

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3163

ATTACK ON PFORZHEIM MARSHALLING YARD ON 21 JAN 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 45, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8th AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1153 - 1239A hrs.
- (d) Bombs : 60 x 1000 lb. G.P.
439 x 500 lb. G.P.
70 x 500 lb. I.B.

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK

- (a) A concentration of approximately 100 H.E. bursts is seen across the center of the marshalling yard, and extending into the business/residential area immediately North and South of the yard.
- (b) Bursts are seen on the marshalling yard and its facilities as follows:
(Numbers used refer to annotations on target Illustration).
 - (5) Passenger Station - at least 8 hits on rail lines in this area. Storage building (East of 7) - 1 possibly 2 hits on Eastern end of building (seen burning).
 - (7) Road over Rail Bridge - 1 possible hit, several near hits - 1 hit on Northern approach to bridge. At least 20 hits on rail lines in this area.
- (c) Other bursts
 - (1) At least 20 hits are seen on business/residential buildings just North and South of the central section of the yard (5), with a small fire visible in the North area.
 - (2) Approximately 35 bursts are seen in the built-up area to the North and South of the river ENZ, 700 yards Southeast of (5), with several hits on business/residential buildings.

(iii) ACTIVITY

- (a) PFORZHEIM MARSHALLING YARD.
 - (1) The loading is light in all sidings.
- (b) HUCHENFELD LANDING GROUND
 - (1) The landing ground is fully covered on a single, small scale photograph.
 - (2) No aircraft are visible.
 - (3) The snow covered landing ground appears serviceable.

(iv) ANNOTATED PRINT: (SAV 305/1046-8)

Shows concentration of bursts extending across central part of the marshalling yard.

(v) ODMB PLOT: None prepared.

(vi) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED.

SAV 92/787,788	21 JAN 1945	1153A hrs.	1/39,900	(F.L.7")	23,250'	'A-B'
SAV 95/369	"	1239A "	1/46,200	(F.L.7")	27,000'	'A'
SAV 305/1046	"	1221A "	1/22,800	(F.L.12")	22,800'	'A'

22 JAN 1945

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3162ATTACK ON TARGETS IN MANNHEIM ON 21 JAN 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK

(a) No. of aircraft : 295, with full fighter escort.
 (b) Command : U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE.
 (c) Time : 1158 - 1218A hours.
 (d) Bombs : 429 X 1000 lb. G.P.
 1647 X 500 lb. G.P.
 788 X 500 lb. I.B.

(ii) STATEMENT ON THE ATTACK

The targets of this attack were the Marshalling Yard, a Tank Factory and Railroad Bridge located at MANNHEIM.

(iii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK

Bombs away are seen but no bursts are visible on 10/10 cloud obscured photographs.

(iv) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(v) BOMB PLOT : None prepared.

(vi) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED

SAV 95/1368	21 JAN 1945.	1217A	hrs.	1/45,400	(F.L. 7")	26,500'	'C'
" 96/783,85,86	"	1200A	"	"	"	"	"
" 96/784	"	"	"	1/26,600	(F.L.12")	26,600'	"
" 100/1169-94	"	1218A	"	1/46,200	(F.L.7")	27,000'	"
" 385/1013	"	1211A	"	1/45,400	"	26,600'	"
" 338/851	"	1158A	"	1/47,000	"	27,500'	"
" 390/1264,66,69	"	1218A	"	1/48,400	"	28,300'	"
" 447/918-919	"	1212A	"	1/44,500	"	25,900'	"
" 486/772,774	"	1214A	"	1/42,800	"	25,000'	"
" 487/702,704	"	1214A	"	"	"	"	"
" 490/587,88	"	1202A	"	1/47,500	"	27,300'	"

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HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 21 January 1945
13 CBW FO 21
13 CBW OPS 264
3 AD FO 558

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (PFORZHEIM, GERMANY)

TO : CO, 953G, APO 559

1. Information Concerning the Target:

a. The primary target (visual) for today was the Junkers & Co. GMBH located in the western outskirts of Dessau, Germany, about 32 miles SE of MAGDEBURG, GERMANY.

b. The secondary target for today was the same as the primary. H2X technique was to be used in the event of the target being overcast.

c. The last resort target (visual or H2X) for today was the Railway Traffic Center of PFORZHEIM, GERMANY, lying on the northern outskirts of the Black Forest.

2. Narrative of the Attack:

a. 13 A Group - 100A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 100 Group made a normal take off and climbed to assembly altitude. Due to weather at 14000 feet the Squadrons assembled at 16000 feet instead. While the Group was forming the Group Leader was notified by VHF that the Division Leader was assembling at 22000 feet so in order to make proper Division assembly the Leader decided to climb to 22000 feet. An error in timing for leaving the Buncher at an altitude other than briefed was made during the mission planning and as a result the Group departed Buncher 28 four minutes early. The Group lost several minutes enroute to Splasher 6, but gained several minutes enroute to Buncher 22 arriving there 3 minutes early. Shortly after leaving Splasher 7 the 390 Group cut thru the 100 Group formation thus causing the Group to break up into Squadrons, and since they had entered the high cirrus layer at this time the High and Low Squadrons were not able to rejoin the Lead, therefore flew on separately in Squadron formation climbing to get out of the overcast and locate the Group leader. The Lead Squadron crossed the English Coast at 1009 about 6 minutes early. The High departed, somewhat higher in altitude, at 1009 also but was unable to see the leader due to clouds. The Low Squadron departed from the Coast at 1012.

(b) Route:

The route was as briefed across the Channel, however, due to the nature of the route the High and Low Squadrons were unable to cut corners and catch up with the Lead Squadron. The Squadrons broke out of the overcast at 0300E at 25000 feet. The Leader called via VHF and stated he would "S" to the left so that the High and Low Squadrons could catch up, however, the High who was attached to an unidentified Group was not able to see the leader's maneuver due to contrails, so remained with this Group to the target area. The Low Squadron also fell in formation with an unidentified Group and followed them along the route to the target.

The Lead Squadron followed the briefed route within several miles to the Pre-IP. While approaching the IP the Lead Squadron had some interference with another Group to the right and was forced to "S" to the right thus avoiding a collision course with them. This caused them to turn about 2 miles right of the IP. Due to poor Micro-H beacons reception the M/O elected to bomb by H2X. Course was set up by the M/O and gave the bombardier checks on the bomb run.

The High Squadron who followed an unidentified Group was able to close up on the Lead Squadron when several corners were cut along the route to the IP. The IP was made good by the Squadron. The M/O set up the course into the target and gave bombardier his check point data, bombing by H2X. The High Squadron cut very short of the RP and was able to join the A Squadron just as they turned off of the RP and followed them back to base.

The Low Squadron tacked on to a Group led by a 385th Squadron and proceeded to follow them to the IP which was made good. The M/O set up the bombardier for an H2X run. After bombs away the Low Squadron left the 385th Squadron's formation and tacked on to another Group which could not be identified and followed them on the route out to about 0400E at which time they joined a Group from the 1st Division and followed them back to base.

The Lead Squadron paralleled the briefed course out, letting down to approximately 15000 feet over the Continent and began to let down to minimum altitude over the Channel where the clouds broke up and offered holes to descend thru.

(c) Weather:

High cirrus and dense persistent contrails were encountered up to 25000 feet over England. The weather improved over the Continent where there was an undercast from 8/10 to 10/10. Great difficulty was experienced over Channel with weather causing Squadrons to become separated from one another.

(d) Difficulties:

Weather was main difficulty. Shifting assembly altitudes made it difficult for navigators to adhere to flight plan. Interference by the 390 Group made it difficult to maintain Group integrity before leaving the English Coast.

