## HEADQUARTERS NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDWENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

29 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Report of the Operations Officer - Mission of 29

April 1944.

TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 559.

95TH MAIN GROUP FORMATION

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE. The 95th Main Group formation scheduled to form the high Group in the 13th Combat Wing formation, took off at 0620 - 0640 hours. Due to a thin layer of clouds, bases 3500 feet and tops 12,500 feet, assembly was made over Mendelsham buncher at 15,000 feet. Three ships could not find formation and failed to rendezvous with the Group. Group assembly was effected at 0745 hours and climb begun to 19,000 feet, the Wing assembly altitude. The Group passed two miles east of Lowestoft at 0800 - turned South, at 0815, turned west and headed for Manningtree, the first Wing assembly point. Arriving at Manningtree at 0826, one minute early and ahead of the 390th "A" Group - Wing Leader, the 95th formation flew to the laft of briefed course. Due partly to straggling formation of the 390th "A" Group and to our formation being early - the 95th did not effect Wing rendezvous until 0906, at a point 6 miles east of Cromer - Altitude was 22,000 feet.

Climb was begun to bombing altitude and enemy coast crossed at 0941, altitude 24,000 feet, slightly to south of course. The 390th "A" Group remained in loose formation until enemy coast was crossed, then closing. Wing formation was good from this point.

The formation continued South of course throughout the route in; the 13th Wing took its bombing interval at 52°39'-10°06'E as prescribed, and reached I.F. at 1113 hours. The target was visible and tombs were dropped by sight in Wing formation. The 95th Group was high Group and to the left at the time of bombing. Bombs were released at 1127, altitude 26,600 feet. A/c No. 7264 was hit just before reaching target and dropped out of formation down below the low Group, dropping its bombs on target from that position.

After bombs were away, a right turn was made and Wing climbed slightly to avoid flak. The Wing was south of briefed course at the time. Descent to 19,000 feet was then begun and formation continued south of course on route out. Flak was encountered along most of the return route but no enemy fighter attacks were experienced. Friendly fighter cover was very good.

The 95th formation recrossed enemy coast at 1425, altitude 21,000 feet. Descent to minimum altitude was started, and about 15 miles from the English Coast, the 95th leader obtained permission from Wing leader to leave ling formation and circle his Group down through a break in the undercast below. After descending to 2,000 feet, the 95th Formation continued on to the English Coast, crossing it at 1442 hours and arriving over base at 1447. Landing was effected at 1456 to 1530 hours.

2. AIRCRAST NOT ATTACKING. Twenty-two aircraft, including one spare took off from base. Assembly was at 15,000 feet over the Mendelsham Buncher. A/c No's 42-97290, 42-31063, and 42-38140 could not locate the formation and returned before becoming dispatched. Spare a/c No. 42-37889 filled in a vacancy in the lead squadron. Nineteen wireraft were dispatched. A/c No. 42-39924 lost an engine at 52°35'-06°00'E and returned to base. He is credited with a sortie.

A/c No. 42-37264 was hit before reaching target and dropped out of formation, but dropped its bombs on target. Bighteen aircraft went over the target and dropped bombs on it.

The formation over the target is shown in the attached Diagram "B".

A detailed description of reasons for failure to attack is given in a separate report on Aircraft Not Attacking.

3. LOST AIRCRAFT. A/c No. 42-37988 left the formation at 52°28'-06°33'E apparantly in control. No chutes seen.

95TH GROUP COMPOSITE SQUADRON GENERAL NARRATIVE. Seven aircraft took off from base at 0605-0606 hours with instructions to join the 390th "B" Composite Group and form their high Squadron. Overcast technique was used in assembly - the Group assembly being effected over Buncher #11 at 14,000 feet at 0715-0745 hours. A/c No. 42-31887 failed to find formation and joined the 95th Main Group instead. The 390th "B" Group then made Wing assembly with the 330th "A".

Reference is made to the above Report of the 95th Main Formation for the remainder of the mission with the exceptions of the following points:

- (a) After completion of the mission, the 95th Composite Squadron left the Sasth "B" Group inside anglish Coast and returned to base, landing at 1454-1525 nours.
- (b) The Squadron leader, a/c No. 42-31320, left the formation after bombs away and his place was taken by No. 42-31514.

