

HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 23 January 1945
13 CBW FO 22
13 CBW OPS 265
3 AD FO 560

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (NEUSS, GERMANY)

TO : CO, 95BG, APO 559

1. Information Concerning the Target:

a. The primary target (visual or Micro-H) for today was the South Exit to the sorting sidings of the RAILWAY MARSHALLING YARD situated in the north central section of NEUSS, GERMANY.

b. The secondary target for today was the same as the primary. H2X technique, in the event of the target being overcast, was to be employed.

2. Narrative of the Attack:

a. 13 A Group - 390A, B Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

Squadron and Group assembly was accomplished satisfactorily despite the fact that assembly altitude was raised to 25000 feet. Dense persistent contrails made visual contact and identity almost impossible. In order to have a longer time to assemble in a good formation, the 93rd Wing was contacted and a 10 minute delay was arranged. This time, however, conflicted with the 1st Division timings. At CP 1 the Group was nine minutes late and not in good Wing formation due to poor visual contact.

(b) Route:

Since very little climbing was necessary to arrive at bombing altitude, no difficulty was experienced. Both Squadrons were in good formation when CP 2 was reached at a point about 8 miles NE of briefed point. No time had been gained or lost during the climb. From here to the Pre-IP the Group was slightly North of course but not far enough off to cause any trouble.

At the IP confusion was evident by the fact that the 93rd Wing and 1 Group of the 1st Division were making almost simultaneous turns into the target, but at different altitudes. Since beacon reception was spasmodic in the Low Squadron they decided to drop with the Lead. A visual run, with Micro-H assist, was made, both Squadrons dropping together. Violent evasive action was taken after bombs away but the Group maintained a good defensive formation. The RP was 4 miles short from the briefed one. The course back to base was followed almost exactly as briefed.

(c) Weather:

Over the bases visibility was restricted due to haze to 22000 feet. Above that altitude thin cirrus and dense persistent contrails were in evidence. The same conditions prevailed over the

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TR, 23 Jan. '45

entire route until just prior to the IP when about 2-4/10ths low clouds were present. The contrail level at the target was about 2000 feet below the bombing altitude of this Group. This is proven by photos of the bombing which show dense contrails being made by aircraft of the 1st Division who were bombing at a lower altitude.

(d) Difficulties:

Weather made it necessary for the Group to assemble higher than briefed. Spasmodic reception of beacons caused Low Squadron to drop with the Leader.

(e) Remarks:

Navigation is considered good despite weather conditions and poor visibility. The ten minute delay agreed upon during assembly caused interference with the 1st Division who were briefed to be following the 3rd Division.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Two PFF aircraft were dispatched. Both were instructed to employ MH technique. 390B Squadron was unable to receive the beacons due to malfunction in sweep delay system. 390A Squadron received weak beacon returns, but was able to make a MH sighting. Bombing was in Group formation. The bombardier gave a visual assist before bombs away. Results were poor to fair.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 390A and B Squadrons:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader	Maj. Pennebaker	Nav	Lt. Rosen
	Pilot	Capt. Beasley	Asst Nav	Capt. Hollopeter
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. F.G.Casserly
			Bomb	Lt. V.L.Rogers

<u>2.</u>	A/C Attacking:		Bombs Dropped
<u>a.</u>	Primary	20	174 x 500 LB GP 31 x 500 LB IB 28 Leaflet Containers
	Jettisoning	2	11 x 500 LB GP 2 x 500 LB IB
	Returning	7	51 x 500 LB GP 11 x 500 LB IB

b. Bombing Altitude: 27000'

c. Time of Release: 1113

3. Run In from IP to Target:

The IP was made good. Contrails and high clouds, however, prevented the bombardier from picking up any check points beyond this point until just a few seconds before the bomb release line. The Mickey Operator, who encountered difficulty in retaining the beacons, went in slightly right of course. The bombardier made course corrections to the right during the last twenty seconds when the target became visible, and then displaced his crosshairs on the MPI. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 102 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. The 390B Squadron dropped off A.

TR, 23 Jan. '45

4. PI Report:

a. The bombs from 390A Squadron fell in fields 1 3/4 miles to the right (SSE) of the assigned target.

b. Bomb Pattern: 2330'L x 1865'W.

c. Bombing Errors: Gross.

d. Bombing Results: Nil. There was no damage of any nature inflicted to the assigned target.

e. The bombs from 390B Squadron fell along the canal in fields about 3600' right of (WSW) and 2250' short of (W) the target. There were several close misses and possible one direct hit on the railway leading into the M/Y from the SE. Contrails and haze on the photographs prevents precise interpretation.

f. Bomb Pattern: 2250'L x 1515'W.

g. Bombing Errors: There was no sighting.

h. Bombing Results: Nil.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 633, A Squadron: Returned 1 x 500 LB GP and 1 x 500 LB IB - Neither would release.

A/C 124, A Squadron: Returned 10 x 500 LB GP and 2 x 500 LB IB - Reason unknown.

A/C 769, A Squadron: Jettisoned 1 x 500 LB GP - Bomb would not release.

A/C 831, A Squadron: Aborted and returned 10 x 500 LB GP and 1 x 500 LB IB.

A/C 058, B Squadron: Jettisoned 10 x 500 LB GP and 2 x 500 LB IB at 5115N-0638E - The A/C was lagging in formation and the pilot ordered the bombardier to close the doors. While they were closed, bombs were away in the Lead A/C.

A/C 972, B Squadron: Aborted and returned 10 x 500 LB GP and 2 x 500 LB IB.

A/C 895, B Squadron: Landed at Brussels with 10 x 500 LB GP and 2 x 500 LB IB - Reason unknown.

A/C 097, B Squadron: Aborted and returned 10 x 500 LB GP and 2 x 500 LB IB.

b. 13 B Group - 95A, B Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The assembly altitude was raised to 25000 feet on advice from Wing Leader and difficulty was encountered in making a good assembly on time. A ten minute delay was announced by Wing Leader.

(b) Route:

The briefed route was flown over the Channel to the IP. The IP was made good and the course to the target was made good by H2X. No definite RP was established as evasive action was taken. Course was paralleled to CP 3 and the Continental Coast was crossed at 5139 $\frac{1}{2}$ -0342E 8 miles north of course. Briefed course was followed to the English Coast.

