

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

APO 559,
13 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Operations Officers Narrative - Mission 6 August 1944.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 559.

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE: The 13 A Combat Wing, composed of the 95 A, 95 B, and 95 C groups, flying as lead, high and low respectively, took-off at 0730 - 0810 hours. By 0830 the groups had assembled over the base at 8,000'. (The assembly had been planned at 4,000', but due to a layer of stratus cloud, the assembly altitude was increased to 8,000'). Since the three 95th groups flew the entire mission together they will be treated as one unit in this narrative.

As the first control point was approached the 13 B Wing was contacted and it was determined that they would be ten minutes late. A 360 degree turn was made at Southwold to enable the 13 B Wing to join the formation. At the completion of the 360 degree turn the 13 B Wing was in trail by approximately two minutes. This completed the task Force and the English Coast was crossed at 0855, ten minutes late.

At 0900 a gradual climb was started. The enemy coast was crossed at 1050, on course. The briefed route was followed to the IP, bombing altitude being reached at 1252. At the IP the groups peeled off in order and no undue difficulty was encountered on the bombing run. Bombs were away at 1250 for the lead group. The rally was effected as planned, and at 1315, after some "s" ing so that the 13 B Wing could close up the formation, a let down was started.

At 1325 one brief fighter attack was encountered by the high group. The escorting P-51s quickly dispersed this attack.

After crossing the battle line the groups descended to 4,000' and flew the remainder of the trip below the cloud bases. The Russian base was reached at 1755 and the landing was made at 1800 - 1825 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING: Thirty-nine aircraft, including three PFF, left the base in the formation shown in attached diagrams "1 A", "2 A" and "3 A". A/C 7154 left the formation before reaching the enemy coast and is not credited with a sortie. A/C 2951 did not release two bombs due to a rack malfunction, and A/C 2560 did not release three bombs for the same reason. The formations over the target are shown in attached diagrams "1 B", "2 B" and "3 B".

3. LOST AIRCRAFT: None.

JAMES A. HEARN,
Capt., Air Corps,
Asst Operations Officer

Mc

S-2 FORM---A/C RETURNING EARLY FROM OPERATIONAL MISSIONS

(To be filled in by pilot and/or navigator immediately upon return to base)

LOT'S NAME FERGUSON A/C NUMBER 2154 DATE 6-8-44

TIME AND PLACE OF TURN BACK 0915 52° 34' N
02° 32' E
(Give exact coordinates)

REASON FOR TURN BACK 50 caliber bullet knocked large hole in
NOSE

DISPOSITION OF BOMBS:
TURNED BROUGHT BACK - 6-X 500
(Number, size, and type)

DISPOSITION OF BOMBS:
JETTISONED _____
(Number, size, type, time, and place)

JETTISONED STATE REASON _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority US 75001
BY 1-NARA Date 9-14-11

DECLASSIFIED
Authority U.S. 75005
BY DA-NARA Date 9-14-11

Mo

S-2 FORM---A/C RETURNING EARLY FROM OPERATIONAL MISSIONS

(To be filled in by pilot and/or navigator immediately upon return to base)

LOT'S NAME FERGUSON A/C NUMBER 7154 DATE 6-8-44

TIME AND PLACE OF TURN BACK 0915 52°34'N
02°32'E
(Give exact coordinates)

REASON FOR TURN BACK 50 Caliber bullet knocked large hole in nose

DISPOSITION OF BOMBS:
TURNED BROUGHT BACK ~~7-X-500~~ 6-X-500
(Number, size, and type)

JETTISONED _____
(Number, size, type, time, and place)

JETTISONED STATE REASON _____

POINTS ON EVASION IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST EUROPE

To be given Combat Crew members and Fighter Ground personnel by P/W Officer

1. Crews will be issued both Reds and Whites.
2. Personnel will be advised to carry their own spending money.
3. Dog tags should be checked at the entrance to the briefing room.
4. Particular emphasis should be given to the relative position of countries and the latest information concerning the Russo-German line of Battle.
5. It is recommended that crews be issued extra rations in the form of carbohydrate concentration or chocolate bars.
6. P/W Bulletin No. 5, dated 13 June 1944, and P/W Bulletin No. 5-A, dated 18 July 1944, contains information which will form the basis of the P/W briefing. Par 3d of P/W Bulletin No. 5-a should be stressed. "The above Political alignment again emphasizes the necessity of not talking politics to either the Russians or the Poles. No questions should be asked and all instructions should be obeyed implicitly". Attention is drawn to par 4 and 5 P/W Bulletin No. 5 and crew members should carry both prints and negatives of identification pictures.
7. All personnel participating in these operations should carry Russian Identity cards which will contain their full name, rank, and serial number in the space provided and appropriate phrase cards. The identity cards will not be surrendered at any time. It should be drawn to the attention of personnel that Pay Data cards are not required in drawing of partial pay. For example, if in Cairo the purse will not be broken into in order to get spending money or for the paying of meals, etc. Instead, officers should contact the finance officer and draw partial pay. The pilot or any officer assuming the status of an enlisted man's Commanding Officer may certify a partial payment voucher for an enlisted man.

SECRET

Mc

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

6 August 1944

SUBJECT: S-2 Report for 95A, 95B and 95C.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

1. 36 A/C and 3 PFF took off from Horham to attack Gdynia/Rahmel FW190 Final Assembly Plant flying wing formation identified as 13A. One A/C #7154, #3 of lead squadron in 95C low group aborted 10 minutes past the English coast for mechanical reasons, all other A/C bombed the primary target.

2. On this mission one pass was made by 4 S/E E/A probably Me 109's at Allenstein at 1325 hours. The attack came in from 12 o'clock high and A/C #1876 received battle damage.

3. Only flak at the target was experienced. It was meagre and inaccurate.

4. Bombing results fair to good, groups 95B and 95C hit in target area. 95A strike photos still not available. Crews report that smoke from explosions with black base to white tops came up to 25,000 feet.

5. Fighter support of P-51's was particularly effective because 10, 25, 20, 10 E/A respectively that were seen by P-51's on each leg of the trip were not even seen by this group.

For the Intelligence Officer:

ARNO A. KRAUSE,
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority U.S. 75005
By J-NARA Date 9-14-11

FROM OITHE 051105D
TO OIHNM
IRM
FRA
SECURITY 3 B.D. A-98-E

ADMINISTRATIVE ANNEX TO FIELD ORDER NO. 371.

