

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

APO 634  
31 January 1944.

SUBJECT: S-3 Narrative of Operational Mission - Frankfurt - 29 January 1944.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. GENERAL NARRATIVE. The 95A Group formation composed of 21 a/c plus one spare took off at 0650-0710. The Group assembled over Buncher #8 at 4000' as planned and then began climbing. At 0850 the Group rendezcoused with the 390th Group at 20,000' over Framlingham instead of over Splasher #6 as planned. The 13A Combat Wing, with the 95A high, 390B lead, 390A low was the lead wing in the 13th Combat Wing formation. Immediately upon the completion of rendezvous, combat wing assembly was effected and out wing was in position behind the 4th Combat Wing.

On the route out, the English Coast was crossed at 0938 hours at Clacton and climb to bombing altitude was begun. At 0958 the enemy coast was crossed at bombing altitude of 25,000'.

The route from enemy coast to the I.P. was flown as ordered with the 95A Group eschedloned to the left. At the I.P., left turn was made and 95A then escheloned to the right to clear the low Group for the bombing run. At 1102 bombs were dropped through 10/10ths cloud on flares of the lead Group. After bombs away rally was effected as scheduled and course was set for home base, following behind the 4th Combat Wing. On the return route there were three combat wings coming out line abreast with the 13th Combat Wing in the middle. Heavy flak was encountered at Darmstadt and violent evasive action was taken.

The French coast was crossed on route back at 1247. Descent was begun and the English coast was crossed at an altitude of 7500 feet at 1312 hours. Home base was reached at 1405 and landings were made from 1400-1420.

2. AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING. Twenty one (21) aircraft plus one (1) spare took off to form the 95A Group as shown in Diagram A. Aircraft numbers 42-39989 and 42-30163 turned back before being dispatched and are not credited with sorties. The remaining 20 aircraft shown in Diagram B were dispatched. A detailed description of aircraft not attacking is given in a separate report.

3. AIRCRAFT LOST. Aircraft number 42-3545 dropped out of formation a few minutes after the target. The ship was last seen going down under control.

HARRY G. MUMFORD,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Operations Officer

SECRETHEADQUARTERS 95TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
APO 634

E-I-14

29 January 1944

AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING95 A Group FormationMission of 29 January 1944

A. Number of A/C Scheduled.....	21 and 1 Spare
B. Number of A/C Taking Off.....	21 and 1 Spare
C. A/C Taking Off less unused spares.....	21
D. Number of A/C Dispatched.....	20
E. Number of A/C Attacking.....	20
F. Number of A/C Not Attacking.....	1
G. Number of Sorties.....	20
H. Detailed description of reasons why aircraft did not attack:	

(A/C 42-30163 No Sortie. Left formation before being dispatched because of: (a) Took off as extra aircraft, (2 aircraft with triangle L flew entire mission with this formation), so finding no spot returned as scheduled.)

1. A/C 42-39989 No Sortie. Left formation before being dispatched because of: (a) No 1 engine supercharger ran away and blew No 7 cylinder head.

For the Commanding Officer:

HARRY G. MUMFORD  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Operations Officer.



HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

DATE 29 JAN. 1944

TARGET \_\_\_\_\_

1. 13 C.W. 95A GROUP POSITION \_\_\_\_\_ GP LEADER CAPT. TUCKER-335-M
2. TAXI TIME 1st A/C 0635 T.O. 1st A/C 0700 BASE 0720 ETR 1310
3. SQUADRON 334 NO. OF A/C 11 CALL SIGNS: W/T JTU

	H	E	N	O	M	K	Q	A	C	J	F		
A/C	:1329	:7447	:9924	:1244	:1299	:9943	:1658	:3545	:0353	:1258	:9989	:	:
A.T.O.	:0656	:0657	:0658	:0659	:0700	:0700	:0703	:0704	:0705	:0706	:0708	:	:
A.T.R.	:1411	:1412	:1413	:1349	:1255	:1409	:1404	:	:1458	:1409	:1107	:	:

SQUADRON 335 NO. OF A/C 11 CALL SIGNS: W/T WCA

	M	R	L	Y	Z	V	W	P	U	S	T*		
A/C	:1600	:1462	:7889	:7929	:1561	:3263	:7971	:6080	:1565	:0178	:1063	:	:
A.T.O.	:0650	:0651	:0652	:0653	:0654	:0655	:0702	:0709	:0701	:0707	:0710	:	:
A.T.R.	:1415	:1416	:1415	:1418	:1419	:1417	:1853	:1410	:1452	:1408	:1040	:	:

SQUADRON \_\_\_\_\_ NO. OF A/C \_\_\_\_\_ CALL SIGNS: W/T PSU

A/C	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

SQUADRON \_\_\_\_\_ NO. OF A/C \_\_\_\_\_ CALL SIGNS: W/T RCC

A/C	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

SQDN	LETTER	NUMBER	DESIGNATION	EXPLANATION
335	T	1063	abortion	full formation
334	F	9989	abortion	Blow plug out of cyl. on #3 Eng.
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:

\* SPARE A/C.

