

IN INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. 3365

LOCALITY: DUREN (Area No. 2 on Special Photo Map)

238

DO DODER REVIEW

This report deals with demage to the target up to 1355A hours on 16 NOV 1944, and includes the results of the attack by aircraft of U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE on 16 NOV 1944. It may also include damage inflicted by ground forces up to the time of photography. (S.A. 2921)

PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE

Area No. 2 is fully covered and. in addition. Area No. 7 is covered on small scale prints and partly on a large scale single print of fair quality. Area No. 8 is covered on small scale prints. (Notes on gun positions are supplied by B Section).

AREA NO. 2

Many craters are seen in the North and East of this area, with a group of large craters in the West centre of the village of Langerwehe which lies in the area. Small groups of craters are seen North, East and South of the railway. Smoke is seen issuing from a burning factory building on the East bank of the river Wehe which runs through the village of Langerwehe.

There are near misses at each cluster of gun-posts but none appears to have received direct hits. No artillery emplacements can be seen.

AREA NO. 7

A large number of craters is seen across the South of Area 7, under a mile North of Area 2.

Two and possibly three of the positions reported as containing artillery are covered on a single print of poor quality. The gun positions cannot be seen and there are no hits seen near enough to the reported positions to have damaged them.

AREA NO. 8

There is a concentration of small craters across the South of Area 8, one and a quarter miles East of Area 2.

This area is covered only on small scale prints. There are numerous craters and the area of two of the gun positions reported is blanketed with craters but the gun positions cannot be seen owing to the smallness of the scale.

GENERAL

Between Areas Nos. 2. 7, and 8, there are many small craters spread over the whole district.

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 13 Squadron. 7 Ph GP.

SORTIE: US/7CR/3583.

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 1355A: 16 NOV 1944.

SCALE: 1/8,200 (F.L.24") and 1/33,600 (F.L.6")

COVER AND QUALITY: The target is covered on prints of fair quality. In addition, Area 7 is covered on small scale prints and partly on a poor quality large scale print. Area 8 is covered on small scale prints.

LAST REPORT: None.

COMPARATIVE SORTIES USED: 106G/3270 (1038/42 - 3051/4).

PRINT DISTRIBUTED: 7007, 4036, 4039, 4056 (to follow when available).

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SUPPLEMENT TO INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 2921

ATTACK ON TACTICAL TARGETS IN THE ESCHWEITER AREA IN GERMANY ON 16 NOV.

(i) For information concerning the number of aircraft, bombs dropped, and time, see the original report.

(11) ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF THE ATTACK

- (a) This report is based on photographs received after interpretation report 3.4, 2921 was issued.
- (b) Additional bursts are seen as follows:-

1. AREA. NO. 1

A group of fragmentation bursts is seen in fields at the Southeast corner of P.5, and another group extends from the autobahn will mile East of P-6 North through the village of FRENZ.

2. AREV. NO. 2

One group of fragmentation bursts extends into the area from the woods on the South. Some additional bursts are seen between LANCERVEHE and Area No. 7 to the North. Two groups of bursts are visible immediately outside the Southeast end of the area with some in the village of DHORN.

3. AREA NO. 7

One group of bursts extends from the East edge of LUCHERBERG immediately North of the area, into the adjacent lake. Two groups are visible a mile West of the area. Smoke from a probable fire is visible in the industrial installation on the West side of LUCHEM

(iii) ADDITIONAL BOMB PLOT

A diagramatic bomb plot showing the additional groups of fragmentation bursts has been prepared, and will be distributed.

(iv) ADDITIONAL PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED

SAV	34/346,343,349	1135A hrs. 16	NOV 44	1/35.600	(F.L. 7")	20,7501	fBf
11	44,/1258	1239A "	11	1/36,000	ที่	21,000	n
11 -	91/785,786,789	12224 "	Ħ	1/36,000	11	21,0001	Ħ
11	92/687,688	11534 "	17	1/21.700	(F.L.12")	21,7001	11
11	92/686,689	11	.11	1/38,800	(F.L. 7")		tC t
11	937,1126,1127,112	9.72504 11	11	1/36,000	11	21,000	1B1
11	94/1116	Unknown "	11	1/23,000	(F.L.12")	23,000	11
11	95/11.78-1180	11144 "	n .	1/40,250		23,500	11
11	100/1012,1013-101		11	1/37,300	11	21,750	tCt
Ħ	303/1169,1170	12034 "	11	1/22,700	(F.L.12")	22,7001	tBt
Ħ	303/1172	12114 "	#	1/39,300		22,9001	101
- 11	305/911,912,914,			-, 5,,,500	(, ,	iding you	_
	915.	1156-1200A hrs.	tt	1/39,400	(F.L. 7")	23,0001	1B1
Ħ	305/913	11564 "	18	1/22,800	(F.L.12")	22,800	tBt
11	306/1076,1077,108	1.1155~1201A hrs.	11	1/34,000	(F.L. 7")	19,750	101
11	351/804,806	12104 "	11	1/22,700	(F.L.12")	22,700	tBt
17	379/655,660	1204-1212A hrs.	11	1/39,400	(F.L. 7")	23,0001	11
#	379/659	12134 hrs.	11	1/21,000	(F.L.12")	21,000	11
Ħ	384/1073,1074,1076		11	1/37,700		22,000	Ħ
	1077,1081,108	2					
11	384/1078	Unknown "	n	1/22,000	(F.L.12")	22,0001	n
Ħ	385/880	11211 ":	tt .	1/21,500	tt	21,5001	. II
11	385/881,884	11224 "	11	1/36,800	(F.L. 7")	21,500	11
tt	388/753-757	11304 "	Ħ.	1/39,000	(F.L. 7")	22,7501	tBt
11	392/1190,1192,1194	4.12394 "	17	1/36,000	11	21,000	n
Ħ	401/800.801.803	Unknown "	11	1/40,250	tt	23,500	11
Ħ	447/760-762	11244 "	n	1/37,700	11	22,0001	101
						•	

alk

S.A. 2921 (cont'd)

