

HEADQUARTERS  
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)  
APO 559

Date 13 January 1945  
13 CBW FO 11  
13 CBW OPS 260  
3 AD FO 549

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (MAINZ-GUSTAVSBURG RAILWAY BRIDGE)

TO : CO, 95 BG, APO 559

1. Information Concerning the Target:

a. The primary target (visual or MH) for today was the MAINZ-GUSTAVSBURG double track RAILWAY BRIDGE on the Main Line of the Rhine Valley. This bridge is a Four Span, Parabolic Lattice Girder Bridge, 1400' in length by 55' in width.

b. The secondary target (H2X) for today was the MAINZ MARSHALLING YARD situated on the western edge of MAINZ, GERMANY.

c. The last resort target (visual or H2X) for today was the Sorting Sidings of the KOBLENZ-MOSEL MARSHALLING YARD, near KOBLENZ, GERMANY.

2. Planning and Execution of the Mission:

a. Group Order and Strength:

(1) 4 A, B, C, D Groups:	12 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a) 94 Group	3 Squadrons
(b) 487 Group	3 Squadrons
(c) 385 Group	3 Squadrons
(d) 486 Group	3 Squadrons
(2) 13 A, B Groups:	6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a) 100 Group	2 Squadrons
(b) 390 Group	1 Squadron
(b) 95 Group	2 Squadrons
390 Group	1 Squadron
(3) 45 A, B Groups:	6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a) 96 Group	3 Squadrons
(b) 388 Group	2 1/2 Squadrons
96 Group	1/2 Squadron
(4) 93 A, B Groups:	6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a) 34 Group	3 Squadrons
(b) 493 Group	3 Squadrons

b. A/C and C/C Available:

(1) 95 Group	35 A/C	45 C/C
	6 A/C PFF	7 C/C PFF
	3 A/C MH	7 C/C MH
(2) 100 Group	34 A/C	34 C/C
	6 A/C PFF	7 C/C PFF
	5 A/C MH	5 C/C MH

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(3) 390 Group	34 A/C	54 C/C
	3 A/C PFF	8 C/C PFF
	2 A/C MH	6 C/C MH

c. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

(1) 95 Group	23 Plus 2 PFF
(2) 100 Group	23 Plus 2 PFF
(3) 390 Group	24 Plus 2 PFF

d. A/C Airborne:

(1) 95 Group	22 Plus 2 PFF
(2) 100 Group	23 Plus 2 PFF
(3) 390 Group	24 Plus 2 PFF

e. A/C Abortive:

(1) 95 Group:

A/C 776: 334 Sqdn "B" - #3 engine feathered - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Griffin.  
 A/C 996: 334 Sqdn "T" - #2 engine feathered - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Madigan.  
 A/C 951: 334 Sqdn "Q" - #1 exhaust stack cracked - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Koehler.  
 A/C 199: 336 Sqdn "Z" - #1 engine feathered - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Gross.  
 A/C 455: 335 Sqdn "Z" - #3 engine feathered - No sortie - Pilot Lt. Purdy.

(2) 100 Group: None.

(3) 390 Group: None.

f. A/C Missing:

(1) 95 Group: None.  
 (2) 100 Group: None.  
 (3) 390 Group: None.

g. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW A Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary	15	75x1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	5	25x1000 LB GP
TO	13	60x1000 LB GP
Returning	5	(25x1000 LB GP)

(2) Method of Bombing: Cat & Mouse & Visual

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

h. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW B Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary	22	110x1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	1	5x1000 LB GP
TO	1	5x1000 LB GP
Returning	13	(65x1000 LB GP)

(2) Method of Bombing: MH

(3) Method of Release: Salvo

3. Narrative of the Attack:

a. 13 A Group:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The two Squadrons of the 100 Group and the one Squadron of the 390 Group made a normal take off as scheduled. An instrument ascent was necessary to 4000 feet where the aircraft broke into the clear. Occasional cirrus clouds at assembly altitude made assembly difficult but it was accomplished without too much delay. The 390 Group made rendezvous with the 100 Group as planned. All points of Wing and Division assembly were made good, approximately on time.

(b) Route:

A climb was started at zero plus 15 minutes as specified in the Field Order. The Continental Coast (CP 1) was reached about 4½ minutes early due to a lower wind velocity from that as briefed.

The route to the IP was flown essentially as briefed. The Group was about 5 miles right of course all the way, to maintain good division formation. At the pre-IP they were 9 miles South of course, deliberately, so that they could make a more shallow turn in an effort to keep their beacons in the scope. The IP was made good and a good MH run was set up, by Squadrons. 8-910th low cloud at target kept the results from being observed but they were believed to be slightly over. The High Squadron followed in trail of the Lead since their course beacon was not being received too well. They followed through and dropped using their own rate checks which were very accurate. Both Squadrons made runs with the AFCE.

Meanwhile, the Low Squadron (390A) had lost radio contact with the Group Leader. They made the IP good and dropped back and to the left in preparation for an individual run. Beacon reception faded temporarily during this maneuver and when it was good again they immediately switched over to H2X and took up a general heading for Koblenz, last resort target. This city was passed also before the H2X was working properly. The bombardier picked a TO and dropped visually on the SW edge of Euskirchen, doing some damage to a railroad junction and tracks.

Thick cirrus clouds after the RP made it necessary for the Group to drop to 21000 feet, about 3000 feet lower than briefed. The Low Squadron did not make rendezvous but came out, on course, by themselves. The route, back to England, was flown very much as briefed without any unusual difficulty.

(c) Weather:

Conditions at take off were satisfactory and no trouble was experienced. Low cumulus, with bases about 1500 feet and tops about 4000 feet, prevailed over the assembly areas. At an altitude of 3000 feet and above slight contrails were in evidence but caused no great difficulty.

A 10/10 low overcast was present until about 4 degrees east where it broke up gradually into about 2/10 low cumulus. Kodak

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reported about 2/10 coverage in the target area but when the Groups reached there they found about 9/10 coverage.

Dense cirrus clouds after the RP forced the Groups to an altitude of about 21000 in order to stay below it.

Approximately the same conditions prevailed at the bases, when the aircraft returned, as was evident at take off time.

(d) Difficulties:

Fading of beacons at a critical time made it necessary for one Squadron to bomb a TO. Thus they were forced to come back to base by themselves as Group reassembly was not feasible.

(e) Remarks:

Navigation is considered very good especially on the part of the Group Leaders.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Two MH aircraft of the 100 Group and one MH aircraft of the 390 Group led the three Squadrons of 13A Group. 100A received beacons strongly on the bomb run, and made what the radar navigator judged as a perfect MH run. PI reports from SAV photos indicated the bomb impact was 2 1/2 to 3 miles over the assigned target. 100B Squadron received both beacons strongly, but the circular course from the "cat" beacon was unreliable. The target course was made good by pilotage; the rate was established by check points off the "mouse" beacon. At bombs away, there was a delay of 10 seconds due to a rack malfunction resulting in the bombs dropping over the assigned target. 390A Squadron received strong beacon returns on the bomb run, however, considerable "S"ing due to formation difficulties caused the Squadron to be off course too long to allow sufficient time for the radar navigator to use the beacons to make an MH run. An H2X run was made, then, on Koblenz, but the distance was too short to pick up the target satisfactorily, because of change from MH to H2X. A visual run was made, finally, on a TO.

(2) 100A Squadron:

(a)	Air Leader	Cel. Barr	Nav	Lt. Larsen
	Pilot	Capt. Spurgeon	Asst Nav	Lt. Broviles
	Co-Pilot	Lt. Sharemet	M/O	Lt. Maddox
			Bomb	Capt. Searle

(b) A/C Attacking:

Bombs Dropped

(1)	Primary	11	55x1000 LB GP
	Jettisoning	1	5x1000 LB GP

(2) Bombing Altitude: 25200'

(3) Time of Release: 1258

(c) Run In from IP to Target:

A cat and mouse run was made on the primary target. Visibility was reported good up to five miles from the target. Final rate checks were .01 degrees of a tangent off. Course was checked with pilotage. The run was believed to be good. Bombs were dropped by cat and mouse. C-1 was used.

