

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H)  
APO 559

Date 24 December 1944  
13 CBW FO 526  
13 CBW OPS 247  
3 BD FO 526

**SUBJECT: Tactical Report (LANDING GROUNDS IN FRANKFURT AREA)**

**TO : Commanding Officer, 25th Bomb Group (T), APO 559**

**1. Information Concerning the Targets:**

- a. The primary targets (visual) for today were the grass Landing Grounds in the Frankfurt Area.
  - (1) The Biblis Landing Ground, 7 miles NE of Worms, Germany, was to be post-holed by the 13A and B Groups.
  - (2) The Zellhausen Landing Ground, 7 miles SSE of Hanau, Germany, was to be post-holed by the 13C, D, E, and F Groups.
- b. A large portion of the Luftwaffe Ground Support Aircraft recently moved up to airfields in this area, and both of these fields are now reported to be the base of one Gruppe of single engine fighters.
- c. The secondary targets (visual or with H2X Technique) for today were Railway Facilities in the Frankfurt Area as follows:
  - (1) The Railway Traffic Centre at Pforzheim, Germany, was the target for the 13A and B Groups.
  - (2) The Railway Workshops one mile WSW of Kaiserslautern, Germany, was the target for the 13C, D, E, and F Groups.

**2. Planning and Execution of the Mission:**

**a. Group Order and Strength:**

- (1) 4 A, B, C, D, E, F and G Groups: 21 x 13 A/C Sqdns
  - (a) 487 Group 3 Squadrons
  - (b) 94 Group 3 Squadrons
  - (c) 94, 486 and 487 Groups 1 Squadron Each
  - (d) 385 Group 3 Squadrons
  - (e) 385, 447 and 385 Groups 1 Squadron Each
  - (f) 486 Group 3 Squadrons
  - (g) 447 Group 3 Squadrons

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- |     |                                       |   |
|-----|---------------------------------------|---|
| (2) | 13 A, B, C, D, E and F Groups         | 15 x 13 A/C Squadrons<br>Plus 2 Squadrons of<br>1st Division  |
| (a) | 390 Group                             | 3 Squadrons   |
| (b) | 390 and 100 Groups                    | 2 Squadrons of 390<br>and 1 Squadron of 100                   |
| (c) | 100 Group                             | 3 Squadrons   |
| (d) | 95 Group                              | 3 Squadrons   |
| (e) | 95 and 100 Groups                     | 2 Squadrons of 95 and<br>1 Squadron of 100                    |
| (f) | 351 and 384 Groups<br>of 1st Division | 2 Squadrons Composed<br>of 18 A/C of 351 and<br>13 A/C of 384 |
| (3) | 45 A, B, C, D and E Groups            | 15 x 13 A/C Squadrons   |
| (a) | 388 Group                             | 3 Squadrons   |
| (b) | 388 and 96 Groups                     | 2 Squadrons of 388 and<br>1 Squadron of 96                    |
| (c) | 96 Group                              | 3 Squadrons   |
| (d) | 452 Group                             | 3 Squadrons   |
| (e) | 452 and 493 Groups                    | 2 Squadrons of 452 and<br>1 Squadron of 493                   |
| (4) | 93 A, B, C and D Groups               | 12 x 13 A/C Squadrons   |
| (a) | 34 Group                              | 3 Squadrons   |
| (b) | 490 Group                             | 3 Squadrons   |
| (c) | 493 Group                             | 3 Squadrons   |
| (d) | 493, 490 and 34 Groups                | 1 Squadron Each   |

b. A/C and C/C Available:

(1)	95 Group	ME 52 A/C	61 C/C
		NE 42 A/C	51 C/C
		PFF 10 A/C	8 C/C
		MH 7 A/C	8 C/C
(2)	100 Group	ME 53 A/C	59 C/C
		NE 48 A/C	54 C/C
		PFF 9 A/C	8 C/C
		MH 7 A/C	6 C/C
(3)	390 Group	ME 51 A/C	62 C/C
		NE 46 A/C	57 C/C
		PFF 7 A/C	8 C/C
		MH 5 A/C	7 C/C

e. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:

- |     |           |                            |
|-----|-----------|----------------------------|
| (1) | 95 Group  | 60 A/C Including 5 PFF A/C |
| (2) | 100 Group | 60 A/C Including 5 PFF A/C |

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(3) 390 Group 60 A/C Including 5 PFF A/C

d. A/C Airborne:

(1) 95 Group All A/C Scheduled Plus 2 W/W A/C

(2) 100 Group All A/C Scheduled Plus 1 W/W A/C

(3) 390 Group 59 A/C Plus 6 W/W A/C

e. A/C Failing to Take Off:

(1) 390 Group

A/C 375: 571 Squadron S - No manifold pressure in #1 and #3 engines - Pilot Lt. O'Conner - No sortie

f. A/C Abortive:

(1) 100 Group

A/C 681: 349 Squadron V - #3 supercharger out - Pilot Lt. Heironimus - No sortie

(2) 390 Group

A/C 206: 571 Squadron P - Runaway prop #4 engine - Pilot Lt. Stone - No sortie

A/C 984: 569 Squadron K - #4 turbo out - Pilot Lt. Drinkwater - No sortie

g. A/C Missing:

(1) 95 Group: 2 A/C

(2) 100 Group: None

(3) 390 Group: 3 A/C

h. A/C Attacking - 390A Group:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary	30	1042 x 100 LB GP
Jettisoning	8	250 x 100 LB GP
Returning	None	

(2) Method of Bombing: Visual

(3) Method of Release: 100' Train

i. A/C Attacking - 390B Comp Group - 100D Squadron:

Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary	35	1297 x 100 LB GP
Jettisoning	1	21 x 100 LB GP
Returning	1	38 x 100 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Visual