(e) Remarks:

Despite weather conditions encountered on flight navigation was good. M/O's gave invaluable assistance to the Lead Navigators throughout the mission.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. All three aircraft were instructed to use MH technique. 100C leader could not receive English beacons, so switched to ASG on the route in in order to keep a check on navigation. 100B did not receive beacons at all. 100A Squadron had poor beacon reception. Due to the difficulty with beacon reception,

the decision was made to bomb by H2X technique. The H2X secondary target was identified in the scope at a range of 35 miles, and bombing was by Squadrons with results unobserved.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 100A Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader	Maj. Wallace	Nav	Lt. Larson
	Pilot	Capt. Spurgeon	Asst Nav	Lt. Passen
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Maddox
			Bomb	Capt. Searle

<u>2.</u>	A/C Attacking:		Bombs Dropped
<u>a.</u>	Secondary	10	57 x 1000 LB GP
	Jettisoning	2	9 x 1000 LB GP
	Returning	1	6 x 1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 28000'

c. Time of Release: 1212

3. Run In from IP to Target:

After overshooting the IP, and the heading to the target was taken up, the M/O picked up the target, and set up course. The bombardier was slouched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 10, 9, 7 and 5 miles. All checks were accurate and no corrections were necessary. Though 14 degrees of right drift was reported, synchronization was believed to have been good when bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 340 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photographs taken show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 972: Three bombs fell out when doors were opened.
 A/C 230: Aborted - 6 bombs jettisoned in Channel.
 A/C 680: Aborted - 6 bombs returned.
 A/C 811: Bomb bay doors were cranked open.
 A/C 616: Had to salvo twice to release bombs.

(b) 100B Squadron:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader	Capt. Ferbrande	Nav	Lt. Chappell
	Pilot	Capt. Ernst	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Stropp
			Bomb	Capt. Lockhart

<u>2.</u>	A/C Attacking:		Bombs Dropped
<u>a.</u>	Secondary	10	60 x 1000 LB GP
	Returning	3	18 x 1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 28500'

c. Time of Release: 1213

3. Run In from IP to Target:

After a good turn at the IP, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier was able to pin point himself along course to the target through 3/10 clouds until approximately 11 miles from the target. After setting up rate visually, the bombardier

clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 10, 9, 7 and 5 miles. All checks were accurate and no rate corrections were necessary when bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 347 degrees. 3½ degrees of drift was reported on the bomb run. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photographs taken show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 613, 975, 500: Aborted and returned all bombs.

(c) 100C Squadron:

<u>1.</u> Air Leader	Capt. Albrecht	Nav	Lt. Krepisman
Pilot	Capt. Brown	Asst Nav	
Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Lentz
		Bomb	Lt. Pitley

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u> Secondary	11	66 x 1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	1	6 x 1000 LB GP
Returning	1	6 x 1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 27500'

c. Time of Release: 1214

3. Run In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 349 degrees, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 10, 9, 7 and 5 miles. The 10 and 9 mile checks were fast and two slight corrections were made. The 7 mile check was good, but the 5 mile check was off. The bombardier, however, decided to let the rate ride out. Six degrees of right drift was reported on the bomb run. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photographs taken show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 811: Aborted - 6 bombs jettisoned in Channel.
A/C 610: Aborted - 6 bombs returned.

b. 13 B Group - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The Group had difficulty assembling in formation over the field Buncher. As a result Buncher 11 was departed 4 minutes late, and the route to the first point of Wing assembly was cut short to make up the time. Due to persistent clouds, the assembly altitude was raised to 22000 feet by the Air Leader. The Group was on time at Splasher 6 and fell behind what was believed to be "Able" leader, but this Group was soon lost in contrails and clouds. The remainder of the assembly was made alone by Baker Group. In order to make up time a course was flown south of the last assembly leg into CP 1. Another formation interfered with the Baker Group before the coast out point was reached separating the Low Squadron from the Group. As a result, CP 1 was reached 4½ minutes late.

"Able" leader could not be seen and was not contacted either visually or by VHF for the remainder of the operation.

(b) Route:

CP 2 at the Continental Coast was made on time. A 452nd Squadron had joined the Group over the channel while C Squadron trailed behind and finally caught up in the vicinity of the Pre-IP. Beacon reception in all three Squadrons was excellent until the area of the Pre-IP was reached; there the course beacon faded out and the decision was made to bomb the secondary by H2X technique in Group formation. The IP was overshoot purposely a few miles to the east. The 452nd Squadron took off on a separate bomb course of its own leaving the Group intact including a number of stray aircraft in the formation. B Squadron leader aborted before the IP due to engine trouble, but the abortion was made early enough to allow the Squadron to keep its position in the Group without difficulty.

The route out of the Continent was made essentially as briefed. There was a steady descent of from 200 to 300 feet in order to avoid the cloud conditions and contrails at altitude. The Group followed the bomber stream. In the Calais area the Gee equipment of A Squadron was jammed and the navigator was temporarily lost. There was much concern over this by the navigator who could have allayed his fears by merely asking for a Mickey fix. The Mickey equipment was working satisfactorily, but the operator was not notified of the navigator's "plight" until the formation was over the channel. The Group landed without incident.

(c) Weather: Same as 13 A Group.

(d) Navigational Difficulties:

Clouds and contrails at flight altitude made assembly difficult.

(e) Remarks:

Gee equipment was jammed in the Calais area on the route out of the Continent.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. All three aircraft were instructed to employ MH technique. Beacon reception was strong in all Squadrons on the route in. 390C Squadron radar equipment failed completely before the Pre-IP; 390B Squadron was unable to receive either beacon in the vicinity of the IP; 390A lost the course beacon before the Pre-IP. The decision was then made to bomb the secondary by H2X. This was accomplished in Group formation. The results were unobserved.

(2) Bombing:

(a) 390 Group - A, B, C Squadrons:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader	Nav	
	Pilot	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Shelton
		Bomb	Lt. Wosczyk
<u>2.</u>	A/C Attacking:		Bombs Dropped
<u>a.</u>	Secondary	30	184 x 1000 LB GP
	Jettisoning	4	20 x 1000 LB GP
	Returning	3	12 x 1000 LB GP
			10 Leaflet Containers

b. Bombing Altitude: 27000'

c. Time of Release: 1218

3. Run In from IP to Target:

After the maneuver at the IP, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 10, 9, 7 and 5 miles. All checks were accurate and no corrections were necessary. When bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 341 degrees, synchronization appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report: Photographs taken show 10/10 undercast.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A Squadron:

A/Cs 375, 470: Jettisoned 12 bombs - reason not reported.

A/C 007: Aborted - 6 bombs returned.

B Squadron:

A/C 807: Rack malfunction - 2 bombs jettisoned at 4840N-0820E.

A/C 600: Rack malfunction - 6 bombs jettisoned at 4830N-0813E.

C Squadron:

A/C 643: Aborted - 10 Leaflet Containers returned.

A/C 121: Aborted - 6 bombs returned.

c. 13 C Group - 95A, B Squadrons:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

A normal take off was made to assembly altitude. The assembly altitude was raised to 16000 feet and a climb was made thru scattered middle clouds. The Group continued to climb to 23000 feet upon advice from the Division leader. Because of this additional climb there were a number of abortions and 452A Squadron which was to fly Low Squadron in 13C Group did not assemble with the Group. The Wing assembly was made good but the Division assembly point was out short and contact with 13A was lost.

(b) Route:

The route to the target was flown as briefed. The Group was one minute early leaving the English Coast and 4 minutes late at CP 1 due to a wind shift from the briefed winds. The M/O took over at the Pre-IP and a MH run was made on the primary target in Squadron formation.

