

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

APC 559,
31 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Operations Officers Narrative - Mission 29 December
1944 - Frankfurt, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

95 A SQUADRON FORMATION

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95 "A" Squadron, flying as lead Squadron of 13 C Combat Group, took-off at 0834-0923 hours and assembled over the base at 10,000 feet. Squadron and group assembly were complete prior to departure from the base at 1010 hours, and the group proceeded to Wing rendezvous. Because of bad weather, neither wing nor division assembly was made as briefed. Division assembly was made at Southwold at 1025 hours, at 10,000 feet, our departure from England.

Climb to bombing altitude was started en route across the English Channel, and the Continental Coast was crossed at 1056 hours at an altitude of 14,500 feet, north of Ostend. In general, the course to the I.P. was flown south of briefed course, and the chosen I.P. (4939N-0922E) was crossed at 1309 hours, from 25,000 feet.

Prior to the I.P., the fan-out procedure was executed, and bombing was done by squadrons. The 95 A Squadron bombed the marshalling yards at Frankfurt at 1322 hours, on a heading of 346 degrees and an altitude of 24,500 feet.

After a right turn at the target, the group was reassembled at the Rally Point at 24,000 feet at 1327 hours and the return route was intercepted. The route out was flown generally to the left of course, although the continental coast was made good at Ostend, altitude 20,000 feet, at 1342 hours. The English Coast was crossed 5,000 feet over Felixtowe, at 1503 hours, and the group landed at base between 1518 and 1540 hours.

It is to be noted that a total of eight aircraft from 13 C group were unable to take off because of bad weather which closed in during take off time.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: Ten aircraft plus one PFF leader were dispatched in the formation shown in diagram A. All eleven aircraft were over the target and received sorties.

3. LOST AIRCRAFT: None.

Oper. Officers Narrative - Mission 29 Dec. Con't.

95 B SQUADRON FORMATION

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95 B Squadron took-off at 0852-0925 hours, to fly as high Squadron of 13 C Combat Group. Squadron and group assembly were effected over the base prior to departure at 1010 hours.

Reference is made to the above narrative of the 95 "A" Squadron Formation for a general narrative of the remainder of the mission, which was flown in company with 95 A Squadron leader of 95 C Combat Group. In addition the following points are to be noted:

Bombs were dropped from squadron formation at an altitude of 25,600 feet at 1325 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: Ten aircraft plus one PFF leader were dispatched in the formation shown in diagram B. All eleven aircraft were over the target and received sorties.

3. LOST AIRCRAFT: None.

95 C SQUADRON FORMATION

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95 C Squadron formation took-off at 0856-0943 hours, and assembled as low squadron of 13 C Combat Group. Squadron and group assembly were accomplished over the base prior to departure at 1010 hours.

Reference is made to the above narrative of the 95 A Squadron formation for a general narrative of the remainder of the mission, which was flown in company with 95 A Squadron leader of 13 C Combat Group. In addition, however, the following points are to be noted:

Bombs were away at 1323 hours from 23,000 feet, dropped from Squadron formation.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: Seven aircraft plus one PFF leader were dispatched in the formation shown in diagram C. All eight aircraft were over the target and are credited with sorties.

3. LOST AIRCRAFT: None.

NOEL T. CUMBAA,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

29 December 1944

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for 95A,B,C, on the mission to Frankfurt, Germany the 29th of December 1944.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559

1. Ten plus one PFF A/C from the 95th group took off beginning 0834 hours to form the lead squadron of the 13th C Combat Group to attack the M/Y at Frankfurt, Germany.

Ten plus one PFF A/C from the 95th group took off beginning 0852 hours to form the high squadron of the 13C Combat Group to attack the M/Y at Frankfurt, Germany.

Seven plus one PFF A/C from the 95th group took off beginning 0856 hours to form the low squadron of the 13th C Combat Group to attack the M/Y at Frankfurt, Germany.

2. No E/A were encountered.

3. Flak was encountered as follows:

Frankfurt	intense	accurate,	Barrage to
5011-0533	meager	inaccurate	" Tracking
5010-0605	"	"	tracking
5010-0615	"	"	"
5010-0620	"	"	"
5005-0632	"	"	"
5008-0547	"	inaccurate	"
5010-0550	moderate	"	"
4955-0551	meager	"	"
5001-0531	"	accurate	"
5014-0525	"	"	"

4. All squadrons bombed visually with excellent results. Bombing order was A,C,B. Each successive pattern covers a different section of the M/Y. Crews reported fires burning fiercely when leaving target area.

5. Fighter escort gave close support. Assembly was difficult due to weather. 95A squadron leading the 13th C combat group was forced to "S" from over the North Sea through the target and back to about 0430 degrees in order to stay behind the 390th group. The 95th group cut the IP short because of winds and to miss the defense of Hanau, but the formation was still driven south of course by the wind. Bombardiers had to crank considerable drift on the bomb run. 95B squadron had difficulty in assembling and did not get into position until the IP was almost reached, by which time all navigational aid lead gave out, and as result fell in third position

on the bomb run. After bombs away, B squadron turned right to avoid flak defense and then rallied with the other squadrons at 0430 degrees. A/C 2450 attacked an unknown T/o in Germany and then landed in France due to mechanical difficulty. All other A/C returned to base by 1545 hours.

For the Intelligence Officer:

WILLIAM ROWELL,
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

Authority 745005
By CEC NARA Date 6/29/10



- 100A Squadron (Green Dots) : 1
- 100B Squadron (Purple Dots) : 1
- 390A Squadron (Purple Dots) : 11 x 203 x 250 lb. GP
- 100C Squadron (Red Dots) : 13 x 207 x 300 lb. GP

- 95A Squadron (Purple Dots) : 11 x 211 x 250 lb. GP
- 95B Squadron (Green Dots) : 11 x 220 x 250 lb. GP
- 95C Squadron (Red Dots) : 7 x 140 x 250 lb. GP

- 390B Squadron (4 1/2 miles SW from target in woods): 12 x 238 x 250 lb. G
- 390C Squadron (Purple Dots) : 10 x 118 x 250 lb. GP