HEREWITH SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR MISSION TO EASTERN COMMAND, USSTAF.

1. CHOLERA SERUM, ATABRIE, BODY INSECTICIDE POWDER, AND OTHER MEDICAL SUPPLIES WILL BE FURNISHED TO THE 95TH AND 390TH GROUPS BY THE DIVISION SURGEON. THESE KITS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT AT LEAST HALF THE AIRCRAFT OF EACH GROUP AND WILL BE RETURNED UNOPENED TO U.M. IF THEY ARE NOT USED.
2. INDIVIDUALS PARTICIPATING WILL POOL PERSONAL EQUIPMENT TO REDUCE NUMBER OF B-4 BAGS TO A MINIMUM.
3. EACH OFFICER WILL TAKE A FIELD JACKET, PINK SLACKS, COTTON SHIRT, AND PINK WOOL SHIRT. IN ADDITION ALL FIELD GRADE AND WING STAFF OFFICERS WILL TAKE A BLOUSE. ALL ENLISTED PERSONNEL WILL TAKE FIELD JACKET, OD SHIRT AND TROUSERS.
4. ALL PERSONNEL (INCLUDING OFFICERS) WILL TAKE MESS KIT, KNIFE, FORK, SPOON AND CANTEEN.
5. PERSONNEL WILL BE CAUTIONED THAT VIOLATIONS OF STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING WEARING OF THE UNIFORM, MILITARY BEARING AND DEPORTMENT WILL BE THE BASIS FOR SEVERE DISCIPLINARY ACTION. EACH INDIVIDUAL WILL CONSIDER HIMSELF A COMMITTEE OF ONE TO ENSURE THAT NOTHING OCCURS TO MAKE THE AMERICAN OFFICER OR ENLISTED MAN LOOK CHEAP, SHADY, OR UNCOUTH IN THE EYES OF THE LOCAL INHABITANTS. BARTER OF COMMODITIES SUCH AS PX RATIONS, LIGHTERS, WATCHES, PENS, AND CIGARETTES IS FORBIDDEN BY U. S. MILITARY REGULATIONS AND LOCAL LAW. EXCESSIVE QUANTITIES OF THESE ITEMS SHOULD NOT BE CARRIED.
6. BAC PACKS CONTAINING PX SUPPLIES FOR 200 MEN WILL BE LOADED 3 PACKS PER GROUP. THESE PACKS WILL BE TURNED OVER INTACT TO GROUP COMMANDER AT DESTINATION BY AIRCRAFT COMMANDERS TO WHOM ENTRUSTED.
7. GROUP S-2'S HAVE BEEN FURNISHED A SUPPLY OF IDENTIFICATION CARDS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO INDIVIDUALS.
8. PHOTOGRAPHIC PERSONNEL ACCOMPANYING EACH GROUP WILL CARRY SUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT TO HANDLE STRIKE PHOTOGRAPHS.
9. ONE AIRCRAFT PER SQUADRON WILL CARRY LIST OF AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBERS AND NAMES OF PERSONNEL IN GROUP FORMATION.
10. A SUPPLY OF INTERROGATION AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE FORMS WILL BE CARRIED.
11. ONE .45 PISTOL AND 3 AMMUNITION CLIPS WILL BE CARRIED PER AIRCRAFT.
12. EACH COMBARDIER SHOULD TAKE A SUPPLY OF ARMING WIRE.
13. CLASSIFIED BRITISH OR AMERICAN HQX EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH OTHER THAN U.S. PERSONNEL.
14. NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES MAY BE CARRIED FOR DELIVERY TO PERMANENT PERSONNEL AT BASES.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 128 795005
BFI-NARA Date 9-19-11

13. USE OF WEAPONS OR AMERICAN GEAR EQUIPMENT WILL NOT BE DIS-
CUSSED WITH OTHER THAN U.S. PERSONNEL.

14. NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES MAY BE CARRIED FOR DELIVERY TO PERMANENT
PERSONNEL AT BASES.

15. ALL PERSONNEL WILL CARRY COMPLETE GAS MASKS BUT NEED NOT TAKE
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING.

16. PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING WILL CARRY SUFFICIENT FUNDS IN ENGLISH
OR AMERICAN MONEY TO DEFRAY ALL ANTICIPATED PERSONAL EXPENSES. THE
UNNECESSARY BREAKING OPEN OF P/V PACKETS WILL BE THE BASIS FOR SEVERE
DISCIPLINARY ACTION.

17. NON-COMBAT PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

- 1 BRIGADIER GENERAL, TASK FORCE COMMANDER (KISSNER)
- 1 COLONEL, WING OPERATIONS (HOLLER)
- 1 ASSISTANT WING OPERATIONS OFFICER (FROM 35TH FIGHTER GROUP)
- 1 MAJOR, WING INTELLIGENCE (TELSON)
- 1 CAPTAIN, ASSISTANT WING INTELLIGENCE AND WING ADJUTANT (PIERCE)
- 1 WING COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER (FROM 13TH COM WG)
- 1 WING PHOTOGRAPHIC OFFICER (FROM 95TH GROUP)
- 2 GROUP COMMANDERS (TRUESDELL, COOD)
- 2 HIGH GROUP AIR LEADERS (ONE FROM EACH GROUP)
- 2 LOW GROUP AIR LEADERS (ONE FROM EACH GROUP)
- 2 GROUP COMMUNICATIONS OFFICERS (ONE EACH GROUP)
- 2 GROUP ENGINEERING OFFICERS (ONE EACH GROUP)
- 2 GROUP OPERATIONS OFFICERS (ONE EACH GROUP)
- 2 GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS (ONE EACH GROUP)
- 2 GROUP ADJUTANTS (ONE EACH GROUP)
- 6 ENLISTED ENGINEERING MAINTENANCE MEN (THREE FROM EACH GROUP)
- 4 ENLISTED PHOTO MEN (TWO EACH GROUP)
- 32 CREW CHIEFS (FROM FIGHTER GROUP)
- 4 RADIO MAINTENANCE MEN (FROM FIGHTER GROUP)
- 4 ARMORERS (FROM FIGHTER GROUP)
- 1 GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (FROM FIGHTER GROUP)
- 1 GROUP ENGINEERING OFFICER (FROM FIGHTER GROUP)

18. COMBAT CREW RADIO OPERATORS SHOULD INCLUDE SUFFICIENT MEN
QUALIFIED IN RADIO MAINTENANCE.

-- PARTRIDGE --

TOD: 09/1005B HEP AR
G FOR R WITH R

281

DECLASSIFIED
Authority U.S. 75003
By R-I-NARA Date 9-14-11

INTERPRETATION REPORT S.A. 2547

* ATTACK ON RAHMEL AIRFIELD ON 6 AUG 1944

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK

- (a) No. of aircraft : 75.
- (b) Command : U.S. 8th AIR FORCE.
- (c) Time : 1252 hours.
- (d) Bombs : 437 X 500 lb. G.P.