448/934,935 1/36,800 (F.L. 7") 21,500 1B 1131-1135/. 452/715-718 1/39,400 23,0001 11434 1/38,000 22,2001 457/658 1/22,600 11434 22,6001 458/596-598,600 12464 21,2501 1/36,400 486/572-574 1120. 101 1/42,000 24,000 1B1 490/390-390 1137% 1/38,600 22,5001 491/560 1/36,000 21,0001 12394 (F.L,6-3/8")23,0001 368/94 Unknown !!

233 copies.

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SUPPLEMENT TO IMMEDIATE MERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 3364

LOCALITY: ESCHWEILER (AREA NO. 1 -- SPECIAL PHOTO MAP)

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PERIOD UNDER REVIEW

This report deals with damage to the target up to 1345 A hours on 19 NOV 1944 which includes the U.S. 8th AIR FORCE attack of 16 NOV 1944. It may also include damage inflicted by ground forces up to the time of photography. (S.A. 2921 and Supplement)

PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE

As weather during the past four weeks has prevented receipt of photographs of good quality and scale, and as action by ground troops since the attack has undoubtedly made further photography of limited value, an interpretation has been made using small scale photographs taken three days after the attack.

This sortie shows a large number of craters in the target areas, believed to be principally the result of shell and mortar fire although some bomb craters are also seen.

Details arelas follows: (No statement is to be made by "B" Section)

Pt. 1.

A few craters are seen in the Northern half of the area.

Pt. 2.

A few bomb craters are seen in the centre of the area and in the extreme Southwest and Southeast corners.

Pt. 3.

A few craters are seen in the Northern corner. An unidentified object is burning about 200 yards west of the central crossroads.

Pt. 5.

Approximately 1 dozen bomb craters are seen in open fields in the Southeast corner of the area.

(Print 7032)

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 27 Squadron.

SORTIE: US7GR/3608

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 1345 A hrs. on 19 NOV 1944.

SCALE: 1/26,000 (F.L.12")

COVER AND QUALITY: Full and Good, but very small scale.

LAST REPORT: Immediate K. 3364 17 NOV 1944.

COMPARATIVE SORTIE USED: 106G/2932 (3182-6, 4180-4)

PRIMT DISTRIBUTED: Portion of 7032 (enlarged 2 x)

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S.B C R B T By Authority of C.O., 8th A.F. Initials A.A. Date

EADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE APO 634 Operational Analysis Section

8 December 1944

Report on Operation by Eighth Air Force Heavy Bombers
Against Enemy Positions in the Eschweiler-Duren Area Near Aachen, Germany
16 November 1944

The purpose of this report is to give a brief account of the results achieved from the point of view of bombing accuracy on the attack by heavy units of the Eighth Air Force against enemy positions beyond the front line near Aachen on 16 November 1944.

1. Description of Operation

On 16 November 1944 the Eighth Air Force attacked enemy positions in the area of Eschweiler and Duren, Germany. There were 104 squadrons of B-17's and B-24's participating in the attack. These squadrons were composed of from 10 to 13 aircraft loaded with 260-pound fragmentation bombs.

Bombing altitudes of most attacking squadrons were between 21,000 and 23,500 feet.

Cloud cover over the target area necessitated instrument bombing in most cases. The First and Second Divisions, generally, dropped on Gee-H, and the Third Division employed Micro-H technique. In most instances bombing was done in group formation - i.e., with a group of three or four squadrons all dropping on the lead squadron in which the aiming operation was performed on Gee-H or Micro-H.

2. Results of Operation

The following table gives a brief summary of the number of squadrons attacking, by divisions:

				Plotted					
	Number Squadrons Attacking	Size of Formation	Number Squadron Bombfalls Flotted	No. Squadrons Dropping on Gee-H or Micro-H*	No. Squadrons Dropping Visually or by H2X*				
First Division	39	12 A/C	27	16	11				
Second Division	26	10 A/C	25	22	3				
Third Division	_39	12-13 A/C	28	<u>27</u>	_1				
Total	104		80	65	15				

Includes squadrons which made no independent aiming but which dropped on another squadron in which the aiming operation was performed as described in the column heading.

VARA Date 7-19-07

The First and Second Divisions were each assigned three areas each having a Gee-H aiming point; the Third Division was assigned to one area having one Micro-H aiming point. The attached plots of squadron bombfells show the respective areas and aiming points.

