INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 2910

ATTACK ON SAARBRUCKEN MARSHALLING YARD ON 9 NOV 1944

INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK;

No. of eircraft

: 396, with full fighter escort. : U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE.

(b) Command

Time (c)

0943 to 1045A hours.

(d) Bombs 48 x 2000 lb. G.P.

1745 x 1000 lb. G.P.

742 x 1000 lb. S.A.P.

18 x 500 lb. G.F.

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK:

(a) All photographs received are 3/10 to 10/10 cloud covered making it impossible to plot many of the concentrations of bursts within the city of SAARBRUCKEN.

Groups of bursts and scattered bursts are seen in various areas in and near the city. One large explosion is seen in the canal.

- (b) Bursts are seen in and near the city as follows: (Distances are measured from the Railway Traffic Center to the approximate center of the burst area).
 - 1. At least 75 are seen in and near the canal 3/4 mile South and on residential buildings just Southwest of the canal. A large explosion is seen in the canal.
 - 2. Approximately 30 outside the East end of the Marshalling Yard. At least two hits are seen on the rail lines near the junction.
 - 3. A group of approximately 50 in open lots and on residential buildings one mile South Southeast.
 - 4. A group of at least 20 and approximately 25 scattered bursts are seen in residential areas just North.
 - 5. Scattered bursts are seen through a small opening in the clouds 1/2 mile Northeast.
 - Approximately 150 in fields 2-1/2 miles North.
 - 7. Scattered bursts are seen through an opening in the clouds three miles Southeast.
 - 8. At least 200 scattered over a wide area of woodlands and open fields 2-1/2 miles East Northeast.
 - 9. At least 25 on residential buildings and open lots just South of the village of SULZBACH six miles North Northeast.

(iii) ACTIVITY:

- 1. SAARBRUCKEN ST. ARNUAL AIRFIELD:
 - The airfield is completely covered on hazy and partially cloud obscured photographs.
 - (b) No aircraft are visible.
 - This is a decrease of one aircraft since the last full cover on 10 SEP 1944 (106G/2735).
 - The West side of the landing ground



- (d) The West side of the landing ground is obstructed by a ditch, the remainder of the landing ground appears serviceable.
- 2. SAARBRUCKEN MARSHALLING YARD:
 - (a) Only the Southeast corner of the yard is seen on partially cloud obscured photographs.
 - (b) The loading appears light to moderate on the parts visible.
- (iv) ANNOTATED PRINT: None prepared.
- (v) BOMB PLOT: None prepared.
- (vi) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

9 NOV 1944 1008A hrs. 1/23,500 (F.L.12") 23,500 * B SAV 95/1163, 1164 23,0001 96/689 10071 1/23,000 100/1004-1010 10094 # 1/38,600 (F.L. 7") 22,500° 22,500 305/904, 906, 9**0**8 1005A 305/905, 907 tt 1/22,500 (F.L.12") 351/800, 803 1/25,600 10374 " 25,6001

1/36,800 (F.L. 7") 21,500 385/872, 873 Ħ 1045A " 1000A # 11 388/747-749 · 1/39,400 23.0001 390/1093, 1094 1/38,600 22,500 1010A 390/1095 1/23,300 (F.L.12") 23,300 1010A 10414 " 447/754,7551/39,400 (F.L. 7") 23,0001 452/705-707 Ħ 10074 " 1/40,250 23,500

" 466/598 " 1000A " 1/11,300 (F.L.24") 22,5001 " 487/496, 497 " 0952A " 1/39,900 (F.L. 7") 23,3001 " 490/385, 387 " 0943A " 1/38,600 " 22,3001 "

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NARA Date

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE APO 634 Operational Analysis Section

By Authority of C. G. Eighth Air Force Initials

29 November 1944

Report on Attacks by Eighth Air Force Heavy Bombers
Against Fortifications in the Metz & Thionville Areas
9 November 1944

The purpose of this report is to give a brief account of the results achieved from the point of view of bombing accuracy on the attack by heavy units of the Eighth Air Force against fortifications beyond the front line in the Metz and Thionville areas on 9 November 1944.

1. Description of Operation

On 9 November 1944 the Eighth air Force dispatched 111 formations of B-17 and B-24 aircraft to attack fortifications in the Metz and Thionville areas. The formations were composed of squadrons of 9 to 13 aircraft. Nine different aiming points were assigned. The attacks were made with 2000 lb. and 1000 lb. high explosive bombs and 1000 lb. armor piercing bombs. Due to the presence of varying degrees of cloud cover over the targets, most of the bombing was done by Gee-H methods, in group formation - i.e., with a group of three squadrons all dropping on the lead Gee-H aircraft flying in the lead squadron.