HEADQUARTERS  
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

DATE 29 JAN. 1944

TARGET \_\_\_\_\_

1. 13 C.W. 95" B" GROUP POSITION GP LEADER MAJ. STRADER - 336-N  
ETD \_\_\_\_\_
2. TAXI TIME 1st A/C 0715 T.O. 1st A/C 0730 BASE 0750 ETR 1310
3. SQUADRON 334 NO. OF A/C 1 CALL SIGNS: W/T JTU

D												
A/C	:0120:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	:0740:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	:1347:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

SQUADRON 335 NO. OF A/C \_\_\_\_\_ CALL SIGNS: W/T WCA

A/C	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

SQUADRON 336 NO. OF A/C 13 CALL SIGNS: W/T PSU

N O F G C B D A K L G M H													
A/C	:9884:	:9884:	:3529:	:1410:	:7495:	:3462:	:3400:	:3153:	:7935:	:0226:	:8024:	:7988:	:0167:
A.T.O.	:0719:	:0720:	:0721:	:0722:	:0723:	:0724:	:0725:	:0804:	:0733:	:0734:	:0735:	:0736:	:0738:
A.T.R.	:1406:	:1403:	:1402:	:1404:	:1401:	:1346:	:1350:	:1106:	:1342:	:	:1429:	:1350:	:1357:

SQUADRON 412 NO. OF A/C 8 CALL SIGNS: W/T ACC

M O W S P Y V X *												
A/C	:1320:	:0634:	:1675:	:7876:	:0322:	:9793:	:8054:	:0233:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	:0725:	:0726:	:0727:	:0729:	:0730:	:0728:	:0731:	:0742:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	:1358:	:1355:	:1357:	:1354:	:1352:	:1404:	:1344:	:1029:	:	:	:	:

SQDN	LETTER	NUMBER	DESIGNATION	EXPLANATION
<u>412</u> <del>1029</del>	<u>X</u>	<u>:0733:</u>	<u>short on</u>	<u>#2 Eng froze oil line broken</u>
<u>336</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>:3153:</u>	<u>short on</u>	<u>Runway Bays</u>
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:
:	:	:	:	:

\* SPARE



95 B Assembly  
Diagram "A"

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE 29 Jan. '44

LEAD

9884

9897

LOW

7935

8024 | 0226

7988

0120 | 0167

HIGH

1320

1675 | 0634

7876

9793 | 0322

8054

3153 | 3400

BRIEFING \_\_\_\_\_  
READINESS \_\_\_\_\_  
STATIONS \_\_\_\_\_  
TAXI \_\_\_\_\_  
TAKE-OFF \_\_\_\_\_  
RENDEZ VOUS \_\_\_\_\_

EXTRA SHIPS

834 \_\_\_\_\_  
835 \_\_\_\_\_  
836 \_\_\_\_\_  
412 \_\_\_\_\_

579" Assembly  
Diagram A

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

LEAD

1600

7889

1462

7929

1329

LOW

1658

0353

3545

3263

1561

9924

7447

1258

1244

9989

0178

1063

9943

1299

7971

1565

6080

BRIEFING

READING ROOMS

STATIONS

TAXI

TAKE-OFF

PTNDZVOUTS

EXTRA SHIPS

334

335

336

412

DATE 29 Jan. '44



FORMATION DIAGRAM

95TH BOMB. GROUP (H)

DATE 29 January

TIME \_\_\_\_\_

A.T.F.

C.W.

Tucker  
1600

Brink  
1658

Campbell  
7889

Brady  
1462

Infield  
1329

Geib  
0353

Rozmetinsky  
3545

Ford  
7929

Hue  
9924

Munson  
7447

Wilson  
1258

Dunham  
3263

Costales  
1561

Hargrove  
1244

Edwards  
9989

Milward  
0178

Vansant  
9943

Kelly  
1299

EXTRA

Crutchfield  
1063

Cole  
1565

Pearson  
6080

Tuberosc  
7971

010

FORMATION DIAGRAM

95TH BOMB. GROUP (H)

DATE 29 January 1945

TIME

A.T.F.