Measurements of aiming errors have been made and are summarized below. All such errors have been measured with respect to the assigned Gee-H or Micro-H aiming point; range and deflection measurements are with respect to the Gee-H or Micro-H pre-computed track.

a. All Plotted Patterns Included

	lst Div.	2nd Div.	3rd Div.	Total Force
Number bombfalls plotted	27	25	28	80
Number bombfalls short of assigned A.P.	10	17	6	33
Number bombfalls long of assigned A.P.	17	8	21	46
Number bombfalls having 0 range error	0	0	1	1
Number bombfalls right of assigned A.P.	10	14	15	39
Number bombfalls left of assigned A.P.	16	10	13	39
Number bombfalls having O deflection error	. 1	1	0	2
Average circular error	97001	82001	70001	83001

It is of interest to tabulate and average these errors after having excluded the most obvious cases of gross error. Following the example of our analysis of the Metz support operation, we make such a tabulation on Page 3, excluding all releases in which the circular error was over two miles. The choice of the distance of two miles is more or less arbitrary; as more experience accumulates another choice may turn out to be more appropriate.

b. Plotted Bombfalls with Errors Over Two Miles Excluded

	lst Div.	2nd Div.	3rd Div.	Total Force
Number of patterns plotted with errors under two miles	16	18	23	57
Expressed as a per cent of all plotted	59%	72%	82%	71%
Number bombfalls short of assigned A.P.	4	16	5	25
Number bombfalls long of assigned A.P.	12	2	17	31
Number bombfells having O range error	0	0	1	1
Number bombfalls right of assigned A.P.	6	8	11	25
Number bombfalls left of assigned A.P.	9	9	12	30
Number bombfalls having O deflection error	1	1, ·	; o	2
Average circular error	45001	36001	56001	47001
Average range error	29001	28001	22001	25001
Average deflection error	29001	22001	H000	3100°
Systematic range error (i.e., the amount by which the collection of patterns within two miles of the A.P. tends to be long or short)	2100' Long	2000! Short	1900¹ Long	
Systematic deflection error (i.e., the amount by which the collection of patterns within two miles of the A.P. tends to be right or left)	500! Left	300† Left	200' Left	

3. Comments

In plotting the bombfalls shown on the attached plots, it has been necessary to approximate the location of a number of falls obscured by cloud on the strike photographs. In such cases the plotted positions are not exact. However, it is believed that any such inaccuracies in plotting are not so great as to introduce any significant mis-statement of average aiming errors.

It is reported that some squadrons dropped on H2X equipment or visually, due to failure of Gee-H or Micro-H equipment. Therefore, in one sense, the table of siming errors shown above cannot be strictly interpreted as a measure of the accuracy of the Gee-H or Micro-H bombing technique on this operation. In this latter connection, there is presented on Page 4 a short table analyzing circular errors on the following two bases:



Case I. Includes only those squadron bombfalls for which the aiming operation was carried out by a Gee-H or Micro-H equipped aircraft flying in that squadron.

Case II. Includes all bombfalls as described in Case I, plus those falls dropped by squadrons flying with and releasing on such squadrons.

Case I	lst Div.	2nd Div.	3rd Div.
Total number plotted Number within two miles of A.P. % of total Average circular error of patterns plotted within two miles of A.P.	8	7	10
	5	6	9
	62 %	86%	90%
	3500†	3600'	5700!
Case II	•	•	
Total number plotted Number within two miles of A.P. fof total Average circular error of patterns plotted within two miles of A.P.	16	22	27
	11	18	22
	69%	82%	81%
	4300'	3600!	54001

From mission narratives it has been possible to find an explanation for some of the extreme gross errors appearing on the attached plots. These are summarized below:

First Division

91 Lead, Low, and High	Gee-H out, H2X aiming.
351, Lead	Gee-H out. H2X aiming.
351 High	Gee-H out, Independent H2X aiming.
305 Lead, Low, and High	Forced off course on bomb run.
303 Lead	Gee-H and H2X out; dropped on another group.
379 Low	Gee-H out; dropped on another group.
Second Division	
392 Group	At release point group was over the 44th - held bombs and dropped over.
491 Group	Gee-H out; attempted to drop visually.

The analysis of this operation reveals conspicuous systematic range errors for each Division, when releases with circular errors over two miles are left out of account. The First and Third Divisions' plotted bombfalls tend to be over, or long of the assigned aiming points; whereas those of the Second Division reveal a short bias. On the other hand, analysis of the deflection errors reveals very little systematic bias to the right or left.

Authority 745005

By ANARA Date 7-19-07

The degree of accuracy achieved by the First and Second Divisions on this operation is somewhat higher than that recorded on the Metz ground support mission carried out on 9 November 1944. In the Third Division there is no basis for comparison because, due to weather, only three squadrons attacked the fortifications assigned as primary targets on 9 November 1944. A brief comparison of average aiming errors, including only the First and Second Divisions, follows:

	Eschweiler-Duren 16 Nov 1944	Metz Area 9 Nov 1944
Average circular error of all plotted bombfalls	9000!	104001
Percentage of plotted patterns within two miles of assigned A.P.	1s 65%	56%
Average circular error of all plotts bombfalls excluding errors over two miles	ed 40001	45001

Operational Analysis Section

Report prepared by:
Mr. L. E. Katzenbach
Dr. J. A. Clarkson
O.A.S. Consultants

Approved for release by:

LESLIE H. ARPS

Lt. Colonel, A.C.

Acting Director

Operational Analysis Section

HEADQUARTERS WINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

Authority 745005

By Anara Date 7-19-07

400 559, 20 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Report of Operations Officer, Mission of 16 November, 1944, Langerweke, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Dombardment Group (H).

95 A Squadron Formation

1. GRASHAL MARRATIVE: The 95 A Squarron Formation took off at 0732 - 0747 hours to fly as lead of 13 B c mbat Group, and assembled over the base at 18,000. Squadron and group assembly was complete by 0655 hours, and the formation detarted the base, clabing on route to wing assembly. The 390 (13A) lead group was contacted before it departed base, and the 13 B Group joined wing formation while 13 A Group was circling Bu. 11, prior to departure. Then 13 A Group departed base, the 13 B formation and no interval and was forced to "ess" somewhat in order to drop back.