NOTE: 100B & 390A dropped simultaneously in the same place.
 NOTE: 95B & C chose different MPIs than the designated one.
 RF : 1 : 24,700
 CIRCLES: 1000' & 2000' from MPI & APs.
 M/Y: Outlined in Black.
 Residential & Factory Area: Outlined in Red
 RIVER: Green

SAME TARGET: FRANKFURT M/Y



95th
 A- 345°
 B- 345°

RIVER



STATION 119

DATE 29 December 1944

	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
					EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
ISLAND	L	8260	HENDRICKSON			834		1524	
ABUSH	F	7783	SUTKOWSKI			900		1524	
ABUSH	R	1462	HAIL			857		1549	
NEGLECT	P	6528	O'REILLY			914		1525	
LANDB	G U	8469	RUDKINS			938		1526	
NEGLECT	A	2447	McALLISTER			915		1529	
"	D	8640	CORBIN	HI		916		1519	
"	N	7215	ROSENZWEIG			918		1522	
"	U	8525	KOEHLER			921		1518	
"	F	7154	SCOTT	LO		922		1521	
"	L	8551	REED			923		1523	
"	V	8657	RYAN						Did not take off

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: 745005
 BY: EC/KARA Date: 6/29/10

"A" SQUADRON

FORM 3

DATE 29 Dec '44

STATION 119

LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
				EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
335	L 8260	HENDRICKSON ✓	412		834		1524	
412	F 7783	SUTKOWSKI ✓	412		900		1524	
"	R 1462	HAIL ✓			857		1549	
334	P 6528	O'REILLY ✓	34		914		1525	
336	8469	RUDKINS ✓	34		938		1526	
334	A 2447	McALLISTER ✓			915		1529	
"	D 8640	CORBIN ✓	34		916		1519	
"	N 7215	ROSENZWEIG ✓	34		918		1522	
"	U 8325	KOEHLER ✓	34		921		1518	
"	F 7154	SCOTT ✓	34	ho	922		1521	
"	L 8551	REED ✓	34		923		1523	
"	V 8657	RYAN ✓			—		—	did not get off

Palto Soutte list

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: 745005
 BY: ECA
 NARA Date: 6/29/10

"C" SQUADRON

STATION 119

FORM 3.

DATE 29 DEC '44

LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
				EST	ACT	EST	ACT	
335	W 8364	BRAUND ✓	35		856		1539	
334	B 8776	GREER ✓	35		945		1539	
335	V 2450	HELM ✓			905			Landed at A-70
"	S 9052	SHAW ✓	35		932		1514	
"	G 8305	PAINTER ✓	35		934		1538	
"	B 7204	HAMILTON J. ✓	35		935		1520	
"	H 7376	TREGONING	Hi		-			did not get off
"	T 6475	BRADLEY			-			did not get off
334	W 8660	CONOVER ✓	35		925		1544	
H12	P 8441	BUSSE	Lo ✓ ⁴¹²		943		1540	
	L 7257	OLSON ✓			-			did not get off
336	J 1939	RAND ✓			-			did not get off
335	O 7194	DILLON			-			did not get off

119
 29 DEC 1944
 1539

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 Authority: 745005
 BFC/KARA Date 6/29/10

HEADQUARTERS 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
 APO 559

STATISTICAL CONTROL REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

13TH COMBAT BOMBARDMENT WING

DATE RENDERED 29 Dec 1944

PART I - TABULAR SUMMARY:

DATE OF MISSION 29 Dec 1944

STRATEGICAL MISSION

COMBAT GROUP	SCHEDULED	AIRBORNE	AIRBORNE LESS RETURNING SPARES	ATTACKING	NOT ATTACKING	SORTIES
A	11 & 1SH	10 & 1SH	10 & 1SH	10 & 1SH	0	10 & 1SH
B	12 & 1SH	10 & 1SH	10 & 1SH	10 & 1SH	0	10 & 1SH
C	12 & 1SH	7 & 1SH	7 & 1SH	7 & 1SH	0	7 & 1SH

PART II - REASONS WHY AIRCRAFT DID NOT ATTACK OR FAILED TO TAKE OFF:

Combat Gp A.C.S.N. Category Reason for Failure & Corrective Action (Yes-No) Sortie

8 A/C Failed to take off due to weather closing in at base.

NOEL A. CUMBA,
 Major., Air Corps,
 Operations Officer.

95A

A.T.F.

C.W.

FORMATION DIAGRAM

95TH BOMB. GROUP (H)

DATE 29-DEC-1944

TIME _____

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Authority 745005
BY CEC NARA Date 6/29/60

HENDRICKSON (COL. SHUCK)
8260

SCOTT
7154

HAIL
1462

SUTKOWSKI
7783

CORBIN
8640

RYAN
8657

REED
8551

O'REILLY
6528

KOEHLER
8525

ROSENZWEIG
7215

MCALLISTER
2447

RUDKINS
7201

EXTRA

EXTRA

ABORTIVE _____

MISSING _____

A.T.F.

C.W.

95B

FORMATION DIAGRAM

95TH BOMB. GROUP (H)

DATE 29-DEC-1944

TIME _____

SAVAGE
8179

GARRISON
8106

BURNS
8333

ROSE
8272

RISTINE
8288

ROSS
8283

LENOX
6583

COTNER
8584

BEK
8067

TESSIER
6522

EARLEY
8199

DUNWOODY
6993

GUNTHER
8774

EXTRA

EXTRA A/C

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: 745005
BFC/KARA Date 6/29/10

A.T.F.

C.W.

95C

FORMATION DIAGRAM

95TH BOMB. GROUP (H)

DATE 29-DEC-1944

TIME _____

BRAUND
8364

BUSSE
8441

HELM
2450

GREER
8776

TREGONING
7376

RAND
1939

OLSON
7257

SHAW
9052

CONOVER
8660

BRADLEY
6475

DILLON
7194

HAMILTON, J
7204

PAINTER
8305

EXTRA

EXTRA A/C

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: 745005
By: EC/NARA Date: 6/29/10

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
 AAF STATION 101
 APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 243

PERIOD: 0001 hours 29 December 1944 to 2400 hours 29 December 1944.

