

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

4 February 1944.

SUBJECT: S-3 Narrative for Operational Mission of 4 February 1944.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634.

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE. 21 a/c of 95A took off from base at 0850-0904 to form the lead group of 13B Combat Wing. By 0910 the Group formation had assembled over base at 2000'. Assembly with 95B over base was not effected due to stratus clouds at briefed altitude.

During the climb to bombing altitude 95B tacked on to 95A and climbed in trail to 20,000'. Due to winds of higher velocity than briefed, Splasher #6 and Buncher #12 were cut short in attempt to make the controlled time at Splasher #7.

En route from Buncher #12 to Splasher #7 the 100B Group filled in the 13B Combat Wing as low Group. Good Combat Wing formation was observed after reaching bombing altitude.

95A, one minute late at Splasher #7, left the English coast from Clacton at 1053 at 21,000' and proceeded on course. The enemy coast was crossed at 23,000' five miles north of course at 1125. The route from the enemy coast to the target was flown approximately 25 miles north of the briefed course. A turn to the south toward Frankfurt was made and paralleled course until north of the target.

At the I.P. there were occasional breaks in the clouds with coverage generally 6-8/10's. The pff ship of 13A Combat Wing fired yellow-yellow flare and 95A opened bomb bay doors. Bombs were away on smoke flares at 1224 on magnetic heading 210°.

A right turn was made off the target, and track out was north of course. Enemy coast was crossed at 51°47' 03°54'E, this being very near the same place the enemy coast was crossed going to the target.

Descent was not begun until mid-channel due to cloud formations. English coast was recrossed at 1432 just east of Orfordness and 95A Group arrived over base at 1535. Landing at home base were from 1534-1549 hours.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING. 21 a/c left base in the formation shown in the attached Diagram "A". a/c #7826 returned to base before being dispatched and is not credited with a sortie. 20 a/c were dispatched and 20 a/c attacked the target and are credited with sorties.

95th "A" GROUP  
COMBAT MISSION

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

LEAD

READ  
13/76

GEIB  
16/58

LLOYD  
12/99

INFIELD  
13/29

\* LEONARD  
12/58

VANSANT  
99/43  
12/51

EDWARDS  
99/89

OVERSTREET  
99/24

STERN  
78/94

TUBEROSE  
79/71

DUNHAM  
14/62

STUBER  
12/44

COLE  
15/65

PEARSON  
79/29

CAMPBELL  
78/89

CRITCHFIELD  
15/61

ROURKE  
78/24

BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
TAXI \_\_\_\_\_  
TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_

EXTRA SHIPS

334 \_\_\_\_\_  
335 \_\_\_\_\_  
336 \_\_\_\_\_  
412 \_\_\_\_\_

ICM

HIC

WALLACE  
16/00

MILWARD  
01/78

MCINTYRE  
06/09

*total*

95th "B" GROUP

~~SECRET~~

ASSEMBLY

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

LEAD

CASPERS -

13 | 20

McGUGGAN ✓  
10 | 54

GUNN ✓  
98 | 69

JEFFERS ✓  
98 | 84

HIATT ✓  
80 | 54

KRUGER  
79 | 35

MCCALLISTER ✓  
98 | 97

NEWSON ✓  
06 | 34

BIEBECKER ✓  
02 | 33

CONLEY ✓  
74 | 95

BROWNLOW  
99 | 43

HANSEN ✓  
80 | 24

LIGHT

BROWN ✓  
78 | 82

REIS ✓  
16 | 75

READ ✓  
97 | 93

BATCHA ✓  
78 | 76

CAVALIER ✓  
12 | 05

HUDDLESTON  
60 | 80

DEAN ✓  
79 | 88

RUSSELL  
34 | 00

MARKS ✓  
35 | 29

BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
TAXI \_\_\_\_\_  
TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RENDEZVOUS \_\_\_\_\_

EXTRA SHIPS

334 \_\_\_\_\_  
335 \_\_\_\_\_  
336 \_\_\_\_\_  
412 \_\_\_\_\_



DIAGRAM "A"