Division assembly was made at 17,000' over Buncher # 10 at 0952, one minute early. The English coast was crossed at 1006 hours, 17,000' over Bungeness, and the group continued the climb across the channel in Wing formation. But Bundfall was made on clurse at 1014 hours, at 18,000'. The route to the priefed I. F. was flown as planned, and the I.F. was crossed at 1101 hours. Ground markers were plotted out by cloud coverage, but friendly flak was observed, and the SCS-51 was effective. Bombs were dropped in group formation by Micro-H methods at 1113 hours, altitude 23,800'. A 180° turn to be right was made to the right after bombs away, and the descent to minimum altitude was started. The return route was flown to the north of briefed course, intercepting the briefed route at the enemy coast. The formation passed over Calais at 1254's hours, altitude 7.000'.

Two aircraft, #6475(95 B Squadron) and #8283(Special Operations) returned to base by 1404 hours, but all other A/C were diverted to Ramsbury due to weather conditions. The main formation returned to base on 18 Nevember, at 1204 - 1335 hours.

- 2. AIBCRASS NOT ATTACKING: Eleven A/C plus one Micro-H leader were disputched as shown in alagram A/ One A/C.No.42-38067 turned back before reaching the target, and is not credited with a sortie. The remaining eleven A/C were over the target and received sorties. In addition A/C # 8283 was dispatched on special operations and is credited with a sortie.
 - 3. AIRCHAFT LOSS: None.

95 B Squadron Formation

- 1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95 B Squadron Formation, flying as high squadron of 13 B Group, took off at 0721 0728 hours. The squadron was assembled over the base at 13,000°, and had joined group formation by 0835 hours. The remainder of the mission was flown in company with 95 4 Squadron, as high squadron of 13 B Group. Reference is made to the above narrative of 95 A Squadron for a general narrative of the balance of the mission.
- 2. AIRCHATT NOT ATTACKING: Twelve sircraft, plus one Nicro-H leader were dispatched as shown in diagram B. All were over the target and received sorties.
 - 3. LOST ATROMAPT: None.

Authority 745005
By

95 C Squadron Formation

- 1. G MERAL MARRATIVE: The 95 Squadron Formation, flying as low squadr n in 15 B Gros, took off at 0750 0814 hours
 and assembled at 11,000 over the base. Squadron and group formation were completed by 0835 hours. Reference is made to the
 above report of the 95 A Squadron formation for a general narrative of the remainder of the mission.
- 2. AIRCHAST NOT ASTACKING: Twelve aircraft, plus one H2X leader were dispatched as shown in diagram C. All were over the target and are credited with sorties.
 - 3. AIRCHAIT LOST: None.

THOMAS H. Holbrook, Lt.Co., Air orps, Operations Officer.

STA.

1. DATE / /44TARGET DUTY OFFICERS .CBW 13B GHOUP 95A GP. LEADER Capt. Frankosky A/C 7961 W/TLFM-K 2. POSITION Lead DEFUTY LDR. Lt. Metzinge A/C 8543 W/T JVA- A 3. EST. TAXI TIME 07d0 EST. T.O. IST A/C 0735 ETD BASE 0840 ETR BASE / 326 4. 'NUMBER A/C ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED / NUMBER OF SPARES ILCULA INCLUDED 5. TIME 1ST T.O. LAST T.O. TIME 1ST LANDING LAST LANDING 6. SQUARDON NO. OF A/C CALL SIGNS; W/T A/C 4.T.O. : A.T.K.: REM'S. : SQUADRON NO. OF A/C CALL SIGNS: W/T A/C : A.T.O. : A.T.R. REM'KS: SQUADRON 336 NO. OF A/C / CALL SIGNS: W/T LFM :7961: : A.T.O. :732: KEM'S. SQUADRON4/2 NO. OF A/C 11 CALL SIGNS: W/T JVA LWZEOAVDFHP :7257:8657:8281:8067:7232:8543:8288 2066:7783:6522:8441:

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KEM'S. :

H BADQUARTERS

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

E-E-26

18 November 1944

SUBJECT: Load Navigator's Marrative, Minety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 16 November 1944, Langerweke, Germany.

10 : Germanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

Authority 7450CS

NARA Date

l. We led Minety Fifth "A" Squadren which led 15th "8" Combat Group. We took off at 0752 hours and made squadren assembly on BU# 25 at 12000' at 0850 hours. Group assembly was made on BU# 25 at 12000' at 0855 hours. We were at BU# 22 at 0917 hours at 17000', BU# 10 at 0952 hours at 17000'.

2. We crossed the English coast at 0942 hours at 17000° at 5148% 0122%. At 1006 hours we were over Dungeness at 17000° at 5055% 0100%. We crossed the Enemy coast in at 1014 hours at 18000° at 5055% 0135%. The briefed I.P. was used.

5. Bombs were away at 1114 hours at 23800' with a magnetic heading of 050°. Bombs were dropped on Miore-E. The French coast out was crossed at 12342 hours at 7000' at 5052H 0136E.

4. The English coast in at 1245 hours at 7000° at 5055N 0100B. We were opposite the base at Horham at 1322 hours. We went to Ramsbury and were over the airdrame at 1410 hours and landed at 1442 hours.

JULIAN E. HUZARMVICE lat Lt., Air Gorpe, Lead Mavigator.

HEADQUARTERS

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDHENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

18 November 1944

E-2-26

KNARA Date 7.19-0

Authority 745005

- SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Missien of 16 November 1944, Langerweke, Germany.
- TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

was formed ever the base and completed at 0885 hours. At that time there was a slew climb to 18000'. There was a wing rendezvous ever BU# 10 at 0982.

