hours, down 1520 hours. 26 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: Nil.

Details of attack as follows:

Assigned Targets	Dispatched	Attacking	Tonnage	Results
			GP IB	•
Wesel Road Bridge Wesel Rail Bridge	45 39	Not attack	110.0	Good
Dulmen Oil Depot (Sec.)		35	103.5	Unob. to Poor
Other Targets				
Ahaus (City)		1	3,0	Unobserved
Totals	83	73	216.5	

# 2. Fighter Escort

Fifteen groups, including two groups based on continent, (857 P-51s) dispatched to escort bomber forces. Up 0937-1050 hours, down 1620-1630 hours. 784 sorties. E/a opposition: 25 - 30/FW-190s, Me-109s engaged in the Dresden-Chemnitz area; 35 FW-190s and Me-109s engaged SW of Berlin; one Me-202 engaged east of Strasbourg. 13 Me-109s sighted NW of Hannover, 2 Me-262s east of Strasbourg, 2 Me-109s south of Fulda, one Me-163 north of Giessen - no combat. Claims: 20-1-9 air (includes one Me-262 damaged). Losses: 5 P-51s (1 to AA, 4 to causes unknown). NYR: 18 P-51s.

Miscellaneous ground claims as follows:

		Destro	oyed.	Dar	maged
Locomotives		97	<del>- Marinal</del> - Grand J	***************************************	36
Motor Transport		24		` 2	26 (
Goods Cars	· Production of the second	51		. 2	71 `
Oil Tank Cars		6		*	6
Passenger Cars		1			27
Ammunition Cars		12	1		0
RR and Power Stat:	ions	1		v Karajana	6
Switch Towers		7/ / 0	7		7
Flak Towers		$z_{E^{(1)}} = \sqrt{2}$ 0		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1, /
Radar Towers		. 0	1 1		3

#### Ground Claims (continued)

		Destroyed			/	Damaged			
Oil Tanks				•	0		× ×		5
Oil Derricks			•		1		* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *		1
Barges		$x_{i_1} = x_i^{i_1 + i_2}$	100 miles		0	4	•		, 2
Factories			ž.		3			`	4
Warehouses \		***************************************		,	3		\$ 100		0

#### 3. Fighter Sweeps

One group (49 P-47s) dispatched to patrol Magdeburg area. Up 1037 hours, down 1528 hours. 44 sorties. E/a opposition: nil, Sighted two jet a/c in the Hague area - no combat. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

## 4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

# Photo Reconnaissance

56 a/c dispatched as follows:

3 Mosquitoes on night photo mission. No losses.

1 Mosquito and 1 P-38 on special photo mission. No losses.

15 F-5s, 7 Spitfires on day photo mission. Losses: 1 Spitfire to AA.

1 a/c on photo mission in Hannover area. Returned safely.

4 a/c on mapping mission in Murnberg area. No losses.

24 P-51s provided escort for PRU a/c. No losses.

# 6. Weather Reconnaissance

40 a/c dispatched as follows:

- 3 B-17s completed routine flights to and from Azores and over eastern Atlantic.
- 5 Mosquitoes on special weather flights over UK, Ireland, Isle of Man, Holland, Belgium, Northern France and Germany. One a/c returned early due to technical failure.
  - -32 P-51s as scouts for bombers. 3 returned early.

No losses.

# 7. Air/Sea Rescue

16 P-47s dispatched on routine search patrol. All a/c completed their mission and returned safely.

# 8. Special Operations

32 a/c dispatched as follows:

7 B-24s on RCM, jamming between 0546-1000 hours. 9 B-24s dropped leaflets over Holland and Germany.

#### SECRET

5 a/c (1 B-17, 3 P-51s, 1 B-24) as radio relays.

2 Mosquitoes on special operation over continent.

9 a/c (3 Mosquitoes, 6 B-24s) as screening force for bombers. 6 B-24s returned early.

No losses.

#### C. INTELLIGENCE

#### 1. Enemy Air Opposition

The G.A.F. reaction on this day was strikingly weak and almost entirely ineffective. Weather should not have had any serious effect on enemy plans for interception. With a few reports from bombers which landed on the continent not yet received, only one bomber is attributed lost to e/a action. Of some 60 to 75 s/e sighted by escort in the general Berlin-Chemnitz area, only three e/a (FW-190s) are believed to have gotten through to the bombers, a low squadron on a second target run in the Dresden area, losing one bomber in a brief attack by three e/a. Aside from an ineffective attack by an Me-262 against an early returning bomber over the Zuider Zee, other bomber formations were apparently unmolested by e/a.

Only two of the escorting fighter groups were in significant combat. At 1215-1220, one P-51 group encountered approximately 12 FW-190s at 18,000-20,000 feet on a southerly course south of Chemnitz and an additional 15-20 FW-190s and Me-109s in the same area at 30,000 feet. This group apparently also encountered the three s/e reported attacking a squadron of bombers in the Dresden area, with total claims for all engagements of 9-0-5 s/e. A second group of P-51s around 1225 encountered 20 FW-190s with 15 Me-109s as top cover 5 miles southwest of Berlin headed in the direction of Chemnitz. These e/a were quite aggressive but were successfully engaged for claims of 10-0-3. Still another P-51 group had slight encounter with a reported plus FW-190s in the Chemnitz area around 1215 for claims of 1-1-0, these e/a undoubtedly being part of the concentration heavily engaged by other P-51s in the Chemnitz area. This formation of e/a used clouds to evade combat.