~~Assembled~~  
~~Combat~~

95th "B" Group  
OVERTARGET

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

LEAD

CASPERS

13 | 20

M<sup>C</sup>GUIGAN

10 | 54

H LATT

80 | 54

COH

BROWN

78 | 82

NEWSON

06 | 34

BIEBECKER

02 | 33

REIS

16 | 75

READ

97 | 93

CONLEY

74 | 95

BATCHA

78 | 76

MANSEN

80 | 24

CAVALIER

12 | 05

MARKS

35 | 29

BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_

READINESS \_\_\_\_\_

STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_

TAXI \_\_\_\_\_

TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_

PREVIOUS \_\_\_\_\_

EXTRA SHIPS

334 \_\_\_\_\_

335 \_\_\_\_\_

336 \_\_\_\_\_

412 \_\_\_\_\_

HEADQUARTERS 96TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
APO 634

E-1-15

4 February 1944

AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

95 B Group Formation

Mission of 4 February 1944

A. Number of A/C Scheduled.....	21
B. Number of A/C Taking Off.....	21
C. A/C Taking Off less unused spares.....	21
D. Number of A/C Dispatched.....	18
E. Number of A/C Attacking.....	17
F. Number of A/C Not Attacking.....	4
G. Number of Sorties.....	18
H. Detailed description of reasons why aircraft did not attack:	

1. A/C 42-29943 No Sortie. Left formation before being dispatched because of: (a)  $\frac{1}{2}$  4 engine failure.
2. A/C 42-8080 No Sortie. Left formation before being dispatched because of: (a)  $\frac{1}{2}$  4 engine failure.
3. A/C 42-3400 No Sortie. Left formation before being dispatched because of: (a)  $\frac{1}{2}$  2 supercharger regulator failed.
4. A/C 42-37935 Sortie. Left formation after being dispatched because of: (a)  $\frac{1}{2}$  3 supercharger regulator failed.

For the Commanding Officer:

HARRY C. MURFORD,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Operations Officer.







C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
65TH FIGHTER WING  
APO 637 AAF Station F-370

NUMBER 13

5 February, 1944.

NARRATIVE REPORT OF WING OPERATIONS ROOM  
Bomber Escort Mission of 4 February 44 (VIII FC FO 234)  
(Target - Frankfurt)

## I. GENERAL.

A typical long-range mission. Radar plotting was fair but of little use in following the forces; however, R/T was good and helped the controller keep a rough track of the bombers and fighters. The bombers reported that they were from four (4) minutes late by some combat wings to on time by others. They were apparently north of course on penetration and quite spread out on withdrawal. Some coming out far north of the planned withdrawal track.

Several hostile radar plots appeared, and R/T indicated many "bogies" but no contact.

The weather was good during the mission except at the 56th's base which closed in at landing time.

Had the bomber forces been able to pass their position this Wing could have been of more value to them as well as to our own groups. This Wing can plot the bombers if their position is given by "G", lat and long or in reference to coded locations given in the field order.

Coordination between Ajax and Wings was satisfactory insofar as the passage of pertinent information was concerned.

## II PRINCIPAL EVENTS AT CHIEF CONTROLLER'S POSITION.

- 0900 - 11 Group was given the intended position of spotter aircraft.
- 1000 - Controller asked that the 66th and 67th Wings and 12 Group check on any aircraft that they have flying in northern East Anglia as we are experiencing very bad interference on "B" from some unidentified A/C. All replied they had no A/C in that area.
- 1027 - From "C": 1st ATF on course on time. Passed on conference line.
- 1103 - 4th Wing of 2nd ATF one (1) minute late at 1053. No contact with lead Wing. Passed on conference line.
- 1104 - 66th and 67th Wings and Ajax notified that through an R/T violation the 4th Group had given away the code letter for Antwerp. Group controllers were told not to use this reference point if at all possible.
- 1122 - 2nd ATF is formed and is running from 4 minutes late to on time. 3rd ATF on time on course. This from "C"; passed on conference line.
- 1154 - From "C": 3rd Wing of 3rd ATF is returning. At 1207 they gave their position at request of controller who wanted to send the 356th to them for escort. They were almost back to England by this time, however, and no escort was necessary. Ajax informed.
- 1220 - 2nd Wing of 1st ATF is 10-15 minutes late coming out. Received on "C"; passed on conference line.
- 1253 - Controller informed Flying Control at the 56th that the weather at their station was going to be very bad about landing time. Controller will keep them informed.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Mission Report of 4 February 44 (Cont'd)  
(Part II cont'd)