(3) Method of Release: 100' Train

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j. A/C Attacking - 100C Group: Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary	24	856 x 100 LB GP
Secondary	12	451 x 100 LB GP
Jettisoning	1	1 x 100 LB GP
Returning	2	76 x 100 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Visual

(3) Method of Release: 100' Train

k. A/C Attacking - 95D Group: Bombs Dropped

(1) Primary	34	1221 x 100 LB GP
Jettisoning	3	63 x 100 LB GP
Returning	4	84 x 100 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Visual

(3) Method of Release: 100' Train

l. A/C Attacking - 95E Comp Group - 100E Squadron:

		Bombs Dropped
(1) Primary	12	450 x 100 LB GP
TO	2	76 x 100 LB GP
Secondary	12	422 x 100 LB GP
Jettisoning	10	380 x 100 LB GP
Returning	1	34 x 100 LB GP

(2) Method of Bombing: Visual

(3) Method of Release: 100' Train

3. Narrative of the Attack:

a. Navigation - 13A Group - 390 A, B, C Squadrons:

(1) Assembly:

The three Squadrons from the 390 Group made a normal take off and climbed to 7000 feet, assembly altitude. The 13A Group was formed over the field with difficulty. The Wing assembly was completed at Buncher 12, at 1058, 2 minutes late. The Division assembly was completed at 5158-0121, at 1113, one minute late; altitude 7000 feet.

(2) Route:

The Continental Coast was crossed at 5112-0251, at 1151, seven minutes late. Timings late because wind had shifted to the East-Southeast. The briefed course was followed very closely over the Continent, however, in vicinity of the frontlines evasive action was taken to avoid flak. The IP was identified by lead navigator by means of pilotage. Ground haze along bomb run made it difficult to discern ground objects. The Group was reformed at RP. The return route was essentially as briefed. The Continental Coast was recrossed at 1610.

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(3) Weather:

CAVU conditions existed during assembly. While crossing the Channel, low scattered clouds were reported, no high or middle clouds were encountered. Over the Continent, haze along ground was reported to be heavy near target making target identification difficult. Average winds obtained were from 90 degrees at 40 knots.

(4) Navigational Difficulties:

None were reported.

(5) Remarks:

Navigation was good. Navigators should give more aid to the Bombardier on the bomb run.

b. Navigation - 13B Group - 390 D, E and 100 A Squadrons:

(1) Assembly:

The two Squadrons from the 390 Group and the 100D Squadron made a normal take off and climbed to 7000 feet, assembly altitude. The Group was assembled without difficulty. The Group arrived at Buncher 11, start of Wing assembly at 1048 on time, altitude 7000 feet. The Division assembly was completed at 5203-0126 at 1116, behind the 13A Group.

(2) Route:

The route was as briefed on the course in, "S"ing slightly to avoid the battle line flak near St. Vith and Malmedy. The Lead Navigator had some difficulty in making the turn prior to the IP due to "S"ing in order to maintain proper Group interval. Some interference was experienced at the Pre-IP where the 13B Group was forced to make a large turn due to interference by another Group forging into the Division Column. The IP was made good by the Lead Navigator. The 100D Squadron had an accidental release at 5010-0923, 20 miles short of the primary target. The Group was reformed at the RP without difficulty. The 13B followed the 13A Group on route out. Continental Coast was recrossed at 1615.

(3) Weather:

Same as reported in 13A.

(4) Difficulties:

"S"ing along route to IP caused some difficulty in making good approach on the IP. Low haze made pilotage somewhat difficult on bomb run.

(5) Remarks:

Navigation was satisfactory.

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**e. Navigation - 13C Group - 100 A, B, C Squadrons:**

**(1) Assembly:**

The three Squadrons from the 100 Group made a normal take off and climbed to 10,000 feet, assembly altitude. The Group was formed without difficulty. The Wing assembly was completed at 1100 on time. The Division assembly was completed at Felixstowe, 1 minute late. The 13C was above and abreast the 13B Group.

**(2) Route:**

The Continental Coast was made good, 6 minutes late due to wind shift. The route in over the Continent was flown essentially as briefed with no serious deviation from course. A persistent ground haze cut down visibility somewhat along the route; however, pilotage could be done over most of the route. IP was made good. 100A and C Squadrons bombed the primary target visually. 100B Squadron leader was hit by flak on the bomb run and was unable to drop on the primary target. The Squadron then made a visual run on the secondary target and joined the 13C Group again without difficulty. The route out was essentially as briefed. The Continental Coast was recrossed at 1614.

**(3) Weather:**

Same as experienced by 13A and 13B.

**(4) Difficulties:**

None.

**(5) Remarks:**

Navigation was good.

**d. Navigation - 13D Group - 95 A, B, C Squadrons:**

**(1) Assembly:**

The three Squadrons of the 13D Group took off on time and made a normal assembly at 10,000 feet. The Group was at Buncher 11, first point of Wing assembly, on time. All points of Wing and Division assembly were made good and on time with the exception of Control Point 1 which was crossed 1/2 minute late. The Group was in proper position behind 13C at this time.

**(2) Route:**

From CP 2 to 0600 East the route was flown essentially as briefed. The Group was following the Division stream and by so doing the High Squadron caught some accurate flak South of Coblenz. Meagre accurate unplotted flak had previously been seen when the battle line was crossed. A track slightly North of

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course was flown until the IP was reached. Prior to the IP the Low Squadron, believing themselves to be in better position, asked and obtained permission from Group Leader to go in second on the bomb run. The Lead Squadron overshot the IP slightly but a successful bomb run was made. Haze and a run directly into the sun made target identification difficult. The 95C and 95B proceeded on the bomb run but shortly before bombs away the High Squadron was directly above the Low Squadron. When they were clear of each other they made last second corrections and dropped but bombs missed target completely. At the IP confusion was caused by the large number of planes in the near vicinity all trying to make an unusually sharp left turn. As a result the High Squadron lost contact with the Lead and proceeded on course alone. The Lead and Low Squadrons deemed it advisable to go West of Kaiserlautern and later corrected their heading to get back on course. At 4845-0738 the High Squadron Leader had trouble with his flow off gasoline and had his second element leader take over the lead of the Squadron. The Leader then remained at altitude for a considerable time to take advantage of the winds and high air speeds. The Group was reformed satisfactorily at this point and stayed on course except for minor deviations all the way back to the base.

