SUBJECT: Anti-Aircraft Report.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th. Bombardment Group (H), APO 634.

1. The route going into the target was: Lizard Point, Bourgneuf and Target. Routs out: Castelli Point, Lezard Point.

2. Visibility was clear and excellent.

3. There were 19 A/C over the target flying at an altitude of 24,000 feet.

4. The general axis of attack was 339° Mag., as of the lead A/C.

5. Before Bombing the formation flew straight and level for a period of from 90 to 110 seconds.

6. A turn of 29° to the left was made after bombing the target.

7. The 95th Group was the second out of the three groups to go over the target.

8. At the target heavy, intense and accurate AA fire was encountered just before arriving at the line of bomb release. Indications are that the type of fire was predicted concentration.

For the Commanding Officer

FLORENCE J. DONOHUE
Major, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

10 . Commanding General Fourth Bombardment Wing APO 919.

1. Following is the expenditure report for 28 June 1943.

a. Station AAF 119
b. Unit 95th Bombardment Group (H)
c. Type of ammunition Cal. AP, I&T
d. Gun location and No. of guns

32 Lower Turret guns	2311
32 Upper Turret guns	1860
16 Right Waist guns	1572
16 Left Waist guns	1464
16 Radio guns	513
16 Left Nose guns	572
16 Right Nose guns	493
16 Center Nose guns	449
32 Tail guns	3991

e. Total number of guns 192
f. Total number of rounds fired 13,226
g. Demolition bombs, number and size 30-2000 lb. general purpose bombs.
h. Three ships missing with total of 6-2000 lb. demolition bombs and 22,000 rounds of Cal. AP, I&T
i. Total number of rounds fired 35,226
j. Total number of bombs expended 36-2000 lb. demolition bombs.

For the Commanding Officer:

LEONARD F. DAWSON
1st Lt., Air Corps
Armament Officer,

SUBJECT: Base Engineering Report on Combat Mission of June 28, 1943.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fourth Bombardment Wing, APO 634.
COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of the 95th Bombardment Group (H).

a. Twenty-one (21) B-17F airplanes took-off, three (3) returned to base before completing mission.
b. Eighteen (18) airplanes completed mission.
c. Three (3) airplanes did not return.

2. There were (3) three abortive airplanes.
42-30219 - Leak in wing tank connections.
42-30283 - Shortage of gasoline.
42-30244 - Shortage of gasoline.

3. Battle damage is as follows:

a. 42-30135 - Minor sheet metal damage caused by flak.
b. 42-30194 - Minor sheet metal damage caused by flak.
c. 42-30178 - Minor sheet metal damage caused by flak.
d. 42-3263 - Minor sheet metal damage caused by flak.
e. 42-30235 - Oxygen line, Oil tank punctured, sheet metal damage.
f. 42-30288 - Sheet metal damage.
g. 42-30322 - Minor sheet metal damage caused by flak.
h. 42-30185 - Minor sheet metal damage caused by flak.
i. 42-30233 - Minor sheet metal damage caused by flak.
j. 42-3273 - Sheet metal damage.

CLARENCE D. FIELDS,
Major, Air Corps,
Base Engineering Officer.

BOMBARDIER'S LOG

ST. NAZAIRE	SEA LEVEL	XXX 11.55
Target:	*Elevation:	Take-Off:
6/22/43	NONE	
Date:	Escort:	

Description and Remarks:

