Mul IMERETATION REPORT S.A. 2998

ATTACK ON STUTTGART/KORNWESTHEIM MARSHALLING YARD on 16 DEC 44

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK

(a) No of aircraft

: 114, with full fighter escort.

(b) Command

: U.S.8TH AIR FORCE.

(c) Time

: 1257 - 1303 A hrs.

(d) Bombs

: 1082 x 500 lb. G.P.

210 x 500 lb. I.B.

50 x 120 lb. Frag.

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK

- (a) A concentration of approximately 70 H.E. bursts is seen across the Southern end of the marshalling yard with hits on the locomotive depot and other rail facilities in this area.
- (b) Bursts are seen on the Marshalling Yard and its facilities as follows: (Numbers refer to target illustration)

1. LOCOMOTIVE AND REPAIR FACILITIES

Locomotive Depot (#7) - 4 hits.
Rail served stores Depot (#23) - 2 hits

- 4 hits, 2 near hits. - 2 hits at entrance.

2. MARSHALLING YARD

Northbound Reception Sidings (#2) - 5 hits.

Storage Sidings (46)
South end of Southbound

- 1 nit at entrance.

forwarding sidings

- 6 hits.

3. THROUGH RUNNING LINES

Through line at South entrance of yard - 2 possible hits. Main line just above North choke point - 4 possible hits.

(c) OTHER BURSTS

- 1. A concentration of at least 75 H.E. bursts is visible in the South portion of the town of LUDWIGSBURG, with 4 possible hits on factory type buildings about 400 yards "ast of the main rail line and probable hits on an over pass. Another concentration of about 60 bursts is seen in the built up area in the West portion of LUDWIGSBURG and extending into a barracks area which is approximately $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles Northwest of the center of the marshalling yard.
- 2. A large concentration of H.E. bursts is seen in fields and across an autobahn about 9 miles North Northeast of the target and just East of the village of HOPSIGHEIM.
- 3. Two groups of H.E. bursts which are partially cloud obscured are visible in fields and extending into the town of GR. INGERSHEIM about $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles North of the target.
- 4. A small group of I.B. bursts and a concentration of H.E. bursts can be seen in fields just North of the town of BIETIGHEIM located $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles North Northwest of the target.
- 5. Four hits and 4 near hits are visible on factory type buildings just East of the South end of the marshalling yard.

(iii) ACTIVITY

(a) STUTTGART/KORNWESTHEIM MARSHALLING YARD

Julius de la solution de la solution

(SAV 490/484-9) (IV) ANNOTATED PRINT :

Shows bursts on Marshalling Yard.

(V) BOMB PLOT:

A bomb plot has been prepared and will be distributed.

(VI) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED :

SAV 95/1251,1253,1255 16 DEC 44 1301-1303A hrs. 1/37,700 (F.L.7")22,000 B 386/645,646,648

390/479,430,484

0 486/227

1357 A ** Unknown

1/35,200 1259 A hrs.

1/36,800

A'000,00 21,500'A Oblique (F.L.6 3/8")

19,750'A

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240 Copies.

HEADQUARTERS 13TH COMBAT BOMB WING (H) APO 559

Date 16 December 1944 13 CBW FO 519 13 CBW OPS 244 3 BD FO 519

SUBJECT: Tastical Report (BIRTIGHEIM, GERMANY).

TO Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APC 559.

- Information Concerning the Target. l.
 - The primary target (visual) for today was the Railway Marshalling Yard situated to the west of KORNWESTHEIM a village six miles due north of the town of STUTTGART. This Yard has a throughput capacity of 4800 wagons in 24 hours, and before the war was normally operating to 85% of capacity. It is therefore one of the largest and busiest yards in South-west Germany. It lies on the busy through route from MUNICH via UIM to KARLSRUHE or BRUCHSAL at a point where branch lines leave it for the Black Forest and Lake Constance in the South and just south of the point where a line from HEILBROWN joins the main east west route.
 - The secondary target was the same as the primary target. **b**. H2X technique, in the event of the target being everdest, was to be employed.
- Planning and Execution of the Mission:
 - Group Order and Strength:

(2)

100 Group

	(1)	13 A Group	3 x 13 A/C Squadrons	
		(a) 95 Group	3 Squadrons Plus 6 A/C T Fly as Chaff A/C	' 0
	(2)	93 A Group	3 x 13 A/C Squadrons	
		(a) 490 Group	3 Squadrons	
	(3)	4 A Group	3 x 13 A/C Squadrons	
		(a) 486 Group	3 Squadrons	
b.	A/C	and C/C Available:	•	
•	(1)	95 Group	ME 48 A/C 50 G/C NE 42 A/C 45 G/C PFF 7 A/C 8 G/C MH 6 A/C 8 G/C	

-1-CONFIDENTIAL

38 A/C

35 A/C

ME

NE

PII MH 57 G/G

51 0/0 7 0/0 6 0/0

Tactical Report, 16 December 1944, Cont'd

(3)	390	Group	ME	34	A/C	46	0/0 0/0 0/0
		. -	NE	32	A/C A/C A/C	43	C/C
			PFF	5	A/C	6	C/C
			MH	ì	A/C	L	a/c

- c. A/C Scheduled to Take Off:
 - (1) 95 Group 35 A/C Plus 3 PFF A/C Plus 6 Chaff A/C
- d. A/C Airborne:
 - (1) 95 Group All A/C Scheduled Airborne
- e. A/C Abortive:
 - (1) 95 Group

A/C 230: 334 Squadron M - Mickey set out - Command Pilot Col. Truesdell - Pilot

Capt. Owen - No sortie.

A/C 364: 335 Squadron W - One engine out - Air

speed indicator out - Command Pilot Col.

Shuck - Pilet Lt. Savage - No sortie.

A/C 469: 336 Squadron U - VHF out - Could not find

formation - Pilot Lt. Lennox - No sortic.

