

6.11.43.

INTERPRETATION REPORT SA. 647ATTACK ON THE GEISENKIRCHEN AREA ON 5.11.43.

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THE ATTACK.

- (a) This report is based on photographs taken during a daylight attack on the GEISENKIRCHEN area by 325 aircraft of United States Eighth Bomber Command from 1315 to 1350 hours on 5.11.43.
- (b) Bombs were dropped as follows:-
- 1560 x 500 lb. G.P.
6852 x 100 lb. I.B.
- (c) Full fighter escort was provided.
- (d) The aircraft approached the target from the North East.

(ii) BOMB BURSTS OBSERVED.

- (a) The attack was made in four formations of which two were in GEISENKIRCHEN, one on the HYDRIERWERKE SCHOLVEN A.G. North of the city and one on the GEISENKIRCHENER BERWERKS A.G. to the North West. Owing possibly to evasive action and the operation of the smoke screen during the attack no photographs show heavy concentrations of bombs bursting on or near the target area. Bombs bursts seen are widely scattered through the GEISENKIRCHEN area from a point North of DORSTEN South beyond HARDENBURG as follows: (NOTE: The paragraphs are lettered to key with the notations on the Bomb Plot).
- A. The bombs seen bursting in closest proximity to isolated target areas fell in open fields immediately North East of the Hydrierwerke Scholven A.G. At least 40 bursts are seen but no direct hits on the plant are noted.
- B. At least 60 bursts are seen South and West of the Hydrierwerke Scholven A.G. of which approximately ten are in the sparsely settled outskirts of BUER. A heavy concentration fell immediately southwest of the target area but smoke and haze makes an accurate count impossible. Several residential buildings in the village of BUER-HASSEL appear to have been hit. Isolated bursts are seen in open fields North of BUER and five miles North of GEISENKIRCHEN. The smoke screen was especially active in this area.
- C. A concentration of incendiary bombs are seen bursting in an industrial area at BISMARCK, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles North of the centre of GEISENKIRCHEN. The area contains a number of small industrial plants. Scattered bombs are seen in GEISENKIRCHEN, with two possible hits on unidentified buildings. The industrial haze over the area and the small scale of the photographs makes a further statement as to direct hits impossible.
- D. A concentration of approximately 70 bomb bursts are seen on and about the barracks and two coal mines at FRILLENDORF $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles East of ESSEN and 5 miles South of the target area. Approximately fourteen of these bursts are in the confines of the barracks area, eight on the Hubert Pit of the MANNESMANN ROHEN-

SECRET

Page 2.

- E. At least 125 G.P. bombs are seen bursting in a rural area beginning 540 yards from the outskirts of HARDENBURG and extending North for 1.8 miles. One burst is on or very near the Hardenburg/Langenburg railway line. A minimum of 80 G.P. bombs burst in a rural area beginning 780 yards Southeast of HARDENBURG and extending Southwards for 1.3 miles. At least seven are on or very near the Hardenburg/Solinger railway line.
- F. In an area closely approximating the area mentioned in E at least 450 incendiaries fell in two groups. Of these the first fell $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles East of HARDENBURG with possibly four hits on the Hardenburg/Dusseldorf railway line and one on a farm building. The second fell in a rural area approximately $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles North of HARDENBURG with three hits on the Hardenburg/Sangenburg railway line and two on farm buildings.
- G. Fourteen bursts are widely scattered to the East and North of the village of POLSUN with hits on two farm buildings and on a minor road.
- H. A concentration of approximately 110 bombs burst one mile west of the village of HAIL between it and DORSTEN and eight miles North of the target. The great majority of these are seen to be in open fields. The main highway from DORSTEN to HAIL received 6 direct hits and several minor roads were also hit.
- I. Ten incendiary bombs fell in open fields North of DORSTEN.
- J. Incendiary bombs are seen falling while the aircraft was passing over the Rhine River South of DUISBURG in a Northwesterly direction. Their point of impact is not photographed.
- K. About forty incendiary bombs are seen in open fields near WERDEN $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles South of the target area.
- L. Thirty eight bombs are seen to have fallen in water at an unidentified location.

(iii) SMOKE SCREEN.