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(d) PI Report:

(1) Clouds obscure all bursts from 100A Squadron, but sufficient terrain is visible in photographs to identify the position of the A/C during the bomb run.

(2) According to computations based upon the bomb trajectory chart the bombs fell in fields approximately 2 miles NE of Mainz, Germany.

(e) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 817: Bombardier's salvo switch would not release bombs - Co-pilot released them from his switch.

A/C 505: One bomb hung up and later fell out through the bomb bay - Position: 5051N - 0756E.

A/C 476: Bomb bay doors closed manually.

A/C 505: Bomb bay doors closed manually.

(3) 100B Squadron:

(a)	Air Leader	Maj. Cruver	Nav	Lt. Chappell
	Pilot	Capt. Ernst	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Stropp
			Bomb	Lt. Lockhart

(b) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(1)	Primary	4	20x1000 LB GP
	Jettisoning	4	20x1000 LB GP
	Returning	5	(25x1000 LB GP)

(2) Bombing Altitude: 25700'

(3) Time of Release: 1220

(e) Run In from IP to Target:

A cat and mouse run was made on the primary target. Run was started 2 miles east of briefed IP. The target was covered by a small patch of clouds. Only one slight rate correction was made on all the rate checks. The bombardier was able to accurately pin-point himself, by pilotage, throughout most of the bomb run. Bombs hung up and could not be salvaged for 10 seconds. The salvo switch had to be hit four times. C-1 was used.

(d) PI Report:

(1) Clouds obscure all bursts from 100B Squadron but sufficient terrain is visible in photographs to identify the position of the A/C during the bomb run.

(2) According to computations based upon the bomb trajectory chart the bombs of this Squadron fell in the vicinity of the small town of Bierstadt, situated 2 miles east of Wiesbaden, Germany.

(e) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 608: Jettisoned 4 bombs at 4944N-0807E at 1252 by bombardier.

A/C 400: Bombs would not release immediately - Had to salvo several times.

A/C 521: Bomb bay doors closed manually.

A/C 470: Bomb bay doors closed manually.

(4) 390A Squadron:

(a)	Air Leader	Lt. Watts	Nav	Lt. Yary
	Pilot	Lt. Morris	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Flanaton
			Bomb	Lt. Kellerhouse

(b) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(1) TO 13 60x1000 LB GP

(2) Bombing Altitude: 24500'

(3) Time of Release: 1319½

(c) Run In from IP to Target:

The primary target could not be bombed because the MH and H2X equipment was not functioning properly. The primary target was covered by a small patch of clouds. On the route out a TO at Euskirchen, Germany, was bombed. A short run was made due to clouds partially obscuring the target. AP was center of town. Bomb pattern landed on a small railroad embankment and junction just west of town. C-1 was used.

(d) PI Report:

(1) This Squadron's bombs fell 3000 feet W of Euskirchen, Germany, a target of opportunity. This pattern fell on and around RR tracks near the junction with 1-2 hits and 3-5 near misses on the tracks. The remaining bursts fell in fields and sparsely built up area west of the town.

(2) Bomb Pattern: 2646'L x 3933'W.

(3) Bombing Errors: Gross.

(4) Bombing Results: Nil.

(e) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

b. 13B Group:

(1) Navigation:

(a) Assembly:

The two Squadrons from the 95 Group and one Squadron from the 390 Group made a normal take off from their respective bases. A low cloud layer made it necessary to make an instrument climb to 4000 feet before breaking thru into the clear. The 390B Squadron had no difficulty making rendezvous with the Squadrons from the 95 Group, thus forming the Group in good order. Buncher 28 was crossed about three minutes late, so made it necessary to cut corners along the assembly route in order to make up time. The Division assembly was completed at Felixstowe at 1034 on time, in good position behind the A Group.

(b) Route:

The briefed route was followed across the channel, however, due to a wind change the Group arrived at the Continental Coast about four minutes early. The route over the Continent was very much as briefed. The M/O had difficulty in picking up the MH beacons and

when he did pick them up could not keep them in the scope for any length of time because the beacons faded out. The Group leader relinquished the lead to the High Squadron Leader who had good beacon reception, and assumed the High position in the Group. The change in leads was made at approximately 0730E and was effected without difficulty. From this point the briefed course was followed by the lead navigator, who was aided by the M/O all along. The IP was made good by the lead navigator, turning over control of the ship to the M/O who went into the target by cat and mouse procedure.

Acting upon weather information sent down by Kodak Control the Group leader decided to climb to 27000 feet to avoid the high cirrus layer reported at the IP and also prepared to make a visual bomb run since a 2/10 cloud coverage was reported over the target.

The High Squadron fell in trail and to the left of the Lead Squadron at the IP and prepared to bomb on the lead Squadron's release since his MH was out. The High Squadron did not release because no smoke bombs were observed indicating bombs away. Visual bombing was not possible since the target was cloud covered. Decision was made to bomb last resort on H2X. Prior to reaching the last resort the target disappeared from the scope and the M/O was unable to pick it up again. The B Squadron then returned to the briefed route and rejoined the A and C Squadrons who were "S"ing on the route out. Along the route out the High Squadron Leader made a run on a TO in the vicinity of 5000-0700 but due to the proximity of this target to front lines it was decided to return the bombs to base. A 360 degree turn was made at this point falling in formation with the 93 Wing on the route out and followed them to the English Coast.

(c) Weather: Same as reported in 13A Group.

(d) Difficulties:

MH beacons reception very poor in Lead A/C. Failure of H2X made it necessary to return bombs to base by the 95A Squadron. Radical course correction by Lead Squadron Leader enroute to IP caused some difficulty for the High Squadron in maintaining position behind the leader.

(e) Remarks:

The navigation was good. It is suggested that briefing officers give the navigators and M/O's information on location of tactical bomb line so that in the event that TO near the front line are selected, no possible error can be made in releasing on friendly troops.

(f) PFF Narrative:

Two MH A/C of the 95 Group, and one MH A/C of the 390 Group led the three Squadrons of 13 B Group. 95A did not receive beacons, and H2X unit was not usable for bombing. Lead was assumed by 95B prior to the IP. 95B Squadron made a complete MH run on the primary target. 95A Squadron brought bombs back to the base, because the radar equipment was not working properly. 390B Low Squadron made a complete MH run on the primary target. All results were unobserved.

(2) 95B Squadron:

(a) Air Leader	Capt. <del>Heneman</del> Nav	Lt. Van Patten
Pilot	Capt. Hendricksen Asst Nav	
Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Finfinger
	Bomb	Lt. Thirton

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- (b) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
  - (1) Primary 9 45x1000 LB GP
  - Jettisoning 1 5x1000 LB GP
  - Returning 2 (10x1000 LB GP)
- (c) Bombing Altitude: 26000'
- (d) Time of Release: 1303
- (e) Run In from IP to Target:

Prior to the IP 95B took Group lead after Mickey equipment in 95A failed. Bomb bay doors were opened 2 minutes before the IP. The IP was made good and M/O took over. Visibility was fair, but the target area was obscured by clouds. M/O clutched bombardier in at check point one. Check points two and three were slow and rate corrections were made. Checks at four and five were good. Bombs were released by MH. C-1 was used.

(d) PI Report:

(1) Clouds obscure all bursts of the 95B Squadron but sufficient terrain is visible in photographs to identify the position of the A/C during the bomb run.

(2) According to computations based upon the bomb trajectory chart the bombs fell on both sides of the Rhine River just short of the Mainz/Kastel Ordnance Works and 4500' NW of the target.

