

W. J. ...
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INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3157

266

ATTACK ON HILSBROEN MARSHALLING YARD ON 20 JAN 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 187, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8th AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1130 - 1215A hours.
- (d) Bombs : 547 x 1000 lb. G.P.
1087 x 500 lb. G.P.

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK

- (a) Nearly all photographs are fully cloud obscured. Part of a pattern of H.E. bursts can be seen extending across the choke point at the extreme Southern end of the yard. Poor quality photographs preclude accurate interpretation of hits.

(iii) ACTIVITY

HILSBROEN MARSHALLING YARD

- 1. Only the Southern end of the yard is covered on poor quality prints, preventing any statement on loading.

HILSBROEN AIRFIELD

- 1. No aircraft are visible.
- 2. The landing ground appears serviceable.

SACH SENLEIM AIRFIELD

- 1. Two medium aircraft are visible on the Northern and Western sides of the airfield, respectively.
- 2. The landing ground appears serviceable.

(iv) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(v) BOMB PLOT: None prepared.

(vi) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV 95/1360,1361,1366	20 JAN 1945	1155A hrs.	1/41,100 (F.L.7")	24,000'	'C'
SAV 100/1185-1188	"	1140A "	1/46,200 "	27,000'	'B'
SAV 385/1009,1010,1012	"	1135A "	1/48,000 "	28,000'	'B'
SAV 390/1256,1257,1259	"	1145A "	1/46,200 "	27,000'	'B'
SAV 447/917	"	1215A "	1/44,500 "	26,000'	'C'
SAV 486/769	"	1135A "	1/42,000 "	24,500'	'C'
SAV 487/699	"	1130A "	1/46,200 "	27,100'	'C'
SAV 487/700	"	1145A "	1/26,500 (F.L.12")	26,500'	'B'

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HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 20 January 1945
13 CBW FO 19
13 CBW OPS 263
3 AD FO 557

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (HEILBRONN, GERMANY)

TO : CO, 95BG, APO 559

1. Information Concerning the Targets:

a. The primary target (visual) for today was the BREISACH RAILWAY BRIDGE over the Rhine River. This bridge is the connecting link in the Railway system between FREIBURG and COLMAR.

b. The secondary target (visual or H2X) for today was the Railway Traffic Center situated on the western outskirts of HEILBRONN, GERMANY.

2. Narrative of the Attacks:

a. 13 A Group - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigations:

(a) Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 390 Group made a normal take off and climbed to assembly altitude. The Group was formed without difficulty over the Buncher. The Wing assembly was made good at Buncher 28 on course and on time. The Group picked up time along the assembly line and arrived at Buncher 12, two minutes early, in position behind the 4th Combat Wing. The Group crossed the English Coast at Felixstowe about 3 minutes early.

(b) Route:

The Group ran into a high cirrus layer which caused some difficulty in maintaining visual contact with the Groups ahead. After making landfall the Group Leader altered course to the right mainly to avoid running into A/C ahead of them in the cirrus layer. The Group corrected back to course at CP 2 shortly after which they broke out of the cloud system.

The Group drifted left of course at CP 3 in order to remain in the Division Column and corrected into the briefed course at the Flak Corridor at the Rhine River. The Group again began to bear to the right of course prior to the IP following the bomber stream. The Group turned about 8 miles South of the IP passing over the briefed IP on course to the target. The Squadrons peeled off at 4818-0624, however, in peeling off the Low Squadron turned inside the High Squadron and went in second, the High following. M/O's setting up course into target by H2X. The Squadrons had difficulty in reforming into Group formation because of interference by several stray Squadrons of the 1st Division who came in from the North cutting thru the 13A Group formation.

The Group Leader maintained bombing altitude due to weather conditions experienced on the route. The briefed course was followed to CP 5. The Group drifted left of course but soon corrected into the briefed course prior to crossing the Continental Coast. The Group descended over Mid-Channel thru a hole in the cloud layer, and crossed the English Coast at 1526.

(c) Weathers:

High cirrus layer met at Mid-Channel during climb became very dense over Continent building up to 25000-26000 feet. Dense persistent contrails were encountered up to 27000 feet. Over target an 8/10 tel0/10 cloud coverage was reported. Horizontal visibility was very poor making visual contact with other Groups rather difficult.

(d) Navigational Difficulties:

Main difficulty was weather. Weak returns reported by M/Os while in cirrus layer, improving in target area.

(e) Remarks:

Navigation was good, despite weather difficulties.

(f) PFF Narratives:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. Bombing was by H2X technique in individual Squadron formations. The target was properly identified at an average range of 35 miles. Results were unobserved.

(2) Bombings:

(a) 390A Squadrons:

<u>1.</u> Air Leader	Maj. Engelbrecht	Nav	Lt. Rollins
Pilot	Capt. Rohr	Asst Nav	Capt. Hollopeter
Co-Pilot	Lt. Taylor	M/O	Lt. Fitton
		Bomb	Lt. Matteson

2. A/C Attackings: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u> Secondary	11	61 x 1000 LB GP
Returning	2	9 x 1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 27500'

c. Time of Release: 1143 $\frac{1}{2}$

3. Run In from IP to Targets:

The bombardier experienced difficulty with his sight after taking off. He had let his telescope indices run up to 0 degrees where it stuck, and it necessitated quite a bit of work to remedy the situation. After the maneuver at the IP, the M/O took over and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 10, 9, 8, 7, 6 and 5 miles. The 10 and 9 mile checks were good, but the 8 mile check was off. The 7 and 5 mile checks were very accurate. The run was very poor, however, since the M/O was not able to set up his course properly. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 13 degrees. G-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Report:

a. Clouds obscure all bursts of 390A Squadron but sufficient terrain is visible in photographs to identify the position of the A/C during the bomb run.

b. According to computations based upon the Bomb Trajectory Chart this Squadron's bombs fell in fields $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Weinsburg, Germany and approximately 6 miles east of the target area.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 481: Lead - Rack malfunction - 2 bombs returned.
 A/C 643: Rack malfunction - 1 bomb returned.
 A/C 151: Aborted with 6 bombs - Presumed to have landed in France.

(b) 390C Squadrons:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader	Cel. Sutherland	Nav	Lt. Welsh
	Pilot	Lt. Stone	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Conroy
			Bomb	Lt. Liana

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Secondary	9	44 x 1000 LB GP
			8 Leaflet Containers
	Jettisoning	3	14 x 1000 LB GP
	Returning	2	6 x 1000 LB GP
			2 Leaflet Containers

b. Bombing Altitudes: 24500'

c. Time of Release: 1144

3. Attacking on a magnetic heading of 340 degrees, the M/O set up course. Half way down the run the scope returns blanked out, but shortly afterwards the M/O was able to pick up the target once more. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, and 5 miles. The first two checks were off and two slight corrections were necessary, after which no further rate corrections were required. When bombs were released synchronization appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Reports:

a. Clouds obscure all bursts of the 390C Squadron's bombs but there is sufficient terrain to identify the position of the A/C during the bomb run.

b. This Squadron's pattern cannot be plotted with aid of Trajectory Chart, but they fell in the vicinity of Talheim, Germany.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 275: Aborted - 6 bombs returned.
 A/C 176: Rack malfunction - 2 leaflet containers returned.
 A/C 849: Released 6 bombs 9 minutes early.
 A/C 134: Released 6 bombs 9 minutes early.
 A/C 936: Rack malfunction - 2 bombs jettisoned 2 minutes late.

(c) 390B Squadrons:

<u>1.</u>	Air Leader	Maj. Campbell	Nav	Lt. Yary
	Pilot	Lt. Morris	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Flanagan
			Bomb	Lt. Kellerhouse

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u>	Secondary	11	60 x 1000 LB GP
	Jettisoning	2	10 x 1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitudes: 25500'

c. Time of Release: 1144½

3. Run In from IP to Targets

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 359 degrees, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier was able to set up his rate thru breaks in the clouds. The M/O clutched the bombardier in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, and 5 miles. Rate corrections were necessary at 9 and 6 miles. The 5 miles check appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Reports

a. There is no photo coverage of this Squadron's bombs. The prints sent forward were taken as the camera ship released early in the vicinity of Grosssachsenheim, Germany.