The RP was made good by 95A and the return route was flown as briefed to the Continental Coast. The 95B Squadron was forced out to the right on the bomb run and overshot the target to 4940N-0845E. A 180 degree turn was made and a visual run was made on the last resort target. The route to the Continental Coast was flown as briefed in

(b) 95B Squadron:

<u>1.</u> Air Leader Maj. Swinney	Nav	Lt. Pieper
Pilot Lt. Savage	Asst Nav	
Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Feeley
	Bomb	Lt. Seferian

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u> Last Resort	8	48 x 1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	3	18 x 1000 LB GP
Returning	2	12 x 1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 25000'c. Time of Release: 12393. Run In from IP to Target:

While on the bomb run to the primary target the Squadron was forced to abandon the run when the 390 Group flew through them. The Squadron proceeded on to the last resort target, and when approximately 4 minutes from the BRL the lead A/C aborted. The deputy lead A/C took over the lead. The bombardier experienced some difficulty picking up an aiming point, due to smoke from the previous Groups' bombs. When bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 251 degrees, rate was good but synchronization for deflection was poor. A PDI run was made because there was insufficient time to set up AFCE.

4. PI Report:

a. The bombs from this Squadron fell 2300' left of the AP, which was the center of the M/Y. With the exception of about 16, which fell in fields, all of the bombs dropped in a fully built up residential area.

b. Bomb Pattern: 1620'L x 1620'W.

c. Bombing Errors: Range : 230' 0
Deflection: 2315' L
Radial : 2450'

d. Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the AP: 0% & 20%.

e. Bombing Results: Nil. There was no damage whatsoever to the M/Y.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 961, 255, 567: Aborted and returned 18 bombs.
A/C 640, 376: Aborted and jettisoned 12 bombs
at 4840N-0816E and 4904N-0848E.

3. Planning and Execution of the Mission:a. Group Order and Strength:

(1) 45 A, B Groups:	6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a) 388 Group	3 Squadrons
(b) 96 Group	3 Squadrons
452 Group	1 Squadron to 13th Wing C Group
(2) 93 A, B Groups:	6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a) 493 Group	3 Squadrons
(b) 490 Group	3 Squadrons

- (3) 4 A, B, C Groups: 9 x 13 A/C Squadrons
 - (a) 447 Group 3 Squadrons
 - (b) 486 Group 3 Squadrons
 - (c) 385 Group 3 Squadrons
- (4) 13 A, B, C Groups: 5 x 13 A/C Squadrons
4 x 12 A/C Squadrons
 - (a) 100 Group 2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
1 x 12 A/C Squadron
 - (b) 390 Group 1 x 13 A/C Squadron
2 x 12 A/C Squadrons
 - (c) 95 Group 1 x 13 A/C Squadron
1 x 12 A/C Squadron
452 Group 1 x 13 A/C Squadron

b. A/C and C/C Available:

- | | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|-----|
| (1) 95 Group | ME | A/C | C/C |
| | PFF | A/C | C/C |
| | MH | A/C | C/C |
| (2) 100 Group | ME | A/C | C/C |
| | PFF | A/C | C/C |
| | MH | A/C | C/C |
| (3) 390 Group | ME | A/C | C/C |
| | PFF | A/C | C/C |
| | MH | A/C | C/C |

c. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

- | | |
|---------------|---------------|
| (1) 95 Group | 23 Plus 2 PFF |
| 452 Group | 12 Plus 1 PFF |
| (2) 100 Group | 35 Plus 3 PFF |
| (3) 390 Group | 34 Plus 3 PFF |

d. A/C Airborne:

- | | |
|---------------|----------------------------|
| (1) 95 Group | All Scheduled A/C Airborne |
| 452 Group | All Scheduled A/C Airborne |
| (2) 100 Group | All Scheduled A/C Airborne |
| (3) 390 Group | All Scheduled A/C Airborne |

e. A/C Abortive:

- (1) 95 Group:
 - A/C 8333: 336 Sqdn "S" - Gas leak - No sortie. Pilot Lt. Dunwoody.
 - A/C 8067: 412 Sqdn "E" - Navigator sick - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Ristine.
 - A/C 8774: 412 Sqdn "B" - Oxygen system out - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Sutkowski.
 - A/C 996: 334 Sqdn "T" - #2 engine out - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Hart.
 - A/C 255: 335 Sqdn "A" - Crew member airsick - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Richardson.
 - A/C 657: 334 Sqdn "V" - Could not locate formation - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Adderson.
 - A/C 640: 334 Sqdn "O" - Oxygen out - Sortie - Pilot Lt. Mozley - Jettisoned bombs at IP.
- (2) 100 Group:
 - A/C 230: 418 Sqdn "O" - Runaway prop - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Mashyna.

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A/C 680: 418 Sqdn "X" - #2 engine out - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Appleton.
A/C 613: 350 Sqdn "T" - #2 turbo and Ball Turret inoperative No sortie - Pilot Lt. Champion.
A/C 500: 350 Sqdn "U" - Could not locate formation - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Hanson.
A/C 975: 350 Sqdn "C" - Could not locate formation - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Wilson.
A/C 610: 351 Sqdn "T" - #1 prop ramaway - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Woodford.
A/C 811: 349 Sqdn "X" - #1 & #4 engines running rough - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Wood.

(3) 390 Group:

A/C 007: 571 Sqdn "M" - #2 engine out - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Hess.
A/C 470: 570 Sqdn "H" - A/S Indicator out - Oxygen leak - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Deitees.
A/C 375: 571 Sqdn "S" - Oil leak in #2 engine - #3 engine running rough - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Wilson.
A/C 121: 569 Sqdn "N" - #2 turbo out - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Gaik.
A/C 643: 569 Sqdn "K" - Electronic turbos out - No sortie - Pilot Lt. David.

f. A/C Outstanding:

(1) 95 Group:

A/C 961: 336 Sqdn "K" - Pilot Major Swinney.

(2) 390 Group:

A/C 176: 568 Sqdn "C" - Pilot Lt. Spragins.

g. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW A Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Secondary	31	183 x 1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	3	15 x 1000 LB GP
Returning	5	30 x 1000 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: PFF

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

h. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW B Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Secondary	30	184 x 1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	4	20 x 1000 LB GP
Returning	3	12 x 1000 LB GP
		10 Leaflet Containers

(2) Method of Bombing: PFF

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

i. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW C Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary	7	41 x 1000 LB GP
Last Resort	8	48 x 1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	4	21 x 1000 LB GP
Returning	7	30 x 1000 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Visual also Micro-H

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

4. Communications:

a. Major Wallace led the 13th Wing. VHF SOP was followed. Communications were good; excess conversation on channel A was the only unsatisfactory situation as communications within the Wing were satisfactory, other Wing leaders, Arrowswift, and Kodak were contacted with excellent results and all Groups contacted the assigned fighters. In the flash report, the Wing leader reported that the need for communication among Air Leaders was imperative because the formations were scattered and several aircraft within the formations occupied the channel for considerable time with conversation concerning the condition of their individual aircraft asking for advice from the leaders. This is unnecessary as the individual airplane commander has to make his own decisions concerning his aircraft and the Air Leader cannot help him.

b. Control Points and Strike Reports:

	CP 1	CP 2	TGT	CP 3	Base
Timings	1025	1132	1216	1321	1533
ATA	1026	1125	1211	1317	1530
13A (100)	S B 5	1210			
13B (390)	S B 5	1215			
13C (95)	S B 5	1217			

5. Mission Camera Report:

a. The 95 Group installed 2 scope and 6 vertical cameras, 1 and 3 of which took pictures:

PFF A/C 7961, 95B: A/C landed on the Continent. It is not known whether any scope or SAV pictures were taken.

A/C 8774, 95A: Aborted.

A/C 8676, 95A: The bomb to which the camera switch was attached was not dropped.

b. The 100 Group installed 1 15mm motion picture and 9 vertical cameras, 1 and 6 of which took pictures:

3 A/C with 2 K-21 and 1 K-22 cameras installed: The camera doors were closed by crew members.

c. The 390 Group installed 2 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 0 and 8 of which took pictures:

PFF A/C 481 and 447: The Mickey sets were inoperative, and no pictures were taken.