(e) Bombing Malfunctions:

- A/C 2455: Aborted - Engine failure - Returned 10x1000 GPs.
- A/C 8199: Aborted - Engine failure - Returned 10x1000 GPs.
- A/C 8469: Aborted - Runaway supercharger - Jettisoned bombs - 5x1000 GPs.

(3) 95A Squadron:

- (a) Air Leader Capt. Wright Nav Lt. Rohr
- Pilot Lt. Savage Asst Nav Lt. Pieper
- Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Feeley
- Bomb Lt. Sefrian

- (b) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
  - (1) Primary 2 10x1000 LB GP
  - TO 1 5x1000 LB GP
  - Returning 9 (45x1000 LB GP)
- (2) Bombing Altitude: 26500'
- (3) Time of Release: No Release
- (c) Run In from IP to Target:

Prior to the IP the MH and H2X equipment went completely inoperative. 95B was then given the Group Lead. 95A



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then decided to drop its bombs off of 95B. 95A assumed the High Squadron and flew left of 95B on the bomb run. Lead bombardier of 95A Squadron saw no smoke markers from 95B and did not release his bombs. On the route out the bombardier picked up a town for a TO and was synchronizing on it. The navigator then decided the TO was too close to our lines. Bombs were returned to base.

(d) PI Report: No photo coverage.

(e) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 2447: Aborted and dropped on a TO at Buhau,  
Germany - 5x1000 GPs.

(4) 390B Squadron:

(a) Air Leader Capt. Jones	Nav	Lt. Lynch
Pilot Lt. Thumbert	Asst Nav	
Co-Pilot	M/O	Lt. Conroy
	Bomb	Lt. Taylor

(b) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary 13 65x1000 LB GP

(2) Bombing Altitude: 26000'

(3) Time of Release: 1304½

(c) Run In from IP to Target:

Bomb run was taken over at IP by M/O.95A and 95B prevented 390B from making the IP good. Clouds covered the target area. Complete bomb run was made by MH. C-1 was used.

(d) PI Report:

(1) Clouds obscure all bursts from 390B Squadron, but sufficient terrain is visible in photographs to identify the position of the A/C during the bomb run.

(2) According to computations based on bomb trajectory chart the bombs fell in the vicinity of the Kestheim-Gustavsburg Road Bridge over the Main River and the built up area of these towns approximately 4000' over the east end of the target.

(e) Bombing Malfunctions: None

#### 4. Mission Camera Report:

a. the 95 Group installed 2 scope and 6 vertical cameras, 1 and 2 of which took pictures:

PFF A/C 7961 with scope and K-21 cameras installed: Did not drop bombs.

A/C's 8525 and 8317 with K-21's installed: Did not drop bombs.

A/C 8469 with K-21 installed: Aborted.

b. The 100 Group installed 1 scope and 6 vertical cameras, 1 and 6 of which took pictures.

c. The 390 Group installed 1 scope and 6 vertical cameras, 1 and 6 of which took pictures.

5. Controller's Log:

- a. 2320 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Alerted.
  - (2) Force.
  - (3) Zero Hour.
  - (4) RBA.
  - (5) Will be MH Cat-Mouse.
- b. 0050 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Order of Groups.
  - (2) Assigned Targets (Primary and Secondary).
  - (3) Bomb Load.
  - (4) Tentative Route.
  - (5) Time Control.
  - (6) Division Assembly.
  - (7) Approach to Assembly.
  - (8) Intervalometer Setting.
  - (9) Other Division Targets.
  - (10) Bombardiers Sighting Angle Computer.
  - (11) Bombing Altitude.
- c. 0200 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Advance Warning to 3 AD FO.
- d. 0200 to Groups:
  - (1) Advance Warning to 3 AD FO.
- e. 0214 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Intelligence Annex to 3 AD FO.
- f. 0215 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Preliminary Timings.
  - (2) Start Climb Time.
  - (3) Control Points.
  - (4) Intervals Between Groups.
  - (5) Assembly Altitude.
- g. 0230 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Timings are Final.
  - (2) Route is Final.
- h. 0315 from 3 AD:
  - (1) 3 AD FO.
- i. 0330 to Groups:
  - (1) 13 GBW FO.
- j. 0405 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Final Assembly Times.
  - (2) New Point in Route.
  - (3) RP for Last Resort Target.
- k. 0420 from 3 AD:
  - (1) MH Annex to 3 AD FO.

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l. 0430 to Groups:

(1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO.

m. 0445 to Groups:

(1) Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO.

n. 0517 from 3 AD:

(1) Mistake of MH Annex.  
(2) Will not change figures.

o. 0608 from 100 Group:

(1) Weather A/C Took Off.

p. 0630 from 100 Group:

(1) 1st Weather Report.

q. 0650 from 100 Group:

(1) 2nd Weather Report.

r. 0818 from 390 Group:

(1) First Take Off.

6. Comments on Mission Planning:

a. Satisfactory.

For the Commanding Officer:

GENE C. SMITH,  
Major, Air Corps,  
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

APC 559,  
15 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Report of Operations Officer, Mission of 13 January  
1945, Mains, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Op (E).

95 A SQUADRON FORMATION

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95 "A" Squadron formation took off at 0821-0843 hours to fly as lead squadron of 13 B Combat Group. Squadron and group assembly were made over the base, with 95 "A" circling at 16,000'. The 95 "B" High Squadron and 390 "B" low Squadron were in group formation prior to departure from the base at 0950 hours, and the formation proceeded to Wing assembly over Buncher #28. The approach from the East was made at 1007 hours, one minute late. Course was continued as briefed, and division assembly at Buncher #12 was made on time.

The English coast was departed at 1034 hours, on time and on course, and the climb to bombing altitude was started over the English Channel. The continental coast was reached at 1107 hours, altitude 18,000' and the course to 4850-0730 was flown as briefed. At this point the 95 "A" Squadron gave up the group lead to 95 "B" Squadron, as 95 "A"'s M-H equipment was unsatisfactory. For the remainder of the route to the target, 95 "B" led the group, and 95 "A" flew as high squadron.

The I.P. was made good at 1252 hours, but clouds on the bomb run necessitated an additional climb of 2,000'. During the climb on the bomb run, 95 "A" High Squadron over-ran 95 "B" Lead Squadron, and were unable to drop on the smoke flares of the 95 "B" Squadron behind them, and the target was obscured by 9/10 clouds. The 95 "A" Squadron therefore did not drop on the Primary target, and a dry run was made on the secondary target in the attempt to use M-H.

After rejoining group formation on the return route, the 95 "A" Squadron started a visual run on a target of opportunity, but broke off because of the nearness to the battle lines. After breaking off, the squadron was unable to catch up with the group, and fell in behind the 93 Combat Wing. The Belgium coast was crossed at 1406 hours at 16,000', and the squadron reached the English coast at 1428 hours, at 6,000'. 95 "A" Squadron landed at base from 1457 to 1509 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: Eleven aircraft plus one M-H leader assembled in the formation shown in diagram A. Of these, three aircraft, (#43,38996, 43-38776, 42-10251) returned before becoming dispatched, and received no sortie. The remaining aircraft were over the target and are credited with scr.

3. LOST AIRCRAFT: None.

## 95 B SQUADRON FORMATION

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95 "B" Squadron took off at 0823-0926 hours to fly as high squadron of 13 B Combat Group. Squadron assembly was effected at 17,000' over Buncher #23, and both Squadron and group assembly were complete prior to departure from the base at 0950.

The remainder of the route, into 4850-0730, was flown as High squadron of 13 B Group, as reported by 95 "A" Lead Squadron. At this point 95 "B" became the lead squadron of the group, as 95 "A"'s M-H equipment was out of order. The I.P. was reached at 1252 hours, and the group started a climb to clear a layer of cirrus clouds on the bomb run. Bombs from 95 "B" Squadron were away at 1303 hours, dropping from 27,000'. The rally point used was south of course, but the briefed course was picked up at 1329 hours at 502400537, and the return route was flown as ordered.