- 1259 - Ajax calls asking location of 355th. Told it is 7 minutes late. Says to watch activity in Y square.
- 1310 - Ajax A-3: Is the 56th with the bombers? No, indications they are returning.
- 1318 - Flying Control at the 356th informed by controller that the 56th A and B Groups would be homed to that station. Homing will eventually be turned over to the 356th on "C".
- 1324 - Flying Control at the 56th informed of the foregoing entry.
- 1334 - Ajax called asking for the position of the 355th. Ajax told controller to instruct the 355th to go in and meet the 3rd ATF and any stragglers.
- 1335 - 355th told to penetrate as far as possible to pick up the 3rd ATF and any stragglers and escort them out. 355th said they would not be able to penetrate too far.
- 1346 - Ajax, checking on a bomber call for help. Told 355th is being informed.
- 1351 - Ajax called again requesting the 355th be put on the 3rd ATF if possible.
- 1408 - Ajax requested position of 355th, supplied. Ajax told the controller to order the 355th to withdraw to the NW and to pick up any stragglers and assign units to escort same.
- 1410 - Controller asked group controller to instruct the 355th as per foregoing entry.

### III. GROUP CONTROLLERS' POSITION.

4th Group Airborne at 1012, crossed in over Flushing at about 1059. Radar plots limited to an area raid. Passed warning of huns over Antwerp, point "F". Group leader heard to ask where "F" was, and another pilot said it was Antwerp. R/V made at 1118 to the east of Beverloo. R/T contact lost shortly thereafter and was not regained until 1147 at about the same point. At 1224 asked leader if he had crossed out. The answer was "YES". Landed at 1309. Southminster relay used with good results to about 200 miles.

56 A Group Airborne at 1116. No radar except a large area raid all the way across the channel. Crossing in signal heard at 1152 and Group was probably near Flushing. Group penetrated well inland, but apparently did not make R/V. Crossing out signal heard at 1312, probably near Ostend. Warned of bad weather at base at 1325 and 1336, and told to go to 356th base, but R/T indicated that Group proceeded to the home base. Landed at 1358.

56 B Group Airborne at 1128. No radar plots. No signal heard but estimated landfall in at 1212 south of Flushing. Group saw some bombers, apparently coming home early, but didn't make any R/V. At 1310 warned of bandits in Brussels area. Time and place of landfall out unknown. Warned of bad weather at base at 1330 and 1348, and to go to 356th base, but R/T indicated that group proceeded to the home base. Landed at 1423. Local and Heathfield relay used with very satisfactory results. R/T coverage throughout mission except for a short time when 56 B had to relay message from 56 A. Distance covered estimated at 240 miles from Heathfield.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Mission Report of 4 February 44 (cont'd)  
(Part III Cont'd)

355th Group Airborne at 1245, crossed out near Bradwell. Group crossed in about 1321 estimated at 10 miles northwest of Dunkirk. Radar plots carried to vicinity of Lille. Group penetrated to Charleroi, where the "pip" was heard at 1341. At 1337 the leader was asked if he saw the B-24's--the answer was "NO", whereupon the controller instructed the group to find the B-24's if possible and to escort the last box out, keeping a careful check on endurance. Acknowledged. Group stayed in area until 1410, but apparently didn't find the B-24's. Information of bandits was passed and the group tried to contact these, apparently without results. Crossing out signal heard at 1429, probably near Ostend. Landed at 1534. 356th and Southminster relays used, both with very satisfactory results. R/T contact was not lost, over a distance of 180 miles.

356th Group Airborne at 1059. Crossing in signal heard at 1130, about 6 miles north of Flushing. Radar plots of poor quality extended to the coast. R/V was made just north of Aachen at 1150. R/T faded at this point and was not resumed until 1234, when a "pip" was heard indicating leaving the bombers, location unobtainable. No indications of combat. No warnings passed to group. Group made landfall out about 1300 near Flushing. Landed at 1345. Local and Heathfield relay used, with good coverage to 220 miles.

#### IV. CHANNELS B, C AND D.

Channel B No mayday received during this mission. Four emergency homings, two bombers and two fighters, were controlled with all planes landing safely.

R/T was very poor during the first three hours of the mission due to faulty transmitter in an unidentified aircraft. Fixing was very good.