2. The English coast was reached at Dungeness at 1006 hours at 18000'

as high of the 18th "5" Combat Group. We took off at 0721 hours. The group

1. We were flying as load of the Minety Fifth "B" Squadron which flow

- 2. The English coast was reached at Dungeness at 1006 hours at 18000 and control point # 2 was reached as briefed on the French coast at 1015 hours at 19000. The I.P. was reached at 1102 hours.
- 5. Bombs were away at 1114g hours. The altitude was 24280' on a magnetic heading of 060°. The French coast out was reached at 1255 hours at 5054N 0158N at 8000' and the English seast in at Dungemess at 1246 hours. We then took a direct heading home and were about the base at 1525 hours.
- 4. From the base we presented to an alternate airdrome at Hamsbury due to inclement weather conditions where we landed at 1454 hours.

WILLIAM P. DOMERTY End Lt., Air Cerps, Lend Wavigetor.

Hradquarters

MINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Office

B-B-26

18 November 1944

NRA Date 7.19-0

Authority 745CCS

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Marrative, Ninety Fifth "C" Squadren, Mission of 16 November 1944, Langerweke, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (R), A. A. F.

15th "B" Combat Group. We took off at 0742 hours. The squedron was formed ever B" 23 at 0830 hours at 11000°. Group assembly was completed at 0835 hours. A climb was then made to 16000°. Wing assembly was accomplished ever B" 22 at 16000° at 0918 hours.

1. We led the Minety Fifth "C" Squadron which flow as low in the

2. The English coast at Dungeness was left at 1007 hours as briefed. From here we began the climb and at 1018 hours made landfall on continent at 8088M 0134E. Bombing altitude was reached at the I.P. at 1102 hours.

3. Bombs were away on the primary target at 1114 hours on a magnetic heading of 062° at 22000°. The French coast out was at 5055N 0136E at 1235 hours at 6300°. Landfall on Dungeness was at 1247 hours.

4. From Dungeness we took up a heading that brought us ever the base at 1822 hours. We were then deviated to Ramsbury because of inclement weather, arriving there at 1411 hours. We landed at 1440 hours.

DANTE J. BALLATORE F/O., Air Corps, Lead Navigator.

HEADQUARTES HINETY PIPTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

B-F-26

18 November 1944

SUBJECT: Lead Benbardier's Marrative, Rimety Fifth "A" Squedrem, Mission of 16 Nevember 1944, Langerweke, Germany.

- 90 . Gennanding Officer, 95th Bembardment Group (H), A.A.F.
- 1. Bombing Approach and Run Made left turn on briefed I.P. and started down run on Micro H with beacens coming in clear, passed ever the front lines and dropped bombs at 1114 hours by Micro H. After bombs away we started turning and small hale epemed up and observed where bombs hit. Light flak was inaccurate. There was 10/10 clouds and as fighters.
- 2. Disposition of Bombs 12 A/C were dispatched with 98th "A"
 Squadron. A/C #8067 aborted over the base and flow ever the north sea to
 drop its bembs. 11 A/C were over the primary target and dropped 295 x 260#
 MS1 (210) fragmentation bembs. A/C #8441 returned 6 x 260# fragmentation
 bembs due to rack malfumetion. A/C #8066 returned 15 x 260# fragmentation
 bembs due to rack malfumetion. All bembs dropped were funed instantaneous
 nose with no tail fuse.
- 3. Types of Release All bembs dropped on the primary target were at 180' interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - AN		Bonds				
Main Bombfall Over Target Bombi	ng No.	61 30	Type	Nose Tail		
Langerweke, Germany. 11 11	295	260/	M81 (T10)	Imst.		
Total on Varget.	Same	as above	•			
Bombs Returned.	21	260 #	M81 (710)	lmst.		
Other Expenditures.	30	260	M81 (Tle)	Inst.		
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).	346	360 }	H81 (710)	Tue's.		

JOHN M. GRIFFIN 1st Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier.

Authority 745005-By ENARA Date 7-19-07

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS MINERY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

B-F-26

18 November 1944

SUBJECT: Lead Bembardier's Marrative, Minety Fifth "A" Squadron, Missiem of 16 Myember 1944, Langerwebe, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Marrative.

- a. Bombing aids used were A.F.C.B., C-2, and E-6-B computer.
- b. Made left turn on the briefed I.P.
- e. After turning off I.P. and straight and level doors were opened.
- d. (1) Beeny resistance had no effect on bombing run.
 - (2) Weather was 10/10ths coverage on bombing run.
- (5) There was light inaccurate flak on combing run but it did not interfere with bombing run.
- e. Small hole opened up after turn away from target and hits were observed on target area.
 - f. No tactical changes are to be made.
- 2. Bombardier's form 12-2 medified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C	Bombs	Pasing:		
Main Bombfall Over Target Bombing	No. Sise Type	Hose Tail		
Langerweke, Germany. 11 11	295 260f M81 (T10)	Inst.		
Total on Target.	Same as Abere.	***		
Bombs Returned.	21 260\$ MS1 (T10)	Inst.		
Other Expenditures.	30 260# M81 (T10)	Inst.		
Total (leaded on A/C taking off).	846 260# M81 (710)	Inst.		

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on the primary target were at 150° interval and armed.

JOHN M. GRIFFIN let Lt., Air Gorpe, Lead Bembardier.