The Belgium coast was crossed at 1359 hours, 12,000' over Ostende, and the English coast was reached at 1423 hours, and the 95 "B" Squadron landed from 1441 to 1518 hours at the base.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: Eleven aircraft plus one M-H leader assembled as shown in formation diagram B. Of these, two A/C (#43-38199 and 42-102455) returned before becoming dispatched and received no sortie. The remaining ten A/C were over the target and are credited with sorties.

3. LOST AIRCRAFT: None.

NOEL T. CUMBAA,  
Major, Air Corps,  
Operations Officer.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
APO 559

STATISTICAL CONTROL REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACHING

13TH COMBAT BOMBARDMENT WING

DATE RENDERED 15 Jan 1948

PART I - TABULAR SUMMARY:

DATE OF MISSION 15 Jan 1948

STRATEGICAL MISSION

COMBAT GROUP	SCHEDULED	AIRBORNE	AIRBORNE LESS RETURNING SORTIES	ATTACKING	NOT ATTACHING	SORTIES
A	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	3	8 & 13H	8 & 13H
B	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	11 & 15H	8 & 13H	3	9 & 13H

PART II - REASONS WHY AIRCRAFT DID NOT ATTACK OR FAILED TO TAKE OFF:

Combat Gp	A.C.S.N.	Category	Reason for Failure & Corrective Action	Sortie (Yes-No)
A	43-58966	F	Cylinder head temperature and oil temperature very high # 2 engine.	No
A	43-58776	F	Pilot reported excessive amount of oil coming breather of # 3 engine.	No
A	42-102961	F	Collar between exhaust stacks cracked in flight.	No
A	42-97961	F	Wickey set out.	Yes
A	44-3840	E	Did't bomb because leader did't bomb.	Yes
A	44-3438	E	Did't bomb because leader did't bomb.	Yes
A	45-33317	E	Did't bomb because leader did't bomb.	Yes
A	42-38837	E	Did't bomb because leader did't bomb.	Yes
A	44-3838	E	Did't bomb because leader did't bomb.	Yes
B	42-33489	F	Runway supercharger.	Yes
B	42-38199	F	Oil pressure relief valve stuck.	No
B	42-102455	F	Pilot reported # 3 supercharger out.	No

S E C R E T

NOEL T. CURRAN,  
Major, Air Corps,  
Operations Officer.

"A"

0550 #1 01200 38 15

FORM 3

STATION 119.

DATE 13 JAN. 45.

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
336	K	7961	SAVAGE	✓ Lead.		821		1509 ✓	
334	X	8990	SCOTT	✓		822		1505 ✓	
"	R	8438	McALLISTER	✓		822		1509 ✓	
"	B	8776	GRIFFIN	✓		835		931 * # 3 Engine Failure	No notes
"	W	8660	RUDKINS	✓		836		1504 ✓	
"	A	2447	ROY	✓		837		1500 ✓	
"	D	8640	CORBIN	✓ High		838		1457 ✓	
"	Q	2951	KOEHLE	✓		839		1228 * No notes	
"	K	8317	PARRISH	✓		840		1500 ✓	
"	U	8525	WELLS	✓ Low		841		1507 ✓	
"	T	8996	MADIGAN	✓		842		952 * No notes	
"	V	8657	RIVET	✓		843		1502 ✓	

13

FORM 3

STATION 119

DATE 13 JAN. 45.

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
412.	Q	7992	HENDRICKSON	✓ lead		8 23	1449	✓	
335	N	6598	RICHARDSON	✓		8 27	1455	✓	
"	S	9052	SHAW	✓		8 28	1452	✓	
336	X	8604	COTNER	✓		8 24	1448	✓	
"	Y	6583	EARLEY	✓		8 29	1446	-	
"	V	8676	DUNWOODY	✓	—	—	—		
"	N	8899	J. TAYLOR	High ✓		8 30	1443	—	
"	Z	8199	GROSS.	✓		8 31	935 *		900 under
"	U	8469	MILLER	✓		8 33	1441	✓	
"	W	6993	SUTTON	✓		900	1518	✓	
335	H	7376	TREGONING	✓ low.		8 32	1447	✓	
"	Z	2455	PAROY	✓		8 34	1406 *		900 under
"	<del>A</del>	<del>8255</del> <del>8269</del>	SCHAAD	✓	—	926	1449	✓	



HEADQUARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION  
"J" FORM

GP.

STA.

1. DATE 13/1/45 TARGET \_\_\_\_\_ DUTY OFFICERS LT. JENKINS
2. CBW 138 GROUP 95A GP. LEADER CAPT. WRIGHT A/C 7961 W/T TMT-K  
POSITION LEAD DEPUTY LDR. LT. SCOTT A/C 8990 W/T NOT-X
3. EST. TAXI TIME 0825 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0835 ETD BASE 0950  
ETR BASE \_\_\_\_\_
4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 12 NUMBER OF ~~SERIES~~ PPF INCLUDED 1

HEADQUARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION  
"J" FORM

GP.

STA.

1. DATE 13/1/45 TARGET \_\_\_\_\_ DUTY OFFICERS LT. JENKINS
2. CBW 138 GROUP 95B GP. LEADER CAPT. JENEMAN A/C 7992 W/T UMA-Q  
POSITION HIGH DEPUTY LDR. LT. RICHARDSON A/C 6598 W/T PYX-N
3. EST. TAXI TIME 0815 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0825 ETD BASE 0950  
ETR BASE \_\_\_\_\_
4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 13 NUMBER OF ~~SERIES~~ PPF INCLUDED 1

TIME 1ST LANDING \_\_\_\_\_

STATION WEATHER OFFICE  
AAF STATION 119  
APO 559

T-A-2

14 January 1945

SUBJECT: Meteorological Interrogation Summary for Mission of 13 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, Headquarters, 95th Bombardment Group(H), APO 559.

1. Base at take-off: Time was 0840 hour. 10/10 stratus, base 800-1000, top 4000 feet. Visibility 2 miles.

2. Route to target: 10/10 stratus below 5000 feet over channel becoming 7-8/10 over continent breaking to 5/10 in large patches east of 4 degrees east. Downward visibility 20 miles plus.

3. Target area: Mainz, Germany. Time was 1305 hour. 8-9/10 stratocumulus below 5000 feet in immediate target area. Downward visibility 20 miles plus through breaks.

4. Return route: 5/10 stratocumulus in large patches below 5000 feet becoming scattered patches west of 4 degrees east, then 10/10 stratus, top 4000 feet over channel for remainder of route.

5. Base on return: Time was 1500 hour. 10/10 stratus, base 500, top 4000 feet. Visibility 2-3000 yards.

6. Remarks: Dense non-persistent contrails formed above 25,000 feet east of 5 degrees east becoming dense persistent in vicinity of 50 degrees north, 5 degrees east.

WALTER S. MILLS, JR.,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Staff Weather Officer.

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

13 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 13 January 1945, Mainz, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A..A..F.

1. We led the Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron which led the 13th "F" Group. We took off at 0820 hours and assembled over the base at an altitude of 16000'. Squadron and Group assembly was made at 0950 hours over the base. Wing assembly was made over BU# 28 at an altitude of 16000' over BU# 28. Division assembly was made at 1017 hours at an altitude of 16000' over BU# 12.

2. We left the English coast at 1034 hours at an altitude of 16000' at 159N 0122E. We crossed the enemy coast at 1107 hours at an altitude of 18000' at 5110N 0245E. The route to the I.P. was as briefed and we made good the I.P. at 4928N 0759E at an altitude of 25400' at 1252 hours.