2. AIRCHAFT NOT ATTACKING. The six aircraft forming the Composite Squadron attacked the primary target and receive credit for sorties. Formation over target is shown in attached Diagram "B".

3. LOST AIRCRAFT. No. 42-31320 left formation shortly after bombs away. Nothing more seen of it.

HARRY G. MUMFORD. Lt. Col., Air Corps. Operations Officer

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 145005

By FNARA Date 8-10-6

H) E-I-15

29 April 1944

HEADQUARTERS 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
- APO 559

AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

95th Group Formation Mission of 29 April 1944

C. A/C Taking Off less unused spares...... 22

1. A/C 42-39924 Sertie. Left formation after being dispatched because of: (a) # 1 engine failure.

2. A/C 42-97290, 42-31063, 42-38140 No Sorties. Unable to find formation so returned to base before being dispatched.

For the Commanding Officer:

HARRY G. MORFORD, Lt. Col., Air Corps, Operations Officer.

B-I-15

29 April 1944

AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

HEADQUARTURS 95TH BOMPARDMENT GROUP (H)

APO 559

95th (Composite) Group Formation

A/C Taking Off less unused spares..... 7 

Number of A/C Not Attacking..... 0 Number of Sorting. .... 7\* Detailed description of reasons why aircraft did not attack:

could not find formation so flew with the 95th Fain Group formation with which it attacked the target)

For the Commanding Officer:

Mission of 29 April 1944

(A/C 42-31887 scheduled to fly with this formation took off late,

HARRY O. MUROOT. Lt. Col., Air Corps. Operations Officer.

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDHENT GROUP (H) NARA Date Office of the Operations Officer DATE 29 April RAM 1 "A" GROUP FORMATION FORM. MAIN GROUP MBLY LEAD C UTCHFIELD 14 62 DELUCA WRIGHT LOW HIGH 25 60 72 64 SCOTT HAGENBAUGH HARRIS 13 76 15 89 78 DOHERTY ROSSETTI VILBERG SH KHAN BERTRAM 05 10 63 78 89 88 99 HOLT 70 68 SNOWDEN SLUSSER PINAS GREENWALD 24 50 19 39 01 99 24 BACHUZEWSKI 19 20 PSOTA BULLARD 72 73 BRIEFING EXTRA SHIPS REAUINESS STATIOUS 334 TAXI 535 TAKE-OFF 336 RENDEZVOUS

19 44

RAM 2 "B"
COMPOSITE SQUADEON
TARGET

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 89 April

19 44

LEAD

,					<del></del> -		5
	LOW					FIG	Ħ
,					<u> </u>	LEAS 13	20 20
-						DANCISIN 72 57	KINNEY 80 54
		<u>-</u>	- Constitution of the Cons	,		BABI 15	2R 14
-	/ <b>!</b>					IAJESKIE 18 76	RIBNIKAR 16   75
		•	Common Property Co.				
BRIEFING READINESS	reason semipapasan hillprin nadilikap on denganpara	r nyr ddarffyggarnin spaffer dan	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			EXTR	A SHIPS
STATIONS TAXI TAKE-OFF PENDEZVOUS						334 - 335 336	

r.F.				FORMATION DIAGRAM
W•				95TH BOMB. GROUP (H)
				DATE 29-4-4
	CR UT	CHFIELD	•	TIME
	14	CHFIELD 1/62		
C 44				
Sc 0 11 13 / 26	De Loca 25/60	WRIGHT 12/641	HA	PRIS
7/1/6	21/60	164	8//	77
Dobert4 72/05	JACOBSON, HAG	EMBAUGH 5 18 9	SHEEHAN	PINAC
72/05	JACOBSON HAG	5/89	SHEEHAN 71   54	P/NAS 99/24
,,				
<u> 402</u> T 70/68	BESSER 81/40	VILBERG 79/88	EN (	CLE
-0/08	V / 40	19188	19/2	24
SNOWDEY	SLUSSER		LEMPE OF	CAFFERMAN
SNOWDE1 24/50	5LUSSER 19/39		12/90 1	GREEN WALD
			Bach	UZEWSKI
2 Deveth another 390 B	EXTRA	_		EXTRA
O andrew			ProtA	
	28/89		PSOTA	BOLLARD