The smoke screen at GELSENKIRCHEN and nearby cities was in full operation during the attack. It appears to extend over a wide area with varying degrees of effectiveness.

(iv) BOMB PLOT AND PRINTS.

- (a) A diagrammatic bomb plot has been prepared which shows only the areas in which bombs fell. No attempt has been made to represent the actual number of bombs in one area or to make an exact plot of their location but their general distribution relative to the target areas is indicated.
- (b) No annotated print will be generally distributed with this report.

(v) PHOTOGRAPHS RECEIVED.

SAV 94/152	5.11.43	1315 hrs.	1/48,000 (F.L.7")	28,000'	'B'
" 385/75	"	1212 hrs.	1/46,300 (F.L.7")	27,000'	'B'
" 385/76	"	1315 hrs.	1/46,300 (F.L.7")	27,000'	'B'
" 95/147	"	1336 hrs.	1/46,300 (F.L.7")	27,000'	'C'
" 95/149	"	1340 hrs.	1/27,000 (F.L.12")	27,000'	'B'
" 100/111	"	1220 hrs.	1/45,500 (F.L.5")	26,000'	'B'

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

APC 634
6 November 1943

7. Fighter support was very good.
SUBJECT: S-3 Narrative Report on Operational Mission, 5 November 1943.

8. Results of bombing were poor.
TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group, APC 634.

1. The 95th Bomb Group was alerted for this Mission at 1753, 4 November 1943. Bomb loading to be 10 x 500 lb. G. P. The 13th Combat Wing was to form two forces of two groups each and fly the 2nd Wing of 3rd Bomb Division formation. The 95th Group to lead 13th Combat Wing and furnish seven (7) ships for lead Squadron of Composite Group which was to fly low Group on 95th.

2. Seven (7) aircraft departed this station at 0930 to form lead of Composite at 3500' above this field. Twenty one (21) aircraft departed this station at 0945 to form 95th Group at 2000' above this field. Ship # 0244 departed this station at 1026 and was unable to find 95th Group formation, so filled in with 96th Group.

3. Ascent through 2000' of overcast was necessary causing a slight loss of time. Ship # 0178 piloted by Lt. Ford lost 95th Group formation in ascent and filled in with 390th Group.

4. Ship # 3545 piloted by Lt. Rongstad returned to this station having aborted at 1105 from the 95th Group formation while still over England, due to rough engines. Ship # 7756 piloted by Lt. Wallace returned to this station having aborted at 1158 from the 95th Group formation while still over England, due to rough engines. Ship # 0120 piloted by Lt. Palmer returned to this station having aborted at 1210 from the 95th Group formation while still over England due to rough engines. Ship # 9943 piloted by Lt. Witt returned to this station having aborted at 1220 from the 95th Group formation while still over England due to rough engines which necessitated feathering # 3 engine. Pathfinder Ship piloted by Lt. Brism returned to this station having aborted at 1158 due to three rough engines. Pathfinder "G" box burned out at 1130 before wing rendezvous. Radio Compass was inoperative and A.F.C.E. was not functioning correctly. Rough engines caused Pathfinder ship's airspeed to drop to 135 m.p.h.

5. Loss of "G" Box and Radio Aids caused Pathfinder to use D.R. Navigation for twenty six minutes before Wing rendezvous. Pilot was unable to maintain altitude on turns with rough engines which caused 95th Group to be late at Clacton. Pathfinder aborted prior to Wing rendezvous and High Squadron took over lead of 95th Group. Due to 95th Group being late at Clacton, Wing rendezvous was not made and at 1300 when leader was unable to find any other Groups 95th Group abandoned the mission.

HEADQUARTERS

6. Composite Group formed with the 45th Combat Wing and bombed on their Pathfinder's flares. Flak over target was intense and effective. No losses were sustained by ships from this Group. No injury to personnel but Battle Damage to six (6) aircraft of this Group in Composite Group. 634

8 November 1943

7. Fighter support was very good.

SUBJECT: 6-3 Narrative Report on Operational Mission, 8 November 1943.