(3) Weather:

Weather was the same that was encountered by the preceding Groups of the Wing.

(4) Difficulties:

Haze and an up sun run were the main difficulties. A sharp turn at the IP made maneuvering very hard.

(5) Remarks:

IP and target run could have been improved if position of the sun had been given more consideration than direction of the wind.

e. Navigation - 13E Group - 95 D, E and 100 E Squadrons:

(1) Assembly:

The three Squadrons of the 13E made a normal take off and climbed to assembly altitude. The 100E Squadron assembled with the 95 Group without difficulty forming the Group at 10,000 feet. The 13E Group fell in behind the 13D Group and followed them throughout the assembly route. The English Coast was crossed at 1119.

(2) Route:

The route was similar to that made good by the 13D

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Group. The Group made good the IP. On the bomb run haze prevented 95D and 95E Squadrons from bombing due to poor target identification, however, the 100 E was able to drop on the primary. The Group Leader then turned off the target and made a run on the secondary assisted by H2X. The Group overshot the second turn after the target by about 15 miles. The Lead Navigator corrected back to the briefed route shortly thereafter. The Continental Coast was recrossed at 1620.

(3) Weather:

Same as reported by other Groups.

(4) Navigational Difficulties:

To avoid congestion the 13E Group had to remain 6 to 8 miles North of course. Low haze and sun on bomb run made pilotage difficult.

(5) Remarks:

Navigation was satisfactory.

PFF Narrative:

390 Group:

Seven PFF aircraft were dispatched. Three sets (390A, 390B, 390D) failed to operate properly. The main difficulty with these sets was poor range and poor definition of scope returns. All bombing was visual; no H2X runs were attempted.

100 Group:

Six PFF aircraft were dispatched. Three sets (100A Dep, 100B, 100D) failed to operate properly. 100A and 100B went out completely. 100D set had an erratic azimuth stabilization which caused the scope returns to constantly shift. All bombing was visual with an H2X course assist in 100A and 100E Squadrons.

95 Group:

Six PFF aircraft were dispatched. One set, 95E, failed completely. Scope returns were strong in the remaining five aircraft. Bombing was visual with H2X assist. The target was identified on the scope at a range of twenty miles.

f. 390 Group - A Squadron:

(1)	Air Leader	Lt. Col. Jones	Nav	Lt. Wey
	Pilot	Capt. Chandler	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/G	Capt. Houser
			Bombardier	Capt. Billingt



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- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- |             |      |                 |
|-------------|------|-----------------|
| (a) Primary | 10   | 380 x 100 LB GP |
| Jettisoning | 2    | 76 x 100 LB GP  |
| Returning   | None |                 |
- (b) Bombing Altitude: 22000'
- (c) Time of Release: 1419½

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 207 degrees, the bombardier experienced difficulty picking up the target because of sun and haze. The target was picked up approximately 40 seconds from the BRL. The bombardier proceeded to synchronize, but the rate moved very sluggishly. The telescope indices also seemed somewhat slow. When bombs were released the rate synchronization was very poor. The Lead A/C carried no bombsight cover, consequently, when the plexiglass was struck by flak, the intruding air may have frozen the rate end of the bombsight.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

- (a) The bombs from this Squadron fell 8070' over and 3780' to the right of the MPI.
- (b) Bomb Pattern: Cannot Be Separated From C's Pattern
- (c) Bombing Errors: Gross
- (d) Bombing Results: Nil

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 470: Jettisoned 38 bombs on town at 5010N, 0700E, bursts seen in town.

A/C 521: Jettisoned 38 bombs on Driess, 5015, 0650, bursts seen in town.

g. 390 Group - B Squadron:

- (1) Air Leader Major Brown Nav Lt. Rosen  
Pilot Lt. Beazley Asst Nav  
Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Casserly  
Bombardier Lt. Rodgers

- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- |             |      |                 |
|-------------|------|-----------------|
| (a) Primary | 11   | 338 x 100 LB GP |
| Jettisoning | 2    | 42 x 100 LB GP  |
| Returning   | None |                 |
- (b) Bombing Altitude: 22500'
- (c) Time of Release: 1420

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After a good turn at the IP, the bombardier was unable to pick up check points on the first part of the run, because of sun and haze. He was able, however, to pick up the river and the target area, but not the target itself until approximately 10 seconds from the BRL. The bombardier made one

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was peer. G-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell in fields and woods NE (short) of the L/F.

(b) Bomb Pattern: 4700'L x 1970'W

(c) Bombing Errors: Range:  
Deflection: 2760'R  
Radial: 2955'S  
Radial: 3945'

(d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the AP: 0 and 0%

(e) Bombing Results: Nil

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 328: Rack malfunction - 4 bombs hung up and were jettisoned.

A/C 390: Personnel error - 38 bombs released at IP.

h. 390 Group - G Squadron:

(1) Air Leader Nav  
Pilot Asst Nav  
Co-Pilot M/O  
Bombardier Lt. Dennessy

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) Primary	9	324 x 100 LB GP
Jettisoning	4	132 x 100 LB GP
Returning	None	

(b) Bombing Altitude: 21500'

(c) Time of Release: 1419½

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

The lead and deputy lead A/C were forced to abort. The Low Squadron pulled up along side the Lead A/C Squadron and released on their smoke bombs.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell in the same place as those of the Lead Squadron, approximately 8070' over and 3780' right of the L/F.