3. Bombs were brought back to the base after a dry run on the target. The Rally Point was used as an I.P. for Koblenz which also proved to be a dry run due to "Mickey" failure. The route back was as briefed and we left the enemy coast at 1406 hours, three miles north of Ostend at 16000'.

4. We crossed the English coast in at 1428 hours at an altitude of 6000' at 5202N 0128E. We were over the base at 1436 hours and landed at 1500 hours.

FRED J. PLEPER  
2nd Lt., Air Corps,  
Lead Navigator.

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

B-F-26

13 January 1944

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 13 January 1945, Mainz, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A. A. F.

1. We led the Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron which flew as high in the 13th "B" Combat Group. We took off at 0823 hours and formed the squadron and group over BU# 23 at 0950 hours at 16500'. Wing assembly was made at BU# 28 at 1007 hours at 16500'. Remaining at this altitude we completed Division assembly on time at 1017 hours at BU# 12 and departed the English coast at Felixstowe at 1034 hours.

2. We crossed the enemy coast at Ostend at 1107 hours at 19000'. Route to the I.P. was flown as briefed. Just before making turn prior to I.P. we were instructed to take over the lead. The I.P. was 4928N 0759E at 1252 hours at 26000'.

3. Mickey run was made on target and bombs were away at 1303 hours on a true heading of 037° at 27000' altitude. The Rally Point was at 5005N 0743E at 1308 hours on a true heading of 285° and an altitude of 26000'.

4. The route back to the coast was flown as briefed. We crossed the enemy coast out at 1359 hours, at Ostend and altitude was 12000'. We made landfall on the English coast at 5200N 0125E at 1423 hours at 5000'. We were over the base at 1431 hours and landed at 1450 hours.

DONALD D. VAN PATTEN  
1st Lt., Air Corps,  
Lead Navigator.

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

E-P-26

13 January 1945

**SUBJECT:** Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 13 January 1945, Mainz, Germany.

**TO :** Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - Before the I.P. we had a report that there were high cirrus clouds over the target causing us to increase our altitude 2500'. Because of M/H failure we turned over lead to 95th "B" and planned to drop in Group formation. Then Kodak reported there was 2/10ths coverage over target and a visual run was possible. After turn onto I.P. I attempted to make a squadron run. Kept on course with aid of pilotage points and occasional fixes from Mickey. As we approached target, weather became 9/10ths and target was impossible to pick up. All data was pre-set in case of last minute break. 95th "B" was behind me so I could not drop on him. There were no smoke flares ahead so I did not drop. We could not go to secondary or last resprt as 95th "B" dropped on Primary. On the way out we searched for a target of opportunity but when I picked up a town and synchronized on it the Navigator thought it was too close to our lines so I brought my bombs back.

2. Disposition of Bombs - 12 A/C were dispatched with 95th "A" Squadron and dropped 10 x 1000# AN-M44 bombs on the primary target. A/C #2447 aborted just before the target (engine failure) and dropped 5 x 1000# M-44 bombs on Dahan, Germany, 4910N 0748E. A/C #7961, 8438, 8525, 8657, 8640 and 8317 returned 30 x 1000# M-44 bombs because the lead A/C could not get rid of his bombs. A/C #8776, 2951, and 8996 aborted (engine failure). All bombs dropped by 95th "A" Squadron were fuzed 1/10 nose and non-delay tail.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped by 95th "A" Squadron were in salvo.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C

Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	Bombs			Fuzing	
			No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Mainz, Germany.	8	2	10	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total on Target			Same as above.				
Bombs Returned.			45	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Other Expenditures (T/O)			5	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			60	1000#	M-44	1/10	None

VESAM EFERIAN  
2nd Lt., Air Corps,  
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

13 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 13 January 1945, Mainz, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Narrative.

a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B, C-2, G-2 and ABC Computers.

b. The maneuver at the I.P. was a turn to the left of about 70° and in Group formation. Down the run 95th "B" dropped back a little and we tried to make a squadron run.

c. Bomb bays were opened two minutes prior to I.P. at 1253 hours.

d. Before the I.P. we had a report that there were high cirrus clouds over the target causing us to increase our altitude 2500'. Because of M/H failure we turned over lead to 95th "B" and planned to drop in Gp. formation. Then Kodak reported there was 2/10ths coverage over target and a visual run was possible. After turn onto I.P. I attempted to make a squadron run. Kept on course with aid of pilotage points and occasional fixes from Mickey. As we approached target, weather became 9/10ths and target was impossible to pick up. All data was pre-set in case of last minute break. 95th "B" was behind me so I could not drop on him. There were no smoke flares ahead so I did not drop. We could not go to secondary or last resort as 95th "B" dropped on Primary. On the way out we searched for a target of opportunity but when I picked up a town and synchronized on it the Navigator thought it was too close to our lines so I brought my bombs back.

e. Our squadron did not drop its bombs.

f. There are no suggested changes in bombing technique.

2. Bombardier's form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C

	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Main Bombfall							
Mainz, Germany.	8	2	10	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total on Target.			Same as above.				
Bombs Returned.			45	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Other Expenditures (T/O)			5	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			60	1000#	M-44	1/10	None

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped were in salvo.

VFSAM SEPERIAN  
2nd Lt., Air Corps  
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

13 January 1945

**SUBJECT:** Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 13 January 1945, Mains, Germany.

**TO :** Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - I opened bomb bay doors two minutes prior to I.P. Mickey took over and made I.P. good. We were in squadron formation at the I.P. Visibility was fair, but the target area was obscured. Mickey clutched me in at check point one. Check point two and three were slow and rate corrections were made. Further checks No.'s four and five were good. I attempted to pick up the target but was unable to do so. The entire run was M/H and we were in squadron formation at bombs away at 1308 hours.

2. Disposition of Bombs - 12 A/C were dispatched from 95th "B" Squadron and dropped 45 x 1000# M-44 bombs on primary target. A/C #2455 and 8199 aborted (engine failure) and returned 10 x 1000# M-44 bombs. A/C #8469 jettisoned 5 x 1000# M-44 bombs, 40 miles east of Southwold (Runaway Supercharger). All bombs dropped were fuzed 1/10 nose and Non-delay tail.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped were in salvo.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C

Main Bombfall		Over Target	Bombing	Bombs			Fuzing	
				No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Mains, Germany.		10	9	45	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total on Target.				Same as above.				
Bombs Returned.				10	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Other Expenditures (jettisoned)				5	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).				60	1000#	M-44	1/10	None

MARSHALL J. THIXTON  
1st Lt., Air Corps.  
Lead Bombardier.

**HEADQUARTERS**  
**NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)**  
**Office of the Operations Officer**

E-F-26

15 January 1945

**SUBJECT:** Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 13 January 1945, Mains, Germany.

**TO :** Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

**1. Narrative.**

a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B, C-2, G-1 and AB Computers.

b. The maneuver at the I.P. was a turn of 25° to the left. We were in squadron formation after the turn.

c. Bomb bay doors were opened at 1256, two minutes before I.P.

d. I opened bomb bay doors two minutes prior to I.P. Mickey took over and made I.P. good. We were in Sq. formation at the I.P. Visibility was fair, but the target area was obscured. Mickey clutched me in at check point one. Check points two and three were slow and rate corrections were made. Further checks No.'s four and five were good. I attempted to pick up the target but was unable to do so. The entire run was M/H and we were in squadron formation at bombs away, at 1308 hours.

e. The bombing results were unobserved due to 10/10ths coverage.

f. There are no tactical changes to be suggested.