5. Bombing Malfunctions: None.

b. 13 B Group - 100A, B, C Squadrons

(1) Navigations

(a) Assembly

The three Squadrons of the 100 Group made a normal take off and climbed to assembly altitude. The Group was formed in good order and with very little difficulty. The Wing and Division assembly was as briefed although the Group was $3\frac{1}{2}$ minutes early at CP 1.

(b) Routes

The briefed route was followed to enemy coast when contact with Fireball Able was lost. On Able's announcement the Group followed on a heading of 180 degrees for a few minutes and still did not make contact with them. Course was made good to CP 2, at which time the Group was above the cloud cover and ahead of Able. Contact with Able, who was trailing, was made and the Group assumed the lead position. The turn to the target was made 4 miles south of the IP. The course into the target was set by the M/O and few corrections were made to the target.

A 180 degree turn was made to the RP allowing the Low Squadron, which was lagging considerably, to catch up. The course to the Continental Coast was as briefed except that from the RP to the next turning point the Group went left of course to avoid the flak area at Bretten. The let down was not started until the Continental Coast was reached because of the cloud cover. The let down was made over the channel and the course to the English Coast was made good.

(c) Weather: Same as 13A Group.

(d) Difficulties

The difficulties encountered were all due to unfavorable weather conditions in that the Group was unable to make contact with any other Group from Continental Coast to CP 2.

(e) Remarks: Navigation was good despite adverse weather conditions.

(f) PFF Narratives

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. Bombing was by Squadrons using HEX techniques. Last minute visual corrections were made by the bombardiers in all three Squadrons. Results were unobserved.

(2) Bombings

(a) 100A Squadrons

- | | | | | |
|-----------|------------|-------------|----------|-------------|
| <u>1.</u> | Air Leader | Maj. Martin | Nav | Lt. Julien |
| | Pilot | Capt. Jones | Asst Nav | Lt. Rasel |
| | Co-Pilot | Lt. Fuller | M/O | Lt. Rhode |
| | | | Bomb | Lt. Barrett |
2. A/C Attackings: Bombs Dropped
- a. Secondary 10 58 x 1000 LB GP
- b. Bombing Altitudes: 25000'
- c. Time of Release: 1139
3. Run In from IP to Targets:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 024 degrees, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 9, 7 and 6 miles. After the 6 mile check, the bombardier picked up the target and made several large course corrections, in order to kill drift. After the corrections, however, clouds prevented the bombardier from completing his sighting operation. The bomb run was made on PDI, because frozen trim tabs prevented use of C-1 Auto-Pilot.

4. PI Reports:

a. The bombs of 100A Squadron fell in open fields between the Necker River and the Railroad Tracks, and over the choke point at the South end of the Marshalling Yard. There are 3-5 bursts on the railroad tracks and 2-4 bursts in the built-up area just west of the tracks. Clouds prevent a more detailed interpretation of this Squadron's bombing.

b. It is impossible to ascertain the bomb pattern size, bombing errors, or percent of bombs within 1000' & 2000' of the MPI.

c. Bombing Results: Fair.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 632: One bomb would not salvo - Had to be toggled out.

(b) 100B Squadrons

- | | | | | |
|-----------|------------|---------------|----------|--------------|
| <u>1.</u> | Air Leader | Capt. Weeten | Nav | Lt. Kirby |
| | Pilot | Lt. DePlanque | Asst Nav | Lt. Rawland |
| | Co-Pilot | Lt. Bayha | M/O | Lt. Svendsen |
| | | | Bomb | |
2. A/C Attackings: Bombs Dropped
- a. Secondary 12 69 x 1000 LB GP
- Jettisoning 1 6 x 1000 LB GP
- b. Bombing Altitudes: 25500'
- c. Time of Release: 1140
3. Run In from IP to Targets:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 001 degrees, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 9, 7 and 5 miles. After the 5 mile check the bombardier was able to pick up the southern part of the M/Y. The bombardier took over and made one slight course correction before bombs were released. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Reports:

a. The bombs from 100B Squadron fell 5000' short of the assigned MPI in fields and slightly built-up areas on both sides of the Neckar River. There are 1-2 near misses on the railroad tracks just South of the M/T. Clouds prevent a more detailed interpretation.

b. It is impossible to measure with accuracy the bomb pattern size and bombing errors.

c. Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the MPI: 0% & 0%.

d. Bombing Results: Poor.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 514: Jettisoned 6 bombs at 4824N-0840E because of an engine failure.

A/C 397: Loaded only 5 bombs because one station was faulty.

A/C 865: Bomb bay doors would not fully close electrically.

(c) 100C Squadron:

<u>1.</u> Air Leader	Capt. Craft	Nav	Lt. Wilde
Pilot	Lt. Williams	Asst Nav	
Co-Pilot	Lt. Blackson	M/O	Lt. Cately
		Bomb	Lt. Orendorff

2. A/C Attackings: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u> Secondary	10	58 x 1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	2	12 x 1000 LB GP
Returning	1	6 x 1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitudes: 24500'

c. Time of Release: 1141

3. Run In from IP to Targets:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 010 degrees, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 10, 9, 8, 7, and 6 miles. Only slight rate corrections were necessary. After the 6 mile check, the bombardier picked up the target thru a break in the clouds and corrected for a 02 degree drift error. The rate was good, but just before the BRL, prop wash was encountered which caused a little difficulty. The bombardier was able to get back on the target, however, before releasing his bombs. G-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Reports:

a. The bursts of this Squadron's bombs are obscured by clouds, but there is enough terrain visible to locate the position of the A/C at the Bomb Release Line.

b. According to computations based upon the Bomb Trajectory Chart this Squadron's bombs fell approximately 3000' over the target in the vicinity of the Umfslaghafen.

5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 525: Rack malfunction - 2 bombs necessitated toggling.

A/C 613: Two bombs had to be salvoed by pilot.

A/C 636: Rack malfunction - Right bomb bay had to be salvoed twice before releasing.

A/C 817: Jettisoned 6 bombs on town of Mulborn.
 A/C 230: Aborted - 6 bombs returned.
 A/C 945: Aborted - 6 bombs jettisoned in channel.

c. 13 C Group - 95A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Navigations:

(a) Assembly:

The first Wing assembly was made three minutes late and the remaining assembly control points were cut short to make up the time. "Able" leader could not be seen due to persistent clouds at altitude. The coast out point was made good four minutes early. "Able" leader was still hidden in clouds and was not seen on the entire route into the target. The route was flown to the North of the briefed course. At approximately 0600E a prominent wind shift caused the formation to drift ten miles south of course. The decision was made to bomb the secondary by H2X by Squadrons after spasmodic radio contact with "Able" leader. B Squadron was trailing A by $\frac{1}{2}$ mile due to engine trouble with C Squadron abreast of B at the approach to the IP. The IP was overshoot to the South and East about eight miles. There was some "S"ing on the bomb run to avoid the outer fringe of Stuttgart flak defenses which were skirted by the C Squadron due to prop wash from the B Squadron on the run. After the RP, "A" leader aborted and "B" leader assumed lead of the Group. Then "B" leader aborted in the vicinity of the battle lines and "C" leader brought the formation back to base without difficulty. Due to adverse clouds the Group lost altitude as soon as possible and came in under the weather at 8000 feet.

(b) Routes: Included in above paragraph.

(c) Weathers: Same as 13A Group.

(d) Navigational Difficulties:

Persistent clouds and haze throughout the route in and out and on the target runs.

(e) Remarks: Navigation was good despite weather conditions.

(f) PFF Narratives:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. Bombing was by individual Squadrons using H2X technique. The target was identified at a range of 40 miles. Results were unobserved.

(2) Bombings:

(a) 95A Squadrons

<u>1.</u> Air Leader	Col. Stewart	Nav	Lt. Sacks
Pilot	Capt. Owen	Asst Nav	Lt. Rohn
Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Dement
		Bomb	Lt. Thixten

2. A/C Attackings Bombs Dropped

a. Secondary 12 70 x 1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitude: 23000'

c. Time of Release: 1154

3. Run In from IP to Targets

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 350 degrees, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 9, 7 and 5 miles. All checks were slow and slight rate corrections were necessary. Synchronization, however, was believed to be good at the BRL. Engine trouble necessitated bombing at an IAS of 145 MPH. AFCE was not used for the same reason.

