

HEADQUARTERS
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)
APO 559

Date 10 January 1945
13 CBW FO 10
13 CBW OPS 259
3 AD FO 547

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY)

TO : CO, 95BG, APO 559

1. Information Concerning the Target:

- a. The primary target (visual or MH) for today was the new Autobahn bridge over the Rhine River at RODENKIRCHEN, near Cologne, Germany. This bridge is of importance, since it is a connecting link in the Autobahn System between Berlin and Aachen, via Cologne.
- b. The secondary target (H2X) for today was the RAILWAY TRANSHIPMENT SHED in the KALK-WORD MARSHALLING YARD, situated to the east and across the River Rhine from Cologne, Germany.

2. Planning and Execution of the Mission:

a. Wing Order and Strength:

(1) 93 A, B, C Groups:	9 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a) 493 Group	3 Squadrons
(b) 34 Group	3 Squadrons
(c) 490 Group	3 Squadrons
(2) 13 A, B, C Groups:	9 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a) 95 Group	3 Squadrons
(b) 100 Group	3 Squadrons
(c) 390 Group	3 Squadrons
(3) 45 A, B Groups:	6 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a) 388 Group	3 Squadrons
(b) 452 Group	3 Squadrons
(4) 4 A, B, C, D Groups:	12 x 13 A/C Squadrons
(a) 94 Group	3 Squadrons
(b) 486 Group	3 Squadrons
(c) 447 Group	3 Squadrons
(d) 385 Group	3 Squadrons

b. A/C and C/C Available:

(1) 95 Group	ME 33 A/C	45 C/C
	PFF 6 A/C	6 C/C
	MH 4 A/C	6 C/C
(2) 100 Group	ME 42 A/C	56 C/C
	PFF 6 A/C	6 C/C
	MH 4 A/C	3 C/C

(3) 390 Group

ME	32 A/C	51 C/C
FFF	4 A/C	7 C/C
MH	4 A/C	7 C/C

c. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

(1)	95 Group	35 Plus 3 FFF
(2)	100 Group	35 Plus 3 FFF
(3)	390 Group	35 Plus 3 FFF

d. A/C Airborne:

(1)	95 Group	All Scheduled A/C Airborne
(2)	100 Group	37 A/C Airborne
(3)	390 Group	33 A/C Airborne

e. A/C Failing to Take Off:

(1) 100 Group:

A/C 673: 418 Sqdn - Stuck in snow - Pilot Lt. Mikesh

(2) 390 Group:

A/C 607: 570 Sqdn - Stuck in snow - Pilot Lt. Schubert
 A/C 041: 570 Sqdn - Stuck in snow - Pilot Lt. Alberts
 A/C 521: 570 Sqdn - Stuck in snow - Pilot Lt. Pepper
 A/C 744: 568 Sqdn - Stuck in snow - Pilot Lt. Proffat
 A/C 064: 569 Sqdn - Stuck in snow - Pilot Lt. David

f. A/C Abortive:

(1) 95 Group:

A/C 469: 336 Sqdn - Radio Operator's hand frostbitten - Pilot Lt. Miller - No sortie.
 A/C 447: 334 Sqdn - #3 turbe out - Pilot Lt. Schaad - No sortie.
 A/C 217: 334 Sqdn - #4 engine out - Pilot Lt. Collings - Sortie.
 A/C 455: 335 Sqdn - Manifold pressure on #3 dropping - Pilot Lt. Purdy - No sortie.
 A/C 438: 334 Sqdn - #2 engine out - Pilot Lt. Ryan - No sortie.
 A/C 201: 334 Sqdn - #3 engine out - Pilot Lt. Parris - No sortie.
 A/C 990: 334 Sqdn - Ball Turret Gunner's hand frostbitten Pilot Lt. Scott - Sortie.
 A/C 317: 334 Sqdn - Oxygen system out - Pilot Lt. Getehius - No sortie.
 A/C 144: 336 Sqdn - #2 engine out - Pilot Lt. Philpott - Sortie.

(2) 390 Group:

A/C 225: 570 Sqdn - #3 engine out - Pilot Lt. Nuber - No sortie.
 A/C 849: 570 Sqdn - #3 turbe out - Pilot Lt. Hassig - No sortie.
 A/C 600: 568 Sqdn - #3 engine out - Pilot Lt. Goodrich - No sortie.
 A/C 093: 568 Sqdn - #1 turbe out - Pilot Lt. Coffin - No sortie.
 A/C 895: 571 Sqdn - #3 engine out - Pilot Lt. Robison - No sortie.

g. A/C Missing:

(1) 95 Group:

A/C 260: 335 Sqdn - Pilot Lt. W. Hamilton
 A/C 441: 412 Sqdn - Pilot Lt. Wersz
 A/C 331: 412 Sqdn - Pilot Lt. Nelson
 A/C 858: 412 Sqdn - Pilot Lt. Rand

(2) 100 Group:

A/C 808: 418 Sqdn - Pilot Lt. Calder
 A/C 991: 350 Sqdn - Pilot Lt. Beck
 A/C 936: 351 Sqdn - Pilot Lt. Dodrill

(3) 390 Group:

A/C 668: 568 Sqdn - Pilot Lt. Skinner

h. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW A Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) TO	26	167x1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	9	54x1000 LB GP
Returning	1	7x1000 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Visual

(3) Method of Release: 50' Train

i. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW B Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) TO	15	144x1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	12	72x1000 LB GP
Returning	1	6x1000 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Visual

(3) Method of Release: 50' Train

j. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW C Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary	11	66x1000 LB GP
TO	16	7 Leaflet Containers
Jettisoning	None	93x1000 LB GP
Returning	2	6x1000 LB GP
		3 Leaflet Containers

(2) Method of Bombing: Visual & MH

(3) Method of Release: 50' Train

3. Narrative of the Attack:

a. Navigation - 13 A Group - 95A, B, C Squadrons:

Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 95 Group made a normal take off, however, due to multi-layered strataform clouds over the base area it was necessary to make an instrument ascent to 14000 feet before breaking out in the clear.

While assembling the M/O in the Lead A/C discovered that the Mickey Dome was knocked off during take off. The Group lead was relinquished to the High Squadron Leader who completed the Group assembly. The A Squadron took the Low while the C Squadron took the High position in the Group. Due to weather conditions the Group had to assemble at 18500 feet.

The first point of the Wing assembly was made two minutes early, however, due to persistent contrails in the vicinity the Wing leader could not see the B and C Groups. The Division assembly was completed at 1009, on time, over Felixstowe despite the weather encountered along the assembly route.

Route:

The route flown was as briefed to 5009-0747. Along the route in, the Low Squadron (formerly A Squadron) Leader aborted at 4931-0601 due to an engine failure. The Deputy Leader assumed the lead of the Squadron at this point. At 0700E the High Squadron (formerly C Squadron) Leader also aborted due to an engine failure, turning the lead over to the Low Element Leader. This resulted in scattering the Squadron somewhat when the change in lead was effected, however, the Group was in good order before reaching the IP.

The Squadrons positioned themselves at the IP for a Micro-H run on the target as a Group. While on the bomb run the Group drifted off to the right of the M/H course and bombed 10 miles north of Cologne, in the vicinity of Dusseldorf. Due to the fact that the Group Leader is MIA reason for this error is unknown.

After bombs away the Group Leader, who was hit by flak, left formation. The Low Squadron assumed the Group Lead at this point. A gradual left turn was made to the RP and from there a direct course was taken up to intercept the briefed route out. Due to contrails and weather the Group remained at bombing altitude until reaching the base.

Weather:

England: 7 to 9/10 strata cumulus, tops 15000 feet, horizontal visibility restricted by dense persistent contrails. Over the Continent 6 to 8/10 cumulus and cumuli-nimbus, tops 16000-18000 feet, and scattered anvil cirrus, plus dense persistent contrails. Near target area 15 to 20 mile break in clouds.

Navigational Difficulties:

Weather was the main difficulty experienced on mission. Icing on windows made pilotage difficult in the vicinity of target.

Remarks:

Navigation was good despite difficulties encountered.

- b. Navigation - 13 B Group - 100A, B, C Squadrons:

Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 100 Group made a normal take off.

The same weather conditions were encountered as that experienced by the Groups during the assembly. Despite contrails the Group was formed and followed the 13A along the assembly route, cutting corners to close up and keep out of contrails. The 13B fell in position behind the 13A upon leaving the English Coast.

Route:

The route flown corresponds closely to that of the 13A Group. All the PFF units were working satisfactory prior to the IP. At the IP the Mickey Operator in the Lead Squadron took over for a Cat and Mouse run on Primary. When he called for bombs away a break in the clouds showed that they were not over the target so bombs were withheld. The bombardier and navigator took over for a visual run on a TO which was identified as Duisberg. The other two Squadrons dropped in the vicinity of Duisberg.

After bombs away the Squadrons did evasive action to the RP and reformed into Group formation. The briefed course was closely followed on return to base.

Weather: Same as 13A.

Difficulties: Weather was the prime difficulty.

Remarks: Navigation as a whole was good.

c. Navigation - 13 C Group - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

Assembly:

Snow on runway and a slick perimeter track made take off at briefed time a little dubious during the early part of the evening. However, take off was made as scheduled without too much difficulty. Instrument ascent was made from 4000 to 15000 feet at which altitude the aircraft were in the clear. Assembly was made at 16000 rather than at 14000 feet as briefed. Contrails at times at assembly altitude made assembly slow but satisfactory. All Squadrons were not at full strength due to aircraft failing to take off. Wing assembly was not completed until just prior to CP 1. Buncher 22 was reached 1 minute late and the English Coast was crossed on time at Felixstowe.

Route:

From CP 1 to the IP the course was flown about as briefed. Just prior to the IP the H2X equipment failed in the lead aircraft and the lead was given over to the High Squadron. The IP was overshoot by about 5 miles before a turn was completed. The MH set was out in the High Squadron Lead and since the H2X set was only fair, a course was set up for what was assumed to be the right target. A large break over the target area allowed the bombardier to make a visual run. Results were observed to be excellent but the bridge attacked was at Dusseldorf instead of at Cologne.

Meanwhile the Lead Squadron (390A) was following the High Squadron and attacked the same bridge almost simultaneously.

The Low Squadron, with MH equipment in good working order, followed the other two Squadrons. The M/O noticed that they were not headed for the Primary so the Squadron broke off and bombed the Primary, MH with visual assist.

Evasive action was taken by all Squadrons after bombs away and a successive rally was made. The Group did not hit the RP but flew North of it as suggested by 3 AD and 13 CBW.

From the RP to the English Coast in the route was flown essentially as briefed.

Weather:

Same as described previously under 13A Group and in other paragraphs for this Group.

Difficulties:

Once again weather proved to be the biggest difficulty of the day. Clouds and contrails prevented assembling at briefed altitude. Icing on windshields made visual contact difficult.

Instrument failure, particularly MH, made it necessary to bomb by other methods. Luckily, a break in low overcast at target made visual bombing possible.

Remarks:

Navigation is considered good despite the unusually bad weather conditions.

d. PFF Narrative:

13A - 95A, B, C Squadrons:

Three PFF A/C were dispatched. All were instructed to use MH technique. 95A radar spinner was damaged on take off, and the set was inoperative during the mission. 95B leader's set was evidently working satisfactorily. The A/C aborted and did not return to base. 95C received fair beacon returns. Bombing was visual on a TO.

13B - 100A, B, C Squadrons:

Three PFF A/C were dispatched. All were instructed to use MH technique. 100A and B received strong beacon returns. 100C had fading beacons on the bomb run. Bombing was combination MH and visual on a target considerably North of the primary.