A. STATISTICS

	Missions	Disp.	Sorties	Atkg.	Tonnage	Claims	Losses				TOTALS
							E/A	AA	N/E	OT	
Heavy Bomber Atks.	14	823	788	780	2035.3	0-0-0	0	5	5	2	12 (a)
Fighter Escort	10	569	535	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	5	0	5 (b)
Fighter Sweeps	3	128	107	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	1	1
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	0	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	5	34	33	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	4	8	8	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>3</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	39	1572	1481	780	2035.3	0-0-0	0	5	10	3	18

(a) includes 5 cat. "E"

(b) includes 2 cat. "E".

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

823 a/c (561 B-17s, 262 B-24s) from three divisions dispatched in four forces against four bridges, four M/Ys and six communication centers. One bridge not attacked. 780 a/c dropped 1973 tons GP and 62.3 tons IB on all other assigned primaries and numerous other targets. Communication centers bombed on Gee-H in most instances, other primaries visually. E/a opposition: nil. Several jet a/c sighted but no combats. Claims: nil. Losses: 7 B-24s, 5 B-17s (includes 5 a/c cat. "E").

First Force

Six group formations (219 B-17s - 3rd Division) dispatched against Frankfurt and Aschaffenburg M/Ys. 210 a/c dropped 514.3 tons GP on assigned targets and several T/Os at 1309 - 1321 hours from 23,000 - 26,500 feet. All bombed visually. Leaflets dropped on Aschaffenburg. Weather: generally clear

with slight ground haze. Flak: meager to moderate, accurate. Battle damage: 84 minor, 17 major. E/a opposition: nil. One Me-163 sighted east of Frankfurt - no combat. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 B-17s cat. "E".

Fighter Support: five groups (282 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1026 - 1104 hours, down 1512 - 1527 hours. 267 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. One group strafed troop train destroying the locomotive. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 P-51s (1 to mechanical failure, 1 ditched in Channel, pilot rescued).

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>GP</u>	<u>Results</u>
Frankfurt M/Y	143	124	300.0	Very Good
Aschaffenburg M/Y	76	67	167.5	Fair
<u>Other Targets</u>				
Southern Frankfurt M/Y		10	24.4	Unobserved
9 T/Os		9	22.4	Unobserved
Totals	219	210	514.3	

Second Force

Eight group formations (304 B-17s - 1st Division) dispatched against Bingen M/Y, Bullay RR bridge and communication center at Wittlich. 293 a/c dropped 696.4 tons GP, 51.8 tons IB on assigned targets and two T/Os at 1303 - 1344 hours from 21,000 - 24,000 feet. Leaflets dropped on Bingen and Bullay. Bingen bombed visually, other targets bombed on Gee-H. Weather: 3/10 - 10/10 clouds over Bullay and Wittlich; clear to 5/10 clouds over Bingen. Flak: meager to moderate, accurate at Bingen. Battle damage: 104 minor, 28 major. E/a opposition: nil. Losses: 3 B-17s (2 to AA, 1 to causes unknown).

Fighter Support: one group (64 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1050 hours, down 1525 hours. 61 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 to mechanical causes.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	<u>Results</u>
Bingen M/Y	151	144	315.6	51.8	Good-Very Good
Bullay RR Bridge	77	74	216.0		Unobserved
Wittlich (comm. center)	76	50	108.5		Unobserved
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Grosslittgen		12	27.0		Fair
T/O (4949N-0613E)		13	29.3		Unobserved
Totals	304	293	696.4	51.8	

S E C R E T

Authority 745005
 By CEL NARA Date 6/29/10

S E

Third Force

Nine group formations (262 B-24s - 2nd Division) dispatched against two bridges, a M/Y, and four communication centers. 241 a/c dropped 672.3 tons GP and 10.5 tons IB on seven of the eight assigned primaries and several other targets at 1232 - 1346 hours from 17,500 - 23,000 feet. Primaries bombed on Gee-H except Irlich and Gerolstein which were attacked visually. Leaflets dropped on Zulpich, Prum and Remagen. Weather: 4/10 - 6/10 in target areas. Flak: generally meager, accurate. Battle damage: 93 minor, 2 major. E/a opposition: nil. Four Me-262s sighted west of Coblenz at 1230 hours - no combat. Losses: 7 B-24s (3 to AA, 1 to unknown causes, 3 cat. "E").

Fighter Support: two group (119 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1018 - 1050 hours, down 1520 - 1550 hours. 106 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. One group strafed. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>GP</u>	<u>IB</u>	
Schleiden (comm. center)	33	9	24.5		Unobserved
Zulpich (comm. center)	32	31	81.5		Unobserved
Irlich nr Neuweid RR bridge	29	51	154.5		Very Good
Stadtkyll (comm. center)	35	32	93.0		Poor
Gerolstein M/Y	28	26	57.5	10.0	Fair - Good
Remagen Bridge	62	30	103.5		Unobserved
Prum (comm. center)	13	10	17.0		Fair - Good
Altenahr RR Bridge	30	Not Attacked			

Other Targets

Duppach		8	21.5		Good
Feusdorf		19	49.5		Good
St. Vith		11	30.5		Good
Vianden		1	2.5	.5	Unobserved
Docks at Coblenz		1	2.0		Unobserved
U/I T/Os		12	34.8		Unobserved
Totals	262	241	672.3	10.5	

Fourth Force

One group formation (38 B-17s - 3rd Division) dispatched against a communication center at Lunebach. 36 a/c dropped 90 tons GP on assigned target at 1235 - 1329 hours from 25,600 - 26,500 feet. All bombed visually. Weather: clear with slight ground haze. Flak: meager to moderate, accurate. Battle damage: 22 minor, 1 major. E/a opposition: nil. Losses: nil.

Fighter Support: two groups (104 P-51s) dispatched. Up 1111 - 1126 hours down 1550 - 1600 hours. 101 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. One Me-109 sighted south of Sedan - no combat. Claims: nil. Losses: 2 P-51s cat. "E".

S E C R E T

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Target</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacking</u>	<u>Tonnage</u> <u>GP</u>	<u>Results</u>
Lunbach (comm. center)	38	35	87.5	Very Good
<u>Other Target</u>				
Telm M/Y	—	<u>1</u>	<u>2.5</u>	Unobserved
Totals	38	36	90.0	

2. Fighter Escort

Ten groups (569 P-51s) dispatched to support four bomber forces. Up 1018 - 1126 hours, down 1512 - 1600 hours. 535 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. One Me-109 sighted south of Sedan but no combat. Two groups strafed. Claims: nil. Losses: 5 P-51s (2 to mechanical reasons, 2 cat. "E", 1 crashed in Channel, pilot safe).