Channel C In general the operation of this channel was normal and satisfactory. At the beginning of the mission the bomber forces passed their course and timings on this channel. These in turn were given to the chief controller as an aid in affecting bomber-fighter R/V. At 1153 the 3rd Wing of the 3rd ATF advised that he was returning with 28 A/C. He gave his position upon request, and it was found that he was close enough to England not to need an escort. The usual amount of fighter-bomber intercom was heard although considerable difficulty at times in receiving answers from the bombers.

Local and relay used; communications satisfactory. R/T coverage was obtained up to 200 miles.

Channel D An unusually light mission from a homing standpoint. 21 A/C requested homings, a vector was passed to each and all landed safely. R/T procedure was very good; all pilots cooperated to the fullest extent.

Communications on both local and relay were very good. Some tractor interference was heard, but did not interfere too badly.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE  
AAF STATION 101  
APO 634

E I G H T H A I R F O R C E N A R R A T I V E O F O P E R A T I O N S

208th Operation - 4 February, 1944

Mission No. 1 - (1st B.D.) Frankfurt  
Mission No. 2 - (3rd B.D.) Frankfurt  
Mission No. 3 - (2nd B.D.) Frankfurt Area

Fifteen Combat Wings, totalling 841 heavy bombers, took off to attack targets in the Frankfurt area, with fifteen groups of USAAF fighters and eight squadrons of RAF Spitfires as escort. Over 900 tons were dropped on Frankfurt through cloud, making the second heavy daylight attack on this target within a week by Eighth Air Force. Enemy fighter opposition was weak, but crosswinds forced bombers to fly over flak concentrations, with some casualties and considerable battle damage resulting.

The heavy overcast and winds, making navigation difficult and the failure of special equipment on PFF a/c leading 2nd Bombardment Division caused many aircraft to bomb scattered targets of opportunity in the Frankfurt-Cologne area. One B-24 Combat Wing returned to bases due to PFF failure. Giessen, Weisbaden and Trier were among targets bombed by other B-17 and B-24 formations

Eighteen B-17s, including two PFF a/c, and two B-24s were lost. Ten of these a/c were reported hit by flak. Only three bomber groups reported any e/a attacks, and total bomber claims are 4-0-0. Two fighter groups make claims which total 8-0-4. One P-38 is missing.

B O M B E R O P E R A T I O N S

Unit	<u>NUMBER of A/C</u>			<u>Personnel Casualties</u>			
	(Dispatched)	Attacked	(Lost)	(Killed)	Wounded	Missing)	
<u>MISSION NO. 1</u>	Primary	Other Targets					
1st C.W.	56	52	1	2	0	2	22
40th C.W.	96	69	10	4	5x	5	40
41st C.W.	102	41	51	0	0	7	0
94th C.W.	28	17	10	1	0	2	10
Pathfinders	5	4	1	1	0	0	11
	<u>287</u>	<u>183</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>83</u>
 <u>3RD BOMB DIV.</u>							
<u>MISSION NO. 2</u>							
4th C.W.	110	52	55	3	0	0	30
13th C.W.	116	109	1	4	0	2	40
45th C.W.	71	0	65	2	0	1	20
Pathfinders	5	2	3	1	0	1	10
	<u>302</u>	<u>163</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>100</u>

x B-17 of the 92nd Group crash-landed at Matching due to engine failure and 5 crew members were killed and 5 injured.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

which followed them report three instances of e/a attacks. Six s/e e/a, out of a total of 15 encountered in the target area, made single passes, which crews reported as not pressed home. In addition the low group of this wing reported about 30 s/e e/a attacking stragglers in the Liege area, and 30 FW-190s were reported as making a few weak attacks in the vicinity of Aachen. 3rd Division claims are 4-0-0.

2nd Division B-24s encountered only eight e/a, of which only three FW-189s 50 miles west of Coblenz made a few weak passes.

In general, escorting fighters were reported as giving very complete cover.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE: Heavy cloud and crosswinds, making navigation difficult apparently forced bomber formations to fly considerably north of their briefed route, and they encountered much accurate flak over the Ruhr in the Cologne-Bonn area and at other localities. In the 1st Division, the 40th C.W. encountered intense, accurate, continuous flak over the Ruhr on the way to the target, and moderate accurate predicted following flak at 25,000 feet over both Cologne and Mainz and intense predicted following flak, very accurate at 25,500 feet over Frankfurt, also flak along the coast from Bruges to five miles past Dunkirk. The 41st C.W. encountered intense accurate barrage flak at 25,000 over Eindhoven, intense accurate barrage over Aachen, very intense accurate barrage at position 5040N-0640E and very intense but inaccurate flak over Weisbaden.