(b) Bomb Pattern: Cannot be separated from A Sqdn's

(c) Bombing Results: Nil

(d) The bombs from 1 A/C, which may or may not have been with this Squadron, fell squarely on the loaded M/Y at Babenhausen, 4 miles SW of the target. There were approximately 20 direct hits on the tracks, goods wagons, and small workshops adjacent to the Yard.

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(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

- A/C 206: Lost two engines - jettisoned 38 bombs.
- A/C 484: #3 station hung up 18 bombs jettisoned in Channel.
- A/C 677: Hit by flak - left formation - jettisoned 38 bombs on Giessen.
- A/C 600: Hit by flak.- left formation - jettisoned 38 bombs on Babenhausen.

1. 390 B Group - D Squadron:

- (1) Air Leader Major Engelbrecht Nav Lt. Rawlins  
 Pilot Capt. Rohr Asst Nav Lt. Arvin  
 Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Epton  
 Bombardier Lt. Matteson

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

- (a) Primary 11 418 x 100 LB GP  
 Jettisoning None  
 Returning 1 38 x 100 LB GP

(b) Bombing Altitude: 22000'

(c) Time of Release: 1428

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 104 degrees, the bombardier picked up the target far enough in advance to make a five minute bomb run. He quickly synchronized but upon approaching closer to the target shifted his AP to the left side of the A/F which had not been hit as yet. When bombs were released synchronization was fair. G-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron partially covered the extreme SE portion of the L/F, approximately 60 falling on the L/F itself, the remainder in fields and woods. The bombs from 1 A/C fell beyond the L/F in woods.

(b) Bomb Pattern: 3200'L x 2075'W

(c) Bombing Errors: Range: 1320'S  
 Deflection: 1700'L  
 Radial: 2075'

(d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: 0% and 13%

(e) Bombing Results: Fair

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C ? : Returned 38 bombs to base.

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j. 390 B Group - E Squadron:

(1)	Air Leader	Capt. Perry	Nav	Lt. Nordling
	Pilot	Lt. Briggs	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Peculunas
			Bombardier	Lt. Martin

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) Primary 12 456 x 100 LB GP  
Jettisoning None  
Returning None

(b) Bombing Altitude: 22500'

(c) Time of Release: 1429

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 255 degrees, the bombardier experienced difficulty picking up the target because of sun and haze. After the target had been picked up and the bombardier had synchronized, the pilot toppled the bombsight gyre. The bombardier dropped when the indices met, though the gyre had been toppled. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run though elevator controls had to be operated manually.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell in cleared fields 5500' to the right and 1515' beyond the L/F.

(b) Bomb Pattern: 3790'L x 1900'W

(c) Bombing Errors: Gross

(d) Bombing Results: Nil

(5) Bombing Malfunctions: None

k. 390 B Group - 100 D Squadron:

(1)	Air Leader	Capt. Wooten	Nav	Lt. Benyues
	Pilot	Lt. DePlanque	Asst Nav	
	Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Rowland
			Bombardier	Lt. Svendsen

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) Primary 12 423 x 100 LB GP  
Jettisoning None  
Returning 1 21 x 100 LB GP

(b) Bombing Altitude: 21000'

(c) Time of Release: 1425

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(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After a good turn at the IP the bombardier took over control of the A/C on C-1 Auto-Pilot. After about 2/3 of the way down the bomb run the navigator who was assisting the bombardier doing pilotage, accidentally tripped the toggle switch which released the bombs. The rest of the Squadron released on the Lead A/C approximately 3 minutes from the target.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell in woods on a hillside 6000' E of Rohrig, Germany, which is approximately 20 miles NE of the target.

(b) Bomb Pattern: 4050'L x 2027'W

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 812: Bomb bay doors wouldn't close electrically.  
A/C 175: Intervalometer failed after releasing 7 bombs on train - remaining bombs salvoed.

1. 100 C Group - A Squadron:

(1) Air Leader	Capt. Scott	Nav	Lt. Julhin
Pilot	Lt. Jones	Asst Nav	Lt. Passen
Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Rhode
		Bombardier	Lt. Barrett

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) Primary 13 488 x 100 LB GP  
Jettisoning None  
Returning None

(b) Bombing Altitude: 25000'

(c) Time of Release: 1434

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 218 degrees the bombardier experienced difficulty picking up the target because of sun and haze. The M/O set up the course and proceeded to call out the number miles from the target. When 17 miles from the target the bombardier was able to pick up the target for a visual sighting operation. He quickly synchronized and when bombs were released the synchronization was good and the bubbles level. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

(a) Incomplete photo-coverage for this Squadron prevents precise and accurate estimate of damage inflicted. The bombs began falling in the woods and parking area, where at least 1/3 dropped, and extended across a portion of the landing ground in a NE-SW direction.

(b) It is impossible to determine bombing errors on the measurements of the bomb pattern.

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(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

- A/C 505: Intervalometer malfunction - 1 bomb trained the rest had to be salvoed.  
A/C 400: Bomb bay doors had to be cranked open and shut.

m. 100 C Group - B Squadron:

- (1) Air Leader Capt. Robinson Nav Lt. Kimball  
Pilot Lt. Brown Asst Nav Lt. Chappel  
Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Lentz  
Bombardier Lt. Titely

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

- |               |      |                 |
|---------------|------|-----------------|
| (a) Secondary | 12   | 451 x 100 LB GP |
| Jettisoning   | 1    | 1 x 100 LB GP   |
| Returning     | None |                 |

(b) Bombing Altitude: 26000'

(c) Time of Release: 1450

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Because of lack of information forwarded by the lead bombardier this Headquarters is unable to explain why the primary target was not attacked. The secondary target was attacked on a magnetic heading of 116 degrees. The bombardier picked up the target without difficulty synchronized and released its bombs. The bombardier failed to report whether C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

