

HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 9 February 1945
13 CBW FO 39
13 CBW OPS 271
3 AD FO 579

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (WEIMAR, GERMANY)

TO : CO, 95BG, APO 559

1. Information Concerning the Target:

a. The primary target for the 13th CBW today (visual or grid) was the Synthetic Oil Plant at Bohlen, near Leipzig, and the MPI for all Groups the Gas Generating Plant.

b. The secondary target (visual or H2X) was the Armaments Works of Berlin-Suhler Waffen, situated on the northeastern outskirts of Weimar.

c. The last resort target (visual or H2X) was the Aero Engine Works at Eisenach.

2. Narrative of the Attack:

a. 13 A Group - 95A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 95 Group made a normal take off and climb to assembly altitude. The Group was formed with good results since CAVU conditions existed. The Group arrived at Buncher 23 approximately one minute early. Due to the fact that the Division Leader was 4 minutes late, the Lead Navigator had to fly a dogleg to the South to lose time and allow the Division Leader to get ahead on course to English Coast. The A Group departed from the English Coast approximately 5 miles South of CP 1, about a minute early, and slightly abreast the 45th Wing formations.

(b) Route:

While crossing the Channel the A Group flew a dogleg course to the South in order to fall behind the 45th Wing. Good position in the Division Column was established prior to reaching the Continental Coast. The Continental Coast was crossed on course at 1034, at an altitude of 16400 feet. Shortly after entering the Coast, the High and Low Squadrons were continually overshooting the Group Leader, and in order to maintain the lead, the Group Leader had to boost his airspeed an additional 10 miles per hour, which was held until approximately 0500E where he dropped his airspeed back to Standard, in order to avoid overrunning a Squadron from the Group ahead which had fallen behind the formation. The Group remained within 3 to 5 miles of the briefed route. At approximately 1030E Kodak Control notified the Groups that the Primary was covered, so the Group Leader prepared to set up for an attack on the Secondary target at Weimar.

Since the High and Low Squadrons had H2X equipment difficulties the Group Leader decided to bomb in Group formation. The A Group could not turn off at the IP as planned since it would have interfered with the Groups of the 45th Wing who had overshoot the IP and

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had turned on to the bomb run. The Group Leader elected to overshoot the IP and follow the 45th Wing, thereby overshooting the IP about 12 miles to the East before turning off on to the bomb run. The Radar Navigator set up the course for the Bombardier and assisted him along the run with fixes and check point data until the Bombardier took over for a visual run when the target became visible thru the undercast.

The Group was forced to go North of course at the RP in order to avoid interference with the 45th Wing who was coming in from the North on their approach to the Last Resort target. The Group began to climb to 26000 feet after descending to 23000 feet to get over weather. The Group altered course at Wittenhausen and proceeded to parallel the briefed course to 5040-0950 at which point the Group followed a first Division unit to the West for a few minutes but turned off when they recognized that the Group ahead was from the 1st Division. The bomber stream was intercepted at 5020-0915. The Group followed the column along the briefed route to approximately 0500E where the A Group encountered some difficulty with an unidentified Group which cut in front of them from the South forcing them to go North of course. The A Group fell in trail of this Group and followed them out to the Coast.

(c) Weather:

CAVU conditions existed over the bases during take off and assembly. An 8 to 9/10 undercast was experienced over most of the route. A 3/10 cloud coverage was reported at the target. Average winds obtained on the mission were from 250 degrees at 60 knots.

(d) Difficulties:

H2X equipment in the High and Low were not functioning properly and could not be used as an aid to navigation. "S"ing behind the 45th Wing made it difficult for the High and Low Squadron Lead Navigators to obtain winds.

(e) Remarks:

Navigation was very good. The splendid cooperation between the members of the lead crew made this mission a success.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. 95B equipment was out due to varying crystal current and faulty azimuth stabilization. Bombing was in Group formation with 95A leading. The RN gave excellent assistance to the bombardier, who made last minute visual corrections with good results.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 95A, C Squadrons:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader Col. Shuck	Nav	Lt. Wilbourne
	Pilot Capt. Wilson	Asst Nav	Capt. Magness
	Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Owens
		Bomb	Lt. Long
<u>2.</u>	A/C Attacking:		Bombs Dropped
<u>a.</u>	Secondary	23	222x500 LB GP
<u>b.</u>	Bombing Altitude:	25000'	
<u>c.</u>	Time of Release:	1224	

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3. Run In from IP to Target:

10/10 undercast precluded attacking the primary target, consequently, the secondary target was attacked. The IP was overshot 12 miles, but the M/O was able to pick up the target and set up excellent course. After the second check point the bombardier picked up the target approximately 7 miles from the BRL. He quickly synchronized and when bombs were released synchronization was excellent. Bombs were released on a true heading of 315 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. The crew cooperation was excellent on this bomb run.

The C Squadron released off of the A Squadron's smoke bombs. The Squadron was flying poor Group formation as it was flying 3000' in back of the A Squadron. The fault lies with the pilot for not properly positioning himself off the lead Squadron. Bombardiers, however, should be constantly on the alert to synchronize for rate, whenever his respective Squadron has not properly positioned itself, in order to put the bombs on the target.

4. PI Report:

a. The bombs from A & B Squadrons fell on the assigned MPI and other target buildings in the immediate proximity. Those from C Squadron, however, fell approximately 3200' short and right of the target, as well as the patterns of A & B Squadrons.

b. Photographs taken by A/C in 100 & 390 Groups, which flew 2nd & 3rd over the target, present a good PR coverage. The following damage was inflicted by 95A & B Squadrons:

(1) 5 hits on the flyover just short (South) of the target and 10 hits on the tracks; the craters are clearly visible. At least 5 goods wagons were derailed and damaged.

(2) MPI building (450'L x 160'W): $\frac{1}{2}$ completely gutted. The damage is in the center of the plant.

(3) Factory building (475'L x 150'W) beside the MPI: $\frac{1}{2}$ completely gutted.

(4) Two small buildings, probably store houses, were destroyed and three others damaged.

(5) Holes are seen in three other buildings in the target area and to the left (West) of the assigned MPI.

c. Bomb Pattern: A Squadron: 2140'L x 1715'W
B Squadron: 1320'L x 1535'W
C Squadron: 2100'L x 1475'W
Group : 5360'L x 3430'W

d. Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the MPI:

A Squadron: 87% & 99%
B Squadron: 80% & 100%
C Squadron: 0% & 0%
Group : 57% & 68%

e. Bombing Errors for the Lead (A) Squadron:

Range: 330' S
Deflection: 745' L
Radial: 825'

f. Bombing Results: A & B: Excellent
C : Nil

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(b) 95B Squadron:

<u>1.</u> Air Leader Capt. Brittingham	Nav	Lt. Flygstad
Pilot	Asst Nav	
Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Decherness
	Bomb	Lt. Hathaway

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u> Secondary	11	106x500 LB GP
Jettisoning on TO	1	10x500 LB GP
Returning	1	10x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 25500'

c. Time of Release: 1224

3. Run In from IP to Target:

Attacking in Group formation the bombardier let the A Squadron set up the course while he synchronized for rate. The bombardier's rate synchronization was excellent, when bombs were released on a true heading of 321 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: See PI Report for 95A, C Squadrons.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C ???: Spare - Returned 10 bombs.