A/C 064, 390C: Stick broke in the camera switch, no pictures were taken.

6. Controller's Log:

a. 1810 from 3 AD:

- (1) Alert.
- (2) Primary targets - unassigned.
- (3) Zero hour.
- (4) RBA.
- (5) Tentative routes for all targets.
- (6) Total force for 3 AD.

b. 1825 to Groups:

- (1) Alert.
- (2) Zero hour.
- (3) RBA.

c. 1915 from 3 AD:

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- (1) Force required. Order of Groups.
- (2) 1st Division targets.
- (3) Control times.
- (4) Division assembly line.
- (5) Approaches to Division Assembly line.
- (6) Approximate Division assembly altitude.
- (7) Probable Chaff force.
- (8) Probable Division Leader.

d. 1935 to Groups:

- (1) 3rd and 1st Division Targets.

e. 1944 to Groups:

- (1) Force Required.
- (2) Order of Squadrons and Groups.
- (3) Fuel Load.
- (4) Probable Chaff Force.

f. 1948 from 45 Wing:

- (1) Identify Group furnishing Squadron for 13C.

g. 2008 from 452 Group:

- (1) Identity of Squadron flying Low with 13C.

h. 2110 from 3 AD:

- (1) Target Assignments.
- (2) Change in Wing Order.
- (3) Secondary Targets.

i. 2130 from 3 AD:

- (1) Designations of Primaries and Secondaries.

j. 2120 from 3 AD:

- (1) Intelligence Annex to 3 AD FO 558.

k. 2140 to Groups:

- (1) Primary and Secondary Targets.

l. 2210 to Groups:

- (1) 13 CBW Advance Warning to FO 20.

m. 2255 to Groups:

- (1) Change in Secondary Photo.

n. 2315 from 3 AD:

- (1) 3 AD FO 558.

o. 2317 from 3 AD:

- (1) Change of Plan.

p. 2320 to Groups:

- (1) Change of Plan.

- q. 2327 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 558.
- r. 2330 to Groups:
 - (1) Scrub Present Targets.
- s. 2342 from 3 AD:
 - (1) New Targets. Primary and Secondary.
 - (2) New Routes.
 - (3) New Time Controls.
 - (4) New Zero Hour.
 - (5) Same RBA.
 - (6) Division Assembly.
 - (7) Assembly Altitude.
 - (8) Approaches to Division Assembly Line.
 - (9) Wing Order and Force.
 - (10) Bomb Load and Interval.
 - (11) Division Order.
- t. 2355 to Groups:
 - (1) New Zero Hour.
 - (2) RBA.
 - (3) Group Order and Force.
 - (4) Bomb Load and Interval.
- u. 0017 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Secondary MPIs.
 - (2) Last Resort MPIs.
 - (3) New Division Assembly.
 - (4) New Approaches.
 - (5) Time Control.
 - (6) Bombing Altitude.
 - (7) Leaflet Load.
- v. 0025 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Route.
 - (2) Assembly Altitude.
 - (3) Chaff Force.
- w. 0030 to Groups:
 - (1) Final Primary, Secondary, Last Resort Targets.
- x. 0056 to 390 Group:
 - (1) Leaflet Load.
- y. 0110 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Bombing Unit.
- z. 0120 from 3 AD:
 - (1) FO 559 received.
- aa. 0125 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Minimum Bombing Altitude.
 - (2) Second Run Info.

- bb. 0139 to Groups:
 - (1) Route on 13 CBW FO confirmed.
- cc. 0150 to Groups:
 - (1) Flak Defenses.
- dd. 0230 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Final Timings.
- ee. 0225 to Groups:
 - (1) 13 CBW FO 21.
- ff. 0232 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 559.
- gg. 0237 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Annex 1 to Intelligence Annex to 3 AD FO 559.
- hh. 0250 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Annex 2 to 3 AD FO 559.
- ii. 0300 to 45 Wing:
 - (1) Assembly Timings.
 - (2) Change in Assembly Line.
- jj. 0305 to Groups:
 - (1) Change in Assembly Line.
- kk. 0334 from 3 AD:
 - (1) ME Info for 3 AD FO 559.
- ll. 0411 from 4 Wing:
 - (1) Received 4 BW (Prov) FO 378.
- mm. 0415 from 4 Wing:
 - (1) Received Annex 1 to 4 BW (Prov) FO 378.
- nn. 0415 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Received Annex 3 to 3 AD FO 559.
- oo. 0645 from 3 AD:
 - (1) New Assembly Altitude.
 - (2) New Control Timings.
- pp. 0652 to Groups:
 - (1) New Assembly Altitude.
 - (2) New Control Timings.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TR, 21 Jan. '45

qq. 0655 to 390 Group:

(1) New Control Timings.

rr. 0715 from 3 AD:

(1) Annex 4 to 3 AD FO 559.

ss. 0915 from 3 AD:

(1) New Assembly Altitude.

For the Commanding Officer:



GENE C. SMITH,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

AFG 559.
24 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Report of Operations Officer, Mission of 21 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), AFG 559.

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95 A and 95 B squadrons formed the lead and high squadrons, respectively, of the 13 C Combat Group. The 452nd Group formed the low squadron of 13 C Group. 95 A squadron took off at 0756 - 0816 hours, 95 B squadron at 0746 - 0809 hours. Assembly was made at 21,000' rather than at the briefed 12,000' because of clouds.

The lead and high squadrons left the base in formation at 0949, 24 minutes late. Due to lost time it was necessary to eliminate the first two legs on wing assembly line. Wing assembly was made between Sp. # 6 and Bu. # 22 at 0953 at 23,000 feet. The low squadron had not yet joined the group at this time. The group departed No. Foreland at 1018, one minute early, in Division formation. Continental coast was crossed at Calais (C.P. # 1) at 1028 at 25,000 feet, one minute early, and C. # 2 at 1130, two minutes early. The IP was made good at 27,000 feet at 1205, one minute late, with the high squadron trailing the lead for bombing by squadrons. The low squadron had never formed with the rest of the group.

The lead squadron (95 A) bombed the primary target, the R.R. bridge at Mannheim, by Micro-H at 1217 at 26,500 feet over 9/10ths cloud coverage. Results were unobserved.

The high squadron (95 B) turned on the bomb run behind the lead squadron, but about 5 minutes from the bomb release line an unidentified group entered the briefed bomb run on the left at a sharp angle. This necessitated a turn to the right by 95 B off the bomb run. The target could not be picked up again, so after passing over the rally point the 95 B leader headed for the target of last resort at Pforzheim. Four minutes before the last resort the squadron leader aborted, and the deputy leader took the lead. He bombed Pforzheim (1239 hours, altitude 27,000') through a break in the clouds and observed hits in the town, though beyond the marshalling yards.

After bombing both the lead and high squadrons followed the briefed route out, but were not together. The low squadron had never been in group formation. The lead squadron encountered heavy clouds at the continental coast, and each plane returned to base individually, landing at 1535 - 1553 hours. The high squadron reached the base at 1527 hours and landed at 1529 - 1533.

Report of Operations Officer, Cont.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: 95 A squadron - 11 A/C plus one PFF left the base in formation as in Diagram A. A/C 8774 aborted over base because of oxygen failure, A/C 8996 because of engine failure, A/C 8333 because of fuel leak, and A/C 8067 because of a sick navigator. No sorties are credited for these crews. A/C 8676 bombed late because doors would not open in time; sortie credited. A/C 8826 bombed with 100th Group.

95 B squadron - 11 A/C plus one PFF left the base in the formation shown on Diagram B. The spare A/C 8657 returned to base. A/C 8255 aborted because of a sick tail gunner, no sortie. A/C 8840 jettisoned bombs at IP and aborted because engineer's oxygen supply was accidentally cut off by a loose flak helmet; sortie credited. A/C 7376 aborted between the IP and the target due to a runaway prop; sortie credited.