**2. Bombardier's form 12-E modified is attached.**

**3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C**

Main Bombfall	Over Target	A/C Bombing	Bombs			Fuzing	
			No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Mains, Germany.	10	9	48	1000#	M-44	1/10	Non-delay
Total on Target.			Same as above.				
Bombs Returned.			10	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Other Expenditures, (jettisoned).			5	1000#	M-44	1/10	None
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			60	1000#	M-44	1/10	None

**4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped were in salvo.**

MARSHALL J. THIXTON  
1st Lt., Air Corps.  
Lead Bombardier.



HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Engineering Officer

V-A-1.

AFPO 559,  
13 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission of 13 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H). Attention:  
Lt Col STUART.

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of 13 January 1945.

- a. Twenty-four (24) B-17 airplanes took-off as scheduled.
- b. Nineteen (19) B-17 airplanes returned to base after completion of combat mission.

2. There were five (5) abortive airplanes.

- a. 42-102951 - A/C lost manifold pressure after collar, between exhaust stacks, cracked in flight.
- b. 43-38776 - Pilot reported excessive amount of oil coming from breather on #3 engine.
- c. 43-38996 - Cylinder head temperature and oil temperature very high on #2 engine.
- d. 42-102455 - Pilot reported #3 supercharger out as aircraft reached I.P.
- e. 43-38199 - Oil pressure relief valve sticking.

3. There were seven (7) airplanes with battle damage.

- a. 43-38660 - Minor skin damage.
- b. 44-8438 - Minor skin damage.
- c. 43-38990 - Minor skin damage.
- d. 44-8525 - Minor skin damage.
- e. 43-38640 - Minor skin damage.
- f. 43-38317 - Minor skin damage.
- g. 42-97992 - Minor skin damage.

DONALD E. DOWLIN,  
Capt., Air Corps,  
Gp Engineering O.

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Armament Officer  
APO 559

13 January 1945

SUBJECT: Mission Expenditure Report for 13 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Following are the expenditures for the mission of 13 January 1945.

A. Station	AAF 119
B. Unit	95th Bombardment Group (H)
C. Type of Ammunition	Cal. 50 API&I-TIEI
D. Gun locations and number of guns	
	42 Ball Turret Guns 420
	42 Upper Turret Guns 420
	21 Left Waist Guns 210
	21 Right Waist Guns 210
	21 Left Nose Guns 210
	21 Right Nose Guns 210
	42 Chin Turret Guns 420
	42 Tail Guns 420
E. Total number of guns	252
F. Total amount of ammunition expended	2520 rounds.
G. Total number of bombs expended	65- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs.
	2- CHB M 1 Sky Markers.

LEONARD F. BAWSON  
Capt. Air Corps  
Group Armament Officer

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (B)  
Office of the Armament Officer  
APO 559

13 January 1945

SUBJECT: Armament Malfunction Report for 13 January 1945.

TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (B).

1. Twelve aircraft were loaded with 5- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs per aircraft and one PFZ aircraft was loaded with 5-1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs and 2- 300 M 1 Sky Markers.

2. Following are the armament malfunctions reported for the mission of 13 January 1945.

No. 2447- Ball Turret ammunition cover, part number B-1012, lost in combat. New Cover installed.

LEONARD F. LAWSON  
Capt. Air Corps  
Group Armament Officer

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Communications Officer

(J-A-1)

APC 559  
13 January 1945

**SUBJECT: Operational Communications**

**TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, Station #119**

1. Of the twenty-four A/C assigned to the mission, twenty crews were available for interrogation by the Communications Officer.
2. Mechanical and electrical failures noted were as follows:
  - (a) 334-A (VHF/faulty dynamotor)
  - (b) 334-K (Interphone/BW jack box faulty)
  - (c) 334-N (Liaison Xmitter/faulty loading unit)
  - (d) 335-H (Interphone/Bomb. jack box out)
  - (e) 336-K (Liaison Xmitter/faulty dynamotor)
  - (f) 336-N (Interphone/faulty wires to headset)
  - (g) 336-Y (Interphone/Bomb. mile faulty)
3. The following navigational aids were used successfully:
  - (a) Twenty A/C used Splashers and Bumpers
  - (b) Twenty A/C used Station 7000
4. The reception of ground stations and beacons was normal.

RICHARD F. WICK  
Captain, A. C.  
Op. Communication O.

(EQUALS ORIGINALLY SECRET)

**HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Intelligence Officer  
APO 559**

**January 15, 1945.  
D-C-5**

**SUBJECT: S-2 Letter for Mains Mission.**

**TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.**

1. Eleven plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Group took off beginning at 0821 hours to form the lead squadron of the 13B Combat Group to attack the RR bridge in Mains, Germany. A/C 8996 aborted over the base at 0900 hours because #2 engine overheated and ran rough. A/C 8776 aborted at 0900 hours over the base because #3 engine had an oil lead. A/C 2951 aborted at 1133 hours at 5025-0333 because of drop in manifold pressure.

Eleven plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Group took off beginning at 0825 hours to form the high squadron of the 13B Combat Group to attack the RR bridge in Mains, Germany. A/C 8469 aborted at 1247 hours at 4904-0745 because of run-away supercharger. A/C 2455 aborted at 1216 hours at 4928-0553 because of #3 engine failure. A/C 8199 aborted at 0900 hours over the base because of #1 engine failure.

2. No E/A were encountered.

3. Moderate, accurate, tracking flak was encountered over Mains, Germany.

4. 95B bombed primary target with estimated poor results on Micro H. Hot prints show Rhine River S of target and it is unlikely bridge was hit. What might possible be bomb burst in cloud covered prints are approximately 3 miles NNE of target. 8 A/C of 95A bombed primary target on the smokemarkers of another Group. The town of Dalen(4808-0747) was bombed visually without a sight by one A/C which was aborting because of mechanical reasons. Results were unobserved.

5. Course followed as briefed with but few exceptions as Mickey set in 95A squadron poor over England and got worse over continent.

Only had beacons a few seconds at a time so relinquished the lead to the high squadron at approximately 4850-0730. 95A took over high position. Formation climbed an additional 2000 feet between this point and target to get above high cirrus cloud. 95A over ran 95B and were unable to drop on their smoke markers as they were to the left. Started for target of last resort but Mickey lost it when bombing circle was turned on. Rest of Group "S" ed until 95A rejoined them. 95A picked up a target of opportunity just east of front line and turned off to bomb it but decided target was too close to front lines. Completed 360 degree turn and filled in behind 93rd Wing. 95B lead 13B Wing to target and bombed by Micro H. Got beacons over England and got all beacons before taking over lead. All A/C returned to base by 1518 hours.

For the Intelligence Officer:

ARNO A. KRAUSE,  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Ass't S-2 Officer.

13 15 10 52

13th Combat Wing  
100th Bomb Group  
390th Bomb Group

XXX

J 2730

HQ. 95TH BOMB GROUP (H)

XXX

13-1-45 18:35 S-2

OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE 95th Bomb Group Mainz, Germany 13 January 1945

1. Leaflets: , None
2. Bombing Results - 95B bombed primary target on Micro H with estimated poor results. Hot prints show Rhine River S of target and it is unlikely bridge was hit. What might possible be bomb burst in ~~shambur~~ cloud covered prints are approximately 3 miles NNE of target. 2 A/C of 95A bombed primary target on the smoke markers of another group with unknown results. Also 95A - The town of Dahn (4809N-0747E) a T.O. was bombed visually without a sight with unobserved results because A/C aborting for mechanical reasons. Suggest reference to paragraph 7.
3. E/A-None
4. Flak:- Mainz - moderate, accurate, tracking.
5. Weather - 7/10ths to 8/10ths low cloud with tops about 10,000feet in target area. High cirrus cloud forced bombing at 2,000 feet higher than briefed.
6. Observations - A/C in Distress - 1258 Mainz B-17 above 10,000 feet in a controlled flat spin generally following the bomber stream.  
Observations in Friendly territory -
 

1130	5032N-0528E	V-2 Trail
1330	5057N-0540E	One crew reported about 5 phosphorus rockets scattered at our altitude from allied side of lines. One crew reported when we take off on mornings with visual conditions a trail of smoke or vapor rises from the Ipswich area to about 25,000 feet.
1355	5102N-0440E	Looked like 2 mickey flares.
1400	5011N-0247E	Parachute descending at 10,000 feet altitude near Belgian Coast and drifting out to sea. Phoned as hot news.
7. Other Information - Course followed as briefed with but few exceptions. Mickey set in 95A squadron (lead) poor over England and got worse over continent. Only had beaco a few seconds at a time so relinquished the lead to the high squadron (95B) at approximately 4850N-0730E. 95A took over high position. Formation climbed an additional 2000 feet between this point and target to get above high cirrus cloud. 95A over ran 95B and were unable to drop on their smoke markers as they were to the left. Started for target of last resort but mickey lost it when bombing circle was turned on. Rest of group "S" ed until 95A rejoined them. 95A picked up a target of opportunity just east of front line and turned off to bomb it but decided target was

OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE C .f.

