CONFIDENTIAL 14 JAN 1944

IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 3588

LOCALITY: FRANKFURT AM MAIN (OST) M/Y

#### PERIOD UNDER REVIEW

This report covers damage to the target between 18454 hours on 25 DEC 1944 and 1500 Å hours on 13 JAN 1945 and includes the attack by aircraft of U.S. 8th AIR FORCE-on 5 JAN 1945. (S.A. 3082)

#### PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE

Light damage only is visible in the M/Y which is blanketed by snow, making assessment difficult.

In the Reception Sidings, one crater has cut at least two rail lines while another crater has cut rail lines at the Entrance to the Sorting Sidings.

The roof of the Locomotive Depot is apparently 2 destroyed and a few railway wagons nearby are either damaged or derailed. Several buildings near the M/Y have been either damaged or partly destroyed.

Details of damage are as follows: -(Numbers in parenthesis refer to Target Illustration No. 6(d)(vi)46/6)

#### FACILITIES

Locomotive Depot (5): roof probably 2 destroyed.

#### M/Y SIDINGS

Reception Sidings (1)

; at least two rail lines cut by one crater.

Entrance to Sorting Sidings (2a)

: rail lines cut by one crater and a few railway wagons are apparently damaged or derailed.

#### THROUGH RUNNING LINES

Rail line to Friedburg N. of Flyover (9): two hits have cut at least one of the two lines.

#### OTHER DAMAGE

Large Building S. of Storage Sidings (4): previously damaged, now damaged and partly destroyed by at least 3 hits.

Large Building N. of Storage Siding (4): NE section 1 gutted.

Large Building S. of Secondary Sorting Sidings (3): 4 of roof probably destroyed.

Medium Building S. of Reception Sidings (1): small section of roof destroyed,

Long Shed Type Building S. of (1): probably damaged by one direct hit, also two small buildings damaged.

Medium Narrow Building N. of Footbridge(11): destroyed.

#### REPAIRS

Snow and quality of prints prevent accurate assessment. (Notes supplied by "F" Section)

#### LOADING

Holding Siding (12)

: moderate loading.

Storage Sidings (4)

: no railway wagons present

Reception Sidings (1)

: moderate loading.

Sorting Sidings (2)

: moderate loading.

#### SERVICEABILITY

The rail line to Friedburg N. of Flyover (9) is 50% serviceable.

(Prints 3072-75)

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 13 Squadron.

SORTIE: US7GR/3798.

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 1500A hours on 13 JAN 1945.

SCALE: 1/14,500 (F.L.24").

COVER AND QUALITY: The target is fully covered on photographs of fair quality marred by snow and cloud.

Immediate and Supplement No. K. 3255 issued 7 and 8 OCT 1944. LAST REPORT:

COMPARATIVE SORTIES USED: 106G/3929 (Prints 3128-35 and 4129-35) PRINT DISTRIBUTED: 3074 (to follow when available)

CONFIDENTIAL.

## CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS 13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H) APO 559

Date 5 January 1945 13 CBW FO 4 13 CBW OPS 256 3 BD FO 541

SUBJECT: Tactical Report (FRANKFURT)

TO Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H). APO 559

#### 1. Information Concerning the Target:

- The primary (visual) target for today was the FRANKFURT OST MARSHALLING YARD, which lies immediately east of FRANKFURT AM MAIN. The southern side of the target adjoins the closely built up industrial area surrounding the port, and the western end of the target by the closely built up town of FRANKFURT. The extreme eastern end of the target is enclosed in a closely built up industrial area. There is, however, a stretch of open country to the north of the central pertion of the target area.
- b. The secondary target for today was the same as the primary. H2X technique, in event of the target being overcast, was to be used.
- 2. Planning and Execution of the Mission:
  - Group Order and Strength:

(1)	45 A,	В,	C	Groups:	9	Squadrons	-	3	Groups

(a	) 96	Group	3	Squadrons
(a (b)	388	Group	3	Squadrons
ĺ٨	1.52	Group	3	Squadrons

(	6)	452	Group		Squadrons

9 Squadrons - 3 Groups (2) 13 A, B, C Groups:

(a)	95	Group	3	Squadrons
(b)	100	Group Group	3	Squadrons
<i>i</i> _ \	200	(Imaria)	2	Sanadaona

Squadrons. 12 Squadrons - 3 Groups (3) 4 A, B, C, D Groups:

(a)	447 Group	3 Squad	irons
(b)	486 Group	3 Squad	
(6)	385 Group	3 Squad	
(a)	94 Group	3 Squad	
(4)	At arond	J Dyuar	rT.Offm

#### A/C and C/C Awailables

A/G	and C/C Available:							
(1)	95 Group	•	ME PFF MH	39 8 5	A/C A/C	52 7 7	G/C G/C	
(2)	100 Group		ME PFF MH	8	A/C A/C	38 6 3	C/C C/C	
(3)	390 Group		ME PFF MH	43 6 3	A/C A/C	52 5 5	G/C G/C C/C	

#### A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

- 33 A/C Plus 3 PFF A/C Plus Spares 33 A/C Plus 3 PFF A/C Plus Spares 33 A/C Plus 3 PFF A/C Plus Spares (1) 95 Group (2) 100 Group
- (3)390 Group

#### d. A/C Airborne:

- 95 Group
- 33 A/C Plus 3 PFF A/C Plus 2 Spares 33 A/C Plus 3 PFF A/C  $\binom{1}{2}$ 100 Group
- (3) 390 Group

## A/C Abortive:

#### 95 Group: (8 A/C) (1)

A/C 1887: 335 Squadron "F" - Oil leak #2 engine -Cylinder head temperature gauge out -

Pilot Lt. Shaw - No sortie.

334 Squadron "Q" - #2 engine feathered -A/C 2951:

Pilot Lt. Paise - No sortie.

- 335 Squadron "N" Icing conditions Couldn't catch formation Pilot Lt. Pearson No sortie.
  335 Squadron "H" #2 supercharger trouble -A/C 6598:
- A/C 7376: Ocillating at 14000 feet - Pilot Lt. Tregoning -No sortie.
- 336 Squadron "Q" #3 engine feathered Pilot A/C 8617:
- Lt. Taylor No sortie.
  335 Squadron "M" #4 engine manifold pressure A/C 7047:
- fluctuating Pilet Lt. Sutton No sortie.
  412 Squadron "Z" #2 engine internal failure -A/C 8281:
- Pilet Lt. Doxon No sortie. 412 Squadron "Y" Oxygen system out Pilet A/C 7858: Lt. Olsen - No sortie.

#### (2) (8 A/C) 100 Group:

- 351 Squadrón "E" #3 engine trouble Pilot A/C 767: Lt. Dovel - No sortie.
- 351 Squadron "X" #4 engine internal failure Pilot Lt. Sherrard Sortie credit. A/C 530:
- 351 Squadron "S" Oxygen system out Pilot A/C 613:
- Lt. Gay No sortie.

  349 Squadron "V" #4 engine internal trouble -A/C 681: Instrument failure - Pilot Lt. Miller - No sortie.
- 349 Squadron "F" Engine needed cylinder A/C972: change - Exhaust stack burned out - Pilot
- Lt. Wood No sortie.

  349 Squadron "D" Loss of a prop Oil leak -A/C 397: Pilot Lt. Lebo - Sortie credit.
- 351 Squadron "B" #4 prop governor failure -A/C295:
- Pilot Lt. Johnson No sortie.
  351 Squadron "N" #1 engine internal failure Prop governor out Pilot Lt. Irvin No sortie. A/C 852:

#### (7 A/C) (3) 390 Group:

- 570 Squadron "U" #2 engine lost manifold pressure Pilot Lt. Alberts No sortie.
  568 Squadron "E" #3 engine internal trouble Pilot Lt. Beazley Sortie credit.
  568 Squadron "C" Icing conditions Could A/C 041:
- A/C 480:
- A/C 176: not stay with formation - Pilot Freerkson -No sortie.

- A/C 337: 568 Squadron "N" #2 engine internal trouble Pilot Lt. Richter No sortie.
- A/C 807: 568 Squadron "O" Oxygen system out Pilot
- Lt. Weaver No sortie.

  A/C 093: 568 Squadron "J" Bad turbo Pilot Lt.
- Coffin No sortie.

  A/C 600: 568 Squadron "S" Oxygen leak Pilot Lt.
  Bushman No sortie.

## f. A/C Failing to Take Off:

## (1) 390 Group:

- A/C 895: 571 Squadron "R" Ran off perimeter Stuck
- in mud Pilot Lt. Thompson No sortie.

  A/C 926: 569 Squadron "B" Replaced another A/C -

Could not get off in time to catch formation - Pilot Lt. Riole - No sortie.

## g. A/C Outstanding:

#### (1) 95 Group: (5 A/C)

A/C 8942: 335 Squadron "Y" A/C 9010: 335 Squadron "X" A/C 8199: 336 Squadron "Z" A/C 1867: 336 Squadron "B" A/C 8288: 412 Squadron "V"

#### (2) 100 Group: (4 A/C)

A/C 334: 349 Squadron "B" A/C 608: 349 Squadron "A" A/C 476: 350 Squadron "P" A/C 821: 418 Squadron "Y"

#### (3) 390 Group: (12 A/C)

A/C 570 Squadron "S" 478: A/C 570 Squadron "O" 097: A/C 570 Squadron "B" 570 Squadron "K" 710: A/C 521: 568 Squadron "T" A/C 668: 677: 932: A/C 568 Squadron "R" A/C 571 Squadron "H" A/C 393: 079: 569 Squadron "V" A/C 569 Squadron "R" 837: 569 Squadron "D" A/C A/C 967: 569 Squadron "A" A/C 571 Squadron "K" 5151

## h. A/C Landing Away From Base:

## (1) 95 Group: (5 A/C)

A/C 8035: 335 Squadron "C" - Landed near Trindille,
France - Crew bailed out.

A/C 8272: 336 Squadron "P" - Landed near Laon, France.

A/C 8584: 336 Squadron "H" - Landed at A-74, France.

A/C 7783: 412 Squadron "F" - Landed at Laon, France.

A/C 7992: 412 Squadron "Q" - Landed at Manston, England.

#### (2) 100 Group: (2 A/C)

A/C 433: 350 Squadron "H" - At Nancy, France.
A/C 602: 349 Squadron "P" - At Messinger, France.

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(3) 390 Group: (4 A/C)

470: 570 Squadron "H" - Reported VHF - Landed in

France.

472: 570 Squadron "F" - At Manston, England. 555: 571 Squadron "G" - Landed in France. 564: 571 Squadron "O" - At Brussels. A/C

A/C

i.	A/C Attacking	-	13	CBW	A	Group:	Bombs	Dropped
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(1)	Primary	27	216x500 LB GP
	Jettisoning	2	54x500 LB IB 16x500 LB GP
	4 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Ax500 LB IB
	Returning	7	56x500 LB GP

- (2) Method of Bombing: Visual
- (3) Method of Release: 80' Train

1.	A/C Attack	ing - 13 C	3W B Group:	Bombs Dropped
	(1) Prima	ry	36	240x500 LB GP
	Jetti	soning	4	60x500 LB IB 32x500 LB GP
	Retur	ning	<b>4</b>	8x500 LB IB 38x500 LB GP 8x500 LB IB

- (2) Method of Bombing: Visual
- 80' Train (3) Method of Release:

#### k. A/C Attacking - 13 CBW C Group: Bombs Dropped

(1)	Primary	30	240x500 LB GP 58x500 LB IB
	Jettisoning Returning	None	
	ue ant urus	•	56x500 LB GP 14x500 LB IB

- Method of Bombing: Visual
- (3) Method of Release: Salvo

#### 3. Narrative of the Attack:

- Navigation 13 A Group 95 A, B, C Squadrons:
  - (1) Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 95 Group made a normal take off from the base. Due to clouds over the base it was necessary to make an instrument climb to assembly altitude. The Group was formed over the Buncher without difficulty. The Group proceeded on a dog-leg course to Splasher 7 which had been planned prior to take off. On the leg to Splasher 7 the B Group cut thru the A Group formation which caused them to "S" slightly, therefore, losing time in the manuever. Splasher 7 was crossed at 10042, 12 minutes late, altitude 23500 feet. Tactical Report, 5 January 1945

Enroute to Maidstone the Group lost several more minutes so that when this point was reached A Group was four minutes late. The Lead Navigator decided to fly an interception course to St. Catherine's Point cutting Splasher ll very short. The Group ran into weather at altitude and when they broke out just east of St. Catherine's Point intercepted the Groups of the 45th Combat Wing as they were enroute to the French Coast. The 13A fell in behind the 45C Group after making a left turn onto course. Point of interception was made at 5010-0147W over the Channel.

#### (2) Route:

The briefed course was followed to the French Coast, which was crossed at 1052. After making landfall the A Group Leader experienced difficulty maintaining interval behind 450, who was lagging behind the 45 A and B Groups, and to avoid overrunning the Group ahead the Group Leader had to "S" practically all the way along the route. At approximately 0700E the A Group had a good interval and began drifting left of course.