3. AIRCRAFT LOST: A/C 7961 aborted on the bomb run and landed on the continent.

NOEL T. CUMBAA
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
APO, 559

STATISTICAL CONTROL REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

13TH COMBAT BOMBARDMENT WING

DATE RENDERED 21 Jan 1948

PART I - TABULAR SUMMARY:

DATE OF MISSION 21 Jan 1948

STRATEGICAL MISSION

COMBAT GROUP	SCHEDULED	AIRBORNE	AIRCRAFT LESS RETURN- ING SPARES	ATTACKING	NOT ATTACKING	SORTIES
A	11 & 12H	11 & 12H	11 & 12H	6 & 12H	5	7 & 12H
B	10 & 12H	10 & 12H	10 & 12H	0	2 & 12H	10 & 12H

PART II - REASONS WHY AIRCRAFT DID NOT ATTACK OR WANTED TO TAKE OFF:

Combat Gp A.C.S.N. Category Reason for Failure & Corrective Action Sortie
(Yes-No)

A	42-38774	F	Engineers O ₂ regulator failed	No
A	42-38087	B	Navigator became ill.	No
A	42-38088	F	Fuel leak in right wing.	No
A	42-38088	F	1 engine failure.	No
A	42-38076	B	Lock bay doors opened late so bombs dropped after target.	Yes
B	42-37376	F	Run away prop.	Yes
B	42-37381	B	Unknown landed on continent.	Yes
B	42-38082	B	Pilots sick belts fell off and got oxygen lines for FIC. Pilot ordered the bomb jettisoned at 1.5. and aircraft returned to base.	Yes

S E C R E T

HOWE F. CHERRY,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

"A" SQUADRON

FORM 3

STATION 119

DATE 21 JAN. '45

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
334	M	8230	OWEN	✓ ①		759	1539		
412	B	^{NO} 8774	SUTKOWSKI	✓ * ⑨ WITH 100		810	1047	Abort - Oxygen out over Boise	
"	J	8826	BEK	✓ ④		807	1558		
336	X	8604	COTNER	✓ ⑤		752	1535		
"	D	8272	JACKMAN	✓ ⑤		757	1538		
534	T	8776 ^{NO}	HART	✓ *		810	1200	#2 Eng feathered.	
336	V	8676	J. TAYLOR	Hi ✓ ②		804	1535		
"	S	^{NO} 8333	DUNWODY	✓ *		805	934	Abort - Gas Leak	
"	T	9037	MILLER	✓ ③		806	1537		
412	E	^{NO} 8067	RISTINE	ho ✓ *		808	954	Abort -	
"	G	8331	HAIL	✓ ③		811	1541		
336	R	7844	O'TOOLE	✓ ⑥		903	1539		

"B" SQUADRON

FORM 3

STATION 119

DATE 21 JAN '45

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
336	K	7961	SAVAGE	✓		746			landed landed on container
334	R	8438	BRAMLETT	✓	1	758		1530	
"	X	8990	ROY	✓	3	747		1529	
335	N	6598	MELVIN	✓	4	731		1532	
336	Y	6583	BRADLEY	✓	2	809		1530	
335	A	8255	RICHARDSON	✓	*	752		1013	Abort - sick tail gunner
"	R	9055	TREGONING	Hi ✓	7	753		1533	
"	H	7376	PURDY	✓	⑧	754		1527	
"	S	9052	DILLON	✓	⑨	755		1532	
334	V	8657	ADDISON	✓	*	803		1337	Loft formation
"	K	8317	WELLS	ho ✓	11	757		1447 1531	
"	A	2447	PAINTER	✓	⑬	801		1447	
"	D	8640	MOZLEY	✓	✓	802		1506	short,

HEADQUARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
"J" FORM

GP.
STA.

1. DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2. CBW 13C GROUP 95B GP. LEADER MAT. SWINNEY A/C 7961 W/T PXU-K
POSITION HQBH DEPUTY LDR. Lt. BRAMLETT A/C 8438 W/T KUU-R
3. EST. TAXI TIME 0735 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0745 ETD BASE 0925
BTR BASE 1533
4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 13 NUMBER OF SPARES INCLUDED

HEADQUARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
"J" FORM

GP.
STA.

1. DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2. CBW 13C GROUP 95A GP. LEADER MAT. LOSEE A/C 8230 W/T KUU-M
POSITION LEAD DEPUTY LDR. Lt. SUTKOWSKI A/C 8774 W/T KLQ-B
3. EST. TAXI TIME 0745 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0755 ETD BASE 0925
BTR BASE 1533

STATION WEATHER OFFICE
AAF STATION 119
APO 559

T-4-2

23 January 1945

SUBJECT: Meteorological Interrogation Summary for Mission of 21 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, Headquarters, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559.

1. Base at take-off: Time was 0800 hours. 10/10 stratocumulus, base 2000 feet, with thin multi-layered medium and high cloud to 25,000 feet. Visibility 5 miles in light intermittent snow.

2. Route to target: 7-10/10 layered medium and high cloud below 23,000 feet over channel becoming 10/10 over continent then breaking to 7/10 altocumulus below 20,000 feet after I. P. Mil high cloud above 25,000 feet.

3. Target area: Mannheim, Germany, time was 1216 hours. Pforzheim, Germany, time was 1230 hours. 7/10 altocumulus below 20,000 feet. 10/10 in immediate area of Mannheim. Large break over Pforzheim with downward visibility of 10-20 miles.

4. Return route: Reverse of route to target with large breaks in medium and low cloud over France and Belgium.

5. Base on return: Time was 1530 hours. 8-10/10 cirrus above 20,000 feet. Visibility 3-4 miles.

6. Remarks: Dense persistent contrails formed above 15,000 feet over England and at bombing altitude over continent becoming dense to semi-persistent in target area.

WALTER S. MILLS, JR.,
Captain, Air Corps,
Staff weather Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 21 January 1945, Manneheim, Germany.

TO : Commanding

1. We led the Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron which led the 13th "C" Combat Group. We took off at 0800 hours and assembled our squadron at 0947 hours at 21500'. Due to the change in assembly altitude, we couldn't assemble and leave the field on time, this necessitating our cutting out the first two legs of the assembly. We fell into approximate wing position between SP# 6 and BU# 22 at 0953 hours at 23000' altitude.

2. The Group left the English coast at 1018 hours at North Foreland at 24000'. We entered the Continental coast at Calais at 1028 hours at 24700'. We proceeded along the briefed route to the Initial Point where we turned at 1205 hours at 4855N 0833E at 26500'.

3. We started the bomb run on a true heading of 355° and had a heading of 358° when bombs were away at 1217 hours at 4927N 0827E. We rallied at 1224 hours at 4935N 0900E at 25500' altitude. The briefed course was followed back to the Enemy coast at 1446 hours at 4956N 0145E at 9500' altitude.

4. At the Enemy coast we encountered a dense cloud bank so the squadron separated and each plane returned individually. We entered the English coast at 1504 hours at 5010N 0123E and passed over the base at 1533 hours and landed at 1540 hours.

NORMAN M. SACKS,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Navigator.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

H-F-26

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 21 January 1945, Pforzheim, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. We led the Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron which was high in the 15th "C" Combat Group. We took off at 0755 hours and assembly was made at 0940 at 21000'. Wing assembly was made at 1019 hours at 25000' altitude. We crossed the English coast out at 1019 hours at 25000' altitude at North Foreland.

2. We crossed the enemy coast in at 1027 hours at 25000' at 5103N 0141E. The I.P. for the primary was made good at 4855N 0833E at 1203 hours at 27000' altitude. At 1208 hours, we were 16 miles and five minutes from the target (secondary target) when unidentified squadron cut us off by sliding between us and lead squadron.