(ii) DETAILS OF THE ATTACK

(a) The first stage of the attack is not visible on the photographs received. Most of the hangar and workshop area is obscured by smoke from earlier bursts but two large concentrations of bursts are seen at the edge of the smoke cloud, to be in the vicinity of either side of the hangar and workshop area. Late photographs show hits on hangars, workshops and barracks type buildings. Of 72 aircraft visible at the time of the attack, 12 are probably damaged.

(b) Bursts are seen on the airfield and its facilities as follows:

1. HANGARS AND WORKSHOPS

(South) - two, possibly 3, large hangars - blanketed by bursts

1 small hangar - one near hit.

1 main assembly or repair shop - one, possibly 2, near hits.

1 main assembly or repair shop - one near hit.

2 stores and dismantling shops - two direct hits on one, one near hit on the other.

8 workshops or stores type buildings - one near hit on each.

2. AIRCRAFT

This statement is based on strike photographs and reconnaissance photographs taken 24 hours after the attack.

In the hangar and workshop area:

One He 111 - probably damaged, 1 burst within 50 feet.

One Si 204 - probably damaged, 1 burst within 80 feet.

One large aircraft - probably damaged, 1 burst within 100 feet.

One medium aircraft - probably damaged, 1 near hit.

Three small aircraft - probably damaged, bursts within 100 feet.

One small aircraft - probably damaged, 1 burst within 50 feet.

Two small aircraft - probably damaged, 1 burst within 80 feet.

Two aircraft - burned out.

3. ACCOMMODATIONS

Twenty-five barracks type buildings are blanketed by bursts.

4. LANDING GROUND

The Southeast corner is blanketed by bursts.

5. OTHER FACILITIES

Numerous hits are seen on the taxi-tracks in the hangar and workshop area.

(c) OTHER BURSTS:

(c) OTHER BURSTS:

Residential buildings at the South side of the target area are blanketed by bursts. At least 50 are seen scattered in open fields 400 to 1200 yards Southwest of the target. Four are seen scattered in open fields 1000 yards East of the target.

(iii) ACTIVITY

(a) Seventy-two aircraft are visible at the time of the attack as follows:

Northeast side of the landing ground (dispersed) -

10 large aircraft
6 small aircraft.

Hanger and workshop area -

2 He 111
1 St 204
2 large aircraft
8 medium aircraft
43 small aircraft.

(b) Reconnaissance photographs taken 24 hours after the attack cover only the hanger and workshop area but show no change. This represents an increase of 27 aircraft since the last full cover on 19 JUN 1944 (106G/62) when there were 45 aircraft visible.

(iv) ANNOTATED PRINT: (SAV 309A/835-8)

Shows smoke rising from bursts which heavily blanketed the hanger and workshop area early in the attack and also new bursts at the West edge of this area.

(v) BOMB PLOT: None prepared.

(vi) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED:

SAV 390C/834	6 AUG 1944	1252 hrs.	1/38,100	(F.L.7")	22,300	'B'.
" 390L/835	"	" "	1/39,000	"	22,700	"
" 390B/836	"	" "	1/37,700	"	22,000	"

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CONFIDENTIAL
8 AUG 1944

189 MC
INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 2893

LOCALITY: RAHMEI near GDYNIA
(Aircraft repair factory and airfield)

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

This report covers all damage to the target between 9 APR 1944 and 7 AUG 1944, and includes damage from the attack by aircraft of U.S. 8TH AIR FORCE on 6 AUG 1944.

STATEMENT ON DAMAGE.

Bombs have straddled the target in a NW-SE direction. Two main assembly or repair shops and a hangar in the SW area have been damaged slightly and two stores and dismantling shops in the S., previously damaged, have been hit again, one in fact being almost completely destroyed. At least 15 store type buildings, some of which had been damaged previously, have now been entirely demolished and 9 or 10 others, including a headquarters type of building, have been hit for the first time. Scattered craters are seen in the N. area of the target, but relatively little damage has resulted.

Over 50 craters are visible in a small area of the factory airfield in the S.E. corner, where over 20 hits have been scored on tarmacs and taxi tracks. The road passing through the factory from E. to W. has been cut at least 10 times and 8 or 9 hits are visible on other roads in the vicinity.

About 80 aircraft are visible, of which at least 55 are of fighter types, the remainder consisting of large and medium types. Five or six small, and one medium aircraft have possibly been damaged.

Numerous small fuselages are visible in the vicinity of the South main assembly or repair shops.

Damage is as follows:-

(Numbers correspond to those on Illustration No. 3(e) 118/2

1. Main assembly or repair shop : Direct hit causing canopy to hang from E. side, W. side having been broken off. Small hole in roof at W. front.
 2. Main assembly or repair shop : Direct hit on N.W. corner, destroying part of side shops.
 6. Hangar : Direct hit or hits demolishing large part of front.
 7. Stores and dismantling shop : Direct hit on end of S. wing, demolishing one-third of wing.
 8. Stores and dismantling shop (previously damaged) : Now almost completely destroyed.
- Numerous unidentified buildings: Now completely obliterated or damaged.

(Prints 0053/5 S)

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: Spec. Squadron.

SORTIE: US 802RG/9.

MEAN TIME AND DATE OF PHOTOGRAPHY: 1320 B hrs. on 7 AUG 1944.

SCALE: 1/10,000 (F.L.36").

COVER AND QUALITY: The target is covered on prints of good quality.

LAST REPORT: K 2026, issued 16 APR 1944.

COMPARATIVE SORTIE USED: J/909.