The Radar Navigator, in the meantime, had difficulty with scope returns and could not get good definition, therefore was not able to assist the Navigator with very accurate fixes. The Lead Navigator had very poor Georeception and was not able to accurately check his position in the Koblenz area, however, using available data at hand proceeded to do DR. Since his navigational aids were not functioning he was not able to detect the wind shift in the vicinity of 0700E which was affecting his flight.

Weather passed down by Kodak Red indicated that the target was covered, and the Group Leader decided to relinquish the lead to the Deputy Leader at the IP assuming his equipment was functioning properly. Due to poor VHF reception the Low Squadron could not be contacted by the Group Leader.

The Group had drifted north of course enroute to the IP so that when the Navigator turned over what he assumed by DR to be the IP was actually about 30 miles NE of the IP since he hadn't taken into account the shift in wind that occurred along the route. The Low Squadron peeled off and fell behind while the Lead Squadron pulled up along side of the High Squadron so that they could bomb on the High Squadron's smoke bombs.

Since the H2X unit in the Deputy Lead A/C was not functioning properly details are somewhat uncertain as to what transpired from the IP for the A and B Squadrons. The C Squadron, however, was apparently aware of its position and continued into the target at Frankfurt where it joined the 100 Group. Most of the A/C were forced to land in France due to lack of fuel.

From indications and what details that can be gathered from several navigators it is assumed that the bombs were released in the vicinity of Fulda. Flak experienced on the withdrawal is assumed to be from the Schweinfurt and Wurzburg defenses.

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The A Squadron became separated from the B Bouadron in weather, returning alone. The A Squadron was able to pick up pilotage points on the route out as the weather broke up near the Rhine River. Darmstadt and Bad Kruznach were picked up which indicate that Frankfurt was not bombed by the A and B Squadrons. A Squadron altered course at 4930-0530 and returned direct to base. Ostend was crossed at 1610. English Coast was entered at 1649. B Squadron returned by way of CP 4 parallelling the battle line to approximately 4910-0630 where course was altered to CP 3. From CP 3 the B Squadron returned direct to base.

#### (3) Weather:

A low strata layer existed over base at take off. Above this middle clouds, a strata cumulus layer, tops at 15000 feet was also encountered. At bombing altitude some contrails were reported. High cirrus over England and the Continent caused some difficulty. Target wind obtained was reported to be from 205 degrees at 70 knots.

#### (4) Difficulties:

Considerable "S"ing made navigation difficult. Accurate winds could not be obtained because Gee failed when most needed. H2X units in Lead and Deputy Lead A/C were not functioning properly and were of little aid to the navigator. Poor VHF reception made it difficult to contact other Squadrons for navigational aid.

#### (5) Remarks:

In order to insure success the Group lead should have been relinquished sooner than it had been. doing so the Group Leader could have ascertained that the Deputy Leader's equipment was not functioning properly and thereby could have enlisted the aid of the Low Squadron Leader whose equipment was apparently in good order. VHF contact could have been made thru one of the Squadron members. Had this been done, it is considered that the failure of this mission could have been avoided.

This west of Navigation was not entirely satisfactory. Radar Navigators knowing that their equipment is malfunctioning should not try to hold the lead hoping that the set will get better. The Command Pilot should be notified of this fact so that he can relinquish the lead to the Deputy Leader or to the Low Squadron Leader.

#### Navigation - 13 B Group - 100 A, B, C Squadrons: b.

#### (1) Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 100 Group made a normal take off. Due to clouds over the base area an instrument climb was necessary to get to assembly. The Group was formed after which the course to Splasher 7 was taken up. The 100 Group arrived at Splasher 7

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Tactical Report, 5 January 1945

on time but did not find the 95 Group who was late. Contact was made at Maidstone where the 100 Group flew abreast the 95 Group. The Groups became separated in the cirrus clouds so proceeded on separately. The Group left the English Coast at 5045-0010E and proceeded to intercept the briefed course over the Channel. The briefed course was intercepted, arriving about 8 minutes early, so the Lead Navigator decided to make a 270 degree turn in order to less time. While in the manuever the 95 Group had passed by. When the turn was completed a 6 minute interval existed between the two Groups.

#### (2) Route:

The point at the French Coast was cut short enabling the B Group to pick up time, however, it was not until 0400E where good Wing formation was made. The route from this point is similiar to that of the A Group into the IP. The Squadrons peeled off at 5105-0912 and made individual runs on Frankfurt, however, because the High Squadron's Air Speed Indicator was out it was necessary to form a 2 Squadron Group so that he could bomb on the A Squadron's smoke flares. The C Squadron proceeded in by itself.

After bombs away the Squadrons reformed into Group formation at the RP. The briefed route out was closely followed. Course was altered at CP 3 direct to base on instruments sent down by Kodak Control. The Continental Coast was crossed at 1615. The English Coast was recrossed at 1659.

- (3) Weather: Same as 13A.
- (4) Difficulties:

Weather hampered good Wing assembly. High Squadron Leader had difficulty with the air speed since his airspeed meter was out.

#### (5) Remarks:

Navigation in this Group was good despite difficulties encountered on route.

- c. Navigation 13 C Group 390 A, B, C Squadrons:
  - (1) Assembly:

The assembly went as planned until 13B Group cut through the formation during rendezvous causing the Low and High Squadrons to be separated from the 13C Group. The Gee equipment in the lead aircraft was out completely, and navigation was accomplished by ASG fixes and occasional pilotage check points. The cloud conditions at the assembly altitude of 22000 made it difficult to keep the Group together in formation. 13C Group trailed 13A Group for the remainder of the assembly. 13B could not be located. The coast out point was considerably east of the briefed CP 1 and was reached 12 minutes early.

#### (2) Route:

Over the Channel 13C and B were abreast of each other and trailing 13A Leader at a proper interval. was positioned to the south. At mid-channel there was a 180 degree turnabout made, evidently to lose time. Despite this manuever, CP 2 at the Continental Coast was reached early. On the route in there was considerable "S"ing by the Lead formations. In the vicinity of 0700 east 390A Leader was hit by flak and compelled to abort leaving 390B Squadron in command of the Group. From this point on into the IP the course was flown as briefed and the Group prepared for a PFF bomb approach upon receiving a 9/10 cloud report over the target by Rodan Red. Continuing on over the IP the Wing Leader finally turned on the target run 20 to 25 miles northead of the briefed initial point. 130 Group had no recourse than to follow suit and the target approach was started with 390B and A forming as one unit and 390C as mnother. The Radar Navigators of A and C Squadrons led the formation on the run until clouds over the target area broke enabling the bombardiers to finish the sightings visually. Due to a number of oxygen difficulties the Group let down to lower altitude earlier than briefed. Then, at notification by Kodak Control, the course was altered directly to base. The altitude was 3000 feet upon reaching the English Coast.

- (3) Weather: Same as 13A.
- (4) Navigational Difficulties:

Gee equipment out in the lead aircraft of the Group. Clouds prevalent at altitude made assembly difficult. Considerable "S"ing on route made navigation difficult.

#### (5) Remarks:

Despite difficulties encountered in navigation on the route into the target, there was excellent coordination between the radar navigators and the bombardiers of the Squadrons on the bomb run which resulted in successful target approaches.

#### d. PFF Narrative:

#### 13 A Group:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. 95A had poor scope returns and was unable to use H2X for bombing. 95B made an H2X sighting on an unidentified target with A Squadron in formation. 95C made a combination H2X - Visual bomb run on the primary target at Frankfurt. Results were fair. 95B received poor ASG returns after bombing due to low pressure in the radar system.

#### 13 B Group:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily with fair to strong returns. The target was identified at an average range of 35 miles. Bombing was visual with PFF assists in two Squadrons. 100B dropped on A Squadron due to malfunction of air speed indicators in the 100B lead aircraft.

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13 C Group:

Three PFF aircraft were dispatched. All sets operated satisfactorily. 390A Leader aborted prior to the IP and 390B took over lead of the Group. 390B and A Squadrons dropped together on a visual sighting with PFF assist on the primary target at Frankfurt. 390C made a visual sighting on the primary with PFF assist. The target was properly identified at a range of 35 miles.

- e. 95 Group B, A Squadrons:
  - (1) Air Leader Capt. Jeneman Nav Lt. Wilbourne
    Pilot Lt. Willison Asst Nav
    Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Owens
    Bomb Lt. Long
  - (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
    - (a) Primary 17 128x500 LB GP 32x500 LB IB Feturning 1 8x500 LB GP 4x500 LB GP 4x500 LB IB
    - (b) Bombing Altitude: 23900\*
    - (c) Time of Release: 1320
  - (3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking was thought to be secondary PFF target, the M/O set up course. Though the M/O was receiving scope returns, the PFF equipment was not working perfectly. The bombardier clutched in at 11 miles and the 9 and 7 miles checks were excellent. PFF equipment failed prior to the last check. Since the first two checks, however, were accurate, the bombardier let his rate ride out and then released his bombs. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 198 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. A Squadron released off B Squadron after PFF equipment had failed.

- (4) PI Report:
  - (a) Photographs taken by both A and B Squadrons show 10/10 undereast.
- (5) Bombing Malfunctions:

B Squadron:

A/C's 376, 251, 887, 598: Aborted and returned to base with 40 bombs.

A/C's 617, 047: Aborted and returned 20 bombs.

A/C 317: Personnel error - 10 bombs jettisoned in

- f. 95 Group C Squadron:
  - (1) Air Leader Nav Lt. Saeks
    Pilot Lt. Brauda Asst Nav
    Co-Pilot Lt. Mott M/O Lt. Mitchell
    Bomb Lt. Davis

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

With the aid of the M/O, who set up course on the first part of the run, the bombardier was able to pick up the assigned MPI, approximately 12 miles from the BRL. He quickly synchronized, and when bombs were released synchronization was good and bubbles level. At the BRL, however, the intervalometer failed, but the bombardier had followed through with salvo. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 220 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. The B Squadron released off the A Squadron's smoke bombs, because the pitot tube was frozen, which resulted in an inoperative air speed indicator. The bombardier in this Squadron, however, should have synchronized for rate.

- (4) PI Report: 100A and 100B:
  - (a) The bombs from this Squadron fell squarely on the center of the M/Y 500' to the right of the assigned MPI. There were between 20 and 25 hits on the tracks. Two explosives occurred from direct hits on goods wagons probably loaded with oil or ammunition. Smoke partially obscures the bursts, but it appeared probable that at least one bomb fell on the road bridge over on track.
  - (b) Bomb Pattern: Smoke obscures the complete pattern.
  - (c) Bombing Errors: Range : 785'0
    Deflection: 440'R
    Radial : 1300
  - (d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: 75% and 100%
  - (e) Bombing Results: Excellent Damage of a severe nature was undoubtedly inflicted
  - (a) Smoke obscures most of the bombs dropped by this Squadron within 1000' of the MPI.

    Approximately 25 bombs developed about 1500' beyond the M/Y in a factory area.
  - (b) Bomb Pattern: Cannot be measured.
  - (c) Bombing Errors: Cannot be measured.
  - (d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: Cannot be ascertained. Only about four bombs fell beyond the 2000' circle.
  - (e) Bombing Results: Cannot be ascertained. The visible pattern indicates that the Squadron overshot perhaps a 1000 feet. The results could not be better than fair, since no fresh bursts developed on the M/Y.

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(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A Squadron:

A/C'# 767, 530: Aborted and jettisoned 20 miles from the target. A/C 503: Intervalemeter failed and two bombs were

B Squadron:

Aborted and 30 bombs were A/C's 972, 681, 613: jettisoned. A/C 397: Aborted and 10 bombs were jettisoned.

#### 100 Group - C Squadron:

(2) A/C Attacking:

(1)	Air Leader Pilot	Capt. Gibbons Lt. Williams	Nav Asst Nav	Lt.	Wild
	Co-Pilet		M/O Bomb		Ordndorff Cately

A/C	Attacking:		Bombs Dropped
(a)	Primary	11	88x500 LB GP
•			22x500 LB IB
	Jettisoning	1	8x500 LB GP
			2x500 LB IB
	Returning	1	\$x500 LB GP
			2x500 LB IB

- (b) Bombing Altitude: 24000'
- Time of Release: (e) 1336

#### Run-In from IP to Target: (3)

After the manuever at the IP, the M/O set up course until the bombardier could pick up the target. The bombardier picked up the target 6 miles from the BRL and synchronized. When bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 211 degrees, the synchronization was fair and the bubbles level. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

#### PI Report: (4)

- Smoke obscures most of the bombs dropped by this Squadron. About 25 bombs developed 1500' to the left of the MPI in a factory area. About 10 fresh bursts appeared on the M/I left of the MPI. (a)
- (b) Bomb Pattern: Cannot be measured.
- Bombing Errors: Cannot be measured. (o)
- (d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: Approximately 30% and 100%
- Bombing Results: Fair - Damage was probably of a (e) superficial nature.