50°50	<b>r.</b> F.	A.				
$\mathcal{O}$ $\mathbb{Q}$	V					FORMATION DIAGRAM
Authority / Z. By F NARA						95TH BOMB. GROUP (H)  DATE 99-4-4
3						TIME
	-					
			<del></del>		(LE.	1SER
					16/75	BERTRAM
			•	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	BA	BER 14
					18/76	RINNEL 80/5-4
					DAX	1C1S/N
IVE_			E	XTRA	72	(C/S/N / 57 EXTRA A/
NG	0	; ;	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	The second section of the second section of the second section of the second section s		

T	ET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET		OFF	LAMD		REMARKS
11.	111	DILLI		TUIMIT	EST	ACT	EST	ACT	CARAMEN
35 R		1462	CRUICHFIELD	·		0620		1505	
75 t	4	7264	WRIGHT		V	1621		1530	
35 >		2560	DELUCA			0672		1504	
	2	1589	HAGENBAUGH	•		0623	/	1457	
36	N	7886	VILBERG-			0623			DID NOT RETURN
35 N	V	8140	BESSER		o de la companya de l	0624		1013	COULDUIT FIND FORMATION
34 1	<	8178	HARRIS			0625		1507	
34 1	1	9924	PINAS		, 1	0676		1135	FIENGINE OUT.
34 F	7	7154	SHEEHAN	and the same of th		0627		1502	
34 0	?	1924	ENGLE			0678		1453	
34 J	5	7201	GREENWALD			0679		1508	
34 H		7290	LEMPERT			0630		0936	COULDN'T FIND FORMATION
34 G	-	1920	BACHUZEWSKI			0631	•	1507	
36.5	3	7354	BULLARD			0632		1458	
412 C		7232	PSOTA			0633		1511	
356. 1	U	1376	Scott	and annual of the constraints		0634		1415	
336-6	-	1110	JACOBSON			0635		038	COUBON'T FIND FORMATION

DATE 4-29-44

			<b></b>	to the comment of the	1		J	
	LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME UST	OFF ACT	LAMDING EST AC	ACT REMARKS
336	L	7205	DOHERTY	b		0640		456
336	H	7068	14011	ander summer animar has been a grant and a		0637		457
336	J	1939	SLUSSER	and the second s		0638	150	500
336	K	2450	SNOWDEN	en e		0639	IS	510
4/2	M	1320	WEASER			0605		COMPOSITE GP, DID NOT RETURN
412	//	1887	BENTRAM	CONTRACTOR OF STREET,		0640	150	509
412	W	1675	RIBNIKAR	electro de servicio. Con la constanti de la co		0605	143	455
335	K	1514	BABER	To make a committee make a make a make and a make	-	0606	14:	454
412	V	8054	KINNEY			0607	154	515
412	1	THE PERSON NAMED AND DESCRIPTION OF	LAJESKIE	ation allows from the conjudence of the conjuden		0607	150	500
412	4	7257	DANCISÍN	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		0608	145	459
						c		
335	4	1889	(COSSOTT)			0640	151	513 Eflia
		necessary and necessary and						
and the second								
							-	
1			<u> </u>		4	<del></del>	1	

# HEADQUARTERS NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDHENT GROUP (H) Office of the Engineering Officer

APO 559, 29 April, 1944.

SUBJECT: Engineering Report on Combat Mission 29 April, 1944.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bomb Gp (H). Attn: Lt Col MC KNIGHT.

- 1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of the 95th Bombardment Group (R) on 29 April, 1944.
  - a. #wenty-nine (29) B-17 airplanes took-off.
  - b. Twenty-three (23) B-17 airplanes returned to base after completion of mission.
  - c. 42-37988 & 42-31320 are missing in action.
  - 2. There were four (4) abortive airplanes.
    - e. 42-39924 #1 engine failure.
    - b. 42-97290 Could not locate formation.
    - 42-31063 Raido and fluxgate compass inoperative.
    - d. 42-38140 Could not locate formation.
  - 3. Battle damage is as follows:
    - a. 42-38178 #2 feeder tank punctured by flak.
    - b. 42-107154- Minor sheet metal damage.
    - c. 42-31589 Left stabilizer and right outer wing panel damaged.
    - d. 42-37889 Right wing tip damaged.
    - e. 42-97264 Right and Left outer wing panels damaged.
    - f. 42-31939 Left outer wing panel damaged.
    - g. 42-97205 Left outer wing panel damaged.
    - h. 42-31376 Oil cooler #2 engine hit by flak.
    - I. 42-97232 Minor sheet metal damage.
    - J. 42-31999 Minor sheet metal damage.
    - k. 42-31675 Minor flak damage.
    - I. 42-31876 Leading edge left wing damaged. Minor flak damage.
    - m. 42-38054 Minor flak damage. n. 42-97257 - Minor flak damage.