EASTERN LOCKS TO BASIN

* Pressure Altitude of Target -335	Type & Size ** of Bombs AN M 34 2000 lb.
* Altimeter Setting 30.34	** No. of Bombs Loaded 2 — *Fuzing: Nose 1/10 Tail 1/40
* Ind. Altitude 24,000	** Initial Point 41-02N plus 015-9 W — * Ordered Actual 41-02N 015-9W
* True Altitude above Target 25,000	x Length of Run 90 secs. — x Time of Run 16-54-10
x Air Speed (MPH) CIAS 155 TAS 230	* Mag. Head. Ordered 343 degs — x Mag. Head. Actual 340 degs.
* Ground Speed *Est 203 **Actual 219	x Time of Release 16-55-40 — ** No. of Bombs Released 2
Drift * Forecast 3 Right/ x Actual plus 3 correction	** Type of Release Train Salvo Individual
* Actual Range 2 miles	x Point of impact (If seen) NW TARGET
x Tan. Drop. Angle * Est. .46 x Actual .45	** Airplane Type B-17F No. 0235
x Disc Speed 128.9 x Trail 39	** Pilot LINDLEY, CAPT., AC
** Actual Time of Fall 41.13 **B.S. Type and No. M9-3440	** Navigator POWELL, WM. 2nd Lt., AC
	** Bombardier WING, 2nd Lt., AC.

Height	Wind Direction *Est.	Wind Direction xActual	Wind Velocity *Est	Wind Velocity xActual	Temp. Forecast *	Temp. Actual x
1000						
3000						
6000						
10000	10		15			plus 1 C
15000	360		15			-9 C.
20000	350		20			-20 C.
22000						
24000						
26000	330		20			-33 C.
30000						

Remarks: VISIBILITY UNLIMITTED. CEILING UNLIMITED.

* Fill in before take-off. ** Fill in after landing. x Fill in during flight.

MEAN TEMP. ------ -2° C

DEPUTY LEADER SIGHTED FOR GROUP. GROUP LEADERS' DOORS WOULD NOT OPEN.

TO : Operations Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Complete discription of bombing:

a. The A.F.C.E. in conjunction with the A.B.C. computor were used as two aids to bombing.

b. The group turned after the IP, and made slight evasive action for a short period of time.

c. The bombay doors were opened just after turning from the IP.

d. The lead bombardier had trouble with his bombay doors, therefore he couldn't make a bombing run. The ~~[illegible]~~ low SQN. leader then took over and made a ninety (90) second bomb run. He had to make two corrections in rate and one correction in the course. He set up the A.B.C. computor with the metro data that was given to him before take-off.

e. The affects of enemy resistance to the bombing run was negative as far as fighters were concerned. The flak was very heavy, intense, and accurate.

f. The S-2 information on the target was excellent.

g. The weather was reported as perfect.

h. There were no unusal tatics employed by the enemy to interfere with the bombing run.

i. The visual results of the bombing was reported as, excellent.

j. There were no suggestions in changing of tatics in bombing technique on any particular target or on any target.

Frank T. Imand
FRANK T. IMAND
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Group Bombardier.

Mission 12

95th GROUP

FLAK REPORT

DATE 28/6/43

Telephoned by X

Target St Nazaire

1. Route followed.

In: Lizard Point - Bourgneuf - Target - Out: Castelli Point - Lizard Pt.

2. Visibility at Target (Any condenaation trails?) Lead Plane

Clear - excellent. No condensation trails

3. No. of A/C over target.

19

4. Formation over target, with height of ~~each~~ 1 A/C A/C. Those A/C damaged

FORM 3

SQUADRON 119 DATE 6-28-43

LET	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF EST.	TIME OFF ACT.	LANDING EST.	LANDING ACT.	REMARKS
								CALL WING UPON LANDING
F	Ø273	Cozens		1155	1155		2142	
J	Ø219	Noyes	Abort		1159		1339	TOKYO TANKS OVER FLOWING INTO WING TANKS - E5 VALVE STUCK OPEN. - IN - Called
C	Ø300	Lemke			1155+		2222	ST EVAL
A	3267	Thomas	Ditch		1156		—	Water landing - All 10 men Rescued
H	Ø135	McPherson			1157		2143	
B	Ø284	South	Ditch		1157		—	Water landing - All OK.
O	Ø194	Hamilton			1157+		2107	
W	Ø218	Johnson			1158		2108	
S	Ø178	Knowlton			1158+		2106	
H	Ø286	Bender	Ditch		1159+			Water landing - All OK.
6	Ø283	Mason	Abort		1200		1942	ABORDED THR BEFORE TARGET BECAUSE of LOW FUEL SUPPLY. CALLED WING.
V	3263	Snow			1200+		2109	
M	Ø244	Thompson			1206		2116	
G	3277	Mauldin			1201			St Eval.
D	5882	O'Neal			1201+		2213	St Eval.
U	Ø235	Lindley			1202		2104	
T	Ø288	Robinson		1202	1203		2127	
P	6344	~~Eastling~~ Adams			1202		2118	
N	Ø185	~~Kring~~ Eastling			1203+		2110	
	Ø233	Kring			1204		2140	St Eval