#### (5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 295: Aborted - 10 bombs were jettisoned. Aborted - 10 bombs returned to base. A/C 852:

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- 1. 390 Group B and A Squadrons:
  - (1) Air Leader Major Campbell Nav Lt. Eusner Pilot Lt. Kenny Asst Nav Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Wilcox Bomb Lt. Wosczyk
  - (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
    - (a) Primary 17 136x500 LB GP 32x500 LB IB Jettisoning None Returning 2 16x500 LB GP 4x500 LB IB
    - (b) Bombing Altitude: 26000\*
    - (c) Time of Release: 13312
  - (3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After the manuever at the IP, the M/O set up course until the bombardier was able to pick up the target visually in his sight. The target was picked up by the bombardier approximately 15 miles from the BRL. Difficulty, however, was experienced with intermittent clouds until approximately a minute from the BRL, at which point the assigned MPI was picked up. The bombardier quickly synchronized and when bombs were released synchronization was fair and bubbles level. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run. A Squadron dropped off of B Squadron's smoke bombs, after lead A/C aborted. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 219 degrees.

- (4) PI Report: 390A and 390B:
  - (a) There was no photographic coverage for this Squadron. All the A/C with cameras installed landed on the continent.
  - (b) Photographs taken by 390B Squadron show that A's bombs fell about 1500' short and 1000' to the left of the MPI. A concentration of about 40 bombs burst around a cloverleaf left of the MPI. There were perhaps 6 to 8 hits on the extreme SE side of the yards and perhaps 2 or 3 hits on the cloverleaf and the spur track running underneath. There were also seven scattered hits on the M/Y left (NE) of the MPI and scattered bursts near factories and in fields adjacent to and leading SW from the yards.
  - (c) No bombing errors were measured, since there was no sighting.
  - (d) Percent of bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: 4% and 74%.
  - (e) Bombing Results: Fair. The damage inflicted was probably not of a severe nature.
  - (a) Photographs taken by this Squadron show two distinct patterns, one of which probably belongs to 390A Squadron.

## Tactical Report, 5 January 1945

- (b) The bombs from B Squadron fell 1500' short and 2000' to the right (NE) of the assigned MPI in fields adjacent to the M/Y on the NE. There were 2 hits or close misses on the road leading to the railroad bridge.
- (e) Bomb Pattern: 1030'L x 2057W
- (d) Bombing Errors: Range : 1435'S Deflection: 950'R Radial : 1700'
- (e) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: 8% and 64%
- (f) Bombing Results: Nil There were no hits on the M/Y
- (5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C's 337, 600, 807, 093, 176: Aborted 50 bombs returned. A/C's 480, 041: Aborted 20 bombs returned.

## j. 390 Group - C Squadron:

- (1) Air Leader Lt. Hannell Nav Lt. Yary
  Pilot Lt. Morris Asst Nav
  Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Flanagan
  Bomb Lt. Kellerhouse
- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
  - (a) Primary 13 104x500 LB GP 26x500 LB IB
    Jettisoning None Returning None
  - (b) Bombing Altitude: 24000
  - (c) Time of Release: 13322
- (3) Run-In from IP To Target:

The M/O set up course to the target after the manuever at the IP. The bombardier was able to pick up portions of the target area thru clouds. When a short distance from the BRL, he picked up the target visually and quickly synchronized. Synchronization at the BRL was fair and bubbles were reported slightly off. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 216 degrees. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on bomb run.

#### (4) PI Report:

- (a) The bombs from this Squadron fell 1500' right and about 500' over. All of the bombs with the exception of 4 to 6, which hit the M/T, fell in fields adjacent to the tracks on the NE side.
- (b) Bomb Pattern: 1050'L x 1554'W
- (d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: 5% and 76%

## CONFIDENTIAL

Tactical Report, 5 January 1945

- (e) Bombing Results: Fair The damage inflicted to the M/Y was not of a severe nature.
- 4. Mission Camera Report:
  - a. The 95 Group installed 3 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 1 and 4 of which took pictures.

One K-21 and scope camera PFF A/C 7992 - landed at another field.

One K-21 A/C 6598 - Aborted.

One K-21 A/C 7376 - Aborted.

One K-21 A/C 8617 - Aborted.

One K-21 A/C 8584 - Landed in France.

PFF A/C 8179 - Set out on bomb run.

b. The 100 Group installed 0 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 0 and 7 of which took pictures.

One K-21 A/C - Lost.
One K-21 A/C 530 - Aborted.
One K-21 A/C 295 - Aborted.
One K-21 A/C 397 - Aborted.
One K-21 A/C 525 - Aborted.
One K-21 A/C 525 - Aborted.
All H2X camera ships grounded.

c. The 390 Group installed 2 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 1 and 4 of which took pictures.

One scope camera PFF A/C 206 - Not used. One K-22 A/C 521 - Landed at another base. One K-21 A/C 480 - Aborted. One K-21 A/C 555 - Landed at another base. One K-21 A/C 677 - Landed at another base. One K-21 A/C 837 - Landed at another base. Tactical Report, 5 January 1945

#### 5. Communications:

a. Col. Shuck led the 13th Wing. VHF SOP was followed.
Discipline was poor expecially during assembly and from the IP until bases were reached. Difficulties in assembly and the great number of abortions caused the Channel to be cluttered with individual situations. In the target area, communication between Squadron and Group Leaders was difficult because of individual aircraft calling about gasoline. Hewling was caused several times because two or three aircraft were transmitting at the same time. While the Wing had difficulty in contacting Kodak aircraft, the 13B and 13C Groups had satisfactory contact. Both successfully contacted the assigned fighters.

Jamming of Channel A can be reduced by emphasing the priority that communication between Squadron Leaders and Group Leaders has over communication with individual aircraft. Formation control must have priority over control of individual aircraft.

#### Control Points:

CP1 CP2 CP3 TGT CP4 Timings 1034 1059 1201 1333 1349 13A 1057 1155 1320

Strike Reports:

13A S B 5 1320

#### 6. Controller's Log:

- a. 2126 from 3 BD:
  - (1) Tentative Plans.
  - (2) Force.
  - (3) Targets Unassigned.
  - (4) Zero Hour.
  - (5) Task Forces.
  - (6) Squadron Bombing.
  - (7) No Routes or Bomb Load Yet.

#### b. 2141 to Groups:

- (1) Above Information.
- c. 2310 from 5 AD:
  - (1) Alerted.
  - (2) Primary Target and MPI and Secondary Target.
  - (3) Bomb Load.
  - (4) Intervalometer Setting.
  - (5) Zero Hour.
  - (6) RBA.
  - (7) No Division Assembly.
  - (8) No Last Resort Targets.
  - (9) No Second Runs.
  - (10) No Leaflet Loading.
  - (11) RBW.

## d. 2325 to Groups:

- (1) Above Information.
- e. 2330 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Last Resort Target and MPI.

#### Tactical Report, 5 January 1945

- (2) Suggested Alternate Last Resort Target and MPI.
- f. 2332 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Advance Warning to 3 AD FO.
- g. 2342 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Correction on MPIs on 3 AD FO.
  - (2) Secondary and Last Resort Targets and MPIs.
- h. 2350 to Groups:
  - (1) Given all Targets and MPIs.
- 1. 2351 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Leaf let Loading.
- j. 0003 to 390 Group:
  - (1) Leaflet Leading.
- k. 0012 to Groups:
  - (1) Fuel.
  - (2) Weather Monitor A/C.
  - (3) Bombing Altitude.
- 1. 0015 from 3 AD:
  - 1) Intelligence Annex to 3 AD FO.
- m. 0025 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO.
- m. 0039 to Groups:
  - 1) Use of T-18 and T-19 Flares.
  - (2) Reaction to Use of Flares.
- . 0042 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Zero Hour Delayed.
  - (2) Route.
  - (5) Assembly Points and Altitudes.
  - (&) Approximate Leave Coast Time.
- p. 9048 to Groups:
  - (1) Advance Warning to 13 CBW FO.
- q. 0125 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Preliminary Timings.
- r. 0135 to Groups:
  - (1) Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO.
- s. 0140 to Groups:
  - (1) Delayed Zero Hour.
  - (2) Assembly Altitude.
  - (3) Approximate Leave Coast Time.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

## Tactical Report, 5 January 1945

- t. 0145 to Groups:
  - (1) Preliminary Times.
  - (2) Start Climb.
  - (3) Wing and Group Intervals.
  - u. 0155 to Groups:
    - (1) Fuel Change.
  - v. 0800 from 390 Group:
    - (1) Check on Bomb and Fuel Load.
    - w. 0210 to 3 AD:
      - (1) Recheck Planning.

  - x. 0220 from 3 AD:

**y**•

2.

22.

bb.

66.

80.

ff.

gg.

- (1) Plans Depend on Weather Conference.
  0230 from 390 Group:
- (1) Ba Not Approve Plans. (2) Decrease Bomb Load.
  - 6240 to 3 AD:
  - (1) Decrease Bomb Lead.

    0255 from 390 Group:
- (1) Bomb Lead.
  - 0257 from 5 AD:
  - (1) Skay Decrease Bomb Load.

0258 to 390 Group:

- (1) Above.
- dd. 0300 to Groups:
  - (1) Decrease Bomb Load.
  - (1) Final Timings.

0308 from 3 AD:

- ATOT to Amount
- 0525 to Groups:
- (1) Final Timings.
- 0325 from 3 AD:
- (1) 3 AD FO.
- hh. 0340 from 3 AD:
  - (1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO.

```
Tactical Report, 5 January 1945
        0346 to 3 AD:
   11.
         (1)
             Fighter Support.
        0350 to 390 Group:
   11.
              Fighter Support.
        (1)
   kk.
        0403 from 390 Group:
         (1)
              Rendezvous Time.
   11.
        0406 from 3 AD:
              Intelligence Annex not Available.
         (1)
        0410 to 390 Group:
   No Times for Rendezvous.
        0420 to Groups:
   MIN.
         (1)
              Fighter Opposition Report.
        0428 to Groups:
   . 90
         (1)
              18 CBW FO.
        0445 from 5 AD:
   PP.
          1) Annex 1 to 3 AD FO (2nd No. 1 Annex).
(2) Annex 2 to 3 AD FO.
        0445 to Groups:
   qq.
              Suggestions on T/O Times.
         (1)
        0525 from 100 Group:
   rr.
         (1)
              Return Let Down Precedure.
        0530 to 95 Group:
         (1)
              Check Return Let Down.
   tt.
        0617 to Wing from 95 Group:
              Weather Ship Took Off.
   MU.
        0632 from 3 AD:
              Mission Will T/O.
              Weather.
              Night Landing.
        0635 from 95 F/C:
   44.
         (1)
              First Weather Report.
        0640 to 390 Groups
   WW.
              Above Information.
              Icing Conditions.
        0708 from 390 Group:
              First T/O.
         (1)
```

#### Tactical Report, 5 January 1945

#### 7. Comments on Mission Planning:

- a. Estimated Airborne Time 10 hours and 30 minutes.
- b. Estimated Oxygen Time 6 hours and 30 minutes.
- c. Landing after dark.
- d. Return route too indirect in friendly territory.
- e. Weather A/C took off 47 minutes after he should have reported the weather from altitude.
- f. Deputy Wing Leader was not listed as being qualified.
- g. Weather did not require extreme southern route followed, or high altitude assembly planned.

For the Commanding Officer:

Tene C. SMITH, Major, Air Corps,

Operations Officer.

7 January 1945.

Sobject: Report of decreations Officer, Masslon & Junuary 1945, Frankfort, Sermany.

To a Communding Citiest, with bomb Group (A), and 55%.

## OS "A" EQUADRON

1. GRASHAL MARKATIVA: The 95 "A" Squadron was leading the 134 Group and took of: at 0729-0830 hours. Squadron assembly was made at 16,000 feet where interminant dense contrails caused considerable difficulty in the Squadron assembly. The Equadron was assembled by 0840 hours, at which time the climb to Ming Assembly altitude assembled with the lead Squadron.

Bplusher #7 which was the first sing control point was made at 1001 arous. The other two Groups made ascembly inspite of high cloud and very poor visibility at assembly altitude. The ground speed was abover than priefed and so Splasaer fil was out enort in order to make Division Assembly at the proper time. At approximately 0600 & the HSK failed in the last ship, and the lead was turned over to the "B" Squadron at approximately 08308. At this point "A" Squadron followed "B" Squadron. The SEX equipment was not functioning properly in "B" lead ship but the run was attempted on Frankfort. In the time that the lead was being changed, are to a wind saift, the 134 was blown north of corrected the L.F. was not made good.

The best run was made on too town of Fulde by means of E2X in "B" Squadr a lead. After the bombs were away clouds were encountered which suched by 10 30,000 feet. Visibility in the clouds was very part, and many that was encountered transdictely after bumbs were away. A numberly heading was maintained until the flak defences which passed, at which time a turn to the right was made and a westerly behaving was assumed. After crossing safely into friendly territory a heading directly back to base was taken as everyone and low on masoline. The base was reached at 1700 betra. Our landing was at 1704-1709 nounce.