13C - 390A, B, C Squadrons:

Three PFF A/C were dispatched. All were instructed to use MH technique. 390A set failed completely. B and C Squadrons had strong beacon reception. 390C bombed the primary MH. A and B Squadrons bombed visually.

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e. 13 CBW A Group - 95B, C, A Squadrons:

(1)	Air Leader	Maj. Powers	Nav	Lt. Doherty
	Pilot	Lt. Hamilton	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Burrow
			Bomb	Lt. Watt

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a)	TO	26	167x1000 LB GP
	Jettisoning	9	54x1000 LB GP
	Returning	1	7x1000 LB GP

(b) Bombing Altitude: 25000'

(c) Time of Release: 1217

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

The lead A/C failed to return from the mission and report cannot be made for the present.

(4) PI Report:

(a) The bombs from A, B, & C Squadrons fell in the Rhine River and snow-covered fields between Himmelgeist and Dusseldorf, Germany. There was no photo coverage for A Squadron, but photographs taken by B & C Squadrons show most of their bursts.

(b) The Group pattern reveals that the Squadrons at bombs away were loosely formed. The bombs from A Squadron were strung out for 2 miles.

(c)	Bomb Pattern:	B Squadron:	2315'L x 2545'W
		C Squadron:	2140'L x 2355'W
		A Squadron:	Incomplete

(d) There was no designated AP, so bombing errors could not be determined. There were no bridges in the immediate proximity of the area bombed by this Group.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

B Squadron:

A/C 455: Aborted - 6 bombs returned.
A/C 257: Shackle frozen - 1 bomb returned.

C Squadron:

A/C's 414, 201, 438, 990: Aborted and jettisoned 24 bombs.

A Squadron:

A/C's 333, 447, 217, 468: Aborted and jettisoned 24 bombs in channel.

f. 13 CBW B Group - 100A Squadron:

(1)	Air Leader	Maj. Martin	Nav	Lt. Larsen
	Pilot	Lt. Spurgeon	Asst Nav	Lt. Russell
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Kaddat
			Bomb	Lt. Svendsen

- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- | | | | |
|-----|-------------|------|---------------|
| (a) | TO | 11 | 66x1000 LB GP |
| | Jettisoning | None | |
| | Returning | None | |
- (b) Bombing Altitude: 27000'
- (c) Time of Release: 1223

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After the maneuver at the IP, the M/O took over and proceeded to call out the data to the bombardier. The first 5 checks were accurate but the last check was 8 degrees off. At the BRL, however, the bombardier did not release his bombs, because they would have hit in open fields. The bombardier picked up a bridge, and proceeded to synchronize. At the BRL the synchronization was fair and bubbles level. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 012 degrees.

(4) PI Report:

- (a) Photographs taken by this Squadron show 6 bursts in the Rhine River short of the railroad bridge in Duisberg, which was the selected AP. Approximately 24 bombs fell beyond the bridge in fields and a factory area.
- (b) Bomb Pattern: Too irregular & incomplete.
- (c) Bombing Errors: Impossible to ascertain because of the scarcity and position of bombs.
- (d) Bombing Results: Nil.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 226: Left bomb bay hung up momentarily - Had to be salvoed.

g. 13 CBW B Group - 100B Squadron:

- | | | | | |
|-----|------------|--------------|----------|--------------|
| (1) | Air Leader | Maj. Cruver | Nav | Lt. Chapel |
| | Pilot | Capt. Ernst | Asst Nav | |
| | Co-Pilot | Lt. Olmstead | M/O | Lt. Stropp |
| | | | Bomb | Lt. Lockhart |

- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- | | | | |
|-----|-------------|----|---------------|
| (a) | Jettisoning | 12 | 72x1000 LB GP |
| | Returning | 1 | 6x1000 LB GP |
- (b) Bombing Altitude: 27500'
- (c) Time of Release: 1224

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After the maneuver at the IP, the M/O took over and

proceeded to set up course. The bombardier picked up the TO from 25 miles. A flak burst made the C-1 Auto Pilot inoperative, but the run was continued on PDI. Shortly before turning on the telescope motor the bombsight was shot out. The bombardier continued to guide the pilot to the target, waiting for the deputy lead A/C to take over. The deputy lead A/C, however, did not take over in time. The bombardier jettisoned his bombs and the remaining A/C in his Squadron released off his smoke bombs. Bombs were jettisoned on a magnetic heading of 349 degrees.

(4) PI Report:

(a) Photographs taken by A/C 514 in this Squadron show approximately 30 bursts in fields near Kapellen, Germany, 5124N-0637E.

(b) A/C 476, which had a camera installed, bombed with the C Squadron at Dusseldorf. Its bombs fell in fields beyond C Squadron's pattern.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions: None

h. 13 GBW B Group - 1000 Squadron:

(1)	Air Leader Capt. Wooten	Nav	Lt. Scott
	Pilot Lt. Raiford	Agst Nav	
	Co-Pilot Lt. Harbinson	M/O	Lt. Frye
		Bomb	Lt. Eden

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) TO 13 78x1000 LB GP

(b) Bombing Altitude: 26500'

(c) Time of Release: 1219

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Neither MH or H2X equipment were working properly so it was decided to drop off the lead A Squadron. The primary was not bombed, consequently, when B Squadron broke into visual weather, the bombardier picked a M/Y at Oberkassel as a TO. The Squadron experienced interference from A while on the bomb run, which resulted in insufficient time for killing course. When bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 010 degrees synchronization was poor. Smoke released but the GP's hung up. The Squadron released on the smoke bombs. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) PI Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell 3000' to the right of the M/Y, which was the selected AP, in fields and on scattered residences. There were 5 hits in a wide autobahn containing a cable railway.

(b) Bomb Pattern: 1780'L x 1560'W.

(c) Bombing Errors: Gross.

(d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of AP: 0% & 0%.

(e) Bombing Results: Nil.

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(5) Bombing Malfunctions: Lead A/C GP's hung up.

i. 13 CBW C Group - 390B Squadron:

(1)	Air Leader	Capt. Brannen	Nav	Lt. Eusner
	Pilot	Lt. Kenny	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Houser
			Bomb	Lt. Woszyk

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a)	TO	9	54x1000 LB GP
	Jettisoning	1	6x1000 LB GP
	Returning	1	6x1000 LB GP

(b) Bombing Altitude: 27000'

(c) Time of Release: 1220

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Unable to bomb the primary or secondary targets because of faulty PFF equipment, the bombardier picked up a bridge as a TO and synchronized. The bombardier experienced difficulty with visibility, because the nose of the A/C was iced up and frosted over. The synchronization was completed prior to the BRL, and when bombs were released synchronization was excellent and bubbles level. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) PI Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell on the selected AP. There were 5 direct hits on road bridge near the SE approach and 3 hits on the bridge by the water's edge.

(b) Bomb Pattern: 3265'L x 1865'W. The pattern was loose.

(c) Bombing Errors:	Range	:	0'
	Deflection:	:	465'R
	Radial	:	465

The looseness of the pattern makes difficult the accurate determining of these errors.

(d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of the AP: 50% & 89%.

(e) Bombing Results: Excellent.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 093: Aborted and returned 6 bombs.
 A/C 600: Aborted and jettisoned 6 bombs in North Sea.

j. 13 CBW C Group - 390A Squadron:

(1)	Air Leader	Capt. Perry	Nav	Lt. Buhrmaster
	Pilot	Lt. Briggs	Asst Nav	Lt. Lewis
	Co-Pilot	Lt. Barbour	M/O	Lt. Houser
			Bomb	Lt. Martin

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) TO	7	39x1000 LB GP
Jettisoning	1	6x1000 LB GP
Returning	2	9x1000 LB GP

(b) Bombing Altitude: 26500'

(c) Time of Release: 1223 $\frac{1}{2}$

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

The MH and H2X equipment failed prior to the IP which resulted in A Squadron flying in echelon off B Squadron. The primary was not bombed, consequently, when the Squadron broke into visual weather, the bombardier picked up a bridge as TO and synchronized. Synchronization at the BRL was excellent and bubbles level. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 299 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) PI Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell on the selected AP. There were 3 hits and several close misses on the center of the same suspension road bridge the B Squadron attacked.

(b) Bomb Pattern: 1590'L x 1135'W.

(c) Bombing Errors: Range : 270'S
 Deflection: 0
 Radial : 270'

(d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of AP: 72% & 99%.

(e) Bombing Results: Excellent.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 849: Aborted and returned 6 bombs.
 A/C 225: Aborted and jettisoned 6 bombs at 5133N-0220E.
 A/C 097: Rack malfunction - 3 bombs returned.

k. 13 CBW C Group - 3900 Squadron:

(1) Air Leader	Lt. Bone	Nav	Lt. Welsh
Pilot	Lt. Stone	Asst Nav	
Co-Pilot		M/G	Lt. Conroy
		Bomb	Lt. O'Brien

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) Primary	11	66x1000 LB GP
Returning	2	7 Leaflet Containers
		6x1000 LB GP
		3 Leaflet Containers

(b) Bombing Altitude: 26000'

(c) Time of Release:

- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- | | | | |
|-----|-------------|---|---------------|
| (a) | TO | 7 | 39x1000 LB GP |
| | Jettisoning | 1 | 6x1000 LB GP |
| | Returning | 2 | 9x1000 LB GP |
- (b) Bombing Altitude: 26500'
- (c) Time of Release: 1229½

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

The MH and H2X equipment failed prior to the IP which resulted in A Squadron flying in echelon off B Squadron. The primary was not bombed, consequently, when the Squadron broke into visual weather, the bombardier picked up a bridge as TO and synchronized. Synchronization at the BRL was excellent and bubbles level. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 299 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) PI Report:

- (a) The bombs from this Squadron fell on the selected AP. There were 3 hits and several close misses on the center of the same suspension road bridge the B Squadron attacked.
- (b) Bomb Pattern: 1590'L x 1135'W.
- (c) Bombing Errors: Range : 270'S
Deflection: 0
Radial : 270'
- (d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' & 2000' of AP: 72% & 99%.
- (e) Bombing Results: Excellent.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 849: Aborted and returned 6 bombs.
A/C 225: Aborted and jettisoned 6 bombs at 5133N-0220E.
A/C 097: Rack malfunction - 3 bombs returned.

k. 13 CBW C Group - 390C Squadron:

- | | | | |
|-----|---------------------|----------|-------------|
| (1) | Air Leader Lt. Bone | Nav | Lt. Welsh |
| | Pilot Lt. Stone | Asst Nav | |
| | Co-Pilot | M/G | Lt. Conroy |
| | | Bomb | Lt. O'Brien |
- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- | | | | |
|-----|-----------|----|----------------------|
| (a) | Primary | 11 | 66x1000 LB GP |
| | Returning | 2 | 7 Leaflet Containers |
| | | | 6x1000 LB GP |
| | | | 3 Leaflet Containers |
- (b) Bombing Altitude: 26000'
- (c) Time of Release:

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(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Although the IP was overshoot, the M/O turned back and intercepted the MH course. The bombardier was clutched in by the M/O, but was unable to synchronize for rate on the target through a hole in the clouds. He made several corrections and then saw that he would lose the target because of clouds, consequently, went back to the Micro checks. The two checks given to him by the M/O were accurate. When bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 279 degrees, the synchronization was good and bubbles level. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) PI Report: No photographic coverage for this Squadron.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 895: Aborted - 6 bombs returned.

A/C 972: Rack malfunction - 3 leaflet containers returned.

4. Mission Camera Report:

- a. The 95 Group installed 1 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 0 and 3 of which took pictures:

PFF A/C 8144 with scope and vertical cameras installed: Aborted.
A/C's 8217, 8469, 8333, 8438, with vertical cameras installed: Aborted.