8. Results of bombing were poor.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group, APO 634.

1. The 95th Bomb Group was alerted for this mission at 1733, 8 November 1943. Bomb loading to be 10 x 500 lb. G. P. The 13th Combat Wing was to form two forces of two groups each and fly HARRY G. MUMFORD, 1st Bomb Division formation. The 95th Group to lead 13th Major, Air Corps, British seven (7) ships for lead Squadron of Composite Operations Officer. low Group on 95th.

2. Seven (7) aircraft departed this station at 0930 to form lead of Composite at 3500' above this field. Twenty one (21) aircraft departed this station at 0945 to form 95th Group at 2000' above this field. Ship # 0244 departed this station at 1026 and was unable to find 95th Group formation, so filled in with 96th Group.

3. Ascent through 2000' of overcast was necessary causing a slight loss of time. Ship # 0178 piloted by Lt. Ford lost 95th Group formation in ascent and filled in with 99th Group.

4. Ship # 3545 piloted by Lt. Rongstad returned to this station having aborted at 1106 from the 95th Group formation while still over England, due to rough engines. Ship # 7750 piloted by Lt. Wallace returned to this station having aborted at 1158 from the 95th Group formation while still over England, due to rough engines. Ship # 0120 piloted by Lt. Palmer returned to this station having aborted at 1210 from the 95th Group formation while still over England due to rough engines. Ship # 3948 piloted by Lt. Witt returned to this station having aborted at 1220 from the 95th Group formation while still over England due to rough engines which necessitated feathering # 3 engine. Pathfinder ship piloted by Lt. Brian returned to this station having aborted at 1158 due to three rough engines. Pathfinder "G" box burned out at 1130 before wing rendezvous. Radio Compass was inoperative and A.F.C.E. was not functioning correctly. Rough engines caused Pathfinder ship's airspeed to drop to 135 m.p.h.

5. Loss of "G" Box and Radio Aids caused Pathfinder to use D.R. Navigation for twenty six minutes before Wing rendezvous. Pilot was unable to maintain altitude on turns with rough engines which caused 95th Group to be late at Clacton. Pathfinder aborted prior to Wing rendezvous and High Squadron took over lead of 95th Group. Due to 95th Group being late at Clacton, Wing rendezvous was not made and at 1500 when leader was unable to find any other groups 95th Group abandoned the mission.

95TH GROUP

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND745005
By 167 NARA Date 2-18-09

DATE November 5, 1943

TARGET _____

1. 13 C.W. 95 GROUP POSITION LEAD GP LEADER Major Mumford - PATHFINDER
ETD _____
2. TAXI TIME 1st A/C 0930 T.O. 1st A/C 0945 BASE 1005 ETR 1430
3. SQUADRON 334 NO. OF A/C 6 CALL SIGNS: W/T WHX

A/C	A	C	K	E	D	G						
A/C	3545	0353	0943	0182	0120	1057	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	949	950	950	952	952	949	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	1316	1423	1409	1425	1329	1425	:	:	:	:	:	:

SQUADRON 335 NO. OF A/C 7 CALL SIGNS: W/T JUZ

A/C	R	W	O	Q	V	G	T	S				
A/C	3098	0218	7826	7756	3263	1057	1063	0178	:	:	3385	:
A.T.O.	945	946	947	947	948	:	953	954	:	:	0945	:
A.T.R.	1419	1416	1417	1305	1418	:	1424	1458	:	:	1258	:

PATHFINDER
C

SQUADRON 336 NO. OF A/C 7 CALL SIGNS: W/T KQX

A/C	F	D	B	L	G	C	M					
A/C	3529	3753	3400	3462	0226	7734	0674	0244	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	951	:	955	956	957	959	958	1026	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	1422	:	1431	1429	1428	1427	1432	1452	:	:	:	:

SQUADRON 412 NO. OF A/C 1 CALL SIGNS: W/T MLG

A/C	X											
A/C	0233	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.O.	959	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
A.T.R.	1430	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

SQDN LETTER NUMBER DESIGNATION EXPLANATION

~~335~~ : ~~3385~~ : ~~0945/1258~~ : ~~PATHFINDER~~

PATHFINDER C : 3385 : #2, 3rd Eng, running rough - G-Box & COMPASS OUT
: 3153 : (DID NOT TAKE OFF) : STUCK IN MUD - ALONG PERIMETER TRACK