The 1st and 2nd Divisions used two different techniques of Gee-H bombing on this mission: the 1st Division used the warning point technique, i.e., a timed run from a pre-computed point, and the 2nd Division used the newer bomb sight technique, i.e., synchronizing the bomb sight by means of check points obtained by the Gee-H navigator.

This mission was the first Gee-H operation on which the I.P. and the target were on opposite sides of the base line determined by the two ground stations.

This unusual feature caused some complications not hitherto experienced on a Gee-H mission.

2. Results of Operations

a. The following table gives a brief summary of the operation by divisions.

	No. Squadrens Dispatched	Size of Formation	No. Squadrons Attacking Primary Area	No. Squadron Bombfalls Plotted
lst Div. 2nd Div. 3rd Div.	36 39 36	12 A/C 9 & 11 A/C 12 & 13 A/C	30 36 3	21 31 3
Total	111		69	55

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The 1st and 2nd Division orders were to attack the given aiming point visually if possible, otherwise by Gee-H. The 3rd Division was ordered to bomb their primary at Thionville only if the operation were visual; actually almost all of the 3rd Division bombed an H2X secondary.

The attached plot shows the 55 plotted bombfalls.

Most of these could be located with fair precision by ground bursts in the strike photographs. These are indicated by rectangles on the plot, the size and shape of each rectangle corresponding roughly to the length and width of the pattern.

In some cases the bombfall had to be located by approximation from a bombs-away photograph in which ground detail was visible. The position of these approximations is shown by a circle; these pattern locations are not exact, but are unlikely to be misplaced over one inch (4000 feet) from the true location,

b. Tabulation of errors.

(Only the bombfalls of the 1st and 2nd Divisions in the Metz area are considered. Deflection and range errors are measured with respect to the Gee-H track.)

(i) All plotted patterns included.

	lst Div.	2nd Div.	Total Force
Number of patterns plotted	21	31	52
Number patterns short of MPI	3	6	9
Number patterns long of MPI	18	25	43
Number patterns right of MPI	15	21	36
Number patterns left of MPI	6	10	16
Average circular error	· .		2 mile

(11) Plotted patterns with errors over 2 miles excluded.

	lst Div.	2nd Div.	Total Force
Number patterns plotted with errors under 2 miles	12	17	29
Expressed as a per cent of all plotted	57%	55%	56%
Number of patterns short of MPI	0	6	6
Number of patterns long of MPI	12	11	23
Number of patterns <u>left</u> of MPI	2	7	9
Number of patterns right of MPI	10	10	20
Average circular error	50001	42001	45001
Average range error	35001	29001	
Average deflection error	25001	24001	
Systematic range error (i.e., the amount by which the collection of patterns within 2 miles of the MPI tends to be long or short)	3500 ¹ Long	1100 [†] Long	
Systematic deflection error (i.e., the amount by which the collection of petterns within 2 miles of the MPI tends to be left or right)	1400' Right	270¹ Left	

Of all bombs dropped by the 75 squadrons dispatched to the Metz area, it is estimated that between 1% and 2% fell within 1000 feet of pre-assigned MPI's.

3. Comments

- a. Strike photographs show cloud condition varying from 2/10 to 10/10. There appears to be a somewhat higher proportion of cloud in the area covered by the 1st Division than in that covered by the 2nd Division.
- b. Evidence has been obtained verbally that in several instances of 2nd Division aimings the Gee-H equipment was supplemented by visual aids.
- c. The whole operation has a strong tendency to be long of the assigned MPI's.
- d. It is noticeable that when errors over 2 miles are rejected (thus discarding the most extreme cases of gross error), the tendency to bomb long was much less marked in the case of the 2nd Division, but not in the case of the 1st Division: in other words, the tendency exhibited here by the 1st Division to bomb long shows up both when they are far off the target and when close in to it. This difference in systematic range errors may be partially attributable to the

differences in techniques employed by the two Divisions. However, it is too early to draw any final conclusions and the matter will be the subject of further reports when the data becomes available.

- e. Since the radius of the tracking circle was about 86 miles for the group of targets, a considerable curvature resulted. The variation in course between I.P. and target was 10°. The drift angle at the target was approximately 15°. It is more difficult to fly the Gee-H lattice with a large drift angle and a great variation in course between I.P. and target. These two considerations would account for some of the large deflection errors (excluding those greater than two miles).
- f. In several cases the falls of the squadrons of a group were plotted quite far apart three or four miles or over. In two of these cases reports from the groups show the reason for this:
 - 379. The 379 Lead and Low squadrons report having bombed together, the Low dropping on the smoke markers of the Lead. The 379 High squadron is reported as having made an independent release on Gee-H.

 392. Reports from 392 are that the 392 Low squadron became separated from the Lead and High. The Low squadron dropped on another group identity not known for certain, but believed to be the 44th.