COMPOENTIAL



HRADQUARTERS

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

18 Movember 1944

R-7-26

Lead Bombardier's Harrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Missien SUBJECT: of 15 November 1944, Langerweke, Germany. 10 : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

& NARA Date 7.19.0

Authority 745005

1. Bombing Approach and Run - Turned 50 left on I.P. in group formation and bombed in same formation. He fighter opposit on and flak was meager and inaccurate. Didn't see any of prearranged signals with ground troops. No evasive action taken. Bombs away at 1114 hours. Pilot picked up SC3-51.

2. Dispostion of Bombs - 13 A/C were dispatched from the 95th "B" Squadron and all were over the primary target dropping \$75 x 280\$ H81 (T10) fragmentation bombs. A/C #6588 returned 1 x 260# M81 bomb dus to a rack malfunction. Fusing was instantaneous nose and no tail.

5. Types of Release - All bembs dropped on the primary target were released on a 150' interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C Bombs Fusing Main Bombfall Over Target Bombing Size Type Nose Tail Ho. 260# M81 (T10) Langerwoke, Germany. 13 375 Inst. Total on Target. Same as Above. Bombs Returned. 1 260# H81 (T10) Inet. Other Expenditures. ٥ Total (leaded on A/C taking off). 260# M81 (T10) Inst. 376

> LEON SHEETELOFF 2nd Lt., Air Corps. Load Rombardier

HEADQUARTERS

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

B-F-26

18 Euvember 1944

SUBJECT: Lead Bembardier's Marrative, Rinety Fifth "B" Squadron, Missien of 16 November 1944, Langerweite, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (F), A.A.F.

- 1. Marrative.
 - a. Bombing aids used were 3-6-B, C-2 computer and Micro-N.
 - b. The maneuver at I.P. was a left turn of 50°.
 - s. Bombs bays opened after turn on Initial Point.
 - d. (1) Enemy resistance did not effect the bembing run.
 - (2) Weather did not effect bombing rum.
 - (3) There were no unusual tacties used by the enemy.
 - s. Bombing results were unobserved.
 - f. There are no tactical changes to be made.
- 2. Hombardier's form 12-E medified is attached.

3. Disposition of Bombs - A/C Bomba Pusing Over Target Bombing Langerweke, Germany. Siso None Tail No. Type 260# H81 (710) Trat. fotal on Target. 18 12 375 Bombs Returned. 1 260# M81 (TlO) Inst. 0 Other Expenditures. Total (leaded on A/C taking off). 376 260# H81 (T10) Inst.

4. Types of Release - All bombs dropped on the primary target were released on a 150° interval and armed.

LEON SHEWELOFF 2nd Lt., Air Corps, Load Bombardier.

Authority 745005-By ENARA Date 7.18-07 CCI (I had a late of a

HEADQUARTHES NINSTY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

E-P-26

18 Movember 1944

STBJECT: Load Sombardier's Harrative, Winety Fifth "C" Squadron, Missien of 16 November 1944, Langerweke, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

Authority 745005

- l. Bomoing Approach and Run 60° turn at I.P., "C" Squadron some distance behind "A" and "B" but managed to esteh "A" Squadron on the bombing run. Cloud ocverage to left of source and clear to the right of course. Opened bomb bay deers several minutes before bombs away and trained bombs just beyond smoke trails of lead. He fighter opposition but meager flak on the bombing run. Bomb impacts seem on and right of target. Sombs away at 1114 hours.
- 2. Disposition of Bombs 13 A/C were disputched from the 95th "C" Squedron and all were ever the primary target dropping 358 x 260 M81 (710) bombs. A/C \$7154 returned 17 x 260 M81 scabs due to a rack malfunction and A/C \$8517 returned 1 x 260 M81 for the same reason. Fusing was instantaneous name and no tail.
- 3. Types of Release All bombs dropped on the primary target were released on a 150' interval and ermed.
- 4. Subular Summary A/C Boraha Pusing Main Bombfall Over Target Rombing Nose Teil ₹O. Size Type Langerweke, Germany. 13 **35**8 2605 M81 (710) Inst. Total on Treet. Same as Abovo. Bombs Returned. 18 260# M81 (710) Inst. Other Expenditures. 0 Total (loaded on a/C taking off). 376 260# E81 (T10) Inst.

MILTON A. LTTLS and Lt., Air Corps, Load Bembardier.

HEADQUARTERS

MINERY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

B_F-26

18 November 1944

Authority 7450csBy Anara Date 7-14-07

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Marrative, Ninety Pifth "C" Squadron, Mission of 16 November 1944, Langerwoke, Germany.

- TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (R), A.A.F.
 - 1. Marrative.
 - a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B. C-2 and Micro-H.
 - b. The maneuver at the I.P. was a 60° turn to the left.
 - e. Bomb bays were opened after turn at the I.P.
 - d. (1) Enemy resistance had no effect on bembing run.
 - (2) There was sloud coverage to the left of ocurse but clear to the right on the bembing run.
 - (3) No unusual hestile tacties were used by the enemy.
 - e. Bombing results were thought to be very good.
 - f. No suggested changes in bombing technique.
 - 2. Bombardier's form 12-2 medified is attached.
- S. Disposition of Bumbs A/C Bombs Fusing Main Bombfall Over Target Bombing Mass Tail No. Size Type 260# M81 (Y10) Langerweke, Germany. 13 13 358 Inst. Total on Inrgot. Same as Abeve. Bombs Returned. 18 260# M81 (T10) Inst. Other Expenditures. 0 Total (leaded on A/C taking off). 376 260# M61 (710) Inst.
- 4. Types of Release All bembs dropped on the primary target were released on a 150' interval and armed.