335 : ~~7156~~ : 7156 : ROUGH ENGINE
334 : A : 3545 : ENG. TROUBLE - O₂ TROUBLE IN BALL TURRET
334 : K : 9943 : #3 PROP FEATHERED
334 : D : 0120 : SICK CREW MEMBER, O₂ TROUBLE
ENG. TROUBLE

COMBAT

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

5 NOV

COMPOSITE GROUP

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE SNOW

LEAD

STORIE
0236

BEYETTE
3273

OWEN
0634

MILLER
3465

BATCHA
0322

WOODCOCK
3317

WEHRMAN
0255

HIGH

LOW

BRIFING
READINESS
STATIONS
TAXI
TAKE-OFF
RENDEZVOUS

EXTRA SHIPS

334
335
336
412

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND745005

By 167 NARA Date 2-18-09

BAT

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

GROUP FORMATION FORM

DATE SNOW

LEAD

PER

LOT

FUCKER
0218

SCOTT
6098

HIGH

CARSON
7826

WALLACE
7756

INFIELD
0353

RENO
1057

BONGSTAD
3545

KERR
3482

FISCHER
3455
0244

YBENGER
3400

POWERS
3263

MERTEN
0226

SMITH
0674

JEEPERS
7734

STERN
0182

WITT
9943

HARGROVE
3539

ROGERS
0233

FORD
0178

TUBEROSE
1063

PALMER
0120

ERTWING
R.L. DIMES
STATIONS
TAXI
TAKE-OFF
RENDEZVOUS

EXTRA SHIPS
334
335
336
412
0244

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

6 November 1943

SUBJECT: S-2 Report

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634.

1. 21 A/C of the 95th Gp. plus one Pathfinder took off to attack Gelsenkirchen, Germany at 0945 hours and landed at 1415 hours. The 95th Group was the lead Group of the 2nd Air Task Force of the 3rd Air Division. The P.F.F. plane leading the 95th Group had an inoperative radio compass and at 11:30 hours its "G" box burned out, in addition #2,3,4, engines were very rough and plane was unable to attain more than 135 M.P.H. air speed. At 1203 hours it aborted and the balance of our planes, except the five noted below, were unable to make rendezvous with other groups and returned without reaching enemy territory. Plane #178 (Ford) had trouble with #3 engine and was unable to keep up with Group on climb. Pilot told navigator to set course for Claxton-on-sea hoping to meet Group there. Alone they arrived there and did not find our Group but rendezvoused with 96th Group over target. Plane #0244 (Fischer) took off 20 minutes late due to an A/C change, failed to find 95th but did find 390th and flew mission with them. Plane #7756 turned back at 51°30'N 00°30'E at 1148 hours with #4 engine out. Plane #3545 turned back over buncher 8 at 1200 hours with #2 engine out. Plane #0120 turned back at Claston-on-sea at 1156 hours unable to keep up with formation due to engine trouble.

2. 7 A/C of the 95th Gp. took off at 0931 to fly as lead Squadron of low group of 2nd A.T.F. of 3 B.D. on same mission. All completed mission and returned to base at 1435. Approximately 20 E/A were seen. Several weak attacks were made at our formation but excellent P-47 support kept E/A away. Intense, heavy and accurate A A was encountered over target. Bombing results were generally unobserved.

STANLEY R. WHEATON
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Ass't. S-2 Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 634, U.S. Army

5 November 1943

SUBJECT: Anti-Aircraft Report.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 634.

1. A/C #0244 reported intense, accurate AA fire at 51°40' - 06°50' and continuing straight south through Mulheim, then it abated until Dusseldorf, where again it was intense and accurate up to 25,000 feet continuous - following. A/C #0178 reported intense fire not very accurate at 27,100 feet over sections of Ruhr not identified. A barrage was encountered as well as considerable continuous-following fire.

2. The Composite Group was considerably off course (see #2) and met heavy concentration of guns firing accurately at each squadron separately. Due to prop wash the formation came down to 26,000 feet and ran with evasive action through about 20 minutes of fire of all types, with continuous following predominating. The axis of attack was almost due north to south, and the 90° right turn after bombing brought the Composite Group through a great deal more AA fire than they would have if the briefed course had been followed.