A/C 660: 334 Squadron W - Could not find formation

Pilot Lt. Carmes - No sertie.

A/C 450: 335 Squadron V - Lost supercharger in #3 engine - Pilot Lt. Madigon - No sortie.

f. A/C Missing:

(1) 95 Group

A/C 7232: 412 Squadron 0 - Pilot Lt. Coffman A/C 8288: 412 Squadron V - Pilot Lt. Gunther

g. A/C Attacking - 95 A Group

Bombs Dropped

- (1) Target of Opportunity 34 338 x 500 LB GP
 Plus 66x500 LB IB
 Stuttgart 5 50 x 260 LB FRAGS
 Fettisening 3 28 x 500 LB GP
 Plus 4 x 500 LB IB
 Returning 2 8 x 500 LB GP
 10 x 260 LB FRAGS
- (2) Method of Bombing: Visual
- (3) Method of Release: 80' Train
- 3. Narrative of the Attack:
 - a. Navigation 13A Group 95 A, B and C Squadrons:
 - (1) Assembly:

The three Squadrons of the Group made a normal take off. Instrument ascent procedure was used until assembly altitude was reached. Squadron assemblies

Tactical Report, 16 December 1944, Cont'd

were completed satisfactorily in spite of heavy These contrails and scattered clouds at 18000 feet. weather condition made it necessary for the Squadrons to climb and descend at various times in an effort to stay in the clear. The Lead A/C of both the Lead and High Squadrons aborted before completion of assembly and the Low Squadron moved into the lead. The former Lead Squadron now took the spot vacated by the Low Squadron. Group assembly was not completed until the formation was a few miles past CP #1 due to the High Squadron becoming separated during a period of poor visual contact. Prior to CP #1 Clambake Able, who now was Division Leader, told Fireball formation to take the third position in the Division Column. To do this 13A flew North of course on a dogleg and spaced themselves in proper position. .

(2) Route:

After the Division Column was in proper order, they prodeeded on course. OP #2 was crossed on course at 1114, ten minutes late. From here to the IP the course flown was almost identical with that as briefed. 30 minutes prior to reaching IP the GEE equipment went out in the Lead A/C. A few minutes later the H2X equipment went out also and the navigator had to rely on DR as there were no other H2X aircraft in the formation. The IP was made good, visually, and a bomb run by Squadrons was started. The order of peel off was lead, lyw and high. The target had previously been reported as being visual so a visual run was anticipated, however, due to undereast conditions visual ground checks became decreasingly hard to obtain and target was not clearly identified. Time of bombs away was 1301, 21 minutes late. At the RP the ground was discernable again and the point was made good. The Group was reassembled again without difficulty at this point. The formation was slightly right of course on the way back since they were echeloned to the right of the Division Column. At 0700E the GEE equipment was operational again and no further difficulty was experienced. continental coast out was crossed at 5121-0314, about 15 miles NE of briefed point, at 1512. English coast in was made at 1546, 9 minutes late at 5207-0135. Navigation along the entire route was very good in spite of all the difficulties with equipment.

(3) Weather:

Over the base the clouds were solid to an altitude of between 18000 and 19000 feet. Dense contrails prevailed at altitudes immediately above the clouds. Over the Channel and continent the same conditions were in evidence. The best average wind was from 240 degrees at 30 knots. In the Mets and Maney area the undercast broke tarmake visual contact with the ground possible. Many navigators reported an almost dead calm at altitude in the target area. On the route back the same weather prevailed. Back at the bases the ceiling had decreased to 500-1000 feet making landing very difficult.

(4) Difficulties:

- (a) Weather was the greater difficulty of the day. Assembly was very slow due to contrails and clouds.
- (b) Signals on the GEE box were fading over the continent and the fixes obtained were not reliable.
- (c) H2X equipment failed in the Lead A/C and the navigator was forced to rely on DR.

(5) Malfunctions:

A/C \$230: H2X out.

A/C 2951: GEE out - Short in Time Base.

A/C 8199: GKE out - Bad tube - Control Knob broken.

A/C 8127: H2X out - Tubes blown out.

A/C 2066: Radio Compass out. A/C 7201: Radio Compass out.

A/C 8255: Radio Compass poor reception.

(6) Remarks:

Navigation was very good considering the difficulties under which the navigator had to work.

b. 95 A Group - C. A and B Squadrons:

(1) Air Leader Nav Lt. Wilbourne
Pilot Lt. Wilson Asst Nav
Co-Pilot Mickey Op Lt. Owens
Bombardier Lt. Long

(2) A/C Attacking Bombs Dropped

(a) Target of Opportunity 34 338 x 500 LB GP
Plus 66 x 500 LB IB
Stuttgart 5 50 x 260 LB FRAGS
Jettisoning 3 28 x 500 LB GP
Plus 4 x 500 LB IB
Returning 2 8 x 500 LB GP
10 x 260 LB FRAGS

- (b) Bombing Altitude: 20850
- (e) Time of Releaset 1301
- (3) Run-In from IP to Target:

The lead and deputy lead A/C aborted which resulted in the C Squadron taking over the lead. The PFF equipment failed prior to the IP which necessitated a visual rum. The bembardier took over control of the A/C after the manuever at the IP and proceeded on the bemb rum. A 9/10 undereast made piletage practically impossible. He managed to pin point himself approximately 2 minutes from the target, but could not see the target because of clouds. He picked up a small city through a break in the clouds, synchronized and released his bembs. Bombs were released on a magnetic heading of 66 degrees. C-l Auto-Pilot was used on the bomb rum.