90

CLARENCE D. FIELDS. Major. Air Corps. Base Engr. Officer.



HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

E-E-26

29 April 1944

SUBJECT: Lead Navigator's Narrative, Ninety Fifth "A" Group, Mission of 29 April 1944, Berlin, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), A.A.F.

- 1. The Ninety Fifth "A" Group flying as high group in the Thirteenth Combat Wing took off at 0620 hours and rendezvoused over BU #19 at 15000' circling around until group was formed.
- 2. At 0800 hours we were two miles east of Lowestoft and headed south to make contact with lead group. At 0815 hours we turned on a westerly heading to make good rendezvous point # 1. However we were a minute early and followed to the left of prescribed course making wing formation finally at 0906 hours at 5235N 0126E, approximately six miles east of Cromer.
- 3. We crossed the Enemy coast at 0941 hours, five minutes late about four miles south of course. We continued south of course but making good our I.P. at 1114 hours. We proceeded on briefed course and bombed primary target.
- 4. After target area we proceeded back out always to the south of briefed course and crossed the Enemy coast at 1405 hours at 5202N 0412E and started descent. We crossed the English coast four miles south of Southwold at 1447 hours and returned to our base.

FLOYD R. GORMAN lst Lt., Air Corps, Lead Mavigator.

CONFIDENTIAL

## HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE AAF STATION 101 APO 634

#### EIGHTH AIR FORCE NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

327th Operation - 29 April 1944

#### BERLIN

Twelve combat wings from the three bomb divisions of Eighth Air Force, with sixteen groups of USAAF P-47s, P-51s and P-38s, and two squadrons of R.A.F. Mustangs as escort, were dispatched to attack the center of Berlin. Fierce air opposition developed against 2nd Division B-24s and especially against one combat wing of 3rd Division, which became separated from its escort and other bombers and was finally forced to attack opportunity targets. However, the entire force of 1st and 2nd Divisions, and the main force of 3rd Division attacked the city of Berlin, dropping over 1400 tons, mostly by Pathfinder methods, with fair to good results.

The 3rd Division wings which successfully attacked Berlin reported no air opposition and the 1st Division, which attacked next, reported only once minor attack. E/a accounted for 27 of the 63 bombers lost and intense accurate flak over the target was responsible for 11 losses. In general, enemy fighters appeared to successfully evade friendly escort. Although groups escorting 3rd Division reported about 150 e/a sighted, many of these remained high and refused to engage, and claims of the escort to 3rd Division are only 3-0-2 for air combats. Total air claims are 14-2-11, and claims of 7-5-5 are made for strafing attacks. Three P-38s and three P-51s of VIII Fighter Command and seven P-51s of IX Fighter Command are missing. Two of the 63 bombers lost ditched in the channel and crews were rescued. Bomber claims have not yet been evaluated.

#### BOMBER OPERATIONS

		Nur	ber of A/	<u>C</u>					
Unit	( <u>AB</u>	Disp.	Atta	cked	Lost)	Pri	mary	0. T.	¹s
1ST BOMB DIV			Primary	O. T.	s	G.P.	<u>I.B.</u>	G.P.	<u>I.B.</u>
lst C.W.	56°	52	51	0	1	75	- 39	0	0
40th C.W.	61	51	49	0	3	<b>7</b> 8	32	0	0
41st C.W.	66	<b>5</b> 8	55	0	3	81	37	0 -	0
94th C.W.	60	50	48	0	3	71	43	0	0
Pathfinders	8	7	7	0	0	11	4	<u>0</u>	<u>o</u>
	251	218	210	ō	10	316	155	ō	<u> </u>