A/C 922: Dropped out of formation and jettisoned 10 bombs on TO Nordheim, Germany.

b. 13 B Group - 100A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The 100 Group made a normal take off and a Group assembly at 11000 without difficulty. The Wing assembly point was made good in trail of 95 Group with 390 Group echeloned to the right. The Division assembly was made good at 12000 at 1008.

(b) Route:

The Continental Coast, CP 2, was crossed at 1034½ at 17500. The course to CP 3 was as briefed except for "S"ing. From CP 3 to IP the Group was north of course 5-6 miles while in the bomber stream. A turn to the right had to be made before the IP to insure making the IP good. The Group overshot the IP 2 miles and started an H2X run to the secondary target on a heading of 320 degrees. Bombs were away after visual synchronization in Squadron formation at 1224 at 26000. The RP was made good and the 100 Group assumed the Wing lead shortly thereafter as 95 Group was forced north of course by the 45th Wing Groups making runs on the last resort target. The remainder of the course was flown as briefed crossing the English Coast at 1527 at 2000 at Buncher 28.

(c) Weather: Same as 13 A Group.

(d) Difficulties: None.

(e) Remarks:

Navigation is considered very good and shows good crew and air leader cooperation.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. Bombing was in Squadron formation with combination visual and H2X technique.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 100A Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader Capt. Robinson	Nav	Lt. Kirby
	Pilot Lt. Deplanque	Asst Nav	Lt. Passen
	Co-Pilot	M/O	Capt. Frye
		Bomb	Lt. Svendsen

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Secondary	10	93x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	3	23x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 26000'

c. Time of Release: 1228

3. Run In from IP to Target:

Attacking the target on a true heading of 320 degrees, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and at the 6 mile check point was able to pick up the target area through a large break in the clouds. The course was off to the left, consequently, a large course correction was made to the right. The bombardier realizing that there was insufficient time left to synchronize on the assigned MPI, let his cross hair ride on a selected AP in the city and killed his rate. When bombs were released, synchronization was good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report:

a. The bombs from this Squadron fell around the selected AP, which was in a fully built-up residential portion of Weimar. There were undoubtedly many residences that were hit. One A/C released late and the bombs fell 2200' beyond the AP.

b. Bomb Pattern: 2140'L x 1930'W.

c. Bombing Errors: Range : 770' S
Deflection: 340' R
Radial : 855'

d. Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the AP: 58% & 88%

e. Bombing Results: Good

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 613: Three B-10 shackle malfunctions - 3 bombs jettisoned.

A/C 945: Attacking E/A knocked 1 engine out - 10 bombs jettisoned on way to target.

A/C 505: Aborted - 10 bombs jettisoned in channel.

(b) 100B Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader Capt. Ferbracke	Nav	Lt. Wild
	Pilot Lt. Williams	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Cately
		Bomb	Lt. Orendorff

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Secondary 13 126x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 26500'

c. Time of Release: 1229

3. Run In from IP to Target:

After overshooting the IP approximately two miles, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier set up rate through breaks in the clouds. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and shortly after picked up the part of town in which the target was located. At five miles the bombardier positively identified the target area and selected an AP inasmuch as he could not pick up the assigned MPI. Synchronization was excellent and bubbles level when bombs were released on a true heading of 340 degrees. Twenty degrees of right drift was experienced on the bomb run. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. Crew cooperation was excellent.

4. PI Report:

a. The bombs from this Squadron fell on the selected AP, which was a small arms factory building (480'L x 450'W). There were at least 6 direct hits on the building, and pictures taken later by the 390 Group show holes in the center and materials inside - or the structure itself - burning. There were also hits and close misses on residences to the left (West) of the factory.

b. Bomb Pattern: 1750'L x 1730'W: Excludes approximately 35 bombs. The pattern was an extremely loose one.

c. Bombing Errors: Range : 215' 0
Deflection: 290' R
Radial : 430'

d. Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the AP: 49% & 68%

e. Bombing Results: Excellent

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None

(c) 100C Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader Capt. Craft	Nav	Lt. Browning
	Pilot Lt. Dawson	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Rowland
		Bomb	Lt. Silva

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

a. Secondary 11 106x500 LB GP
Returning 2 20x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 25500'

c. Time of Release: 1230

3. Run In from IP to Target:

After overshooting the IP two miles the M/O picked

up the target and set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles. Shortly after the clutch-in, the pilot had to turn to the right in order to avoid overrunning the B Squadron. By the time a proper interval had been taken up the bombardier had very little time with which to get back on the target. The bombardier turned the A/C as far as the secondary clutch would allow, but did not have sufficient time to properly kill drift before bombs were released. True heading at bombs away was 320 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report:

a. The bombs from this Squadron fell about 7000' to the right and beyond the MPI in fields and woods.

b. Bomb Pattern: 2300'L x 2300'W

c. Bombing Errors: Gross

d. Bombing Results: Nil

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/Cs 708, 861: Aborted and 20 bombs returned.

c. 13 C Group - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

Squadron and Group assembly went off very well. Prior to CP 1 the Group, by coming in from the South, was on the inside of the turn and as a result they overshot the A and B Groups. About half way across the channel the Group attained proper position, however.

(b) Route:

From CP 2 to the IP the route was flown about as briefed with a slight favoring of a track to the South due to right echeloning. The IP was overshot a little to the NE before bomb runs could be set up. The High Squadron peeled off first followed by the Lead and Low, and all runs were by H2X with visual assist. The High and Low bombed the secondary target and proceeded to the RP. The Lead Squadron headed for Erfurt believing it to be Weimar. At the last moment the bombardier noticed that his visual checks were not accurate and since the correction into the assigned target could not be made he elected to go to the LRT. The briefed IP for this target was used and a good run made. At the RP for this target the Group reassembled and continued on course to CP 4. During this time a Vampire Group succeeded in getting in between the 95 and 390 Groups. The route out was flown in this order. After the battle line was crossed the Group followed the 95 Group and headed directly to their base by the most direct route. The English Coast was crossed at 5129-0324, about 20 miles NE of briefed coast out point.

(c) Weather: Same as 13 A Group.

(d) Difficulties:

Poor returns from Weimar caused the M/O of the lead Squadron to think Erfurt was the assigned secondary. The error was realized on time and the Squadron went on to the assigned LRT.