- (a) There was no photographic coverage for this Squadron, which attacked the secondary target.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

- A/C 047: Intervalometer failed - bombs salvoed.  
A/C 523: Two bombs had to be salvoed.  
A/C 412: One bomb jettisoned in the Channel - Would not release over target.  
A/C 124: Door would not close electrically.

n. 100 C Group - C Squadron:

- (1) Air Leader Lt. Craft Nav Lt. Kretismann  
Pilot Capt. Ricker Asst Nav  
Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Cately  
Bombardier Lt. Tong

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

- |             |      |                 |
|-------------|------|-----------------|
| (a) Primary | 11   | 368 x 100 LB GP |
| Jettisoning | None |                 |
| Returning   | 2    | 76 x 100 LB GP  |

(b) Bombing Altitude: 24000'

(c) Time of Release: 1435

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(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Attacking on a magnetic heading of 217 degrees the bombardier experienced difficulty picking up the target because of sun and haze. Approximately 40 seconds from the target he was able to pick up his AP and after some rapid corrections synchronized. When bombs were released, synchronization was good and bubbles level. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bombing run.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell on top and to the right of A Squadron's pattern - in the woods and the extreme SW portion of the L/F. Approximately  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the bombs fell in this portion of the field.

(b) Bombing Errors: Range: 0  
Deflection: 250'L  
Radial: 250'

(c) Bomb Pattern: 4525'L x 2270'W

(d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the AP: 43% and 92%

(e) Bombing Results: Good

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 015: Intervalometer failed to function properly - 23 bombs salvoed.

A/C 987: Intervalometer failed to function properly - 30 bombs salvoed.

A/C 681: Aborted - 38 bombs returned to base.

A/C 972: Flak damage prevented bombs from releasing - 38 bombs returned to base.

e. 95 D Group - A Squadron:

(1) Air Leader	Col. Shuck	Nav	Lt. Hugarevich
Pilot	Lt. Collings	Asst. Nav	Lt. Shirly
Co-Pilot		M/O	Lt. Scholte
		Bombardier	Lt. Griffin

(2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped

(a) Primary	11	376 x 100 LB GP
Jettisoning	None	
Returning	3	80 x 100 LB GP

(b) Bombing Altitude: 24,500'

(c) Time of Release: 1438

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After a good turn at the IP the bombardier experienced difficulty picking up the target because of sun and haze. When the target was finally picked up the bombardier had approximately 30 seconds with which

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Tactical Report, 24 December 1944, Cont'd

to synchronize. Though drift and rate had been pre-set the final synchronization for rate was not very good. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 217 degrees. G-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

- (a) Two SAV sorties show only the bombs from approximately 5 A/C in this Squadron. The bombs from 3 to 4 A/C fell in the woods and empty dispersal area in the extreme NE boundaries of the L/F, while those from another A/C fell in fields adjacent to the SW portion of the L/F.
- (b) It is not known whether all the A/C in this Squadron released off the Squadron leader. Certainly, all of the bombs dropped are not shown.
- (c) Bomb Pattern: 3525'L x 2520'W
- (d) Bombing Errors: Range: 2265'S  
Deflection: 1260'L  
Radial: 2720'
- (e) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the AP: 0% and 27%
- (f) Bombing Results: Nil

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

- A/C 257: Rack malfunction - 19 bombs returned to base.
- A/C 858: Intervalometer and A-2 release failure - 33 bombs returned to base.
- A/C 783: Intervalometer and toggle switch failure - 38 bombs returned to base.

p. 95 D Group - B Squadron:

- (1) Air Leader Lt. Wood Nav Lt. Doherty  
Pilot Lt. Hamilton Asst Nav  
Co-Pilot Lt. Mott M/O Lt. Burrow  
Bombardier Lt. Sheweloff

- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- (a) Primary 11 399 x 100 LB GP  
Jettisoning 2 57 x 100 LB GP  
Returning None

(b) Bombing Altitude: 25000'

(c) Time of Release: 1437½

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After the maneuver at the IP the C Squadron received permission from the Group Air Leader to follow the A Squadron into the target in trail. The B Squadron positioned itself off to one side of the C Squadron



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Tactical Report, 24 December 1944, Cont'd

and proceeded on the bomb run. The bombardier picked up the target and proceeded to synchronize. Approximately 2/3 down the bomb run the bombardier was informed that the C Squadron was directly beneath them. The bombardier released the bombsight trigger. When the Low Squadron cleared the way, the bombardier in the B Squadron had to make a large correction in order to get back on the target. The bombsight gyro toppled. It was quickly leveled again, and though the bombardier resynchronized, the synchronization was poor. When bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 230 degrees.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

- (a) The bombs from this Squadron fell in fields and woods NW of the L/F.
- (b) Bomb Pattern: 3715'L x 2840'W
- (c) Bombing Errors: Range: 3275'0  
Deflection: 4150'R  
Radial: 5245'
- (d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the AP: 0% and 0%
- (e) Bombing Results: Nil

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

- A/C 447: Bomb bay door motor burned out and by the time doors were cranked down 38 bombs had to be released late.
- A/C 207: Intervalometer failed after releasing 19 bombs - 19 had to be toggled out.

q. 95 D Group - C Squadron:

- (1) Air Leader Nav Lt. Murray  
Pilot Lt. Braund Asst Nav  
Co-Pilot Lt. Baird M/C Lt. Mitchell  
Bombardier Lt. Davis

- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
  - (a) Primary 12 446 x 100 LB GP
  - Jettisoning 1 6 x 100 LB GP
  - Returning 1 4 x 100 LB GP
- (b) Bombing Altitude: 24000'
- (c) Time of Release: 1437½

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After the maneuver at the IP, the C Squadron received permission from the Group Air Leader to bomb second because the B Squadron was lagging. The Bombardier picked up the target when his indices were about 60 degrees and quickly synchronized. Approximately

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Tactical Report, 24 December 1944, Cont'd

30 seconds from the BRL the bombardier was informed that the B Squadron was directly above them. To clear the B Squadron a rather sharp turn was made to the right and in doing so 2 smoke bombs and 6 GP's were released as a result of a malfunction. C-1 Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb run.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell about 3 miles NNW from the target in open fields. A few stray bombs fell in the village of Grob Rohrheim. One A/C was evidently out of position during the bomb run, for its bomb pattern was approximately 2000' from the main pattern.