Operational Analysis Section

Report prepared by:
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O.A.S. Consultants

Approved for release by:

LESLIE H. ARPS Lt. Col. A.C.

Acting Director

Operational Analysis Section

HEADQUARTEES NIMETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (E) Office of the Operations officer

Att 559, 10 Novmeber 1944.

SUBJECT: Report of Operations officer, Mission of 9 November 1944. Saarlouis. Germany.

- TO : Commanding Officer. 95th Bomb Group (M). A:O 559.
- 1. Gamenal Markativa: The 85 A Squadron formation took off at 0080-0843 hours, to lly as lead squadron of 13 A Combat Group. Assembly was affected over the base as 14,000 feet, and by 0755 both the squadron and group formation were complete. With 85 B. high Squadron and 95 C low Squadron in position, the climb to 18,000 feet was started, and 13 A Group departed the base at 0802 hours.

The route over England was flown as briefed, and the Group departed the English Coast over North Foreland at 0858, two minutes ahead of briefed schedule. Climb was started as the coast was departed, and the formation reached the French Coast on course and on time (0908 hours), at an altitude of 20,000 feet.

The course to the LLP. was flown as briefed, but cloud coverage prevented a run on the primary target. At 0953 hours course was set for the secondary, and the bomb run was started at 0957 hours at an absitude of 25,800 feet. The secondary target was not picked up by Micky, and bombs were propped on Sarlouis. Bombs were dropped in group formation at 1008 hours from 28,000 feet altitude. After bombs away the group took up a northly heading until turning at a point ten miles south of briefed course at 1040 hours. The route out praised the briefed course until it was intercepted at 1158 hours. The French coast was propped on course at 1200 hours, and the formation returned to base at 1246 hours, landing 1246 - 1307 hours in a snowstorm.

- 2. AIRCHAST NOT AITACKING: Lieven A/C plus one R2X leader left the base as shown in diagram "A". One A/C, No.42-102450 aborted before techning dispatched, and is not credited with a syrtic. The remaining claven A/C attached Saarlouis and are credited with sorties.
 - 3. LOST Aircraft: Hone.

THOMAS H. HOLDRON, Lt. Col., Air Corps, Operations officer.

559. 10 wovember 1944.

Report of Operations Officer, Mission of 9 Rovember 1944. SAARLOHIS. GERNANI.

TO : Commanding Officer. 95th somb Group (E). Ald 659.

as high squadron of 13 A Combat Group, took off at 0615 - 0631 hours. Assembly was completed over the field at 15.000 feet by 0750 hours, and the squadron joined group for action prior to departure from the base at OSOE hours. For the remainder of the myssion the 95 B Squadron flew in close support of 95 A lead squedrom, and reference is made to the above report of 25 A Squadron formation for a general marrative of the remainder of the mission.

1. GENERAL NARHATIVE: The 95 B Squadron formation, flying

The 95 B Squadron formation returned to the base in group

formation, landing at 1252-1551 hours. 2. Alkobast wor Attacklag: Twelve alrerat plus one Tro leader were departed the base as shown in diagram B. Of these A/C No. 42-97644 and No. 48-38333 aborted befor becoming discatened. and were not credited with sorties. The remaining eleven A/C were

3. LUST AIRCHAST: Rone.

over the target and received sorties.

SUBJECT

THOMAS by bolish off. Lt. Col., air Corss. Operations Officer.

DECLASSIFIED Authority (MD)
By By NARA Date Sidistry Report of Operations officer, Mission of 9 Rovember 1944. SAARLOUIS. GURKANY.

: Commanding Officer. 95th Bomb Grone (H). AVU 559. OT

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 95 C Squadron formation. flying as low squadren of 13 A Combat Group, took off at 0645 - 0732 hours and assembled over the base at 13,000 seet. The squadron was late for group assembly as acheduled, but folined group formation over buncher 23 at 0840 hours.

heference is made to the geport of 95 A Squadron formation for a general narrative of the remainder of the mission, which was flown in company with #5 A Squadron. 95 C Squadron arrived at base in group formation and landed at 1309 - 1343 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKINGS Twelve A/C plus one FFF leader were dispatched as shown in diagram "C". All thirteen A/C were over the target and received sorties.

3. LOST AIRCHAPT: Nome.

THOMAS H. HULBROOK. Lt. Col., Air Corps, Operations Officer.

DECLASSIFIED Authority &

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SCON LETTER NUMBER DESIGNATION

HEADQUARTERS HINETY FIFTH BOMBAROMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

B-3-26

9 Mavember 1944.

SUBJECT: Look Mavigator's Marrative, Einsty Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 9 November 1944, Saarlevis, Germany.

TO . Commanding Officer, 95th Bembardment Group (H), A.A.F.