(e) Remarks:

Navigation is considered to be good despite the case of mistaken target identification.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. 390A experienced difficulty in picking up the secondary target in the scope, and sighted on the wrong return, however, a visual check caught the error and the last resort target was attacked instead by H2X-Visual technique. 390C was able to set up an H2X course after the turn on the IP, but the target faded before check points could be called. 390B made a combination H2X-Visual sighting on the secondary.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 390A Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader Major Perry	Nav	Lt. Yary
	Pilot Lt. Morris	Asst Nav	Lt. Lewis
	Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Flanagan
		Bomb	Lt. Kellerhouse

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Last Resort	11	105x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	1	3x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 24100'

c. Time of Release: 1258

3. Run In from IP to Target:

After overshooting the IP, several miles, the M/O picked up what he thought to be the secondary target and set up course. After clutching in and several rate checks had been made, the bombardier picked up the target visually and identified it as Erfurt. Bombs were held and it was decided to bomb the Last Resort Target. An IP was made good at 5117N-1030E and after the turn had been made the M/O set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 10, 9, 8 and 7 miles. After the 7 mile check the bombardier picked up the target visually through a break in the clouds. Two small rate corrections were made before bombs were released. When bombs were released on a true heading of 190 degrees, synchronization was thought to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was not used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report:

a. No bursts from bombs dropped by this Squadron are visible. According to computations based on the trajectory chart, however, the bombs probably fell in the city about 2500' to the right and beyond the target.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 633: Rack malfunction - 3 bombs jettisoned at 5046N-0930E.

(b) 390B Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader Capt. Jones	Nav	Lt. Webster
	Pilot Lt. Tracy	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Robinson
		Bomb	Lt. Pace

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Secondary	11	108x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	1	10x500 LB GP
	Returning	1	10x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 25700'

c. Time of Release: 1230

3. Run In from IP to Target:

After overshooting the IP five miles the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and rate checks were made at 7, 6 and 5 miles. After the five mile check the bombardier picked up the target visually through a break in the clouds and had less than a minute with which to synchronize. A 5 degree last minute course correction was made to the right. This resulted in the bombardier overcorrecting. When bombs were released on a true heading of 320 degrees, rate was good but course was slightly off to the left. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report:

a. The bombs from this Squadron fell between 1000' and 2000' to the right of the assigned MPI. A concentration of bombs fell in the East portion of the target area on a group of 24 small buildings.

b. Bomb Pattern: 1075'L x 1445'W

c. Bombing Errors: Range : 0'
Deflection: 1200' R
Radial : 1200'

d. Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the MPI: 81% & 87%

e. Bombing Results: NIL. There was no damage inflicted on the assigned building.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 393: Jettisoned 10 bombs at 5026N-0915E.
A/C 121: Aborted - 10 bombs returned.

(c) 390C Squadron:

<u>1.</u> Air Leader	Capt. Nauman	Nav	Lt. Miller
Pilot	Lt. Kennedy	Asst Nav	
Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Keelan
		Bomb	Lt. Hale

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u> Secondary	11	104x500 LB GP
Jettisoning	2	20x500 LB GP
Returning	1	4x500 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 24456'

c. Time of Release: 1231

3. Run In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a true heading of 313 degrees, the M/O picked up the target and started to set up course when the target faded out of the scope. The bombardier took over and pin pointed himself thru breaks in the clouds to the target. C-1 Auto-Pilot failed halfway down the bomb run and the pilot quickly switched over to PDI. After giving

the pilot a 5 degree course correction the bombardier picked up the target. Seven degrees of right drift was quickly pre-set and two corrections quickly set up course and rate, before bombs were released. The lead A/C was in a slight dive when bombs were being released.

The bombardier in this Squadron did a splendid job considering the short time with which he had to synchronize and the difficulties experienced on the bomb run.

4. PI Report:

a. The bombs from this Squadron fell in a loose pattern 800' to 1500' to the right of the assigned MPI. One concentration landed on the railroad tracks and South portion of the target area. Another concentration fell on the eastern portion. No damage was inflicted on the assigned target building.

b. Bomb Pattern: 2930'L x 1465'W

c. Bombing Errors: Range : 0'
Deflection: 1100' R
Radial : 1100'

d. Percent of Bombs Within the 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: 23% & 100%

e. Bombing Results: NIL. The assigned target building sustained no damage.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 607: Aborted and jettisoned 10 bombs.
A/C 097: Rack malfunction - 4 bombs returned.
A/C 225: 10 bombs jettisoned at 5040N-1130W.

3. Planning and Execution of the Mission:

a. Group Order and Strength:

- (1) 45 A, B Groups: 6 x 12 A/C Squadrons
 - (a) 96 Group 2 x 12 A/C Squadrons
 - 452 Group 1 x 12 A/C Squadron
 - (b) 388 Group 2 x 12 A/C Squadrons
 - 452 Group 1 x 12 A/C Squadron
- (2) 13 A, B, C Groups: 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
 - (a) 95 Group 1 x 12 A/C Squadron
2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
 - (b) 100 Group 1 x 12 A/C Squadron
2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
 - (c) 390 Group 1 x 12 A/C Squadron
2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
- (3) 4 A, B, C Groups: 9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
 - (a) 487 Group 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
 - (b) 486 Group 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
 - (c) 447 Group 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
- (4) 93 A, B, C Groups: 9 x 12 A/C Squadrons
 - (a) 493 Group 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons

- (b) 34 Group 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
- (c) 490 Group 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
- (5) 4 D Group: 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons
- (a) 385 Group 3 x 12 A/C Squadrons

b. A/C and C/C Available:

- | | | |
|---------------|------------|--------|
| (1) 95 Group | REG 43 A/C | 46 C/C |
| | PFF 9 A/C | 5 C/C |
| | MH 9 A/C | 5 C/C |
| (2) 100 Group | REG 40 A/C | 45 C/C |
| | PFF 7 A/C | 6 C/C |
| | MH 4 A/C | 4 C/C |
| (3) 390 Group | REG 36 A/C | 61 C/C |
| | PFF 10 A/C | 8 C/C |
| | MH 7 A/C | 6 C/C |

c. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

- (1) 95 Group 35 Plus 3 PFF
- (2) 100 Group 35 Plus 3 PFF
- (3) 390 Group 35 Plus 3 PFF

d. A/C Airborne:

- (1) 95 Group 38 A/C Airborne
- (2) 100 Group 38 A/C Airborne
- (3) 390 Group 37 A/C Airborne

e. A/C Abortive:

- (1) 95 Group:

A/C 922: 412 Sqdn "D" - Elevator Trim Tabs uncontrollable
Pilot Lt. Young - No sortie.

- (2) 100 Group:

A/C 505: 350 Sqdn "V" - Sick personnel - Pilot Lt. Micheal
Sortie.