4. PI Reports: Photographs show 10/10 clouds.5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 676: Door had to be cranked down.

(b) 95B Squadrons

<u>1.</u> Air Leader	Capt. Bridgingham	Nav	Lt. Flygstad
Pilot	Capt. Collins	Asst Nav	
Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Decherniss
		Bomb	Lt. Griffin

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u> Secondary	10	58 x 1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	2	12 x 1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitudes: 23500'c. Time of Release: 11563. Run IN from IP to Targets:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 346 degrees, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 9, 7 and 5 miles. All rate checks were accurate and at the BRL synchronization appeared to be good. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

4. PI Reports: Photographs show 10/10 clouds.5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 776: Bombs released accidentally after bomb bay doors opened.

A/C)?): Jettisoned 6 bombs on a TO.

(c) 95C Squadrons

<u>1.</u> Air Leader		Nav	Lt. Hadlock
Pilot	Lt. Browne	Asst Nav	
Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Urankar
		Bomb	Lt. Waters

2. A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

<u>a.</u> Secondary	10	57 x 1000 LB GP
Returning	5	13 x 1000 LB GP

b. Bombing Altitudes: 22500'c. Time of Release: 1156 $\frac{1}{2}$

3. Run I_1 from IP to Target:

After the maneuver at the IP, the M/O picked up the target and set up course. The bombardier was clutched in at 11 miles and checks in rate were made at 9 and 7 miles. The 7 mile check was fast and a rate correction was necessary. The M/O was unable to give the bombardier a 5 mile check because the target blanked out momentarily at that point. The bombardier let his rate ride and released his bombs on a magnetic heading of 346 degrees. C-1 AutoPilot was not used because the A/C could not be trimmed properly, due to a faulty ailiron.

4. PI Reports: Photographs show 10/10 clouds.5. Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 364: Rack malfunction - 1 bomb returned.

A/C 598: Aborted - 6 bombs returned.

A/C 269: Aborted - 6 bombs returned.

3. Planning and Execution of the Missions:

a. Wing Order and Strengths:

(1)	93 A, B Groups:	6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 34 Group	3 Squadrons
	(b) 490 Group	3 Squadrons
(2)	45 A, B Groups:	6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 388 Group	3 Squadrons
	(b) 452 Group	3 Squadrons
(3)	4 A, B, C Groups:	9 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 487 Group (Composite)	3 Squadrons
	(b) 385 Group (Composite)	3 Squadrons
	(c) 447 Group	3 Squadrons
(4)	13 A, B, C Groups:	7 x 12 A/C Squadrons 2 x 13 A/C Squadrons
	(a) 390 Group	3 Squadrons
	(b) 100 Group	3 Squadrons
	(c) 95 Group	3 Squadrons

b. A/C and C/C Available:

(1)	95 Group	34 A/C	45 C/C
		8 A/C PFF	8 C/C PFF
		5 A/C MH	6 C/C MH
(2)	100 Group	35 A/C	37 C/C
		5 A/C PFF	7 C/C PFF
		4 A/C MH	3 C/C MH
(3)	390 Group	33 A/C	49 C/C
		5 A/C PFF	8 C/C PFF
		5 A/C MH	7 C/C MH

c. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

(1)	95 Group	33 Plus 3 PFF
(2)	100 Group	35 Plus 3 PFF
(3)	390 Group	33 Plus 3 PFF

d. A/C Airbornes:

(1)	95 Group	33 Plus 3 PFF
(2)	100 Group	33 Plus 3 PFF
(3)	390 Group	33 Plus 3 PFF

e. A/C Failing to Take Off:

(1) 100 Groups:

A/C 770: 351 Sqdn "Z" - #4 waste gate motor out - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Ellison.
 A/C 610: 351 Sqdn "T" - Interphone out - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Gwinn.

f. A/C Abortives:

(1) 95 Groups:

A/C 6598: 335 Sqdn "N" - Could not locate formation - Pilot Lt. Tregoning - No sortie.
 A/C 8269: 335 Sqdn "K" - Could not locate formation - Pilot Lt. Bradley - No sortie.

(2) 100 Groups:

A/C 945: 418 Sqdn "F" - Lost formation - Pilot Lt. Garley - No sortie.
 A/C 514: 349 Sqdn "J" - Lost oil in #4 engine - Feathered it and couldn't maintain position - Pilot Lt. Marmorine - No sortie.

(3) 390 Groups:

A/C 390: 571 Sqdn "E" - Supercharger out on #2 engine - Pilot Lt. Ellis - No sortie.
 A/C 275: 570 Sqdn "A" - Broken crankshaft on #2 engine - Pilot Lt. Youry - No sortie.

g. A/C Missings:

(1) 95 Groups:

A/C 8660: 334 Sqdn "W" - Pilot Capt. Conover.
 A/C 8281: 412 Sqdn "Z" - Pilot Lt. Chead.
 A/C 1462: 412 Sqdn "R" - Pilot Lt. Beard.

(2) A/C 151: 569 Sqdn "O" - Pilot Lt. Greenstreet.

h. A/C Attacking - 13 CEW A Groups:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Secondary	51	170 x 1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	5	8 Leaflet Containers
Returning	4	24 x 1000 LB GP
		15 x 1000 LB GP
		2 Leaflet Containers

(2) Method of Bombings: PFF

(3) Method of Releases: Salvo

i. A/C Attacking - 13 CEW B Groups:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Secondary	32	185 x 1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	2	12 x 1000 LB GP
Returning	1	6 x 1000 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombings: PFF with Visual Assist

(3) Method of Releases: Salvo

j. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW C Groups

Bombs Dropped

(1) Secondary	32	185 x 1000 LB GP
TO	1	6 x 1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	1	3 x 1000 LB GP
Returning	5	15 x 1000 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombings: PFF

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

4. Communications:

a. Major Englebrecht led the 13th Wing. VHF was not satisfactory as the Wing Leader's sets went out at 0700E. Communications during assembly on Channel A was satisfactory. Over the continent, traffic was unusually heavy because of aircraft with engine trouble and the distance between the Wings. The demands on radio were heavy because of the problems caused by the weather. Channel B was satisfactory through CP 2 but because of set troubles, weather, and troubles encountered by the Kodak weather information was not satisfactorily received at all points. Fighter contacts were established by two of the Groups. To improve the discipline, greater emphasis is needed in indoctrination of crews that the primary need for VHF communications is from Air Leader to Air Leader and that communications between Air Leader and aircraft in his formation are secondary.

b. Control Points:

	CP 1	CP 2	CP 3	CP 4
Timings	0947	1044	1113	1424
ATA	0945	???	???	???

c. The Wing W/T receiving room failed to pick up but on Control Point Message from the Wing Leader. The Command Navigator and the Lead Radio Operator must coordinate closely so that progress reports are reliable.

d. Strike Reports:

13A	(390)	S B 5	1143
13B	(100)	S B 5	1140
13C	(95)	S B 5	1155

5. Mission Camera Reports:

a. The 95 Group installed 1 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 1 and 8 of which took pictures:

One K-21 A/C 6598: Aborted.

b. The 100 Group installed 1 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 0 and 4 of which took pictures:

Two K-21's were installed in aborting A/C.
 One K-22: Blown fuse.
 Two K-21's were frozen.

c. The 390 Group installed 2 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 2 and 6 of which took pictures:

One A/C with K-21 installed: Did not drop bombs on toggle switch side.
 One A/C with K-21 installed: Blew a fuse - arming wire shorted line.
 One A/C with K-21 installed: Double exposed and camera froze.

6. Controller's Logs

(1) 1755 from 3 ADs

(1) Alerted.