Ground strafing claims as follows:

Destroyed

4 locomotives

Damaged

3 locomotives
10 self-propelled guns on flat cars
25 goods wagons
15 flat cars
11 cars and trucks

3. Fighter Sweeps

Three fighter groups (81 P-47s, 47 P-51s) dispatched on free lance support. Up 0800 - 0947 hours, down 1239 - 1439 hours. 107 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. One group reported a P-38, with U.S. markings, made several passes at formation west of Coblenz. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51 to unknown causes, pilot safe (this a/c from group based on continent).

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

Nil.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

34 a/c (4 B-17s, 3 Mosquitoes, 27 P-51s) dispatched on weather missions. 2 B-17s completed routine flights over the Atlantic, one completed a flight to the Azores and one from the Azores. 3 Mosquitoes completed special weather re-

connaissance over central Germany, Holland, Belgium and northeast France. 27 P-51s dispatched as weather scouts for bomber operation. 1 a/c returned early due to mechanical failure. No losses.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

8 P-47s dispatched on routine patrol. All a/c completed mission. No Losses.

8. Special Operations

10 a/c dispatched as follows:

2 B-24s dispatched on leaflet operations. Both a/c completed missions dropping leaflets over Belgium. No losses.

7 a/c (4 B-17s, 3 Mosquitoes) dispatched as screening force for bombers. All a/c completed mission. No losses.

1 Mosquito dispatched and completed special photo mission to Neu Ulm.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

No opposition was encountered by either the bombers or fighters; the only e/a seen by the fighters being one Me-109 south of Sedan at 17,000 feet. The e/a was lost in the haze when the fighters tried to engage. Third Force bombers report sighting four Me-262s at 1230 hours east of St. Vith at 25,000 feet and First Force bombers one Me-163 east of Frankfurt. None of these e/a attacked.

Weather conditions over the Ruhr-Frankfurt area were such that the GAF was probably grounded and although e/a could have taken off from base north of the Ruhr the enemy apparently did not choose to send them south to intercept heavy bombers.

2. Flak

Bingen	- meager to moderate, accurate.
Aschaffenburg	- meager, inaccurate.
Wittlich	- nil to meager, accurate.
Bitburg	- meager, accurate.
Bullay	- nil to meager, inaccurate.
Frankfurt	- moderate to intense, accurate, tracking and barrage.
Lunbach	- meager, fairly accurate, tracking.

3. Observations

Large factory protected by smoke-screen at 5015N-0715E.
M/Y at Pelm crowded with tank cars and freight cars.
M/Y at 5021N-0636E filled with freight cars.
At 5011N-0536E, four steel towers thought to be radar towers with evidence of considerable activity and tracks through snow.
Camouflaged area in small woods at 5015N-0833E with a maze of roads in it.

S E C R E T

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Grosslittgen - Fair Results

Approximately 100 GPs in village of Grosslittgen, 4 and $\frac{3}{4}$ miles northwest of Wittlich.

Bingen M/Y - Good to Very Good Results

Five concentrations of mixed GP and IB in and immediately adjacent to target area. At least 350 bursts seen in M/Y with 5 direct hits on RR station. Two small explosions could be seen and photographs taken late in attack show at least 5 fires in the area. Damage to central portion of the target will be severe. 2 concentrations of bombs fell into the town of Bingerbrück adjacent to the M/Y. Photographs late in attack showed at least 6 large fires burning. Severe damage to town area. Three concentrations could be seen adjacent to the west edge of this town in open areas and woodland. Approximately 150 bombs fell in the central portion of Bingen. Seven fires burning late in attack and damage should be severe. Approximately 100 bombs in open area $\frac{3}{4}$ mile north of target.

Duppach - Good Results

Secondary roads and village hits.

Feusdorf - Good Results

Bursts seen in the village. Secondary roads out with a tight pattern.

St. Vith - Good Results

Good pattern of GPs on the village and roads; bursts on rail lines.

Neuweid RR Bridge - Very Good Results

Bursts on the rail line and in the river adjacent. Excellent concentrated pattern squarely on the MPI with 1000 lb. bombs bursting on or very near the bridge and other bursts landing on the approaches.

Stadtkyll - Poor Results

Bursts are seen in open areas and on secondary roads.

Gerolstein - Fair to Good Results

Bursts seen through light haze, on and near the M/Y area.

Prum - Fair to Good Results

Tight pattern which fell short of the RR track (still seen to be out from previous bombing) and cut a primary road. Bursts in the village area.

SECRETAschaffenburg M/Y - Fair Results

Bombed by 2 groups using 250 GP bombs. One pattern touches the southern edge of the M/Y with a probable three hits on the station and four to five bursts in the yard. The balance of this pattern and parts of two others are in the built-up area of the town. Other patterns are seen 1.8 and 3 miles southwest of the yard, partly blanketing a possible small industrial plant. Scattered stray bursts are seen one to two miles west northwest of the target. Possible $\frac{1}{4}$ of the bombs from 4 squadrons fell in the river.

Lunebach Communications Center - Very Good Results

Village of Lunebach bombed by one group. Three patterns of 250 lb. GP successively blanketed the MPI and the village. Considerable field fortifications including trenches, machine gun emplacements and at least two dual purpose batteries are noted in the vicinity of the town. Small scale photos prevent any other identification of equipment.

Frankfurt M/Y - Very Good Results

Attacked by four groups, 7 of 12 squadrons placed bombs squarely in yard over sidings which were heavily loaded. Bombing of these 7 squadrons was extremely accurate and patterns were very compact with but little wastage in over-lap on either side. Rough estimate placed the number of goods wagons and flats in the yards and sidings in the city at around 3000 and of these 2000 were under the pattern noted. Four or five explosions noted; one of which was definitely ammunition and another appeared to be gasoline which burned for some time. Two more hits and one near miss were scattered on a large rail-over-rail bridge and the last pattern probably added 3 to 5 hits to this number. Photo coverage before the last three patterns fell showed about 20 small fires burning single cars. Hits also seen on wagons shops and the remains of 2 round-houses. Also two hits on barracks, probably for AA personnel, just north of the yard. The remaining patterns fell south of the yard, one on RR lines two miles southwest of the target, probably resulted in 10 - 15 hits on the lines and sidings and scattered hits in industrial and residential buildings. Another pattern strung across the RR junction 2 and $\frac{3}{4}$ miles south of the target with probably 8 - 10 hits on the lines and small sidings. Another pattern fell on a barge dock area one mile southeast of the target. Few hits on warehouse type buildings. Remainder of patterns in open country.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.