A/C 861: 351 Sqdn "M" - #4 prop governor inoperative -
Could not control with feathering button - Pilot Lt. Gwinn - No sortie.

A/C 208: 351 Sqdn "R" - Runaway prop - #2 engine
uncontrollable with feathering button - Pilot Lt. Gay - Sortie.

- (3) 390 Group:

A/C 607: 570 Sqdn "E" - #1 supercharger out - Amplifier
replaced - No change - Pilot Lt. Schubert - Sortie.

A/C 393: 569 Sqdn "V" - #1 engine feathered due to loss
of oil pressure - Pilot Lt. Harned - Sortie.

A/C 121: 569 Sqdn "N" - #3 engine lost manifold pressure -
Supercharger inoperative - Amplifiers replaced - No change - Pilot Lt.
Woodard - Sortie.

f. A/C Outstanding: None

g. A/C Attacking - 13 A Group:

Bombs Dropped

- | | | |
|---------------|----|---------------|
| (1) Secondary | 36 | 348x500 LB GP |
| Jettisoning | 1 | 10x500 LB GP |
| Returning | 1 | 10x500 LB GP |

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(2) Method of Bombing: Combination Visual and PFF

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

h. A/C Attacking - 13 B Group: Bombs Dropped

(1) Secondary	34	325x500 LB GP
Jettisoning	3	23x500 LB GP
Returning	2	20x500 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Combination PFF-Visual

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

i. A/C Attacking - 13 C Group: Bombs Dropped

(1) Last Resort	33	317x500 LB GP
Jettisoning	4	33x500 LB GP
Returning	2	14x500 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Combination PFF-Visual

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

4. Communications:

a. VHF:

(1) Col. Shuck led the 13th Wing. Communications within the Wing were satisfactory although the discipline was poorer than usual. Chatter immediately after the target nearly jammed the channel. This is dangerous because it interferes with the reforming of the Wing formation. Although chatter threatened to jam the channel during assembly, the Air Leader of the Wing silenced the majority of the unnecessary traffic.

(2) Communication with Arrowswift, Kodak, and other leaders with the exception of Vampire who was unreliable were satisfactory. Fireball Able relayed weather and other information to the other Fireball Leaders satisfactorily.

(3) Fighter contacts were made several times although in the target area efforts were without success.

b. W/T:

(1) Control Points:

	CP 1	CP 2	CP 3	TGT	CP 4	BASE
Timings	1006	1035	1138	1236	1415	1628
ATA	1005	1034	1131	1224	NIL	1615

(2) CP 3 was not received although a message was received by Division requesting weather information transmitted after the strike report was sent in.

(3) Strike Reports:

13A	(95)	S A 2	1224
13B	(390)	S A 5	1230
13C	(100)	S A 3	1229

5. Mission Camera Report:

a. The 95 Group installed 1 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 0 and 8 of which took pictures:

A/C 8179, C Squadron, with Scope installed: Blown fuze.
A/C 6583, B Squadron, with K-21 installed: Blown fuze.

b. The 100 Group installed 9 vertical cameras, 8 of which took pictures:

A/C 1708, C Squadron, with K-21 installed: A/C aborted.

c. The 390 Group installed 3 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 3 and 9 of which took pictures.

6. Controller's Log:

- a. 1845 from 3 AD: (1) Zero Hour (2) RBA (3) Order and Force of Wings and Divisions. (4) Targets (5) Division Assembly (6) Keep Bombs Loaded Till 1030 (7) Tentative Route.
- b. 1900 to Groups: (1) Force and Order (2) Division Order (3) Zero Hour (4) RBA (5) Keep Bombs Loaded (6) Gas Load (7) W/A Aircraft (8) Bombing by Squadrons.
- c. 1935 from 3 AD: (1) Will put up special W/X aircraft.
- d. 1948 from 3 AD: (1) Routes (2) Bombing Altitude.
- e. 2010 from 3 AD: (1) AW to 3 AD FO 579.
- f. 2035 to Groups: (1) AW to 13 CBW FO 39.
- g. 2045 to Groups: (1) Last Resort Target.
- h. 2120 from 3 AD: (1) Preliminary Timings.
- i. 2200 to Groups: (1) Preliminary Timings (2) Assembly Altitude.
- j. 2230 from 3 AD: (1) Intelligence Annex to 3 AD FO 579.
- k. 2250 from 3 AD: (1) Change in Route.
- l. 2330 from 3 AD: (1) Bomb Load.
- m. 2332 to Groups: (1) Bomb Load.
- n. 2340 from 3 AD: (1) Bomb Load and T/I (2) There will be a Plan B.
- o. 0025 to Groups: (1) There will be a Plan B.
- p. 0110 from 3 AD: (1) Plan A Route - Plan B Route (2) Targets - Plan A and B.
- q. 0145 to Groups: (1) Plan A Secondary and Last Resort Targets (2) Targets for Plan B.
- r. 0200 to Groups: (1) Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO 39 (Plan A).
- s. 0200 from 3 AD: (1) Final Timings for Plan A and B.
- t. 0208 to Groups: (1) AW to 13 CBW FO 39 (Plan B).
- u. 0220 to Groups: (1) Final Timings for Plan A and B.
- v. 0230 from 3 AD: (1) 3 AD FO 579 (Plan B).
- w. 0236 to Groups: (1) 13 CBW FO 39 (Plan A).

TR, 9 Feb. '45

- x. 0303 to Groups: (1) 13 CBW FO 39 (Plan B).
- y. 0325 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 579 (Plan A).
- z. 0425 from 3 AD: (1) 3 AD FO 579 (Plan B).
- aa. 0430 from 3 AD: (1) Cancel Plan B (2) Run Plan A.
- bb. 0432 to Groups: (1) Cancel Plan B (2) Run Plan A.
- cc. 0440 from 3 AD: (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 579.
- dd. 0450 from 3 AD: (1) Intelligence Annex to 3 AD FO 579 (Plan B).
- ee. 0503 to Groups: (1) Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO 39.

For the Commanding Officer:

Frank B. McLaughlin
FRANK B. MCLAUGHLIN,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

13 A GROUP: BOMBED IN GROUP FORMATION: VISUAL WITH PFF ASSIST.
 95 A SQUADRON (purple dots): 12 x 116 x 500 GP
 95 B SQUADRON (purple dots): 13 x 126 x 500 GP
 95 C SQUADRON (red dots): 11 x 106 x 500 GP

13 B GROUP: BOMBED IN SQUADRON FORMATION:

100 A SQUADRON (purple dots): 10 x 98 x 500 GP: PFF WITH VISUAL ASSIST.
 100 B SQUADRON (red dots): 13 x 126 x 500 GP: VISUAL WITH PFF ASSIST.
 100 C SQUADRON (green dots): 12 x 106 x 500 GP: PFF WITH VISUAL ASSIST.