į	DECLASSIFIED
	Authority <b>145005</b>
	BUE NARA Date 8-10-6

		Nun	ber of A	/c			T	ons By	NARA D	ate 2
Unit 2ND BOMB DIV	·	Disp.	Atta rimary	cked 0.T.'s	Lost	Prin G.P.		O.T G.P.	I.B.	
2nd C.W. 14th C.W. 20th C.W. 96th C.W. Pathfinders	40 42 82 82 6 252	32 40 79 77 5 233	31 31 76 69 5 212	000000	1 9 7 6 2 25	78 78 0 0 <u>2</u> 158	5 198 179 3 390	000000	0 0 0 0 0	
3RD BOMB DIV	•									
4 A C.W. 4 B C.W. 13th C.W. 45th C.W. Pathfinders	61 68 62 66 8 265	55 58 52 55 8 228	0 51 49 52 6 158	32 2 0 2 2 2 38	18 3 3 4 0 28	0 77 74 78 6 235	50 51 49 52 0 152	48 3 0 3 2 56	32 2 0 2 0 36	
OPERATIONAL TOTALS	768	679	580	<b>3</b> 8	63	<b>7</b> 09	697		36	

#### BOMBING RESULTS:

#### Berlin

368 B-17s and 212 B-24s dropped 1404 x 1000 G.P., 16 x 500 G.P. - 706 tons G.P. - and 9239 x 100 I.B., 933 x 500 I.B. - 702 tons I.B. - a total of 1408 tons - on Berlin from 23,000 - 26,700 feet at 1116 - 1154 hours. Three large concentrations fell in central Berlin. The first was in the area of the Air Ministry and about one-half of this large building received severe damage, and the south wing was burning fiercely at the end of the attack. The second concentration spread across the Tempelhof marshalling yard, and extended to the Anhalter Station where the main RR lines received hits, as did possibly the station. The third concentration fell on the heavily built-up area on the N. side of Tempelhof A/F. Another large bomb pattern can be plotted on the heavily built-up area just east of Tempelhof A/F.


Partial cloud coverage prevents detailed as essment of the major part of the attack but the following areas have been plotted in which bursts are observed. The main rail line running into Tempélhof M/Y was cut in the south outskirts of the city. Several concentrations fell in the Zellendorf district and one large pattern in this area is seen to cover an industrial-residential district. Bombs also fell in the Dahlen, Grunewald, Schonberg and Mariendorf districts.

#### Magdeburg

24 B-17s dropped 66 x 1000 G.P., 8 x 500 G.P. and 89 x 500 I.B. - 35 tons of G.P. and 22 tons of I.B. - on Magdeburg. Results are unobserved.

#### Brandenburg

10 B-17s dropped 30 x 100 G-P. and 40 x 500 I.B. - 25 tons - on Brandenburg. Results are unobserved.



#### Other Opportunity Targets

4 B-17s dropped 12 x 1000 G.P. and 16 x 500 I.B. - 10 tons - on unidentified opportunity targets. Results are unobserved.

ENCOUNTERS: Heaviest e/a attacks were made on 2nd Division wings, which flew last, between Celle and the I.P. and on the route out, and on the 4 A Combat Wing of 3rd Division, one of the leading B-17 wings, which became separated from the remainder of the Division and was viciously attacked near Magdeburg. 1st Division formations, flying between the other divisions reported only one weak attack. The great majority of attacking e/a were FW-190s and Me-109s, which attacked in waves of 15 - 20, and were reported to use rockets and aerial bombs in a few instances, in addition to cannon and machine-gun fire.

The 4 A Combat Wing experienced difficulty with PFF equipment and lost visual contact with other bombers and fighter escort. Reaching the Magdeburg area, the wing was attacked by packs estimated as totalling 100 e/a, which attacked in waves from nose and tail. Attacks were pressed home vigorously and closely and lasted for about 20 minutes. This wing lost a total of 18 B-17s.