3. Lead ship turned to 60° true to avoid collision with unidentified squadron. At 1213 hours we turned to 15° true and passed over rally point, at 1218 hours. Made 360° turn and passed over R.P. again at 1222 hours, on a heading of 210° true. Sixteen miles northeast of Pforzheim the lead ship aborted and we took over the lead and bombed the last resort, visually thru a break in the undercast. Lead ship aborted at 1234 hours. Bombs were away at 1239 hours at 27000' on a true heading of 245°.

4. After bombs away we rejoined bomber stream at 4824N 0803E at C.P. # 3. We were 4 minutes late at C.P. # 3. We were at Calais at 1446 hours as briefed. Leader aborted in bomber stream on heading of 210° true. He was having difficulty and I do not believe that he intended to bomb the last resort. We crossed the English coast at 1504 at North Foreland and was over the base at 1527 hours and landed at 1535 hours.

JON W. LURTZ
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Navigator.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

H-F-28

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 21 January 1945, Pforzheim, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. We led the Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron which was high in the 15th "C" Combat Group. We took off at 0755 hours and assembly was made at 0940 at 21000'. Wing assembly was made at 1019 hours at 25000' altitude. We crossed the English coast out at 1019 hours at 25000' altitude at North Foreland.

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JON W. LURTZ
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Navigator.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

22 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 21 January 1945, Mannheim, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A...F.

1. Narrative.

a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B, C-2 and APCE.

b. The maneuver at I.P. was 25° turn to left in squadron formation.

c. Bomb bays were opened two minutes prior to I.P. at 1206 hours.

d. Entire run was 9/10 to 10/10 hrs and Micro-H technique was used throughout. I clutched in at check point one. Mickey Operator was unable to give me checks 2 and 3 but 4 and 5 were on. Bombs were away at 1217 hours. Cl was used on the run. Bombing was in squadron formation.

e. Bombing results were unobserved.

f. There are no suggested changes in bombing technique.

2. Bombardier's form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C

	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Fuzing	
Main Bombfall						Nose	Tail
Mannheim, Germany.	8	7	41	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total on Target.			Same as above.				
Bombs Returned.			28	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Other Expenditures (jettisoned)			3	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			72	1000#	M-44	1/10	None

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on primary target were dropped in salvo and armed.

MARSHALL J. THIXTON
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

22 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 21 January 1945, Mannheim, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - Bomb bays were opened two minutes prior to I.P. Entire run was 9/10 to 10/10ths and Micro-H technique was used throughout. I clutched in at check point one. Mickey Operator was unable to give me checks 2 and 3 but checks 4 and 5 were on. Bombs were away at 1217 hours. C1 was used on the run. Bombing was in squadron formation.

2. Disposition of Bombs - 12 A/C were dispatched from the 95th "A" Squadron. 8 A/C were over the primary target dropping 41 x 1000# AN-M44 G.P. bombs. A/C #8333 aborted (gas leakage) and returned 6 x 1000# M-44 bombs. A/C #8996 aborted (engine failure) and returned 6 x 1000# M-44 G.P. Bombs. A/C #8067 aborted (sick personell) and returned 6 x 1000# M-44 G.P. bombs. A/C #8774 aborted (oxygen failure) and returned 6 x 1000# M-44 G.P. bombs. A/C #8331 returned 1 x 1000# M-44 G.P. bomb because of rack failure. A/C #8676 returned 5 x 1000# M-44 bombs because of rack failure and dropped 3 x 1000# M-44 bombs late (personell error). Fuzing was 1/10 nose and non-delay tail.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on primary target were dropped in salvo and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C

		Bombing		Bombs		Fuzing	
Main Bombfall	Over Target		No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Mannheim, Germany.	8	7	41	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total on Target.			Same as above.				
Bombs Returned.			28	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Other Expenditures (jettisoned).			3	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			72	1000#	M-44	1/10	None

MARSHALL J. THIXTON
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

22 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 21 January 1945, Pforzheim, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - We flew deputy lead of 95th "B" Squadron. The leader began a run on the primary but was cut out approximately 17 miles from the target. He made a right turn to avoid a collision course and informed us that the decision had been made to bomb the last resort. He aborted four minutes from the last resort on a true heading of 210°. He then took over and made a turn onto the target. It had been hit previously and I had to kill rate on a point short. Bombs were away at 1239 hours. Results were observed to be over the Marshalling Yards but on the built up area. CI was not used because there was not enough time due to the sudden abortion of the leader.

2. Disposition of Bombs - 13 A/C were dispatched with 95th "B" Squadron and 8 A/C were over the last resort target dropping 48 x 1000# G.P. AN M-44 bombs. Lead A/C #7961 aborted before target because of engine failure and landed on the continent. Disposition of his bombs is unknown. A/C8640 lost oxygen and jettisoned bombs at 4840N 0816E. A/C #8255 aborted because of a sick crew member and returned all bombs. A/C #7386 jettisoned bombs because of #3 engine failure. A/C #8567 aborted because he could not find formation and returned all bombs. All bombs were fuzed 1/10 nose and non-delay tail.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on the last resort target and jettisoned by 95th "B" Squadron were salvoed and armed.

4. Tabular Summary -A/C

Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	Bombs		Fuzing	
			No.	Size	Type	Nose Tail
Pforzheim, Germany.	8	8	48	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Total on Target.			Same as above.			
Bombs Returned			12	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Other Expenditures.			18	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			78	1000#	M-44	1/10 None

CHESTER E. WILCOXSON
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

22 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 21 January 1945, Pforzheim, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Narrative.

a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B and C-2 computers.

b. No formal Initial Point was made. The leader aborted and we took over and made a turn to the target.

c. Bomb bays were opened at this point at 1236 hours.

d. The lead began a run on the primary but was out approximately 17 miles from the target. He made a right turn to avoid a collision course and informed us that the decision had been made to bomb the last resort. He aborted 4 minutes from the last resort on a true heading of 210°. We then took over and made a turn onto the target. It had been hit previously and I had to kill rate on a point short. Bombs were away at 1239 hours. Results were observed to be over the Marshalling Yards but on the built up area.

e. Bombing results were observed to be fair.

f. There are no suggested changes in bombing technique.

2. Bombardier's form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C

	Over Target	Bombing	Bombs		Fusing	
Main Bombfall			No.	Size	Type	Nose Tail
Pforzheim, Germany.	8	8	48	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Total on Target.			Same as above.			
Bombs Returned.			12	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Other Expenditures.			18	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			78	1000#	M-44	1/10 None

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on the last resort target and jettisoned by 95th "B" Squadron were salvaged and armed.

CHESTER E. WILCOXSON
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Engineering Officer

V-A-2

APO 559,
22 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission 21 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Gp (H). Attn: Capt. OLSSON.

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of 21 January 1945.

- a. Twenty-five (25) B-17 aircraft took-off.
- b. Eighteen (18) B-17 aircraft returned to base after completion of mission.
- c. 42-97961 failed to return to base.

2. There were six (6) abortive airplanes.

- a. 43-38996 - #2 engine failure.
- b. 43-38333 - Fuel leak in right wing.
- c. 43-38774 - Aerial Engineer's oxygen regulator failed.
- d. 43-38657 - Pilot lost formation.
- e. 43-38255 - Tail gunner become ill.
- f. 43-38067 - Navigator become ill.

3. There was no battle damage.

DONALD H. DOWLIN
Capt., Air Corps
Gp Engineering O

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Armament Officer
APO 559

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Armament Malfunction Report for 21 January 1945.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Seventeen aircraft were loaded with 6- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs per aircraft and the two PFF aircraft were loaded with 6- 1000 lb. G. P. Demolition Bombs and 4- CHB M1 Sky Markers per aircraft.