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b. A/C and C/C Available:

(1) 95th Group	:	39	A/C	50	A/C
		PFF 7	A/C	10	C/C
		M-H 5	A/C	10	C/C
(2) 100th Group	:	41	A/C	57	C/C
		PFF 7	A/C	5	C/C
		M-H 6	A/C	4	C/C
(3) 390th Group	:	41	A/C	55	C/C
		PFF 4	A/C	7	C/C
		M-H 4	A/C	7	C/C

c. A/C Scheduled to Take-Off:

- (1) 100th Group : Scheduled 35 A/C, plus 3 PFF A/C, plus 4 chaff A/C.
- (2) 390th Group : Scheduled 35 A/C, plus 3 PFF A/C.
- (3) 95th Group : Scheduled 35 A/C, plus 3 PFF A/C.

d. A/C Airborne:

- (1) 100th Group : All A/C scheduled, airborne.
- (2) 390th Group : 37 A/C airborne.
- (3) 95th Group : 30 A/C airborne.

e. A/C Abortive:

(1) 100th Group:

A/C 673 "E": 418 Sqdn. One engine went out. Landed away from base. No sortie. Pilot, Lt. Mikesch.

(2) 390th Group:

A/C 097 "D": 570th Sqdn. No. 1 engine out. No sortie. Pilot, Lt. Bouton.

A/C 956 "K": 568th Sqdn. No. 1 engine out. Sortie. Pilot, Lt. Skinner.

(3) 95th Group: None.

f. A/C Attacking, 100th Group:

		<u>Bombs Dropped</u>	
(1) Primary Target	:	12	240 x 250 lb. GP
Jettisoning	:	26	415 x 300 lb. GP
	:	1	1 x 300 lb. GP
(2) Method of Bombing	:		Visual
(3) Method of Release	:		Salvo

g. A/C Attacking, 390th Group:

		<u>Bombs Dropped</u>	
(1) Primary Target	:	33	559 x 250 lb. GP
Jettisoning	:	4	64 x 300 lb. GP
	:		60 x 250 lb. GP
	:		16 x 300 lb. GP
Returning	:	2	15 x 250 lb. GP

(2) Method of Bombing : Visual

(3) Method of Release : Salvo

h. A/C Attacking, 95th Group

Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary Target	:	29	671 x 250 lb. GP
Jettisoning	:	1	20 x 250 lb. GP
	:	1	9 x 250 lb. GP

(2) Method of Bombing : Visual

(3) Method of Release : Salvo

1. A/C Missing: None.

3. Narrative of the Attack:

a. Navigation, 13th "A" Group, 100th "A", "B" and "C" Squadrons:

(1) Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 100th Group made a normal take-off and climbed to assembly altitude. The Group was formed without difficulty. Prior to departing for Buncher 28 the Command Pilot requested that the first point of the assembly be made two minutes early in order to be ahead of the other Groups in the Wing. The Wing assembly line was as briefed. All points were reached two minutes early. The Division assembly was completed at 1025, three minutes early, at Southwold.

(2) Route:

The route across the Channel was as briefed, however, due to a wind shift the Group arrived at the Continental Coast 6 minutes early. Since emphasis was placed on the fact that the Groups would not fly over Brussels, the 13th "A" Group made an "S" turn to the south of Brussels and returned to about two miles south of the briefed route. Control point No. 3 was made good. At this point flak was experienced from the St. Vith's defenses so the Group began to bear to the south of course in order to avoid flak along the route across the battle line and to the Pre-IP. Due to slow rate of climb the lead navigators were not able to get a very accurate check of the winds at altitude since bombing altitude was not reached until 0800E. The Squadrons peeled off at the Pre-IP as planned. "S"ing enroute to the IP, coupled with a high wind velocity, caused the lead Squadron to overshoot the IP several miles to the south, making it necessary to come in on another heading. Due to these high winds excessive drift was experienced on the bomb run. After bombs away the Group was reformed at the RP. The Group was slightly south of the briefed route on return, mainly to avoid the flak defenses enroute to the target. The briefed course was intercepted at Ghent. The continental coast was recrossed at 1438.

(3) Weather:

Fog persisted over the bases at take-off time, reported tops at 300 ft. Visibility above the fog layer during assembly was unrestricted. Over the channel and continent

to CP3 the Groups reported a 10/10 low strata cumulus layer. After leaving CP3 the clouds became scattered and broken affording good view of the ground. Prior to reaching the pre-IP the undercast dissipated and afforded a good view of the ground for a great distance. The target could be seen from the IP without difficulty. Winds were somewhat stronger than briefed, causing excessive drift on the bomb run.

(4) Navigational Difficulties: None.

(5) Remarks:

Navigation was good.

b. Navigation, 13th "B" Group, 390th "A", "B" and "C" Squadrons:

(1) Assembly:

All Squadrons took off and assembled without difficulty. The initial Wing assembly point at Buncher 28 was reached at 0955 hours and at the briefed altitude of 9,500 feet. At that point the Group fell behind 13th "A" Group, and remained in position during the remainder of the assembly. The coast was departed four minutes early.

(2) Route:

The continental coast was reached six minutes early. Along the route into the target, there was considerable "S"ing by the Wing leader to allow rear Groups to catch up to the Division. The formation averaged five miles south of course. By arrangement via VHF, it was decided to pass over the briefed IP before turning onto the bomb run. This was accomplished and the peel-off by Squadrons was made six miles south of the briefed IP. A sharp right turn was made at bombs away. The return route was uneventful.

(3) Weather:

There was a persistent ground fog over England during assembly. Over the channel and part of the continent, 3/10 low stratus clouds limited visibility. CAVU conditions prevailed over the target area. On the return route, essentially the same weather conditions were encountered.

(4) Navigational Difficulties: None.