Tactical Report, 16 December 1944, Cont'd

- (4) Photo Intelligence Report:
 - a) The bombs from A Squadron fell in fields and on a road 1800' NE of Bietigheim, Germany, while those from B Squadron fell approximately 4.7 miles East North East and those from C Squadron 2400' N in fields.
 - (b) Smoke and clouds prevented accurate measurements of the bomb patterns of A and C Squadrons, while clouds completely obscure the bursts of B Squadron.
 - (c) The MPI of the Lead Squadron's (C) bombs was approximately left of the chosen AP.
- (5) Bombing Malfunctions:
 - C Squadron:

A/C 660: Aborted - 12 bombs jettisoned on instructions from control tower.

A/C 469: Aborted - 12 bombs jettisoned on instructions

from control tower.

B Squadron:

A/C 364: Aborted - 8 bombs jettisoned on instructions from control tower.

A Squadren:

A/C 230: Aborted - 8 bombs returned to base.

Chaff A/C 450: Aborted - 10 bombs returned to base.

- 4. Mission Camera Report:
 - a. The 95 Group installed 1 scope and 9 vertical cameras, 0 and 7 of which took pictures:
 - (1) A/C 8660: Aborted.
 - (2) A/C 8469: Aborted.
 - (3) PFF A/C 8230: Aborted.
- 5. Communications:
 - a. The 95 Group comprised the entire 13th Wing. During assembly there was an excessive amount of VHF traffic on Channel A. A security violation involving mention of Chaff aircraft occurred. Transmission and reception on Channels A, B and C was reported as clear and free from jamming. Route and target weather information was received satisfactorily.
 - b. Progress Reports sent by W/T only.

Tactical Report, 16 December 1944, Cont'd

Progress Reports:

CP1 CP2 CP3 TGT CP4 Base Timings 1039 1105 1158 1241 1400 1550 13 CBW 1215 1301 1416 1620

Strike Reports:

95 - 535 1301

- 6. Controller's Log:
 - a. Stand by until 2200 received at 1640.
 - b. Alerted at 2242 and the following info from 3BD:
 - (1) Force Required.
 - (2) Division assembly.
 - (3) Bomb load.
 - (4) Zero hour.
 - (5) Reference base altitude.
 - (6) Targets.
 - (7) Route.
 - c. At 0045 sent Advance Warning to 13 CBW FO 519.
 - d. At 0116 sent Annex 1 to 13 CBW FO 519.
 - e. At 0155 received Intelligence Annex to 3BD FO 519.
 - f. At 0307 3BD Navigator to 13 CBW Navigator: "RBA now 15000 5 minutes added to all timings."
 - g. At 0320 received 3BD FO 519 and Annex 1.
 - h. At 0322 received 93 CBW FO 181.
 - i. At 0400 received Annex 2 to 3BD FO 519.
 - j. At 0400 received 4 CBW FO 238.
 - k. At 0700 fellowing message from Major McLaughlin to Groups: "Practice mission to take off."
 - 1. At 0900 the Division Leader (95A) and the Deputy Leader (95B) aborted.
 - m. At 0930 the following message from Major Smith to Lt. Sullivan 3BD: "93 CBW will take over Division Lead."

For the Commanding Officer:

GENE C. SMITH, Major, Air Corps, Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS WINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

APO 559. 18 December 1944.

- Symbol: Operations Officers Magrative for the Mission 16 December 1944, Stutgert, Germany.
- TO a Commanding Officer, 98th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559.
- l. GRERAL MARRATIVE: The 95th Group (184 Wing leading the 3rd Division forces on this mission was composed of "A", "B", and "C" Squadrons plus six chaff ships that were scheduled to forma seperate squadron and fly high-high squadron.

The Chaff ships took off at 0757-0801 hours and assembled over base at 20,000 feet. Before Group assembly was effected however the chaff leader was informed that the Division lead had been changed to the 93rd Wing Group and that the chaff ships were to rendesvous with the 93rd Wing at Control Point one and proceed with them. This astion was followed.

95"B" Squadron took off at O614-0888 hours and assembled over base at 25,000 feet, cloud formations interfering with briefed altitude.

 $95^{8}A^{8}$ took off at 0808-0824 hours and assembled at 18,000 feet over base.

95°C" took off at 0829-0843 hours and assembled at 17,000 feet.

Before completion of assembly both "A" and "B" Squadron leaders were forced toabort because of mechanicalfailure. The deputy leader of each Squadron assumed the respective Squadron leads and completed the assembly. The control tower advised "C" Squadron leader to assume lead of the Group with "A" Squadron flying low position and "B" Squadron flying high. The tower also advised "C" leader to contact the 93rd Wing leader and have him assume Division lead.

Due to cloud formations and condensation trails Group assembly was hampered and delayed. The low squadron fell in trail of lead squadron but the high could not rendervous because of clouds. The 95th Leader contacted 95rd Wing leader and arranged to meet division formation at Control Point 1(one). This was accomplished with the 95th high squadron trailing behind but gradually overtaking the group until at Control Point 1 (one) they joined the 95th Group and completed the Group formation.

The 95th Group reached this Control Point at 1040 hours at 18,000 feet, slightly allead of the 93rd Wing. The Group made a dog leg to south of course and rejoined Division formation at 1056 hours as third group in the line.

The enemy coast was crossed at 1114 hours at an altitude of 17,000 feet. At 1129, climb to bombing altitude was begun. From this point on briefed course was followed. Near the I.P., the miskey set in the 95th Group lead

ship became inoperative thus making a visual bombing a mecessity. The I.P. was reached at 1251 at an altitude of 22,000 feet, the three squadrons took interval and all made visual runs on target. Due to undereast however little sighting could be done. The lead squadron dropped through a small break in the clouds, the two following squadrons dropped on the lead's smoke flures. Bombs for the lead were away at 1801 hours. Sally was effected and briefed Route out followed.

Upon mearing the enemy coast out the Group leader elected, because of the elected, to have all ships proceed to base individually. This was carried out.


Ships landed at 1555-1644 hours.