C.W.

Kerr  
9884

McCallister  
9897

Kroeger  
3529

Fischer  
7935

Caspers  
1320

Higgins  
0226

Hambly  
8024

Jeffers  
1410

Calloway  
1675

Gunn  
0634

Dean  
7988

Westmyer  
3462

Cavalier  
7495

Batoha  
7876

McLane  
0120

Russell  
0167

Seger  
9793

Read  
0322

Hiatt  
8054

EXTRA

Reis  
0233

McGaughey  
3153

Huddleston  
3400

VE       
G       
S



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE  
AAF STATION 101  
APO 634

E I G H T H A I R F O R C E N A R R A T I V E O F O P E R A T I O N S

198th Operation - 29 January, 1944

Mission No. 1 - (3rd B.D.) Frankfurt  
Mission No. 2 - (1st B.D.) Frankfurt  
Mission No. 3 - (2nd B.D.) Frankfurt

Led by pathfinder aircraft and utilizing overcast bombing technique the largest force of bombers yet dispatched by the Eighth Air Force attacked Frankfurt through 10/10 cloud. 15 Combat Wings, 12 of B-17s and 3 of B-24s, dropped a total of 1886 tons and 2,600,000 leaflets on the target with unobserved results. Pathfinder equipment operated well in most instances and crews believed that the target was well-covered.

Enemy fighter opposition was very aggressive against some groups and weak against others. Most concentrated attacks were on the lead Combat Wing of the 3rd Bombardment Division which was first over the target. Flak was moderate to intense. 29 bombers are missing. Preliminary claims are 60-14-32.

Fighter support was provided by 13 groups of P-47s, 2 groups of P-38s and 1 group of P-51s as well as 12 squadrons of RAF Spitfire IX's. 2 squadrons of long-range Typhoons made a coordinated sweep of France and Holland. 10 P-47s and 4 P-38s are missing. Tentative claims of fighter pilots are 42-6-10.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Number of A/C</u>			<u>Personnel Casualties</u>		
	<u>(Dispatched</u>	<u>Attacked</u>	<u>Lost)</u>	<u>(Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing)</u>
<u>3RD BOMB DIV.</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Other Targets</u>				
<u>MISSION NO. 1</u>						
13 A & B C.W.	114	108	3	0	2	30
45 A & B C.W.	76	72	6	0	2	60
4 A & B C.W.	113	105	4	0	2	42
Pathfinders	6	6	0	0	0	0
	<u>309</u>	<u>291</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>132</u>
<u>1ST BOMB DIV.</u>						
<u>MISSION NO. 2</u>						
40 A & B C.W.	113	108	1	0	4	10
1st C.W.	74	64	1	1	1	20
41 A & B C.W.	119	113	1	1	1	40
94th C.W.	55	52	4	2	6	40
Pathfinders	5	5	0	0	0	0
	<u>366</u>	<u>342</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>110</u>

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

<u>Unit</u> <u>2ND BOMB DIV.</u> <u>MISSION NO. 3</u>	<u>Number of A/C</u>		<u>Lost</u>	<u>(Killed Wounded Missing)</u>		
	<u>(Dispatched</u> <u>Primary</u>	<u>Attacked</u> <u>Other Targets</u>				
14th C.W.	51	45	3	11	11	37
2nd C.W.	54	51	2	0	0	20
20th C.W.	80	71	0	0	3	0
Pathfinders	3	3	0	0	0	0
	<u>188</u>	<u>170</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>57</u>
OPERATION TOTALS	863	803	3	29	15	32
						299

BOMBING RESULTS: 633 B-17s dropped 4164 x 500 G.P., 6,940 x 100 I.B. and 532 x 500 I.B. on Frankfurt from 22,000 to 26,500 feet at 1052 to 1138 hours, and 170 B-24s dropped 795 x 500 G.P., 2,016 x 100 I.B. and 264 x 500 I.B. on Frankfurt from 19,500 to 23,000 feet at 1137 to 1143 hours. As the target was completely overcast by 10/10 cloud no photographic assessment or visual observation is available of bomb damage. However pathfinder equipment proved generally efficient and crews believe the bombing was successful.

3 B-17s dropped 36 x 500 G.P. bombs on unidentified targets in Germany with unknown results.

2,600,000 US G leaflets Nos. 23, 24 and 17 were dropped on the target by 1st Division a/c.