(5) Remarks:

Navigation was good.

c. 13th "C" Group, 95th "A", "B" and "C" Squadrons:

(1) Assembly:

Thick ground fog that came over the field during the take-off made it impossible for eight of the Group's A/C to become airborne. All the others took off at intervals greater than usual due to this fog. Assembly was made at correct altitude but forming was slow so the Group did not join the Division column until CPl was reached. Here they fell in their proper Division order.

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13th "C" Group:

Three PFF A/C were dispatched. 95th "B" Squadron did not operate satisfactorily due to an inoperative flux-gate compass. Signals were also weak. Bombing was visual. No H2X runs were attempted.

e. 100th Group, "A" Squadron:

(1) Air Leader:	Major Wallace	Navigator :	Lt. Kimball
Pilot :	Capt. Brown	Asst. Nav.:	Lt. Roesel
Co-Pilot :		Mickey Op.:	Lt. Rentz
		Bombardier:	Lt. Titley

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) Primary Target :	12	240 x 250 lb. GP
(b) Bombing Altitude :	25,000'	
(c) Time of Release :	1317	

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Without the 13th GBW knowledge the Groups agreed to overshoot the IP 8 miles. The bombardier was able to pick up the target approximately 5 miles from the BRL. After pre-setting 24° of drift, the bombardier experienced some difficulty killing the rest of the drift. When bombs were released, there was 30° of drift registered in the sight and synchronization was good. At the BRL, synchronization was excellent and bubbles level. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 335°. C-1 autopilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) Photo-Intelligence Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell in the extreme E portion of the M/Y, which was loaded with at least 2500 wagons. Later photographs show about 50 craters in the yards and 4 hits on the fly over. The portion of the M/Y hit by this Squadron was lightly loaded. Cars, nevertheless, were derailed, and many craters were made on through tracks. Four fires were started in the yards.

(b) Bomb Pattern :	1920' L x 2340' W
(c) Bombing Errors :	Range : 340' S
	Deflection: 1700' R
	Radial : 1790'

(d) Percent of Bombs Within
 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: 1% and 51%

(e) Bombing Results: Good.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 334: Salvo switch defective, part of the bombs had to be trained.
 A/C 397: do.

f. 100th Group, "B" Squadron:

(1) Air Leader:	Major Martin	Navigator :	Lt. Juhlin
Pilot :	Capt. Jones	Asst. Nav.:	
Co-Pilot :		Mickey Op.:	Lt. Rhode

(2) A/C Attacking:

		<u>Bombs Dropped</u>
(a) Primary Target	: 13	208 x 300 lb. GP
(b) Bombing Altitude	: 26,000'	
(c) Time of Release	: 1318	

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After over shooting the IP 8 miles, the bombardier took up a heading of 353° to the target. 120° of drift was preset into the bomb sight, but before the bombs were released a remaining 14° had to be cranked out. The bombardier experienced very little difficulty, excepting a change of airspeed on the bomb run. The visibility was excellent and C-1 auto-pilot worked very well. When bombs were released synchronization was excellent and bubbles were level. Bombardier was uncertain throughout the bomb run because of the excessive drift registered in the bomb sight.

(4) Photo-Intelligence Report:

- (a) Since both 390th "A" Squadron and this Squadron released abreast of each other simultaneously, it is impossible to segregate the bombs belonging to each. The compact pattern covered the coach building shop and the center of the sorting sidings. Stray bombs extended themselves into a heavy flak battery position, where many near misses were made on the guns and two direct hits in the centers of two buildings probably accommodating personnel for the batteries. There were two small explosions, and later photographs show burning goods wagons. At least 120 bombs fell on the tracks in the center and to the right (East).
- (b) Bomb Pattern : 1920' L x 1700' W.
- (c) Bombing Errors : Range : 0
 Deflection: 300' R
 Radial : 300'
- (d) Percent of Bombs Within
 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: 89% and 100%
- (e) Bombing Results: Excellent.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 505: Right bomb bay would not salvo, had to be released in train.

g. 100th Group, "C" Squadron:

(1) Air Leader:	Capt. Gibbens	Navigator :	Lt. Wilde
Pilot :	Lt. Williams	Asst. Nav.:	
Co-Pilot :		Mickey Op.:	Lt. Stropp
		Bombardier:	Lt. Lockhart

(2) A/C Attacking:

		<u>Bombs Dropped</u>
(a) Primary Target	: 13	207 x 300 lb. GP
Jettisoning	: 1	1 x 300 lb. GP

(b) Bombing Altitude : 24,800'

(c) Time of Release : 1319

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 351°, an IP was made good at 49°54'N, 09°45'E. After picking up the assigned MPI, the bombardier experienced difficulty with high Squadron, which was flying directly above them with bomb bay doors open. An "S" turn was made and the air speed was decreased from 150 mph to 140 mph. The bombardier made the necessary corrections, allowing for the 10 mph. decrease in airspeed, and quickly resynchronized. Synchronization was excellent and bubbles level when bombs were released. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) Photo-Intelligence Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell in the center and the left (west) portion of the M/Y, some of them disappearing in the smoke at the center of the yards. Two pronounced explosions occurred, probably from direct hits on wagons loaded with ammunition or oil near the entrance to the storage sidings. Later photographs show four fires burning from goods wagons, and a total of at least eight from bombs dropped by the first four Squadrons over. There are at least 40 bursts visible on the tracks and goods wagons in the storage and the holding sidings.

(b) The damage accomplished by all Squadrons of the 100th Group was of a severe and extensive nature.

(c) Bomb Pattern : 1450' L x 1450' W.

(d) Bombing Errors :
 Range : 375' S
 Deflection: 330' R
 Radial : 495'

(e) Percent of Bombs Within
 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: 87% and 100%.

(f) Bombing Results: Good.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 459: Rack malfunction, 1 bomb jettisoned in Channel.

h. 390th Group, "A" Squadron:

(1) Air Leader:	Maj. Pennybaker	Navigator :	Lt. Buhrmaster
Pilot :	Lt. Briggs	Asst. Nav.:	Lt. Nordling
Co-Pilot :		Mickey Op.:	Lt. Pearlunas
		Bombardier:	Lt. Martin

(2) A/C Attacking:

			<u>Bombs Dropped</u>
(a) Primary Target	:	11	203 x 250 lb. GP
Jettisoning	:	1	20 x 250 lb. GP
Returning	:	2	15 x 250 lb. GP

(b) Bombing Altitude : 24,800'

(c) Time of Release : 1319

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 352°, the bombardier picked up the assigned MPI without difficulty and synchronized. The bomb run was long, visibility excellent, and C-1 auto-pilot worked very well. The synchronization was excellent and the bubbles level when bombs were released. The Squadron was flying a collision course with the 100th "B" Squadron and both Squadrons released simultaneously.