- (c) Weather: Same as 13A Group.
- (d) Difficulties: None except as noted in assembly.
- (e) Remarks: The navigation was good despite weather.
- (f) PFF Narrative:

Two PFF aircraft were dispatched. 95A received beacons strongly on the scope and was able to make an MH sighting on the primary in Squadron formation. Results were unobserved. 95B did not receive beacons and made a H2X bomb run on a target of opportunity. The bombardier assisted visually. Results were unobserved.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 95A Squadron:

<u>1.</u> Air Leader Maj. Gooding	Nav	Lt. Russell
Pilot	Lt. Parker	Asst Nav Lt. Shirey
Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Borch
	Bomb	Lt. Schultz

<u>2.</u> A/C Attacking:		Bombs Dropped
<u>a.</u> Primary	10	93 x 500 LB GP
		17 x 500 LB IB
Jettisoning	3	26 x 500 LB GP
		6 x 500 LB IB
Returning	1	11 x 500 LB GP
		3 x 500 LB IB

b. Bombing Altitude: 26000'

c. Time of Release: 1114

3. Run In from IP to Target:

After the IP was made good visually, clouds obliterated check points, and the radar operator assumed control of the bomb run on MH until about 30 seconds before the BRL. The haze and contrails then dissipated sufficiently for the bombardier to orient himself in relation to the ground and make visual corrections. AFCE was used during the run, and bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 107 degrees.

4. PI Report:

a. Haze, contrails, the terrain, and the quality of the photographs all help in making precise interpretation impossible. No bursts are visible, but according to computations based upon the bomb trajectory chart, the bombs fell about 3000' beyond (E) and 3000' right of (S) the target in an area containing residences, factory buildings, and railway tracks.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 2455: Returned 1 x 500 LB GP and 1 x 500 LB IB because of rack malfunction.

A/C 7047: Returned 10 x 500 LB GP and 2 x 500 LB IB because of rack malfunction.

A/C 8255: Released 10 x 500 LB GP and 2 x 500 LB IB at the IP because of rack malfunction.

A/C 8990: Jettisoned 6 x 500 LB GP and 2 x 500 LB IB because of rack malfunction.

A/C 9055: Aborted and jettisoned at 5204N-0218E 10 x 500 LB GP and 2 x 500 LB IB.

(b) 95B Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader	Lt. Greer	Nav	Lt. Fryer
	Pilot	Lt. Abevender	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Baldi
			Bomb	Lt. Spinnen-weber

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	TO	12	120 x 500 LB GP
			24 x 500 LB IB
	Jettisoning	1	10 x 500 LB GP
			2 x 500 LB IB

b. Bombing Altitude: 25500'c. Time of Release: 11153. Run In from IP to Target:

After the IP, heavy contrails precluded the possibility of pilotage on the bomb run until a few seconds from the BRL. At this point, the bombardier picked up the target. Realizing that the assigned MPI could not possibly be hit because the rate was not good, the bombardier synchronized on a railway bridge crossing the Rhine River 9000' beyond (E) the target. At bombs away the A/C went into a violent bank for some unknown reason. The AFCE was used on the bomb run, and bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 85 degrees.

4. PI Report:

a. Because the Squadrons turned abruptly after bombs away, the target disappeared in the photographs before any bombs burst. According to computations based upon the bomb trajectory chart, the approximate position of the Squadron's pattern was centered around the East portion of the railway bridge.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 6522: Aborted and jettisoned at 5210N-0240E
16 x 500 LB GP and 2 x 500 LB IB.

3. Planning and Execution of the Mission:a. Wing Order and Strength:

(1)	93 A, B Groups:	4 x 12 A/C Squadrons
		1 x 6 A/C Squadron
(a)	34 Group	2 Squadrons
(b)	493 Group	2 Squadrons
	34 Group	6 A/C Chaff Force
(2)	13 A, B Groups:	4 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a)	390 Group	2 Squadrons
(b)	95 Group	2 Squadrons

b. A/C and C/C Available:

(1)	95 Group	30 A/C	52 C/C
		5 A/C PFF	5 C/C PFF
		4 A/C MH	4 C/C MH
(2)	100 Group	40 A/C	38 C/C
		8 A/C PFF	8 C/C PFF
		4 A/C MH	6 C/C MH

(3) 390 Group	34 A/C	51 C/C
	6 A/C PFF	8 C/C PFF
	6 A/C MH	7 C/C MH

c. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

(1) 95 Group	24 Plus 2 PFF
(2) 390 Group	24 Plus 2 PFF

d. A/C Airborne:

(1) 95 Group	24 Plus 2 PFF
(2) 390 Group	24 Plus 2 PFF

e. A/C Abortive:

(1) 95 Group:

A/C 055: 335 Sqdn "R" - Hydraulic fire - Oxygen out - Pilot Lt. Mercer - No sortie.
 A/C 522: 412 Sqdn "H" - #1 engine out - Pilot Lt. O'Toole - No sortie.

(2) 390 Group:

A/C 831: 571 Sqdn "C" - #2 engine out - Pilot Lt. Thompson - No sortie.
 A/C 097: 570 Sqdn "D" - #3 engine out - Pilot Lt. Bouton - No sortie.
 A/C 972: 571 Sqdn "F" - #1 engine leaking oil - Pilot Lt. Welton - No sortie.
 A/C 895: 571 Sqdn "R" - #2 engine out - Landing at Brussels.

f. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW A Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary	20	174 x 500 LB GP
		44 x 500 LB IB
		28 Leaflet Containers
Jettisoning	2	11 x 500 LB GP
		2 x 500 LB IB
Returning	6	51 x 500 LB GP
		11 x 500 LB IB

(2) Method of Bombing: H2X with Visual Assist

(3) Method of Release: Intervalometer - 80'

g. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW B Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary	10	93 x 500 LB GP
		17 x 500 LB IB
TO	12	120 x 500 LB GP
		24 x 500 LB IB
Jettisoning	4	36 x 500 LB GP
		8 x 500 LB IB
Returning	1	11 x 500 LB GP
		3 x 500 LB IB

(2) Method of Bombing: H2X with Visual Assist

(3) Method of Release: Intervalometer - 80'

4. Communications:

a. Major Pennebaker (390) led the 13th Combat Wing. Communication on all Channels is reported satisfactory with no jamming or interference noted. Control points were sent to Arrowswift. Target and route

TR, 23 Jan. '45

weather information was received satisfactorily. Channel A is reported to have been crowded with chatter prior to Division Assembly Line. Fighters were contacted.

b. Control Points and Strike Reports:

	CP 1	CP 2	TGT	CP 3
Timings	1004	1024	1100	1137
13A	1013	1035	1113	1149

390A P A 5 1113

95A P B 5 1115

5. Mission Camera Report:

a. The 95 Group installed 1 scope and 6 vertical cameras, 0 and 5 of which took pictures:

PFF A/C 8230 with scope camera installed: Failed to take pictures - cause undetermined.

A/C 9055 with K-21 installed: Aborted.

b. The 390 Group installed 2 scope and 6 vertical cameras, 1 and 5 of which took pictures:

PFF A/C 481 with scope camera installed: Brilliance was too low and no pictures were taken although roll went through.