REASONS FOR FAILURE TO BOMB: 39 B-17s and 18 B-24s failed to bomb - 33 B-17s and 14 B-24s due to mechanical or equipment failure, 2 B-17s due to weather, 3 B-24s to enemy action and 1 B-17 and 1 B-24 due to other reasons.

CASUALTIES: Personnel - 15 crew members were killed, 32 wounded and 299 are missing.

Equipment - 29 a/c were lost - 15 B-17s to e/a, 2 B-24s and 1 B-17 to a combination of flak and e/a, 1 B-17 to accident and 7 B-17s and 3 B-24s to causes unknown.

Estimated Battle Damage - 92 B-17s and 41 B-24s category "A" and "AC", 23 B-17s and 3 B-24s category "B", and 1 B-17 and 3 B-24s category "E",

ENCOUNTERS: Heavy enemy air opposition occurred in the target area and there were attacks of varying degrees of aggressiveness from weak to strong by s/e e/a on both the penetration and withdrawal legs. The 3rd Bombardment Division which was the first element over the target reported vicious and intense attacks at the target area, and determined attacks against stragglers on the homeward leg. The 1st Bombardment Division reported s/e e/a attacking in line abreast from 12 and 6 o'clock and t/e e/a firing rockets from all angles and at close range, in formations of 4 abreast. Me-410s were especially noted due to their speed and ability to press attacks through the bomber formations. For the most part attacks on this Division were centered on a few groups with other groups experiencing weak opposition. Attacks on the 2nd Bombardment Division, last over the target, were mainly in the target area although one low group was attacked from the enemy coast on the way in and continuing to half way to the coast on the return. From 60 to 100 e/a were observed of all types, including FW-190s, Me-109s, Me-110s, Me-210s, Me-410s, FW-189s, JU-88s and DO-217s.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE: Moderate to intense flak, inaccurate and of the barrage type was experienced in the target area with meager and inaccurate flak along the route in and out. Ground rockets leaving a corkscrew trail of white smoke were seen at the I.P.

WEATHER: 10/10 low undercast was continuous to the target although this was breaking up to 7/10 on route back. Visibility was unlimited and crews reported ideal weather for bombing through clouds.

OBSERVATIONS: No observations were reported due to weather conditions.

VIII FIGHTER COMMAND OPERATIONS

29 January, 1944

13 groups of P-47s, 2 groups of P-38s and 1 group of P-51s provided penetration, target and withdrawal support. Weather conditions impeded rendezvous with bombers in only one instance, and in general, fighter support was characterized as excellent. 10 P-47s and 4 P-38s were lost. Tentative fighter claims are 42-6-10.

Some groups experienced no enemy opposition while other groups met determined attacks. On penetration support one group observed 20 plus e/a, predominantly FW-190s with some Me-109s and one JU-88, which bounced bombers and fighters alike from above and out of the sun in front and rear attacks. Three flights of one squadron enroute out were consistently bounced by formations of from 1 - 5 e/a.

There was some indication that the enemy attempted to build up a concentration of strength in the target area especially of t/e fighters. One group was especially effective in breaking up this attempt and scored several victories. On the whole enemy reaction was numerically less than anticipated but characterized as aggressive.

<u>Group</u>	<u>Type of A/C</u>	<u>Type of Support</u>	<u>No. A/C on Mission</u>	<u>Lost</u>	<u>Claims</u>
361	P-47s	Penetration	41	1	0-0-0
358	P-47s	Penetration	40	0	0-0-0
4	P-47s	Close Escort	44	1	9-0-0
355	P-47s	Close Escort	47	4	1-0-2
78B	P-47s	Penetration	34	1	4-0-0
353	P-47s	Free Lance	32	0	0-0-0
354	P-51s	Target	40	0	5-1-4
55	P-38s	Close Escort	42	0	0-0-0
20	P-38s	Target	47	5	10-2-1
356	P-47s	Withdrawal	46	0	1-0-0
56A	P-47s	Withdrawal	30	1	1-0-1
56B	P-47s	Withdrawal	30	0	4-3-1
352	P-47s	Withdrawal	52	1	6-0-1
78A	P-47s	Withdrawal	36	0	0-0-0
359	P-47s	Withdrawal	48	0	1-0-0
361	P-47s	Free Lance	23	0	0-0-0
<u>TOTALS</u>			632	14	42-6-10

NOTE: The foregoing is based on preliminary information and should not be used for record purposes.

C O N F I D E N T I A L