2nd Division formations reported first attacks by 60 - 100 s/e e/a in the Celle area, lasting beyond the I.P. These e/a attacked in groups of 15 - 25, approaching from the nose, passing through bomber formations and then concentrating on stragglers. After B-24s had bombed, they were attacked by 75 - 125 e/a between Hanover and the Zuider Zee, with especially aggressive attacks by 30 - 50 s/e.e/a in the Dummer Lake area. Tactics followed the pattern previously reported. In one instance, several FW-190s were reported to have dropped aerial bombs from about 1000 feet above the formation, the missiles bursting immediately above the B-24s and appearing to hit two bombers.

REASONS FOR FAILURE TO BOMB: 40 B-17s and 21 B-24s failed to bomb - 16 B-17s and 10 B-24s due to mechanical or equipment failures, 19 B-17s and 10 B-24s due to enemy action, and 5 B-17s and 1 B-24 to other reasons.

CASUALTIES: Personnel - 15 crew members were killed, 57 wounded, 625 are missing and 19 were rescued.

Equipment - 38 B-17s and 25 B-24s were lost - 10 B-17s and 1 B-24 due to AA, 10 B-17s and 17 B-24s due to e/a, 2 B-17s and 1 B-24 to e/a and AA, and 16 B-17s and 6 B-24s to reasons unknown.

Estimated Battle Damage - 229 B-17s and 114 B-24s Category "A" and "AC", 82 B-17s and 7 B-24s Category "B", and 1 B-17 and 1 B-24 Category "E

ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE: Intense accurate flak, of both barrage and predicted following types was reported in the Berlin area. Intense, accurate predicted fire was also experienced over Brunswick, Hanover and Magdeburg. Meager to moderate, generally inaccurate flak was reported over Ijmuiden, Quackenbruck, Diepholz, Zwolle and Nienberg. Fire at Dummer Lake was moderate to intense and fairly accurate. A total of 10 B-17s and one B-24 were lost to flak and 432 of the 679 bombers participating in the operation suffered minor or major battle damage, mostly from flak.

inland, with a neavy

WEATHER: 5/10 to 10/10 cloud was reported from landfall inland, with a neavy haze over western Germany which was instrumental in the 4 A Combat Wing being separated from other formations. 3/10 to 3/10 cloud prevailed in the target area, necessitating bombing with the aid of instruments in most cases, although breaks allowed visual observation of results and make some photographic assessment possible.

OBSERVATIONS: Smoke screens were noted at Salzwedel, Osterburg, Magdeburg, Stendal, Brunswick, Hanover, Lake area NW of Berlin, Osnabruck, Rathenow, Burg, Fallersleben, Gardelegen, and a smoke screen with smoke pots along a highway at Lakenwalde. At 5239N - 1006E, an A/F with 20 parked a/c was seen. An apparently new field with two new runways and 20 a/c was also seen at approximately 5237N - 0600E. The area around Wittenberge had been flooded in some places to a width of 10 miles. The following was also noted: 40 t/e on an A/F at Shonefeld; 30 4-engine a/c on A/F north of Stendal at 1240 hours; 25 - 30 large e/a on A/F at Burg at same time; 25 large e/a or gliders on A/F see of Vechta at 1055 hours; 25 large e/a on A/F at Potsdam just SE of Berlin; and about 5 t/e or 4-engine e/a on A/F at Salzwedel.

FIGHTER OPERATIONS

16 groups (321 P-47s, 155 P-51s and 117 P-38s) of the VIII Fighter Command, and 4 groups (99 P-47s and 84 P-51s) of the IX Fighter Command furnished continuous escort for these operations. In addition, 24 P-51s of the R.A.F. provided escort, and 2 groups (48 P-47s) of VIII Fighter Command flew second sorties consisting of sweeps and area support. Determined e/a opposition was encountered at several points, especially by those groups accompanying the 2nd Division. VIII Fighter Command claims 8-1-7 in the air, and 5-0-5 on the ground for the loss of 3 P-51s and 3 P-38s. IX Fighter Command claims 6-1-4 in the air, 2-5-0 on the ground and lost 7 P-51s.