A/C 972 with K-21 installed: Aborted.

6. Controller's Log:

a. 2250 from 3 AD:

- (1) Force.
- (2) Targets - Primary and Secondary Plus MPIs.
- (3) Bomb Load.
- (4) Zero Hour.
- (5) RBA.
- (6) Division Assembly Point.
- (7) Time Control.
- (8) Approach to Assembly.
- (9) Chaff Force.
- (10) Tentative Route.
- (11) Weather A/C.
- (12) Bombing Unit.
- (13) Time Intervals.

b. 2330 to Groups:

- (1) Force.
- (2) Bomb Load.
- (3) Zero Hour.
- (4) RBA.
- (5) Division Assembly Point.
- (6) Time Control.
- (7) Approach to Assembly.
- (8) Chaff Force.
- (9) Tentative Route.
- (10) Weather A/C.
- (11) Bombing Unit.
- (12) Time Intervals.

c. 2330 from 3 AD:

- (1) Leaflet Load.

- d. 2335 to Groups:
 - (1) Leaflet Load.
- e. 0015 to Groups:
 - (1) Targets - Primary and Secondary Plus MPIs.
- f. 0035 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Last Resort Target.
- g. 0050 to Groups:
 - (1) Last Resort Target.
- h. 0150 to Groups:
 - (1) Gas Load.
- i. 0150 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Approved Routes and Preliminary Timings.
 - (2) 3 AD FO 560 Received.
- j. 0205 to Groups:
 - (1) 13 CBW Advance Warning to FO 21.
- k. 0208 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Intelligence Annex to 3 AD FO 560.
- l. 0210 to Groups:
 - (1) Timings.
 - (2) Assembly Altitude.
- m. 0215 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 560.
- n. 0223 to Groups:
 - (1) Attention Directed to Restricted Area.
- o. 0225 to Groups:
 - (1) Annex 1 to Advance Warning FO 21.
- p. 0230 from 3 AD:
 - (1) MH Info 3 AD FO 560.
- q. 0330 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Final Timings.
- r. 0330 to Groups:
 - (1) 13 CBW FO 21.
- s. 0347 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Annex 2 to 3 AD FO 560.

TR, 23 Jan. '45

t. 0613 from 3 AD:

(1) Wind Changes.

u. 0617 from 390 Group:

(1) First Report from Weather A/C.

v. 0636 from 3 AD:

(1) Deviation from route may be necessary on return route to avoid weather.

w. 0707 to Groups:

(1) Deviation from route may be necessary on return route to avoid weather.

x. 0815 from 3 AD:

(1) Departure Point may be changed.

y. Comments on Mission Planning:

(1) None.

For the Commanding Officer:



GENE C. SMITH,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO.K. 3683

268

LOCALITY: NEUSS M/Y

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

This report covers damage to the target between 1435 A hours on 13 January 1945 and 1150 A hours on 23 January 1945 and includes damage resulting from the attack by aircraft of U.S. 8th AIR FORCE on 23 January 1945 (weather conditions reported haze, cloud and snow). (S.A. 3168)

PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE.

Owing to the fact that the whole area is snow covered and that there is a total absence of shadow no detailed statement on damage can be made.

It is seen, however, that many hits have been obtained in the Sorting Sidings and near the Northern flyovers. Other hits are seen in the Rail Junction South of Neuss and near the Passenger Station. In the area a few trucks are seen to be on fire.

The factory area of Bauer and Schaurte (bolt and nut factory) (priority 3) lying immediately West of the main station has received at least one hit. An unidentified building in the Southern corner is probably damaged.

Many bombs have fallen in the closely built-up area in the North West of Neuss and several fires are burning.

Industrial damage is seen at the Southern end of the dock area. Bombs have fallen in the following plants:-

1. Walter Rau, Neusseroelwerke A.G. - hydrogenation of vegetable and marine oils.
2. N. Simons - hydrogenation of vegetable and marine oils.
3. C. Thywissen Oelmuhle - manufacturer of edible oils and fats.

The N. Simon Oil Plant and an unidentified factory at the extreme Southern end of the central dock basin are on fire.

Groups of craters are seen in open fields and lightly built-up areas between one and two miles to the North, South West and South East.

(Prints 4044/8
3044/8)

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 16 Squadron.

SORTIE: 16/1629

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 1150 A hrs. on 23 JAN 1945.

SCALE: 1/10,000 (approx) (F.L.20")

COVER AND QUALITY: The snow covered yard is fully covered on prints of poor quality

LAST REPORT: K3583 issued 14 JAN 1945.

COMPARATIVE SORTIE USED: 106G/4130 prints 3069/70, 4079/80

PRINT DISTRIBUTED: None

CONFIDENTIAL
A.C.I.U.
G.W.S./MF

DISTRIBUTION NO. 24C
304 Copies.

ATTACK ON NEUSS MARSHALLING YARD ON 23 JAN 45

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- | | | |
|---------------------|---|-----------------------------------------|
| (a) No. of aircraft | : | 181, with full fighter escort. |
| (b) Command | : | U.S. 8th AIR FORCE. |
| (c) Time | : | 1108 - 1138 A hrs. |
| (d) Bombs | : | 1671 x 500 lb G.P.
326 x 500 lb I.B. |

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK

- (a) Due to poor photograph quality, haze, cloud and snow, no bombs can be seen bursting. Marks in the snow indicate where the bomb patterns have fallen but the type of bombs cannot be identified.

A pattern of bombs blanket the Northern third of the Marshalling yard and junctions to the North. Scattered bursts are seen in the Industrial area just East and in the small sidings just North-east.

Bomb patterns are concentrated on junctions at the South end of the yard, the wagon repair shops and one of the locomotive depots in the same vicinity. Patterns cover at least one third of NEUSS and extend East to cover industrial buildings in the Southeast harbor area. At least three burst marks are seen in the factory area of the BAUER AND SCHAURTE BOLT FACTORY.

- (b) Other bursts. (All distances are measured from the Passenger Station)

- (1) Two large areas of bursts marks are seen along the East bank of the RHINE RIVER two miles East.
- (2) A large concentration and numerous scattered burst marks one and one-half miles Southeast, another concentration one and one-half miles Southwest.
- (3) One small group is seen $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles West-Southwest, two groups $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles Northwest, three groups 2 to $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles North and one group $\frac{3}{4}$ mile East. Scattered burst marks are seen throughout the area.

(iii) ACTIVITY

A. MARSHALLING YARDS

1. NEUSS

(a) COVER

The photographs are of small scale and poor quality. The yard is partially smoke obscured.

(b) LOADING

No statement can be given.

2. DUSSELDORF

(a) COVER

The yard is covered on small scale poor quality photographs.