(4) Photo-Intelligence Report:

(a) Since both 100th "B" Squadron and this Squadron released abreast of each other simultaneously, it is impossible to segregate the bombs belonging to each. The compact pattern covered the coach building shop and the center of the sorting sidings. Stray bombs extended themselves into a heavy flak battery position, where many near misses were made on the guns and two direct hits in the centers of two buildings probably accommodating personnel for the batteries. There were two small explosions, and later photographs show burning goods wagons. At least 120 bombs fell on the tracks in the center and to the right (east).

(b) Bomb Pattern : 1920' L x 1700' W.

(c) Bombing Errors : Range : (0)
 Deflection: 300' R
 Radial : 300'

(d) Percent of Bombs Within
 1000' & 2000' of the MPI: 89% and 100%

(e) Bombing Results: Excellent.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 447: Rack malfunction, 8 bombs returned to base.
 A/C 472: Rack malfunction, 7 bombs returned to base.
 A/C 097: Aborted, 20 bombs jettisoned in the Wash.

i. 390th Group, "B" Squadron:

(1) Air Leader: Capt. Branner Navigator: Lt. Lewis
 Pilot : Lt. Morris Asst. Nav.:
 Co-Pilot : Mickey Op.: Lt. Flanagan
 Bombardier: Lt. Kellerhouse

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) Primary Target : 12 238 x 250 lb. GP
 Jettisoning : 1 20 x 250 lb. GP

(b) Bombing Altitude : 27,000'

(c) Time of Release : 1320

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 326°, the bombardier picked up the target without difficulty and synchronized. Approximately two minutes from the BRL the AFCE failed. The run was continued on PDI, but the bombardier reported

that it was too late to make a run on the assigned target. The bombardier then reported "that the bombs were dropped anyway, hoping to hit in the target area." It should be realized by lead bombardiers that there is only one way of hitting in the target area, and that is by synchronizing. The chances of "hoping bombs" in the target area are one in one million. When unable to synchronize on the primary target, go to the secondary target.

(4) Photo-Intelligence Report:

- (a) The bombs from this Squadron fell approximately 4-1/2 miles left and short (WSW) of the target in woods. One small building in this area was demolished, and there were three close misses, possibly one hit, on a railway.
- (b) Bomb Pattern : 1400' L x 2165' W.
- (c) Bombing Errors : Gross.
- (d) Percent of Bombs Within
1000' & 2000' of the MPI: 0% and 0%.
- (e) Bombing Results: Nil.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 956: Aborted, 20 bombs jettisoned at 50°00'N,
06°43'E.

j. 390th Group, "C" Squadron:

(1) Air Leader:	Navigator :	Lt. Welsh
Pilot : Lt. Bore	Asst. Nav.:	
Co-Pilot : Lt. Stene	Mickey Op.:	Lt. Conroy
	Bombardier:	Lt. O'Brien

(2) A/C Attacking:

		<u>Bombs Dropped</u>	
(a) Primary Target	: 10	118 x 250 lb. GP	
Jettisoning	: 2	64 x 300 lb. GP	
		20 x 250 lb. GP	
		16 x 300 lb. GP	
(b) Bombing Altitude	: 24,600'		
(c) Time of Release	: 1320-1/2		

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After the maneuver at the IP, the bombardier picked up the target and took over. The bombardier proceeded to set up course and rate until approximately 7 miles from the target, where the pilot had to take over in order to avoid a collision with an unknown Squadron. By the time the bombardier regained control of the A/C, there was little time with which to synchronize. He reset his cross-hairs on the target, leveled his bubbles and released his bombs. When bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 352°, synchronization for course was good, but rate was off.

(4) Photo-Intelligence Report:

in the iced river, across a small M/Y, on and close to residences, and on a large M/Y just SE (short and left) of the assigned target. There were only about 3 bursts, however, on these yards.

- (b) Bomb Pattern : Too irregular.
- (c) Bombing Errors : Range : 1360' S
Deflection: 1235' R
Radial : 1850'
- (d) Percent of Bombs Within
1000' and 2000' of the API: 10% and 65%
- (e) Bombing Results: Nil.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 846: 20 bombs were jettisoned at 50°15'N,
08°32'E.

A/C 831: Unable to open doors in time to bomb
primary, 16 bombs jettisoned at
50°17'N, 08°30'E.

1. 95th "C" Group, "A" Squadron:

- (1) Air Leader: Col. Shuck Navigator : Lt. Van Patten
Pilot : Capt. Hendrick- Asst. Nav.:
Co-Pilot : son Mickey Op.: Lt. Finfinger
Bombardier: Lt. Jones

(2) A/C Attacking:

		<u>Bombs Dropped</u>	
(a) Primary Target	:	11	211 x 250 lb. GP
Returning	:	1	9 x 250 lb. GP

(b) Bombing Altitude : 24,550'

(c) Time of Release : 1322

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 344°, in Squadron formation, the bombardier experienced no difficulty in picking up the target. He then proceeded to synchronize and at the BRL, synchronization was good and bubbles were level. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) Photo-Intelligence Report:

(a) With the exception of perhaps 15, every bomb visible in SAV photographs fell on the heavily loaded sorting sidings in the M/Y. The damage inflicted to goods wagons and the tracks should be considered severe.

(b) Bomb Pattern : 1860' L x 1690' W.

(c) Bombing Errors : Range : 0
Deflection: 0
Radial : 0

(d) Percent of Bombs Within
1000' & 2000' of the MPI: 100%

(e) Bombing Results: Excellent

(5) Bombing Malfunction

A/C 7783: Rack Malfunction. 9 bombs returned to base.