13 C GROUP: BOMBED IN SQUADRON FORMATION: PFF WITH VISUAL ASSISTS.

390 A SQUADRON (Bombed L.R.: EISENACH): NO BURSTS VISIBLE:

390 B SQUADRON (green dots): 11 x 108 x 500 GP:
 4 x 500 IB:
 390 C SQUADRON (blue dots): 11 x 104 x 500 GP:
 3 x 500 IB:

ASSIGNED MPI: FOR ALL GROUPS: CENTER OF PURPLE CIRCLES, WHICH WAS AN ARMAMENT WORKS.


SELECTED AP: FOR 100 A & B: CENTER OF RED CIRCLES. AP FOR 100 A WAS A POINT IN THE RESIDENTIAL SECTION; FOR 100 B, A SMALL ARMS FACTORY.

RF: 1 : 25,000

CIRCLES: 1000' & 2000'

100B
100C

BUILT-UP AREA



100 C

NORTH

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 5200

ATTACK ON WEIMAR ARMAMENT WORKS ON 9 FEB 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK.

- (a) No. of aircraft : 198, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8th AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1124-1509 A hours.
- (d) Bombs : 1910 x 500 lb. G.P.

(ii) STATEMENT ON THE TARGET.

The target is the ARMAMENTS WORKS OF BERLIN-SÜDLER WAFREN-u. FAHRZEUG-WERKE GmbH. ("Fritz Sauckel" Werk formerly Busch Werke A.G.), situated on the Northeastern outskirts of WEIMAR. The complex of buildings produces military transport, and the large single building to the North is reported to be engaged in small arms production.

(iii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK.

(a) Of twelve groups and concentrations of H.M. bursts totalling more than 775, seven extend into the target area. Hits are visible on all the main units of the military transport works, and several hits and near hits are seen on the small armaments works. Other bursts are seen two miles Northwest of the target, in the town of WEIMAR, and in adjacent fields. Late in the attack smoke prevents many bursts being plotted accurately.

(b) Bursts are seen in the target area as follows:
(Numbers refer to the accompanying bomb plot.)

Large square building (1) - one direct hit.

Large square building (2) - one hit.

Square building (3) - one near hit.

Medium rectangular building (4) - one hit.

Large square building (5) - one direct hit.

Large irregular building (6) - at least two direct hits, three near hits.

Large rectangular building (7) - two hits.

Large rectangular building (8) - one direct hit.

U-shaped building (9) - one hit, one probable hit, two near hits.

Group of barracks type buildings (10) - hits or near hits on at seven.

Small arms factory (11) - at least five direct hits, a probable hit, at least four near hits. Smoke seen coming from the roof late in the attack.

Barrack type buildings adjacent to (11) (Not on bomb plot) - hits or near hits on four.

(c) Other bursts are seen as follows:

1. Rail facilities South of the target - one near hit on the rail over rail bridge, five hits on the East-West lines, two possible hits on the line leading South, two near hits on the locomotive shed.

2. Industrial installation 1000 yards South of the M.T. works - 2 near hits.

3. At least 100 bursts in WEIMAR.

4. A concentration of approximately 70 bursts in fields 2000 yards North-Northwest of (11).

5. Twenty in fields two miles Northwest of the target.

6. Two probable hits on barracks type buildings 900 yards North-east.

7. One hit on long rectangular building on South side of rail lines at South side of the M.T. Works.

95th Rail

(iv) ACTIVITY.

WEIMAR MARSHALLING YARD.

The yard is lightly loaded.

(v) ANNOTATED PRINTS.

- 1. (SAV95C/1413-10) - shows the first concentration of bursts on the I.T. Works, and a concentration of bursts in fields to the West.
- 2. (SAV100B/1224-9) - shows the first concentration of bursts on the small arms factory.

(vi) BOMB PLOT:

A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed.

(vii) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED.

SAV 94/1549,1350	9 FEB 1945	1234-36	A	hrs	1/42800 (F.L.7")	25000'	'B'
" 95/1410,11,13	"	1124-	"	"	1/44500 (F.L.7")	26000'	'A'
"	"	1223	"	"			
" 100/1224,27,28	"	1229-36	"	"	1/42800 (F.L.7")	25000'	'B'
" 390/1513,15	"	1230	"	"	1/43500 (F.L.7")	25500'	'B'
" 447/947,948	"	1236	"	"	1/43100 (F.L.7")	25250'	'B'
" 452/903	"	1309	"	"	1/24800 (F.L.12")	24800'	'B'
" 486/805,807	"	1232	"	"	1/43500 (F.L.7")	25500'	'B'
" 487/750,752	"	1233	"	"	1/44400 (F.L.7")	26000'	'B'
0486/290	"	UNKNOWN			OBLIQUE (F.L.6-3/8")	25000'	'B'
0487/286-288	"	"			" (F.L.6-3/8")	25500'	'B'

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MR/WJA/CJ

DISTRIBUTION NO-11C
234 copies

A

FORM 3

STATION 119DATE 9 Feb 1945

LET	SHLP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
				EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
335	8280 8280	Wilson	✓		835		1555	
336	Q 8617	Rosenzweig	✓		836		1542	
334	Y 8657	Ryan	✓		837		1554	
	U 8525	Wells	✓		850		1556	
	A 2447	Rinet	✓		851		1555	
	X 8990	Addison	✓		852		1556	
	D 8610	Carlin	Hi ✓		852		1601	
	R 8317	Plask	✓		853		1602	
	J 7801	Scherfins	✓		854		1600	
	R 8438	Roy	Lo ✓		854		1603	
	L 9175	Parrish	✓		855		1557	
	P 9152	Mogley	✓		856		1602	

B.

FORM 3

STATION

119DATE 9 Feb. 1945

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
335	W	8364	Philpott	✓		846		1547	
336	U	8469	Miller	✓		840		1535	
335	B	7204	Hamilton	✓		842		1543	
336	Z	8199	Thomas	✓		843		1547	
"	W	6993	Tuso	✓		844		1548	
"	S	8333	Miller	✓		845		1545	
"	Y	6583	Earby	Hi ✓		846		1550	
"	X	8604	Dunwoody	✓		847		1551	
"	T	9037	Schaaf	✓		848		1549	
"	V	8676	Sutton	✓		849		1549	
325	N	6598	Bradley	Lo ✓		841		1552	
"	Z	2455	Purdy	✓		845		1553	
"	E	6838	Kelg	✓		841		1552	

C

FORM 3

STATION 119DATE 9 Feb. 1945

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
334	J	8179 8179	Stotesbury	✓		837		1605	
412	B	8774	Sutkowski	✓		904		1540	
"	Y	9177	Hunter	✓		857		1604	
"	H	6522	Weisz	✓		858		1607	
"	J	8826	O'Toole	✓		859		1607 ⁺	
"	M	8741	Newman	✓		900		1612	
"	E	8067	Layl	Hi ✓		901		1609	
335	H	7376	R.A. Nelson	✓		850		1610	
412	D	8922	Young			911		917	Elev. tabs. (Unused spare)
"	V	8288	Ristene	Lo ✓		902		1611	
"	A	6801	Twinning	✓		902		1608	
335	A	8255	Dehert	✓		857		1619	
"	K	8269	Duncan	✓		903		1606	
412	J	8179	Stotesbury						Missed

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Intelligence Officer

9 February 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the mission to Weimar, Germany for the above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission -- the 95th Group flew as the 13A Combat Group to attack the synthetic oil plant at Bohlen, Germany, but because of weather at the primary target, the secondary target, the armament works of Berlin-Suhler Waffen-U-Fahrzeugwerke GmbH was attacked in group formation.