- (2) Order of Wings and Force Required.
- (3) Assembly Lines and Approaches.
- (4) Targets.
- (5) Routes.
- (6) Zero Hour.
- (7) RBA.

b. 1815 to Groups:

- (1) Alerted.
- (2) Target Area.
- (3) Zero Hour.
- (4) RBA.
- (5) Force Required.
- (6) Order of the Wings.
- (7) Assembly.

c. 1900 from 3 ADs:

- (1) Correct Targets and MPI.

d. 2009 from 3 ADs:

- (1) Flak Annex to 3 AD FO 557.

e. 2115 to Groups:

- (1) Advance Warning to 13 CBW FO 19.

f. 2020 to Groups:

- (1) Correct Targets and MPI.

g. 2129 from 3 ADs:

- (1) 3 AD FO 557.

h. 2135 to Groups:

- (1) Fuel.

i. 2135 from 3 ADs:

- (1) Leaflet Load.

j. 2240 from 3 ADs:

- (1) Possible MH Lead.

k. 2245 to Groups:

- (1) Possible MH Lead.

l. 2245 from 3 ADs:

- (1) Corrected Targets.
- (2) Cancelled MH Leads.

m. 2305 from 3 ADs:

- (1) Additional Target Information.

n. 2308 to Groups:

- (1) Corrected Targets.
- (2) Cancelled MH Leads.
- (3) Additional Target Information.

o. 2309 from 3 ADs:

- (1) Intelligence Annex to 3 AD FO 557.


- p. 2320 to Groups:
 - (1) A-2 Target Information.
- q. 2325 from 3 ADs:
 - (1) Train Interval.
- r. 2320 to Groups:
 - (1) Train Interval.
 - (2) Leaflet Leads.
- s. 2335 from 3 ADs:
 - (1) Division Targets.
 - (2) Last Resort Target.
 - (3) Change of Zero Hour.
- t. 0001 to Groups:
 - (1) Complete Target Information.
 - (2) Last Resort Target Information.
- u. 0008 from 3 ADs:
 - (1) Complete Route.
- v. 0034 to Groups:
 - (1) Annex 1 to 13 CEW FO 19.
- w. 0050 from 3 ADs:
 - Annex 1 to 3 AD FO 557.
- x. 0055 from 3 ADs:
 - (1) Assembly Times.
 - (2) Assembly Altitude.
 - (3) Bombing Altitude.
- y. 0115 to Groups:
 - (1) Assembly Times.
 - (2) Assembly Altitude.
 - (3) Bombing Altitude.
- z. 0145 from 3 ADs:
 - ME Data 3 AD FO 557.
- aa. 0150 from 3 ADs:
 - (1) A-2 Annex to 3 AD FO 557.
- bb. 0215 to Groups:
 - (1) 13 CEW FO 557.
- cc. 0220 from 3 ADs:
 - (1) Annex 2 to 3 AD FO 557.
- dd. 0230 from 3 ADs:
 - (1) Change in Times.
 - (2) Changed Check Point.

- ee. 0245 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Annex 3 to 3 AD FO 557.
- ff. 0245 to Groups:
 - (1) Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO 19.
- gg. 0305 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Kodak Information.
- hh. 0310 to Groups:
 - (1) Above.
- ii. 0340 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Annex 1 to MH Data 3 AD FO 557.
- jj. 0450 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Annex 4 to 3 AD FO 557.
- kk. 0516 to 3 AD:
 - (1) Weather Ship - Take Off Time.
- ll. 0645 from 3 AD:
 - (1) 2nd Division Information.
- mm. 0700 to 3 AD:
 - (1) Weather Report.

7. Comments and Recommendations:

- a. No sortie line on 3 AD Field Order.

For the Commanding Officer:



GENE C. SMITH,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NIGHT STAFF, BOMBARDMENT GROUP (B)
Office of the Operations Officer

AIR 559.
21 January 1945.

FROM: Operations Officers Narrative for the mission of 20 January 1945,
Heilbronn, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 96th Bombardment Group, AIR 559.

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95A Squadron, flying as lead squadron in the Bth "C" Combat Group, with 95B Squadron in the high position and 95C as low took off from base at 0756-0813 hours and assembled over base at 12,000 feet by 0855 hours. 95B Squadron took off from base at 0748-0754 hours and assembled over base at 15,000 feet by 0850 hours. 95C Squadron took off from base at 0804-0812 hours and assembled over base at 11,000 feet by 0810 hours.

After assembly, the Squadrons joined in Group formation and proceeded to Sun. #28 where wing assembly was effected at 0926 hours with the lead squadron at an altitude of 12,000 feet. Division assembly was made and the formation left the English Coast at Felixstowe at 0947 hours, altitude 17,000 feet.

The enemy coast was crossed at 1016 hours at an altitude of 22,000 feet. From here to the I.P. the formation stayed north of course due to weather. The I.P. was reached at 1138 hours. The leader elected to bomb the secondary target and evasive action was taken between I.P. and target to avoid Stuttgart defenses. Bombs for 95A Squadron were away at 1154 hours; for 95B at 1156 hours; and for 95C at 1156½ hours.

The lead ships of both "A" and "B" squadrons were forced to abort after rally of the group was effected and the deputy leaders of each squadron assumed the respective leads. Briefed route out was followed out. The coast was crossed at 1417 hours at an altitude of 12,000 feet. The English coast crossed at 1500 hours and over the field at 1508 hours. Landing was effected at 1501-1549 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: 95 "A" Squadron - eleven aircraft plus one PFF left base in formation shown in Diagram "A". All aircraft attacked the secondary target and receive credit for sorties.

95 "B" Squadron - eleven aircraft plus one PFF left base in formation shown in diagram "B". Aircraft #7257 bombed a T/O with the 91st Group. Aircraft #8776 failed to attack the target, but receives a sortie as do the remaining ten ships in the formation which bombed the secondary target.

95 "C" Squadron - eleven aircraft plus one PFF left base in formation shown in Diagram "C". Aircraft #8598 and 8269 returned early and do not receive sorties. The remaining ten aircraft attacked the secondary target and receive sorties.

3. AIRCRAFT LOST: None.

(Operations Officers Narrative for the mission of 20 January 1945, Heilbronn,
Germany.)

NOEL T. CUMBA,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
APO 559

STATISTICAL CONTROL REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

13TH SCIMITAR BOMBARDMENT WING

DATE RENDERED 20 Jan 48

PART I - REGULAR SUMMARY:

DATE OF MISSION 20 Jan 48

STRATEGICAL MISSION

COMBAT GROUP	SCHEDULED	AIRBORNE	AIRBORNE LESS RETURNING SPARES	ATTACKING	NOT ATTACKING	SORTIES
A	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	0	11 & 15H
B	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	10 & 15H	1	11 & 15H
C	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	9 & 15H	2	9 & 15H

PART II - REASONS WHY AIRCRAFT DID NOT ATTACK OR FAILED TO TAKE OFF:

Combat Gp A.C.S.N. Category Reason for Failure & Corrective Action (Yes-No) Sortie

B	43-28778	B	Bombs jettisoned at I.P. because of unknown reasons. No malfunction found on the ground.	Yes
C	44-5269	C	Lost formation.	No
C	44-6598	C	Lost formation.	No

HOWE T. CUMMIS,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

SECRET

"A"

FORM 3

STATION 119

DATE 20 JAN. 45

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
335	J	8210	OWEN	Lead.		7 42		1549	
336	T	9037	Rose	✓		7 43		1538	
"	W	6993	HART			7 45		1537	
"	X	8604	THOMAS	✓		7 56		1539	
337	Y	6583	EARLEY	✓		7 57		1541	
338	B	8774 8112	ROSS	✓		8 01		1500	
336	V	8676	J. TAYLOR	HIGH. ✓		7 58		1533	
336	P	8272	JACKMAN			7 59		1527	
"	R	7844	MILLSPRUGH	✓		8 00		1522	
"	E	8106	LEMOX	✓ Low.		8 39		1518	
"	S	8333	TWISS	✓		8 13		1519	
337	J	8826	NELSON	✓		8 02		1517	

B

FORM 3

STATION

119.