FLORENCE J. DONOHUE,
Major, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

A. Munit

HEADQUARTERS
VIII BOMBER COMMAND
APO 634

Bomber Command Narrative of Operations
121st Operation - 5 November, 1943

- Mission No. 1 - Gelsenkirchen (Hydrierwerke Scholven, A.G)
- Mission No. 2 - Gelsenkirchen (Gelsenkirchener Berwerks, A.G.).
- Mission No. 3 - Gelsenkirchen (city).
- Mission No. 4 - Gelsenkirchen (city).
- Mission No. 5 - Munster (city).

Four Air Task Forces of B-17s attacked Gelsenkirchen, industrial city in the Ruhr, and one Air Task Force of B-24s attacked Munster, important communications center for the Ruhr area. The attack on Gelsenkirchen was made in four formations, two of which were on the city proper, and two on synthetic oil plants North of the city. Bombing results were poor on Gelsenkirchen. On the Munster attack, bombing results were fair, several hits being made on the marshalling yard, a factory, and the Munster/Loddenheide Airfield. VIII Fighter Command P-47s and P-38s afforded excellent protection. During this period, the IX Bomber Command and R.A.F. carried out operations in the Pas de Calais area. Anti-aircraft fire at both targets was intense. Enemy fighter opposition was moderate. Claims against e/a are 27-5-13. Ten bombers are missing.

Unit	Number of A/C					Claims	Personnel Casualties		
	(Participated)	Attacked	Failed	Lost	(Missing)		(Killed)	Wounded	Missing
3RD BOMB DIV.	To Bomb+					0-0-0	0	0	10
MISSIONS NOS. 1,2,3.	A.		B.						
94	29	24	3	2	1	0-0-0	0	0	10
95	25	9	16x	0	0	0-0-0	0	1	0
96	43	37	5	1	0	0-0-0	1	3	0
100	25	21	4	0	1	0-0-0	1	0	18
385	24	22	0	2	0	0-0-0	0	0	0
388	25	23	2	0	2	0-0-0	0	4	20
390	23	19	4	0	0	0-0-0	0	1	0
	<u>194</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0-0-0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>48</u>

1ST BOMB DIV.
MISSION NO. 4
GELSENKIRCHEN

91	18	14	3	1	0	0-0-0	0	1	0
92	22	20	1	1	1	0-0-0	0	4	10
303	19	19	0	0	1	0-0-0	0	0	10
305	19	18	1	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0
306	21	18	3	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0
351	18	17	1	0	0	0-0-0	2	4	0
379	21	20	1	0	0	0-0-0	0	5	0
381	22	22	0	0	1	2-0-2	0	8	16
384	20	20	0	0	0	3-1-3	0	0	0
	<u>180</u>	<u>168</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5-1-5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>36</u>

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Unit	Number of A/C					Claims	Personnel Casualties		
	(Participated	Attacked	Failed	Lost)			(Killed	Wounded	Missing)
MISSION NO. 5	To Bomb+								
MUNSTER			A.	B.					
44	32	26	5	1	0	0-0-0	0	7	0
93	26	25	1	0	0	10-3-3	7	8	0
389	30	28	2	0	0	8-1-1	0	2	0
392	30	25	4	1	3	3-0-3	0	5	31
	<u>118</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>21-4-7</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>31</u>
<u>PATHFINDER</u>									
482	11	9	2	0	0	1-0-1	0	4	0
TOTALS	503	436	58	9	10	27-5-13	11	57	115

+ Failed to Bomb - A - Mechanical and Equipment Failures.
 B - Other than Mechanical and Equipment Failures (includes weather, enemy action, recall, etc.)
 x Failure of PFF equipment.

MISSION NOS. 1, 2, 3, AND 4 - GELSENKIRCHEN

Four task forces composed of 380 B-17s of 1st and 3rd Bombardment Divisions participated in attacks on industrial targets at Gelsenkirchen and synthetic oil plants near Gelsenkirchen. All task forces were escorted by P-47s. Intense anti-aircraft fire was encountered over the target and 7 B-17s were lost. Claims are 6-1-6.