95A - Eleven A/C and one PFF A/C formed the lead squadron and all A/C attacked the secondary target.

95B - Twelve A/C and one PFF A/C formed the high squadron and all A/C attacked the secondary target.

95C - Twelve A/C and one PFF A/C formed the low squadron. Ten A/C and the PFF attacked the secondary target, and A/C 8255 attacked a target of opportunity, the town of Nordheim (5027-1023), the crew reporting good results. A/C 8922 returned from over the base as a spare.

2. Reference is suggested to the Operational Narrative teletype for further S-2 information.

For the Intelligence Officer:

Arno A. Krause
ARNO A. KRAUSE,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

A/C No.	Air- borne	Sor- ties	Attack- ing	ABORTS				LOST			DAMAGE		P	S	BOMBS DROPPED			RET.
				M	W	E	O	E/A	AA	OTHER	Maj.	Min.			LR	TO	JETT	
8657	1	1	1											10				
8640	1	1	1											10				
9175	1	1	1											10				
8438	1	1	1											10				
8525	1	1	1											10				
2447	1	1	1											10				
7201	1	1	1											10				
8317	1	1	1											10				
8990	1	1	1											10				
9152	1	1	1											10				
8617	1	1	1											10				
8210	1	1	1											6				

13

A/C No.	Air-borne	Sor-ties	Attack-ing	ABORTS				LOST			DAMAGE			BOMBS DROPPED				
				M	W	E	O	E/A	AA	OTHER	Maj.	Min.	P	S	LR	TO	JETT	RET.
8333	1	1	1											10				
8676	1	1	1											10				
9037	1	1	1											10				
6598	1	1	1											10				
7204	1	1	1											20				
2455	1	1	1											10				
6583	1	1	1											10				
8199	1	1	1											10				
6993	1	1	1											10				
6838	1	1	1											10				
8604	1	1	1											10				
8469	1	1	1											10				
364	1	1	1											6				

Muc

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 285

PERIOD: 0001 hours 9 February to 2400 hours 9 February 1945

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Disp.</u>	<u>Sorties*</u>	<u>Atkg.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>Losses</u>			<u>NYR</u>
							<u>AA</u>	<u>OT</u>	<u>Totals</u>	
Heavy Bomber Atks.	1296	1248	1200	3015.4	0-1-2A(b) 1 0-0-0G	1	7	9	17	2
Fighter Escort (a)	835	756	0	0	19-2-8A(c)1 37-0-12G	1	0	5	6	3
Fighter Sweeps	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	37	36	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	2
Weather Recon.	44	42	0	0	5-1-0A 0-0-0G	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	17	17	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	23	23	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	2252	2122	1200	3015.4	24-4-10A 37-0-12G	2	7	14	23	7

- (a) Includes 361st and 352nd Groups based on Continent.
- (b) Includes 0-1-1 Me-262 jet a/c.
- (c) Includes 5-1-1 Me-262 jet a/c.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

1296 a/c (918 B-17s, 378 B-24s) from three Air Divisions dispatched in six forces against Magdeburg/Rothensee Synthetic Oil Plant, Lutzkendorf Synthetic Oil Plant, Bielefeld/Schildesche RR Viaduct, Arnberg Viaduct, Wesel Road Bridge, Wesel Rail Bridge and Bohlen Synthetic Oil Plant. 1200 a/c dropped 3015.4 tons GP on assigned primaries (excepting latter three), several secondaries and T/Os. Targets bombed visually and on PFF. Weather: 4/10-10/10 with breaks at some targets. E/A Opposition: attacks by 6 FW-190s in Magdeburg area; 4 Me-262s in Fulda area; 1 Me-262 in Frieburg area; 3 Me-262s in Limburg area; 4 Me-262s in Frankfurt area. Losses: 17 a/c (2 B-24s, 15 B-17s - 1 to E/A, 7 to AA, 9 to unknown causes). Claims 0-1-2 (of which 0-1-1 were Me-262s). NYR: 2 B-24s (believed safe on Continent).

First Force

Twenty-nine squadron formations (313 B-24s - 2nd Air Division) dispatched against Magdeburg/Rothensee Synthetic Oil Plant. 288 a/c dropped 663.7 tons GP on assigned target, Magdeburg M/Y (secondary) and 2 t/Os at 1134-1209 hours from 21,000-25,000 ft. All targets bombed on H2X (Tarchen bombed visually). Leaflets dropped on Magdeburg. Six B-24s dispensed Chaff. Weather: 7/10-9/10 undercast at Magdeburg; 10/10 undercast enroute. Flak: meager to moderate, fairly accurate. Battle Damage: 50 minor, 1 major, 1 cat. "E". E/A Opposition: 6 Fw 190s attacked in Magdeburg area. Claims: 0-0-1. Losses: 5 B-24s (to unknown causes). NYR: Ni

Fighter Support: Three groups (173 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0930-1001 hours, down 1438-1511 hours. 151 sorties. E/A Opposition: 15 Me 109s and Fw 190s west of Dessau. Claims: 9-0-5 air, 1-0-0 ground. Two groups strafed. Losses: 1 P-51 (to E/A). NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> GP	<u>Results</u>
Magdeburg/Rothensee Synthetic Oil Plant	313	10	23.0	Unobserved
Magdeburg M/Y (sec.)		268	614.7	Unobserved
<u>Other Targets</u>				
RR at Tarchen (5221N-1205E)		9	25.0	Fair
Quackenbruck A/F		1	1.0	Unobserved
Totals	313	288	663.7	

Second Force

Eight group formations (311 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) dispatched against Bohlen Synthetic Oil Plant. 288 a/c dropped 683.9 tons GP on Weimar Arms Plant (secondary) and numerous T/Os at 1218-1325 hours from 24,000-27,000 feet. Targets bombed visually and on H2X. Leaflets dropped on Giessen and Weimar. Weather: 6/10 undercast with breaks. Flak: meager to moderate, fairly accurate. Battle Damage: 26 minor, 7 major, 1 cat. "E". E/A Opposition: Me 262s attacked in Frankfurt, Fulda and Frieberg areas. Claims: 0-1-1. Losses: 4 B-17s (2 to AA, 1 to E/A, 1 to unknown causes).