MATERIAL DISTRIBUTED: Print 0054S & Damage Illustration (to follow when available)

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A.C.I.U.

JR/MB

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plus 1 to A.I. 2(b)

1 to A.I. 3(b)

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

P/W BULLETIN NO. 5a

18 July, 1944

EVASION IN EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

1. The following represents supplemental information to briefing material contained in P/W Bulletin No. 5 dated 13 June, 1944, this headquarters, entitled "Evasion in Eastern and Southeastern Europe".

2. The following applies specifically to paragraphs 14 and 15 of reference bulletin:

On 11 July, 1944, several members of an R.A.F. crew returned to this country, following an evasion from southeastern Poland into Russia. These men bailed out of their aircraft probably somewhere in the fork between the Rivers Vistula and San, in a heavily forested district. They made contacts on small farms in the area and within a short time were put into the hands of Polish partisan organizations. Since the Poles were unable to evacuate them they were passed to Russian partisans, who arranged for an aircraft to pick them up and fly them into Russia.

3. These evaders have given the following advice which should be used in briefing crews for shuttle raids to Russia. It should be pointed out that this information is based on the experience of these men in southeastern Poland. It does not apply to other parts of the country, in particular northwestern Poland, where conditions are probably quite different.

a. It is essential to proceed to a small farm at once as it is impossible to proceed very far alone, owing to large scale bandit activity. It is probable that farmers in the area will be in touch with partisan organizations. Crews should be warned that many large farms belong to, or are occupied by, the Germans.

b. The chief necessity when in the hands of partisans is to quickly establish one's identity. Once this has been done, both Polish and Russian partisans will be most helpful.

c. It is unlikely that Polish partisans will be able to evacuate evaders. Evaders should ask to be passed on to the Russians who operate alongside but not in close cooperation with the Poles. The Poles are very suspicious of the Russians, who in turn have little regard for the Polish organizations and do not hesitate to rob Polish farmers.

d. The above political alignment again emphasizes the necessity of not talking politics to either the Russians or the Poles. No questions should be asked and all instructions should be obeyed implicitly.

e. The R.A.F. evaders point out that vodka produced by the Poles is a very

useful precaution against cold but that it is very strong, about 45% alcohol, and only short drinks should be taken. The Russian partisans have an even stronger drink, called "Spiritus", about 90% alcohol, of which about two sips are enough, as care should be taken to avoid giving any information to partisans except that which is necessary for evasion.

f. German troops do not go into the forests in this area but they bomb and machine-gun these forests almost daily. They patrol roads and railways and frequently raid villages, which they raze to the ground.

4. Care should be taken to give crews up-to-date and accurate information on the Russian battle lines.

5. Eastern Command reports that some crews were equipped with RED Escape Purses. Attention is directed to paragraph 2 of reference letter. Adequate supplies of Universal Escape Purses are on hand.

SECRET

TARGETS FOR POSSIBLE ATTACK ENROUTE:

1. Rositz - Oil Refinery
2. Berlin (Erkner) - Ball Bearings
3. Schneidemuhl - Me 410 Aircraft Factory
4. Gdynia (Rahmel) - FW 190 Assembly
5. Graudenz - Aircraft Repair and Assembly (FW 58 and possibly others.)

TARGETS FOR POSSIBLE ATTACK WHILE AT FOREIGN BASES

1. Odertal (Beschowitz) - Synthetic Oil Plant
2. Blechhammer - Synthetic Oil Plants (2)
3. Oswiecim - Synthetic Oil Plant
4. Trezibinia (near Krakow) - Crude Oil Refinery
5. Krosno - (1) Oil Storage
(2) Aircraft Depot

SECRET

95th "A" Group
Over Target
Diagram "1B"

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 6 August 1944

LEAD

NILLER
76 | 83

LOW

PSOTA
70 | 82

AUSTIN
14 | 82

HIGH

DANCISIN
77 | 97

GIELEN
20 | 65

HEARN
72 | 04

SQUYRES
18 | 87

METZINGER
78 | 98

SALVIA
72 | 88

KINNEY
19 | 99

FLETCHER
72 | 87

LASH
18 | 75

PIPKIN
24 | 87

BRIEFING _____
READINESS _____
STATIONS _____
TAXI _____
TAKE-OFF _____
RENDEZVOUS _____

EXTRA SHIPS
334 _____
335 _____
336 _____
412 _____

95th "B" Group
Assembly
Diagram "2A"

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 6 August 1944

LEAD

STRETTON

79 | 61

WALKER

24 | 50

BRODERSON

19 | 39

LOW

MERCHENBAHN

13 | 76

PIESS

14 | 10

HIGH

GILBERT

73 | 83

LAYL

18 | 76

ELLSWORTH

78 | 44

DECKARD

73 | 34

OLNEY

71 | 94

BRAUND

78 | 58

HANSON

18 | 67

COTHER

19 | 89

BRIEFING _____
READINESS _____
STATIONS _____
TAXI _____
TAKE-OFF _____
RENDEZVOUS _____

EXTRA SHIPS

334 _____
335 _____
336 _____
412 _____

95th "C" Group
Assembly
Diagram "3A"

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 6 August 1944

LEAD

WAGENBAUGH

24 | 55

LOW

BOUDON

72 | 01

SILVERWOOD

75 | 99

HIGH

ROMANGHEK

29 | 51

GRIFFIN

26 | 78

BACHIZETSKI

60 | 85

PRICE

15 | 89

DAY

72 | 15

FERGUSON

71 | 54

LATHAM

25 | 60

POWELL

19 | 92

CURLEY

18 | 00

MC CULLEY

70 | 47

BRIEFING _____
READINESS _____
STATIONS _____
TAXI _____
TAKE-OFF _____
RENDEZVOUS _____

EXTRA SHIPS

334 _____
335 _____
336 _____
412 _____

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 25TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP
APO 559

STATISTICAL CONTROL REPORT OF AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

13TH COMBAT BOMBARDMENT WING

DATE REPORTED ~~14 August 1944~~

PART I - TABULAR SUMMARY:

DATE OF MISSION ~~8 August 1944~~

STRATEGICAL MISSION

COMBAT GROUP	SCHEDULED	AIRBORNE	AIRBORNE LESS RETURNS FIRE SPARES	ATTACKING	NOT ATTACKING	SORTIES
A	12	12	12	12	0	12
B	12	12	12	12	0	12
C	12	12	12	11	1	11