In the 3rd Division, the 45th C.W. encountered intense accurate barrage flak at 23,000 feet just south of Bonn enroute to target and intense barrage flak north of Bonn on return route. All crews report intense accurate flak in the Ruhr area on way to and from target. Ten a/c in all are reported lost to flak.

WEATHER: Crews reported 8/10 to 10/10 cloud over the Continent and very low temperatures contributing to mechanical failures. The overcast and crosswinds as formation approached the target caused considerable deviation from the briefed route.

OBSERVATIONS: A large airfield near Deelan, Holland, with four-engine a/c on it was reported.

Several crews reported barrage balloons, with no cables visible, at around 25,000 feet over Holland.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A LFIGHTER OPERATIONS

<u>Group</u>	<u>Type of A/C</u>	<u>Type of Support</u>	<u>No. A/C on Mission</u>	<u>Lost</u>	<u>Claims</u>
361	P-47	Penetration	42	0	0-0-0
78A	P-47	Penetration	33	0	0-0-0
356	P-47	Penetration	41	0	0-0-0
359*	P-47	Penetration	48	0	0-0-0
4	P-47	Penetration	48	0	0-0-0
358	P-47	Penetration	48	0	0-0-0
55	P-38	Target	31	0	0-0-0
20	P-38	Target	25	1	0-0-0
354	P-51	Target	44	0	0-0-0
353	P-47	Withdrawal	43	0	0-0-0
78B	P-47	Withdrawal	37	0	0-0-0
352	P-47	Withdrawal	48	0	4-0-1
359*	P-47	Withdrawal	44	0	0-0-0
56A	P-47	Withdrawal	29	0	0-0-0
56B	P-47	Withdrawal	35	0	4-0-3
355	P-47	General Area	<u>41</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>
TOTALS			637	1	8-0-4

\*Participated twice.

Enemy fighter opposition was reported as exceptionally weak by our fighters, with a total of only 65 e/a in all encountered and only two fighter groups making claims.

Penetration support to the 1st Bombardment Division was first given by the 359th fighter group which was vectored to hunt for e/a but sighted none. At 1615, this group returned to the bomber formations and uneventfully swept the Nijmegen, Arnheim and Apeldoorn areas. The 4th group rendezvoused with the bombers at 1118 and escorted them without incident until 1132. At 1137 the 354th group took over north of Coblenz, taking the bombers through the target area and leaving them at 1305. These fighters report 1 B-17 going down from flak in the target area and another such incident southeast of Antwerp, but no e/a seen. The 56 A group reached its rendezvous point at 1220 and orbited the area for 20 minutes sweeping to the coast, but also saw no enemy fighters. The 56 A & B groups before meeting the bombers encountered 23 - 30 FW 190s in the Charleroi-Florenne area, and in the resulting combats scored 4-0-3 without loss to themselves. The fighters reported these enemy pilots as experienced and aggressive.

Continuous and uneventful escort to the 3rd Bombardment Division was provided by the 361st, 78 A, 55th 353rd and 78 B groups with no e/a encountered. Some fighter pilots reported the bomber formations as loose in the target area and somewhat difficult to cover.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



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Escort to the B-24 formations was first provided by the 358th and 356th groups, both of which reported a complete uneventful mission. From 1205 until 1302, the 20th fighter group provided cover and also saw no e/a. After the 352nd group sighted the bombers north of their briefed course and made rendezvous at Aldenhoven, 16 - 20 e/a were seen in the Brussels area and the ensuing combats resulted in claims of 4 destroyed and 1 damaged. Finally, the 359th group provided uneventful escort, seeing no e/a and the 355th group patrolled uneventfully on free lance withdrawal support, likewise without incident.

The generally poor weather which hindered the bombers may explain to some extent the lateness of enemy fighter reaction, but it appears that there were exceptionally few e/a in the air throughout this entire operation.

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary information and should not be used for record purposes.

C O N F I D E N T I A L