(b) LOADING

Reception sidings - light.
Sorting sidings - Moderate.
Storage sidings - light

/ B. NUSS/KAARST

B. NUSS/KAARST AIRFIELD

- (1) The airfield is covered on small scale poor quality photographs.
- (2) No aircraft are visible.
- (3) Snow covers the landing ground.

(iv) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(v) BOMB PLOT: None prepared.

(vi) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED

SAV 34/512,513	23 JAN 45	1108 A. obs.	1/45400	(F.L.7")	26,500	'B'
" 95/1371,1372,	"	1114 "	1/46200	"	27,000	'B'
1373,						
" 303/1466	"	Unknown "	1/44500	"	26,000	'B'
" 379/862-864	"	1138 "	1/46200	"	27,000	'B'
" 390/1270,1271	"	1113 "	1/46200	"	27,000	'B'
" 398/614	"	1118 "	1/41400	"	24,200	'B'
" 398/611,612,	"	1118 "	1/24500	(F.L.12")	24,500	'B'
615,616						
" 495/599,600	"	1115-1122 "	1/26000	"	26,000	'B'
O -493/213	"	Unknown Oblique		(F.L.6-3/8)	26,000	'B'

CONFIDENTIALA.C.I.U.TEP/CBS/JWLDISTRIBUTION NO. 11-C243 COPIES

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer.

APO 559.
25 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Operations Officers Narrative - Mission 23 January 1945 - Nuess,
Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95th Bombardment Group sent the lead (95 A) and low (95 B) squadrons of the 13 B Combat Group. There was no high Squadron. The primary target was the marshalling yards at Nuess, Germany. The 95 A Squadron took-off at 0730-0744 hours with 11 aircraft plus one spare aircraft plus one PFF aircraft. The 95 B Squadron took-off at 0733-0739 hours with 11 aircraft plus one spare plus one PFF. The two spare aircraft returned unused.

The Group assembled over the base at 25,000 feet, 2000 feet above the briefed altitude because of clouds. The 13 A Group was late in forming and requested an additional ten minutes for Division assembly. The 13 B Group consequently was ten minutes late at Wing assembly (Bu. # 11, 25,000 feet) and at Division assembly (Felixstowe, 25,000 feet, 1016 hours).

The 13 B Group followed the briefed course to the target. The I.P. was made good by pilotage at 1103, nine minutes late. The Squadrons fell in trail at this point to make individual runs. The lead squadron made the run on Micro-H with visual corrections during the last 30 seconds. Bombs were away at 1114, results were unobserved. 95 B Squadron made the run on BX, because the beacons could not be tuned in. Part way down the run the 495rd Group interfered. The target was found again by BX but when the MPI was picked up visually a few seconds before the Bomb Release Line it was found that the synchronization was off. The bombardier therefor synchronized on a Target of Opportunity, the bridge across the Rhine at Nuess. Just at the time of bombs away (1115), the AFCE caused the ship to make a violent bank to the left. The bombs were therefor somewhat scattered, the results were unobserved.

Both squadrons made sharp 180 degree turns to the left off the target, and were in group formation shortly after the Rally Point. The Group followed the route out about 5 miles north of course and reached the base at 1244. The 95 A landed at 1246-1253 hours, and 95 B at 1254-1307 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: In 95 A Squadron A/C 8255 released bombs early on bomb run due to malfunction in A - 4 release system. A/C 7047 released bombs late because of malfunction in the A - 2 release system.

3. AIRCRAFT LOST: None.

NOEL T. GUMBAA,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
APO 559

STATISTICAL CONTROL REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

13TH COMBAT BOMBARDMENT WING

DATE RENDERED 25 January 1945

PART I - TABULAR SUMMARY:

DATE OF MISSION 25 January 1945

STRATEGICAL MISSION

COMBAT GROUP	SCHEDULED	AIRBORNE	AIRBORNE LESS REFUELING SPARES	ATTACKING	NOT ATTACKING	SORTIES
A	11 & 1SH	12 & 1SH	11 & 1SH	9 & 1SH	2	11 & 1SH
B	11 & 1SH	12 & 1SH	11 & 1SH	11 & 1SH		11 & 1SH

PART II - REASONS WHY AIRCRAFT DID NOT ATTACK OR FAILED TO TAKE OFF:

Combat Gp	A.C.S.N.	Category	Reason for Failure & Corrective Action	Sortie (Yes-No)
A/B	43-58255	E	Bomb. reported malfunction causing bombs to release early. The intervalometer circuit and bombsight circuit were thoroughly checked with a volt ohm meter for a short or a feed-back. No malfunction was found.	Yes
A/B	42-107047	E	Bombardier reported he could not drop bombs. The doors were opened and closed over the channel. It is believed that the doors were not fully opened at the IP because the bombardier reported that he could neither release his bombs in train or salvo. The L-21A release handle would not go forward into the salvo position. The bomb bay doors and the release system checked out on the ground after the mission.	Yes

S E C R E T

NOEL T. CUMBAA
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer

STATION

119

FORM 3

DATE

23 Jan 45

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
334	C	8217	Abmender	✓		733		1255	
336	N	8899	J. Taylor	✓		757		1237	
"	V	8676	Hart	✓		746		1254	
"	X	8604	Cotner	✓		747		1256	
"	U	8469	Burns	✓		748		1255	
"	T	9037	Schoaf	✓		749		1256	
412	V	8288	Weing	✓		750		1301	
"	H	6522	^{NO 0} O. Toole	✓		751		1307	Jettisoned Bombs
"	B	8774	Willis	✓		752		1249	
"	E	8067	Walter	✓		753		1302	
"	J	8826	Bek	✓		755		1303	
334	Q	2951	Thurman	✓		758		1304	
336	P	8272	Jackson	✓		754		1305	

HEADQUARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
"J" FORM

GP.
STA.

- DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
- CBW 13B GROUP 95B GP. LEADER Lt. Greer A/C 8217 334-C W/T TOX
POSITION Lo DEPUTY LDR. Lt. J. Taylor A/C 8899 336-N W/T NSW
- EST. TAXI TIME 0730 LST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0745 ETD BASE 0905
ETR BASE 1242

NO	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF	LANDING	REMARKS
				EST	ACT	EST
1	8217	Greer	✓	730	730	1246
2	8899	J. Taylor	✓	730	730	1245
3	8217	Greer	✓	730	730	1246
4	8899	J. Taylor	✓	730	730	1245
5	8217	Greer	✓	730	730	1246
6	8899	J. Taylor	✓	730	730	1245
7	8217	Greer	✓	730	730	1246
8	8899	J. Taylor	✓	730	730	1245
9	8217	Greer	✓	730	730	1246
10	8899	J. Taylor	✓	730	730	1245
11	8217	Greer	✓	730	730	1246
12	8899	J. Taylor	✓	730	730	1245
13	8217	Greer	✓	730	730	1246
14	8899	J. Taylor	✓	730	730	1245
15	8217	Greer	✓	730	730	1246
16	8899	J. Taylor	✓	730	730	1245
17	8217	Greer	✓	730	730	1246
18	8899	J. Taylor	✓	730	730	1245
19	8217	Greer	✓	730	730	1246
20	8899	J. Taylor	✓	730	730	1245

GROUP 13B

10 13 5

DATE 23 44

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

24 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, 95 "A" Squadron, Mission of 23 January 1945. Neuss, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Leader of the 13 "B" Group, we took off at 10730, completed group assembly at 25,000 feet over base at 1000. Wing assembly was made over BU #11 at 1012 at same altitude and we left the English coast (CP #1) at 1016 at 25,000 feet at Felixstowe.