Fighter Support: Five groups (294 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0949-1004 hours, down 1510-1557 hours. 271 sorties. E/A Opposition: 25 Me 262s encountered in Fulda area; 3 Me 163s in Bielefeld area; 100 Me 109s in Magdeburg area; 2 Fw 190s in Berlin area. Claims: 8-1-3 air (includes 5-1-1 Me 262s); 2-0-9 ground. Two groups strafed. Losses: 1 P-51 (to unknown causes), 1 Cat. "E". NYR: 3 P-51s (believed safe on Continent).

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> GP	<u>Results</u>
Bohlen Synthetic Oil Plant	311	Not Attacked		
Weimar Arms Plant (sec.)		198	477.5	Very Good

<u>Other Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> GP	<u>Results</u>
Jena (city)		11	27.5	Unobserved
Giessen M/Y		25	60.0	Unobserved
Gottingen M/Y		15	24.0	Fair
Fulda (city)		24	58.7	Poor
Eisenach Engine Works		11	26.2	Unobserved
4 T/Os		4	10.0	Unobserved
Totals	311	288	683.9	

Third Force

Eight group formations (304 B-17s - 1st Air Division) dispatched against Lutzkendorf Synthetic Oil Plant. 285 a/c dropped 707.8 tons GP on assigned target, Erfurt (secondary) and several T/Os at 1257-1333 hours from 23,000-27,000 feet. Targets bombed visually (Eisenach bombed on H2X). Leaflets dropped on Eisleben. Weather: 4/10-6/10 over target. Flak: over primary moderate to intense, fairly accurate, for most groups; meager and inaccurate for some. Battle Damage: 44 minor, 20 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 9 B-17s (5 to A, 4 to unknown causes).

Fighter Support: Four groups (215 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1010-1041 hours, down 1556-1630 hours. 193 sorties. E/A Opposition: 27 Me 109s encountered in Kassel area. Claims: 2-1-0 air; 34-0-3 ground (probably Kolleda A/F). Two strafed. Losses: 4 P-51s (to unknown causes); 1 cat. "E". NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> GP	<u>Results</u>
Lutzkendorf Syn. Oil Plant	304	233	577.8	Good-Very Good
Erfurt (sec.)		12	32.5	Fair-Good
<u>Other Targets</u>				
Eisenach		13	32.5	Unobserved
Eisleben		13	30.0	Unobserved
Montesada		11	27.5	Fair
3 T/Os		3	7.5	Unobserved
Totals	304	285	707.8	

Fourth Force

Seven squadron formations (65 B-24s - 2nd Air Division) dispatched against Bielefeld/Schildesche RR Viaduct. 64 a/c dropped 142.5 tons GP on the assigned target at 1246 hours from 23,000-25,000 feet. Bombing was by Gee-H. Weather: 10/10 undercast at target. Flak: nil at target. Battle Damage: nil. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

Fighter Support: One group (40 P-47s) dispatched. Up 1035 hours, down 1433 hours. 39 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: ni

SECRET

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Target</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>GP</u>	<u>Results</u>
Bielefeld/Schildesche	65	64	142.5	Unobserved

Fifth Force

Four group formations (151 B-17s - 1st Air Division) dispatched against Paderborn/Altenbeken Viaduct and the Arnberg RR Viaduct. 147 a/c dropped 439.0 tons GP on assigned targets at 1258-1307 hours from 22,000-25,000 feet. Targets bombed on Gee-H. Weather: 8/10-10/10 clouds; tops at 8,000-12,000 feet in target area. Flak: nil at target. Battle Damage: 1 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Losses: 2 B-17s (to unknown causes).

Fighter Support: One group, the 361st based on the Continent, (53 P-51s), dispatched. Up 1110 hours, down 1530 hours. 47 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>GP</u>	<u>Results</u>
Paderborn/Altenbeken Viaduct	76	72	215.5	Unobserved
Arnberg RR Viaduct	76	75	233.5	Unobserved
Totals	151	147	439.0	

Sixth Force

Four group formations (152 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) dispatched against Wesel Road Bridge and Wesel Rail Bridge. 128 a/c dropped 378.5 tons GP on Dulmen Depot (secondary) and Munster M/Y (last resort) at 1330-1339 hours from 25,000-28,000 feet. Secondaries bombed on Micro-H; last resort on H2x. Weather: 10/10 clouds over targets. Flak: meager and inaccurate. Battle Damage: 8 minor, 2 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. (Leaflets dropped on Dulmen).

Fighter Support: One group, the 352nd based on the Continent, (60 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1229 hours, down 1500 hours. 55 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>GP</u>	<u>Results</u>
Wesel Road Bridge	76	Not Attacked		
Wesel Rail Bridge	76	Not Attacked		
Dulmen Oil Depot (sec.)		107	315.5	Unobserved
Munster M/Y (last resort)		21	63.0	Unobserved
Totals	152	128	378.5	

2. Fighter Escort

Fifteen groups, including the two groups based on the Continent, (795 P-51s and 40 P-47s) dispatched to support six bomber forces. Up 0930-1229 hours, down 1433-1630 hours. 756 sorties. E/A Opposition: engagements with 15 Me 109s and Fw 190s in Magdeburg area; 25 Me 262s (in groups of 6, 9 and 10) in Fulda area; 3 Me 163s in Bielefeld area; 100 Me 109s in Magdeburg area; 2 Fw190s in Berlin area; 27 Me 109s in Cologne area. Claims: 19-2-8 air (includes 5-1-1 Me 262s); 37-0-12 ground. Six groups strafed with claims listed below. Losses: 6 P-51s (to unknown causes). NYR: 3 P-51s (believed safe on Continent).

Ground Claims:DestroyedDamaged

Trains (with loads)	2	0
Locomotives	32	12
Goods Wagons	2	77
Oil Tank Cars	1	0
Passenger Cars	2	6
RR Switch Towers	1	1
Hangars	4	2
Motor Transports	9	44
Ammunition Dump	1	0
Tractors	3	0

3. Fighter Sweeps

Nil.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

37 a/c dispatched as follows:

13 a/c (11 F-5s, 2 Spitfires) dispatched to map and assess damage to M/Ys and A/Fs in northern and west central Germany. E/A Opposition: one u/i s/e a/c attacked in Cologne area; one Me 262 attacked over Elsassthal. Losses: nil.

3 a/c (2 Mosquitoes, 1 P-38) on Mickey mission over Ruhland, Brux and Kassel areas. Losses: nil.

21 a/c (P-51s) as escort to PRU a/c. 20 sorties. Losses: nil. NYR: 2 P-51s (believed safe on the Continent).