- b. The 100 Group installed 2 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 0 and 5 of which took pictures:

PFF A/C 379 with scope camera installed: Malfunction of Micro Switch.

PFF A/C 400 with scope camera installed: Poor definition of radar set.

A/C's 8532, 6841, and 6297 with K-21 cameras installed: Camera doors closed by crews.

- c. The 390 Group installed 1 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 0 and 4 of which took pictures:

PFF A/C 013 with scope camera installed: Radar set was out and no pictures were taken.

A/C 895 with K-21 installed: Aborted.

A/C 668 with K-21 installed: Missing in action.

A/C 079 with K-21 installed: Froze, stripped gears and broke drive shaft.

A/C 812 with K-21 installed: Intervalometer froze.

A/C 481 with K-21 installed: Camera double exposed all negatives

5. Communications:

- a. Major Frankoski (95) led 13th Wing. Communications on all channels is reported clear without jamming or interference. The leader aborted and was able to send only one control point to Arrowswift. Route and target weather information was received satisfactorily by the B and C Wing leaders. The Continental Fighter Control Sector "Nuthouse" was contacted on VHF and assigned fighters were contacted visually. There was some confusion on channel A as aircraft were returning from

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mission. Too much flying control information was transmitted on channel A. It is suggested that all but emergency traffic be confined to airdrome control frequency when giving landing instructions.

Control Points:

	CP1	CP2	TGT	CP3
Timings	1037	1107	1223	1305
13A	1034	1105	1217	1302

Strike Reports:

95 P A 4 1217

6. Controller's Log:

a. 1820 from 3 AD:

- (1) Alerted.
- (2) Zero Hour.
- (3) Conditions of Runways.

b. 1837-1845 to all Groups and 3 AD:

- (1) Conditions of runways and perimeter tracks.

c. 2000 to 95 Weather Officer:

- (1) Weather Report.

d. 2005 from 3 AD:

- (1) Targets - Unassigned.
- (2) Force.
- (3) Zero Hour.
- (4) RBA.
- (5) Time Control.
- (6) Tentative Routes.

e. 2026 to Groups:

- (1) Force Required - Position - Flares - Callsigns.
- (2) Weather A/C.
- (3) RBA.
- (4) Zero Hour.
- (5) Time Control.
- (6) Keep working on runways.

f. 2250 from 3 AD:

- (1) Northern Targets Scrubbed.
- (2) New Targets will be Tactical.
- (3) Force may be changed.
- (4) Zero Hour Same.

g. 2342 from 3 AD:

- (1) Targets - Unassigned (Primary & Secondary).
- (2) Bomb Load.
- (3) Division Order in 8AF.
- (4) Zero Hour.
- (5) RBA.

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- (6) Force Required Same.
- (7) MH Cat Mouse Leads.
- (8) Two Task Forces.

h. 2353 to Groups:

- (1) Zero Hour.
- (2) RBA.
- (3) Bomb Load.
- (4) Same Force Required.
- (5) MH Cat Mouse Leads.
- (6) Task Force A & B.
- (7) Division Order.

i. 0037 from 3 AD:

- (1) Assigned Targets - Primary - Secondary & Last Resort.
- (2) Division Assembly Points.
- (3) Approaches.
- (4) Time Control.
- (5) Tentative Route.
- (6) Intervalometer Setting.

j. 0055 to Groups:

- (1) Fuel.
- (2) Intervalometer Setting.
- (3) Time Control.

k. 0128 from 3 AD:

- (1) Advance Warning to 3 AD FO.

l. 0130 to Groups:

- (1) Advance Warning to 13 CBW FO.

m. 0145 from 3 AD:

- (1) Intelligence Annex to 3 AD FO.

n. 0153 from 3 AD:

- (1) Final Timings.
- (2) Start Climb Time.
- (3) Assembly Altitude.

o. 0218 to Groups:

- (1) Assembly Times.
- (2) Assembly Altitude.
- (3) Start Climb Time.
- (4) Bombing Altitude.

p. 0235 to 3 AD:

- (1) RBW.
- (2) Bombing Unit.
- (3) Second Runs.

q. 0315 from 3 AD:

- (1) 3 AD FO.

r. 0320 to Groups:

- (1) 13 CBW FO.


TR, 10 Jan. '45

- s. 0355 from 100 Group:
 - (1) Will use MH Cat Mouse crew in Low Squadron.
- t. 0420 from 3 AD:
 - (1) MH Annex to 3 AD FO.
- u. 0422 to 95 Group:
 - (1) Corrected Times on 3 AD Annex.
- v. 0511 from 3 AD:
 - (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO.
- w. 0731 to 95 Group:
 - (1) Weather A/C Took Off at 0700.
- x. 0746 to 95 Group:
 - (1) Report from Weather A/C.
- y. 0748 to 95 Group:
 - (1) Raise Assembly Altitude.
 - (2) Head West in Case of Trouble.
- z. 0748 from 95 Group:
 - (1) First A/C Took Off.

7. Comments on Mission Planning:

- a. Leader of 13C (390) not listed as a qualified Group leader.
- b. Weather Monitor A/C took off 40 minutes after they should have been reporting the weather from assembly altitude. Failed to include icing conditions in their weather report.
- c. Fireball Able started transmitting without regard for message being transmitted from the weather monitor A/C.

For the Commanding Officer:



GENE C. SMITH,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

APO 559,
11 January 1946.

SUBJECT: Report of Operations Officer, Mission of 10 January, 1946.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

95 "A" Squadron

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95 A Squadron formation took off at 0752-0818 hours to fly as lead squadron of 13 A Combat Group, leader of 13 Combat Wing. The Group had been briefed for assembly at 14-16,000 ft., but the tops of the 10/10 overcast were 16,000, so assembly was affected three thousand feet higher than briefed. The M-H globe of the lead aircraft was damaged on the take off and at 0918 hours the leader notified the group that 95 B (original high) Squadron would lead, 95 C (original low) Squadron would be high squadron, while 95 A (original lead) would become low squadron. Squadron and group assembly were completed over the base by 0955 hours, and the formation proceeded to Wing assembly at BU. # 8 with 95 B leading.

Excessive contrails made visual identification of the other groups an impossibility, but the formation passed over BU. # 8 at 0948 hours, and continued on course to division assembly at BU. #12. BU. #12 was made on time, but the wing ahead was five minutes early and the gap was not closed until the group was over Belgium. At 0958 the climb to bombing altitude was started, and the English coast was departed on course at 1010 hours, altitude 21,000. The Belgium coast was crossed 24,700' over Ostende at 1034 hours. The route was flown, as ordered to 4935N-0658E; here a direct route was flown to the I.P. in order to close wing interval. At 1146 the lead A/C of 95 A Squadron aborted, and the deputy leader in the high element took over the formation according to S.O.P. At 1150 the 95 B Group leader announced that bombing would be done in group formation, and at 1202 hours the formation turned at the I.P. for a M-H run on the target. 95 A squadron dropped on the bombs of 95 B lead squadron from 26,000' at 1217 hours, and started descent to the rally point. From the rally point the 95 A squadron led the group flying due west until the briefed route was intercepted at 5108-0450, at 1242 hours.

At 1250 hours the formation was down to an altitude of 19,000', and was forced to reclimb to 25,000 to clear clouds and contrails of the second division forces. The continental coast was departed at 5118-0302 at 1305 hours. Final let down was started over the English channel, and the English coast was reached at 18,000', at 1350 hours. The squadron made an overcast peeloff over the base and landed at 1352-1441 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: Eleven aircraft plus one M-H leader were assembled in the formation shown in diagram "A". Of these A/C, two #42-102447 and 43-38469 returned before becoming dispatched and received no sortie. The lead A/C #44-3217 turned back at 1146 hrs with #4 eng. out and received a sortie.

The remaining nine aircraft were over the target and are credited with sorties.

3. LOST AIRCRAFT: None.

95 "B" Squadron

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95 B Squadron formation took off at 0748-0916 hours to fly as high squadron of 13 A Group, but before squadron assembly had been completed the 95 A leader turned the lead over to 95 B. Squadron and group assembly were completed by 0935 hours, and the formation proceeded to the target as reported in the general narrative of 95 A Squadron.

The bomb run: Bombs were dropped at 1217 hours, from 27,000'. It is not known why the bombing was done North of the target, three and a half miles short of the city of Dusseldorf, because the lead A/C was hit by flak shortly after bombs away, and has not returned to base. When the leader started descent with pieces falling from the #4 engine, some A/C followed him down as far as 19,000 before forming on the deputy lead; others split up and joined 95 A and 95 C squadrons.

The remainder of the mission was flown as stated in the general narrative of 95 A squadron, and the squadron landed at 1347-1427 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: Twelve A/C plus one H-H leader were dispatched as shown in formation diagram "B". one A/C, #42-102455 turned back before departing England, and received no sortie. The remaining A/C were over the target area and are credited with sorties.

3. LOST AIRCRAFT:

1. #8260 ---- #4 engine hit by flak in target area. Last seen crossing battle lines, descending westward. Has been reported as landing on the Continent, Bombardier injured.
2. #7656 ---- Hit by flak over target. Nosed down with #2 engine on fire. A/C last seen at 17,000 heading West, apparently under control, no fire. As many as four are reported to have bailed out.
3. #8331 ---- Has been reported as landing at Lille, France.
4. #8441 ---- Radioed to local XDI station at 1455 hours that gas was low and rudder damaged.

95 "C" Squadron

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: - The 95 C Squadron took off at 0730-0839 hours to fly as low squadron of 13 A Combat Group until it was designated as high squadron by the 95 A leader at 0916 hours. Squadron and group assembly were completed by 0935 hours and the formation flew the course as reported in the general narrative of 95 A Squadron.

Report of Operations Officer, Con't.

At 1130 hours, however, the 95 C Squadron leader aborted, and turned the squadron lead over to the low element leader. In the process of reforming, the squadron lost 3,000 feet, and flew as low-low until the rally point was reached. Bombs were dropped on the 95 A release at 1217 hours from 25,300', and the formation continued to the rally point which was twenty miles north of briefed course.

The remainder of the return route was flown as stated in the 95 A squadron narrative, and the formation landed at 1426-1524 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: Twelve A/C plus one H-E leader took off in the formation shown in diagram "C". Three A/C, #44-8438, 43-38817 and 42-107201 returned before becoming dispatched, and received no sortie. The remaining ten aircraft were over the target and are credited with sorties.

3. LOST AIRCRAFT: None.

NOEL T. CUMBAA
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
APO 559

STATISTICAL CONTROL REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

13TH COMBAT BOMBARDMENT WING

DATE RENDERED 10 Jan 1945

PART I - TABULAR SUMMARY:

DATE OF MISSION 10 Jan 1945

STRATEGICAL MISSION

COMBAT GROUP	SCHEDULED	AIRCRAFT	AIRCRAFT LESS RETURNING SPARES	ATTACKING	NOT ATTACKING	SORTIES
A	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	0	0 @ 15H	0 @ 15H
B	12 @ 15H	12 @ 15H	12 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	1	11 @ 15H
C	12 @ 15H	12 @ 15H	12 @ 15H	0	4 @ 15H	0 @ 15H

PART II - REASONS WHY AIRCRAFT DID NOT ATTACK OR WANTED TO TAKE OFF:

Combat Gp	A.C.S.N.	Category	Reason for Failure & Corrective Action	Sortie (Yes-No)
A	42-200067	F	Low manifold pressure @ 2 engine.	No
A	42-20017	F	@ 4 engine out.	No
A	42-20000	B	Ball turret gunners hands frozen	No
A	42-20006	F	Radio bay door unbolts burned out.	Yes
B	42-200006	F	Low manifold pressure @ 3 engine.	No
C	42-20144	F	@ 2 engine out.	Yes
C	42-20000	F	@ 2 engine out.	No
C	42-20000	B	Ball turret gunners hands frozen	Yes
C	42-20017	F	Oxygen out.	No
C	42-207001	F	@ 3 engine out.	No

1. DATE 10/1/45 TARGET _____ DUTY OFFICERS Capt. Jeneman
(PFF)
2. CBW 3A GROUP 95C GP. LEADER Maj. Swinney A/C 8144 W/T TBP-0
POSITION Low DEPUTY LDR. Lt. Melvin A/C 6598 W/T USV-N
3. EST. TAXI TIME 800 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 815 ETD BASE 930

"B"

HEADQUARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
"J" FORM

GP.