PART II - REASONS WHY AIRCRAFT DID NOT ATTACK OR FAILED TO TAKE OFF:

Combat Gp A.C.S.N. Category Reason for Failure & Corrective Action (Yes-No) Sortie

"C" 42-107154 "E" While test firing guns spent case broke plex-glass. No

JAMES A. HEARN
Capt., Air Corps
Actg. Operations Officer

SECRET

WATER

COMBAT REPORT


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GROUP 95TH (HISH) SQ. 336TH A/C 2450 DATE AUG 21

WHERE ATTACK TOOK PLACE 5400N 2000E HEIGHT 11000' TIME 1326

Our Heading 140
Type of E/A F.W. 190
Clock Pos. 1
Attack Level LEVEL

MARK A/C ATTACHED AND CLOCK POSITION



HIGH S.P. (LOW L. OF WINGS)

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

COMPLETE STORY OF THE ATTACK.

W/T FIRST SAW E/A (FW 190) 300 YDS OUT AT 1 O'C. LEVEL, COMING IN, 2 FW 190 100 YDS BEHIND #1; W/T BEGAN FIRING ON #1 AT 250 YDS, & E/A BROKE AWAY TO REFORM LEVEL AFTER PASSING ACROSS IN FRONT OF FORMATION. AT THIS TIME E/A BEGAN SMOKING (W/T - 300 ROUNDS) WHILE W/T WAS FIRING; E/A HAD PASSED TO 7 O'C. & W/T FIRED 50 ROUNDS (E/A AT 500 YDS). P/S1 WAS THEN CLOSING IN FROM 8 O'C. ON E/A; BOTH WENT DOWN, OUT OF SIGHT. #2 FW 190 BOKE OFF AT 9 O'C (TT). DMSD.

Gunner responsible for E/A damage: T/S R.W. SEWTER Position W/T

Other gun positions firing on the same E/A TAIL

Other A/C firing at the same time at the same E/A; A/C Nos. 2334

If E/A was shot down or damaged: Corroborated by:
S/SGT F.E. KILBURN No. 2450 Position in A/C TAIL
" " " " "
" " " " "

Comments of interrogator:

CLAIM - 1 E/A DAMAGED. Disapproved. This is probably some E/A that went on back to attack another formation.

Interrogator: CAPT. DURR Time AUG 20

ROMANOV

COMBAT REPORT


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GROUP 95TH SQN. 324 A/C 2951 DATE AUG 6 '44

WHERE ATTACK TOOK PLACE ALLENSTEIN, E. P. HEIGHT 17200 TIME 1325

Our Heading 144
Type of E/A FW 190
Clock Pos. 11
Attack Level LEVEL

MARK A/C ATTACKED, AND CLOCK POSITION



DO NOT
WRITE IN
THIS SPACE

COMPLETE STORY OF THE ATTACK.

U/T FIRST SAW E/A AS THEY CAME INTO SP. AT 11 LEVEL. U/T OPENED FIRE AS E/A WAS AT 8:30 LEVEL & BEGINNING A LEFT TURN. U/T WAS FIRING AT LAST OF 4 E/A. E/A WAS 400 YDS OUT & LEVEL. U/T FIRED 3-40 ROUND BURSTS. E/A WAS AT 70'C; AT THIS POINT E/A STARTED SMOKING & DISAPPEARED INTO CLOUD.

Gunner responsible for E/A damage T/S P. M. LAUR Position U/T

Other gun positions firing on the same E/A _____

Other A/C firing at the same time at the same E/A: A/C Nos. ?

If E/A was shot down or damaged: Corroborated by:

1LT. C. A. ROMANOV A/C No. 2951 Position in A/C P

" " " " "
" " " " "

Comments of interrogator:

PILOT SAW A/C SMOKING AS U/T OPENED FIRE. U/T SAW OTHER 3 E/A PULL OFF TO THEIR RIGHT & GO INTO DIVE & THEN MIX IT UP WITH PSIS. (CLAIM - 1 E/A PR. DAB DESTROYED)

Interrogator _____ Time AUG 13
If formation varied widely from standard, show by diagram on back

A.T.F.

C.W.

Low

FORMATION DIAGRAM

95TH BOMB. GROUP (H)

DATE 6-8-44

TIME _____

Hagenbaugh
Boudon
24/55

Romancheck
29/51

Boudon
22/01

Sherrwood
75/99

Bachuzewski
60/85

Price
15/89

Day
22/15

Grittin
26/78

Powell
19/92

Curley
16/00

McCullpy
20/47

Ferguson
71/54

Latham
25/60

ABORTIVE 0

MISSING _____

CHANGES _____

EXTRA _____

EXTRA A, _____

A.T.F.

C.W.

B. Hi

FORMATION DIAGRAM

95TH BOMB. GROUP (H)

DATE 6-8-44

TIME

STREETON
29/61

Herchenbahn
13/76

Walker
24/50

Broderson
19/39

G. I. BERT
73/83

Layl
18/76

ELLSWORTH
78/44

FIPSS
14/10

BRAUND
78/58

HANSEN
18/67

Deckard
73/34

OLNEY
71/94

COTNER
19/89

ABORTIVE

MISSING

CHANGES

EXTRA

EXTRA A

A.T.F.

C.W.

Lead

FORMATION DIAGRAM

95TH BOMB. GROUP (H)

DATE 6-8-44

TIME _____

MILLER
76/83

DANCISIN
77/97

PSOTA
78/82

AUSTIN
14/62

HEARN
72/04

SQUIRES
18/87

MATZINGER
78/98

GRIFFIN
20/66

FLETCHER
72/57

LASH
16/75

SALVIA
72/32

KINNEY
19/99

PIPKIN
24/29

ABORTIVE _____

MISSING _____

CHANGES _____

EXTRA

EXTRA A

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

INTOPS SUMMARY NO. 98

PERIOD: 0001 hours 6 August 1944 to 2400 hours 6 August 1944.