- 2. ARCRET NOT ATTACKING: Six chaff ships took off from base. \$2450 developed mechanical trouble and returned before being dispatched. 95"A" Squadron- Eleven a/o plus one P.F.F. left base in formation shown in Diagram "A". A/o 8230 returned before becoming dispatched. 95"B" Squadron Twelve aircraft plus one PFF left base in formation shown in Diagram "B". Aircraft plus one PFF left base in formation shown in Diagram "C". Aircraft plus one PFF left base in formation shown in Diagram "C". Aircraft 8660 and 8460 returned before becoming dispatche.
- 3. AIRCRAFT LOST: Aircraft 42-97232 last seem in formation before Group was dispersed.

MCML T. CUMMAA. Major. Air Corps. Operations Officer.

,	등사용하는 경기 시험을 하고 있는 것이 되는 것이 되는 것이 되는 것이 되었다. 강점 중점을 들고 강점이 많은 것이 되는 것이 되는 것이 되는 것이 되는 것이 되었다.
-1.	
2.	CBW BA GROUP GS GP. LEADER Col. Skuel A/C 8364 W/TSKB-L
	POSITION High DEPUTY LDR. At. Wright A/C 8760 W/T SKB-
3.	EST. TAKI TIME 0753 LST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0805 ETD BASE 0955
	ETR BASE /547
	GP. HE UARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DISSION "J" FORM STA.
1.	DATE / /44TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2.	CBW GROUP GP. LEADER & Hendrelson A/C 6583 W/T SAF-
	POSITION DEPUTY LDR LA Madegan A/C 3455 W/T SKB-V
	HE UARTERS 3D BOMBARDMENT DISTON STA.
1.	DATE / /44TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2.	CBW 43 AGROUP SC GF. LEADER of Wilson A/C 8217 W/TLZW-C
	POSITION LOW DEPUTY LDR. LA Glovel A/C 8333 W/T SAF - S
3.	EST. TAXI TIME 08/5 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0825 ETD BASE 0955
	ETR BASE <u>/547</u>
	GP.
J.	HE QUARTERS 3D BOMBARDHENT DI SION STA.
1.	DATE / /44TARGET DUTY OFFICERS
2.	CBW 13A GROUP 95 A GP. LEADER Col. True dell A/C 8230 W/TAZW- M
	POSITION Lead DEPUTY LDR. Rt. Hebring A/C 8543 W/TTYU-A
3.	EST. TAXI TIME 0805 EST. T.O. 1ST A/C 0815 ETD BASE 0955

ETR BASE /547



MEADQUARTERS RINETY FIRST BOSBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

APO 559, 17 becomber 1944.

SUBJETT: Lead Anvigator's Marravive, Minoty Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission 16 December, 1944.

TO : Commending Officer, 95th Bomb Group (ii), APT 589.

- I. We were flying as lead of the low squadron in 18 "A" Group. Takeoff was effected at 0852 and climb to rendervous altitude was started. During
 the climb the Group leader and the High Squadron leader (deputy leader) were
 forced to abort so we took ever the lead of the group upon reaching assembly
 altitude. Assembly altitude 18,000 feet was reached at 0950 but after 5 tirmuits
 of the buncher, the consensation trails were so thick that we had to move up
 1000 feet. At 1033 we had our squadron, now the lead squadron and the low
 squadron assembled. The high squadron being in trail of our formation. Prior
 to this time arrangements had been made to permit the 93rd Wing (Clambake Able)
 to lead the division to the target and return. They were properly notified
 that we would meet them at Central Point # 1 at which time we would fall in
 trail.
- 2. Control Point # 1, Orfordness, was crossed at 1040 hours at 18,000 feet with the 15 "A" still in the lead 90 we deviated to the south of briefed course to permit Clambake to pass. At 1056 sourse was set to Control Point # 2 which was reached at 1114 hours at 17,000 feet. The climb to bombing altitude was started at 5057 0353 at 1129. The briefed course was followed to the I.P. which was crossed at 1251 at 21900 feet pm course to the target. Bombs were away at 1501 hours from 21,900 feet altitude on a heading of 66° magnetic, impact being at 4858 09088.
- S. We crossed over the R.P. at 1307 and a turn to the right was started off the Rally Point. This turn brought us to the north of course till 1343 hours at 4845 -0804 where we regained the briefed route. The briefed route was followed till 1427 hours, our position being 4948-0515, altitude 14,000, where we deviated to the North in an effort to avoid weather. The Contenental coast was crossed at 1512 hours at 5121-0314 at 11,000 feet. The English coast was crossed at 5207-0135 at 1546 hours at 2,000 feet. We were over our base at 1600 hours.
- 4. The privary navigation difficulty was the weather at take-off and during the as embly. The condensation trails were a great hazard in rendezvouing the group. The HZZ equipment was not working to maximum efficiency and finally went out all together 25 minutes prior to the I.P.

JACK B. WILBOURNE, 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Lead Eavigator.

HEADQUARTERS NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (M) Office of the Operations Officer

APO 559, 17 December 1944.

- SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Marrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron mission 16 December 1944.
- TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.
- 1. We took-off at 0805 and circled bancher 23 to altitude. We took over lead of 95 B Squadron 20 minutes before time for control point one. As forming was made impossible at briefed time, and altitude by weather, and redio contact with our lead was practically inpossible we climbed to 23,000 feet and formed over the buncher. At 1041 hours we made control point one with 8 ships 2 minutes late. By essing over the channel our other 4 ships by the time we reached control point 2 at 1113 hours and 20,000 feet. Shortly thereafter the lead and low squadrons come up on us and Wing formation was complete at 18,000 feet and 1131 hours at 5040M-0533E.
- 2. The briefed route was closely followed to the I.P. We were at the I.P. at 1251 hours and 22,300 feet.
- 3. The briefed course from the I.P. to the target was followed as near as possible. Bombing was to be visual but we found the target covered and had no mickey. We dropped on 95 A smoke and bombs were away at 1303 hours, 700 Ma g heading and 22,400 feet altitude. The results were unobserved. We made a left turn from the target and passed the R.P. on the right as Gee was out Co-ordinates at R.P. time were unobserved and we made a right turn pin pointing ourselves by pilotage at 0944E and 5028N at 1312 hours.
- 3. The briefed route was followed back toward the coast till we were about at 0400% and 5028% when we turned to the north in search of a hole to let down. As weather was too bad for a formation let down we pealed off at 1513 hours at 0540% and 5110 % and returned to base singly. The average time of return to base was about 1610 hours.