STA.

Recorded

1. DATE 10/1/45 TARGET _____ DUTY OFFICERS Capt. Jeneman
(PFF)
2. CBW 3A GROUP 95B GP. LEADER Maj. Powers A/C 8260 W/T USV-L
POSITION High DEPUTY LDR. Lt. Ringbloom A/C 8281 W/T LMV-Z
3. EST. TAXI TIME 740 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 755 ETD BASE 930

"A"

HEADQUARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
"J" FORM

GP.

STA.

Recorded

1. DATE 10/1/45 TARGET _____ DUTY OFFICERS Capt. Jeneman
(PFF)
2. CBW 3A GROUP 95A GP. LEADER Maj. Frankosky A/C 8217 W/T LBV-C
POSITION Lead DEPUTY LDR. Lt. Gloria A/C 8333 W/T TBP-S
3. EST. TAXI TIME 750 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 805 ETD BASE 930

ETD BASE _____

4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 12 NUMBER OF ~~STARES~~ PFF

"A"

FORM 3

Journal

STATION 119

DATE 10 Sept 45

LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
				EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
✓ 34	C 8217	^{YES} Collings ✓	412		818	1422	Gettisoned bomber	# 4 ENG. INSTR. FROM TOWER. <i>Sent</i>
✓ 36	U 8469	^{NO} Miller ✓	412		801 [†]	1422	11	11 - BADLY FROSTBITTEN.
36	N 8899	P. Taylor ✓	36		752	1425		
36	X 8604	Thomas ✓			805	1431		
36	R 7844	Gross ✓			806	1435		
36	Q 8617	unnamed ✓			830			landed at Rayden - 1437
36	S 8333	Glovich ✓ (21)			809	1434		
36	E 8106	Ross ✓			810	1441		
36	W 6993	Hart ✓			815	1359		
35	S 9052	Pearson (20) ✓	35		811	1421		
35	F 1887	Shaw ✓	1		812	1352		
✓ 34	A 2447	^{NO} Schaad ✓	<u>NO</u>		813	1325	aborted	SUPERCHARGER OUT. -

"B"

FORM 3

STATION

119

DATE

10 Jan-45

LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
				EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
35	L 8260	H. Hamilton ✓	35		748	-		D.S. Continent.
412	Y 7858	Rand ✓	412		808			1426 OUTSTANDING
35	B 7204	J. Hamilton ✓	35		805		1449	
412	J 8826	Walter ✓	412		824		1424	
412	P 8441	Heisz ✓			755		-	
412	G 8331	Olson ✓			759		-	rudder damaged - fuel low - 1506
412	Z 8281	Ringbloom (Hi) ✓			753		1350	
412	B 8774	Squires ✓			757		1427	
412	R 1462	Hail ✓			803		1427	
35	M 7047	Hansen ✓	35		834		1347	
412	L 7257	Busse ✓ (Ho)	412		826		1401	
336	85 J 9037 7276	Bradley ✓	35		916		1425	
35	Z 2455	<u>Purdy</u> ✓	35		819		920	Drapping MANIFOLD PRESSURE NO. 3 eng.

"C"

FORM 3

STATION 119DATE 10 Jan-45

LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
				EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
✓ 36	O 8144 ^{YES}	Philpott	34		750	1440	Jettisoned bombs - #2 ENG	Sorte
✓ 34	R 8438 ^{NO}	Ryan ✓	34		816	927	Returning to base no. 2 eng. feathered	
✓ 34	X 8990	Scott ✓			820	1336	shot B.T.G. HAND FROSTBITTEN PROP FEATHERED MOTOR BURNED OUT.	Sorte
34	B 8776	Griffin ✓			822 ⁺	1428		
34	W 8660	Roy ✓			859	1450		
34	Q 2951	Paine ✓			838	1524		
35	N 6598	Melvin (Hi) ✓	35		828	1430		
35	O 7194	Mercer ✓			841	1452		
✓ 34 35	K 8317 ^{NO} R 9055	Hetchins ✓			836	1333	shot - OXYGEN OUT.	
34	U 8525	Hells ✓ (Ho)	34		832	1446		
34	T 8996	Rosenzweig ✓			838	1436		
✓ 34	J 7201 ^{NO}	Barrish ✓			833	959	Returning to base No. 3 ENG. feathered	JETTISON BOMBS
36	V 8676	Nelson ✓	35		843	1426		

1st Div Dep. CLACTON ~~HE~~ +68 3, 2, 1
2nd Div Dep. BV 24 ~~HE~~ +86

BRIEFING CHECK LIST

RB WIND 70° 25 KNOTS

MISSION NO. _____ FIELD ORDER NO. ~~527~~ DATE 10 Jan 45

1. ZERO HOUR 1000 R.B.A. 23,000

2. START - A 0725 TAXI - A 0740 T.O. - A 0805 RUNWAY SURF WING
B 0725 B 0740 B 0755
C 0745 C 0800 C 0815
L 0720 0735 0750

3. GROUP ASSEMBLY: PLACE Bu. 23 MAX TIME 0930 ALT - A 14,000 B 15,000
C 13,000

4. CLIMB: MPH IAS FT/MIN TO
MPH IAS FT/MIN TO
MPH IAS FT/MIN TO

5. GROUP FORMATION: 95A LEAD 95B HIGH 95C LOW

6. CW ASS'Y: PLACE Bu 8a TIME 0945 ALTITUDE 14,000
Bu 9 TIME 0951 ALTITUDE
TIME ALTITUDE

7. AD ASS'Y: FROM Bu 12 TIME 0956 ALT 14,000 APPROACH OF WGS 43 NE
TO 22 TIME 1000 ALT 13 N
TO TIME ALT 45 NW
4 W

Start climb at 0953

8. ROUTE OUT	RELIXSTONE	TIME	ALT
CP1	5114 - 0255	1036	ALT 21,000
CP2 F/RV	5014 - 0430	1106	ALT
	4930 - 0536	1127	ALT
	4933 - 0719	1152	ALT
	5009 - 0747	1203	ALT 27,000
	-	TIME	ALT
	-	TIME	ALT
	-	TIME	ALT

9. I.P. 5033 0750 TIME 1211 ALT 25,000 TRUE (27,000)
I.P. TO TARGET: DIST. 40 TIME OF RUN 11 HEADING 317 M.H.
TARGET Cologne TIME 1222 ALTITUDE 27,000 (25,000 True)

10. BOMBING DATA: TRAIN INTERVAL 50 ft. Interval
Bomb by 500W - 2nd Runs ARE AUTHORIZED IF NU E/A
MIN. BOMB ALT 22,000'

Due to Route to R.P. suggest Evasive action

L/R NINE ASSIGNED - Any CC identified in Gr. 10mi E. of Friendly Troops VIS

11. ROUTE BACK: R.P.: 5050 -0605 TIME 1231 ALT 24,000 Start Desc. to MIN

CP. 3 5124 -0327 TIME 1301 ALT

FELIXSTOWE TIME 1334 ALT

BASE - TIME 1350 ALT

- TIME ALT

- TIME ALT

- TIME ALT

- TIME ALT

- TIME ALT

8300 for 9055

12. LATEST T.O. TO JOIN FORMATION AT ENGLISH COAST: 0910

13. BOMB LOAD: B GAS LOAD

A 6 X 1000 GP 1/10 N/D GAS LOAD 2500 Gals.

C GAS LOAD

14. FLARES: SQUADRON ALL FLARE RR R/T CALL Fireball ABLE

T-18 RED Trailing Duvvody - Alt - GROSS

Group Army also wq.

15. FIGHTER SUPPORT: 78 ATB Group P-51's c/s BAL 1-1, 1-2

R/V 5015-0430 Bomb c/s VINE GROVE 1-4

Group Army also

16. MISC: KODAK SPEC. Channel w/x + CONT. COMST zero - 30 d will

give info to 2 KODAK CONTROL + DIV Leader - then decide if additional

alt is necessary - 43M will have 6 Chaff @ 10 IP to TGT.

2 KODAK White w/x to 0700 4 KOD. RED. w/x IP: 7 TGT 9 20min Prior -

SCS-51 at 0600 (346°) Route IN "2" zebra Yellow to Blue

Report at Interrogation -

Stay N. of R.P. 1 - Missed.

STATION WEATHER OFFICE
AAF STATION 119
APO 559

T-A-2

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Meteorological Interrogation Summary for Mission of 10 January 1945

TO : Commanding Officer, Headquarters, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559

1. Base at take-off: Time was 0750 hour. 5-6/10 stratocumulus and swelling cumulus, base 2-3000, tops 5-6000 feet. Visibility was 3000 yards.

2. Route to target: 9-10/10 swelling cumulus with tops to 16-18000 feet, with occasional cumulonimbus to 22-23000 feet from English coast to continental coast. Tops gradually subsiding inside continent and coverage becoming patchy 3-6/10.

3. Target area: Cologne and Dusseldorf, Germany. Time was 1217 hour. 3-6/10 cumulus below 15000 feet. Visibility was restricted to 15-20 miles by contrail cirrus.

4. Return route: Reverse of route to target.

5. Base on return: Time was 1350 hour. Snow showers passing over the area with variable 8-10/10 ceilings at 400-600 feet and tops 18-20,000 feet, occasionally to 22-23000 feet. Visibility 3-4 miles lowering to 400-500 yards in intermittent snow.

6. Remarks: Moderate to dense persistent contrails at 16000 feet and above for the entire route. Light to moderate rime ice in clouds over England.

HARVEY T. JACOLICK,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Station Weather Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

11 January 1944

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A", "B", "C" Squadrons,
Mission of 10 January 1944, Himmelgeist, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Take off was from 0750 until 0825 hours. Squadron assembly was at 13000', 14000' and 15000' over BU# 23. At 0935 hours Group assembly was complete at 18000'. The High Squadron leader had to take over due to the Mickey dome of the Group lead ship being damaged on take-off. The additional altitude gained before group assembly was complete, was due to weather conditions. At 0935 hours the group left the base for BU# 8, Wing assembly. This point was reached at 0943 hours, two minutes early. At 0954 hours Division assembly was made at 19500' at 1010 the English coast was crossed at 5158N 0121E at 21000'.

2. Some Essing was done between Division assembly and coast out so that coast out could be made on time. Continental coast in was at 5112N 0252E at 1034 hours at 24700'. The briefed route was followed to 4933N 0658E. The next point was cut short and a direct route was flown to the I.P., 5033N 0750E.

3. Time at I.P. was 1202 hours at 25000'. From this point a course of 314 true was flown to the target, 5110N 0647E. Bombs were away at 1217 hours at 25000'. A westerly heading was flown from the point of bomb release to 5108N 0555E. This was the rally point time, 1228 hours at 24000' altitude.