6. Weather Reconnaissance

44 a/c dispatched as follows:

2 B-17s on routine weather flight to Azores and return. Losses: nil.

2 B-17s on weather flight over sea NW of Lands End. Losses: nil.

5 Mosquitoes on special weather flights over France, Belgium, Holland, NW Germany and Southwestern approaches. Losses: nil.

35 P-51s (33 sorties) as weather scouts for bombing forces. 8 P-51s of 2nd Division scouting force encountered 100 plus Me 109s in vicinity of Magdeburg. Claims: 5-1-0. Losses: nil.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

17 P-47s dispatched on routine search and patrol. All a/c completed their mission and returned safely.

8. Special Operations

23 a/c dispatched as follows:

3 Mosquitoes dispensing Chaff for the 1st Division.

2 Mosquitoes on special operations.

6 a/c jamming from 0715-1000 hours.

12 a/c (1 B-24, 1 B-17, 10 P-51s) as radio relays.

All the above a/c returned safely.

C. INTELLIGENCE1. Enemy Air Opposition

The most aggressive attacks today were made by the Me 262s operating mainly in the Fulda area. These e/a, of which it seems about 20 to 25 were active, attacked in elements of 3 to 5 and in spite of being engaged by escorting fighters attempted to get through to the bombers and appear to have succeeded in shooting down at least one of the Second Force B-17s. Fighter claims for these engagements are 5-1-1 for the three groups.

One large concentration of Me 109s was engaged by the First Force scouting force. These e/a were flying on a WNW course in two formations of fifty plus each at 15,000 feet in the Magdeburg area. The scouting force which was flying at 18,000 feet attacked, claiming 5-0-0 and report that e/a split-essed to deck and lacked coordination. None were seen to approach the bombers. One straggler, however, was attacked by six Fw 190s fifteen miles NW Hannover and six black s/c e/a were also sighted on a westerly course N of Brunswick but did not attack.

One P-51 group sweeping ahead of the first force engaged 4 Fw 190s and Me 109s in the Brandenburg area and Berlin area and destroyed three - 15 Me 109s and Fw 190s flying P-51 formation, were also encountered west of Dessau, by another group on close escort. In the ensuing combat which lasted twenty minutes and in which e/a fought aggressively, nine e/a were destroyed and five damaged with the loss of one P-51.

The only engagement reported by fighters escorting the Third Force is reported by a group which strafed an airfield, probably Kolleda. The group had just finished strafing when 15 plus Me 109s at 9,000 feet came in from the west. A lone pilot of the same group was attacked by a further twelve Me 109s but evaded. The whole group was short of ammunition but claims 2-1-0.

The fourth, fifth and sixth forces and their escort saw no enemy aircraft.

2. Flak

Dulmen - meager, inaccurate, tracking fire.

Egmond - meager, accurate, tracking fire.

Magdeburg - meager to moderate, fairly accurate.

Osnabruck - meager, inaccurate.

Lutzkendorf - moderate to intense and accurate to inaccurate.

Frankfurt, Mainz, Jena - meager, inaccurate.

Eisenach - meager, inaccurate -6-

3. Observations

20 e/a on A/F at Burg.

4 silver s/e and 2 silver t/e e/a on EW runway of A/F at 5207-1142E.

15 to 20 e/a parked on runway, not dispersed, of A/F at 5229-1203E.

M/Y at Hersfeld heavily loaded as was M/Y at Gena.

A/F at 5108-1038E with buildings similar to an assembly plant and with 50 to 75 t/e parked on A/F.

4. Damage to Enemy InstallationsWeimar Arms Plant - Very Good Results

Seventeen squadrons bombed with 500 pound GPs. Eight patterns blanketed the target. Patterns of 4 squadrons fell in built up area of city; five more fell in fields and suburban areas to 2.2 miles distant. Patterns lie SE and NW of target. Bombs from 1 squadron destroyed center of large building at MPI as well as one directly west of it. Also damaged buildings on S and W side of area.

Later pattern indicates hits on buildings at E end of target. 8 hits on small arms factory N of target. RR tracks cut in 8 to 10 places near target. Several small buildings on fire. Large fire in small arms factory.

Fulda - Poor Results

Bursts blocked and cut RR line. Some patterns in field 1 1/2 miles W of town

Gottingen - Fair Results

1/10 to 4/10 cloud obscured. One pattern fell in Northern part of M/Y - 6 to 8 hits on tracks. Fair Results.

Parohen (52 miles WSW of Berlin) - Fair Results.

Two tight patterns of GPs are seen to burst in an open area adjacent to the town and across the highway.

Magdeburg M/Y - Unobserved Results.

General results obscured by clouds but some squadrons were observed, or locations of bursts plotted, through small breaks in the undercast.

Some patterns observed to burst in open areas in three cases and others scored hits on or near misses to highways, a bridge in the dock-industrial area to the north of Magdeburg and very good hits on a RR siding near a road over rail bridge of the Autobahn north of town.

Lutzkendorf near Halle - Good to Very Good Results.

Clouds of 5/10 to 10/10 density combined with smoke of fires started early in the attack and from an ineffective smoke screen making it impossible to pin-point and assess all strikes. Six concentrations of GP bombs could be seen bursting in the target area. The main weight of these bombs fell in the central and western portion

Damage to Enemy Installations (cont'd)

of the target area. Direct hits could be seen on the following installations: power stations, 2 hits and severe fire; wet-gas holder exploded; Schalfeld gas generator on fire; 2 contact oven houses; cooling tower; residual gas holder; gas generator; gas condensation plant on fire; ash disposal plant; brown coal bunker on fire; compressor house exploded; 5 u/i buildings; 2 oil storage tanks.

Intense fires could be seen burning in the target area late in the attack and damage can be expected to be severe. Concentrations covered rail lines immediately north of the target area and though cloud and smoke covered the area it was apparent that a large u/i plant adjacent to the target was heavily hit, since at least 3 huge columns of smoke could be seen coming from this area.

Eight concentrations of GP bombs could be seen near the target area; 3 of these concentrations fell into a small residential area adjacent to the western and southern boundary of the target area. The remaining 5 concentrations fell into open areas 1 mile NE, 1 mile NW, 1 1/4 miles N-NW, 1 mile SW and 2 miles N-NW respectively.

Erfurt (secondary) - Fair to Good Results.

Railway center at Erfurt - target. One concentration of GP bombs practically hidden by cloud could be seen bursting in the central portion of the town of Erfurt. This area is completely built-up and should be severely damaged.

Montesada - Fair Results (T/O).

Approximately 90 GP bombs bursting in and adjacent to this small village. Damage to center will be severe.

Unterrissdorf - Poor Results (T/O).

Approximately 100 GP bombs in open fields 3/4 miles west of Unterrissdorf and 19 1/2 miles NW of Lutzkendorf.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.