- 1. We nere lead squadron of the 15th "A" Group. We took off at 0650 hours and made essembly departing the base at 0608 hours at 14000'. We reached BU# 8 at 0656 hours, BU# 25 at 0640 hours and BU# 19 at 0648 hours all at an altitude of 19000'.
- 2. We left the English coast at North Fereland at 0888 hours at 19000* and started our climb reaching the French coast at 6907 hours at 20000*. We continued on briefed course to the Initial Foint where it was observed that the primary target was covered by clouds so we preceded to the secondary target.
- 5. The mickey operator picked up what he thought was the target and turned at 0957 hours, 16 miles short of the I.P. The target did not show on his scope and we bended the term of Sagriouss at 4970% 0646% at 1006 hours at 25000° on a magnetic heading of 526° and with emmalve action to avoid scattered flak we headed on a northerly course until we arrived at a point ten miles south of the briefed course. We turned here and paralleled the briefed course to 3052% 0255% where we took briefed course.
- 4. We left the French seast at 1200 hours at an altitude of 6800' and proceeded directly to the base. We erossed the English coast at 1234 hours at 51588 01233 at 2000' and arrived at the base at 1249 hours.

ALBERT L. HILLMAN let Lt., Air Gerps, Lead Bavigater.

Authority (1/1) 1/5005

Byi-L NARA Date 7/607

COMPLENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS WINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (K) Office of the Operations Officer

B-E-26

9 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Lead Mavigator's Marrative, Minety Fifth "B" Squadron, Missien of 9 Hovember 1946, Scarlouis, Germany.

70 : Sommanding Officer, 95th Bemberdment Group (H), A.A.F.

- l. We were the high squadron of the 18th "A" Combat Group. Take off was at 0615 hours and the squadron assembled over the base at 15000° at 0780 hours. The squadron nade group assembly at 0785 hours at 15000° over the base.
- 2. From group assembly throughout the mission group formation was maintained. Bombs were away at 1008 hours at an altitude of 24500' with the group. The flight plan was followed closely throughout. We were over the base at 1245 hours and landed at 1250 hours.

PERD J. PIEPER And Lt., Air Gorps, Load Mavigator.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
MINETY FIFTH ECHBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-E-26

9 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Load Havigator's Marrative, Minety Fifth "C" Squadren, Mission of 9 November 1944, Saarlouis, Germany.

- TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bembardment Group (H), A.A.F.
- l. We flew as lead of the Ninety Fifth "G" Squadren which flew as low squadren in the 15th "A" Combat Group. We formed in group formation over BU# 23 and departed at 0840 hours at 18000°.
- 2. We remained with the group to the target and dropped bembs in group formation on P.F.F., at 1008 hours at 25000° on a true heading of 195°. The target was Saarlouis, which was secondary target. P.F.F. was inoperative in our ship.
- 5. We left formation at 1145 hours at 10000° on a true heading of 300° at 5059H G245H. Engine was out. We were over the base at 1505 hours. Route to I.P. was flown very closely. Remainder of squadron came back with the group.

Authority (1/1) 1/5005
Built Anna Dec 7-1807

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS MINETY PIFTE DOMEADDMENT GROUP (N) Office of the Operations Officer

B-F-26

9 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Load Bombardier's Marretive, Minety Fifth "B" Squadron, Missien of 9 November 1944, Saarlouis, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

l. Bombing Approach and Run - The maneuver at the I.P. was about a 270° turn to the right and a 90° back to the left. We bombed on P.P.P. in group formation. The ran was about 10 minutes. Bombs were released on smoke flares from lead equadron and were away at 1006 hours.

2. Dispostion of Bombs - 13 A/C were dispatched from the 95th *8* Squadron, 11 A/C dropped 80 x 1000# G.P. AN-M44 bombs on Smarlouis, (Smarlautern), due to mickey error, in the process of mining for secondary target. A/C # 8335 and A/C #7844 aborted due to mechanical failure and jettisioned 16 x 1000# G.P. AN-M44 hombs in north sea. One half bomb lead fused 1/10 and 1/10, other half fused 1/10 nose and 1/40 tail.

5. Types of Release - All 86 x 1000# 0.P. Ax-M44 beabs dropped were trained at 150' interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/G Kain Bombfall Over Turget Bombi Smarlouis, Germany. 11	80 1000# H-44 1/10 1/10
Total on Target. Bombs Returned.	1/10 1/40 Same as above. 0 16 1000 # M-44 1/10 1/10
Other Expenditures. Total (loaded on A/C taking eff).	1/10 1/40 96 1000# H-44 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/40

VHEAM SHPHRIAW End Lt., Air Corps, Load Bombardier.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority (ALL) 715005
By L. Mara Date 7-18-07

HRADQUARTERS: MINETY PIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

E-F-26

9 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Lead Hombardier's Sarrative, Ninety Fifth "B" Squadron, Mission of 9 November 1944, Saarlouis, Germany.