DATE

20 JAN. 45.

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
412	N	8040	Collinge	Leao		7 42		1555	
334	X	8990	Scott	✓		7 55		1509	
	B	8776	McAllister	✓		7 46		1529	
	R	8438	Bramlett	✓		7 47		1511	
412	L	7257	BEK	✓		9 14		1430	
334	A	2447	ROY	✓		7 48		1532	
"	D	8640	CORBIN	✓ Nigh.		7 49		1508	
"	K	8317	PAINTER	✓		7 51		1525	
"	J	7201	ADDISON	✓		7 52		1512	
	8	8225	Monte						
334	T	8996	Rosenzweig	✓ ho.		7 53		1530	
"	Q	2957	PARRISH	✓		7 54		1530	
"	U	8525	Mozley	✓		7 50		1501	

"C"

FORM 3

STATION

119

DATE

20 JAN - 45

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
335	W	8364	Brown			7 44		1524	
39022 Arrest.	L	8225	Mercer	✓		8 14		1524	
3.	R	9055	J. Hamilton	✓		8 04		1514	
"1	A	8255	Melvin	✓		9 05		1524	
334	W	8660	Conover	✓		8 06			
"	V	8657	Dillon	✓		8 07		1526	
335	N	6598	Tregony	✓		8 08		1414	could not find formation
"	K	8269	Bradley	✓		8 09		1419	" " " "
402	E	8067	Hansen	✓		8 10		1531	
335	S	9052	Shaw	✓		8 11		1531	
512	Z	8281	Schaad	✓		8 12			
"	R	1462	Beard	✓		8 03			

[Handwritten signature]

ADQUARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT VISION
"J" FORM

GP.
STA.

1. DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2. CBW 13C GROUP 95C GP. LEADER LT. BROWN A/C ³³⁵ 8364 W/T KJS-W
POSITION Low. DEPUTY LDR. LT. MERCER A/C ^{3902H} 8275 W/T RT-ANTENT-L
3. EST. TAXI TIME ⁰⁷⁵⁵ ~~0745~~ EST. T.O. 1ST A/C ⁰⁸⁰⁵ ~~0755~~ ETD BASE ⁰⁹¹⁰ ~~0800~~
ETR BASE 1439

PFF

ADQUARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT VISION
"J" FORM

GP.
STA.

1. DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2. CBW 13C GROUP 95B GP. LEADER CAPT. BRITTINGHAM A/C ²¹² 8040 W/T JZW-N
POSITION High. DEPUTY LDR. LT. SCOTT A/C ³³⁰ 8990 W/T MFO-X
3. EST. TAXI TIME ⁰⁷³⁵ ~~0745~~ EST. T.O. 1ST A/C ⁰⁷⁴⁵ ~~0735~~ ETD BASE ⁰⁹¹⁰ ~~0800~~

ETR BASE 1439

PFF

ADQUARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT VISION
"J" FORM

GP.
STA.

1. DATE / / 44 TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2. CBW 13C GROUP 95A GP. LEADER LT. COL. STUART A/C ³³⁵ 8210 W/T KJS-J
POSITION Lead DEPUTY LDR. LT. ROSE A/C ³³⁶ 9037 W/T WUD-T
3. EST. TAXI TIME ⁰⁷⁴⁵ ~~0735~~ EST. T.O. 1ST A/C ⁰⁷⁵⁵ ~~0745~~ ETD BASE ⁰⁹¹⁰ ~~0800~~

ETR BASE 1439

STATION WEATHER OFFICE
AAF STATION 119
APO 559

T-4-2

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Meteorological Interrogation Summary for Mission of 20 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officers, Headquarters, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559.

1. Base at take-off: Time was 0800 hours. 2-3/10 high thin stratocumulus at 5000 feet. Visibility 7 miles.

2. Route to target: 10/10 swelling cumulus and associated medium cloud below 17,000 feet over channel and France becoming 10/10 with small breaks below 23,000 feet for remainder of route except target area. Nil cirrus over channel becoming 10/10 contrail cirrus and fine cirrus below 25,000 feet for remainder of route.

3. Target area: Mallbronn, Germany. Time was 1156 hours. 10/10 cumulus and stratocumulus below 12,000 feet with dense persistent contrails and contrail cirrus above 23,000 feet.

4. Return route: Reverse of route to target.

5. BASE on return: Time was 1525 hours. 2-5/10 cumulus, base 1500, 6-7/10 stratocumulus, base 4500 feet. Visibility 2-3 miles.

6. Remarks: Dense persistent contrails formed above 20,000 feet over entire route.

WALTER S. MILLS, JR.,
Captain, Air Corps,
Staff Weather Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 20 January 1945, Heilbronn, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. We led the Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron which led the 13th "C" Combat Group. We took off at 0740 hours and assembled over base at 0855 hours at 12000'. We took our position in the Wing formation at 0926 hours at BU# 28 at 12000' and left the English coast at Felixstowe at 0947 hours at 17000' altitude.

2. The Group entered the Enemy coast at 1115 hours at 5117N 0300E at 22000' altitude. Weather, poor visibility and sudden wind shifts kept us north of course to Control Point # 3, where we followed the briefed course. We turned on the I.P. at 4826N 0827E at 1135 hours at 25200'.

3. We Eased into the target and straightened out for a four minute run on a true heading of 350°. We released our bombs at 1154 hours at 4913N 0913E at 25000'. We rallied our group at 4913N 0922E at 25000'. As soon as the group reformed our ship aborted due to engine trouble.

4. We followed the briefed course back, leaving the Enemy coast at 5017N 0300E at 1447 hours at 1000' and we crossed the English coast at Felixstowe at 1532 hours at 1000'. We passed over the base at 1545 hours and landed at 1548 hours.

NORMAN M. SACKS
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Navigator.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 20 January 1945, Heilbronn, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. We led the Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron which flew as high in the 13TH "C" Combat Group. We took off at 0743 hours and reached assembly altitude of 13000' at 0816 hours. Made wing assembly at BU# 28 at 0926 hours at 13000' and Division assembly at 0943 hours at 16000' at 5201N 0100E. We left the English coast on course at Felixstowe at 0947 hours at 17000'.

2. We reached the Continental coast at 1013 hours at 22500' at 5117N 0300E. We were north of route to I.P. Went to secondary target and made IP at 1135 hours at 25600' at 4826N 0827E. Did some Essing on run from I.P. to target. Run was PFF with bombs away at 1156 hours on a magnetic heading of 346° at 25600' on secondary target.

3. Rally Point was short so made a 180° turn to intercept lead squadron and reached Rally Point at 1200 hours on a heading of 220° for next turn. Mickey went out at Rally Point and lead aborted so I took over the lead and did D.R. to 4830N 0640E at 1225 hours when we aborted and low squadron took over lead.

4. Because of changing headings during abortion lost out on D.R. Put pilot on a heading and picked up a radio fix at 1335 hours at 4913N 0541E at 2600'. From there on stayed on course to the coast and left the Continental coast at 1457 hours at 5116N 0300E at 1500'. I reached the English coast at Felixstowe at 1540 hours at 1500' and reached the base at 1553 hours and landed at 1558 hours.

DONALD B. FLYGSTAD
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Navigator.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "C" Squadron, Mission of 20 January 1945, Heilbronn, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. We led the Ninety Fifth "C" Squadron which flew as low in the 13th "C" Combat Group. We took off at 0740 hours and the group was assembled at 0910 hours at 11000'. Wing assembly was at 0926 hours over BU# 28 at 11000'. Division assembly was at 0945 hours at 12000'. We departed the English coast at Felixstowe at 15000' at 0947 hours.

2. We crossed the Enemy coast at Ostend at 5117N 0500E at 1013 hours at 19000' altitude. We were north of course to the I.P. by ten to twelve miles. The Initial Point used was 4826N 0827E. We turned on the Initial Point at 1140 hours at 23500' altitude.

3. The route from the I.P. to the target was not straight and level. We used evasive action when skirting Stuttgart. The last ten minutes of the bomb run was straight and level. Bombs were away at 4805N 0911E at 23500' altitude. The magnetic heading was 346° at 1156½ hours. The R.P. used was 4916N 0858E. We were at 22500' and turned on the R.P. at 1202 hours.

4. The flight plan was followed back to the coast at Ostend where we crossed the coast at 12000' altitude at 1417 hours. The English coast was crossed at 1500 hours at 11000' at 5203N 0132E. We arrived back at the base at 1508 hours and landed at 1525 hours.