2. At altitude of 26,000 feet we entered Belgium coast in at 5117 $\frac{1}{2}$ N - 0302E at 1038. We were over I.P. at 1103 at 27,500 feet.

3. The magnetic heading at time of bombs away (1114) was 107° at altitude of 27,500 feet over the target area. We and the preceding groups made a sharp turn to the left, making it practically 180° and fell short of the R.P. about 15 miles south and west (1123) at 26,000 feet.

4. Route back was wouth of course (3 -4 miles). We crossed the Dutch coast on way out at 1158 at 14,000 feet at 5139 $\frac{1}{2}$ N - 0342E. The English coast was crossed at 1229 at 4,500 feet at 5158N - 0123E. We were over base at 1244 and land at 1248.

EUGENE T. RUSSELL
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Navigator.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

24 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, 95 "B" Squadron, Mission of 23 January 1945. Neuss, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. We took off at 0734 hours. The squadron was formed at 0930 at an altitude of 23,500 feet. Wing assembly was made good at 1012 at an altitude of 24,000 feet. Division assembly was made at 1016 at 24,000 feet, the same time and altitude as departure from England.

2. The enemy coast was crossed a little north of briefed course. We were at 25,000 feet, and we made the coast at 1038, our position being 5117N - 0302E. The route to the I.P. was made according to flight plan and we crossed exactly over the I.P., 5119N - 0538E, at 1103, altitude 26,700 feet.

3. From the I.P. to target micky operator made an H2X run, and succeeded in making the briefed course. We dropped bombs at 1115, altitude 26,700', on a magnetic heading of 085°. Position at bombs away was 5113N - 0642E. Made almost a 180° turn after bombs away and we turned short of the rally point. We turned at 1123, altitude 26,000' at position 5125N - 0609E.

4. The route from rally point to the coast was made according to flight plan. We were about five miles north of course when we crossed the coast on way out. Left the coast at 1158, altitude 10,000' at a position 5139N - 0342E. We crossed the English coast at 1230, altitude of 3,000' as we passed Felixstowe. We were over the base at 1244, and landed at 1255.

FRED E. FREI
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Navigator.

95 A

FORM 3

STATION 119DATE 23 Jan '45

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					LST	ACT	EST	ACT	
334	M	8230	Parker	✓		730		1246	
"	R	8438	Bramlett	✓		730		1247	
"	V	8657	Ryan	✓		732		1245	
335	N	6598	Melvin	✓		735		1238	
"	Z	2455	Palmer	✓		736		1248	
"	K	8269	Nelson R.A.	✓		737		1248	
"	R	9055	Mercer NO 1	Ki ✓		738		1225	(Spare)
"	M	7047	Oehlert	✓		739		1250	
"	A	8255	Bradley	✓		740		1251	✓
334	X	8990	Morris	✓		741		1251	
"	V	8525	Wells	Lo ✓		742		1252	
"	B	8776	Painter	✓		744		1253	
"	D	8640	Scherfins	✓		743		1252	

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

24 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, 95 "A" Squadron, Mission of 23 January 1945. Neuss, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Bombing Approach and Run - Bomb doors were opened two minutes before the I.P. The I.P. was made good visually by a right turn of 50°. A thin layer of clouds obstructed view. Radar operator took over in MH until 30 seconds before bombs away at which time I was able to pick up target and make last minute visual corrections. Believe cloud layer was results of persistent contrails from previous formations. We went into a left turn immediately after release and therefore didn't observe results. Bombs were away at 1114. Length of run was 10 minutes, A.F.C.E. was used on the run and we were insquadron formation at I.P. and also at time of release. Flak was intense and inaccurate.

2. Disposition of Bombs - Thirteen A/C were dispatched with the 95 "A" Squadron. Twelve A/C were over the primary target dropping 94 X 500 AN-M64 and 18 X 500 M-17 bombs. A/C 9056 aborted (fire in aircraft) and jettisoned 10 X 500 AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs in the channel. A/C 8255 dropped 10 X 500 AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs on the I.P. (actual release) A/C 8990 dropped 4 X 500 AN-M64 bombs on the primary target and jettisoned 6 X 500 AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs in the channel on orders from the tower (rack malfunction) A/C 2455 jettisoned 1 X 500 AN-M64 and 1 X 500 M-17 bombs in the channel (rack failure). Fuzing was 1/10 nose and 1/40 tail in G.P. bombs and the M-17 bombs to open at 5000'.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on primary target were dropped with an 80 ft. interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary.

	A/C		Bombs		Fuzing		
	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Main Bombfall							
Neuss, Germany	12	10	93 X	500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			17 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'	
Total on Target			93 X	500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			17 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'	
Bombs Returned			10 X	500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			2 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'	
Other Expenditures (Jettisoned)			27 X	500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			7 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'	
Total (loaded on A/C taking off)			130 X	500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			26 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'	

EDWARD H. SCHULTZ
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

24 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, 95 "A" Squadron, Mission of 23 January 1945. Neuss, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Narrative.

- a. Bombing aids were A.F.C.E., C-2, W-6-b computers and tachometer.
- b. A right turn of about 50° was made on the I.P. in Squadron Formation.
- c. Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes before the I.P. at 1103.
- d. Bombing Approach & Run - Bomb doors were opened two minutes before the I.P. The I.P. was made good visually by a right turn of 50°. A thin layer of clouds obstructed view. Radar operator took over in MH until 30 seconds before bombs away at which time I was able to pick up target and make last minute visual corrections. Believe cloud layer was results of persistent contrails from previous formations. We went into a left turn immediately after release and there fore didn't observe results. Bombs were away at 1114. Length of run was 10 minutes, A.F.C.E. was used on the run and we were in squadron formation at I.P. and also at time of release. Flak was intense and inaccurate.
- e. Since we turned instantly after release, the results were not observed.
- f. There are no suggested tactical changes in bombing technique.