70 : Commanding Officer, Of th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Narrative.

- a. Bombing wide used were B-6-B and C-2 computers.
- b. Maneuver at I.P. was a 270° turn to right and a 90° left turn.
- c. Bomb bays were found frozen over the channel during the check and were cranked open 14 minutes before the I.P.
 - d. (1) Massay resistance was mederate flak and a heavy barrage of rockets.
 - (2) The weather around the target area was scattered to 8/10ths owneruge.
 - (3) A heavy barrage of rockets was the only outstanding interference and was to the luft of Saarbrusken.
 - e. Bembing results were unobserved.
 - f. There are no suggested testical changes to be made.
- 2. Bombardier's form 12-2 modified is attached.

5. Disposition of Bombs - A/C		Bombs		Fusing	
Nain Bombfall Over Target Bombing Saarlouis, Germany. 11 11	No. 80	Sise 1000∯	Тур о И-44	Hece Tail 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/40	
Total on Target. Bombs Returned	Same	as Abovo	•	•	
Other Expenditures.	16	1000#	M-44	1/10 1/10 1/10 1/40	
Total (loaded on A/C taking eff).	96	1000#	µ-€4	1/10 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/40	

4. Types of Release - All 98 x 1000# G.J. AN-MC4 bombs dropped were trained at 150° interval and armed.

HEADQUARTERS

MINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

B-7-26

9 Wovember 1944.

SUBJECT: Load Bembardier's Marrative, Minety Fifth "C" Squadron, Mission of S November 1964, Saarlouis, Germany.

10 : Commanding Officer, 95th Bembardment Group (H), A.A.F.

l. Bombing Approach and Run - We were at the I.P. at 0958 hours. Lead squadron made turn approximately 270° to right then 90° to left. We followed lead squadron until busis away and dropped on smoke bomb. Results were unobserved. Bombs away were at 1008 hours on a magnetic heading of about 200°.

2. Disposition of Bombs - 13 A/O were dispatched from the 95th "C" Squadron. Due to miskey error 70 x 1000# G.P. AB-844 bombs were dispped on Saarlouis (Saarlautern) in the process of aiming for Saarbrucken. A/O # 7655 took off late due to engine trouble, missed the rendezvous and bombed with the lat Division dropping 6 x 1000# G.P. AB-844 bombs. Fusing in half bombs was 1/10 nose and 1/10 tail. The other half was 1/10 nose and 1/40.

5. Types of melease - All 70 x 1000# G.P. AN-M44 bombs dropped on the target were released on a 150° interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/S	Bombs	Fusing
Hain Bombfall Over Target Bombing Saarlouis, Germany. 12 12	No. Size Type 70 1000# M-44	Nose Teil 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/40
Total on Target. Bombs Returned.	Same as Above.	
Other Expenditures.	6 1000 7 14-44	1/10 1/10 1/10 1/40
Total (leaded on A/C taking eff).	76 1000 ₂ K-44	1/10 1/10 1/10 1/40

CHANL S T. JOMES and Lt., Air Corps, Lead Bombardier.

Authority (1/1) 7/5005

Decl. Range Dec. 7-1800

HEADQUARTERS

WINETT PIFTH BONDARDHERT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

3-?-26

9 Movember 1944.

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Marrative, Minety Fifth "C" Squadron, Missien of 9 November 1944, Searlouis, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Marrative.

Total (leaded on A/C taking off).

- a. Bombing aids used were B-6-B, C-2 and P.F.F. equipment.
- b. At I.P. we made turn to right of 270° and left turn of 90° at 0968 hours.
 - s. Opened bomb bay doors after level off at I.P. at 1000 hours.

d. At I.P. at 0958 hours. Lead squadron made turn 270° to the right them 96° to left. Fellowed lead squadron until bembs away and dropped on smoke bomb at 1008 hours.

- e. Doubing results were unebserved.
- f. There are no suggested changes to be made.
- 2. Bombordier's form 12-5 modified is attached.

5. Disposition of Bo	ombs - A/C		bs	Pusing	
Main Bombfall Over Targe	st Bombing	No.	5150	Type	Hose Tail
Saarlouis, Germany. 12	12	70	1000#	N-44	1/10 1/10
Total on Target.		Samo	as Above.		
Bombs Returned.		None.			
Other Expenditures.		B	1000#	35-44	1/10 1/10

4. All 70 bombs dropped on target were released at 180° interval and were armed.

76

GMARLES T. JOHRS Sad Lt., Air Corps, Load Bembardier.

1000

¥-44

1/10 1/40

1/10 1/10

1/10 1/40

DECLASSIFIED
Authority (1/1) 7 4500
By C NARA Date 7-1807

9 Wovember 1944.

Office of the Operations Officer B-P-26

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Marrative, Minety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 9 November 1944, Saarlouis, Germany.

- TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.
- 1. Bombing Approach and Run A right turn was made onto the I.P. at 0951 hours. Group them Essed to right to avoid another group. Cloud coverage was 7/10ths. F.F.F. technique was employed. Bombs were away at 1008 hours.
- 2. Disposition of Bombs 12 A/C were dispatched from 95th "A" Squadron. Due to miskey error, 80 x 1000# G.P. AM-M44 bombs were dropped on Saarlouis (Saarlautern) in the process of siming for Saarbrucken which was the assigned secondary target. A/C #8450 aborted and jettisioned 8 x 1000# G.P. AN-M44 bombs 40 miles east of Southwold. Furing in half bombs was 1/10 and 1/40. The other half was 1/10 and 1/10.
- 5. Types of Release All 80 x 1000# G.P. bembn dropped on the target were released on a 150' interval and armed.

4. Tabular Summary - A/C	Rembs	Tusing		
Main Bombfell Over Target Berbing	No. Sise	Type	Hose Tail	
Sagriouis, Garmany. 11 11	80 1000 ∲	M-44	1/10 1/10	
*	"		1/10 1/40	
Total on Target.	Same as abov	•.		
Bombs Returned.	Kene.			
Cther Expenditures.	8 1000	H-44	1/10 1/10	
			1/10 1/40	
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).	88 1000#	K-44	1/10 1/10	
•	_	•	1/10 1/40	
			•	

RICHARD S. TREPLE lat Lt., Air Corps, Load Bombardier.

HEADQUARTERS WINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (R) Office of the Operations Officer

R-F-26

9 Fovember 1944.

SUBJECT: Lead Bombardier's Warrative, Minety Fifth "A" Squadron, Mission of 9 November 1944, Saarlouis, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

1. Warrative.

- a. Bombing aids used were E-6-B, C-2 and G-1 computers.
- b. A right turn was made just short of I.P. onto 185°.
- e. Bomb bays were opened just beyond I.P. at 0957 hours.
- d. A right turn was made onto I.P. at 0954 hours. Group them essed to right to avoid another group. Cloud severage was 7/10ths. P.F.F. technique was employed. Bembs were away at 1008 hours.
 - e. No bombing results were observed.
 - f. No tastical changes are suggested.
- 2. Bombardier's 12-% form modified are attached.

5. Disposition of Rembs - A/U		B	ompa	Pusing		
Main Bombfall Over Target Bombing Searlewis, Germany. 11 11	80	81ze 1000#	Туре Н-44	Nose Tail 1/10 1/10 1/10 1/40		
Total on Target.	Same	as above	•	,		
Bombe Returned.	None.	•				
Other Expenditures.	8	1000#	M-44	1/10 1/10 1/10 1/40		
Total (loaded on A/C taking off).	80	1000#	M-44	1/10 1/10 1/10 1/40		

4. Types of Release - All 80 x 1000# G.P. bembs dropped on the target were released on a 150' interval and armed.

Kichard E. PERPLE

let Lt., Air Gorps, Lead Bombardier.

Authority (1/1) 7 15005

By I NARA Date 7-18-07

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission of 9 November 1944.

TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H). Attention: Lt Col MUMFORD.

 The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of 9 November 1944.

Thirty-eight (38) B-17G airplanes took-off as scheduled.

Thirty-five (35) 8-176 airplanes returned to base after

completion of combat mission.

2. There were three (3) abortive airplanes.

a. 42-102450 - Hole blown in #7 oplinder of #2 engine.

5. 42-97844 - #4 propeller tip broke-off in air causing excessive vibration in engine.

c. 43-36355 - #2 engine failure.

3. There was no battle damage.

CLARENCE D. FIELDS, Wajor, Air Corps, Base Engr. Officer.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority (M/D 7/5005
By Date 7-16-07

bombed that target. Actual secondary target came into scope at that time and it was then realised that Group lead bombed Saarlautern, a target of opportunity. All A/C landed by 1351 hours.

WILLIAM ROWELL, 2ndLt. Air Corps, Ass*t. 5-2 Officer. HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE AAF STATION 101 APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 193

PERIOD: 0001 hours 9 November 1944 to 2400 hours 9 November 1944.