FRED E. FREI, 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Navigator.



HEADQUARTERS

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NINETY FIFTH SOMBARDMENT GROUP (II) Office of the Operations Officer

APO 559, 17 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Minety Fifth "C" Squadron, Mission 16 December 1944.

- TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Op (H), APO 559.
- 1. Take-off was at 0820 we were to fly high element of lead Squadron but on abortion of leader took over lead of low squadron. Assembly was hampered by weather so Group and Division assembly was held at control point one at 1040 where English coast was left at 18,000 feet.
- 2. Enemy coast was at 5110N-0245E at 16,500 feet. Route in was followed to I.P. 4857-Q820 at 1251 hours at 21,600 feet.
- 5. I.P. to target was unobserved due to clouds. Target time was 1501 at 21,500 feet. MR 56°. RP was at 1307 hours 4905N-0920E.
- 4. Route back was flown 15 miles north of course due to bad weather. The enemy coast crossed at 6rfordness at 1552 hours at an altitude of 4,300 feet. Over base at 1600 hours.

ANDREW S. KIRK, lst Lt., Air Corp s, Lead Mavigator.

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HEADQUARTERS NINETY FIFTH HOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

17 December 1944

- SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 16 December 1944, Stuttgart, Germany.
- TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.
 - 1. Narrative.
 - a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B, C-2 and A.F.C.B. equipment.
 - b. A left turn of about 30° was made at the I.P.
 - c. Somb bay doors were opened at this point at 1251 hours.
 - d. Enemy resistance had no effect on the bombing run. Weather had little effect on the bombing run. There were no unusual hostile tactics which interfered with the bombing run.
 - e. Results of bombing were unobserved.
 - f. There are no suggested tactical changes to be made.
 - 2. Bombardier's form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C	Bombs			Fuzing
Main Bombfall Over Target Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Nose Tail
Bietigheim, Germany. 11 11	108	500#	M-64	1/10 1/100
	20	500#	M-17	Open @ 5000!
Total on Target.	Same	as abo	ve.	
Bombs Returned.	0			
Other Expenditures (Jettisioned)	20	500 #	M-64	1/10 1/100
	4	500#	M-17	Open @ 5000*
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).	128	500#	M-64	1/10 1/100
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	24	50 0 #	M-17	Open @ 5000

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on target of opportunity were trained out at an 80' interval and armed.

MAHLON H. LONG JR. 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier.

CENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS MINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

17 December 1944

Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Hinety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 16 December 1944, Stuttgart, Germany.

- : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F. 10
- Bombing Approach and Run I.P. was made good and course to target was as briefed. Bomb bay doors had to be cranked open during bomb, run. Mickey set was out and run had to be made visually with only slight breaks in clouds. I saw one check point (portion of Autobahn) but did not see enouth of it to pin point myself. The time from Autobahn to target was two to 22 minutes and when this time was just about out I tried to find the target but could not due to clouds. A small break came and a city was glimpsed through it. Course was good and only a small rate correction was necessary to place cross hairs on it. The whole operation was a matter of 15 seconds. Bombs were away at 1301 hours.
- 2. Dispostion of Bombs 13 A/C were dispatched with 95th "A" Squadron. A/C #8469 aborted and jettisioned 10 x 500# G.P. M-64 and 2 x M-17 incendaries. A/C #8660 aborted and jettisioned 10 x 500# G.P. M-64 bombs and 2 x N-17 incendaries on instructions from tower. Thus 10 A/C were ever a target of opportunity dropping 108 x 500# G.P. M-64 bombs and 20 x M-17 incendaries. All U.P. bombs were fused 1/10 nose and 1/100 tail. All M-17 bombs were set to break open at 5000.
- 5. Types of Release All bombs dropped on target of opportunity were trained out at an 80' interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C		Box	mbs	Pusing			
Main Bombfall Over Target	Bombing	No .	8150	Type	Nose Tail		
Bietigheim, Germany. 11	11	108	500 #	M-64	1/10 1/100		
		20	50 0#	M-17	Open @ 5000'		
Total on Target.		Samo	as Above.				
Bombs Returned.		0					
Other Expenditures (jettisioned)		20	50 0#	M-64	1/10 1/100		
		4	500 #	M-17	Open @ 50001		
Total (loaded on A/C taking off)	•	128	500 #	M-64	1/10 1/100		
·		24	50 0∦	M-17	Open @ 5000*		

MAHLON H. LONG JR. 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier.

HRADQUARTERS HINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

2. Disposition of Bombs - A/C were dispatched with 95th "B" Squadron.

A/C #8364 aborted and lettisioned 8 x 500# G.P. AN-M44 bombs. Thus 18 A/C

Office of the Operations Officer

17 December 1944

E-F-26

TO

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Marrative, Ninety Pifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 16 December 1944, Stuttgart, Germany.

10 : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Bombing Approach and Run - Lead bombardier's ship landed at strange field. There is no one bombing except that he was seen to drop on the smoke flares of lead squadron 13th "A" Group.

were over a target of opprotunity dropping 120 x 500# G.P. M-64 and 24 x M-17's. All G.P. bombs were fused 1/10 nose and 1/100 tail. All M-17 bombs were fuzed to break open at 5000'.