2. AIRCHART ATTROUGHO: bleved (11) aircraft and one (1)
PFF were dispatched as shown in diagram "A". Aircraft #42-31887
returned early because oil was looking from #2 engine. Aircraft
#42-102957 returned early due to a #2 engine failure. Aircraft
#42-97575 returned early because a #2 supercharger was fluctuating.
Aircraft #44-6598 returned early due to ice on the wing. Seven

- (7) aircraft and one (1) FFF attacked the target as shown in diagram "IA". Seven (7) aircraft and one?" were given credit for sorties.
  - 3. ASKCHAFT LOST: None.

## 95 "B" SQUADRON

1. GREERAL BARMATIVE: The 958 Squadron was flying high squadron on 95% and formed 124 Group. The Squadron took off at 0713-0881 hours. Assembly was at 17,000 feet at Sug23. The Squadron was formed at 0840 hours and made assembly with lead Squadron shortly thereafter. Assembly was as written in 954 Squadron General Barrative. B Squadron assumed the lead of the Group and chose an i.F. and started a comb run. Due to an improperly functionaring H2R the wrong target was piezed up and the bomb run was made on the term of Fulda. Heavy flak was encountered after Bombs were away and because the navigator was suffering from anaxia at this time the position is uncertain. This caused heavy flak damage, because it was uncertain as to which direction to turn to avoid the defenses. After crossing into friendly territory the direct route to base was followed in order to save gas.

Base was reached at 1710 hours. Landing was at 1712-1717 hours.

- 2. AIRCRAFT ATTACKING: Eleven (11) sircraft and one (1)
  PPF were dispatched as shown in diagram "B". Aircraft #45-35617
  returned early due to a #3 engine running rought. Aircraft #42107047 returned early because #4 running rough, #5 slow to react.
  Aight (8) aircraft and one (1) PPF attacked the target, as shown
  in diagram "IB". Nine (9) and one (1) PFF were given cradit for
  sortios.
  - 5. RINCHAMI LOSO: None.

## 98 "C" SQUADRON

Squadron of the 13A Group. Takeoff was at 0755-0368 hours.
Assembly was at 15,000 feet where considerable difficulty was enconcountered due to the adverse weather conditions. Assembly was complete at 0840 hours, and the lead Squadron was joined shortly thereafter. The Seceral Harrativefor "a" Equadron is the same to the 1.f. at which time "C" Squadron started a run on Frankfort. Breaks in the undereast were encountered in the target area and the turn from the target was as breifed. At the R.E. the 390th Group was joined, and "C" Squadron returned to the base along the priefed course flying opposite side and slightly in trail, of the high Squadron of the 590th Group.

The lead saip of the squadr n aborted just before crossing

the Spitish coast upon return. The formation arrived at base at 1840 hours and landing was at 1866-1728 hours.

2. ALROADY ATTACKIES: Eleven (11) aircraft and one (1) PFF were dispatoned and shown in diagram "C". Aircraft #48-97058 returned early due to a se engine failure. Seven (7) sinoraft and one (1) PFF attacked the target on shown in diagram "10". Fine (9) aircraft and one (1) Pff and a shown oradic fun sortios.

5. Alkerty Lost: None.

NOEL T. CORBAA, Kajor, Air Corps, Operations Officer.

#### 5TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) APO # 559

5th, January 1945

SUBJECT: ABORTION OF AIRCRAFT # 1887

- TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 335TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON
- 1. While eircling field at an altitude of 21,000 feet my engineer called my attention to a heavy stream of oil emitting from the filler neek of # 2 engine. The rate of flow looked profuse so I left the formation and returned to base.
- 2. Upon reaching field I called Bezel asking to land and have oil cap replaced so as to join formation at Control Point 2.
- 5. I was directed to eircle field which I did until the complete drainage of the tokios. I then landed with bombs.

William C. Shaw Jr.
WILLIAM C. SHAW JR.
1st. Lt. A.C.

#### 1st. Ind.

HEADQUARTERS: 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AAF STATION 119, 5TH JAN 1945

- TO : COMMANDING OFFICER. 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP. AAF STATION 119
- l. Investigation found that there was no excessive loss of oil from the engine. There were no leaks in any of the lines, nor was the oil eap off as was feared by the Pilot. Oil pressure and temperature remained normal throughout flight.
- 2. Pilot stated that he wished to return to field and remedy the oil leak with the intention of taking off again and regaining his place in formation. This decision was impossible due to insufficient time remaining with reference to last possible time of take off.
- 5. It is felt Pilot should have continued mission until further difficulties were encountered or until a more accurate estimate could be made of the apparent cause of the oil leak.
- 4. Pilot will reply by indorsement to this Hq. stating in what manner his situation could have been better analized, as well as the effect this abortion had on weakening the remaining formation

JOHN F. LOSEE
Major, A.C.
Commanding

# 35TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) APO # 559

5th, January 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion Of Aircraft # 6598

TO: Commanding Officer, 335th Bombardment Squadron

- 1. At approximately 5-10 minutes before control point, at 21,000 feet, time 1030 hrs. in wing and division assembly, aircraft # 6598 aborted the formation, due to severe wing ice on both top and leading edges.
- 2. The top ice was frozen snow which did not blow off in take off due to non use of Kill-Frost. The leading edge ice was asquired in ascent thru the clouds. Neither ice formation evaporated whil flying in open air.
- 3. Kill-Frost was not used because at the rate in which the snow was melting before take-off, it was believed it would blow off during the take off run.
- 4. At altitude above 20,000 feet the airplane could indicate only 135-140 MPH in level flight with 38 inches M.P. and 2300 RPM.
- 5. Upon instructions from Bezel, the aircraft circled the field until 1235 hrs. at which time it was landed with bombs aboard.

DONALD L. PEARSON 2md. Lt. A.C.

ls t. Ind.

HEADQUARTERS: 335 BOMB SQ. 95TH BOMB GROUP (H) AAF Station 119, 5th; Jan 1945

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, AAF Station 119

- l. It is evident that this aircraft could not centinue the mission under the conditions outlined. However the Pilot is considered responsible for the gross error of accepting an aircraft which had not been de-iced by the ground crew.
- 2. Adminstrative reprimand has been excuted and Officer directed to reply by indorsement stating steps that could have been taken to prevent this abortion both prior to and during flight.

JOHN F. LOSEE Major, A.C.

Commanding

#### 

# HEADQUARTURS 95TH POTTARDURFT GROUP (H)

#### STATISTICAL CONTROL REPORT OF AIRCRAST NOT ARTACULING

13TH COLDARDITHE TIME

DATE RENDERED 5 3 10.5

PART T - TABULAR SUPPARY:

DATE OF MISSION 6 3 1866

#### STRATUGICAL MIDSION

COMBAT GROUP	S CHEDULED		AIREORGE LEGS RETURN- ING SPURJS	ASTACKING	MOT ATTA SKI MG	SORTIES
A	11 & 159 11 & 158	11 & 18H	11 & 135 11 & 136	7 a 1511 8 a 153	4 3	y a lau s a lau
G	12 & 158	11 + <b>1</b> 89	11 & 138	8 & 189	8	9 & <b>1</b> 56

PART II - REASONS THY AIRBRITE DED HUT ARRACK OR CLUID TO MAKE OFF:

3

42-37783

Sortie Combat Gp A.C.S.H. Category Reason for Warlure & Corrective Action (Yes-No) 2 43-33007 Oil look ( 2 esgine. Oil presente los 2 engine. 1/-1020E1 á. " a Larbo surging. 3 - GT 370 1 SE- 500 Could't stay in formation.dum to wing too. 6 8 onclass oil inch. 43-48617 & 4 ancies receive rough. 42-107047 reach. 62-36317 Sectionalist balled to turn on overhood Ton 1 and bolous. Lose of to in pilots system 42-07050 Lost & 8 supercharger, & 8 cylinder Ω 48-58281 blown in \$ 2 engine.

SECRET

Universe, leaded in France.

Boel T. CVARA, Major., Air Corps, Operations Officer.

You

# FOUR HUNDRED TWELFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) APO 659

5 January 1945

#### SUBJECT: Abortion

- TO : Office of the Group Operations Officer, 95th Bomb Cp (H), APO 559, U. S. Army (Thru CO, 412th Bomb Sq (H), 95th Bomb Gp (H), APO 559, U. S. Army).
  - 1. Aircraft and engines checked out on run up.
- 2. Before rendezvous with squadron the following malfunctions appeared: No. 5 cil temp was 95 degrees during climb, bomb bay doors inoperative, bombardier was not sure bombs would release, slow leak in nav-pilot oxygen system.
- 5. After rendezvous oil temp on No. 3 did not drop down and oxygen continued to leak. Navigator went on different system but pressure dropped 20 pounds in ten minutes. Pressure at abort was 160 pounds.
  - 4. Pilot left formation at app. 1114 hours, position 0125E 4935N.
  - 5. Bombs were brought back.
  - 6. Aircraft number is 42-97858.

HERBERT D. OLSON

lst Lt., Air Corps, Pilot.

5 January 1945 SUBJECT Airplane Abortions.

TO Operations.

> 1. Airplane 38617 returned early from the mission of this date because of number three engine trouble. Engine began to run rough and oil pressure dropped to a low reading. Ground check disclosed the engine had consumed all the engine oil, engine being changed.

ROBERT E. BAXTER. Capt., Air Corp, Engineering Officer.

# THESE HUNDRED THIRTY SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUARDRON(H) OFFICE OF THE SQUADRON COMMANDER APO 559

5 January 1945

SUBJECT: Abertien.

- TO : Operations officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H). APO 559, U.S.Army.
  - 1. Took off at 08:18 hours in airplane No.8617.
- 2. Soon after take off #5 engine began to vibrate. The instruments were all normal and we continued to climb. We assembled with the formation at 17,000 feet. At 10:40 hours the oil pressure began to fall on the #5 engine and an excessive summent of oil began coming off the breather. We feathered the No.5 engine at 50:10 N. 00:50 W. and returned to base. We landed with all our bombs at 12:55 hours.

JAMES D. TAYLOR lst Lt. A.C. Pilot

#### lst. Ind.

556th Bomb. Sqdn. 95th Bomb Gp. (H). APO 559 U.S.Army. 5 January 1945.

- TO : Operations officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H). APO 559 U.S.Army.
  - 1. For your information.

JOHN L. GILBERT

Capt. A.C.

DEPUTY SODN. COMMANDER

## THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) OFFICE OF THE ENGINEERING OFFICER

5 Jan. 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion Report, Aircraft Number 42-107047.

TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559.

1. The subject aircraft aborted from the combat mission of the 5th January 1945.

2. The pilot reported that number four (4) engine Tach and manifold pressure fluctuated at 24,000 feet; (b) right hand booster motor not mounted to upper turret; (c) upper turret power warning light was out; (d) light for main fuse box out; (e) radio's trailing antenna motor shorted and burned; (f) left waist/interphone out; (g) radio compass out; (h) number three (3) engine slow to react to increase of power.

3. Number four (4) engine checked satisfactory on the ground; (b) the booster motor was mounted but engineer failed to pull his ammunition through; (c) warning light replaced; (d) bulb replaced in main fuse box; (e) radio's trailing antenna motor replaced; (f) communication is being checked; (g) radio compass being checked; (h) the amplifier of number three (3) engine was changed and engine ground checked satisfactory.

EDWARD J. FLANAGAN, Captain, A.C., Engineering Officer.

# THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIXTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) OFFICE OF THE SQUADRON COMMANDER APO 559

5 January 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion.

- TO : Operations officer, 95th Bombardment Group. APO 559 U.S.Army.
  - 1. I took off in ship No.7049.
- and manifold pressure began fluctuations badly. The co-pilot ran the No.4 tachameter and manifold pressure began fluctuations badly. The co-pilot ran the No.4 prop. contributions described and the engineer changed the supercharger amplifier, but the fluctuations continued during the flight. While in formation I found the No. 3 engine responded very slowly to power increases. It was very difficult to keep up with the formation altho I was useing 2500 R.P.M. and 38 inches manifold pressure. At 50:10 N. and 00:50 W. the formation made a sharp turn to the left. I used full power and called for more R.P.M. but could not keep up with the formation. The No.4 engine became very rough and we thought we would have to feather it, so I reduced power. Realizing we could not catch the group again, I called fireball red high and he told me to return to base. I called Bezel and was given permission to land. We landed at 1304 with our bombs.

JOHN E. SUT ON 2nd Lt.AC. Pilot

#### lst. Ind.

336th Bomb Sqdn. 95th Bomb Gp. (H).APO 559 U.S.Army. 5 January 1945

- TO : Operations of licer, 95th Bombardment Group (H). APO 559 U.S. Army.
  - 1. For your information.

JOHN L. GILBERT

Capt.A.G.