4. From this point a course of 270° was flown to the coast out, which was crossed at 5118N 0302E at 23000' at 1305 hours. English coast was crossed at 1330 hours at 5200N 0125E at 18000'. We were over the base at 1337 hours at 13000' and landed at 1355 hours.

WOODROW W. MAGNESS
Captain, Air Corps,
Group Navigator.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

B-F-26

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 10 January 1945, Himmelgeist, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - We assumed lead of 95th "A" Squadron and dropped down to fly the low squadron, 95th "B". A PFF ship took over the group lead. Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes prior to the I.P. Bombing was in group formation and we were in that formation at I.P. and bombs away. I was unable to release at the target because my doors would not come all the way open. However my squadron dropped on the group lead. Bombs were away at 1217 hours.

2. Disposition of Bombs - Twelve A/C were dispatched from 95th "A" Squadron. Nine A/C were over the target dropping 48 x 1000# AN-M44 bombs. A/C #8333 had a release failure and jettisoned 6 x 1000# AN-M44 bombs at 5220N 0220E. A/C #2447, 8217 and 8468 aborted due to mechanical failure and jettisoned in the channel. All bombs were fuzed 1/10 nose and instantaneous tail.

3. Types of Release - All 48 x 1000# AN-M44 bombs dropped on the target of opportunity with a 50' interval.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C

Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	Bombs No.	Size	Type	Fuzing Nose Tail
Himmelgeist, Germany.	9	8	48	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst
Total on Target.			Same as above.			
Bombs Returned.			None.			
Other Expenditures (jettisoned)			24	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			72	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst

WILLIAM A. MONKEVICH
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 10 January 1945, Himmelgeist, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Narrative.

a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B, C-2 and AFCE equipment.

b. A 50° turn to the left was made at the I.P. We were in group formation, low squadron in position.

c. Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes prior to I.P. at 1203.

d. We assumed lead of 95th "A" and dropped down to fly the low squadron, 95th "B". A PFF ship took over the group lead. Bomb bays were opened two minutes prior to the I.P. Bombing was in group formation and we were in that formation at I.P. and bombs away. I was unable to release at the target because my doors would not come all the way open. However my squadron dropped on the group lead. Bombs were away at 1217 hours.

e. Bombing results were observed to be nil.

f. There are no suggested tactical changes in bombing technique.

2. Bombardier's form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Types of Release - All 48 x 1000# AN-M44 bombs dropped on target of opportunity with a 50' interval.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C			Bombs		Fuzing	
Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Nose Tail
Himmelgeist, Germany.	9	8	48	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst.
Total on Target.			48	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst.
Bombs Returned.			None.			
Other Expenditures. (jettisoned)			24	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst.
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			72	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst.

WILLIAM A. MONKEVICH
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-P-26

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 10 January 1945, Himmelgeist, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Narrative.

- a. There is no information on the bombing aids used.
- b. No information as lead crew is missing in action.
- c. No information as lead crew is missing in action.
- d. The leader of 95th "B" Squadron aborted after the target and at present is MIA. Nothing is known of his run except the pictures indicate he dropped the bombs north of the target on a target of opportunity of Himmelgeist, Germany.
- e. Bombing results were poor as reported by other crews in this squadron.
- f. There are no suggested changes in bombing technique.

2. Bombardier form 12-B modified is not attached as lead crew is MIA.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C

			Bombs		Fuzing	
Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Nose Tail
Himmelgeist, Germany.	12	12	71	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst
Total on Target.			Same as above.			
Bombs Returned.			7	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst
Other Expenditures.			None.			
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			78	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped by 95th "B" Squadron were at 50' interval and armed.

CARL A. CARLSON
1st Lt., Air Corps,
336th Sq. Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

B-F-26

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 10 January 1945, Himmelgeist, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - The leader of 95th "B" Squadron aborted after the target and at present is M.I.A. Nothing is known of his run except the pictures indicate he dropped the bombs north of the target on a target of opportunity, Himmelgeist.

2. Disposition of Bombs - 13 A/C were dispatched with 95th "B" Squadron and dropped 71 x 1000# G.P. AN-M44 bombs on a presumably target of opportunity. A/C #8260 (lead), 7858, 8441 and 8331 are all outstanding but are reported to have dropped on the lead so are counted on the target. A/C #7257 returned 1 x 1000# G.P. because of a frozen shackle. A/C #2455 aborted because of mechanical failure and returned 6 x 1000# G.P. All bombs dropped by 95th "B" Squadron were fuzed 1/10 nose with non-delay tail.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped by 95th "B" Squadron were at 50' interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C

Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Fuzing Nose Tail
Himmelgeist, Germany.	12	12	71	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst
Total on Target.			Same as above.			
Bombs Returned.			7	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst
Other Expenditures.			None.			
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			78	1000#	M-44	1/10 Inst

CARL A. CARLSON
1st Lt., Air Corps,
336th Sq. Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "C" Squadron, Mission of 11 January 1945, Himmelgeist, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - We assumed the lead of 95th "C" when the leader aborted and moved up to lead the high squadron. Bomb bays were opened two minutes prior to the I.P. Bombing was done in group formation and we were in the Group formation at the I.P. and on the run. Dropped on the group leader and bombs were away at 1217 hours. Flak was heavy and intense on the bombing run.

2. Disposition of Bombs - 13 A/C were dispatched with 95th "C" Squadron and A/C #8144, 7201 and #8438 all aborted (engine failure) and jettisoned 18 x 1000# G.P. M-44 bombs. A/C #8317 aborted and jettisoned 6 x 1000# G.P. bombs. A/C #8990 aborted and jettisoned 6 x 1000# G.P. bombs. Thus 8 A/C were over a target of opportunity dropping 48 x 1000# G.P. All bombs were fused 1/10 nose and instantaneous tail.

3. Types of Release - All bombs dropped by 95th "C" were released on a 50' train interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C

Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	Bombs			Fusing	
Himmelgeist, Germany.	8	8	No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Total on Target.			48	1000#	M-44	1/10	Inst
Bombs Returned.			None.				
Other Expenditures (jettisoned)			30	1000#	M-44	1/10	Inst
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			78	1000#	M-44	1/10	Inst.

ANTHONY J. SILVA
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "C" Squadron, Mission of 10 January 1945, Himmelgeist, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Narrative.

a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B, C-2 and AFCE equipment.

b. A 50° left turn was made at the I.P. We were in group formation. High squadron position.

c. Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes before I.P. at 1203.

d. We assumed the lead of 95th "C" when the leader aborted and moved up to lead the high squadron. Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes prior to the I.P. Bombing was done in group formation and we were in group formation at the I.P. and on the run. Dropped on the group leader and bombs were away at 1217 hours. Flak was heavy and intense on the bombing run.

e. Bombing results were observed to be nil.

f. There are no suggested changes in bombing technique.

2. Bombardier's form 12-B modified is not attached. Bombardier was not a Deputy or Deputy, Deputy Leader and took over in emergency.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C			Bombs			Fuzing	
Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Nose	Tail
Himmelgeist, Germany.	8	8	48	1000#	M-44	1/10	Inst
Total on Target.			Same as above.				
Bombs Returned.			None.				
Other Expenditures, (jettisoned)			30	1000#	M-44	1/10	Inst
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).			78	1000#	M-44	1/10	Inst

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped by 95th "C" were released on a 50' train interval and armed.

ANTHONY J. SILVA
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Lead Bombardier.

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Engineering Officer

APC 559,
11 January 1945.

Engineering Report on Combat Mission of 10 January 1945.

Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H). Attention:
Lt Col STUART.

The following information is submitted concerning combat mission
ary 1945.

- a. Thirty-eight (38) B-17 airplanes took-off as scheduled.
- b. Twenty-six (26) B-17 airplanes returned to base after completion of combat mission.
- c. 44-8260 landed on the continent and 43-38617 landed at Raydon.
- d. 42-97866, 43-38441 and 44-8331 are missing in action.

There were seven (7) abortive airplanes.

- a. 44-8438 - Pilot reported gas fumes, #2 carburetor too rich. Aircraft checked okay on ground.
- b. 43-38990 - Gunner's fingers froze after electric plug of heat suit pulled out of electrical circuit.
- c. 42-107201- #3 engine failure.
- d. 44-8217 - #4 engine failure.
- e. ~~42-102447~~ - #3 supercharger failure.
- f. 43-38317 - Oxygen leak caused by accident to ball turret on take-off.
- g. 42-102455- Taxi accident caused excessive prop vibration in flight after take-off.

Battle damage is as follows:

- a. 42-97194 - sheet metal and elevator chg.
- b. 42-107204- major sheet metal.
- c. 42-107047- sheet metal.
- d. 43-38676 - bulkhead damage.
- e. 43-39037 - sheet metal and left wing chg.
- f. 43-38281 - major sheet metal.
- g. 43-38774 - major sheet metal.
- h. 42-97257 - #1 main tank chg.

DONALD H. DOWLIN,
Capt., Air Corps.
Gp Engineering O.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Armament Officer
APO 559

10 January 1945

SUBJECT: Armament Malfunction Report for 10 January 1945.

TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Thirty-four aircraft were loaded with 6- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs per aircraft and the three B-7 aircraft were loaded with 6- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs and 2- CHB M1 Sky Markers per aircraft.

2. Following are the armament malfunctions reported for the mission of 10 January 1945.

A/C No. 7257- A-4 system. This aircraft returned one, one thousand pound bomb, to base on station 20. The A-4 release had operated, but the B-7 shackle was frozen, retaining the bomb. On landing, the bomb was jarred loose from the shackle. It fell on the door, bending it open, and then fell on the runway. The door has been repaired.
Part No. 12826 wire assembly in hand control assembly of A2A Ball Turret broken. Repaired.

A/C No. 8223- A-4 system. This aircraft did not release its bombs on the target. The bomb bay doors were opened electrically, but the bomb door indicator lights did not light up on either the bombardier or pilot's panel. The doors were closed and reopened several times, but the indicator lights did not come on. The flight engineer attempted to crank them open, but could not do so. Later, on returning, the doors were cranked open over the channel. The indicator lights came on and the bombs were jettisoned. An inspection on the ground revealed that the bomb bay door motor had burned out. The motor has been replaced.

A/C No. 3217- Ball Turret was damaged and it has been replaced.

A/C No. 7047- Ball Turret guns were stowed improperly during landing. New Turret installed.

A/C No. 6993- Part No. 32175 Speed reducer and power take-off assembly on Chin Turret inoperative. Replaced.

A/C No. 6598- Part No. 1547 Collector ring to Ball Turret sub damaged. Assembly replaced.

LEONARD F. PARSON
Capt. Air Corps
Group Armament Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Armament Officer
APO 559

10 January 1945

SUBJECT: Mission Expenditure Report for 10 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Following are the expenditures for the mission of 10 January 1945.

A. Station Afl19
B. Unit 95th Bombardment Group (H)
C. Type of Ammunition Cal. 50 API&I-TIEI
D. Gun locations and number of guns

68 Ball Turret Guns	680
68 Upper Turret Guns	680
34 Left Waist Guns	340
34 Right Waist Guns	340
34 Left Nose Guns	340
34 Right Nose Guns	340
68 Chin Turret Guns	680
68 Tail Guns	680

E. Total number of guns 408
F. Total amount of ammunition fired 4080 rounds.
G. Aircraft numbers 7858-8441-8331 reported missing each loaded with
5000 rds. Cal. 50 API&I-TIEI Ammunition and
6- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs.
H. Total amount of ammunition expended 19,080 rounds.
I. Total number of bombs expended 221- 1000 lb. G.P. Demolition
Bombs.
6- OMB M1 Sky Markers.