(b) Bomb Pattern: 3540'L x 2080'W

(c) Bombing Errors: Gross

(d) Bombing Results: Nil

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 210: Rack malfunction - 6 bombs released prematurely and 4 had to be returned to base.

r. 95 B Group - D Squadron:

(1) Air Leader	Major Power	Nav	Lt. Sacks
Pilot	Lt. Owens	Asst Nav	Lt. Frei
Co-Pilot		M/O	Capt. McCardia
		Bombardier	Lt. Thixton

(2) A/C Attackings: Bombs Dropped

(a) Secondary	12	422 x 100 LB GP
Jettisoning	None	
Returning	1	34 x 100 LB GP

(b) Bombing Altitude: 24500'

(c) Time of Release: 1456

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

Unable to pick up the primary target because of sun glare and haze a run was made on the secondary target. The turn at the secondary IP was made and the M/O set up the course for the bombardier. After the first two checks the bombardier picked up the target. The bombardier reported having only 10 seconds with which to synchronize, only had time to place his crosshairs on the target and make one course correction. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 158 degrees.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

(a) The bombs from this Squadron fell in woods 5 miles to the left of the M/Y on which the bombardier had synchronized.

Tactical Report, 24 December 1944, Cont'd

- (b) Bomb Pattern: 6430'L x 3430'W
- (c) Bombing Errors: Gross
- (d) Bombing Results: Nil

s. 95 E Group - E Squadron:

- (1) Air Leader Lt. Jenkins Nav Lt. Russell  
 Pilot Lt. Parker Asst Nav  
 Co-Pilot Lt. Sellin M/O Lt. Borch  
 Bombardier Lt. Schultz

- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- (a) TO 2 76 x 100 LB GP  
 Jettisoning 10 380 x 100 LB GP  
 Returning None

(b) Bombing Altitude: 25000'

(c) Time of Release: 1506

(3) Run-In from IP to Target:

After the maneuver at the IP the bombardier experienced difficulty picking up the target because of sun glare and haze. When the bombardier finally picked up the target it was approximately five miles away. He told the pilot it was too late to make a run on the primary. While passing over the primary someone released his bombs and the wing bombardiers like a bunch of sheep proceeded to toggle out bombs. The lead and deputy lead A/C were the only A/C having bombs and a run was made on a target of opportunity. When bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 97 degrees synchronization was fair.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

- (a) Photographs taken by the lead A/C, which attacked Worms, Germany, approximately 6 miles SW of the target, shows the bombs from two A/C bursting in fields about 2 miles short of the city.

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 269: Flak cut wires in bomb bays - 38 bombs were jettisoned.

t. 95 E Group - 100 E Squadron:

- (1) Air Leader Capt. Gibbons Nav Lt. Wilcox  
 Pilot Lt. Ernst Asst Nav  
 Co-Pilot M/O Lt. Strepp  
 Bombardier Lt. Lockhart

- (2) A/C Attacking: Bombs Dropped
- (a) Primary 12 450 x 100 LB GP  
 Jettisoning None  
 Returning None

Tactical Report, 24 December 1944, Cont'd

- (b) Bombing Altitude: 24000'
- (c) Time of Release: 1446
- (3) Run-In from IP to Target:

A wide turn was made at the IP and the M/O set up the course to the target. The bombardier picked the target area approximately 10 miles from the BRL. The run was long and the C-1 Auto-Pilot worked very well. A minute and a half from the BRL the bombardier picked up his AP in his sight and synchronized. When bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 241 degrees the synchronization was excellent and the bubbles level.

(4) Photo Intelligence Report:

- (a) Approximately 115 bombs dropped by this Squadron fell on the S portion of the L/F. One A/C released early, the bombs falling in woods about 2½ miles ENE from the AP, and two A/C released late, the bombs extending from the edge of the main bomb pattern into farm land.
- (b) Bombing Errors: Range: 2300'0  
Deflection: 0'  
Radial: 2300'
- (c) Bomb Pattern: 7800'L x 2465'W
- (d) Percent of Bombs Within 1000' and 2000' of the MPI: 37% and 63%
- (e) Bombing Results: Good

(5) Bombing Malfunctions:

A/C 812: Bomb bay doors would not close electrically.  
A/C 175: Seven bombs released in train - 31 bombs salvoed.

4. Mission Camera Report:

- a. The 95 Group installed 6 scope and 15 vertical cameras, all and 13 of which took pictures:  
2 A/C with cameras did not bomb.
- b. The 100 Group installed 2 15mm motion picture and 10 vertical cameras, both and 9 of which took pictures:  
1 A/C with a camera aborted.
- c. The 390 Group installed 5 scope and 16 vertical cameras, 2 and 11 of which took pictures:  
1 PFF A/C: Landed in France - contained scope & vertical camera.  
1 PFF A/C: Scope camera was not used.  
1 PFF A/C: Aborted - contained scope and vertical camera.  
3 A/C with vertical cameras: Malfunctions.

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

Tactical Report, 24 December 1944, Cont'd

**5. Communications:**

- a. Lt. Col. Jones led 13th Combat Wing. Some jamming on Channels A and B was reported in target area. Col. Shuck could not contact 13C at any time. 95D could reach Colgate but could not contact fighters direct on Channel C. 100, 390 Groups reached fighters satisfactorily.