EUGENE C. HADLOCK
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Navigator.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 20 January 1945, Heilbronn, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - Bomb bays were opened two minutes prior to I.P. We overshot the IP slightly and turned onto bomb run in squadron formation. Cloud coverage was 9/10 to 10/10ths at this point. I clutched in at 11 miles and checked on 9,7,5 mile range. All were a little slow and required adjustment. Target was 10/10ths and bombs were away at 1154 hours. Engine trouble made it necessary to indicate 145 on the run. I made the data change before turning onto run. Bombing was in squadron formation. AFCE was not used because we were having engine difficulty.

2. Disposition of Bombs - 12 A/C were dispatched from 95th "A" Squadron and all were over the secondary target dropping 70 x 1000# G.P. M-44 bombs. Fuzing was 1/10 nose and non-delay tail.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on target were dropped in salvo and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C

Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	Bombs			Fuzing	
			No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Heilbronn, Germany.	12	12	70	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total on Target.			Same as above.				
Bombs Returned.			0				
Other Expenditures.			0				
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			70	1000#	M-44	1/10	None

MARSHALL J. THIXTON
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

B-F-26

21 January, 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 20 January 1945, Heilbronn, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Narrative.

a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B, C-2 and AB Computer.

b. The maneuver at the I.P. was a 45° turn to the left in squadron formation.

c. Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes prior to the I.P. at 1143 hours.

d. We overshot the I.P. slightly and turned onto bomb run in squadron formation. Cloud coverage was 9/10 to 10/10ths at this point. I clutched in at 11 miles and checked on 9,7,6 mile range. All were a little slow and required adjustment. Target was 10/10ths and bombs were away at 1154 hours. Engine trouble made it necessary to indicate 145 on the run. I made data change before turning onto run. AFCE was not used because we were having engine difficulty.

e. Bombing Results were unobserved.

f. There are no suggested changes to be made.

2. Bombardier's form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C

			Bombs		Fuzing	
Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Nose Tail
Heilbronn, Germany.	12	12	70	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Total on Target.			Same as above.			
Bombs Returned.			0			
Other Expenditures.			0			
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			70	1000#	M-44	1/10 None

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on target were dropped in salvo and armed.

MARSHALL J. TRIXTON
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-P-26

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission,
of 20 January 1945, Heilbronn, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Narrative.

a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B, C-2 and AB Computer.

b. The maneuver at the I.P. was a 45° turn to the left and in
squadron formation.

c. Bomb bays were opened two minutes prior to I.P. at 1142.

d. We overshot the I.P. slightly and turned on bomb run in squad-
ron formation. Clutched in at 11 miles and checked at 9,7,5 mile
ranges. All checks were good and bombs were away at 1156 hours.
Bomb run was 10/10ths except for a few holes just beyond I.P. Bombing
was in squadron formation. AFCE was inoperative and not used.

e. Bombing results were unobserved.

f. There are no suggested changes in bombing technique.

2. Bombardier's form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C

			Bombs		Fuzing	
Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Nose Tail
Heilbronn, Germany.	11	10	58	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Total on Target.			Same as above.			
Bombs Returned.			0			
Other Expenditures.			12	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			70	1000#	M-44	1/10 None

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on secondary target were rel-
eased in salvo and armed.

JOHN M. GRIFFIN
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of
20 January 1945, Heilbronn, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - Bomb bays were opened two minutes prior to the I.P. We overshot slightly and turned on bomb run in squadron formation. Clutched in at 11 miles and checked at 9, 7, 5 mile ranges. All checks were good and bombs were away at 1156 hours. Bomb run was 10/10ths except for a few holes just beyond I.P. Bombing was in squadron formation. AFCE was inoperative and not used.

2. Disposition of Bombs - 12 A/C were dispatched from the 95th "B" Squadron and 10 A/C were over the secondary target dropping 58 x 1000# M-44 G.P. bombs. A/C #8778 dropped its bombs when bomb bays were opened at 4830N 0830E. A/C #7257 dropped bombs with 91st Bomb Group at 4855N 0842E. Fuzing was 1/10 nose and non-delay tail.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on secondary target were released in salvo and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C

	Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	Bombs			Fuzing	
				No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Heilbronn, Germany.		11	10	58	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total on Target.				Same as above.				
Bombs Returned.				0				
Other Expenditures.				12	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).				70	1000#	M-44	1/10	None

JOHN M. GRIFFIN
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

R-P-26

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "C" Squadron, Mission of 20 January 1945, Heilbronn, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - Bomb trays were opened two minutes prior to the I.P. We turned onto I.P. in squadron formation and were in that formation at bombs away. I clutched in at 11 miles and checked at 9 and 7. The 7 mile check was fast and I adjusted rate. The 5 mile check was not made because target return blacked out at that point. Bombs were away at 1156½ hours. Target return was good except when it blacked out momentarily at the 5 mile check. AFCE was not used because ship could not be trimmed properly. Aileron trim tab was at fault.

2. Disposition of Bombs - 12 A/C were dispatched from 95th "C" Squadron. 10 A/C were over the secondary target dropping 57 x 1000# G.P. M-44 bombs. A/C #6593, 8269 returned 6 x 1000# G.P. M-44 bombs each because they were unable to join their group. A/C #8384 returned 1 x 1000# M-44 bombs due to rack malfunction. Fuzing was 1/10 nose and non-delay tail.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on the secondary target were salvoed and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C

Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	Bombs		Fuzing	
			No.	Size	Type	Nose Tail
Heilbronn, Germany.	10	10	57	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Total on Target.			Same as above.			
Bombs Returned.			13	1000#	M-44	1/10 None
Other Expenditures.			0			
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			70	1000#	M-44	1/10 None

CHARLES E. WATERS
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "C" Squadron, Mission of 20 January 1945, Heilbronn, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Narrative.

a. Bombing aids used E-6-B, C-2 AB Computer.

b. The maneuver at I.P. was a 45° turn in squadron formation.

c. The bomb bay doors were opened two minutes prior to I.P. at 1142.

d. We turned onto I.P. in squadron formation and were in that formation at bombs away. I clutched in at 11 miles and checked at 9 and 7 miles. The 7 mile check was fast and I adjusted rate. The 5 mile check could not be made because target return blacked out momentarily at this point. Bombs were away at 1156 1/2 hours. AFCE was not used because ship could not be trimmed. Aileron trim tab was at fault.

e. Bombing results were unobserved.

f. There are no suggested changes in bombing technique.

2. Bombardier's form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C

Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	Bombs			Fuzing	
			No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Heilbronn, Germany.	10	10	67	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total on Target.			Same	as above.			
Bombs Returned.			13	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Other Expenditures.			0				
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			70	1000#	M-44	1/10	None

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on the secondary target were salvaged and armed.

CHARLES E. WATERS
2nd Lt., Air Corps.
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Engineering Officer

V-A-2

APC 559,
21 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission 20 January, 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Gp (H). Attn: Lt Col STUART.

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of 20 January 1945.

- a. Thirty-six (36) B-17 aircraft took off.
- b. Thirty-one (31) B-17 aircraft returned to base after completion of mission.
- c. 43-38660, 42-31462 & 43-38281 failed to return to base.

2. There were two (2) abortive airplanes.

- a. 44-8269 - Lost the formation.
- b. 44-6598 - Lost the formation.

3. Battle damage is as follows:

- a. 43-38776 - Minor flak damage.
- b. 43-38990 - Minor flak damage.
- c. 42-107201 - Minor flak damage.
- d. 43-38657 - Minor flak damage.
- e. 44-8525 - Minor flak damage.
- f. 43-38996 - Minor flak damage.

DONALD H. DOWLIN
Capt., Air Corps
Gp Engineering O

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Armament Officer
APO 559

20 January 1945

SUBJECT: Armament Malfunction Report for 20 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Thirty-one aircraft were loaded with 6- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs per aircraft and the three PFF aircraft were loaded with 4- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs and 4- CHB M 1 Sky Markers per aircraft.