LEONARD F. DAWSON
Capt. Air Corps
Group Armament Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Communications Officer

(J-A-1)

APO 559
10 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Communications

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, Station #119

1. Of the thirty-eight crews assigned to the mission, thirty were available for interrogation by the Communications Officer.
2. Mechanical and electrical failures noted were as follows:
 - (a) 336-E (Liaison receiver/antenna lead-in grounded out)
 - (b) 335-M (Interphone/RW mike switch out)
 - (c) 334-W (Radio compass/replaced for shop check)
3. The following navigational aids were used successfully:
 - (a) 334-X, one QDM from home station
 - (b) 336-R, two QDM from home station
 - (c) 412-J, three QDM from home station
 - (d) 336-O, one fix from MF Section "H"
4. The reception of ground stations and beacons was normal.

RICHARD F. KNOX
Captain, A. C.
Gp. Communication O.

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INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 3114

ATTACK ON DUSSELDORF-NEUSS ROAD BRIDGE ON 10 JAN 1945

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK:

- (a) No. of aircraft : 66, with full fighter escort.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1216-1220 A hours.
- (d) Bombs : 392 x 1000 lb G.P.

(ii) STATEMENT ON THE TARGET:

The target is the DUSSELDORF-NEUSS Road bridge over the RIVER RHINE at G.S.G.S. 4416/R1 - 297895, 4 miles Southwest of the center of DUSSELDORF.

(iii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

- (a) Approximately 60 bursts are seen across the bridge and in adjacent fields and the RIVER RHINE with probably three direct hits and at least four near hits on the bridge.
- (b) Other bursts are visible as follows:
(Distances are measured from the center of the target)
 1. Five on a quayside and in fields one mile Northwest.
 2. Twenty on partially built-up areas one mile Southeast.
 3. Ten in and on the banks of the RIVER RHINE two miles Southeast.
 4. Approximately 50 on a partially built-up area 2½ miles Northeast.
 5. Approximately 75 in fields and the RIVER RHINE 3½ miles Southeast with possible hits on two river barges which are seen burning later in the attack.

(iv) ACTIVITY:

(a) DUSSELDORF AIRFIELD

1. Only the extreme South end of the airfield is covered.
2. No aircraft are visible on the part covered, Five large hangars and six covered shelters are located on this portion of the airfield.
3. On the last cover (16/1521) on 25 DEC 1944, 14 aircraft were visible.
4. Snow cover prevents any statement on the serviceability of the landing ground.

(b) DUSSELDORF MARSHALLING YARD

The marshalling yard is lightly loaded.

(v) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.

(vi) BOMB PLOT: A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed.

(vii) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV 95/1343,1344	10 JAN 45	1216A hrs.	1/42,800 (F.L.7")	25,000' 'A'
" 100/1160,1162,1164	" "	1219A "	1/45,400 (F.L.7")	26,500' "
" 390/1228,1239	" "	1220A "	1/45,800 (F.L.7")	26,750' "

**HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER**

10 January 1945

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for the mission to Himmelgeist, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. The Mission - the 95th Group flew as 13A Combat Group in an attack against a RR Bridge across the Rhine River at Cologne, Germany. The mission was flown as reported in the "Analysis of the Operational Mission for 10 January 1945," a copy of which is filed with this mission folder. As noted in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, the Group attacked a target of opportunity near Himmelgeist, Germany.

95A - Eleven A/C and one PFF A/C took off and assembled as the Low Squadron in the Combat Group. Eight A/C attacked the above T.O. Two A/C are credited with sorties: A/C 8333 flew the entire route but was unable to bomb a target in Germany because of malfunction; PFF A/C 8217 returned from 4939N-0708E at 1146 hours because #4 engine was out and A/C couldn't hold formation. Two A/C aborted: A/C 8489 returned from 5028N-0404E at 1055 hours because radio operator had frost-bitten hands; A/C 2447 returned from 5124N-0220 at 1030 hours because of loss of power in #1 and #3 engines.

95B - Twelve A/C and one PFF A/C took off and assembled as the Lead Squadron in the Combat Group. Twelve A/C attacked the above T.O. One A/C 2455 aborted over the base at 0905 hours because of #3 prop vibration and fluctuating manifold pressure.

95C - Twelve A/C and one PFF A/C took off and assembled as the High Squadron in the Combat Group. Eight A/C attacked the above T.O. Two A/C are credited with sorties: PFF A/C 8144 returned from 4939N-0700 at 1133 hours because #2 prop was windmilling and A/C couldn't hold formation; A/C 990 returned from 4933N-0656E at 1138 hours because BT gunner had frozen hands. Three A/C aborted: A/C 8317 returned from 5102N-0318E at 1042 hours because of several mechanical failures; A/C 7201 returned from 5215N-0253E at 0925 hours because of #3 engine failure; A/C 8458 returned from 5209N-0126E at 0840 hours because of engine failure.

2. Enemy Air Opposition - there was none.

3. Flak - crews reported moderate and accurate tracking fire from Cologne. In view of the above-mentioned "Analysis of Operational Mission," paragraphs 8, 9, 10, and 11, it is believed this AA fire was encountered over Dusseldorf. All battle damage and A/C losses were incurred in this area.

4. Bombing Results - strike photos show poor bombing. The Group dropped 3½ miles short of any target in the Dusseldorf area in a scattered pattern, most of the bombs falling in the Rhine River. The town of Himmelgeist was the T.O. - it was bombed for reasons unknown because the lead A/C has not returned to this base.

5. Other Information - fighter support was reported fair. The irregular points of the mission are covered in the "Analysis of the Operational Mission."

One PFF A/C 8260 has been reported as landing in Belgium, and the Bombardier is reported in the hospital.

Three A/C are Missing:

A/C 7858 was hit by flak in #2 engine at 1217 hours over Dusseldorf. A/C nosed down immediately with smoke pouring from the engine. A/C last seen at 17,000 feet heading 270° with wheels down, under control and fire out. As many as 4 men are reported bailed out with one chute seen to open.

At 1222 hours: in the vicinity of 5105-0632 a B-17 was reported seen at 10/12,000 feet going straight down in a dive in flames. No chutes seen.

A/C 8441 radioed to local IBI station that rudder was damaged and gas was low at 1455 hours, one hour after return of formation to base.

A/C 8331 has been reported as landing at Lille, France.

For the Intelligence Officer:

ARNO A. KRAUSE,
Captain, Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

11 JAN 1945

PFF INTERPRETATION REPORT T-36

- (1) Summary of PFF missions on 10 JAN 1945 from photographs received through 1800 hrs. on 11 JAN 1945.

1ST DIVISIONMission to Euskirchen A/F

SAT 351/104	- Not plotted. Aircraft in bank during bomb run.
SAT 351/105	- Plotted, see bomb plot.
SAT 351/106	- Not plotted, not enough check points.
SAT 401/127	- Not plotted, no bomb run.
SAT 401/128	- Plotted, see bomb plot.
SAT 457/54	- Not plotted, no blips.

2ND DIVISIONMission to Dasburg

SAT 392/63	- Not plotted, not enough check points.
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Mission to Schonberg

SAT 458/10	- Not plotted, not enough check points.
SAT 467/98	- Not plotted, not enough check points.

- (2) No photographs received on other targets attacked this date.

- (3) Sorties Received:

SAT 34/12	SAT 351/106
SAT 91/104	SAT 379/56
SAT 91/105	SAT 381/91
SAT 94/69	SAT 381/92
SAT 351/104	SAT 392/63
SAT 351/105	SAT 392/37
SAT 401/27	SAT 467/93
SAT 401/28	SAT 483/55
SAT 457/54	
SAT 458/10	

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HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

10 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Analysis of the Operational Mission for 10 January 1945.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. 0818 hours - take off - 95 A (Lead Sq) lead a/c 8217 knocked off PFF dome when it hit highlight fixture along runway on take off.

2. 0915 hours - Over Base during climb to assembly altitude, 17,000 feet - 95 A (Lead Sq) Command Pilot ordered 95 B (High Sq) to take over Group Lead.

3. 0935 hours - Over Base - Group assembly completed with 95 B (original High Sq) in the lead position, 95 C (original Low Sq) in the high position, and 95 A (original Lead Sq) in the low position. Assembly was 3,000 feet higher than briefed in order to clear the cloud tops of a 10/10ths overcast.

4. 0943 hours - Buncher 8 - Wing assembly point crossed 2 minutes early, but Wing was not assembled due to contrails. Lead Wing (93RD) was reported 5 minutes ahead and this Wing couldn't catch up with it.

5. 1130 hours - (4941-0655) - 95 C (High Sq) Lead a/c 8144 aborted because #2 prop windmilling. 95 C (High Sq) Command Pilot ordered a/c 8525 leading the Low Element to take over the lead of that Squadron. The Squadron reformed on him.

6. Thereafter, 95 C (High Sq) lost almost 2,000 feet altitude, and never regained the original High Squadron position, bombing from 25,300 feet.

7. 1146 hours - (4939-0708) - 95 A (Low Sq) Lead a/c 8217 aborted because #4 engine failure and couldn't keep up with formation. According to SOP, a/c 8333 took over the lead of that Squadron.

8. 1150 hours - (5001-0748) - 95 B (Group Lead) advised 95 A and 95 C Squadron Leaders (acting) that bombing would be done in Group formation.

9. 1202 hours - (5038-0750) - Actual IP; turn onto bomb run was 6 miles North of assigned IP (5033-0750).

10. 1217 hours - (5110-0648) - Apparently the Bombardier of 95 B (Lead Sq) was making a visual run at 27,000 feet on the second Bridge from the South across the Rhine River at Dusseldorf. Bombs were dropped $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles short of the city of Dusseldorf for reasons unknown because the lead a/c is missing.

95 A (Low Sq) dropped on the bombs of 95 B from 26,000 feet.

95 C ("Low Low" Sq) dropped on the bombs of 95 A from 25,300 feet.

11. 1217 plus hours - Dusseldorf - 95 B (lead Sq) Lead a/c 8260 was probably hit by flak in #4 engine. A/c dove to approximately 19,000 feet and the Squadron broke up. A few a/c including the Deputy Lead a/c 8281 followed him down to that altitude, where the Deputy Lead took over the Squadron, and 6 a/c formed on him. The balance of the a/c in 95 B tacked onto 95 A and 95 C. A/c 8260 fell behind the formation under control.

12. 1223 hours - (5110-0619) - 95 A Squadron took over the lead of the Group.

13. 1228 hours - (5108-0555) - 95 A Squadron was in the lead position and 95 C Squadron in the low position at this point, 20 miles NNW of briefed RP (5050-0605). 95 B Squadron trailed below and behind the Group for the balance of the mission.

14. 1242 hours - (5105-0450) - Briefed course picked up and followed on route out.

15. 1250 hours - (5105-0402) - Started climb to 25,000 feet to clear clouds and contrails. Descent to minimum altitude began 15 miles from English Coast.

16. Four a/c are missing:

A/c 7858 was hit by flak in #2 engine at 1217 hours over Dusseldorf. A/c nosed down immediately with smoke pouring from the engine. A/c last seen at 17,000 feet heading 270° with wheels down, under control and fire out. As many as 4 men are reported bailed out with one chute seen to open.

A/c 8260 was probably hit by flak over Dusseldorf at 1217 hours, and was seen to dive to about 18,000 feet. There was no fire but pieces were seen to fly off the #4 engine before the a/c left formation. A/c last seen below and behind the formation heading due W across the enemy lines at 1228 hours. No chutes seen.

At 1222 hours in the vicinity of 5105-0632 a B-17 was reported seen at 10/12,000 feet going straight down in a dive in flames. No chutes seen.