1. 95th Group, "C" Squadron:

(1) Air Leader: Navigator : Lt. Murray
 Pilot : Lt. Braund Mickey Op.: Lt. Mitchell
 Co-Pilot : Lt. Baird Bombardier: Lt. Davis

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) Primary Target	:	7	140 x 250 lb. GP
Jettisoning	:	1	20 x 250 lb. GP
(b) Bombing Altitude	:	22,600'	
(c) Time of Release	:	1324-1/2	

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 310° , the M/O set up the course. The bombardier then took over and proceeded to synchronize after having preset 19° of drift. The only difficulty encountered was in killing the remaining drift. At the BRL synchronization was good. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run. Bombs released on a magnetic heading of 345° .

(4) Photo-Intelligence Report:

- (a) The bombs from this Squadron fell in two distinct patterns, the lower one covering the heavily loaded holding sidings, the upper one partially covering the heavily loaded storage sidings. There were at least 60 direct hits on the tracks and sidings in this area. Another fire, presumably from a goods ammunition wagon, was started.
- (b) At least 13 bombs from one A/C fell about 1 mile beyond the target in fields.
- (c) Bomb Pattern : 1850' L x 1210' W.
- (d) Bombing Errors : Range : 80' S
 Deflection: 485' R
 Radial : 525'
- (e) Percent of Bombs Within
 1000' & 2000' of the AP: 80% and 100%
- (f) Bombing Results: Very Good.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 2450: Could not hold formation. 20 bombs jettisoned on pilots orders.

m. 95th Group, "B" Squadron:

(1) Air Leader: Lt. Stdesburg Navigator : Lt. Pieper
 Pilot : Lt. Savage Asst. Nav.:
 Co-Pilot : Mickey Op.: Lt. Feeley
 Bombardier: Lt. Seferian

(2) A/C Attacking:

Bombs Dropped

- (a) Primary Target : 11 220 x 250 lb. GP
 (b) Bombing Altitude : 25,300'
 (c) Time of Release : 1325

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 333°, the bombardier picked up the target without difficulty. After having preset 17° of drift, he alined himself with a known check point in the vicinity of the target, and proceeded to synchronize for the remaining drift. Excessive smoke over the assigned MPI, necessitated shifting his aiming point to a visible portion of the target area. At the BRL synchronization was good and bubbles were level. C-1 auto-pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) Photo-Intelligence Report:

- (a) The bombs from this Squadron fell on the east portion of the M/Y in the same area partially covered by the pattern of 100th "A" Squadron. Excluding approximately 20, all of the bombs fell on the tracks and goods wagons east (right) of the fly-over in the goods station section and west (right) of it in the goods sidings. All exits from the sorting sidings were hit. There were at least 3 direct hits and a dozen close misses on the fly-over. The damage caused by this Squadron must also be considered of a severe nature.
- (b) Bomb Pattern: 1625' L x 2210' W
- (c) Bombing Errors: Range : 300' S
 Deflection: 130' L
 Radial : 350'
- (d) Percent of Bombs Within
 1000' & 2000' of the AP: 88% and 100%.
- (e) Bombing Results: Excellent.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions: None.

4. Mission Camera Report:

- a. The 95th Group installed one scope and 9 vertical cameras, 0 and 8 of which took pictures:

A/C 7376, "C" Squadron: Failed to take-off.

- b. The 100th Group installed 9 vertical cameras, 8 of which took pictures:

One A/C with a K-21 camera: Fuse Blown.

- c. The 390th Group installed 3 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 2 and 8 of which took pictures:

One K-22 camera: Intervalometer failed.

One PFF A/C with scope camera: Gain too high.

5. Communications:

- a. Major Wallace led the 13th Wing. VHF SOP was violated in that the Wing leader instructed the other two Group leaders to stand by on Channel "B". Discipline was very good during assembly and until the IP, where more than the usual chatter started. The 95th in the air, and "Bezil" on the ground were reported as the only serious violators. In the Target area, one 95th Group A/C called a leader to say that he might have to drop out of the formation because he was considering feathering a prop and if he did not to expect him to be able to stay in formation.
- b. Communications between Wings and with "Arrowswift" and "Kodak" were satisfactory. Contact with the assigned fighters was not made as they were thirty minutes late in taking off and were diverted by the ground sector. Other fighters were contacted after crossing the enemy lines.

c. Strike Reports:


13A	PA2	1317
13B	PA5	1318
13C	PA5	1322

6. Controller's Log:

- a. 13th CBW alerted at 1840 hours.
- b. The following information was received from 3rd BD, at 2300 hours:
- (1) Order of Wings.
 - (2) General area of targets.
 - (3) Zero hour.
 - (4) Force required.
 - (5) R.B.A.
 - (6) Bomb load.
- c. Received the following information at 0120 hours:
- (1) Plan "A".
 - (2) Targets (General)
- d. Received the following information at 0200 hours:
- (1) Targets
- e. At 0245 hours, routes for Plan "A" were received.
- f. The following information was received at 0300 hours:
- (1) Plan "B"
 - (2) Targets
 - (3) Train Interval
- g. The corrected route for Plan "B" and Order of Wings was received at 0335 hours.
- h. Notified at 0545 hours that Plan "A" was scrubbed and ten minutes would be added to Wing and Division assembly times.
- i. Corrected Plan "B" route received at 0510 hours.
- j. 3rd BD advised that mission should be scrubbed for Groups

- k. Received Intelligence Annex to 3rd BD F.O. 531 at 0230.
- l. Received route from 3rd BD Navigator.
- m. Sent Advance Warning to 13 CBW F.O. No. 531 Plan "A" at 0245.
- n. Sent Annex No. 1 to 13 CBW F.O. No. 531 Plan "A" at 0315.
- o. Sent Adv. Wrng. to 13 CBW F.O. 352 Plan "B" at 0350.
- p. Received Annex No. 2 to 3rd BD F.O. No. 531 at 0355.
- q. Received Timings for Plan "A" from 3rd BD at 0425.
- r. Sent Annex 1 to Advance Warning to 13 CBW F.O. 352, Plan "B" at 0510.
- s. Received 3rd BD F.O. No. 531 plan "A" and Annex No. 1 at 0525.
- t. Received 3rd BD F.O. No. 532 Plan "B" at 0700.
- u. Sent 13 CBW F.O. No. 532, Plan "B" at 0700.

For the Commanding Officer:



GENE C. SMITH,
Major, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.