TOO CLOSE TO FRONT LINES. Completed 360° turn and filled in behind 93rd Wing. 95B lead 13B wing to target and bombed by Micro-H. Got beacons over England and got all beacons before taking over lead.

8. PFF

A.1.Scholte - 95A A/C 961 Cat-Mouse - no returns except at rare intervals - target never picked up.

2. Borch - 95C A/C 992 cat-mouse - strong returns from all 3 beacons. Rate beacon came in at proper time.

B. 1. 95A set not usable on entire run because of multitudinous spots, wens, warts, snow, spoking and other ailments.

2. 95B set worked satisfactorily throughout.

C. Comments: None.



13 18 61

✓2720

15th Combat Wing  
100th Bomb Group  
390th Bomb Group

XXX

HQ. 95TH BOMB. GP (H) XXX

13-1-44 17:40 3-2

FLAK REPORT 95th Bomb. Group Mainz, Germany 13 January 1945 F. X. Pierce

1. STATISTICS:

13B	95A	8 plus 1	27,300E	1308	29°	296°	NONE
	95B	9 plus 1	27,000	1308	20°	330°	MAINZ

REMARKS: 95th Group formed lead and high squadrons of 13B, 390th forming low squadron. Two A/C in 95A dropped bombs on 95B over target. One A/C in 95A attacked T.O. at 4809N-0747E with unobserved results. Rest of 95A squadron returned bombs.

2. FLAK: DAMAGE AND LOSSES:

95A	1A HRL-RP	5A over Target	None Lost
95B	2A 1PBrl	2ABRLS/2A over target	None Lost

REMARKS: Battle Damage is preliminary reports of crews. 5 A/C on 95A and 2 A/C in 95B sustained damage over target but could not tell just where it happened.

3. OPERATIONS:

- A. Micro H on 95B, 95A did not drop due to mechanical failure in HXZ equipment.
- B. 2/10 gag over target.
- C. Briefed course followed up to Koblenz where 95A started to make a run on Koblenz but had trouble with HXZ and also abandoned this target before entering flak defenses.
- D. None
- E. None

4. Flak:

- A. Moderate Accurate Tracking
- B. " " "
- C. None
- D. Encountered 5010N-0610E inaccurate moderate tracking no damage
- Observed 5010N-0640E Moderate.
- " 5010N-0620E Meagre Tracking.
- E. None

5. PHENOMENA:

None

# A. Squadron

A/C No.	Air-borne	Sorties	Attacking	ABORTS				LOST			DAMAGE		BOMBS DROPPED			REMARKS		
				M	W	E	O	E/A	AA	OTHER	Maj.	Min.	P	S	LR		TO	JETT
957	1			1														5
8996	1			1														5
8776	1			+														5
8640	1	1																5
8266	1	1	1										5					5
2447	1	1	1													4809-0747	5	5
8438	1	1										1						5
85-	1	1										1						5
8817	1	1										1						5
8657	1	1										1		5				5
8990	1	1	1															5
7961	1	1																5
	17	9	3	3								4		10				5



*mc*  
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE  
AAF STATION 101  
APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 258

PERIOD: 0001 hours 13 January 1945 to 2400 hours 13 January 1945.

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Disp.</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Atkg.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>				<u>Tot</u>
							<u>E/A</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>N/E</u>	<u>OT</u>	
Heavy Bomber Atks.	9	958	923	909	2439.2	0-0-0	0	2	1	30	33a
Fighter Escort	7	280	270	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	3	5	8b
Fighter Sweeps	5	148	108	0	0	3-0-0A 3-0-1G	0	0	1	1	2
Fighter Bombing	1	45	45	45	11.3	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	3	11	10	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	5	38	28	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	1	1c
Air/Sea Rescue	4	8	8	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	36	1497	1401	954	2450.5	3-0-0A 3-0-1G	0	2	5	37	44

- (a) Approximately 23 believed safe on Continent
- (b) Includes 2 believed safe on Continent, 2 Cat "E".
- (c) Believed safe on Continent.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

958 a/c (682 B-17s, 276 B-24s) from three Air Divisions dispatched in three forces against seven Rhine RR bridges and two M/Ys in the tactical area. 909 a/c dropped 2439.2 tons GP on all assigned primaries, one secondary and several T/Os. Assigned targets bombed on Pathfinder in most instances. Majority of a/c from 1st Air Division diverted on return to base. No enemy air opposition. Claims: nil. Losses: 24 B-17s, 9 B-24s (2 to AA, 1 Cat. "E" 30 to unknown causes - approximately 23 of which are believed safe.)

SECRET

First Force

Ten group formations (367 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) dispatched against RR bridges at Gustavsburg and Mainz, and Bischofsheim M/Y. 339 a/c dropped 801 tons GP on assigned targets and several T/Os at 1240-1319 hours from 24,000-27,000 feet. Leaflets dropped on Mainz, Bischofsheim and Euskirchen. Assigned targets bombed on Micro-H with one group on Bischofsheim visually. Weather: generally 6/10-10/10 over all targets. Flak: moderate to intense, accurate at Bischofsheim and Mainz. Battle Damage: 119 minor, 7 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 B-17s (2 to AA, 1 Cat. "E").

Fighter Support: Two groups (80 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1018-1022 hours, down 1430-1439 hours. 79 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 P-51s - Cat "E".

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Mainz RR Br.	77	31	61.0	Poor
Mainz-Gustavsburg RR Br.	147	95	238.5	Poor
Bischofsheim M/Y	143	119	294.5	Fair to Good
Mainz M/Y (Sec)		74	160.5	Poor
<u>Other Targets</u>				
Euskirchen RR Junction		13	29.5	Fair
T/Os		7	17.0	Unobserved
Totals	367	339	801.0	

Second Force

Twelve group formations (276 B-24s, 2nd Air Division) dispatched against RR bridges at Worms and Rudesheim and Kaiserslautern M/Y. 263 a/c dropped 718.2 tons GP on assigned targets and one T/O at 1354-1535 hours from 20,000 to 25,000 feet. Leaflets dropped on Worms and Kaiserslautern. Assigned targets bombed on Gee-H with a few visual assists. Weather: generally 5/10-10/10 in all target areas. Flak: moderate, accurate at Worms. Battle Damage: 39 minor. E/A Opposition: nil. One jet a/c sighted in Charleroi Area. No combat. Claims: nil. Losses: 9 B-24s. (8 believed safe on Continent, 1 to unknown causes).

Fighter Support: Three groups (118 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1114-1125 hours; down 1520-1617 hours. 114 sorties. One group diverted to other bases in UK on return. E/A opposition: nil. Three Me-262s sighted, one south of Mons, one south of Linguyan and one vicinity of Worms. Claims: nil. Losses: 4 P-51s (2 believed safe on continent, 1 ditched in Channel, 1 to unknown causes).