In general, Groups reported VHF communication clear on all Channels. Route and target weather information was received satisfactorily. Control point messages were sent to Arrowswift. Discipline was reported good.

	CP1	CP2	CP3	TGT	CP4	BASE
Timings:	1112	1144	1250	1404	1505	1608
13A	1113	1151	1237	1420		

**Strike Reports:**

13A	PA4	1420	95A	PA1	1435
390	BA5	1420	100	PA3	1440

**6. Controller's Log:**

- a. Alerted at 1800 and the following information from 3BD:

- (1) Bomb Load.
- (2) Maximum Effort.

- b. At 1830 the following message from 3BD:

"Hold up on bomb load."

- c. At 1945 the following information from 3BD:

- (1) Force required.
- (2) Order of Groups and Division.
- (3) Division assembly and approach.
- (4) Zero Hour.

- d. At 2050 the following information from 3BD:

- (1) Targets.
- (2) Bomb Load.
- (3) Reference base altitude.
- (4) Bomb by Squadrons.
- (5) Bombing altitude.

- e. At 2215 Advance Warning to 13 CBW FO 526 sent.

- f. At 0053 the following message from 3BD:

"Use 1st Division A/G to put up another Group."

- g. At 0115 sent 13 CBW FO 526.

- h. At 0140 received 3BD FO 526.

- i. At 0145 received Intelligence Annex to 3BD FO 526.

- j. At 0200 sent Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO 526.

- k. At 0235 received Annex 1 to 3BD FO 526.

- l. At 0245 received Annex 1 to Intelligence Annex to 3BD FO 526.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Tactical Report, 24 December 1944, Cont'd

m. At 0340 following message from 3BD:

"Primary target is visual only, not visual or PFF or as stated in Annex 1 of Division Field Order."

n. At 0400 sent corrected 13 CBW FO 526.

o. At 0410 received Annex 2 to Intelligence Annex to 3BD FO 526.

p. At 0430 received Annex 2 to 3BD FO 526.

q. At 0430 received 45 CBW FO 331.

r. At 0520 received 4 CBW FO 354.


s. At 0520 sent Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO 526.

t. At 0600 received Annex 2 to 3BD FO 526.

u. At 0550 sent Annex 2 to 13 CBW FO 526.

v. At 0730 received Annex 5 to 3BD FO 526.


For the Commanding Officer:

  
GENE C. SMITH,  
Major, Air Corps,  
Operations Officer.

Ch COBAT HOE 100 (6) 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

390th A BATTALION (100 DCTS): 10 x 300 x 100 lb. AP  
B S BATTALION (100 DCTS): 11 x 300 x 100 lb. AP  
C S BATTALION (100 DCTS): 9 x 300 x 100 lb. AP  
(released off of A BATTALION)  
D S BATTALION (100 DCTS): 11 x 410 x 100 lb. AP  
E S BATTALION (100 DCTS): 12 x 450 x 100 lb. AP


Scale: 1000' & 2000' from the AP  
1:25,000



bombs accidentally re-  
ods 20 mi NE of target.

attacked the RR Workshops at KALISERSLAUTERN, GER.:  
the bombs fell in woods 4 miles to the left of the  
target.

95th B SQUADRON 2 x 76 x 100 lb. GP.: attacked WORMS, GER.: the  
bombs fell in fields 2 miles short of the city.  
10 x 380 x 100 lb. GP.: jettisoned in Germany.



100th C

95th B



HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer  
APO 559

26 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Operations Officers Narrative - Mission 24 December  
1944 - Eiblis, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer. 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: Three Squadrons of B-17's took-off to form 13 "D" Combat Group and attack Eiblis, Germany. 95 "A" Squadron took-off at 0852-0901 hours and assembled over the base at 10,000 feet by 1010 hours. 95 "B" Squadron took-off at 0845-0902 hours and assembled at 11,000 feet by 1010 hours. 95 "C" Squadron took-off at 0904-0911 and assembled at 9,000 feet by 1010 hours.

After assembly, the squadrons effected group formation and proceeded to Bun. # 11, where Wing assembly was completed at 1051 hours, with the lead Squadron at an altitude of 10,000 feet. Division assembly was made over Bun. # 12 at 1102 hours, and 13 "D" Group departed the English Coast at 1117 hours over Felixstowe at 10,000 feet. Here a climb to bombing altitude was begun. The group crossed the Enemy Coast at 1154 hours at an altitude of 12,500 feet and from there to the I.P., followed the briefed course.

I.P. was crossed at 1424 hours, the lead Squadron at 25,000 feet. Bombing interval was taken between squadrons and all three squadrons bombed the primary target, although visibility in the area was very poor. Bombs for the lead Squadron were away at 1438 hours from an altitude of 25,000 feet. Group Rally was effected at 1441 hours and route out followed as briefed except for being slightly North of course. Let down to minimum altitude was begun at 1502 hours and the Enemy Coast recrossed at 1516 hours at 8,000 feet of altitude. Reached English Coast at 1641 and base at 1648. Land for group was made at 1650 - 1728 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: 95 "A" Squadron - Eleven A/C plus one PFF left base in formation. All A/C attacked primary target and are credited with sorties. 95 "B" Squadron - Eleven A/C plus one PFF left base in formation. All A/C attacked primary target and are credited with sorties. 95 "C" Squadron - Twelve A/C plus one PFF left base in formation. All A/C attacked primary and are credited with sorties.

3. LOST AIRCRAFT: None.

13TH "E" GROUP

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: 95 "E" Group was composed of the 95th D and 95th E squadrons flying lead and high positions respectively and a squadron from the 100th Group flying low position.

95D Squadron took off at 0922-0931 hours and assembled over the base at 6,000 feet by 0950.

95E Squadron took off at 0910-0919 hours and assembled over base at 7,000 feet by 1014 hours.