2. Following are the armament malfunctions reported for the mission of 21 January 1945.

A/C No. 8331- Returned one bomb to the base. The salvo solenoid did not energize in the last bomb release and current was not relayed to the last station. The release has been replaced.

A/C No. 8676- Three bombs were released late because the bomb bay doors were not fully open. The three bombs in the left bay were returned to the station. There was a loose wire connection leading from the left bomb bay overhead switch. The connection has been repaired.

FREDERICK A. FLINT
2nd Lieut. Air Corps
Asst. Group Armament Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Armament Officer
APO 559

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Mission Expenditure Report for 21 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Following are the expenditures for the mission of 21 January 1945.

A. Station	AAF 119
B. Unit	95th Bombardment Group (H)
C. Type of Ammunition	Cal. 50 API&I-TIEI
D. Gun locations and number of guns	

36 Ball Turret Guns	360
36 Upper Turret Guns	360
18 Left Waist Guns	180
18 Right Waist Guns	180
18 Left Nose Guns	180
18 Right Nose Guns	180
36 Chin Turret Guns	360
36 Tail Guns	360

E. Total number of guns..... 216

F. Total amount of ammunition fired..... 2160 rounds.

G. Aircraft number 7961 reported missing loaded with 6- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs, 2- CHB M1 Sky Markers and 5000 rounds Cal. 50 API&I-TIEI Ammunition.

H. Total amount of ammunition expended..... 7160 rounds.

I. Total number of bombs expended..... 110- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs.
6- CHB M1 Sky Markers.

LEONARD F. CAMSON
Capt. Air Corps
Group Armament Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Communications Officer

(JA-1)

APO 559
21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Communications

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, Station 119

1. Of the twenty-five crews assigned to the mission, twenty-three were available for interrogation by the Communications Officer.
2. Mechanical and electrical failures noted were as follows:
 - (a) 334-A (Liaison receiver/replaced for shop check)
 - (b) 335-R (Interchons/checked OK)
 - (c) 335-S (Radio compass/antenna lead-in faulty)
 - (d) 334-F (Radio compass/loop housing faulty)
 - (e) 334-D (Liaison Xmitter/replaced for shop check)
3. The following navigational aids were used successfully:
 - (a) 334-K, 334-T, 334-R, 334-D, 412-J, one QDM each obtained from local HF/DF station
 - (b) 334-K, 336-P, one fix each, HF/DF Section "N"
 - (c) Twenty-one A/C used 3glashers and Bunchers
 - (d) Twenty-four A/C used Station 7000
4. The reception of ground stations and beacons was normal.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

RICHARD F. KNOX
Captain, A. C.
Co. Communication O.

**HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER**

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the mission to Mannheim, Germany for the above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. Eleven plus one PFF A/C from the 95th group took off beginning 0756 hours to form the lead squadron of the 15thC Combat Group to attack the RR bridge at Mannheim.

A/C 8303 aborted 0915 hours, at 5218N-0113E because of gas leakage. A/C 8067 aborted 0921 hours over the base because navigator was ill. A/C 8774 aborted over the base because of oxygen failure. A/C 8996 aborted 1046 hours at 5020N-0301E because of #2 engine failure.

Twelve plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Group took off beginning 0747 hours to form the high squadron of the 15thC Combat group to attack the RR bridge at Mannheim.

A/C 8255 aborted 0927 hours over the base because of illness of one crew member. A/C 8657 aborted 1155 hours 4900N-0855 because of equipment failure. A/C 7376 aborted 4904N-0848E, 1231 hours, because of a runaway prop. A/C 8640 aborted 4840N-0816E, at 1151 hours, because of oxygen failure. A/C 7961 aborted 4910N-0850E because of mechanical failure.

2. No E/A were encountered.

3. Flak was encountered by 95A squadron at Mannheim, being inaccurate, moderate, barrage.

4. 95A squadron bombed primary target in squadron formation using Micro-H with no visual assist. Because of fair beacon returns, bombing classified fair. A/C 8826 bombed with 100th group. 95B squadron bombed last resort target of Pforzheim. Bombs fell in the town, blanketing one of the bridges across the river.

5. The fighter support was reported good. Lead A/C of 95B aborted at approximately 4910N-0850 and deputy lead took over and bombed target of last resort visually. 95B followed 95A to approximately 4910N-0830 where another group came in from the west and forced them to the right. This forced 95B to go east of the primary and secondary targets and to approximately 4940N-0845 where a right turn was made. The original R.P. was hit and a run was made on the target of last resort.

For the Intelligence Officer:

**WILLIAM ROWELL,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.**

B Squadron: 1289
27000

A/C No.	Airborne	Sorties	Attacking	ABORTS				LOST			DAMAGE			BOMBS DROPPED			RET.	
				M	W	E	O	E/A	AA	OTHER	Maj.	Min.	P	S	LR	TO		JETT
8657	1			1													6	
8255	1						1										6	
8990	1	1	1											6				
8678	1	1	1											6				
9052	1	1	1											6				
8640	1	1		1											6 (4840-0816)			
8817	1	1	1											6				
9055	1	1	1											6				
8447	1	1	1											6				
7376	1	1	1	1										6		4904-0848		
7961	1	1	1	1														
8439	1	1	1				1							6				
6583	1	1	1											6				

Savage

(Unknown 6)

Mc

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 266

PERIOD: 0001 hours 21 January to 2400 hours 21 January 1945

A. STATISTICS

	Disp.	Sorties	Atkg.	Tonnage	Claims	E/A	Losses			NYR(a)
							AA	OT	Totals	
Heavy Bomber Atks..	912	774	753	2094.5	0-0-0	0	2	18	20(b)	10
Fighter Escort	419	370	0	0 (c)	8-0-1G	0	0	0	0	4
Fighter Sweeps (d)	104	96	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	38	35	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	1
Weather Recon.	35	35	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	1
Air/Sea Rescue	14	14	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>7</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	1529	1330	753	2094.5	8-0-1G	0	2	18	20	16

(a) Believed safe on Continent

(b) Includes 2 Cat. "E"

(c) Includes 1 Me-262 destroyed

(d) Includes 352 Gp. based on Continent. 361 Gp did not operate

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

912 a/c (152 B-24s, 760 B-17s) from three Air Divisions dispatched in three forces against three M/Ys, one road and rail bridge, one tank factory, one tank depot and one AFV factory in western Germany. 753 a/c dropped 1496.7 tons GP, 597.8 tons IB on assigned targets and several T/Os. Assigned targets bombed on PFF. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 B-24s, 18 B-17s (2 to AA, 16 to causes unknown, 2 Cat. "E"). NYR: 10 B-24s believed safe on Continent.

First Force

Ten group formations (378 B-17s, 1st Air Division) dispatched against a M/Y, Tank factory and a Tank depot at Aschaffenburg. 350 a/c dropped 647.8 tons GP and 364 tons IB on assigned targets and two T/Os at 1150-1221 hours from 21,300-26,500 feet. All bombed on Gee-H and H2X. Leaflets dropped on Aschaffenburg. Weather: 10/10 undercast over Aschaffenburg. Flak: nil to meager, inaccurate. Battle Damage: 4 minor. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 6 B-17s (4 to causes unknown, 2 Cat. "E").

Fighter Support: Three groups (139 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0910-0915 hours, down 1426-1530 hours. 112 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil. NYR: 2 P-51s believed safe on Continent.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Aschaffenburg M/Y	151	257	485.8	250.0	Unobserved
Aschaffenburg-Siebert Tank Factory	114	66	97.5	97.5	Unobserved
Aschaffenburg Tank Depot	113	Not Attacked			

Other Targets

Pforzheim M/Y		24	60.0	12.0	Fair
Mannheim-Lanz AFV Factory		3	4.5	4.5	Unobserved
Totals	378	350	647.8	364.0	

Second Force

Ten group formations (382 B-17s, 3rd Air Division) dispatched against road and rail bridge, M/Y and AFV factory at Mannheim. 308 a/c dropped 661.9 tons GP, 200.5 tons IB on assigned targets and several T/Os at 1157-1239 hours from 25,000-28,000 feet. Assigned targets bombed on Micro-H and H2X, one T/O bombed visually. Leaflets dropped on Mannheim. Weather: 9/10-10/10 undercast over Mannheim. Flak: moderate, accurate at Mannheim. Battle Damage: 48 minor, 5 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 12 B-17s (2 to AA, 10 to causes unknown).