## VIII Fighter Command

<u>Unit</u>	Type of A/C	Type of Support	No $A/C$ on Mis	sion Lost	Claims
65th Fig.	hter Wing		ing Andrews Andrews	1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1	
4 56A 56A+ 56B 56B + 355 356A 356B	P-51 P-47 P-47 P-47 P-47 P-51 P-47	Pen., Tgt., & With Area Withdrawal Ramrod Withdrawal Pen., Tgt., & With Penetration Withdrawal	21 <sub>+</sub> 23 21 <sub>+</sub> 23	2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3	5-0-3++ 0-0-0 0-0-0 0-0-0 0-0-1 1-0-0 0-0-0 0-0-0 6-0-4
66th Fig.	hter Wing				
55 78A 78B 353 357	P-38 P-47 P-47 P-47 P-51	Withdrawal Withdrawal Withdrawal Penetration Pen., Tgt., & With	36 48 20 31 drawal <u>42</u> 177	0 0 0 0 0	0-0-0 0-0-0 0-0-0 0-0-0 0-0-1 0-0-1

		CONFIDENT	IAL	Authority 7	LASSIFIED 45005
Unit T	ype - A/C	Type of Support	No on Missi		RA Date 8-10-6
67th Figh	ter Wing		And the second		
20 352 359 361 364	P-38 P-51 P-47 P-47 P-38	Withdrawal Pen. Tgt.,& Withd Penetration Withdrawal Withdrawal	144 1rawa1 27 43 52 37 203	0 0 0 0 3 3	0-0-2 2-0-2(1) 1-0-0 2-0-0 2-1-3 7-1-7
	Total VIII	Fighter Command	641	6	13-1-12
		IX Fighter Con	mend		
70th Figh	ter Ving				
354 358 362 363	P-51 P-47 P-47 P-51	Penetration Withdrawal Withdrawal Penetration	39 49 50 <u>45</u> 183	3 0 0 4 7	6-1-4 0-0-0 2-4-0++ 0-1-0++ 8-6-4
	Total USAAF	,	824	13	21-7-16
R• A• F•	P-51		21,	0	0-0-0
	OPERATIONAL	TOTALS	848	13	21-7-16

<sup>+</sup> Flew second sorties.

#### Escort to Bombers

Escortato 1st Bombardmont Division: The 359th Group rendezvoused with the 1st Division Fortresses at Egmond at 0945 hours and broke off escort at Celle at 1048 hours. Eight FW-190s and 4 Me-109s were intercepted after they had made a pass at 3rd Division bombers, and one e/a was destroyed. The 363rd Group (IX F.C.) joined the formation at Dummer Lake at 1020 hours and stayed with them until reaching Gifhorn at 1215 hours. The 357th Group met the bombers in the Steinhuder Lake area at 1020 hours and escorted them through the target, leaving north of Hanover at 1230 hours. One of the two Me-109s engaged west of Berlin was damaged, and no other e/a were seen in the air. The 364th Group made rendezvous near Dummer Lake at 1028 hours and broke escort at Salzwedel at 1130 hours. Near Steinhuder Lake the belly tanks were dropped to fight off attacks by a formation of 25 to 50 c/a lasting from 1045 to 1125 hours. Claims are 2-1-3 for the loss of 3 a/c. The 78 B Group furnished withdrawal support from south of Hanover at 1255 hours and were thought to have left the bombers south of Dummer Lake in a thick overcast. The 362nd Group (IX F.C.) met some units of this Division northwest of Hanover at 1255 hours and escorted them uneventfully to south of Zuider Zee at 1355 hours.

Escort to 2nd Bombardment Division: The 353rd Group rendezvoused in the vicinity of Dummer Lake at 1030 hours and continued with the bombers until 1105 hours at a position northeast of Brunswick. They were unable to engage

<sup>++</sup> On ground.

<sup>(1) 0-0-2</sup> on ground.

### <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 745005
By F NARA Date 8-10-6

40 plus e/a seen flying south from Hamburg at 1055 hours. (IX F.C.) picked up the bombers at Dummer Lake at 1035 hours. 30 plus Me-109s and FW-190s were engaged from Gardelegen to west of Berlin where they broke escort at 1140 hours. The 55th Group was unable to locate the bombers and, as the majority of planes were having mechanical difficulty, the group turned back north of Magdeburg at 1116 hours. The 361st Group arrived at Steinhuder Lake at 1235 hours but were unable to find the Liberators. One squadron accompanied four combat wings of unescorted B-17s to the enemy coast, while the remainder swept the area to the limit of endurance at 1315 hours. Two Me-109s were encountered and destroyed. The 56 B Group rendezvoused at Dummer Lake at 1335 hours and escorted Fortresses and Liberators of all Divisions to the neighborhood of Rotterdam at 1450 hours. One flight returned from landfall to near quackenbruck to help stragglers. The 356 B Group joined two boxes of Liberator and three boxes of Fortresses at a point south of Dummer Lake at 1345 hours and escorted them uneventfully out over Egmond at 1440 hours and over the North Sea until 1500 hours.