The two squadrons effect group formation after assembling and were joined over the base by the 100th squadron. From here the "E" Group proceeded to Bu#11, making wing assembly at 0925 hours, altitude, 10,000 feet. The formation departed the English coast at 1119 hours and began climb to altitude.

Briefed course was followed to I.P., which was crossed as briefed but due to poor visibility, the "E" Group was unable to bomb primary target. Instead, the Group continued in Division formation and on the route out, 95D Squadron dropped on the secondary target at 1457 hours from an altitude of 25,000 feet. 95E Squadron bombed a target of opportunity at 1505 hours.. Route out was followed, crossing the Enemy coast at 1620 hours and the English coast at 1644. Base was reached at 1651 and landing effected at 1707-1732 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: 95D Squadron - Eleven a/c plus one PFF left base in formation. All a/c attacked secondary target and are credited with sorties.

95E Squadron - Eleven a/c plus one PFF left base in formation. All a/c attacked T/O and receive sorties.

3. AIRCRAFT LOST: Aircraft #43-88760 left formation after bombs away and slowly straggled from sight. No chutes were seen.

NOEL T. CUMBAA,  
Major, Air Corps,  
Operations Officer.

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 24 December 19 44

LEAD

COLLINGS  
81 | 44

BKK  
72 | 57

RISTINE  
82 | 88

LOW

RINGBLOOM  
80 | 87

JENSEN  
82 | 81

HIGH

FLETCHER  
77 | 83

RAND  
84 | 41

L'ECUYER  
14 | 62

WEISE  
65 | 22

HAIL  
78 | 58

SQUIRES  
78 | 82

SUTICOWSKI  
83 | 81

*SHORT FUEL  
LEFT FORMATION*

BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
TAXI \_\_\_\_\_  
TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_

EXTRA SHIPS


334 \_\_\_\_\_  
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336 \_\_\_\_\_  
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95A  
OVER TARGET

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 24 Dec. 45




BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
 READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
 STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
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 TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
 RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_

EXTRA SHIPS  
 334 \_\_\_\_\_  
 335 \_\_\_\_\_  
 336 \_\_\_\_\_  
 412 \_\_\_\_\_

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 24 December 19 44



BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
 READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
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EXTRA SHIPS


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95 B  
OVER TARGET.

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 24 Dec. 44



BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
 READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
 STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
 TAXI \_\_\_\_\_  
 TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
 RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_

EXTRA SHIPS

334 \_\_\_\_\_  
 335 \_\_\_\_\_  
 336 \_\_\_\_\_  
 412 \_\_\_\_\_

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 24 December 1944

LEAD

BRAUND

82 | 10

ROSE ✓

81 | 99

JENEMAN

84 | 69

COTNER ✓

85 | 84

GROSS ✓

69 | 93

ROSS

83 | 33

*2/3 CLUTTERED UP  
AT LANDING  
TRAFFIC PATTERN  
CUT INTO.*

LOW

GARRISON ✓

81 | 06

MILLSPAUGH ✓

18 | 67

BURNS ✓

78 | 44

HIGH

TAYLOR, J. ✓

86 | 17

BROWN

~~85 | 83~~

82 | 30

DUNWOODY ✓

82 | 72

*LED EL.  
ON RETURN.*

BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
TAXI \_\_\_\_\_  
TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_

*BROWN - FLYING  
82/30 SPARE*

EXTRA SHIPS


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95 C  
OVER TARGET.

NINETY-FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 24-12 48



BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_

READINESS \_\_\_\_\_

STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_

TAXI \_\_\_\_\_

TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_

RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_

\*300 Hi EL. OF Hi Sq.

390<sup>th</sup> GP.

FIREBALL ORANGE HI.

EXTRA SHIPS

334 \_\_\_\_\_

335 \_\_\_\_\_

336 \_\_\_\_\_


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NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 24 December 1944



BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
 READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
 STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
 TAXI \_\_\_\_\_  
 TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
 RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_


EXTRA SHIPS  
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 412 \_\_\_\_\_

95° D  
OVER TARGET.

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 24-12 48



BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
 READINES \_\_\_\_\_  
 STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
 TAXI \_\_\_\_\_  
 TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
 RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_


EXTRA SHIPS

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NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 24 December 19 44



BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
 READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
 STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
 TAXI \_\_\_\_\_  
 TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
 RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_


EXTRA SHIPS  
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95 E  
OVER TARGET.

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 24-12 44



BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
 READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
 STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
 TAXI \_\_\_\_\_  
 TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
 RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_

EXTRA SHIPS  
 334 \_\_\_\_\_  
 335 \_\_\_\_\_  
 336 \_\_\_\_\_  
 412 \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
APO 559

STATISTICAL CONTROL REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

13TH COMBAT BOMBARDMENT WING

DATE RENDERED 24 December 1944

PART I - TABULAR SUMMARY:

DATE OF MISSION 24 December 1944

STRATEGICAL MISSION

COMBAT GROUP	SCHEDULED	AIRBORNE	AIRBORNE LESS RETURNING SPARES	ATTACKING	NOT ATTACKING	SORTIES
A	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	10 @ 15H	1	11 @ 15H
B	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	0	11 @ 15H
C	12 @ 15H	12 @ 15H	12 @ 15H	12 @ 15H	0	12 @ 15H
D	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	0	11 @ 15H
E	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	11 @ 15H	0	11 @ 15H

PART II - REASONS WHY AIRCRAFT DID NOT ATTACK OR FAILED TO TAKE OFF:

Combat Gp A.C.S.H. Category Reason for Failure & Corrective Action (Yes-No) Sortie

A	43-3783	E	Bombardier didn't drop bombs because at time of bomb away another aircraft was directly below his aircraft.	Yes
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WILL T. FISHER,  
Major, Air Corps,  
Operations Officer.

SECRET