Types of Release - All bombs dropped were trained out at an 80° interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C	Bombs	Pusi <u>ng</u>			
Main Bombfall Over Target Bombing	No. Size	Type	Nose Tail		
Bietigheim, Germany. 12 12	120 500#	M-64	1/10 1/100		
Total on Target, Incendaries.	24 500#	M-17	Open @ 5000		
Total of All bombs on Target.	Same as above.	•	•		
Bombs Returned.	0				
Other Expenditures.	6 500#	M-64	1/10 1/100		
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).	128 500 }		1/10 1/100		
	24 500 ^W	M-17	Open @ 5000*		

IRVING H. LEVIH 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier,

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

17 December 1944

- SUBJE:T: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Winety Fifth "C" Squadron, Mission of 16 December 1944, Stuttgart, Germany.
- TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.
 - 1. Marrative.
 - a. Bombing aids used were 3-6-B, C-2 computors.
 - b. The maneuver at the I.P. was a turn to the left of 200.
 - c. Bomb bays were opened after turn at I.P. at 1251 hours.
 - d. Enemy resistance had no effect on the bombing run. Weather was 8/10ths undercast over target area. There were no unusual hostile tactics encountered on the bombing run.
 - e. Bombing results were observed through almost 10/10ths clouds to be in a small town.
 - f. No sugested changes in bombing technique on this target or on any target.
 - 2. Bombardier's form 12-E modified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs	- A/C		Bembs		Fising
Main Bombfall Over Target	Bombing	No.	Sise	Type	Nose Tail
Bietigheim, Germany. 11	11	110	500¥	M-64	1/10 1/100
-		22	500#	M-17	Open @ 5000*
Total on Target.		Same as	above.		
Bombs Returned.		8	500#	M-64	1/10 1/100
Other Expenditures.		0	-		•
Total (loaded on A/C taking of	f).	118	50 0 #	M-64	1/10 1/100
•		22	500#	M-17	Open @ 5000

4. Types of Release - All bombs released were trained at an 80' interval and armed.

COMPANYMAL

JAMES J. HAGGERTY let Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier.

COMMODENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

B-F-26

17 December 1944

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "C" Squadron, Mission of 16 December 1944, Stuttgart, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

- l. Bombing Approach and Run At the I.P. we made a turn to the left of 30 and after leveling out opened bomb bay doors. I synchronized once on an open spot in clouds to set up rate. As we approached target, undercast was about 8/10ths, and it was impossible to synchronize visually. Despite the red flare shot by the leader, signifying visual run, I had to instruct my pilot to follow the lead squadron in trail. I salvoed all my bombs on the smoke flares trailing from the leader's bombs. Bombs were away at 1501.
- 2. Disposition of Bombs 12 A/C were dispatched from the 95th "C" Squadron. 11 A/C were over Target of Opportunity dropping 110 x 500# G.P. bombs and 22 x M-17 bombs. A/C #8230 aborted, returning 8 x 500# G.P. bombs. All bombs were fused 1/10 nose and 1/100 tail. All M-17's were to open at an altitude of 5000'.
- 5. Types of Release All bombs released were trained at an 80° interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C		Bombs		Pusing	
Main Bombfall Over Target	Bombing	No.	Size	Type	Nose Tail
Bietigheim, Germany. 11	11	110	500#	M-64	1/10 1/100
•		22	500#	M-17	Open @ 50001
Total on Target.		Same	as a bove	•	-
Bombs Returned.		8	500 ∰	N-64	1/10 1/100
Other Expenditures.		None.	-		•
Total (leaded on A/C taking off)).	118	500 ∯	M-64	1/10 1/100
· ·		22	500#	M-17	Open @ 50001

JAMES J. HAGGERTY lat Lt.m Air Corps, Lead Bombardier.

CONFIDENTIAL

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Engineering Officer

APO 559. 17 December 1944.

V-A-1.

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission of 16 December 1944.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H). Attention: Lt Col STUART.

- The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of 16 December 1944.
 - Forty-four (44) B-17 airplanes took-off as scheduled. b. Thirty-five (35) B-17 airplanes returned to base after completion of combat mission.
 - c. B-17's 42-97232 and 43-38288 are missing. B-17 43-38760 landed at Leiston; 42-107204 landed at
 - There were five (5) abortive airplanes.

Thorpe-Abbott.

- Two (2) burned-out valves on mickey set. 44-8230
- 43-38660 Aircraft couldn't find formation. - Pitot tubes froze due to heaters being out 44-8364
- causing airspeed indicator to be inoperative.
- 42-102450 #3 supercharger flux sating 10" at altitude. 43-38469 - Aircraft couldn't find formation.
- 3. There was no battle damage.

DONALD H. DOWLIN. Capt., Air Corps, Base Engr. Officer.

HEADQUARTERS NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

16 December 1944

SUBJECT: S-2 Letter 95A,B,C.

- TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Gp. (H), APO 559.
- l. Eleven plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Gp. took off beginning 0815 hours to form the lead squadron of the 15th A Combat Group to attack a M/Y in Stuttgart. A/C 8250 aborted 5 miles HW of the base at 0845 hours because Mickey set was inoperative. Twelve plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Gp. took off beginning 0805 hours to form the high squadron of the 15th A Combat Group to attack a M/Y in Stuttgart. A/C 8364 aborted over the base because no airspeed reading could be abtained.

Twelve plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Gp. took off beginning 0825 to form the low squadron of the 13th A Combat Group to attack a M/Y in Stuttgart. A/C 8660 and 8469 aborted at 50°49'N-03°00E and 52°22'N-01°40'E respectively because of inability to find the formation.