A. STATISTICS

	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Disp.</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Atkg.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>Losses</u>				<u>Totals</u>
							<u>E/A</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>N/E</u>	<u>OT</u>	
Heavy Bomber Atks.	20	1182+	1117	1027	2424.4++	0-4-8 A	4	18	4	2	28
Fighter Escort	16	741	649	0	0	31-2-7 A 2-0-4 G	0	0	0	9	9
Fighter Sweeps	0	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter Bombing	0	0	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Photo Recon.	31	31	31	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather Recon.	11	11	11	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Air Sea Rescue	20	20	20	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0	0	0
Special Operations	<u>41</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	139	2026	1869	1027	2424.4	31-6-15A 2-0-4 G	4	18	4	11	37

+ Includes 16 spares (4 used).

++ Does not include tonnage of 75 B-17s attacking Gdynia.

B. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

1. Bomber Attacks

23 combat wings (646 B-17s, 536 B-24s - 1182 a/c) dispatched in five force against 13 industrial targets in north central Germany, Poland and seven Noball targets in France. Five Noball targets not attacked. 1027 a/c dropped 2424.4 tons G.P. and I.B., visually, on all other assigned primaries and other targets. E/a opposition: two attacks by approximately 25 e/a at Genshagen and Berlin. Claims: 0-4-8. Losses: 28 a/c (17 B-17s, 11 B-24s).

First Force: 11 combat wings (414 B-17s) dispatched to attack aero-engine works, pilotless a/c plant and a/c assembly and component plant in the Berlin area. 390 a/c dropped 916.8 tons G.P. and I.B. on the three assigned primaries and other targets at 1223 - 1257 hours from 23,500 - 26,000 feet. Leaflets dropped at Brandenburg. Battle damage: 84 minor, 22 major. E/a opposition: 18 FW-190s and Me-109s attacked at Genshagen. 50 - 75 e/a seen south of Hamburg but no attacks. Claims: 0-0-3. Losses: 11 B-17s (7 to AA, 4 to AA and E/A).

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Fighter Support: Four groups (196 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0841 - 0931 hours, down 1411 - 1527 hours. 168 sorties. One group strafed Gutersloh-Magdeburg area. E/a opposition: 15 plus Me-109s and Do 217s seen near Schonfiel and Strasbourg A/F. Four Me-109s and one FW-190 bounced near Brandenburg. Combat with two Me-109s south of Brandenburg. 30 plus Me-109s engaged SE of Hamburg. Claims: 19-0-2 air. Losses: 2 P-51s to unknown reasons.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacked</u>	<u>Tons</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I.B.</u>	
Brandenburg (a/c assembly)	148	126	232.5	69.7	Good
Brandenburg Opel (pilotless a/c)	76	69	134.8	25.0	Good-Very Good
Genshagen (aero-engine)	190	174	283.0	119.3	Good
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Stendal A/F		12	30.0		Good
8 T/Os		9	22.5		Unobserved
Totals	414	390	702.8	214.0	

Second Force: Two combat wings (78 B-17s) dispatched to attack FW-190 assembly plant at Gdynia and to proceed to bases in Russia on completion of bombing. 75 a/c attacked assigned target and landed at Eastern Command bases. Complete details unavailable. Battle damage: 21 minor, 2 major. Claims: 0-2-2. Losses: nil.

Fighter Support: Three groups (160 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0850 - 0945 hours, down 1345 - 1545 hours. 154 sorties. E/a opposition: combat with 30 - 40 Me-109s at Schweriner Lake. 40 Me-109s and FW-190s sighted at Neumnster. Combat with 50 plus s/e e/a at Havelberg. One group (64 F-51s) escorted bombers to Russia, and landed safely. Claims: 7-2-3 air. Losses: 5 P-51s to unknown reasons (two believed in Russia).

Details of attack as follows:

<u>Assigned Target</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacked</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Results</u>
Gdynia/Rahmel (FW-190 assembly)	78	75	Not available	Very Good

Third Force: Three combat wings (154 B-17s) dispatched to attack tank-engine and aero-engine assembly plants in Berlin. 139 a/c dropped 331.6 tons G.P. and I.B. on both assigned primaries and other targets at 1233 - 1240 hours from 22,000 - 25,000 feet. Leaflets dropped over Berlin. Weather: CAVU at target, 2/10 - 4/10 en route. Flak: moderate to intense, barrage and tracking; accurate on some groups. Battle damage: 87 minor, 16 major. E/a opposition: 6 Me-109s and one FW-190 made one attack on lead group in target area. 15 jet-propelled a/c sighted in Helmstedt area but no attacks. Claims: 0-2-3. Losses: 6 B-17s (3 to AA, 2 to unknown causes, 1 crash-landed in U.K.).

Fighter Support: Three groups (144 P-51s) dispatched. Up 0905 - 0933 hours, down 1515 - 1523 hours. 107 sorties. E/a opposition: combat with 6 - 8

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

s/e e/a NE of Bremen. Bounced one Me-410 over Breszeu. Three groups strafed south of Berlin and Hamburg and in Bremen area. Claims: 4-0-0 air, 2-0-4 ground. Losses: one P-51 to unknown reasons.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacked</u>	<u>Tons</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I.B.</u>	
Berlin/Niederschwie (tank engines)	57	45	71.3	35.0	Good
Berlin/Marionfelde (aero-engine)	97	83	155.3	42.5	Good
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Nordholz A/F		4	7.5	2.5	Unobserved
6 T/Os		7	12.5	5.0	Unobserved
Totals	154	139	246.6	85.0	

Fourth Force: Six combat wings (445 B-24s) dispatched to attack torpedo works at Kiel and six oil installations in the Hamburg area. 399 a/c dropped 1118 tons G.P. and I.B. on all assigned primaries and other targets at 1152 - 121 hours from 21,000 - 26,000 feet. Leaflets dropped over Hamburg and Schulau. Weather: CAVU in target areas. Smoke screen at Kiel restricted visibility. Flak: intense, accurate at Hamburg, both predicted and barrage type. Battle damage: 262 minor, 28 major. E/a opposition: nil. Several Me-410s and JU-88s observed in Hamburg area but no attacks. Claims: nil. Losses: 11 B-24s (8 to AA, 3 crash-landed in U.K.).