INTELLIGENCE S-2

LEAD

* COZENS 334
F T 0273

LEMKE 334
C T 0300

NOYES 334
J T 0219

THOMAS 334
A T 3267

** SOUTH 334
B T 0284 ?

** McPHERSON 334
H T 0135

LOW

LINDLEY 412
U T 0235

ADAMS 412
T 0322

* ROBINSON 412
T T 0288

** EASTLING 412
N T 0185

KRING 412
X T 0233

ISSEY 412
W T 3273

HIGH

HAMILTON 335
O T 0194

* KNOWLTON 335
S T 0178

JOHNSON
W T 0218

** BENDER 336
H T 0286

SNOW 335
V T 3263

MASON
C T 02

THOMPSON 336
T 6244

O'NEAL 336
D T 5882

MAUDL
G T 3

XTRA SHIPS
4 = 9943
35 = 0272
36 = 0161
12 = 0255
CAMERA ABOARD A/C
* AUTOMATIC CAMERA ABOARD A/C
BOMB SIGHT ABOARD A/C

JUNE 27, 1943

⊕ COZENS (334) * F 0273 1155

LEMKE(334) C 0300 1155

NOYES(334) J 0219 1159

⊕ THOMAS(334) A 3267 1156

SOUTH(334) B 0284 1157

McPHERSON (334) H 0135 1207

⊕ LINDLEY(412) U 0235 1203

ADAMS(412) P 0322 1203

ROBINSON (412) T 0288 1204

⊕ EASTLING(412) * N 0185 1204

MASSEY(412) W 3273 1205

KRING (412) X 0233 1205

⊕ HAMILTON(335) 1158 O 0194

KNOWLTON(335) S 0178 1159

JOHNSON(335) W 0 218 1158

⊕ BENDER (336) * H 0286 1200

SNOW (335) V 3263 1201

MASON(336) C 0 2 8 3 1200

⊕ THOMPSON (336) M 0244 1206

O'NEAL(336) D 5882 1202

MAUDDIN (336) G 3277 1201

EXTRA SHIPS

334	9943	K	⊕
335	0272	U	⊕
336	0161	B	⊕
412	0255	V	⊕

BRIEFING @ 0900
STATIONS @ 1030
TAXI @ 1140
T/O @ 1155
ETA 2124
R/O FIELD @ 2500' @ 1215

AMERAS ABOARD A/C ** AUTOMATIC CAMERAS ABOARD A/C ⊕ BOMB SIGHT ABOARD A/C

INTELLIGENCE S-2

LEAD

* COZENS (334)
F [redacted] 0273

LEMKE (334)
C [redacted] 0300

NOYES (334)
J [redacted] 0219

THOMAS (334)
A [redacted] 3267

** SOUTH (334)
B [redacted] 0284 ?

** McPHERSON (334)
H [redacted] 0135

LOW

LINDLEY (412)
U [redacted] 0235

* ROBINSON (412)
T [redacted] 0288

ADAMS (412)
[redacted] 0322

** EASTLING (412)
N [redacted] 0185

KRING (412)
X [redacted] 0233

ISSEY (412)
W [redacted] 3273

HIGH

HAMILTON (335)
O [redacted] 0194

* KNOWLTON (335)
S [redacted] 0178

JOHNSON (335)
W [redacted] 0218

** BENDER (336)
H [redacted] 0286

SNOW (335)
V [redacted] 3263

MASON (336)
C [redacted] 0283

THOMPSON (336)
[redacted] 6244

O'NEAL (336)
D [redacted] 5882

MAUDLIN (336)
G [redacted] 3277

TRA SHIPS
4 = 9943
5 = 0272
6 = 0161
2 = 0255

CAMERA ABOARD A/C
E AUTOMATIC CAMERA ABOARD A/C
BOMB SIGHT ABOARD A/C

SECRET. BY D.R.L.S.