DEPUTY SODN. COMMANDE

THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FOURTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) OFFICE OF THE SQUADRON ENGINEERING OFFICER A.P.O. 559

6 January 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion of B-17G No. 43-38996

TO: Commanding Officer. 95th Bombardment Group (H). Sta. 119.

returning to this base at 1055. 2. The pilot became ill before going on oxygen and later passed out.

This aircraft aborted from the mission of 6 January 1945.

3. There were no engineering malfunctions.

> PENDLETON BEALL JR. lat Lt., Air Corps. Engineering Officer.

# THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FOURTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) OFFICE OF THE SQUADRON ENGINEERING OFFICER A.P.O. 559

5 January 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion of B-17G No. 42-102951.

TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), AAF Sta. 119.

- 1. This aircraft aborted from the mission of 5 January 1945, returning to this base at 1215.
- 2. The pilot reported an oil leak in No. 2 engine. The propeller was immediately feathered.
- 3. Upon ground imspection it was found that No. 2 propeller has an oil leak.
- 4. Further inspection will be necessary before placing aircraft in commission.

PENDLETON BEALL, JR, lst Lt., Air Corps, Engineering Officer.

# THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) OFFICE OF THE ENGINEERING OFFICER

5 Jan. 1945

SUBJECT: Abortion Report, Aircraft Number 42-97576.

TO

l. The subject aircraft aborted from the combat mission of the 5th January 1945.

: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559.

from 28 to 41 inches above 14,000 feet.

5. The supercharger ground checked satisfactory but it is being thoroughly checked to determine the cause for oscillating at altitude.

2. The pilot reported that number two (2) supercharger was oscillating

EDWARD J. FLANAGAN, Captain, A.C., Engineering Officer.

## THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) OFFICE OF THE ENGINEERING OFFICER

5 Jan. 1945

- SUBJECT: Abortion Report, Aircraft Number 42-31887.
- 10 : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559.
- 1. The subject aircraft aborted from the combat mission of the 5th January 1945.
- 2. The pilot reported that the oil filler neck of number two (2) engine was leaking oil and the cylinder head temperature gauge was out.
- 3. Upon examination on the ground it was found that oil had leaked from around the cap, although it was tight. The tank capacity is thirty-seven (37) gallons and upon measuring following the return of the aircraft the tank registered thirty-six (36) gallons of oil.
- 4. The cylinder head temperature gauge was inoperative. The gauge is being replaced.

EDWARD J. FLANAGAN, Captain, A.C., Engineering Officer.

# POUR HUNDRED TWELFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) WINETY PIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Engineering Officer A.P.O. 559

5 January, 1945.

SUBJECT: Abortive aircraft.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Airplane  $B-17^G$  #45-38281 aborted from a combat mission this date, landing at approximately 1315 hours.

2. Upon inspection it was found that #8 cylinder was "blown" on #2 engine.

CHESTER L. PEEK, Captain, AC, Engineering Officer.

# FOUR HUMDRED TWELFTH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H) NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Engineering Officer A.P.O. 559

5 January, 1945.

SUBJECT: Abortive mireraft.

TO

: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombal and Group (H).

- this date, landing at approximately 1315 hours.
  - 2. Pilot reported an oxygen leak in the nose compartment.
  - 3. After plane had landed oxygen system was filled to 350 lbs.

Airplane B-17G #42-97858 aborted from a combat mission

No leaks were found; the system checked out satisfactorily.

CHESTER L. PEEK, Captain, AC, Engineering Officer.

GP.

HF "QUARTERS 3D BOMBARDHENT DI SION "J" FORM

Recordo

1.	DATE 5	'L	44TARGHT_	 DUTY.	OFFICERS	The second section of the second seco

- 2. CBW 13 A GROUP 95 C GP. LEADER LT. BRAUND A/C 412-Q W/T KVJ
  POSITION Lo DEFUTY LDR. LT. Ringbloom A/C 412-E W/T KVJ
- 3. EST. TAXI TIME 0740 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0850 ETD BASE 0840 ETR BASE ## 1720
- 4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 12 NUMBER OF BFARES : C. ...

HEAD. UARTERS 3D BOTTEMEDITENT DIVERSION FORM

L. DATE 5/1/44TARGLT DUTY OFFICERS

- 2. CBW 13 A GROUP 95BGF. LEADER CAPT. JENEMAN A/C 336-0 W/T UQB
  POSITION HI DEPUTY LDR. LT. J. TAYLORA/C 336-Q W/T UQB
- 3. EST. TAKI TIME <u>0720 EST.</u> T.O. 1ST A/C <u>0730 ETD BASE 0840</u>
  ETR BASE <del>1810</del> 1720
- 4. NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED 12 NUMBER OF BARES ELECTION

HEAO, WARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DIVESION

Recorded

- 1. DATE <u>5/1 /44</u>TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
- 2. CBW 13 A GROUP 95 A GP. LEADER COL. SHUCK A/C 334-S W/T UUJ
  POSITION Lead DEPUTY LDR. LT. TREGONING /C 335-H W/T KHU
- 3. HST. TAXI TIME 0730 LST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0740 LTD BASE 0840 LTR BASE 4810 1720

i	S TAT]	ion/	/9	_		F	ORM	3	DATE 5 Dee JAN-45
	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OF	FF ACT	LAIT BST		REMARKS
336	0	8144	Wilson	v 11/2	7	31		1717	
,	P	8272	Rose	v 36	7	32			A-70
	E	8106	Burno	v 36		233		1714	
•,	<u>Z-</u>	8/99	Thomas	v 76		734			
•,	U	8469	Miller	v 36	7	35	<u>.</u>	1716	
334	W	8660	Dumwody	2	8	11		1712	
336	Q	8617	Jaylor.	Hiv FG	7	36	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	1219	#33-eathered
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STATION //9

FORM 3

DATE 5 Dec. SAN-45

LET SHIP PILOT TARGET TIT OFF LANDING REMARKS

LET SHIP 745 LANDED OF MANSTON ENG ETRIVOULDENCY 412 Q 7992 Bround 1776 B 8774 Tessier 750 1734 Lan France H 6522 Rand 751 Z- 8281 Dojoa 752 1308 about *753* 1212 A-10 - France #2 ENG. 4937-0540 3 " F 7783 Walter 754 L 7257 Weiss 1707+ 1708 E 8067 Ringhlow 755 744 8288 Hai 852 1316 Ove 334 B 8776 Madigan 1724 801 T 8996 Kochler 602 1655 \$ 8438 Rinet 115 1700

BAKER

15

CHARLIE WILLIE

97

75

TOMMY

25

JASON

06

RONALD

93

FREDDIE

KARLO

45


GEORGE

16

MICKEY

03

### PARKER (COL. SHUCK) 8179 Neglect-S J. HAMILTON SHAW 1887 Island-F TREGONING PEARSON ' 7204 Island-B 7376 191ahd-H 6598 Island-N<sub>PAINTER</sub> RICHARDSON CONOVER BRADLEY MERCER 9010 8269 8942 7194 8305 Island-Y Island-X Island-K Island-G Island-0 PAINE KLEIN 8551 Negleçt-L 2951 Neglept-Q 0615 READ INESS EXTRA SHIPS: 0715 STATIONS 334th 336th **7047** 336th **7961 PP** 0730 TAXI TAKE OFF 0740 · RENDEZVOUS base 16,000 @ 0840 412th 1462, 7858 RENDEZVOUS ALTITUDES BOMBING ALTITUDES 95 B 95 B 25,500 17,000 95 A 16,000 25,000 95 C 95 G 24,500 15,000 13TH COMPAR WING 100 B 390 B 95 B 390 A 100 A 95 A 390 C 95 C 100 C BOMBER-FIGTHER 6 MF/DF n BOMBER-BOMBER COLORS OF THE DAY: FIART COLORS: 0100-0700 A Sq. B Sq. C Sq. 0700-1500 R GG PETER RR RR 95th Sq. 100th Sq. 1300-1900 🏋 YY 1900-0100 390th Sq. R/T COLLECTIVE CALL SIGNS: A SQ. RED HI 95TH SQS-FIREBALL ABLE FIREBALL FIREBALL FIREBALL YELLOW HI FIREBALL YELLOW LO 100TH SQS-FIRDBALL BAKER 390TH SQS-FIREBALL CHARLIE FIREBALL GREST MI FIREBALL BASE REFERENCE ALTITUDES 22,000 SHIPS TO MOUITOR: VHF AUTHENTICATOR PIPER CHARREL "B" HAMILTON RECALL CODE PHRASE TENNESSEE CAVILLAR INDIVIDUAL ABORTION SUNKISE SERBAADE CHARREL "C" (SAF) RICHARDSON RELAY SHIP CALL SIGH RELAY MF/DF FIXES OFTAINED BY MERCEN 66TH FTR. WOLF) PAINTER · (RAF) CONTROL POINTS SENT BY PARKER, TREGORING, CONOVER 5295 VHF/DF STATIONS: STRIKE MESSAGES STIT BY CHATTIEL "A" 13TH WING RECALL PHRASE EASTWARD HO FRAMLINGHAM: TICHTBOOT D/F CHAMIEL "B" VHF CALL SIGHS: 2-4 BOMBERS VINEGROVE BURY ST. ED: CHAIRLEG D/F FIGHTERS BALANCE GROUND "OILSKIN" ALT "COLGATE"



CHARLIE WILLIE BAKER TO MY JASON FREDDIE RONALD KARLO GEORGE MICKEY 15 75 97 25 06 93 77 45 03

### STATION WEATHER OFFICE AAP STATION 119 APO 550

6 January 1944

SUBJECT: Interrogation Summary for Mission of 5 January 1944.

- TO : Commanding Officer, Headquarters, 95th Bombardment Group, APO 559.
- 1. Base at take-off: Time was 0745 hours. 4-5/10 stratocumius base 500-1000 feet. 5-7/10 stratocumulus base 2000-2500, tops 5-5000 feet with scattered patches of this cloud in this indefinite layers up to 15,000 feet. Visibility was 7 miles, except 5-5 miles in light snow showers.
- 2. Route to target: 10/10 stratecumulus and cumulus below 10,000 feet over southern England, the channel, and French edast, breaking to 3-5/10 from 03 to 06 degrees east then increasing rapidly to 6-5/10 cumulus and stratecumulus in large patches below 10,000 feet for the remainder of the route. Nil medium cloud. Nil high cloud except 10/10 contrails cirrus above 20,000 feet over southern England and the channel becoming nil over the continent until the immediate target area.
- 5. Target area: Frankfurt, Jermany. Time was 1350 hours. 6/10 thin stratognoulus and cumulus in large patches below 10,000 feet. Jeattored fine cirrus above 87,000 feet. Dosnword visibility 10-20 viles in reas.
- 4. Heturn route: Heverse of route to target over the continent with all cloud breaking to nil ever delgium, then 5-8/10 swelling cumulus base 5000 feet except 1000 feet in rain showers over the eastern half of the chamel.
- 5. Base on return: Time was 1715 hours. Wil cloud except trace of swelling cumulas on the horizon. Visibility was 2-3 miles in home.
- 6. Remarks: Bease and persistent contrails formed above 30,000 feet over England and channel becoming light interstitient over the continent.

Whithis 3. Mind, JR., Captain, air Corpe, Staff Weather Officer.

7 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Lead Mavigator's Marrative, 95 "A" Squadron, Mission of 5 January 1945. Frankfurt, Germany.

- TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).
- 1. Flying the 95 "A" lead of the 13 "A" Combat wing, we took off at 0788, assembled over base at 22,000 feet. at 0940. Wing assembly was made at SP #7 at 1004 at 22,500 feet. Losing time right along, in order to make Division assembly, we had to cut corners abruptly and made Division assembly at 5010N 0047% at 24,500 feet after crossing English coast at 1204 hours.
- 2. French coast was crossed at 1052 hours at 4934-00057. Briefed course was flown into at 1222 hours. Due to failure of Mickey and wind drift wer were blown from course and made an I.P. good of 5058 0925 at 1306 hours.
- 5. We had a bomb run on the town of Fulda by PFF means. Bombs away at 1320 at 25,000 feet. We turned left off target running in to heavy flak. We then turned south to a point of 4919N 1001E at 1356 hours.
- 4. Here we turned to the right and came out at CP #8 at 1817 hours at 4945 0447. Here we turned on a course direct to base upon receipt of permission from Kodak ships.
- 5. We crossed Enemy coast at 5115 0755 at 1609 hours and the English coast in at 1649 at  $5204\frac{1}{2}$  01308. We reached the base at 1656 hours.

EUGENE T. RUSSELL 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead devigator.