2. Following are the armament malfunctions reported for the missions of 20 January 1945.

A/C No. 8364- One-one thousand pound bomb on station 37, and one sky-marker bomb on an external rack, were returned to the station. The A-4 release on the external rack was found to be defective and it was replaced. The internal racks ground checked in good order.

A/C No. 8776- Released bomb load early. The bomb bay doors were opened and the bombardier reported that the bombs dropped as he was turning up the pointer on the intervalometer. No malfunction could be found on ground check.

LEONARD F. DAWSON
Capt. Air Corps
Group Armament Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Communications Officer

(J-A-1)

AFPO 559
20 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Communications

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, Station #119

1. Of the thirty-six crews assigned to the mission, thirty-two were available for interrogation by the Communications Officer.
2. Mechanical and electrical failures noted were as follows:
 - (a) 334-K (VHF/replaced for shop check)
 - (b) 334-B (Interphone/CP & TT wiring faulty)
 - (c) 334-A (Radio compass/replaced for shop check)
3. The following navigational aids were used successfully:
 - (a) Thirty-one A/C used Splashers and Bunchers
 - (b) Thirty-six A/C used Station 7000
4. The reception of ground stations and beacons was normal.

RICHARD F. KNOX
Captain, A. C.
Gp. Communication O.

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**HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER**

20 January 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the mission to Heilbronn, Germany on the above date.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - the 95th Group flew as the 13C Combat Group in an attack against the RR bridge across the Rhine River at Breisach. Because the primary target was solid cloud covered, the secondary target, the rail center of Heilbronn was bombed. Lt. Col. Stuart was in command.

95A - Eleven A/C plus one PFF A/C took off to lead the Combat Group. All A/C attacked the secondary target and landed at this base.

95B - Eleven A/C plus one PFF A/C took off to fly the high squadron. Ten A/C bombed the secondary target. A/C 7257 joined the 91st Bomb Group and bombed with them, a P.O. believed to be Pforzheim (4854-0842). A/C 8776 completed a sortie with the squadron but failed to attack a target due to a rack malfunction. All A/C landed at this base.

95C - Eleven A/C and one PFF A/C took off to fly the low squadron. Ten A/C bombed the secondary target. Two A/C aborted: A/C 6598 returned from 48°27'N-07°11'E at 1125 hours followed by his wingman A/C 8269 because they lost the formation in the clouds, and with loss of power for mechanical reasons in A/C 6598, couldn't catch formation when next seen - navigation equipment out in both A/C. Three of the attacking A/C failed to return to this base: A/C 8281 is reported DS, France, and A/C 8660 and A/C 1462 have not checked in with flying control. All others landed at this base.

2. Enemy Air Opposition - there was none.

3. Flak - meagre to moderate AA fire tracked the formation accurately near Stuttgart doing minor damage to eight A/C.

4. Bombing Results - each of the three mickey operators reported good HXK returns on the secondary target which was picked up at 35/45 miles and definitely identified. 95A and 95B believe bombs on the target, and 95C believes bombs on the target or if anything a little bit over.

5. Other Information - very little fighter escort was seen by crews except in the target area. Haze and cloud made visability poor and escort may have been in the vicinity.

-1-

For the Intelligence Officer:

**ARNO A. KRAUSE,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.**

VST 45-2 (9 OCT 44)

OPERATIONAL REPORT - STATISTICAL SECTION

GROUP	95A	95B	95C
A/C AIRBORNE	11+1	11+1	11+1
SORTIES	11+1	11+1	9+1
A/C ATTACKING	11+0	10+1	9+1
5. A/A FAILING TO ATTACK	0	1	2
a. Mechanical	0	1	1
b. Weather	0	0	2
c. Enemy action	0	0	0
d. Other	0	0	0
6. A/C LOST	0	0	0
a. TO AA	0	0	0
b. TO E/A	0	0	0
c. TO AA AND E/A	0	0	0
d. TO Accident	0	0	0
e. By Reasons Unknown	0	0	0
7. TIME OF ATTACK	1154	1156	1156 ⁴²
8. ALTITUDE OF ATTACK	25,000	25,600	23,000
9. BOMBS DROPPED (PRIMARY)			
a. Number	70	58	51
b. Size	1000	1000	1000
c. Type	GP	GP	GP
d. Number A/C Bombing	12	10	10
BOMBS DROPPED (OTHER)			
a. Number	0	6 (4855-0842)	0
b. Size	0	1000	0
c. Type	0	GP	0
d. Number A/C Bombing	0	1	0
BOMBS DROPPED (OTHER)			
a. Number	0	6 (4830-0830)	0
b. Size	0	1000	0
c. Type	0	GP	0
d. Number A/C Bombing	0	1	0
10. BATTLE DAMAGE	0	3	5
a. Minor	0	3	5
b. Major	0	1	0
c. Salvage	0	0	0
12. Claims	0-0-0	0-0-0	0-0-0

3 out-standing

Bombed with 91st & completed attacking

Jethome

13x1000 GP RET.

Phoned Wg
20/1/45
1745
SDP

A

A/C No.	Air- borne	Sor- ties	Attack- ing	ABORTS				LOST			DAMAGE		BOMBS DROPPED				RET.		
				M	W	E	O	E/A	AA	OTHER	Maj.	Min.	P	S	LR	TO		JETT	
8826	1	1	1												6				
7844	1	1	1												6				
8333	1	1	1												6				
8106	1	1	1												6				
8774	1	1	1												6				
9037	1	1	1												6				
8676	1	1	1												6				
8272	1	1	1												6				
6993	1	1	1												6				
6583	1	1	1												6				
8604	1	1	1												6				
8270	1	1	1												4				

B

A/C No.	Air-borne	Sor-ties	Attack-ing	ABORTS				LOST			DAMAGE				BOMBS DROPPED						
				M	W	E	O	E/A	AA	OTHER	Maj.	Min.	P	S	LR	TO	JETT	RET.			
7257	1	1	1														4855-0842 6	7/01 UP 1/02 0.2			
8640	1	1	1														6				
8438	1	1	1														6				
8990	1	1	1														6				
8776	1	1											1					4880-0830 (UP) 6	Jettisoned OK		
2447	1	1	1														6				
8996	1	1	1										1				6				
8317	1	1	1														6				
8525	1	1	1														6				
7201	1	1	1										1				6				
7957	1	1	1															4833-0833 6			
8040	1	1	1														4				
												52					18				
												58					12				

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 265

PERIOD: 0001 hours 20 January to 2400 hours 20 January 1945

A. STATISTICS

	Disp.	Sorties	Atkg.	Tonnage	Claims	Losses			NYR	
						E/A	AA	OT Totals		
Heavy Bomber Atks.	762	696	674	1769.7	0-0-0	0	0	21(a)	21	0
Fighter Escort	384	358	0	0	1-0-0A(c) 0-0-0G	0	1	1	2	11
Fighter Sweeps (b)	55	52	0	0	0-0-0	0	1	0	1	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	6	6	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	8	8	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	10	10	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>49</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	1274	1178	674	1769.7	1-0-0A 0-0-0G	0	2	22	24	11

(a) Category "E" - Four a/c

(b) Includes 352 Gp. based on Continent. 361 Gp. did not operate.

(c) Me-262

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

762 B-17s from two Air Divisions dispatched in four forces against a synthetic oil plant, two M/Ys and two bridges in western Germany. 674 a/c dropped 1752.2 tons GP, 16.5 tons IB - total 1768.7 tons on three primaries, one secondary and several T/Os. Breisach Bridge not attacked due to overcast. Bombing by H2X, Geo-H, Micro-H, only Stuttgart bombed visually. No e/a opposition. Two Me-109s sighted NW of Stuttgart. Claims: nil. Losses: 21 B-17s (17 to unknown reasons, 4 Cat "E").

First Force

Four group formations (154 B-17s, 3rd Air Division) dispatched against Sterkrade-Holten Synthetic Oil Plant. 127 a/c dropped 322.7 tons GP and 16.5 tons IB on primary and assigned secondary at 0955-1021 hours from 20,000-28,000 feet. All bombed on H2X. Leaflets dropped on Sterkrade and Rheine. Weather: 9/10-10/10 undercast in target area with dense non-persistent contrails. Flak: meager, inaccurate at Rheine. Battle Damage: 33 minor, 6 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 B-17s (2 to causes unknown, 1 Cat. "E").