Fighter Support: Three groups (150 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0946-0952 hours, down 1440-1510 hours. 138 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. One u/i jet a/c sighted southeast of Nancy - no combat. One group strafed transportation facilities south of Heilbronn, one group strafed Stuttgart/Bobligen A/F. Claims: 2-0-0 ground. NYR: 1 P-51 believed safe on continent.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched Attacking</u>		<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Mannheim M/Y	155	254	544.5	165.0	Unobserved
Mannheim-Lanz AFV Factory	114	21	27.8	28.0	Unobserved
Mannheim Rd & Rail Bridge	113	16	47.5		Unobserved
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Pforzheim M/Y		10	30.0		Poor
Speyer		4	6.0	6.0	Unobserved
T/O - 4915N-0835E		1	2.3	.5	Unobserved
T/O - 4922N-0830E		1	2.3	.5	Unobserved
T/O - 4850N-0827E		1	1.5	1.5	Unobserved
Totals	382	308	661.9	200.5	

Third Force

Fifteen squadron formations (152 B-24s, 2nd Air Division) dispatched against Heilbronn M/Y. 95 a/c dropped 187 tons GP and 33.3 tons IB on assigned targets and several T/Os at 1217-1307 hours from 21,000-27,000 feet. Assigned target bombed on H2X; 2 T/Os bombed visually. Leaflets dropped on Heilbronn. Weather: 9/10-10/10 over Heilbronn. Flak: nil at Heilbronn. Battle Damage: 2 minor. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 B-24s to causes unknown. NYR: 10 B-24s believed safe on Continent.

Fighter Support: Three groups (32 P-47s, 98 P-51s - 130 a/c) dispatched. Up 0947-1010 hours, down 1510-1555 hours. 120 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. One group strafed Thalheim and Matzingen A/Fs and surrounding rail targets, one group strafed Leipheim A/F and rail targets south of Stuttgart. Claims: 6-0-1 ground includes 1 Me-262 destroyed. Losses: nil. NYR: 1 P-51 believed safe on Continent.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched Attacking</u>		<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Heilbronn M/Y	152	68	132.8	22.3	Unobserved
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Pforzheim M/Y		11	24.7	5.5	Unobserved
Arnbach Com. Cen.		14	26.0	5.0	Poor
Mannheim Com. Cen.		1	2.0	.5	Unobserved
Reutlingen		1	1.5		Unobserved
Totals	152	95	187.0	33.3	

2. Fighter Escort

Nine groups (387 P-51s, 32 P-47s - 419 a/c) dispatched to support bomber forces. Up 0910-1010 hours, down 1426-1555 hours. 370 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. One u/i jet sighted southeast of Nancy, no combat. Straf-ed Leipheim, Stuttgart/Böblingen, Thalheim and Motzingen A/Es and miscellaneous ground targets. Claims: 8-0-1 ground (includes 1 Me-262 destroyed). Losses: nil. NYR: 4 P-51s believed safe on Continent. Additional ground claims as follows:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Locos	8	1
Freight Cars		59
Trucks		2
Flak Car	1	
Oil Storage Tank	1	
Hangar		1
Flak Position		1
Steam Shovel		1
Switch Towers		2
Passenger Cars		3

3. Fighter Sweeps

One group (48 P-51s) dispatched on free-lance support to bombers. Up 0945 hours, down 1520 hours. 45 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Straf-ed rail targets vicinity of Weisenberg destroying 4 oil wagons, 1 truck damaging 2 locos, 30 goods wagons, 10 coal wagons. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

One group based on Continent (56 P-51s) dispatched to patrol St. Vith-Bruhl-Duren area and escort to medium bombers. 51 sorties. Patrol and escort uneventful. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

Other group based on Continent did not operate.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

38 a/c dispatched as follows:

4 P-51s and 2 Mosquitoes dispatched for D/A photos over Germany. After leaving target, an Me-262 appeared head-on and began orbit to get on our tail. Evasive action was begun but did not run as it deemed best to stay with the fighters. A moment later jet was high above and behind a/c and fighters began

screaming to break away. Broke away to right, and an instant later jet made a diving pass, passing directly over a/c but did not fire. Lost visual contact with jet and fighters, but maintained radio contact with fighters.

7 P-51s on special photo mission of target at Politz. 1 a/c returned early.

2 Mosquitoes were dispatched on Mickey missions over Germany. 1 a/c aborted due to mechanical failure.

23 P-51s as escort to PRU a/c. 1 a/c returned early. Losses: nil. NYR: 1 P-51 believed safe on Continent.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

35 a/c (4 B-17s, 5 Mosquitoes, 26 P-51s) dispatched.

2 B-17s completed routine weather flights over the northwest of Lands End.

1 B-17 completed routine flight to the Azores and 1 B-17 completed routine flight from the Azores.

5 Mosquitoes completed special weather reconnaissance over France, Belgium, Holland, Germany and North Sea.

26 P-51s as weather scouts for bomber forces. Losses: nil. NYR: 1 P-51 believed safe.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

14 P-47s dispatched on routine patrols. No incidents. All a/c returned safely.

8. Special Operations

7 a/c dispatched on Special Operations as follows:

5 B-24s on RCM, jamming between 0655-0930 hours. No losses.

2 B-17s on scope photo reconnaissance mission. 1 a/c returned early due to H2X malfunction. No losses.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Adverse weather conditions undoubtedly accounts for the general inactivity of GAF tactical fighters. None of the bombers or their escort sighted any e/a in the air.

The only engagements were inconclusive and took place between t/e jet e/a and two small flights of P-51s carrying out PRU and PRU escort missions. One flight of 7 P-51s was bounced from behind by two t/e jet e/a at 24,500 feet northeast of Steinhuder Lake at 1430 hours on withdrawal from north-central Germany. These e/a were very aggressive, closing to 300-400 yards, but none of our a/c was hit. Another flight of P-51s (3 a/c) escorting a PRU Mosquito was engaged from 1140 to 1200 hours in the Politz area by 14 to 16 Me-262s.

S E C R E T

Four of the Me-262s which were flying a P-51 formation made an unsuccessful pass at the Mosquito, breaking away as P-51s turned into them. One jet a/c bounced the flight from 3,000 feet above, but when turned into broke away without firing. Pilots reported that although e/a pilots did not appear particularly skillful, the jet fighters were able to pull away easily, preventing P-51s from getting within range at any time.

2. Flak

Rastatt - intense, accurate
Karlsruhe - moderate to intense, accurate
Mannheim - moderate, fairly accurate
Stuttgart - moderate, accurate
Aschaffenburg - meager, inaccurate

3. Observations

No observations due to 10/10 undercast.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Pforzheim M/Y - Fair Results (Attacked by 1st Air Division)

Two concentrations of GP bombs could be seen in and near target area. One direct hit and one probable hit on road over rail bridge near center of target area. Two hits on storage building east end of yard seen to be on fire late in the attack. Twenty-two bursts in the M/Y which was lightly loaded at time of attack. Main weight of bombs fell in and adjacent to north central part of M/Y. This area 10-40 percent built up.

Pforzheim M/Y - Poor Results (Attacked by 3rd Air Division)

A pattern of GP seen straddling river in built up area of town about one-half mile south of M/Y.

Arnbach - Poor Results

Bursts seen in woods on outskirts of Arnbach.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.