7 January 1948.

- SUBJECT: Lead Havigator's Harrative, 95 "B" Squadron, Mission of 5 January 1945. Frankfurt. Germany
- TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).
- 1. We took off at 0730 and assembled with the group at 0900 at 17,000'. We climbed to 25,000' to make Division assembley. We departed English coast at 1024 at 23,500 feet. We crossed enemy coast at LeHarve at 1052 at 25,300'.
- 2. Route to IP wasn't made good due to "S"ing. We were north of course nearly all the way in. The lead called for us to take over the lead on the bomb run. We made I.P. at(5058 0925) good at 25,300 at 1306.
- 3. My exygen mask froze up just prior to IP and I had anexia so I called M/O immediately after bombs away and told him to make circular ot good. The bombardier got an emergency makk on me and we were heading west when I picked up my position by pilotage.
- 4. Bombs were away at 1320 on a heading of 1920 at 25,300, cordinates uncertain.
- 5. Route back to coast was not made good due to gasoline shortage, wind shift, etc. We crossed coast at 1625 at 4,000' 5120 0315. We crossed the English coast in at 1702 and were over the base at 1710 and landed at 1715.

JACK B. WILBOURNE 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Lead Mavigator.

7 January 1945

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, 95th "C" Squadron, Mission of 5 January 1945, Frankfurt, Germany.

- 10 : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H) A.A.F.
- 1. We took off at 0745 and assembled our group at 0850 at 15000feet. We met wing formation at splasher # 7 at 21,000 feet. We left the English coast at 1024 hours at 22,000 feet at 5047 0005 W.
- 2. The group entered the enemy coast at 1052 at 24,500 feet at 4934 0005 E. We followed the flight plan to the turn at 5012 0631 E at 1222 hours where we started to drift north of course. The next turn was made at 1240 hours at 5031 0801 E. We then turned east at 1250 hours towards I.P. which was made at 1306 hours at 5058 0925 E.
- 3. At this time we were told to bomb as a squadron and started our bomb run on Frankfurt. Bombs were away at 1358 at 24,500 feet. We reformed at 1358 at the Rally Point.
- 4. Briefed course was flown from Rally Point to 4930 0353 E at 1519 hours when the squadron turned towards home base. We left the enemy coast at 1620 hours at 5053 0138 E.
- 5. We reached English coast at 1640 at 5120 0125 E. We reached the base at 1700 hours.

NORMAN M. SACKS, let Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator.

6 January 1945.

Lead Bombardier's Narrative, 95 "A" Squadron, Mission of 5 January SUBJECT: 1945, Frankfurt, Germany.

Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

TO

- 1. Narrative.
  - b. The maneuver at the I.P. was a turn to the right.

a. Bombing aids used were C-2, E-6-B, Tachometer and AFCE.

- c. Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes before the I.P.
- d. Target was covered by lo/loths undercast. There was no enemy

resistance or any unusual hostile tactics which interefered with the

- e. Bombing results were unobserved.
- f. There are no suggested changes in bombing technique.
- Bombardier's Form 12-E modified is attached.

the bombing run.

- 3. Disposition of Bombs.

- Over Target Bombing

- 64 X 500GP Frankfurt, Germany

the secondary target were trained out at 80' interval and armed.

- Mainbombfall No. Size Type
- - Pusing
  - Nose Tail
  - AN-M64 1/10 1/40
- 16 X 500 Open at 50008 M-17 64 X 500GP AM-M64 1/10 1/40 Total on Target
- 16 X 500 M-17 Open at 5000 32 X 500GP AN-M64 1/10 1/40 Bombs returned
- 8 X 500 M-17 Open at 5000' Other Expenditures None Total (loaded on A/C taking off) AN-M64 1/10 1/40 96 X 500GP
- 24 X 500 M-17 Open at 5000' Types of Release - All 64 X 500GP and 16 X 500 K-17 bombs dropped at

EDWARD H. SCHULTZ 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier.

5 January 1945.

Lead Bombardier's Narrative, 95 "A" Squadron, Mission of 5 January SUBJECT: 1945, Frankfurt, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

Bombing Approach and Run. Bomb doors were opened two minutes before the I.P. A right turn was made on the I.P. Our mickey was out and bomb run was PFF. We bombed in squadron formation and we dropped on smoke bombs of "B" squadron. Bombs were away at 13202. Target was covered by 10/10ths undercast. CI suto pilot was used on the run.

2. Disposition of Bombs - Twelve A/C were dispatched from 95 "A" squadron. Eight A/C were over the target dropping 64 X 500GP AN-M64 and 16 X 500 M-17 bombs. A/C #6598 aborted (severe wing ice) and returned 8 X 600GP AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs. A/C 1887 aborted (oil leak in #2 engine) and returned 8 X 500 AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs. A/C 7376 aborted (super charger out) and returned 8 X 500 AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs. A/C 2951 aborted (feathered engine) and returned 8 X 500 AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs. A/C #8305, 8942, 9010 are outstanding but their bombs have been counted in the Tabular Summary as being on the target. All GP bombs were fused 1/10 mass and 1/40 tail. All M-17 bombs

3. Types of Release - All 64 X 500GP AN-M64 and 16 X 500 M-17 bombs dropped at the secondary target were trained out at 80' interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary.

Total (loaded on A/C taking off)

were fused to break open at 5000'

Fusing Nose Tail Main Bombfall Over Target Bombing No. Size Type 1/10 1/40 Frankfurt, Germany 64 X 500GP AN-M64 16 X 500 N-17 Open at 5000 1/10 1/40 Total on Target 64 X 500GP AN-M64 16 X 500 M-17 Open at 50001 Bombs returned 32 X 500GP AN-M64 1/10 1/40 8 X 500 M-17 Open at 5000' Other Expenditures None

> EDWARD H. SCHULTZ 1st Lt., Air Corps,

1/10 1/40 Open at 5000'

Lead Bombardier.

96 X 500GP AN-M64

24 X 500 M-17

5 January 1945.

- SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, 95 "B" Squadron, Mission of 5 January 1945, Frankfurt, Germany.
- TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bembardment Group (H).
  - 1. Marrative.
    - a. Bombing aids were C-2, M-6-B and PFF equipment.
    - b. The maneuver at the I.P. was a turn of about 80 degrees to the right.
    - c. Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes prior to the I.P at 1303.
    - d. There was 10/10ths cloud coverage over the target. Enemy resistance or unusual hostile tactics did not interfere with the bombing run.
    - e. Bombing results were unobserved.
    - f. There are no suggested changes in bombing technique.
  - 2. Bombardier's Form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs.

a: Staboar orott	4	A/					
		Fusing					
Main Bombfall	Over	Target	Bombing	No.	Type	Sise	Nose Tail
Frankfurt, Germany		10	8.	64 X	500GP	AN-M64	1/10 1/40
•				16 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'
Total on Target				64 X	500GP	AN-M64	1/10 1/40
<b>G</b>				16 X	500	M-17	Open at 50001
Bombs returned				16 X	500GP	AN-M64	1/10 1/40
				4 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'
Other Expenditures				16 X	500GP	AN-M64	1/10 1/40
				4 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000
Total (loaded on A/C	takin	g off)		96 X	5000P	AN-M64	1/10 1/40
,		ω·		24 X		M-17	Open at 5000'

4. Types of Release - All 64 X 500GP AN-M64 and 16 X 500 M-17 hombs dropped on secondary target were trained at 80' interval and dropped armed M-17 set to break at 5000'.

MANLON H. LONG JR. 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier.

6 January 1945.

- SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, 95 "B" Squadron, Mission of 5 January 1945. Frankfurt. Germany.
- TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).
- 1. Bombing Approach and Run Bomb bay doors were opened two minutes prior to IB. We took the lead of the group at this point. I.P. was cut short to allow the 95 "A" Squadron to fall in trail. Mickey set was not working perfectly but he thought he had the target in his scope. I clutched in at eleven miles and made checks at seven and five mile range. They required no correction. Mickey set went out before five mile check and bombs were away at 1320 hours. Bombing was in squadron formation and results were unebserved. Ci auto pilot was used on the run.
- 2. Disposition of Bombs Twelve A/C were dispatched from 95 "B" squadron. Ten A/C were over the target dropping 64 X 500GP AN-M64 and 16 X 500 M-17 bombs. A/C #6217 aborted (engine failure) returning 8 X 500GP AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17s. A/C #7047 aborted (engine failure) returning 8 X 500GP AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17s. A/C #8525 dropped 8 X 500GP AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17 on T/O because of a release failure at the target. A/C #8272, 8199, 8584 each carrying 8 X 500GP AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs are outstanding. These bombs are presumed on the target. A/C 8317 jettisiened 8 X 500GP AN-M64 and 2 X 500 M-17s in the channel (unable to release at the target, low on gas on return).
- 3. Types of Release All 64 X 500GP AM-M64 and 16 X 500 M-17s dropped on secondary target were trained at 80' interval and dropped armed, the M-17s set to break at 5900'.

4. Tabular Su		•				
	A	<b>/</b> 0				Fusing
Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Type	Size	Nose Tail
Frankfurt, Germany	10	8	64 X	500GP	an-M64	1/10 1/40
•	•		16 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'
Total on Target			64 X	500GP	An-M64	1/10 1/40
		•	16 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'
Bombs Returned			16 X	500GP	AN-M64	1/10 1/140
			4 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'
Other Expenditures			16 X	500GP	AN-1464	1/10 1/40
•			4 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000'
Total (loaded on A/C	taking off)		96 X	500GP	AN-1164	1/10 1/40
·	•		24 X	500	M-17	Open at 5000*

5 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, 95 "C" Squadron, Mission of 5 January 1945, Frankfurt, Germany.

- TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).
- 1. Bomoing Approach and Run There is no report on the bomb run made by 95 °C" Squadron as the lead ship landed away from the Base. From interrogation of other crews it is presumed the run was PFF with a last minute visual assist. Results were fair.
- 2. Disposition of Bombs Twelve A/C were dispatched with 95 "C" Squadron and nine A/C were over the secondary target dropping 72 X 500GP AN-M64 and 18 X 500 M-17 bombs. A/C #8288 aborted after the target and his bombs are counted on the target. A/C #7858 aborted because of lack of oxygen and returned 8 X 500GP and 2 X 500 M-17s bombs. A/C #7783 aborted before the target and landed on the continent. The disposition of of the 8 X 500GP and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs is unknown. A/C #8281 aborted because of engine failure and jettisoned 8 X 500GP and 2 X 500 M-17 bombs forty miles east of Southwold. All GP bombs released on the secondary target were fuzed 1/10 nose and 1/40 tail. The M-17 bombs were set to break at 5000 feet.
- 3. Types of Release All bombs dropped on the secondary target were at an interval of 80°. The jettisoned bombs were salvoed safe.
  - 4. Tabular Summary.

	waters 3 e									
		./c			Fusing					
Main Bombfall	Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size Type	Nose Tail					
Frankfurt, Germany	9	9	72 X	500GP AN-M64	1/10 1/40					
-			18 X	500 M-17	Break at 5000'					
Total on Target			72 X	500GP AN-M64	1/10 1/40					
			18 X	500 M-17	Break at 5000'					
Bombs Returned			8 X	500GP AN-M64	1/10 1/40					
	•		2 X	500 M-17	Break at 5000'					
Other Expenditures			16 X	500 GP AN-M64	1/10 1/40					
			4 X	500 M-17	Break at 5000'					
Total (loaded on A/C	taking off)	*	98 1	BOOGP AN-MEA	1/10 1/40					

CARL A. CARLSON lst Lt., Air Corps,

Break at 5000'.

24 X 500 M-17

W.D. A.C. FORM 12-E MODUPTED 17-10-43 3RD APO 534.

OBJECTIVE

AIMING POINT (MPI) Frankfurt, M/

## COLBAT BOMBING FLIGHT RECORD

	una capit gaza addicació decrea		
BOMBARDIER	Lang, N.J. 2nd La	An annual transfer with a second of the second seco	DATE 5 January 1945
PILOT	Wilson, J.G., 2nd	и.	TAKE OFF
NAVIGATOR	Wilbourne, JaB., 2	nd Lt.	LANDED
ORGANIZATION	Squedron	<b>95th</b> Group	ATRPLANE Type Number
OB JECTIVE P	rankfurt. Gormany.	(secondary)	
	e. L	en de la company	
W.D. A.C. FORM 12-E MODIFIE 17-10-43 3RD		95 "A" Squadron	
	COMB	AT BOMBING FLIGHT RECO	DMD
BOMBARDIER_	Schults, E. H., let	LIA.	DATE 5 January 1948
PILOT	Parker, R.E., lat	<b>A.</b>	TAKE OFF
NAVIGATOR_	Bussell, N.T., 1st	ike	LANDED
ORGANIZATION		Group	AIRPLANE <b>B-100 8179</b> Type Mumbo

## HEADQUARTERS

## NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDHENT GROUP (H) Office of the Engineering Officer

APO 559. 6 January 1945.

- SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission 5 January 1946.
- : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Gp (H). Attn: Air Executive. TO
- 1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission 5 January 1945.
  - Thirty-six (36) B-17G airplanes took-off.
  - Eighteen (18) B-17G airplanes returned to base after completion of mission.
  - 43-38942, 43-39010, 44-8305, 44-8272, 43-38199, 43-38584, 42-31867, 42-97992 & 43-38288 did not return to base.
  - 2. There were nine (9) abortive airplanes.
    - 42-102951 #2 engine internal failure. 8.
    - b. 42-31887 Oil leaking from #2 tank cap loose.
    - c. 42-97376 Supercharger fluctuating governor ground wire.
    - d. 44-8598 Ice on wing.

      e. 42-107047 No power in #3 engine #4 tachometer fluctuating. T. 43-38617 - #3 engine running rough - 30 gallons of oil lost.

      5. 43-38281 - #8 cylinder blown on #2 engine.

      h. 43-37783 - Landed in France.

    - T. 42-97858 Pilot's oxygen system leaking.
  - 3. Battle damage is as follows:

8. .

- 44-8179 Right outer wing panel damaged.
  - 5. 43-38660 Left outer wing panel damaged. (Tokio tanks)
  - c. 44-8438 Left stabilizer damaged.
  - d. 44-8269 - Main bulk head damaged.
  - 42-107204 Rudder control cables severed.

### HEADQUARTERS

# NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Armament Officer APO 559

5 January 1945

SUBJECT: Mission Expenditure Report for 5 January 1945.

- TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).
  - 1. Following are the expenditures for the mission of 5 January 1945.

A. Station AAF 119

B. Unit 95th Bombardment Group (H)

C. Type of Ammunition Cal. 50 APIGI-TIMI

D. Cun locations and number of guns

50 Ball Turret Guns	500
50 Upper Turret Ouns	500
25 Left Waist Guns	250
25 Right Waist Guns	250
25 Left Nose Guns	250
25 Right Nose Guns	250
50 Chin Turret Guns	500
50 Tail Guns	500

W. Total number of guns 300

F. Total amount of ammunition fired 3000 rounds.

G. Aircraft Numbers 9010- 8283- 8199- 8272 reported missing each loaded with 8-500 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs and 2- 500 lb.
M 17 Incendiary Bombs and 5000 rounds Cal. 50 API&I-

TIEI Ammunition.

H. Total amount of ammunition expended 23,000 rounds.

I. Total number of bombs expended 232-500 lb. G.P. Demolition Hombs. 58-500 lb. M 17 Incendiary Bombs. 6- CHB M 1 Sky Markers;

LEONARD F. NAWSON Mapt. Air Corps Group Armament Officer

# HEADQUARTERS MINETY FIFTH BOWDARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Armament Officer APO 559

5 January 1945

BUBJEUT: A reassent Malfunction Report for 5 January 1945.

- TO : Commanding Officer. 95th Bosbardmant Group (11).
- 1. Twenty-six aircraft were loaded with 8-500 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs and 2-500 lb. W 17 Incendiary Bombs per aircraft and the three PFF aircraft were loaded with 8-500 lb. G.P. Demolition Bombs, 2-500 lb. M 17 Incendiary Bombs and 2- WB M 1 Sky Markers per aircraft.
- 3. Following are the armament malfunctions reported for the mission of 5 January 1945.
  - 1/0 No. 3525- The bombs were released late. The bomb bay doors had not been fully opened, consequently the safety switches to the racks were off. The bombardier reported that he looked at the bomb bay door indicator light and that it appeared to be on. He did not check with the pilot. Later when the doors were fully open, the light came on and the bombs were released. The bombardier reported that the sun, shinging on the light, made it appear to be on.
  - 1/2 No. 3317- This aircraft failed to release the bomb load at the target. Then part of the erew went back to release the bombs manually, they discovered that the overhead switches were off. The overhead switches were turned on and the bombs were dropped in the channel.
  - :/3 To. 3067- Bell furret double power motor burned out. The brushes
    were burned and the commutator pitted. The part number is
    74831. The double power unit was replaced.

## HINSTY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Communications Officer

5 Jamery 1945

APO

SUBJECT: Operational Communications

Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, Station #119 TO

1. Of the thirty-eight grows assigned to the mission, seventeen were

available for interrogation by the Communications Officer.

Mochanical and electrical failures noted were as follows:

(c) 412-H (VHF/tube failure)

(b) 334-W (Radio compass/realigned)

(d) 412-B (VHF/faulty tripper switch)

one IM each from home station

(c) Seventeen A/C reported using Station 7000

versione britis SESBELL

(a) 334-L (Interphene/Nav. mike switch out)

The following navigational side were used successfully:

(a) Seventeen A/C reported using Splashers and Bunchers

(b) 335-U obtained four QUEs from home station: 412-F. 412-Y, 334-R, 334-U, 335-O, 336-B, 412-E, ontained

4. The reception of ground stations and beacons was normal.

(Interphone/faulty IN jack box, RN mike switch)

RICHARD F. KNOX Captain, A. C. Gr. Committeetion C.

 $(J-\lambda-1)$ 

# HEADQUARTERS NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT OR UP (H) Office of the Intelligence Officer APO 559

Janurary 5, 1945. D-D-5.

SUBJECT: S-2 Letter-Frankfurt Mission.

To : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group, APO 559.

1. The mission-this Group flew as the 13A Combat Group is an attack against the marshalling yards at Frankfurt, Germany. Colonel Shuck in command.

95A-Eleven A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the lead squadron. Eight A/C attacked the secondary target, the M/Y at Frankfurt using pathfinder tachnique. Four A/C aborted: A/C 951 aborted over the base because of loss of oil in #2 engine; A/C 589 aborted before leaving the English coast because severe icing conditions made it impossible to stay in formation; A/C 1-87 aborted before leaving the Elglish coast because of an oil lead in #2 filler line; A/C 7376 aborted over the base with a surging super-charger.

958-Eleven A/C plus one PFF A/C formed the high squadron. Eight A/C attacked the secondary target using pathfinder technique. A/C 8525 attacked an unknown target of opportunity. A/C 8317 completed a sortis but failed to drop be be on any target. Two A/C aborted: A/C 8617 returned before leaving the English coast because of loss of oil in #3 engine; A/C 7047 returned before leaving the English coast because of truble with #3 and #4 engines.

950-Eleven A/C and one PFF A/C formed the low squadron. Nine A/C attacked the primary target. A/C 7783 completed a sortle but is not believed to have attacked a target. Two A/C aborted: A/C 8281 returned before leaving the English coast because of a blown cylinder on #2 engine; A/C 8441 returned from 4935-0125 at 1114 hours because of loss of oxygen.

Nine A/C failed to return to this base. From 95A A/C 8305 landed at AY33 less two men who babled out and are at Y34, A/C 8942 landed at A70, and A/C 9010 is not accounted for. From 95B A/C 1867 is DS France, A/C 8272 landed at A70, A/C 8584 landed at A74, and A/C 8199 is not accounted for. From 95C A/C 7783 landed at A70, and A/C 8288 is not accounted for.

- 2. Enemy Air Opposition: there was none.
- 3. Flak-AA fire from Darmstadt, Stuttgart, Kehl near Strasbourg, and Saarbrucken tracked with accuracy, and ranged from meagre to moderate intensity. AA fire from Mannheim was both tracking and barrage, and was intense and accurate.
- 4. Bombing results-strike photos show a solid undercast for 95A and B squadrons, but radar navigator for 95B picked up the city of Frankfurt at 35 miles and believes bombs hit in the city. 95A released on the smoke markers of 95B. Strike photos for 95C squadron show a scattered pattern of bombs in the primary target M/Y. Bombing was therefore classified as 95A, good, 95B, good, and 95C, fair.
- 5. Other information-fighter escort was reported as good. Pathfinder equipment in 95A lead A/C went out before the IP, and 95B squadron took over the lead. 95B bombed using pathfinder equipment and 95A released bombs on the smokers of 95B. 95C squadron made a pathfinder run with visual assist behind another group believed to be the 100th Group which cut them out at the IP. Bombing order was therefore 95B,A, and after an interval C.

For the Intelligence Officer:

ARNO A. KRAUSE, Captain, Air Corps, Ass't. S-2 Officer.

1. GROUP 2. A/C AIRBORNE 3. SORTIES	GS P	95 B	950
2. A/C AIRBORNE	11+1	11+1	11+1
3. SORTIES	8	10	10
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## STATION AS ATHER OFFICE AAF STATION 119 APO 559

6 January 1964

SUBJECT: Meteorological Interregation Summery for Mission of 5 January 1944.

TO : Commanding Officer, Headquarters, 95th Bombardment Group, APO 550.

- l. Base at take-off: Time was 0745 hours. 4-5/10 strategumilus base 800-1000 feet. 5-7/10 strategumilus base 8000-8500, tops 3-5000 feet with scattered patches of this cloud in this indefinite layers up to 15,000 feet. Visibility was 7 miles, except 3-5 miles in light snow showers.
- over southern England, the channel, and French coast, breaking to 3-t/10 from 05 to 05 degrees east then increasing rapidly to 6-2/10 summlus and stratocumulus in large patches below 10,000 feet for the remainder of the route. Nil medium cloud. Nil high cloud except 10/10 controlls cirrus above 80,000 feet over southern England and the channel becoming nil over the continent until the immediate target area.

2. Route to target: 10/10 strategumulus and cumulus below 10,000 feet

- 3. Target area: Frankfurt, Germany. Time was 1550 hours. 6/10 thin stratogumulus and cumulus in large patches below 10,000 feet. Scattered fine cirrus above 27,000 feet. Domiward visibility 10-20 miles in home.
- 4. Beturn route: Reverse of route to target over the continent with all cloud breaking to mil over Belgium, then 5-6/10 swelling cumulus state \$6000 feet except 1000 feet in rain showers over the eastern half of the channel.
- 5. Bage on return: Time was 1715 hours. Wil cloud except trace of swelling cumulus on the horizon. Visibility was 8-3 miles in here.
- 6. Remarks: Bease and persistent contrails formed above 20,000 feet over England and channel becoming light intermittent over the continent.

WALTER 3. MILES, JR., Captain, Air Corps, Staff seather Officer.

COMMAND PILOTS PARKER (COL. SHUCK)

HAMILTON Ne Flect SHAW
7204 SHAW
Island B Island - F "A" SQ. PEARSON TREGONING 7204 Island-B 7376 6598 Island-N Island-H PAINTER MERCER BRADLEY RICHARDSON CONOVER 9010 Island-X 7194 Island-0 8269 8305 8942 Island-G Island-Y Island-K KLEIN PAINE 8551 2951 Negledt-L NegIect-Q "B" SQ. WILSON (CAPT. JENEMAN) 81 44 Landberg-0, BUR NS ROSE EXTRA SHIPS: TOWER 81 06 Landberg-E Landberg-P TAYLOR Landberg OTTON 334th NELSON Landberg-HENOX 335TH 7047 Island-M THOMAS 8525 Neglect-U MILLER 336TH 7961 PFF Landberg-K 8317 7201 Neglect-J 1867 8199 412TH 1462 Abush-R, 7858 Abush-Y Landberg-Z Landberg-B Neglect-K DUNWODY 8660 8469 Neglect-W Landberg-U "C" SQ, BRAUND 79 | 92 Abush-Q RAND TESSIER MADIGAN RINGBLOOM 65 | 22 Abush-H 87 74 80 67 Abush-E Abush-B Něglect-B RIVET KOEHLER DOXON OLSON 96 38 81 41 84 84 Abush-Z Neglect-R Neglect-T Abush-P Abush-V WALTER WEISZ 77 83 Abush-F 72 57 Abush-L

## HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE of the control of the વર્ષ તેલું છેલું પહોંદી ભારતો પ્રોકેલ્ફિટ પહોંચારને તે તેના પ્રાથમ APO. 6346 હતું કે વર્ષો છેલા છે. આ પ્રાથમ કરવાના પ્રોક્રિક જો પાસ્તુલ થઈ છે. પૂર્વ કેઇ છેલા જોઈ જોઈ જોઈ કે કે કે કે કે કે કે કોઈ જો પ્રોફ્રિક ક



INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 250.

PERIOD: 0001 hours 5 January 1944 to 2400 hours 5 January 1944.

Miss	ions Dis	p. Sorti	es Atkg	Tonnage		Losses AA N/E OT Totals
Heavy Bomber Atks.	20 100	8 899	869	21,52.6	0-0-0	1, 46 48 (a)
Fighter Escort	11 50	7 467	0	o .	10-0-0 A 0 4-0-0 G	0 1 6 7 (b)
Fighter Sweeps	5 6	4 61	0	0	•	<b>1</b> 0,300 <b>1</b>
Fighter Bombing	1. 5	49	48	. 11.3	0-0-0	0 0 0
Photo Recone	4 5	53	0	(; O	0-0-0	0 0 0 0
Weather Recon.	5 4	1 33	. 0	0	0-0-0	0, 0 1 1 (o)
Air/Sea Rescue	5 1	.2 12	0	0	0-0-0	0 0 0
Special Operations	12 _ 5	<u>6 53</u>	10	16.8	<u>0-0-0</u> <u>0</u>	0 0 0 0
Totals	63 17	98 1627	927	2180.7	1-0-0 A 0 4-0-0 G	2 2 53 57

- (a) majority believed safe on Continent.
- (b) four P-51s believed safe.
- (c) believed safe on Continent.