There were several scattered sightings of e/a, apparently unconnected with strategic operations. Two evading Me-109s were chased by P-51s to the deck south of Fulda, and one fighter on withdrawal reported sighting eight Me-109s 20 miles northeast of Coblenz at 7,000 feet on a northeasterly course. Also on withdrawal, at 1350 a strafing flight of P-51s sighted 13 Me-109s 10 miles northwest of Hannover at 15,000-16,000 feet, but was unable to engage. There were again a few scattered sightings of jet a/c, with one of three Me-262s encountered in the Strasbourg area at 1515 attempting a pass at withdrawing P-51s. Several Me-163s were sighted. A P-51 flight on PRU escort reported shadowing, but no attacks, by two flights of four a/c each, possibly jets, in the Erfurt area.

#### 2. Flak

Dresden - nil to meager and inaccurate.

Erfurt, Gotha, Mainz, Brux, Prague, Frankfurt - meager to moderate, accurate to inaccurate.

Glotten, Ijmuiden - meager, accurate.

Magdeburg - meager to moderate, fairly accurate.

Wesel - meager, accurate, tracking.

Dulmen - meager to moderate, inaccurate to fairly accurate, tracking.

# 3. Observations

M/Y at Coblenz observed full of freight.

Considerable activity in M/Ys at Erfurt, Friedburg, Fulda and Wiesbadon.

M/Y at 5030N-1209E (Plauen) full of rolling stock.

M/ at 5034N-1025E - several engines, 60-70 cars, considerable activity.

M/Y at Bad Nauheim full of rolling stock.

A/F at 5247N-0620E appeared newly built-up and repaired.

Very heavy truck traffic observed going north on autobahn from Sieburg to Cologne.

30 plus s/c and t/c c/a observed on grass A/F southeast Meiningen.
Grass A/F with 3 u/i t/c a/c observed 3 miles south of Iacher Iake.
A/F separated by river at Aschaffenburg had 40 u/i s/c a/c and 10 u/i
t/c a/c.

Approximately 50 t/e a/c believed He-Ills and some Me-263s on landing strirunning north and south. Approximately 20 a/c lined up on SW quadrant, others dispersed. Believe Coburg a/F (5015N-1100E).

8 u/i t/e observed on Weisbaden A/F.

Approximately 20 s/e t/e a/c observed on 1/F west of Magdeburg.

75 plus a/c, including Me-109s, FW-190s, and many u/i t/e a/c seen dispersed on field and in revetments on Dessau A/F. U/I A/F being constructed 10 to 12 miles NW of Magdeburg with 2 u/i s/e on this A/F.

#### 4. Damage to Enemy Installations

# Magdeburg Synthetic Oil Plant - Unobserved to Fair Results.

Squadron patterns observed south of city and throughout city proper. One direct hit on large bridge in center of city, one direct hit on traffic overpass in center of city.

# Dulmen Oil Depot - Unobserved to Poor Results.

Cloud cover prevents accurate plotting of bombs but scattered bursts are seen threu h cloud at 2-7/10 miles SW, 1 mile E-SE and 1.3 miles S and 2.5 miles SE of MFI.

# Wesel Road Bridge - Good Results.

Two patterns blanket bridge with one hit on the west span, two possible hits on the east approach and one possible hit on the east span and several near misses. One pattern is seen 1.2 miles S of MPI.

# Eger A/F - Fair Results.

Pattern GP bombs seen north of A/F with several bursts on field and what appears to be one a/c load of bombs blanket center part of hangar area. 3 possible hits on large hangar at least one near miss on small one next to it. Approximately 60 a/c, 30 small and 30 medium are visible, one appears to be damaged by pattern.

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## Tachau - Fair Results.

Pattern GP and IB seen extending through small town, no RR yard or anything of military significance.

#### Sonneberg - Fair Results.

C.e pattern seen crossing the junction at one end of the small RR yards near the town. One pattern is seen blanketing the east choke point of the main yard and the road over rail bridge, one or two possible hits are seen on this bridge.

# Bomberg - Fair Results.

One pattern is seen blanketing center of M/Y, another pattern is seen at the edge of cloud appears 7/10 miles east of M/Y in suburban area and one pattern is seen about 3/10 miles NW of yard.

# Hos M/Y - Poor Results.

Pattern of GP and IB bombs seen at edge of town about 3/4 miles NE of M/Y.

## Prague - Fair to Good Results

Two concentrations of bombs could be seen bursting in a compact residential area 1-1/4 miles SE of center of city adjacent to eastern edge of M/Y. One concentration of bombs could be seen bursting in residential area 40-70% built-up two miles south of center of city. One additional concentration fell in a suburban area 2-1/2 miles SW of center of city.

# Brux Synthetic Oil Plant - Good Results.

Two concentrations of bombs bursting in central and eastern portion of plant area. The south central part was obscured by cloud and impossible to pin-point all bursts. Bursts seen in the immediate vicinity of distillation plant, cooling t wers and central oil storage area, but assessment of damage could not be made due to clouds and intense ground haze.

# Dresden - Unobserved to Fair Results.

Due to cloud cover of 7/10-10/10 density and fires caused by RAF on night of 13/14 February most of bombs dropped on target could not be plotted. Of the 27 concentrations dropped, 11 were plotted, however, portions of these are partially obscured. 3 concentrations could be seen bursting in Dresden, Friedrichstadt M/Y. A few bursts could be pin-pointed in forward siding, main weight of bombs fell across central portion of M/Y and into an industrial area immediately adjacent to north edge of yard. 2, possibly 3 concentrations could be seen in the Labtau M/Y, 1 mile SE of the Friedrichstadt yards in central portion of city, hits could not be pinpointed, however. 2 explosions seen. High possibility that severe damage will result in the built-up industrial area adjacent to eastern and western sides of yards. 3 concentrations of GP fell in Kackmitz district 1-1/2 mile SW of center of city.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

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