A/c 8441 radioed to local XD1 station that rudder was damaged and gas was low at 1455 hours, one hour after return of formation to base.

A/c 8331 - No report.



RICHARD H. OGDEN,
Major, Air Corps,
Asst. Operations Officer.



ARNO A. KRAUSE,
Captain, Air Corps,
Asst. Intelligence Officer.

95TH BG

XXX

10/1/45 1930 S-2

OPERATIONAL NARRATIVE 95TH GROUP HIMMELGEIST MISSION 10 JANUARY 1945

1. LEAFLETS -- None.
2. BOMBING RESULTS -- Bombing of TO near the town of Himmelgeist was visual in Group formation. Results poor. Primary was not bombed for the probable reason that the IP was overshot by about 15 miles. Hot prints show bomb bursts in the Rhine River and fields $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles SSE of Dusseldorf.
3. E/A -- None.
4. FLAK -- Cologne - moderate, accurate, tracking.
Dusseldorf - meagre, inaccurate, tracking.
5. WEATHER -- Dense persistent contrails at 27,000 feet with 5 to 6/10 cloud below 15,000 feet at Cologne diminishing to 3 to 4/10 at Dusseldorf.
6. OBSERVATIONS --
1215 - Dusseldorf (5113-0645) truck traffic across the Rhine River.
Two A/C from this Group were lost to flak. More later.
7. OTHER INFORMATION -- Lead A/C mickey equipment damaged on take-off. Command pilot reformed group so 95A (original lead) took the low position, 95B (original high) took the lead position, and 95C (original low) took over the high position. Lead A/C of 95A and 95C squadrons aborted and deputy leaders took over about 4930-0700. 95C lost 2,000 feet and flew below 95A until just before target when they climbed back to high position. Lead of 95A and 95C advised at approximately 5000-0740 that bombing would be done by group. Group went ~~in~~ 15 miles NE of briefed IP and then straightened out on briefed course which took formation past primary target. 95C dropped on bombs of 95A (low squadron) and 95A dropped on 95B (lead squadron) bombs. Lead A/C forced out of formation just after bombs away and this squadron broke up tacking on to 95A and 95C. 95A took over lead at this point. Formation north of briefed RP but hit briefed course ~~max~~ at 5055-0540 and followed briefed course out. Formation had to climb to 25,000 feet to avoid contrails on the way out. Group assembly made OK but wing assembly wasn't made due to contrails. Fighter escort described as fair. Four A/C have not returned to this base.
8. A. 3 A/C airborne.
B. 8217 - Dome was knocked off on take-off.
8217 and 8144 aborted before target because of mechanical reasons.
C. 8260 - No report.
8144 - Fair returns.
D. 8260 - No report.
E. 95A - Capt. Scholte - 8217.
95B - Lt. \int Burrow - 8260.
95C - Lt. De Cherniss - 8144

CO. 13TH CBW
100TH BG
390TH BG

J220D

ATTN: FLAK OFFICER

XXX

XXX

10/1/45 1845 S-2

FLAK REPORT 95TH BG COLOGNE 10 JANUARY 1945 F. X. PIERCE

1. STATISTICS --

13A	95A	9	26,000	1217	315 Degrees	260 degrees	Himmelgeist
	95B	11 plus 1	27,000	1217	309 degrees	240 degrees	Himmelgeist
	95C	9 plus 1	25,300	1217	309 degrees	271 degrees	Himmelgeist

Remarks on statistics: None.

2. FLAK DAMAGE AND LOSSES--

95A 1A IP BRL 3A UNK 1 A/C landed away.
95B 2A 2AC IP BRL 1AC BLR RP 2AC UNK 4 A/C MIA.
95C 2A IP BRL 1A UNK

Remarks: Flak damage is preliminary report given by crews.

3. OPERATIONS --

- A. Visual bombing in group formation.
- B. CAVU over target. 10/10 route in and out.
- C. Lead wing was 5 minutes early crossing Belgian coast in but were on time over enemy territory. IP was overshoot by about 15 minutes and target of opportunity was attacked.
- D. None.
- E. 95B took over lead when lead A/C of 95A aborted. The ~~main~~ lead of 95B is MIA so definite story of mission is not known.

- 4. A. Accurate Tracking Moderate to intense
- B. Accurate Tracking Moderate to intense
- C. Encountered 5040-0735 Inaccurate Moderate Barrage No Damage
- Encountered 5051-0730 Inaccurate Meagre Barrage No damage
- Observed Bonn Intense
- D. None
- E. One crew reported that no flak encountered until about 2½ minutes from BRL. The TO attacked is just about 3 miles South of Dusseldorf, so flak was also encountered from that area. One A/C in 95B was definitely hit by flak over target and was diving with left wing on fire. Fire was seen to be put out, but no word has been heard from this A/C. One A/C in 95B was last reported running short of fuel on route out. Other two MIA, unheard from.

5. PHENOMENA:--

Dark and light and red flak were reported.
Three different sizes of flak, smallest about one-half size of regular 88 MM.
Railroad guns.

3BD INST 45-2 (9 OCT 44)

OPERATIONAL REPORT - STATISTICAL SECTION

	95A	95B	95C
1. GROUP			
2. A/C AIRBORNE	12	13	13
3. SORTIES	9	12	10
4. A/C ATTACKING	9 8	12	8
5. A/A FAILING TO ATTACK	3 4	1	5
a. Mechanical	3	0	5 3
b. Weather			
c. Enemy action		SPARE 1	SPARE 1
d. Other	1	4 1 UR	1
6. A/C LOST	0	4 1 UR	0
a. TO AA		1 X	
b. TO E/A			
c. TO AA AND E/A			
d. TO Accident			
e. By Reasons Unknown		3 X	
7. TIME OF ATTACK	12 17	12 16	12 17
8. ALTITUDE OF ATTACK	26000	27000	25300
9. BOMBS DROPPED (PRIMARY)	Himmelgeist		
a. Number	48	71	48
b. Size	1000	1000	1000
c. Type	GP	GP	GP
d. Number A/C Bombing	8	12	8
BOMBS DROPPED (OTHER)			
a. Number			
b. Size			
c. Type			
d. Number A/C Bombing			
BOMBS DROPPED (OTHER)			
a. Number			
b. Size			
c. Type			
d. Number A/C Bombing			
10. BATTLE DAMAGE	4	7	4
a. Minor	4	2	4
b. Major		5	
c. Salvage			
12. Claims	0-0-0	0-0-0	0-0-0
	lett: 24x1000	Ret 7x1000	lett 30x1000

33451
860

2340
11

Planes 1750
UR

A/C No.	Air-borne	Sorties	Attacking	ABORTS				LOST			DAMAGE			BOMBS DROPPED			RET.	
				M	W	E	O	E/A	AA	OTHER	Maj.	Min.	P	S	LR	TO		JETT
2455	1			1														6
7257	1	1	1										5					1
3774	1	1	1							1			6					
8281	1	1	1							1			6	→				
7204	✓ 1	1	1							1			6					
3057	✓ 1	1	1							1			6					
1462	1	1	1							1			6	→				
8326	1	1	1								1		6	→				
7047	✓ 1	1	1								1		6R					
8331	1	1	1									1	6?					
8441	1	1	1									1	6?					
8266	✓ 1	1	1									1	6					
7858	1	1	1							1			6					

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 255

PERIOD: 0001 hours 10 January 1945 to 2400 hours 10 January 1945

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Mission</u>	<u>Disp.</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Atkg.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>				<u>Totals</u>
							<u>E/A</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>N/E</u>	<u>OT</u>	
Heavy Bomber Atks.	13	1119	982	912	2199.5	0-0-0	0	17	2	38	57 (a)
Fighter Escort	3	152	137	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	1	6	7 (b)
Fighter Sweeps	3	155	123	0	0	1-0-0A 2-0-0G	0	0	0	4	4 (c)
Fighter Bombing	1	15	13	13	3.4	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	1	10	6	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	7	41	37	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	1	1
Air/Sea Rescue	5	12	12	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	35	1509	1315	925	2202.9	1-0-0A 2-0-0G	0	17	3	49	69

- (a) Some believed safe on Continent
- (b) 6 P-51s believed safe on Continent
- (c) 1 believed safe on Continent

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

1119 a/c (886 B-17s, 233 B-24s) from three Air Divisions dispatched in three forces against four A/Fs, one M/Y, six road bridges and two railroad bridges. 912 a/c dropped 2199.5 tons GP on 13 primary targets, two secondary and several T/Os. Assigned targets bombed visually and on PFF. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 57 a/c (34 to unknown causes, 17 to AA, 6 to Cat. "E").

First Force

32 squadron formations (428 B-17s - Third Air Division) dispatched against A/Fs in tactical area. 345 a/c dropped a total of 1,007.5 tons GP on assigned targets, a secondary and several T/Os at 1204-1240 hours from 24,000-28,000 feet. Bombing on PFF with visual assist. Leaflets dropped on Karlsruhe and Cologne.

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S E C R E T

Weather: 10/10 enroute - breaks over targets. Flak: moderate to intense and fairly accurate. Battle Damage: 40 major, 159 minor. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 26 a/c (15 to unknown causes, 7 to AA, 4 to Cat. "E").

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>GP</u>	<u>Results</u>
Cologne-Rodenkirchen Rd. Bridge	63	31	91.5	Unobserved
Cologne South RR Bridge	76	34	102.0	Poor
Cologne-Deutz Rd. Bridge	70	10	27.0	Unobserved
Cologne-Hohenzollern RR Bridge	72	52	149.0	Good
Karlsruhe M/Y	147	105	308.0	Very Good
Cologne-Gereon M/Y (Sec)		20	54.5	Unobserved
<u>Other Targets</u>				
Duisberg Bridge		11	33.0	Poor
Oberkassel Bridge		21	63.0	Unobserved
T/O 5110-0648E (Dusseldorf)		28	83.5	Very Good
T/O 5112N-0643E		17	49.5	Unobserved
10 T/Os		16	46.5	Unobserved
Totals	428	345	1007.5	

Second Force

Nine group formations (233 B-24s - Second Air Division) dispatched against 4 road bridges. 174 a/c dropped 469 tons GP on assigned primaries and a T/O at 1315-1329 hours from 20,000-27,000 feet. Assigned targets bombed on Gee-H. Weather: 8/10-10/10 cloud in target area. Flak: nil to meager, inaccurate. Battle Damage: 7 minor, 0 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 7 a/c (5 to unknown causes, 2 Cat. "E").

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>GP</u>	<u>Results</u>
Steinbruck Rd. Bridge	65	23	61.0	Unobserved
Schonberg Road Bridge	54	70	186.0	Unobserved
Wewler Road Bridge	60	60	166.0	Unobserved
Dasburg Road Bridge	54	20	53.0	Unobserved
<u>Other Target</u>				
Prum		1	3.0	Unobserved
Totals	233	174	469.0	

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Third Force

Twelve group formations (458 B-17s - First Air Division) dispatched against 2 railroad bridges, 2 road bridges and a M/Y. 393 a/c dropped 723 tons GP on assigned targets, a secondary target and several T/Os at 1206-1346 hours from 23,000-28,500 feet. Assigned targets bombed visually and on Gee-H. Leaflets dropped on Euskirchen. Weather: 4/10-10/10 over targets. Flak: meager to intense and fairly accurate. Battle Damage: 84 minor, 56 major. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 24 a/c (10 to AA, 14 to unknown causes).