## OPERATIONAL SUMMARY 杨维护 化二二烷二烷烷 納美工實

1,008 a/c (749 B-17s, 259 B-24s) dispatched from three Air Divisions in three forces against seven communication centers, eight M/Ys, three A/Fs and two railheads in the tactical area and central Germany. 869 a/c dropped 1997.9 tons GP, 154.7 tons IB - total 2152.6 tons - on assigned targets, secondary targets and several T/Os. Two primaries not attacked. Bombing on PFF with visual assists. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 48 a/c (1 to AA, 1 Cat "E", 46 unknown - majority believed safe on Continent).

Nine group formations (259 B-24s - 2nd Air Division) dispatched against six M/Ys and one railhead. 233 a/c dropped 508, 7 tons GP, 70.2 tons IB - total 578.9 tons - on assigned targets and four T/Os. One primary not attacked. Bombing at 1203 - 1233 hours from 21,000-25,000 feet, visually and

on Gee-H. Leaflets dropped on Pirmasens, Cochem and Sobernheim. Weather: 8/10-10/10 on route, 4/10-5/10 at targets. Flak: meager, inaccurate. Battle damage: 51 minor, 0 major. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 a/c (2 to unknown causes, 1 Cat "E").

Fighter Support: four groups (177 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1003-1016 hours, down 1426-1520 hours. 164 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. One u/i jet a/c in Hengelo area; no combat. Claims: il. Losses: 1 P-51, believed safe.

## Details of bomber attacks as follows:

Assigned Targets	Dispatched	Attacking	Tonna	ze TD	Results
and the state of t			<u>GP</u>	<u> 10</u>	
Neustadt M/Y Sobernheim M/Y	38	32	73,0		Fair
Cochem M/Y & RR Bridge	44 30	42 31	76.5 71.8		Fair Unobserved
Oberstein M/Y		Not Attacked	1200		,
Kirn M/Y	38	18	34.3	-	Good
Pirmasens Railhead St. Ingbert M/Y	40 43	39 3	86.5 7.5		Fair, Unobserved
Neunkirchen M/Y	4-2	51	121.2		Poor-Fair
Other Targets		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			¥.,
Prum		<u>l</u>	2.2	_	Unobserved
Burg Heinkerchen		<u>1</u> Ω' :: .	2.2		Unobserved
Neubruke	valenta kan da	7	17.7 15.8		Good Poor
Totals	259	233	508.7	70.2	,

## Second Force

Eleven group formations (370 B-17s - 3rd Air Division) dispatched against two M/Ys and four communication centers. 299 a/c dropped 707,7 tons GP, 84.5 tons IB - total 792.2 tons - on primary targets and several T/Os. One primary not attacked. Bombing at 122.2 - 1355 hours from 24,000-28,500 feet, visually and by PFF. Leaflets dropped on Frankfurt, Hahau and Ascharfenburg. Weather: 3/10-5/10 enroute, 8/10-10/10 in target area. Flak: meager to moderate, fairly accurate. Battle damage: 78 minor, 11 major. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 40 a/c (1 to A., 39 to unknown causes - many believed safe on Continent).

Fighter Support: four groups (213 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1028-1115 hours, down 1515-1600 hours. 194 sorties. E/a opposition: one s/e e/a shot down north of Hochst/Oberau A/F. which was strafed. Transportation and other ground targets strafed in Fulda-Meiningen-Bad Salzungen area for claims of 11-0-3 locomotives, 0-0-23 goods wagons, 0-0-1 switch tower, 1-0-0 radar station. E/a claims: 1-0-0 air, 4-0-0 ground. Losses: 3 P-51s (2 believed down on Continent, 1 believed down in UK).

## Details of bomber attacks as follows:

Assigned Targets		Attacking	Tonnage GP IB	Results
a de production de la compact de production de la compact	the second secon	aje ajeli data bija		No. of the second
Hanau M/Y			123.8 30.	5 Fair-Good
Frankfurt M/Y				O Good
Waxweiler Com. Center	37	32	92.5	Poor
Wetteldorf Com. Center	39	27	76.0	Poor
Pronsfeld Com. Center	39	33	101.0	Poor
Schonecken Com. Center	38 Not	Attacked	- 1.直播 (2005年) - 2.44年	
Kaiserslautern		29	78.1	Fair-Good
Other Targets	and the second			
The state of the s	•		and the second s	
Heilbron	•	29	48.0 11.	
ll u/i T/Os	*******	_11	26.5 2.	5 Unobserved
garan da ang kanggaran ng kangga Ng kanggaran ng kan				_%;
Totals	370	299	707.7	5
and the second of the second o			and the second second	

## Third Force

Ten group formations (379 B-17s - 1st Air Division) dispatched against three communication centers, three A/Fs and a railhead in the tactical area. 337 a/c dropped 781.5 tons GP on assigned targets and T/Os. One primary not attacked. Bombing at 1246-1330 hours from 24,000-29;000 feet on Gee-H and H2X. Leaflets dropped on Neiderbreisig, Neidermendig and Coblenz. Weather: 10/10 over target. Flak: meager, inaccurate. Battle damage: 17 minor, 3 major. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 5 a/c to unknown causes.

Fighter Support: three groups (117 P-51s) dispetched. Up 1004-1150 hours, down 1503-1523 hours. 109 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 P-51s (2 to unknown causes, 1 Cat "E").

### Details of bomber attacks as follows:

Assigned Targets	Dispatched	Attacking	<u>Tonnage</u>	Results
Neidembraisig A/F Endembash A/F	77.	70 Not Attacked	129.9	Unobserved
Neidermandig A/F Dumplifield Com. Center Kall Com. Center Mechernich Com. Center Heinbach Railhead Coblenz M/Y	78 39 37 37 37 37	54 37 35 1	100.7 105.9 101.9 3.0 107.9 217.5	Unobserved Unobserved Unobserved Unobserved Unobserved
Other Targets			Marie Committee	
Pronsfeld Com. Center Waxweiler Com. Center 4 u/i T/Os	13	2 1 <u>4</u>	3.9 1.9' 1.8.9	Unobserved Unobserved Unobserved
Totals	379	337	781.5	: ' •

## 2. Fighter Escort

Eleven groups (507 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1003-1150 hours, down 1426-1600 hours. 467 sorties. E/a opposition: one s/e e/a shot down north of Hochst/Oberau A/F from which it had taken off when P-51s came in to strafe A/F; one u/i jet a/c seen in Hengelo area. Ground targets strafed in Fulda-Meiningen-Bad Salzungen area. E/a claims: 1-0-0 air, 4-0-0 ground. Losses: 7 P-51s of which 4 are believed safe.

## 3. Fighter Sweeps

One group (64 P-51s) dispatched 61 sorties flown in five missions. Uneventful patrol in break-through area. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51 to AA.

## 4. Fighter Bombing

One group (54 P-47s) dispatched to attack Siegen M/Y. Up 1247 hours, down 1626 hours. 49 sorties. 48 a/c dropped 11.3 tons on target through 10/10 undercast with unobserved results. E/a opposition: one Me-109 bounced P-47s vicinity of Vogelsand but evaded when attacked by our a/c. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

## 5. Photo Reconnaissance

56 a/c (7 F-5s, 3 Mosquitoes, 2 Spitfires, 44 P-51s) dispatched as follows:

3 Mosquitoes on might photography over Berlin. 1 a/c aborted.

7 F-5s on D/A photos in France and Germany.

2 Spitfires on D/A photos in France and Germany.

44 P-51's as escort. Uneventful.

No losses.

## 6. Weather Reconnaissance

41 a/c (33 P-51s, 4 B-17s, 4 Mosquitoes) dispatched as follows:

1 B-17 completed routine flight from Azores.

1 B-17 completed routine flight to Azores.

2 B-17s completed routine weather flights over sea to northwest of Lands End.

4 Mosquitoes on weather reconnaissance over Germany, Holland, England and Isle of Man. 1 a/c aborted.

33 P-51s dispatched as weather scouts for heavy bomber forces. 26 sorties. 1 P-51 NYR (believed safe on Continent).

## 7. Air/Sea Rescue

12 P-47s dispatched on routine patrols. All a/c completed missions and returned safely.

## 8. Special Operations

56 a/c (26 B-24s, 25 B-17s, 2 P-47s, 3 Mosquitoes) dispatched on special operations as follows:  $\underline{S} \ \underline{E} \ \underline{C} \ \underline{R} \ \underline{E} \ \underline{T}$ 

2 P-47s dispatched as radio relays. Both a/c completed mission and returned safely.

10 B-24s dispatched on RCM missions. 5 a/o jammed from 0704-1200 hours, 2 a/c jammed from 1000-1600 hours. 3 a/c failed to complete mission. All a/c returned safely.

12 B-24s dispatched on night of 4/5 January to attack Coastal Battery at Coubre Point. 10 a/c dropped 16.8 tons GP using H2X technique with unobserved results. Flak: meager, inaccurate. E/a opposition: nil. Claims and losses: nil.

24 B-17s, 2 Mosquitoes dispatched as screening force for bomber operations. All a/c completed mission and returned safely.

1 Mosquito dropped chaff, successful mission.

4 B-24s, 1 B-17 dispatched to drop leaflets over southeast Belgium. All a/c completed mission and returned safely.

## C. INTELLIGENCE

## 1. Enemy Air Opposition

The G.A.F. again failed to oppose widespread heavy bomber operations. Weather condtions, though not optimum, should not have prevented e/a from taking off and attempting interception in considerable strength.

The only e/a attack of the day was made by a single Me-109 which bounced a squadron of bomb-carrying P-47s near Vogelsand at 1420 hours. Our a/c attempted to engage but e/a evaded. P-51s which strafed an airfied believed to be Hochst/Oberau destroyed one s/e e/a which apparently was caught soon after becoming airborne. Only two sightings of jet a/c were reported.

## 2. Flak

Hanau - moderate, accurate, tracking and barrage.

Frankfurt - meager to moderate, inaccurate to accurate, tracking.

St. Vith - meager, inaccurate.

Coblenz - meager, inaccurate.

Pronsfeld - meager, inaccurate.

Heinbach - meager, inaccurate.

Neustadt - meager, inaccurate.

Pirmasens - meager to moderate, accurate.

# 3. Observations

Active M/Ys reported at Friedburg, Aschaffenburg and Hanau. Large army camp with numerous trucks and vehicles at 4903N-0727E.

## 4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Pirmasens Communication Center - Fair Results

Hits seen on railroad communications, a small M/Y and surrounding open areas.

## Neustadt Communication Center - Fair Results

A few bursts seen on railroad lines, built-up area and open fields.

## Kirn MY - Good Results

Bursts seen on M/Y and surrounding built-up area. Some bursts in fields and woods.

Sobernheim M/Y - Fair Results

Bursts seen in M/Y, city area, roadways and fields.

## Neunkirchen M/Y Poor to Fair Results

Very few bursts on railroad lines. Some bursts on minor roadways and open areas.

## Neubruke (4936N-0710E) - Poor Results

Bombed as a target of opportunity. Hits seen in woods.

## Heimkirchen (4934N-0734E) - Good Results.

Bombed as target of opportunity. Hits in town area and communications. Francisco de la companya de la comp

## Pronsfeld - Poor Results

Bombs fell in open fields and wooded areas 41 miles NE of target about one mile west of the town of Prum.

## Wetteldorf - Poor Results

Bursts in woods and open country NE of target, distances varying from 1-3/8 to 3-1/2 miles northeast of target.

## Waxweiler - Poor Results

Only photographs submitted show village of Kinzerburg. Bombs probably fell about 1-1/2 miles north of target.

## Kaiserslautern M/Y - Fair to Good Results

Photo cover is probably incomplete because of a/c landing on Continent. 18 500-pound GPs are strung across western part of M/Y and another fell just south of the western end. A total of 21 hits on the tracks are noted. Yard was moderately loaded with rolling stock of various kinds.

## M/Y at Frankfurt - Good Results

Target bombed by most of seven squadrons carrying 500 pound GP and IB clusters. Information not complete due to missing a/c. Photos show bombing on or near M/Y. Yard held about 600 cars about equally divided between the sorting and holding sidings. Of these two areas, the sorting sidings area best hit. It is estimated that there are about 45 HE bursts in the yard and concentrations of IB bombs were noted in the thickly parked areas. The roadover-rail bridge is probably hit by two or more CP bombs.

## Hanau M/Y - Fair to Good Results

Target reported bombed by six squadrons carrying 500 pound GP and IB clusters and 250 pound GP bombs. One pattern of bombs, including incendiaries, fell across the center of the yard and some 20 or 30 bursts were noted there. One pattern of 500 pound GPs fell on the area of factory-type buildings 1-1/3 mile north of the M/Y with several probable hits. Other strikes noted on or near the factory-type buildings 1/2 to 3/4 mile north of the target.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.