Fighter Support: Five groups (173 P-47s, 44 P-38s - 217 a/c) dispatched. Up 0915 - 0946 hours, down 1422 - 1502 hours. 196 sorties. E/a opposition: combat with 2 Me-109s south of Hamburg. Two P-47s bounced by four Me-109s SW of Hamburg. Claims: 1-0-2 air. Losses: one P-47 to unknown reasons.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacked</u>	<u>Tons</u>		<u>Results</u>
			<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I. B.</u>	
Harburg (Rhenania) Oil Refinery	66	62	162.5		Good
Harburg (Ebano) Oil Refinery	36	33	88.5		Very Good
Hamburg (Rhenania) Oil Refinery	71	61	171.8		Very Good
Kiel Torpedo Works	98	58	84.5	85.5	Poor
Hamburg (Schlieman) Oil Refinery	36	32	90.5		Poor
Hamburg (Schulau) Oil Refinery	78	72	203.4		Very Good
Hamburg (Dutch Petroleum)	60	54	155.8		Very Good
<u>Other Targets</u>					
Hemingstedt Oil Refinery		23	63.5		Good
4 T/Os		4	12.0		Unobserved
Totals	445	399	1032.5	85.5	

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Fifth Force: One combat wing (91 B-24s) dispatched to attack seven Noball targets. Five targets not attacked because of weather. 24 a/c dropped 58 tons G.P. on two assigned targets at 1229 - 1236 hours from 22,500 - 23,000 feet. Weather: 9/10 in target area with breaks in cloud. Flak: meager, inaccurate. Battle damage: 9 minor, 0 major. E/a opposition: nil. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

Fighter Support: one group (24 P-47s) dispatched. Up 1009, down 1431 hours. 24 sorties. Escort uneventful. Claims: nil. Losses: nil.

Details of bomber attacks as follows:

<u>Assigned Targets</u>	<u>Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacked</u>	<u>Tons G.P.</u>	<u>Results</u>
Forêt de St. Sei	13	Not Attacked		
Val des Jonco	13	Not Attacked		
La Briqueterie	13	Not Attacked		
Mont Gournoy	14	Not Attacked		
Mont Couvair	13	11	26.5	Poor
St. George-sur-Fontaine	13	13	31.5	Good
St. Jean des Cardemay	<u>12</u>	<u>Not Attacked</u>	<u> </u>	
Totals	91	24	58.0	

2. Fighter Escort

16 groups (197 P-47s, 44 P-38s, 500 P-51s - 741 a/c) dispatched to escort bombers attacking targets in Germany, Poland and Noball targets in the Pas de Calais area. Up 0841 - 1059 hours, down 0931 - 1545 hours. 649 sorties. E/a opposition: combats with approximately 125 - 150 s/e and a few t/e a/c in Bremen, Hamburg, Brandenburg areas, and north of Berlin. Four groups strafed transportation facilities near Magdeburg, Hamburg and Verdun, and grass A/Fs south of Berlin. Claims: 31-2-7 air, 2-0-4 ground. Losses: 9 a/c (8 P-51s, 1 P-47) all to unknown reasons.

In addition to e/a destroyed on the ground, strafing claims include:

<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
3 locos	6 locos
5 tank cars	36 - 40 goods wagons
2 goods wagons	

3. Fighter Sweeps

Nil.

4. Fighter Bombing

Nil.

5. Photo Reconnaissance

31 a/c dispatched on photo reconnaissance missions. Four a/c failed to obtain photos. 19 F-5s dispatched on a mapping mission in Paris area. Two

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

F-5s dispatched on special targets. Four F-5s and two Spitfires dispatched over Germany. Four F-5s intercepted by e/a. 400 bursts of accurate, black flak seen over Kiel. All a/c returned safely.

6. Weather Reconnaissance

19 a/c dispatched on weather mission. 18 were successful. Four Mosquitoes, two B-17s, one B-25 dispatched as weather scouts for special operations. Eight P-51s and one Mosquito dispatched as weather scouts for bombing operation. Two Mosquitoes dispatched over Brest and Hanover. All a/c returned safely.

7. Air Sea Rescue

20 a/c (12 P-47s, 8 P-51s) dispatched on Air Sea Rescue operations. 12 a/c completed routine spotting work and reported no ditching incidents. Eight a/c attempted an unsuccessful interception of a Danish fishing vessel, which on 5 August was known to have picked up part of a bomber crew from an airborne lifeboat off the Frisian Islands. All a/c returned safely.

8. Special Operations

6 B-17s dropped leaflets over two targets in Holland and 16 targets in France. All a/c returned safely.

19 a/c dispatched on special operation. All a/c returned safely.

16 a/c dispatched on special operation. All a/c returned safely.

C. INTELLIGENCE

1. Enemy Air Opposition

Due to effective fighter support, heavy bombers encountered only two slight attacks although the G.A.F. put forth its greatest effort in the past three days of strategic bombing.

The lead group of the last wing attacking assembly plants in Berlin was attacked by six Me-109s and one FW-190. E/a made a single attack from the rear and were reported as "not aggressive". Claims were 0-2-3 for no losses.

B-17s attacking Genshagen encountered 12 FW-190s, 6 Me-109s and 1 JU-88 in the target area. E/a made passes both from the tail and head on from above, in groups of 4 - 6, on the low box of the combat wing. The attacks were persistent, fighters coming in through their own flak, and were made both upon the box as a whole and on the stragglers which had been hit by flak. Claims were 0-0-3 for losses of four B-17s to combination of E/A and AA.

Other bomber forces sighted e/a but experienced no attacks. 50 - 75 e/a were seen south of Hamburg, several Me-410s and Ju-88s in Hamburg area, 15 - 20 s/e e/a over Kiel Bay, and 15 jet-propelled e/a in the Helmstedt area. The jet-propelled e/a remained in the vicinity of the formation for about 15 minutes but did not attack. A B-17 group reported sighting 6 - 10 a/c, believed jet-propelled, just before the target at Genshagen. No attacks were made but contrails and other distinctive characteristics caused crews to believe the e/a to be jet-propelled.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Supporting fighters reported combat with approximately 125 - 150 e/a. Groups escorting first force B-17s in the Berlin area engaged 15 plus Me-109 and Do-217s near Schonfeld and Strasbourg A/F, 30 Me-109s southeast of Hamburg and 7 Me-109s and FW-190s near Brandenburg. Claims were 19-0-2.

A P-51 group dispatched to escort B-17s attacking Gdynia, rendezvoused with wrong bomber force, and supported other B-17s in the Berlin area. One squadron encountered 30 - 40 Me-109s at Schweriner Lake at 1200 hours and another squadron had combat with 50 plus s/e e/a at Havelberg. In addition, 40 FW-190s and Me-109s were sighted near Neumunster, but no combat.