Six A/C from the 95th Gp. took off beginning 0755 hours to form the chaff squadron for the 3rd Division in the attack on a M/Y in Stuttgart. A/C 2450 returned to base at 1128 hours because of mechanical difficulty.

- 2. No E/A were encountered.
- 5. Flak was encountered as follows. Stuttgart - mederate, inaccurate and barrage. 4852-0912 - meager, inaccurate and barrage.
- 4. Strike photos show poor bembing results. A target of opportunity, Bietigheim, was bombed by 95C squadron with a visual sighting of 10 seconds. 95A & B squadrons released on smoke markers of 95C, because the PPF ships of these squadrons had aborted. The chaff ships at the lead of the division column dropped their bombs on an unknown target. There was a solid undercast and no PFF ship was flying with this formation.
- 5. Fighter support was excellent. Assembly was not affected until C.P. I was reached, because of weather conditions. The high squadron was behind until 50°00'N-04°30'E. Because 95A and B PFF A/C aborted, this combat group fell into third place in the division stream. 95C Mickey was acting up all the way and went out just before the assigned I.P, and as a result the visual run was made on Bietigheim. The chaff ships flow with this group until C.P. I was reached and then moved forward to the lead of the division

eclumn. On the route back at about 50°50'N-04°00'E clouds to 25,000 feet forced a turn northward to try to go around. Lew on exygen and gus, the A/C broke off individually through the clouds and landed as such. A/C 8760 landed at Leiston and A/C 7204 at Thorpe Abbot. A/C 7232 and 8288 are outstanding. All other A/C returned to base by 1644.hours.

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other A/C returned to base by 1644.hours.

WILLIAM ROWELL,

and Lt., Air Corps,

Assit. 8-2 Officer.

Priority

Secret

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Headquarters 95th Bomb Group 16 December 1944 2280 8-2

D

Operational Marrative 16 December Stuttgart 95th Bomb Group5.....

1. Leaflets: Hone.

Authority NNI)

2. Bembing Results: strike photos show bembing results poor. A target of opportunity Bietighein was bembed by 95C squadron with an abnormal visual sighting of ten seconds. 95A and 95B squadrons released on the smoke markers of 95C bedause their PFF lead A/C had aborted. But one pattern of bembs is visable through clouds on the interest print and that is one half mele H of Bietigheim. The six chaff A/C formed at the head of the Division column and dropped frag bembs on an unknown target. The area was solid cloud severed and there was no PFF A/C leading this unit.

5. E/A: None seen and none encountered.

- 4. Flak: 4852-0912-meagre, inaccurate, barrage, Stuttgart-moderate, inaccurate, barrage. 4842-0742-meagre, inaccurate barrage.
- 5. Weather: because of multi layered clouds and dense persistent contrails, all assembly points were missed up to CPI. Clouds were solid up to the assigned IP where the 10/10ths coverage gave occasional breaks of 5 to 10 seconds duration from the assigned IP to the target Bietigheim. East of this point the continent was clear. On route back at about 5050-0400 clouds to 25000 fenced a turn north-ward, to try to go around. Low on exygen and gas the A/C broke off individually through the clouds and landed individually.
- 6. Observations.
- 1. 4845-0725-at 1214 hours 60-100 box cars in M/Y.
- 2. 4847-0915-at 1304 hours smoke screen along river stopped as formation headed for the target.
- 5. 4844-0920-at 1304 hours smoke pots on Fils river.
- 4. 4905-0920-at 1306 hours two trains headed NE.
- 5. Area of 4847-0915 at 1312 hours bombs dropped on A/C no bombs on hangers.
- 6. 4842-0944 at 1312 hours single train heading east.
- 7. 4842-0942 at 1312 hours A/C with 14 T/E and 25-30 8/E fighters one 4 engine A/C with 3 rudders.
- 8. 4908-0944-at 1313 hours A/C with B-17 definately a 4 engine A/C on tais strip at end of long runway. At IP a B-17 10-15 miles away not associated with a formation and did not go over target area but headed towards RP might be same A/C acting as enemy scout.
- 9. 4854-0918-at 1318 hours fires in town. Brown smake and solid flame in built up area.
 10. 4842-0913-at 1324 hours A/C with damaged buildings seemed rebuilt. Revetments on hardstands. No activity. 24 fighters and one 4 engine bomber.
- 11. 4842-0748-at 1345 hours 16-24 landing barges anchored in rives.
- 12. 4846-0855-at 1620 hours A/C hangars damaged but runways OK.
- 13. 4842-0912 at 1520 hours A/C at Plieninger being reconstructed. Runways servicable.
- 14. 4840-0925 small luninous bodies, searchlights or oiltanks north of autobahn.
- 15. 4847-0915 north partof Stuttgart and Ludwigsburg six miles to north burning.
- 7. Other Information: fighter estort gave close and excellent cover. Assembly was not effected till #FE/CPI as noted in 5, and the high squadron was behind till about 6000-0430. Because 95A and B PFF A/C aborted this combat Group fell in, in third place in the division stream. 950 mickey was acting up all the way in and went out just before the assigned IP. The bombardier knowing he was NNW of the assigned target N of Stuttgart and seeing a town on yourse through a cloud break made a ten second visual run on the town of Bietigheim as a TO. 95 A and B having no HSX, released on the smoke markers of 950. Due to weather on route back the formation broke up and A/C returned to bases individually as noted in \$. A/C 8760 which assumed lead of 958 squadron landed away from this base. A/C 7232 and 8288 of 95 A squadron bombed with the squadron but are unaccounted for at this time. The six chaff A/C assembled with the 95th Group at CPI and then moved forward in the division stream to the head of the column, thereafter following SOP. 8. PFF Information: A. 5 PFF airborne. B. 2 sets failed to operate. #8230 burned out a tube-aborted. #8217 burned out a tube-went path/on. #8634 abouted due to engine trouble. C. 8217 got 30 miles or less up to IP then set failed. D. We. E. Owen low aguadron lead took over lead of 95th Group. Scheduled: Lead Squadron Capt McCardia. High Squadron-F/O Feeley. Low Squadron-2nd Lt Owen.