BOMBING RESULTS: 328 B-17s, including 5 Pathfinders, dropped 1570 x 500 G.P. fused 1/10 sec. nose and 1/40 sec. tail, and 6936 x 100 I.B. on targets in and near Gelsenkirchen from 26,000 - 29,000 feet at 1313 - 1350 hours. Weather in the target area was clear, but the smoke screen at Gelsenkirchen and nearby cities was in full operation during the attacks with varying degrees of effectiveness. There was also considerable industrial haze and smoke over the area, and bombing was scattered. In the attack on the Hydricerwerke Scholven A.G., north of Gelsenkirchen, bombs straddled the plant with good concentrations just northeast and southwest of the target. Although strike photographs do not show any direct hits, the bombing patterns were seen to extend to the boundaries of the plant. Strike photographs of the Gelsenkirchener Berwerke A.G. do not show any hits on or near this target. In the attack on the city itself scattered bursts were seen, and in the industrial area of Bismarck (a suburb one and one-half miles north of the center of Gelsenkirchen) a concentration of incendiaries caused possible damage to several factories. Other incidents of bombing were scattered in the Ruhr area and include a heavy concentration on barracks and coal mines at Frillendorf, one and one-half miles east of Essen, and a number of hits on railway lines and highways in the area.

REASONS FOR FAILURE TO BOMB: 53 a/c failed to bomb - 30 because of mechanical and equipment failures, 16 because of equipment failure of PFF a/c leading the formation, 3 because of personnel failures, and 4 were unable to keep formation.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ENCOUNTERS: Missions 1, 2 and 3 - Enemy fighter opposition was weak. Enroute to target area, e/a would simulate P-47 formations and several times crossed the flight line of Fortresses but at a safe distance of 8,000 feet below them.

Commencing in target area about 1315 hours and continuing for approximately 20 minutes after "bombs away", a total of 17 attacks were experienced. Attacks were made singly and in formations from all positions around the clock. No unusual tactics were reported. Vigorous attacks were made against stragglers. The formations encountered about 75 e/a, almost evenly divided between Me-109s, FW-190s and JU-88s, with 8 Me-210s and 4 Me-110s.

Mission No. 4 - Enemy fighter opposition was weak. Approximately 25 e/a, mostly FW-190s and Me-109s, attacked in target area at about 1340 hours and attacks lasted 25 to 30 minutes. Most attacks were made singly without definite pattern. Attacks made were mostly on stragglers. E/A consisted of Me-110s, DO-217s, Me-109s, FW-190s and Me-210s.

CASUALTIES: Personnel - 4 crew members were killed, 15 seriously wounded, 17 slightly wounded and 84 are missing.

Equipment - 7 B-17s are missing - 3 to flak, 1 to e/a, and 3 to reasons unknown.

Estimated Battle Damage - 89 category "A", 2 category "AC" and 1 category "E".

ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE: Anti-aircraft fire was meager to moderate and mostly inaccurate along the route to and from the target. However, at the target, the anti-aircraft fire was very intense and accurate. Some meager inaccurate AA fire was observed enroute at Egnond, Uden and Dordrecht.

ROUTE: Mission Nos. 1, 2, and 3 - Bases to 52°37'N - 04°35'E to 52°40'N - 06°10'E to target to 51°32'N - 07°00'E to 51°50'N - 04°00'E to bases.

Mission No. 4 - Bases to 52°48'N - 01°33'E to 52°47'N - 04°00'E to 52°45'N - 04°39'E to 52°40'N - 06°10'E to target to 51°50'N - 04°00'E to 52°56'N - 01°19'E to bases.

FIGHTER ESCORT: B-17s of the 1st and 3rd Bombardment Divisions were escorted by six groups of VIII Fighter Command P-47s from vicinity of Dutch coast to the target and return. Enemy fighter opposition was not strong except in the target area, where about 50 e/a, mostly Me-109s and FW-190s were encountered. In ensuing engagements 4 P-47s were lost, while our fighters claim 8-3-8.

MISSION NO. 5 - MUNSTER

102 B-24s of 2nd Bombardment Division led by 4 Pathfinder B-17s of 482nd Squadron, attacked industrial and transportation targets in Munster. 2 a/c attacked Coesfeld and Haltern. Escort from inside Dutch coast to the target and back to Dutch coast was provided by one group of P-47s and one squadron of P-38s. 3 B-24s were lost. Claims against e/a are 21-4-7.