A. STATISTICS.

	Missions Disp.	,Sorties	Atkg.	Tonnage	Claims	E/A, I	Loss A N/F OI	es Totals
Heavy Bomber Atk			100	3753.2			7 5 7	
Fighter Escort	11 495	476	0	0	0-0-0	0	0 3 2	1 5 ,5
Fighter Sweeps	0 0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0 0 0	gr 4 .0 00
Fighter Bombing	6 211	139	93	20.2	0-0-0	0	2 0 15	17
Photo Recon.	4 4	4 :	0	0.	0-0-0	0	0 0 0	0
Weather Recon.	4 39	3 7	0	o o	0-0-0	0	o o o	0
Air/Sea Rescue	7 18	18	0	ο.	0-0-0	o	0 0 0	0
Special Operatio	ns <u>21</u> <u>110</u>	106	<u> </u>	0	0-0-0	. <u>o</u>	<u>o</u> <u>ò</u> <u>o</u>	<u>o</u> .
Totals	61 2176	2033	1216	3773.4	0-0-0	0	9 8 24	41

+ 15 Spares, 9 Used

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

Twenty-five combat wings (897 B-17s, 402 B-24s - 1299 a/c) dispatched in three forces against Saarbrucken M/Y and tactical targets in the Metz and Thionville areas. Support by eleven fighter groups. 1123 a/c dropped 3753.2 tons GP on assigned targets and several other targets. Bombed on PFF in most instances. No enemy air opposition. Claims: nil. Losses: 19 a/c (16 B-17s, 3 B-24s including 2 Category "E").

First Force

Five combat wings (460 B-17s - 3rd Division) dispatched against tactical targets in the Thionville area. 360 a/c dropped 1076.7 tons GP on assigned targets and four T/Os at 0939-1110 hours from 22,000-21,000 feet. 82 a/c failed to attack due to weather and inability to locate target. Leaflets dropped in the Thionville area and Saarbrucken area. Bombing visual and on H2K. Weather: 6/10-9/10 over Thionville and 10/10 over Saarbrucken. Flak: nil to meager, accurate at Thionville and moderate, accurate at Saarbrucken. Bat le damage: 82 minor, 14 major. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 12 a/c (7 to AA, one to accident, 4 to unknown causes).

Fighter Support: Four groups (192 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0759-0817 hours, down 1145-1250 hours. 187 sorties. E/A opposition: nil. At 0950 hours one Me-163 was sighted north of Metz; no combat. Miscellaneous transportation targets were strafed in the Metz area destroying one oil car, damaging 23 locos, 32 RR carsone truck, 2 barges. Claims: nil. Lesses: one P-51 believed landed on Continent.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

Assigned Targets	Dispatched	Attacking	Tonnage	Results
Tactical Target No. 4 in Thionville area Tactical Target No. 3	230	47	105,0	Poor
in Thionville area	230	Not attacked	•	
Saarbrucken M/Y (Secondary PFF)		276	847•7	Poor
Other Targets				
Saarlautern 3 T/Os	Marian, m	34 3	115.0 9.0	Unobserved Unobserved
Totals	460	360	1076.7	

Second Force

Twelve combat wings (437 B-17s - 1st Division) dispatched against tactical targets in the Metz area. 414 a/c dropped 1567.0 tons GP on assigned targets and one T/O at 0947-1103 hours from 21,600-25,700 feet. Leaflets dropped in the Metz area. Bombing both visual and on Gee-H. Weather: 6/10-10/10 over targets. Flak: meager, accurate at Saarbrucken and nil to meager, inaccurate at Metz. Battle Damage: 11 minor, 2 major. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 4 a/c (2 due to collision, 2 Category "E" crashed on take-off).

Fighter Support: Four groups (184 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0809-0827 hours, down 1254-1313 hours. 176 sorties. E/A opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Eosses: one P-51, cause unknown.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

Assigned Targets	Dispatched	Attacking	Tonnage	Results
Tactical Target No.5 in Metz area	302	217	806.5	Poor
Tactical Target No.6 in Metz area	135	128	490.5	Poor
Other Targets				
Saarbrucken M/Y T/0 (4854N-0742E)		41 28	162 . 5 107 , 5	Poor Unobserved
Totals	437	414	1567.0	

Third Force

Five combat wings (402 B-24s - 2nd Division) dispatched against tactical targets in the Metz area. 349 a/c dropped 1109.5 tons GP on assigned targets at, 0953-1110 hours from 21,000-24,000 feet. Leaflets dropped on Metz. Bombing both visual and on Gee-H. Weather: 5/10-9/10 at Metz and 7/10 at Saarbrucken. Flak: nil to meager, inaccurate at Metz, meager, inaccurate at Saarbrucken. Battle damage: 5 minor. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 a/c, reasons unknown

Fighter Support: Three groups (119 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0823-0834 hour down 1230-1244 hours. 113 sorties. E/A opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 3 P-51s, category "E" due to accidents.