HEADS BURNY ALL PORCE



INTONO SUMMARY NO. 230

PERIOD: 0001 hours 16 December 1944. to 2400 hours 16 December 1944.

A. STATISTICS

			Losses								
	Mission	2 124 9 2	· <u>flortie</u>	s Atks-	<u>Tomosige</u>	Claims	坐	AA	N/E	<u>ot</u>	Totals
Heavy Bomber	itks. 1	236	115	115	329.1	0-0-0	0	0	3	3	6
Fighter Escor	1	114	106	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	.0
Fighter Sweep	8 0	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0.	0	0
Fighter Bombin	ng O	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	O	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	0	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	o	0	0	. 0
Weather Recon.	. 4	18	18	O	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	• 1	2	2	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	. O ,
Special Operat	tions 4	16	_15	_0	<u>.</u>	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	<u>o</u>
Totals	s 11	386	256	115	329+1	0-0-0	0	0	3	3.	. 6 ``

⁺ Includes 116 B-17s (1st Division) dispatched but recalled during assembly due to adverse weather conditions. Losses: 3 B-17s (2 crashed on return, 1 crashed after crew baled out).

Operation of 2nd Division cancelled prior to assembly.

B. OFERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

Three group formations (120 B-17s, 3rd Division) dispatched against Stuttgart M/Y. 115 a/c dropped 276 tons CP and 53.1 tons IB on assigned target, city of Bietigheim and one u/i T/O at 1249-1259 hours from 21,700-22,500 feet. Stuttgart bombed on H2X with some visual assists, Bietigheim visually. Weather: 5/10 - 8/10 in target area. Flak: meager, inaccurate at Stuttgart. Battle damage: 9 minor, 0 major. E/a opposition: nil. Losses: 3 B-17s to unknown causes.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

Assigned Target		ispatched	Attackin	g Topine	go TB	Bemite
a grand and are			+ + C		=	
Stuttgart M/Y		120	81	189.0	36.3	Good

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Other Transpote	Dispertaned At	tacking Tonr	ago Results	3
		<u> </u>	B	
Biotigheim T/O		33 84.5	16.3 Poor	
T/ ()		2.5		
	120	276.0	53.1	,

2. Fighter Escort

Three groups (114 P-51s) dispatched to support bombers attacking Stuttgart. Up 1021-1046 hours, down 1545-1550 hours. 106 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. One jet a/c sighted vicinity Baden Baden. Claims: nil. Losses: nil (33 a/c landed safely on Continent, 14 a/c diverted to other A/Fs in U.K.).

3. Fighter Sweeps

Nil

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil:

5. Photo Reconnaissance

Nil

6. Weather Reconnaissance

18 a/c (10 P-51s, 4 B-17s, 4 Mosquitoes) dispatched. 2 B-17s completed routine flights over Atlantic to west of England. 2 B-17s flew routine flights to and from Azores. 4 Mosquitoes completed special flights over England, central and western France, Belgium and SW Germany. 10 P-51s as weather scouts for heavy bombers. No losses.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

2 P-47s dispatched and completed routine patrol. No incidents reported.

8. Special Operations

16 a/c dispatched as follows:

- 6 P-51s dispatched as airborne relays. No losses.
- 2 Mosquitoes completed special operational flights over Holland. No losses.
- 3 B-17s dispatched on leaflet operation. One a/c aborted. Two a/c completed mission dropping leaflets over France and Germany. No losses.
- 5 B-24s dispatched on RCM mission, jamming from 0830 to 1230 hours.

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C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enery Air Opposition

Adverse weather conditions probably account for the lack of opposition to today's comparatively small scale heavy bomber effort. The enemy apparently appreciated that a major attack was not imminent and decided against attempting to intercept under the difficult though not prohibitive weather conditions. The only e/a sighted was a probable Me-262 reported flying above an escorting P-51 formation in the Baden Baden area without attempting to engage.

2. Flak

Stuttgart - meager, inaccurate.

3. Observations

A/F at 4842N-0942E (Coppingen), 14 t/e e/a, 25-30 s/e e/a and one 4engined a/c with triple rudders.

A/F at 4842N-0913E (Plieningen). 24 e/a and a 4-engined e/a also a great

deal of construction work going on.

At 4840N-0925E, small luminous objects in fields north of autobahn. A/F at 4907N-0946E (Hall), 18 s/e e/a observed dispersed on field with one s/e e/a taking off. Also reported on this A/F was an O.D. B-17 definitely identified as such by a number of crews.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Kornwestheim M/Y at Stuttgart - Good Results

Pattern of one squadron is well-centered on the south end of the yard, north end of the locomotive depot and extends into the edge of the town. At least four hits noted on the locomotive depot buildings, eighteen hits on the M/Y (one of which caused an explosion) and seven hits on the rail-served storage depot. There were four hits and three near misses on the three large factory-type buildings just east of the south end of the yard. Inter photos show incendiaries were distributed throughout the area. Yards were quite heavily loaded. Another tight pattern fell on the main line entering the north end of the yard just above the choke point. An over-pass appeared to have been hit in this area and three hits were noted on a group of seven warehouses or factory-type buildings : about 400 yards east of the line. A third pattern fell on the west edge of Ludwigsburg covering about one-half to two-thirds of the area occupied by the Stuttgart/Indwigsburg II Barracks. Several barracks buildings were under the pattern. Six squadrons dropped in open country six to nine miles north of the target; part of one of these covered one-third of a small village of Gr. Ingersheim.

Bietigheim - Poor Results

Bombs fell in open country just north of town and about 7-1/2 miles N-NW of Stuttgart M/Y.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.