BOMBING RESULTS: 102 B-24s and 4 PFF B-17s dropped 657 x 500 M 50 I.B. clusters, 680 x 100 I.B., 340 x 500 G.P. fused 1/10 sec. nose and 1/40 sec. tail, and 16 x 100 G.P. on Munster. Bombing was from 22,000 to 25,000 feet at 1349 to 1358 hours. Weather was clear. Strike photographs show many H.E. bursts on and near

C O N F I D E N T I A L

the marshalling yards and 6 direct hits on a possible textile mill areas and the Munster-Loddenheide airfield were also hit.

1 B-24 dropped 12 x 500 M 50 I.B. clusters on Coesfeld and 1 B-24 dropped 8 x 500 G.P. and 16 x 100 I.B. on Haltern with unobserved results.

REASONS FOR FAILURE TO BOMB: 14 a/c failed to bomb - 12 because of mechanical or equipment failures, 1 because of personnel failure, and 1 due to enemy action.

ENCOUNTERS: Approximately 50 e/a attacked formations of this Division, the attacks beginning near the I.P. and continuing intermittently to the Dutch Coast. Effective fighter escort prevented the majority of e/a from pressing home their attacks. The lead group reported e/a came out of the sun from 10 to 2 o'clock. The low group reported that enemy fighters seemed eager and pressed nearly all of their attacks close - many within 100 yards or so and some even going through the formations. 4 JU-88s in echelon to the right attacked over the Dutch Coast on the way back. They decreased their speed as they came into range and fired rockets singly from about 4 o'clock, then peeled away and headed back to Germany. Rocket explosions were huge and the smoke was very black and persistent. Types of e/a seen were FW-190s with tear-shaped belly tanks, JU-88s, Me-110s and Me-210s. About 80% of the e/a were single engine.

CASUALTIES: Personnel - 7 crew members were killed, 17 seriously wounded, 8 slightly wounded and 31 are missing.

Equipment - 3 bombers are missing - all for reasons unknown.

Estimated Battle Damage - 24 category "A", 13 category "AC", and 1 category "E".

ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE: Meager and inaccurate AA fire was experienced going in to the target. Moderate to intense and very accurate gun fire of the barrage type was encountered on the bomb run, changing to predicted control type with lessened intensity over and following the target area. Barrage type fire near Haanstede was moderate and accurate. Very accurate anti-aircraft fire reported over Middleburg. On the way back meager continuous following AA fire was reported at Hertogenbosch, Breda and Tilburg.

ROUTE: Bases to 53°55'N - 04°00'E to 53°24'N - 05°12'E to 52°40'N - 06°10'E to 52°19'N - 07°05'E to target to 51°32'N - 03°26'E to 52°27'N - 01°34'E to bases.

FIGHTER ESCORT: B-24s of 2nd Division were escorted from Gorredijk to Munster by one P-47 group and at the target and on return by 1 P-38 squadron. Two other squadrons of P-38s did not rendezvous with bombers but swept area and escorted straggling B-17s. 30 or more e/a were encountered in the target area and on the route out, mostly FW-190s and Me-109s. 5 rocket-firing DO-217s were attacked. P-38s were especially valuable in escorting stragglers. Fighters claim 10-2-5 on this mission. There were no fighter losses.

OBSERVATIONS

There was a very large and well camouflaged airfield near Hertogenbosch. Several smoke screens were observed at Bochum, north of the Dortmund-Ems Canal,

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at Munster, Hamm, Dorstein, Gladbeck, Enschede and Ruhr. Strong point defense positions were noted along the coast of Holland in the form of large 5 or 6 point stars at $51^{\circ}54'N - 04^{\circ}10'45"E$ and $51^{\circ}52'30"N - 04^{\circ}11'15"E$.

W E A T H E R

Route Out: Over England 10/10 stratocumulus, tops 5,000 feet becoming 7/10 to 9/10 stratocumulus over mid-North Sea, decreasing to nil at Continental coast. Target: Over the continent and over targets 2/10 cirrus at 30,000 feet. Visibility 10+ miles aloft. 2-5 miles at surface due to haze and smoke.

Route Back: Return route was similar to route out.

C O N F I D E N T I A L