S E C R E T

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Worms RR Bridge	92	86	235.0	Very Good
Kaiserslautern M/Y	89	87	248.7	Unobserved
Rudesheim RR Bridge	95	89	231.5	Unobserved
<u>Other Target</u>				
T/O - 4935N-0703E	_____	<u>1</u>	<u>3.0</u>	Unobserved
Totals	276	263	718.2	

Third Force

Eight group formations (315 B-17s, 1st Air Divisions) dispatched against RR Bridges at Germersheim, Mannheim and Maximiliansau. Forces on two latter targets encountered 200-400 foot low ceiling and poor visibility on return to base and were diverted to other bases in U.K. Figures on these targets are approximations and details are incomplete. 307 a/c dropped 920.0 tons GP on three assigned targets. Germersheim bombed on Gee-H at 1318-1324 hours from 23,800-26,700 feet. Other targets bombed visually - time, altitude, flak and e/a opposition unknown. On Germersheim only - weather: 8/10-10/10. Flak: meager, accurate to inaccurate. Battle Damage: 7 minor, 2 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Total Losses: 21 B-17s, approximately 15 believed safe on Continent).

Fighter Support: Two groups (82 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1040-1050 hours, down 1520-1614 hours. 77 Sorties. One group (35 P-51s) unable to land on return diverted to bases on Continent. E/A Opposition: nil. Report on a/c diverted to Continent not available. Losses: 2 P-51s (1 to weather, 1 to unknown causes).

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Results</u>
Germersheim RR Bridge	73	71	212.0	Unobserved
Mannheim Rd & RR Bridge	78	76	228.0	Unknown
Maximiliansau RR Bridge	164	159	477.0	Unknown
<u>Other Target</u>				
T/O	_____	<u>1</u>	<u>3.0</u>	Unobserved
Totals	315	307	920.0	

2. Fighter Escort

Seven groups (280 P-51s) dispatched as support for heavy bomber forces. Up 1018-1114 hours; down 1430-1614 hours. 270 sorties. One group diverted to other U.K. bases on return. Another group (35 a/c) diverted to bases on Continent. E/A Opposition: nil. Three scattered sightings of Me-262s. Claims: nil. Losses: + 8 P-51s (2 Cat. "E", 2 believed safe on Continent, 1 ditched in Channel, 1 to weather, 2 to unknown causes).

+ Of the 35 a/c diverted to Continent, 30 are accounted for as of 0500 hours, 14 January 1945.

3. Fighter Sweeps

Three groups (75 P-51s, 37 P-47s - 112 a/c) dispatched on free lance support for bomber forces. 102 sorties. Up 0907-1050 hours; down 1338-1515 hours. One group strafed Giebelstadt A/F. E/a Opposition: 1 Me-262 encountered taking off and 2 Me-109s about to land. Claims: 3-0-0 Air (1 jet); 3-0-1 ground, also 3 locomotives destroyed, 4 locomotives, 15 goods wagons damaged. Losses: 2 P-51s (1 Cat. "E", 1 to unknown causes).

Two groups based on Continent (36 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1440, down 1605 hours. 36 sorties. 25 P-51s of one group gave area support to RAF bombers in Saarbrucken area. 11 P-51s from other group on general area patrol. Missions uneventful. E/A opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

4. Fighter Bombing

One group based on Continent (45 P-51s) dispatched on fighter bombing patrol Mannheim-Trier, Coblenz-Frankfurt-Karlsruhe areas. 45 sorties. Up 1010-1208 hours; down 1300-1430 hours. 45 a/c strafed and dropped 11.3 tons fragmentation bombs on M/Y and a convoy destroying 3 trucks, damaging 36 goods cars, 2 trucks, 1 tank, 1 half-track and 1 factory. No e/a opposition. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

11 a/c (6 F 5s, 1 Spitfire, 4 P-51s) dispatched. D/A photos obtained of Dortmund, Siegen and Frankfurt areas. 1 a/c recalled because of failure to contact escorting fighters. One F-5 escorted by 4 P-51s. All a/c returned safely.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

38 a/c (4 B-17s, 6 Mosquitoes, 28 P-51s) dispatched as follows:

- 2 B-17s flew routine flights to and from Azores
- 2 B-17s flew routine flights over Atlantic to west of England
- 4 Mosquitoes completed special flights over Holland, Belgium and Germany.
- 2 Mosquitoes dispatched on special flights aborted due to mechanical failure.

28 P-51s dispatched as weather scouts for bomber forces. 20 sorties. Losses: 1 P-51 (scout) believed safe on Continent.

S E C R E T

7. Air/Sea Rescue

8 P-47s dispatched on routine patrol missions. Located pilot who bailed out off Clacton. All a/c returned safely.

8. Special Operations

9 a/c dispatched as follows:

6 B-24s dispatched on RCM patrol. 6 a/c completed mission, jamming from 0705-1040 hours. No losses.

3 Mosquitoes dispatched on Chaff dispensing mission for heavy bombers. 3 a/c completed mission. No losses.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Weather conditions, although not favorable, should not have prohibited an e/a reaction against the heavy bombers. It seems likely that German fighters were being held for defensive and offensive tactical operations later in the day under improving weather conditions.

The only e/a encountered were in the vicinity of Giebelstadt A/F, where a small formation of sweeping P-51s destroyed one Me-262 shortly after take-off and two Me-109s as they were coming in to land. There were a few scattered sightings of individual Me-262s flying at 30,000-33,000 feet and probably serving as observer a/c.

2. Flak

Worms - moderate, accurate.

Rudesheim - nil to meager, inaccurate.

Kaiserslautern - nil to meager, inaccurate.

Germersheim - meager, accurate to inaccurate.

Mainz - meager to moderate, fairly accurate, tracking.

Bischofsheim - moderate to intense, accurate, tracking.

3. Observations

Nil.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Worms RR Bridge - Very Good Results

At least four patterns of 1000 pound bombs on or near the bridge and its approaches. Smoke and long shadows make observation difficult and it is not possible to say definitely that the bridge has been knocked down. However, the tight patterns on and around the bridge and its approaches and the eastern viaduct definitely insures severe damage. Hits were also scored on industrial type buildings on the western bank with very good results and possible hits on rail line at this point.



S E C R E T

Rudesheim RR Bridge - Unobserved Results

Target was attacked through 8/10-10/10 cloud. No bursts were observed but the calculated trajectories of the bombs from a visible release point places the patterns on or near the target.

Kaiserslautern M/Y - Unobserved Results

Target attacked through 8/10-10/10 cloud. Two patterns calculated to burst within three miles of the target in the case of two squadrons.

Euskirchen RR Junction - Fair Results

Between two and four hits on target, but scattered bursts in the extreme edge of the village.

Bischofsheim M/Y - Fair to Good Results

Target attacked by 12 squadrons carrying 500 pound GPs. Of these, 12 squadrons only one had a pattern squarely on the center of the yard. Hits scored on the NW - SE choke points and most of one pattern and part of another fell in the town of Bischofsheim. One pattern fell on a dam just NW of the target, possibly one hit and near misses to the dam itself.

Mainz-Gustavsburg RR Bridge - Poor Results

Mainz RR Bridge - Poor Results

Mainz M/Y - Poor Results

Clouds cover this area at time of the attack and bomb hits cannot be spotted. Photos taken by one of the last groups over the M/Y shows most of this area, and it is believed that neither bridge has been hit. There is one pattern in central part of Mainz along the river bank by the highway bridge, another pattern in the south part of Wiesbaden M/Y, one pattern hit the south-east corner of the village of Bierstadt about two miles east of Wiesbaden. Some scattered bursts observed in open country west of Mainz and part of one pattern observed near the Wiesbader M/Y with possible 6 - 10 hits on the field itself, doing no damage except to a few small buildings.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.