2. Bombardier's Form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs.

	A/C		Bombs			Fuzing	
	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Main Bombfall							
Neuss, Germany	12	10	93	X 500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			17	X 500	M-17	Open at 5000'	
Total on Target			93	X 500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			17	X 500	M-17	Open at 5000'	
Bombs Returned			10	X 500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			2	X 500	M-17	Open at 5000'	
Other Expenditures (jettisoned)			27	X 500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			7	X 500	M-17	Open at 5000'	
Total (loaded on A/C taking off)			130	X 500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			26	X 500	M-17	Open at 5000'	

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on primary target were dropped with an 80 ft. interval and armed.

EDWARD H. SCHULTZ
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

24 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, 95 "B" Squadron, Mission of 23 January 1945. Neuss, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Narrative.

- a. Bombing aids used were A.F.C.E., C-2, E-8-B computers, Hot Plate and Tachometer.
- b. A right turn of about 45° was made at I.P. in Squadron Formation.
- c. Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes before I.P. at 1105.
- d. Bombing Approach and Run - Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes before the I.P. and right turn of 45° was made onto run in Squadron formation. We proceeded down the run well in train of the lead squadron on H2X. We altered course about ¼ of the way down the run due to the 493rd's cutting us out and returned to briefed course. Heavy persistent contrails made it impossible to hit assigned M.P.I. because the rate was too far off. I synchronized on a bridge across the Rhine with about a 20 second run. The run was made on A.F.C.E. and at instant of bombs away ship sent into a violent bank for reason unknown. Bombs were away at 1115 with results unobserved. At bombs away we were in Squadron Formation. Flak was intense but inaccurate.
- e. Results were unobserved.
- f. No suggested changes in Bombing Technique.

2. Bombardier's Form 12-E modified attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs.

	A/C		No.	Size	Type	Fuzing	
	Over Target	Bombing				Nose	Type
Main Bombfall							
Neuss, Germany	12	12	120 X 500		AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			24 X 500		M-17	Open at 5000'	
Total on Target			120 X 500		AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			24 X 500		M-17	Open at 5000'	
Bombs Returned			None				
Other Expenditures (Jettisoned)			10 X 500		AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			2 X 500		M-17	Open at 5000'	
Total (loaded on A/C taking off)			130 X 500		AN-M64	1/10	1/40
			26 X 500		M-17	Open at 5000'	

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on the target of opportunity were dropped with a 80 feet interval and armed.

ROBERT T. SPINNENWEBER
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

24 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, 95 "B" Squadron, Mission 23 January 1945. Neuss, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Bombing Approach and Run - Bomb bay doorw were opened two minutes before the I.P. and right turn of 45° was made onto run in Squadron formation. We proceeded down the run well in train of the lead squadron on H2X. We altered course about 1/4 of the way down the run due to the 493rd 's cutting us out and returned to briefed course. Heavy persistant contrails made it impossible to do pilotage on the run up to a few seconds from B.R.I. When I was finally able to pick up target it was impossible to hit assigned M.P.I. because the rate was too far off. I synchronized on a bridge across the Rhine with about a 20 second run. The run was made on A.F.C.S. and at instant of bombs away ship went into a violent bank for reason unknown. Bombs were away at 1115 with results unobserved. At bombs away we were in Squadron Formation. Flak was intense but inaccurate.

2. Disposition of Bombs - Thirteen A/C were dispatched with the 95 "B" Squadron. Twelve A/C were over the target of opportunity dropping 120 X 500 AN-M64 and 24 X 500 M-17 bombs. A/C 6522 aborted (engine failure) and jettisioned 10 X 500 AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs in the channel on the order of the tower. Fuzing was 1/10 nose and 1/40 tail with M-17's to open at 5000 feet.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on the target of opportunity were dropped with a 80 feet interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary

	A/C	Over Target	Bombing				Fuzing	
				No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Main Bombfall								
Neuss, Germany		12	12	120	X 500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
				24	X 500	M-17	Open at 5000'	
Total on Target				120	X 500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
				24	X 500	M-17	Open at 5000'	
Bombs Returned				None				
Other Expenditures (Jettisioned)				10	X 500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
				2	X 500	M-17	pen at 5000'	
Total (loaded on A/C taking off)				130	X 500	AN-M64	1/10	1/40
				26	X 500	M-17	Open at 5000'	

ROBERT T. SPINNENWEBER
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Engineering Officer

V-A-2

APO 559.
24 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission 23 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Gp (H). Attn: Lt Col STUART.

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission 23 January 1945.

- a. Twenty-six (26) B-17 airplanes took-off.
- b. Twenty-four (24) B-17 airplanes returned to base after completion of mission.
- c. 43-39055 & 44-6522 returned to base as unused spares.

2. There were no abortive airplanes.

3. Battle damage is as follows:

- a. 44-8230 - Main spar in right wing damaged.
- b. 44-8269 - Bulkhead and stringers in vertical stabilizer damaged.
- c. 43-38774 - Minor sheet metal damage.
- d. 43-38067 - Minor sheet metal damage.

DONALD H. DOWLIN
Capt., Air Corps
Gp Engineering O

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Armament Officer
APO 559

23 January 1945

SUBJECT: Armament Malfunction Report for 23 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Following are the armament malfunctions reported for the mission of 23 January 1945.

- A/C No. 7047- A-2 release system. The doors were opened and closed over the channel. It is believed that the doors were not fully opened at the IP because the bombardier reported that he could neither release his bombs in train or salvo. The L-21A release handle would not go forward into the salvo position. The bomb bay doors and the release system checked out on the ground after the mission.
- A/C No. 8255- A-4 release system. The bomb load was released in train, prematurely at the IP. The intervalometer circuit and bombsight circuit were thoroughly checked with a volt ohm meter for a short or a feed-back. No malfunction was found.
Right hand gun solenoid cable in Upper Turret broken. Solenoid replaced.
- A/C No. 8217- PFF aircraft with A-4 release system. Bombardier had to throw the salvo switch twice to release the entire load.
- A/C No. 8990- A-4 release system. Bombardier dropped four bombs on the target and eight were released late. Bombardier reported that the intervalometer went to eight and stopped and the remainder of the load was toggled out over the channel. The intervalometer has been replaced although it ground checked on both high and low settings.
- A/C No. 9055- Ball Turret azimuth sight cable broken. Replaced.

LEONARD F. DAWSON
Capt. Air Corps
Group Armament Officer

. HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Armament Officer
APO 559

23 January 1945

SUBJECT: Mission Expenditure Report for 23 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Following are the armament expenditures for the mission of 23 Jan 1945.