MILTON B. LYTLE and Lt., Air Corps. Load Combardier.

APO

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission 16 November 1944.

HEADQUARTERS

: Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Gp (H). Attn: Lt Col MUMFORD.

Thirty-eight (38) B-17G airplanes took-off.

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission

TO

16 November 1944.

There was one (1) abortive airplane.

48-38067 - #4 supercharger inoperative. Aircraft landed at WOODBRIDGE due to field being closed in by weather.

3. Battle damage is as follows:

a. 42-97961 - Right outer wing panel damaged. Tokio tank puncutred.

CLARENCE D. FIELDS Major, Air Corps Base Engr. Officer

V-A-2

559.

18 November 1944.

Authority 745005By ENARA Date 7-19-07

HEADQUARTERS MINERY-FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Intelligence Officer

APO 559 16 Nevember 1944

SUBJECT: S-2 Report Mission of 16 November 1944.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), AFO 559, U. S. Army.

1. Eleven A/C plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Group took off beginning at 0752 hours to form the lead squadron of the 138 Combat Group to attack area No. 2. Duren. A/C 8067 aborted over the field due to No. 4 turbo failure.

Twelve A/C plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Group took off beginning at 0721 hours to form the high squadron of the 13B Combat Group to attack area He. 2. Duren.

Twelve A/C plus one PFF A/C from the 95th Group took off beginning at 0750 hours to form the low squadron of the 15B Combat Group to attack area No. 2. Duren.

- 2. We enough A/C were encountered, although two undentified jets were seen over this base at 0785 hours, watching the assembly from about 28,000 feet. One jet, believed to be a Me-262, was seen 7 miles NE of the base. One top turnet gunner fired and the jet turned off.
- 8/ Flak was encountered in the target area which was inaccurate, meagre, tracking and barrage.
- 4. Bembing was done by Micro-H technique in Group formation. Mickey operator of lead squadren believed that bembs hit in target area, which was also substantiated by crews. Strike photos were taken but target could not be identified due to clouds and smoke.
- 5. Fighter support was good. Havigational aids such as ground markers and barrage balloons were ineffective. Friendly flak was visible, but was not red as briefed. A/C 5475 and 8285 returned the same day of this operation, but all other A/C were diverted to Remsbury due to weather conditions. Those p lanes returned to the field on 18 November 1944.

WILLIAM ROWELL, 2nd. Lt., Air Corps, Ass't. S-2 Officer.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE AAF STATION 101 APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 200

PERIOD: 0001 hours 16 November 1944 to 2400 hours 16 November 1944.

A. STATISTICS (x)

<u>Mi</u>	ssions	Disp.	Sorties	Atkg.	Tonnage	Claims		Loss A AA		OT	Tota
Heavy Bomber Atks	. 1	1239++	1213	1204	4120.2	0=0=0	O	0,0	. 0	4	4
Fighter Escort	9	485	460	0	0	0-0-0	0	1	5	c	6
Fighter Sweeps	0	0	. 0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	. 0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	14	14	12	· . O: .	. 0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	4	24	23	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air/Sea Rescue	1	16	16	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>.</u>	23	20	0	0	0-0-0	<u>o</u> .	<u>o</u>	1	<u>o</u>	1
Totals	33	1801	1744	1204	4120.2	0-0-0	0	1	6	. 4.	11

⁺ Adverse weather forced majority of bombers and fighters to be diverted on return to UK. Statistics represent approximations in some instances.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

Thirty combat wings (996 B-17s, 243 B-24s - 1239 a/c) dispatched against tactical targets in areas east of Aachen. 1204 a/c dropped 4120.2 tons fragmentation bombs in assigned areas. All bombing on FF. Dense haze at home bases caused nearly all a/c to be diverted on return to UK. E/a opposition: nil. Losses: 4 B-17s, all to unknown causes.

First Force

Thirteen combat wings (495 B-17s - 3rd Division) dispatched against tactical targets west of Duren. 486 a/c dropped 1688.1 tons fragmentation bombs in assigned areas at 1113 - 1139 hours from 19,500 - 20,000 feet. Bombing on H2X and Micro-H. Leaflets dropped in Duren area. Weather: 6/10 - 8/10 in target area with occasional breaks. Dense haze at home bases caused all but

^{++ 27} spares, 20 used.

SECRET

90 a/c to be diverted to other bases. Flak: nil to meager, inaccurate. Battle damage: 7 minor, 1 major, E/a opposition: nil. Losses: 2 B-17s both to unknown causes.

Fighter Support - Three groups (159 P-51s) dispatched. An additional group of P-47s originally assigned to support First Force B-17s made late take-off due to closed in field and supported Ninth Air Force medium bombers. Up 0945 - 0954 hours, down 1400 - 1630 hours. 151 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 1 P-51, category "E" (crashed in England).

Details of bomber attack as follows:

Assigned Target		Dispatche B-17s	ed A	ttacking	Tonnage Frag.	<u>Results</u>
Tactical Targets	, part	•			. A second	Arrest Contract
West of Duren	1.5 %	495	m _e	486	1688.1	Unobserved

Second Force

Authority 745005

Thirteen combat wings (501 B-17s - 1st Division) dispatched against tactical targets in area north of Eschweiler. 490 a/c dropped 1776.3 tons fragmentation bombs on assigned area at 1142 - 1225 hours from 20,000 - 24,000 feet. Twelve combat wings bombed on H2X and Gee-H, one combat wing bombed visually. Leaflets dropped in target area. Weather: 6/10 - 9/10 over target. One combat wing bombed visually through 2/10 - 3/10 cloud. Dense haze made necessary diversion of most a/c on return to UK. Flak: meager, inaccurate in target area. Battle damage: 7 minor, 1 major (incomplete). E/a opposition: nil. Losses: 2 B-17s, both to unknown reasons.