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>GP</u>	<u>Results</u>
Bonn/Hangelar A/F	117	63	117.7	Good
Euskirchen/Odendorf A/F	116	98	182.1	Unobserved
Cologne/Ostheim A/F	110	83	152.4	Fair
Gymnich A/F	115	52	94.1	Poor-Fair
Cologne M/Y (Sec)		43	81.5	Poor-Fair
<u>Other Targets</u>				
Euskirchen M/Y		8	13.3	Unobserved
Belecke M/Y		8	14.2	Unobserved
Duren M/Y		12	22.8	Unobserved
T/O 5 miles NW Gymnich A/F		13	20.9	Unobserved
U/I T/Os		<u>13</u>	<u>24.0</u>	Unobserved
Totals	458	393	723.0	

2. Fighter Escort

Three groups (152 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0950-1015 hours, down 1420-1510 hours. 137 sorties. E/A Opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 7 P-51s (6 believed safe on Continent, 1 Cat. "E").

3. Fighter Sweeps

Three groups (101 P-51s, 54 P-47s - 155 a/c) dispatched to give free-lance area support to bombers. Up 0838-0952 hours, down 1330-1448 hours. 123 sorties. E/A Opposition: one Me-109 destroyed as it was about to land at Paderborn A/F. Three He-111s strafed on ground there. Claims: 1-0-0 air, 2-0-0 ground. Losses: 4 a/c (1 P-51 to unknown causes, 1 P-47 believed safe on Continent, 2 P-51s Cat. "E").

4. Fighter Bombing

One group based on Continent (15 P-51s) dispatched on dive-bombing mission. Up 1010 hours, down 1224 hours. 13 sorties. 13 a/c dropped 3.4 tons frag. bombs on M/Ys at R-2486 and at Neustadt, claiming 0-0-27 goods wagons. E/A Opposition: nil. 2 Me-262s seen north of Karlsruhe. E/A Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

S E C R E T

5. Photo Reconnaissance

10 a/c dispatched as follows:

2 Mosquitoes on special photo mission over Brux area. Both a/c aborted.
8 P-51s, escort, failed to rendezvous with Mosquitoes. Two a/c aborted.
No claims. No losses.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

41 a/c dispatched as follows:

3 B-17s on weather flight over sea NW of Lands End.
1 B-17 on routine weather reconnaissance to Azores.
1 B-17 on routine weather flight to position 13 and return.
4 Mosquitoes on special weather flights over N. France, West Central
Germany, Holland, North Sea, Denmark and Belgium.
32 P-51s weather reconnaissance for heavy bombers. 28 sorties.

No claims. Losses - 1 P-51 believed safe on the Continent.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

12 P-47s completed routine patrol and search.

Report received of one B-17 ditching at 5153N-0247E. 4 chutes seen in
same vicinity. Weather too bad for a/c to search. Boats dispatched from Ostend
and Harwich to search area. Results not known.

8. Special Operations

5 a/c dispatched as follows:

1 Mosquito on special operations over Holland.
4 B-24s on RCM missions, jamming from 0800 to 1015 hours.

No claims. No losses.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

North of 51 degrees North, weather conditions should not have prevented the
GAF from taking off. In spite of this there is no indication of any effort to op-
pose the heavy bombers and their escort. One Me-109 was destroyed by a fighter
group over Paderborn A/F as it was coming in to land. The only other e/a seen were
2 Me-262s, 10 miles North of Karlsruhe on a South course. These were being chased
by 25 P-51s.

2. Flak

Euskirchen - Meager, inaccurate to accurate.
Bonn - Meager, accurate.
Cologne - Moderate to intense, accurate.

2. Flak (Continued)

Karlsruhe - Meager to moderate, fairly accurate.
Schonberg - Meager, inaccurate.
Weweler - Meager, inaccurate.

3. Observations

Sieburg M/Y very active.
Offenburg M/Y - a large amount of traffic.
Pforzheim M/Y well filled.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Cologne South RR Bridge - Poor Results

Attacked by one group using 1000 GP bombs. Bursts from two squadrons fell just short south of the target, mostly in the river. Bursts from the other squadron fell 1-1/4 mile W-SW in the built-up and manufacturing area.

Cologne/Hohenzollern RR Bridge - Good Results

Attacked by five squadrons carrying 1000 GP bombs. A pattern blankets the target with four hits and one near miss on the bridge, one hit on the main station and eight scattered bursts in built-up area just beyond. One pattern is seen in the built-up area 6/10 mile north of MPI. Another 3/10 mile SE of MPI; a third, one mile S-SW of MPI - all in built-up area. Other patterns are unobserved due to lack of photos.

Karlsruhe M/Y - Very Good Results

Bombed by 11 squadrons with 500 lb. GP bombs. Beginning about 300 yards east of the main passenger station the yard was quite evenly covered eastward for a distance of about 2100 yards. As nearly as can be told, only one of the 11 squadrons failed to place bombs in the yard. A rough estimate would place the number of RR cars in the yard at 800 to 1000. Late in the attack the yard was clearly observed to be fairly pock-marked by an even distribution of craters.

Dusseldorf Road Bridge (T/O) - Very Good Results

Bombed by six squadrons with 1000 GP bombs. Two squadrons blanketed the bridge, securing possibly six hits on the bridge and 10 on the east approach. Pattern of one squadron is seen in the built-up area of the town and another three squadrons dropped in group formation and strung bombs through fields and woods for approximately six miles, mostly short of the bridge.

Duisburg RR Bridge (T/O) - Poor Results

Split pattern of 1000 GP seen on both sides of river near RR bridge used as target. Part of the pattern strings across the blast furnace and west end of the Veriengy Steel-Works, the rolling mills 1/2 mile northeast of the aiming point. Possibly two or three hits or near misses on these blast furnaces. One hit is seen on a copper smelting plant belonging to the same company directly north and a string of bursts is seen southwest of the bridge at some sidings of another part of the steel works.

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Bonn/Hangelar A/F - Good Results

450 GP bursts in central portion of target area and approximately 500 GP bursts adjacent to NE edge of field. Field not completely covered by photos of last elements bombing. Some additional damage can be expected. Ten a/c visible on field at time of attack.

Cologne/Ostheim A/F - Fair Results

Three concentrations of GP in or near target area. At least 250 direct hits in center of landing field, machine gun testing range, two aircraft shelters and ammunition and fuel storage areas. However, no explosions or fires visible. Main weight of bombs on east edge of A/F in open area and one mile north of center of target.

Gymnich A/F - Poor to Fair Results

125 bombs fell in northwest portion of landing ground. Two small concentrations, totalling 100 GPs fell adjacent to north edge. Approximately 300 GPs in and adjacent to small village of Bliefheim six miles southeast of center of target. 200 bombs fell in open area eight miles southeast of target and 250 in quarry and woodland four miles east of target.

Eusirchen/Odendorf A/F - Unobserved Results

Cloud cover of 8 to 10/10 density over entire target area prevents assessment. However, partial concentrations could be seen in southeast and northwest sections of landing field. Approximately 300 bombs covered southwest corner of Odendorf village 1/2 mile east of center of target.

Cologne M/Y and City (Sec.) - Poor to Fair Results

Concentration of approximately 100 GPs in the Gerion M/Y and at least 20 direct hits on rail lines. At least 15 scattered bursts near the main railway station and some bursts on rail lines NW of station. One concentration of approximately 75 bombs in an open area, 2 1/2 miles southeast of railway station.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
65TH FIGHTER WING
APO 558 AAF Station F-370

NUMBER 247

11 January, 1945.

"B" AND "C" CHANNEL REPORTS --- 65th FIGHTER WING OPERATIONS ROOM.
Period of Operations: 0000 - 2400 hours 10 January, 1945.

This Wing controlled Channel "B" (Air/Sea/Rescue) and Channel "C" (Fighter-Bomber) for Eighth Air Force fighters and bombers.

I. GENERAL

No comments.

II. "B" CHANNEL (Air/Sea/Rescue) (Lt. Godfrey, Lt. Graham, Controllers)

There were ten emergency bomber homings handled on this channel today. There were no fighter homings given and no Maydays heard.

Quilpen C for Charlie at 19,000 feet proceeded to Wash to drop bombs. Found hole in overcast and dropped bombs at 1315 hours, and headed for home base. Reported position over home base at 1335 hours.

Bomber G for George, no compass, and one engine feathered was 10 miles from Manston. Wanted steer to home base. Plotted home all the way from initial call to within four miles of home base where he recognized terrain. Was OK and left channel at 1332 hours.

Landberg Q for Queenie, airspeed out, no vacuum instruments, wanted weather and steer to home base. Vectored from Manston to Horham. Was OK and left channel at 1411 hours.

Pinetree O for Obee reported four chutes over channel, position 5134N 0248E. This position reported from several sources. Plainsong 68 diverted to position. Ostend boat sent to position. Teamwork 61 and 64 also vectored through very bad weather to position. Teamwork aircraft got within two minutes of position and had to turn back because of no visibility. Seagull 52 and 11 sent to position. No further reports of search.

Quilpen B for Baker, one prop windmilling, in no immediate danger. 290 - 50 miles from Manston. Was OK over land at 1455 hours.

Egland G for George in soup at 2500 feet, wanted steer to home base and was given 330° - 95 miles. Also asked for weather and Q.F.E. to home base which was given to him. Was OK and left channel at 1509 hours.

Bomber X for Xray was above clouds over channel at 12,000 feet and wanted steer to Clacton. Was in no trouble. Left channel after getting vector.

Cotspring N for Nan called several times for A/S/R but he could not receive Colgate or Colgate relay. Sent Teamwork 62 and 67 to intercept.

Luggage K for King with two engines out coming across channel wanted Q.F.E. at Manston, was at 11,000 feet and 25 miles away. Got homing from Bluefrock after crossing in at 1545 hours.

Pebbley A for Able, with one engine out and throttle out wanted Q.F.E. at Sudbury. Crossed in OK at 1511 hours.

Acquit Q for Queen wanted steer to home base. Was given 330° 35 miles and was in no trouble. Crossed in OK at 1524 hours.

Teamwork 43 and 46 searched area east southeast of Clacton for 45 minutes. Reported finding nothing at all. Some aircraft was supposed to have gone down in this area.

III. CHANNEL "C" (Fighter-Bomber) (Sgt. Steel, S/Sgt Sheff, S/Sgt Cypher, Controllers)

Eighth Air Force Channel C Report.

Only Vinegrove 15 and 17 were contacted in the 1st Task Force. The lead combat wing was five minutes late; the middle ones were on time and Vinegrove 3 was five minutes early. They were in a very scattered formation. The combat wings were warned that Balance 2 would not be with them and were to call Balance 1 if any assistance was needed.

The 3d Task Force was running two to five minutes early

Very few homings were heard, one bomber in distress was sent to A/S/R channel

Communications were good and range was about 200 miles from relay.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Mission Report of 10 Jan 1945 Cont'd.

2nd Air Division Channel C Report

There were no timings received from any of the Vinegrove aircraft of the 2d Task Force. Information was passed to all the 2d Task Force, through Vinegrove 24, that Balance 1's were to be their support instead of Balance 3's. Vinegrove 24 acknowledged this message.

Communications were good on Southwold relay.

1st Air Division Channel C Report.

Most of the Vinegrove 3's called in their timings at control points 1, 2 and 3. When Vinegrove 32 and 33 tried to contact Balance 3's at 1220 hours, I told them to contact Balance 1 on the other "C" channel (Eighth Air Force channel "C") for their support. This information was also given to Vinegrove 34 and 3-12 at 1225 hours; acknowledged at 1226 hours.

I put out a call to all Vinegrove 3's giving the same information, but no one acknowledged.

Communications were good; range being about 150 miles from the relay.

Ray H. Larrabee

RAY H. LARRABEE,
Major, Air Corps,
Senior Controller.

Distribution: Special.
65th FW Reg. No. 9618.