Another P-51 group engaged 6 - 8 s/e e/a northeast of Bremen and one Me-410 over Prenzlau with claims of 4-0-0. P-47s escorting B-24s attacking Kiel encountered eight Me-109s, which dived to deck from 30,000 feet. Two of these e/a were engaged. The same group encountered four Me-109s southwest of Hamburg. Claims were 1-0-2.

2. Flak

Brandenburg - moderate, inaccurate to accurate.
Genshagen - intense, inaccurate to accurate.
Heligoland - meager, inaccurate.
Cuxhaven - meager, inaccurate.
Wesermunde - moderate, inaccurate.
Nordholz - meager, inaccurate to accurate.
Bremervorde - moderate, inaccurate.
Ottendorf - meager, inaccurate.
Hamburg area - several rocket bursts.
Berlin - moderate to intense barrage and tracking fire.

3. Observations

Airfields

35 plus u/i a/c on grass fields two miles southwest of Oldenburg.
2 e/a believed jet-type sighted on A/F two miles south of Oldenburg.
25 plus t/e a/c on A/F east of Magdeburg.

* Runway lengthened and activity seen on A/F five miles west of Rensburg.
E-W runway at Neumunster and Waltenkirche A/Fs are being lengthened approximately 200 yards on east end.

Extended runways on A/Fs at Luneburg and Jever.

20 plus u/i e/a on Melun A/F.

New A/F under construction at 5315N-1233E.

Construction work on A/Fs at Lubeck, Kiel and Echernforde photographed.

Runway described as one and one half as long as the average heavy bomber runway observed 15 miles southwest of Hamburg.

Uncharted A/F at 5350N-0958E.

A/F under construction at 5358N-0935E.

A/F under construction near Bad Braustedt at 5355N-0953E.

A/F under construction with camouflaging at Rensburg.

A/F, two runways under construction, 2 planes on field at 5418N-0932E.

A/F under construction at 5342N-0952E.

A/F reconstructed at 5335N-0954E.

S E C R E T

Other

Newly constructed 4,000 foot ramp seen on Scharnhorn Island.

15 flat-topped ships, which looked like a/c carriers, seen at 5343N-0800E.

Oil storage depot, 8 small tanks, at 5340N-0830 E.

Camouflaged buildings with nets over them in woods at 5348N-0943E and

5346N-0943E.

8 - 12 oil tanks one mile east of Grundeich painted white, 17 oil storage tanks at Stade,

Some built-up areas observed resembling power plant on Neuwerk Island.

New Barracks observed near Bad Segderg at 5356N-1012E.

Much shipping observed in harbors at Bremerhaven Cuxhaven and area off Heligoland.

Searchlights at Kiel, Ecknerford, Schlessig, Lundern, Rensberg, Ostermoor, Schleismühle, and Elmshorn.

4. Damage to Enemy Installations.

Berlin/Niederseiwie (tank-engines) - Good Results

Two patterns blanketed the target and a third probably extended into it. Eight hits by GP bombs noted on the two main buildings and four hits on smaller buildings. Nearby M/Y received at least twelve bursts, and two hits seen on highway bridge over river.

Berlin/Marienfelde (aero-engine works) - Good Results

Three out of five groups attacking hit the target area. Difficult to check extent of last pattern and estimate damage. One group laid tight pattern in center of target, blanketing most of heavily built-up part of area. Another dropping slightly shorter, covered the adjoining Fritz Werner A.G. and the Siemes & Halske A.G. Probable that the very large building in the former was severely hit. All of the buildings in the target area probably received hits or near-misses.

Genshagen (aero-engine) - Good Results

Ten concentrations of GP bombs, five concentrations of IB cover most of target area. Smoke in area prevents complete assessment. However, damage to this target appears severe. Hits were made on following installations with GP bombs: 11 workshops, 1 storage building, 1 office building, 1 canteen building, 2 engine test beds. Hits were made with IB on the following: technical school, 2 work shops, 1 stores and office building.

Brandenburg (Opel) (MT & Pilotless a/c) - Good to Very Good

Five concentrations of GP, one concentration of IB in target area. Direct hits on following installations: main assembly building, 2 annex buildings, 1 u/i building - 75 x 350 feet, 2 medium sized u/i buildings, power plant, 12 small buildings. Direct hits seen in the factory parking area which held a considerable number of vehicles at time of attack.

Brandenburg (Avado) (He-177 Assembly and Component) - Good Results

Intense smoke over target area prevents complete assessment of damage. Direct hits seen on following buildings: 4 assembly buildings, 8 work shops, 1 machine-gun range, 1 stores building, 2 a/o shelters, 4 huts or work shops, these huts burning intensely indicating probable use as portion of factory.

Stendal A/F - Good Results

Approximately 100 bombs bursting in northwest hangar, barracks area. Two hangars - two direct hits each. Five barracks buildings received direct hits.

Harburg (Ebano) (Oil Refinery) - Very Good Results.

Target covered by good pattern of bombs. Large fires burning at end of attack.

Harburg (Rhenania) (Oil Refinery) - Very Good Results.

Numerous patterns cover target. Severe fires seen burning in late photos over target.

Hamburg (Rhenania) (Oil Refinery) - Very Good Results

At least six patterns of GP and IB bombs burst squarely on target or lost in smoke of fires that started immediately after 1st Squadron attack. Fierce fires seen to be burning late in attack.

Hamburg (Deutsche Petroleum) - Very Good Results

At least five patterns of GP and IB bursts are seen to strike MPI and immediate target area. Fires seen to be burning fiercely.

Hamburg (Schlieman) (Oil Refinery) - Poor Results

No hits on the target area.

Kiel (Torpedo Works) - Poor Results

Due to heavy smoke screen largely obscuring Kiel area, bursts partially unobserved. One pattern seen to burst across MPI area near east entrance Kiel Canal. Both sets of locks at this end of Canal covered by GP patterns, with probability of some damage.

Hemingstedt Oil Refinery - Good Results

One very good pattern of GPs burst squarely across MPI.

Hamburg (Schulau) (Oil Refinery) - Very Good Results

Six patterns of GP and IB bursts completely cover the MPI and target area. Large fires seen burning at end of attack.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary reports and is not to be used for record purposes.