Escort to 3rd Bombardment Division: - The 356th Group provided uneventful escort from Alkmaar at 0942 hours to Vic Lingen at 1004 hours. The 4th Group took over here and escorted the bombers to the target and back almost to Osnabruck without sighting e/a in the air. The 352nd Group made rendezvous east of Celle at 1030 hours and continued escort on through the target, breaking off east of Gardelegen. Two e/a were destroyed during engagements with three formations with no losses. The 355th Group met the bombers at Steinhuder Lake at 1030 hours. One attack by 4 FW-190s was dispersed at 1045 hours, and another by 75 e/a in the Berlin area. After the target, 25 Me-109s were driven off near Brunswick. Escort was broken at 1207 hours, but they continued along the bomber stream until 1245 hours just west of Steinhuder Lake. c/a was destroyed for the loss of one. The 20th Group passed 1st and 2nd Division bombers on way to rendezvous, and at 1110 hours also saw 50 Me-109s, some with rockets. About 150 s/e e/a were noted in formations of 50 west of the target but they refused to engage. Eight e/a made a diving pass at the group and damaged two a/c. The 78  $\wedge$  Group made rendezvous at 1235 hours east of Hanover, and remained with the bombers until 1318 hours, probably north of the Ruhr where intense, heavy flak scattered the formation. There were many stragglers, but no e/a seen. The 358th Group (IX F.C.) furnished final withdrawal support without incident, meeting the Fortresses at 1257 hours east of Lingen and leaving them at Egmond at 1329 hours.

#### Strafing Attacks and Fighter Observations

65th Fighter Wing: One section of the 4th Group strafed an unidentified A/F west of Berlin leaving five a/c burning. This group also strafed three trains at an unidentified marshalling yard.

66th Fighter Wing: - Groups of this wing reported that overcast restricted observations. No strafing was reported.

67th Fighter Wing: - One flight of the 352nd Group strafed an A/F in the Burg area, where 15 unidentified c/a and 10 gliders were observed. A section of the 359th Group strafed the Hanover M/Y, reporting 13 locomotives destroyed and 6 damaged.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary information and should not be used for record purposes.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
AAF STATION 101
APO 634

### EIGHTH AIR FORCE NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

328th Operation - 29/30 April, 1944

Night Leaflet Operation - France and Holland

Four B-17s of the 422nd Squadron, 305th Group, 1st Bombardment Division, dropped 1,060,000 leaflets over France and Holland at 2322 - 0052 hours from 22,000 - 25,000 feet. No enemy opposition from ground or air was reported. All a/c returned safely.

Leaflets were distributed as follows:

Locality	Number of A/C	Type of Leaflets	Number of Leaftets
Meastricht	1	US H 10	80,000
Eindhoven		US H 10	40,000
Amsterdam	resident of the second	US H 10	80,000/
Haarlem		X H 10	40,000
'Paris		US F 103	160,000
Lille		US F 103	160,000
Tourcoing		T 12	20,000
Marck		T 12	20,000
Criel	$oldsymbol{i}$	T 12	20,000
Abbeville		T 1-2	20,000
Amiens	$q = (1 + 1)^{2} \cdot (1 + 1)^{2$	~ T 12	20,000
Armentieres		T 12	20,000
Ypres		T 12	20,000
Lessines		T 12	20,000
Charleroi		T 12	20,000
Gembloeux		T 12	20,000
Leyden		US H 10	80,000
Groningen		US H 10	80,000
Apeldorn		(US H 10	,40,000
-		(X H 10	20,000
Rotterdam		х н 10	20,000
Hague		X H 10	60,000
		선생님 중요하는 당시하는 보다 되었다.	

1,060,000