Fighter Support: Three groups (103 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0837-0841 hours, down 1220-1242 hours. 95 sorties. E/A Opposition: one Me-262 sighted near Emmerich. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51 to engine failure.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Sterkrade-Holten Syn. Oil Plant	154	12	.28.0	5.0	Unobserved
Rheine M/Y (Sec)	—	115	294.7	11.5	Unobserved
Totals	154	127	322.7	16.5	

Second Force

Four group formations (155 B-17s, 1st Air Division) dispatched against Sterkrade-Holten Synthetic oil Plant. 134 a/c dropped 323.0 tons GP on Sterkrade-Holten and Rheine M/Y at 1005-1047 hours from 24,000-28,500 feet. Bombing on Micro-H and H2X. Leaflets dropped on Rheine. Weather: 5/10-6/10 over Continent to Germany, then 8/10-10/10 in target area. Flak: moderate and accurate in the Sterkrade area, meager to moderate, accurate to inaccurate at Rheine. Battle Damage: 19 minor, 10 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 B-17, Cat. "E".

Fighter Support: Two groups (96 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0833-0840 hours, down 1240-1245 hours. 94 sorties. E/A Opposition: two e/a, possible jets, seen in Osnabruck area, one u/i jet observed near Dusseldorf. No attacks. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	
Sterkrade-Holten Syn. Oil Plant	155	24	60.0	Unobserved
Rheine M/Y (Sec)	—	110	263.0	Unobserved
Totals	155	134	323.0	

Third Force

Six group formations (223 B-17s, 3rd Air Division) dispatched against Heilbronn M/Y and Breisach Bridge. 197 a/c dropped 574.0 tons GP on Heilbronn primary, Pforzheim M/Y, and two T/Os at 1131-1225 hours from 23,000-28,500 feet. Bombing on H2X. Leaflets dropped on Heilbronn. Weather: general 8/10-10/10 cloud condition existed over targets and most of route. Breisach Bridge not attacked due to 10/10. Flak: meager, inaccurate, tracking barrage at Heilbronn. Battle Damage: 16 minor, 2 major. E/A Opposition: 2 Me-109s sighted NW of Stuttgart, but no attacks. Claims: nil. Losses: 11 B-17s to unknown causes.

Fighter Support: one group (48 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0923 hours, down 1413 hours. 39 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>GP</u>	<u>Results</u>
Heilbronn M/Y	115	91	271.8	Unobserved
Breisach Bridge	108	Not Attacked		
Heilbronn M/Y		96	273.5	Unobserved
<u>Other Targets</u>				
Pforzheim M/Y		8	22.7	Unobserved
T/O 4901N-0848E		1	3.0	Unobserved
U/I T/O		1	3.0	Unobserved
Totals	223	197	574.0	

Fourth Force

Six group formations (230 B-17s, 1st Air Division) dispatched against Mannheim Road and Rail Bridge. 216 a/c dropped 533.5 tons GP on primary and several T/Os at 1038-1142 hours from 26,000-29,600 feet. Bombing was on Gee-H and H2X on primary and visual on T/Os. Leaflets dropped on Mannheim. Weather: 8/10-10/10 over targets. Flak: meager and accurate to inaccurate at Mannheim; moderate and accurate at Stuttgart. Battle Damage: 25 minor, 4 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 6 B-17s (4 to unknown causes, 2 Cat. "E").

Fighter Support: Three groups (137 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0906-0942 hours, down 1420-1510 hours. 130 sorties. E/A Opposition: two Me-262s engaged S of Augsburg, a third Me-262 sighted W of Augsburg. One group strafed UIm vicinity damaging one locomotive, 10 box cars, a switch train, truck and trailer. Claims: 1-0-0.(Me-262 Air). Losses: 1 P-51 to AA. NYR: 11 P-51s believed safe on Continent.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Mannheim Rd & RR.Br.	230	170	418.5	Unobserved
<u>Other Targets</u>				
T/O (just outside Mannheim)		21	52.5	Unobserved
Stuttgart		24	60.0	Unobserved
U/I T/O		1	2.5	Unobserved
Totals	230	216	533.5	

2. Fighter Escort

Nine groups (384 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0823-1000 hours, down 1220-1510 hours. 358 sorties. E/A Opposition: one Me-262 sighted near Emmerich, tow e/a possible jets, seen in Osnabruck area, one u/i jet observed near Dusseldorf, one Me-262 sighted west of Augsburg, tow Me-262s engaged south of Augsburg. One group strafed Ulm area damaging one locomotive, 10 box cars and miscellaneous transportation targets. Claims: 1-0-0, Me-262, air. Losses: 2 P-51s (1 to AA, 1 to engine failure). NYR: 11 P-51s believed safe on Continent.

3. Fighter Sweeps

One group (39 P-51s) dispatched to sweep behind Ruhr to Frankfurt. Up 1000 hours, down 1340 hours. 36 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Strafed Minden-Stadhagen area destroying 4 locomotives, 5 tank cars, 7 box cars and damaging 28 box cars and miscellaneous transportation targets. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51 to AA.

One group based on Continent (16 P-51s) dispatched on area patrol in the St. Vith-Duren area. Up 0929 hours, down 1211 hours. 16 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

Other group based on Continent did not operate.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

6 a/c dispatched as follows:

3 F-5s dispatched to obtain D/A coverage of M/Ys in Germany and tactical targets in the Euskirchen area. One mission unsuccessful. Losses: nil.

3 B-17s dispatched on H2X scope photo operation to Frankfurt, Mannheim and Kaiserslautern. Photos taken of Frankfurt and Mannheim. Other mission not completed due to Intercom equipment failure. One u/i e/a sighted NE of Heilbronn but no attacks. Losses: nil.

6. Weather Reconnaissance.

8 a/c dispatched as follows:

2 B-17s completed a weather flight to and from the Azores.

1 B-17 completed a weather flight over the NW of Lands End.

5 Mosquitoes completed special weather reconnaissance over UK, Holland, Germany. Two u/i a/e e/a observed at 4955N-0740E, but no attacks.

Losses: nil.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

10 P-47s dispatched on routine patrol. All a/c completed missions.

Losses: nil.

8. Special Operations

49 a/c dispatched as follows:

8 B-24s dispatched on RCM, jamming between 0608-0915 hours. Losses: nil.

11 a/c (2 B-17s, 9 B-24s) dropped leaflets on Holland, Belgium and Germany night 19/20. All a/c completed missions. Losses: nil.

4 Mosquitoes dropped Chaff for a bomber force. 3 sorties. Losses: nil.

16 P-51s were weather scouts for bomber forces. Losses: nil.

10 B-17s as screening force for bombers. Losses: nil.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Extremely unfavorable weather conditions precluded any organized interception effort.

The only engagement of the day occurred at 1215 hours south of Augsburg where P-51s claimed the destruction of one of two Me-262s encountered at 25,000 feet. A third Me-262 sighted in the same area used its superior speed to evade. A few scattered sightings in the general Emmerich-Dusseldorf-Osnabruck area indicate limited but unaggressive patrol activity by jet e/a. The only conventional e/a sighted were two Me-109s reported northwest of Stuttgart at 1150 hours by one of the bomber formations.

2. Flak

Sterkrade - meager to moderate, accurate to inaccurate.

Rheine - meager to moderate and accurate to inaccurate.

Venlo - meager and fairly accurate.

3. Observations

Many jets seen on an A/F near Lake Constance.

Several V-2 rocket trails seen between 1050 and 1115 hours at 5240N-

0549E climbing at a 75-degree angle at 25,000 feet believed launched from 5230N-0610E.

S E C R E T

Oil or gas fire, or two fires close together, burning and smoking fiercely on ground about one to five miles south of Amsterdam.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Sterkrade-Holten Synthetic Oil Plant - Unobserved Results

Rheine M/Y - Unobserved Results

10/10 cloud cover prevents damage assessment.

Heilbronn M/Y - Unobserved Results

One pattern believed to have fallen across the south choke point of the yard.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.