Fighter Support - Four groups scheduled to support Second Force B-17s were unable to take-off due to adverse weather conditions. Bombers covered by overlapping escort of other fighters.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

Assigned Target	<u>Dispatched</u> <u>B-17s</u>	Attacking	Tonnage Frag.	Results
Tactical Targets North of Eschweiler	50 1	490		Unobserved

Third Force

Four combat wings (243 B-24s - 2nd Division) dispatched against tactical targets in area north of Eschweiler. 228 a/c dropped 655.8 tons fragmentation bombs on assigned area at 1235 - 1248 hours from 21,000 - 23,000 feet. Bombing on Gee-H. Leaflets dropped in Eschweiler area. Weather: 6/10 - 10/10 cloud with breaks and ground haze in target area. Zero ceiling at bases caused all a/c to be diverted to other bases on return. Flak: meager, inaccurate at target. Battle damage: report unavailable. E/a opposition: nil. Losses: nil.

SECRET

Fighter Support: Two groups (107 P-513) dispatched. Two additional groups unable to take-off due to adverse weather. Up 1119 - 1140 hours, down 1530 - 1605 hours. 98 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. Both groups strafed transportation targets in Giessen, Marburg and Berleburg areas. Losses: 4 P-51s (1 to AA, 3 category "E").

Details of bomber attack as follows:

Assigned Torget	Dispatched B-24s	Attacking	Tonnago Frag.	Results
Tactical Targets North of Eschweiler	243	228	655.8	Unobserved

Fourth Force

DECLASSIFIED THE 74500S

Ninth Air Force medium bombers.

Fighter Support: Four groups (106 P-47s, 113 P-51s - 219 a/c) dispatched. Up 100% - 1201 hours, down 1400 - 1558 hours. 211 sorties. Two groups also supported heavy bombers. E/a opposition: nil. Losses: 1 P-51 category "E" (crash-landed in England).

2. Fighter Escort

Nine fighter groups (379 P-51s, 106 P-47s - 485 a/c) dispatched to support Eighth and Ninth Air Force bombers attacking tactical targets in area east of Aachen. Up 0954 - 1201 hours, down 1400 - 1605 hours. 460 sorties. Six additional groups unable to take off due to adverse weather conditions. E/a opposition: nil. Two groups strafed transportation targets in Giessen, Marburg and Berleburg areas. Losses: 6 P-51s.

Ground claims are as follows:


	Destroyed	Damaged
Locomotives Large trucks Gas trucks Power Station Switch house	8 2 1 1	2 2 0 0
Goods wagons	Ö	50

3. Fighter Sweeps

Nil.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.



5. Photo Reconnaissance

Fourteen a/c (10 F-5s, 4 Spitfires) dispatched. Two missions were cancelled and 2 missions failed to obtain photos due to clouds. Five a/c failed to get photos of assigned targets due to cloud cover but obtained other photos. Remaining missions obtained photos of Enschweiler, Duren, Bielefeld, Munster, Cologne, Hanm, Rheydt, Gelsenkirchen and Duisburg. All a/c returned safely to base.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

Twenty-four a/c (16 P-51s, 5 Mosquitoes, 3 B-24s) dispatched. P-51s scouted bomber forces. Two B-24s completed routine weather flights over Atlant and Azores. One B-24 dispatched to Azores was recalled due to bad weather at destination. Five Mosquitoes completed special weather flights over UK, eastern Atlantic, North Sea, Holland, Belgium and Germany. One Mosquito sighted 2 jet-propelled a/c, 1 at 5145N-0420E and 1 at 5200N-0545E. All a/c returned safely.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

16 a/c dispatched. No incidents. All a/c returned safely.

8. Special Operations

23 a/c dispatched as follows:

2 P-47s, 11 P-51s dispatched as airborne radio relays. Two P-51s did not complete missions. All a/c returned safely.

4 B-17s dispatched as screening force. All a/c returned safely.

5 B-24s dispatched on RCM mission. Four a/c jammed between 0110 - 1305 hours. One B-24 crashed immediately after take-off. Remaining a/c returned safely.

One Mosquito completed special operation over Holland.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

No e/a were sighted by bombers or fighters. Cloud conditions and visibility would have seriously hindered enemy air defensive operations, and there was no indication of reaction.

2. Flak

The only flak met on today's bomber operation was meager and inaccurate fire in the target area.

3. Observations

Nil.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Tactical Targets - East of Aachen area - Unobserved Results.

Most SAV's are unavailable as majority of a/c were diverted. Only a limited estimate of results is possible from available photographic coverage. One combat wing which bombed visually was able to see strikes just south of the westernmost querry and along side of the autobahn in the Eschweiler area. Bomb bursts were also noted in the 1st Division target area about 1000 yards northwest of the briefed MPI, and 2 miles south of Eschweiler.

Photographic cover taken after bombing shows numerous small craters in the Eschweiler target area. Large fires are also burning in the factory area west of the target. Most of Eschweiler target area is completely smoke obscured. Hazy cover in the vicinity of Duren shows heavy concentrations with scattered craters along the northern and eastern sides of the target area. A group of unidentified buildings along the northeasterd side of Langerwehe are on fire. Further cover of Eschweiler area shows concentrations of small craters and scattered HE with numerous fires in small villages six miles north of target area to Puffendorf. Open area southeast of Eschweiler also bombed.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.