A. Station	AAF 119
B. Unit	95th Bombardment Group (H)
C. Type of Ammunition	Cal. 50 API&I-TIET
D. Gun location and number of guns	

50 Ball Turret Guns	500
50 Upper Turret Guns	500
25 Left Waist Guns	250
25 Right Waist Guns	250
25 Left Nose Guns	250
25 Right Nose Guns	250
50 Chin Turret Guns	500
50 Tail Guns	500

E. Total number of guns.....	300
F. Total amount of ammunition expended.....	3000 rounds.
G. Total number of bombs expended.....	246- 500 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs.
	46- 500 lb. M17 Incendiary Bombs.
	3- CHB M1 Sky Markers.

LEONARD F. DAVSON
Capt. Air Corps
Group Armament Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Communications Officer

(JA-1)

AFO 559
23 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Communications

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, Station #119

1. All crews assigned to the mission were available for interrogation by the Communications Officer.
2. Mechanical and electrical failures noted were as follows:
 - (a) 336-H (Interphone/RW mike cord replaced)
 - (b) 334-H (Interphone/Nav. mike cord replaced)
 - (c) 334-C (VHF/replaced for shor check)
(Interphone/CP jack box faulty)
 - (d) 412-E (Interphone/Faulty BT headphones)
3. The following navigational aids were used successfully:
 - (a) Twenty-six A/C used Splashers and Bunchers
 - (b) Twenty-six A/C used Station 7000
4. The reception of ground stations and beacons was normal.

RICHARD E. MOX
Captain, A. C.
Cn. Communications O.

**HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Intelligence Officer**

25 January 1945

SUBJECT: S-3 Report for the mission to Neuss, Germany for the above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 889.

1. Twelve plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Group took off beginning 0730 hours to form the lead squadron of 18thB Combat Group to attack the M/Y at Neuss, Germany. Spare A/C 9055 returned early.

Twelve plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Group took off beginning 0733 hours to form the low squadron of the 18thB Combat Group to attack the M/Y at Neuss, Germany. Spare A/C 8822 returned early.

2. No E/A were encountered.

3. Flak was encountered at Dusseldorf, being inaccurate, barrage and tracking, moderate to intense.

4. 95A squadron bombed primary by MicroEH with visual assist and 95B squadron used HEX on a T.O. with visual assist. Bombing results cannot be assessed from available photos because A/C banked away from target. 95A MicroEH operator had to oscillate the scope to pick up the beacons alternately, not being able to get simultaneous registration before the IP. On the bomb run both beacons registered and for the last 30 seconds bombardier was able to make a visual sighting. Bombardier was making a slight course correction at bombs away but thought bombing good, though results unobserved because of clouds. 95B was making a HEX run when in the last 20 seconds the area opened up, and not being able to synchronize on the primary, bombardier chose a T.O. the RR bridge across the Rhine River at Neuss (082655/5, and thought bombing fair to good, though results unobserved because of cloud. Bombs from A/C 255 fell at the IP, when bombay doors were opened, early release being due to faulty equipment.

5. Fighter escort was good. Assembly was made at 25,000 feet due to cloud. Briefed course was followed to the target. R.P. was out short by both squadrons. Formation was a bit south of course at C.P. #3 and a bit north of course crossing east coming out. 95B was out out by another squadron at IP and were two minutes behind 95A. The lead A/C of 95B AFCE veered A/C to left and tumbled gyro seconds before bombs away. 95B made an HEX run with visual assist when mickey operator was unable to pick up beacons.

For the Intelligence Officer:

**WILLIAM ROWELL,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Ass't. S-3 Officer.**

COMMANDING GENERAL
 15TH COMBAT WING
 CO. 100TH BOMB GP.
 CO. 390TH BOMB GP.

JH62-D

XXXX

NO. 95TH BOMB GP. (H)

XXXX

23-1-45 16:15 S-2

OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE FOR TEE (95TH BOMB GP) NEUSS, GERMANY 23 JANUARY 1945

1. LEAFLETS: NONE

2. BOMBING RESULTS: 95A squadron bombed Primary by Micro-H with visual assist and 95B Squadron used H2X on AT.O with visual assist. Bombing results cannot be assessed from available photos because A/C banked away from target. 95A Micro-H operator had to oscillate the scope to pick up the beacons alternately, not being able to get simultaneous registration before the IP. On the bomb run both beacons registered and for the last 30 seconds bombardier was able to make a visual sighting. Bombardier was making a slight course correction at bombs away but thought bombing good, though results unobserved because of clouds. 95B was making an H2X run when in the last 20 seconds the area opened up, and not being able to synchronize on the primary, bombardier chose a T.O. the RR bridge across the Rhine River at Neuss (082065/5), and thought bombing fair to good, though results unobserved because of cloud.

3. E/A: None seen.

4. FLAK: Dusseldorf - inaccurate, barrage and tracking, moderate to intense. 88's firing barrages, 105's tracking.

5. WEATHER: 9/10ths cloud in target area.

6. OBSERVATIONS:

- 1115 Neuss B-17 from Gp ahead spiraled down and wing seemed to break off.
- 1115 Neuss B-17 from Gp behind went into a dive and then levelled off.
Believe one man bailed out.
- 1134 Eindhoven - Goods wagons in M/Y
- 1142 5130N-0510E V-2 contrail going almost straight up from Rotterdam.

7. OTHER INFORMATION: Fighter escort good assembly made at 25,000 feet due to cloud. Briefed course followed to the target. R.P out short by both squadrons. Formation a bit south of course at C.P. #3 and a bit north of course crossing coast coming out. 95B was cut out by another squadron at IP and were two minutes behind 95A. The lead A/C of 95B AFCE veered A/C to left and tumbled gyro seconds before bombs away. 95B made an H2X run with visual assist when mickey operator was unable to pick up beacons.

8. PFF:

- A. Borch 95A #230 Micro-H Both beacons 72 miles from target.
Baldie 95B #217 Target identified 40 miles, good returns.
- B. 95B unable to failure to pick up beacons. Set out complet base was blown.