Details of bomber attack as follows:

Assigned Targets	Dispatched	Attacking	Ronnage .	Results
Tactical Target No. 23 in Metz area Tactical Target No. 18	95	92	249.5	Fair
in Metz area Tactical Target No. 27 in Metz area Tactical Target No. 17	94	90 116	333.5 345.5	Poor
in Metz area Other Target	87	36	126.5	Poor
Saarbrucken M/Y Totals	402	<u>15</u> 349	54.5 1109.5	Unobserved

. 2. Fighter Escort

Elevin groups (495 P-51s) dispatched to support bombers. Up 0759-0834 hours, down 1145-1313 hours. 476 sorties. E/a opposition: nil. One Me-163 at 0950 hours north of Metz; no combat. Miscellaneous transportation targets strafed in Metz area. Claims: nil. Losses: 5 P-1s (one to cause unknown, 3 category "E" due to accidents, one believed safe on Continent).

3. Fighter Sweeps

Nil

4. Fighter Bombing

Six groups (149 P-47s, 62 P-51s - 211 a/c) dispatched to bomb and strafe rail and other targets in area between Frankfurt and Manheim east of the Rhein. Up 0734-0820 hours, down 1158-1315 hours. 139 sorties. 93 a/c dropped 20.2 tons GP on miscellaneous targets in assigned area. E/A opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: 17 a/c (8 P-47s, 9 P-51s - 2 to AA, 12 to causes unknown, 3 believed safe on Continent).

SECRET

Claims for bombing and strafing as follows:

	Destroyed Damaged
Locomotives	20 • 19
Box cars	105
Passenger cars	22
Trucks	4 62
Warehouses	$oldsymbol{i}$
Switch tower	2
Half tracks	(5)

5. Photo Reconnaissance

Dáy - 9 November 1944

4 c/c (3 F-5s, 1 Spitfire) dispatched on D/A photo missions. One a/c partially successful obtaining D/A photos of targets in western and northwestern Germany. Three a/c unable to obtain D/A photos due to clouds but other photos obtained. No losses.

Night - 9/10 November 1944

Nil.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

39 a/c (3 B-24s, 1 B-17, 3 Mosquitoes, 32 P-51s) dispatched as follows:

2 B-24s completed routine weather flights to Azores. One B-17 and one B-24 flew routine weather flights over eastern Atlantic. 3 Mosquitoes completed special weather flights over England, North Sea, France and western Germany. 32 P-51s flew as weather scouts for bombers, 2 a/c returned early. All a/c returned safely.

7. Air/Sea Rescue

18 P-47s dispatched. No rescues. All a/c returned safely.

8. Special Operations

110 a/c (15 B-17s, 12 B-24s, 77 P-51s, 6 P-47s) dispatched as follows:

28 a/c (22 P-51s, 6 P-47s) dispatched on radio relay operations. No losses.

17 a/c (5 B-17s, 12 B-24s) dispatched on leaflet operations 15 a/c dropped leaflets over France, Holland and Germany. No losses.

65 a/c (10 B-17s, escorted by 55 P-51s) dispatched as screening force to bomber operations. 2 P-51s returned early. No losses.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Weather conditions over the continent were very poor preventing any enemy air opposition to today's large scale bomber and fighter operations. Weather over enemy bases south of fifty degrees was non-operational, other bases north of fifty degrees were only partially operational.

2. Flak

Miltonburg intense, accurate. moderate, accurate Worms Saarbrucken - meager to moderate, accurate. Thionville meager. accurate. Metz

3. Observations

Neunkirchen and Hamburg M/Y were very active. A large U-shaped concrete structure with new barracks adjacent at 4930N-0720E.

- meager, inaccurate.

A number of strong fortifications observed around Nohfelden. A/F, five miles northwest of Karlstadt, 12 - 15 camouflaged s/e a/c and 12 - 14 t/e a/c parked on grass.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations

Tactical Target No. 4 Thionville Area - Poor Results

Bombs fell between three and five thousand yards east northeast of target in open wooded area.

Saarbrucken M/Y - Poor Results

Cloud cover prevents accurate assessment of damage, but as nearly as can be determined no patterns fell on assigned target. Patterns were located within the boundaries of the town and another probably fell on the outer edge. The only disturbance noted was a fair sized explosion caused by one pattern which landed across the river. This may have been due to hitting a barge loaded with explosives.

Tactical Target No. 18 Metz Area - Poor Results

Most of the bursts fell from one to two miles east northeast of the Fort with hits mainly in open fields.

Tactical Target No. 17 Metz Area - Poor Results

Bursts are mostly unobserved. Most of hits observed on fields and roadways.

Tactical Target No. 23 Metz Area - Fair Results

Hits are seen on Fort installations, fields, roads and village area,

SECRET

Tactical Target No. 27 Metz Area - Fair Results

Bursts observed within 1,000 feet of the MPI. A few hits on Fort install ations, also hits in fields and on roadways.

Cloud cover prevents definite or accurate assessment of damage, but as

Tactical Target No. 5 Metz Area - Poor Results

Bursts varied from 400 yards to several miles from MPI.

Tactical Target No. 16 Metz Area - Poor Results.

nearly as can be determined no patterns fell on assigned target,

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.