3BD INST 45-2 (9 OCT 44)

OPERATIONAL REPORT - STATISTICAL SECTION

	95A	95B
1. GROUP		
2. A/C AIRBORNE	13	13
3. SORTIES	12	12
4. A/C ATTACKING	10	12
5. A/A FAILING TO ATTACK	32	1
a. Mechanical	282	*
b. Weather		
c. Enemy action		
d. Other		
6. A/C LOST	0	0
a. TO AA		
b. TO E/A		
c. TO AA AND E/A		
d. TO Accident		
e. By Reasons Unknown		
7. TIME OF ATTACK	1114	1115
8. ALTITUDE OF ATTACK	28,000	26,700
9. BOMBS DROPPED (PRIMARY)		
a. Number	91 1514	
b. Size	500 500	
c. Type	GP M17	
d. Number A/C Bombing	10	
BOMBS DROPPED (OTHER)		
a. Number		70-Neutral Secondary 17018 1224
b. Size		500 500
c. Type		GP M-17
d. Number A/C Bombing		12
BOMBS DROPPED (OTHER)		
a. Number		
b. Size		
c. Type		
d. Number A/C Bombing		
10. BATTLE DAMAGE	5	3
a. Minor	5	3
b. Major		
c. Salvage		
12. Claims	6-6-0	6-6-0

Left: 65119-6538-10x500 2x500
 (5158) 6x500 2x500
 (-6220)
 Chandel-10x500 2x500

Left: { 10x500 - 5115-0239
 { 2x500

~~10x500~~

Tot. 93-1
 10-2
 10-2
 10-2
 7-3
 total 130-24

Ret: 111500
 Abort JWH
 SN-8 JWH 3x500
 SORTIE JWH
 Hung up

Pruned
 13 14 Wg.
 Capt. JWH
 1535

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 268

PERIOD: 0001 hours 23 January to 2400 hours 23 January 1945.

A. STATISTICS

	Disp.	Sorties	Atkg.	Tonnage	Claims	Losses			Totals	NYR
						E/A	AA	OT		
Heavy Bomber Atks.	209	200	181	499.2	0-0-0	0	1	4	5	0
Fighter Escort	79	74	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Sweeps (a)	75	68	0	0	1-0-0A	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	5	4	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	1	1	0
Weather Recon.	26	25	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	6	6	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	16	16	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	416	393	181	499.2	1-0-0A	0	1	5	6	0

(u) 352 Gp. based on Continent. 361 Gp. did not operate.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

209 a/c from two Air Divisions dispatched in two forces against Neuss M/Y. 181 a/c dropped 417.7 tons GP and 81.5 tons IB on assigned target and on a bridge near the M/Y. Bombing both visual and on PFF. E/a opposition: one i e/a attacked a straggling B-17 near Krefeld. Battle damage: 86 minor, 9 major, 2 Cat. "E". Claims: nil. Losses: 5 B-17s (1 to AA, 4 to unknown causes).

First Force

Four group formations (110 B-17s, 3rd Air Division) dispatched against Neuss M/Y. 93 a/c dropped 207.2 tons GP and 40 tons IB on assigned primary and on a bridge near M/Y at 1107-1115 hours from 26,500-27,200 feet. Primary bombed on Micro-H, H2X and visually. Leaflets dropped on Neuss. Weather: 2/10 - 7/10 with high clouds and heavy ground haze in target area. Flak: moderate to intense, accurate. Battle damage: 53 minor, 1 major. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 B-17s to unknown causes. (6 B-17s dropped chaff in advance of attacking force.)

SECRET

S E C R E T

Fighter Support: One group (38 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0941 hours, down 1251 hours. 36 sorties. Mission uneventful. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I.B.</u>	
Neuss M/Y	110	81	177.2	34.0	Good
<u>Other Target</u>					
Neuss Bridge	—	<u>12</u>	<u>30.0</u>	<u>6.0</u>	Unobserved
Totals	110	93	207.2	40.0	

Second Force

Four group formations (99 B-17s, 1st Air Division) dispatched against Neuss M/Y. 88 a/c dropped 210.5 tons GP and 41.5 tons IB on assigned target at 1107-1143 hours from 23,000 - 27,400 feet. Target bombed on Gee-H, H2X and visually. Leaflets dropped on Neuss. Weather: CAVU to 10/10 with high tops, but cloud well broken. Ground haze in target area. Flak: meager to intense, accurate. Battle damage: 33 minor, 8 major, 2 Cat. "E" (one on take-off and one on landing). E/a opposition: one straggling B-17 was attacked by a single u/i e/a near Krefeld at 1144 hours. E/a made one pass, circled twice and left. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 B-17s (one to AA, 2 to unknown causes).

Fighter Support: One group (41 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0937 hours, down 1243 hours. 38 sorties. Escort uneventful. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. (1 P-51 Cat. "E" at base).

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Target</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I.B.</u>	
Neuss M/Y	99	88	210.5	41.5	Unknown

2. Fighter Escort

Two groups (79 P-51s) dispatched to support two heavy bomber forces. Up 0931-0937 hours, down 1243-1251 hours. 74 sorties. Escort uneventful. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. (1 P-51 Cat. "E").

3. Fighter Sweeps

352 Group based on Continent flew four missions. 75 P-51s dispatched on area patrol east of Rhine and over break-through area. 68 sorties. E/a opposition: 2 Me-109s engaged about ten miles SE of Neuss. Claims: 1-0-0. Losses: nil.

S E C R E T

SECRET

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

5 Mosquitoes dispatched as follows:

2 flew Mickey missions over western Germany.

3 dispatched for night photos in Holland, one of which aborted due to mechanical failure and crashed on landing. This a/c a total loss. Other a/c returned safely.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

26 a/c (17 P-51s, 5 B-17s, 4 Mosquitoes) dispatched as follows:

3 B-17s completed routine weather flights over sea NW of Lands End.

1 B-17 completed routine flight from the Azores.

1 B-17 completed routine flight to the Azores.

4 Mosquitoes completed special weather reconnaissance over France, Belgium and Germany.

17 P-51s dispatched as weather scouts for bomber forces, 16 completing missions.

No losses.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

6 P-47s flew three missions on routine search and patrol. No losses.

8. Special Operations

16 a/c dispatched as follows:

Night - 22/23 January

9 a/c (8 B-24s, 1 B-17) dropped leaflets on Luxembourg, Holland, Germany and France.

1 B-24 on special operation.

No losses.

Day - 23 January

5 B-24s dispatched on VHF ROM mission, jamming from 0705-1000 hours, 1 Mosquito dropped chaff in support of 1st Air Division.

No losses.

SECRET

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

An attack by a lone u/i e/a on a single B-17 was the only e/a opposition met on this mission. Weather conditions over enemy bases were reported as being good. It now appears probable that shallow heavy bomber attacks will not be opposed by the Luftwaffe while their tactical air units are being rebuilt to strength following their heavy losses of the past thirty days.

2. Flak

Neuss - moderate to intense, accurate tracking and barrage on 3rd Division forces. Meager to intense, accurate on 1st Division force.

3. Observations

Nil.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Neuss M/Y - Good Results.

Many bursts and fresh craters in M/Y and on northern portion of town of Neuss. Intense cloud - haze makes interpretation of these strikes difficult due to fact that 1st and 3rd Divisions bombed simultaneously, identity of the pattern and bursts cannot be determined. However, a concentration of bursts is seen in southern one third of M/Y and scattered bursts in built-up area of town and nearby fields. About 50% of 1st Division a/c were diverted and a complete interpretation of bombing by that Division cannot be made until those a/c return to base.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.