From:- Headquarters, Bomber Command.

BOMBER COMMAND INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3570 - 23/7/43.

RAID ASSESSMENT

OCCUPIED FRANCE:

ST.NAZAIRE. In the U.S.A.A.F. attack on 28th June a paint and a submarine stores depot were destroyed. Several bombs were dropped on the shelter being constructed over the new lock entrance and holes were made in the reinforced concrete; the displacement of a steel girder caused some consternation among German engineers. The Power Plant operating in the lock gates was destroyed.

12

SECRET
(American CONFIDENTIAL)
30.6.43

INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. S.A. 371.

ATTACK ON EASTERN ENTRANCE LOCK OF BASSIN DE ST. NAZAIRE ON 28.6.43.

SAV	94/21	28.6.43	1655 hrs.	1/37,500	(F.L. 8")	2,5000 ft.	'B'
	95/19	"	"	1/24,000	(F.L. 12")	24,000 ft.	'A'
	95/20	"	"	1/36,000	(F.L. 8")	24,000 ft.	'A'
	94/18	"	1656	1/37,500	(F.L. 8")	25,000 ft.	'B'
	94/19	"	"	1/37,500	(F.L. 8")	25,000 ft.	'C'
	95/21	"	"	1/46,500	(F.L. 7")	24,000 ft.	'B'
	96/9	"	"	1/48,000	(F.L. 7")	25,000 ft.	'B'
	95/18	"	1657	1/46,500	(F.L. 7")	24,000 ft.	'B'
	94/20	"	1657½	1/38,500	(F.L. 8")	25,700 ft.	'A'
	96/8	"	1700	1/48,500	(F.L. 7")	25,000 ft.	'B'
	100/1	"	"	1/49,500	(F.L. 7")	27,800 ft.	'C'
	100/2	"	"	1/42,000	(F.L. 8")	27,800 ft.	'C'
	100/3	"	"	1/42,000	(F.L. 8")	27,800 ft.	'C'
	92/17	"	1705	1/48,000	(F.L. 6")	24,000 ft.	'B'
	92/18	"	1707	1/24,000	(F.L. 12")	24,000 ft.	'A'
	305/84	"	1708	1/21,500	(F.L. 14")	25,000 ft.	'A'
	351/13	"	1710	1/23,000	(F.L. 12")	23,000 ft.	'A'
	351/14	"	"	1/23,000	(F.L. 12")	23,000 ft.	'A'
	306/82	"	1710½	1/39,700	(F.L. 8")	26,500 ft.	'C'
	306/83	"	1711	1/39,000	(F.L. 8")	26,200 ft.	'B'
	306/85	"	1712	1/39,000	(F.L. 8")	26,000 ft.	'B'
	91/53	"	"	1/37,500	(F.L. 8")	25,000 ft.	'B'
	91/52B	"	1713	1/37,500	(F.L. 8")	25,000 ft.	'B'

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON ATTACK

(a) These photographs were taken during a daylight attack on the Eastern Entrance Lock of the Bassin de St. Nazaire by a total of 149 aircraft of U.S.B.C. on 28.6.43. The attack was made in two waves approximately 20 minutes apart.

(b) The first wave consisting of 51 aircraft dropped 101 x 2,000 lb. G.P. bombs.

(c) The second wave of 98 aircraft dropped 180 x 2,000 lb. G.P. bombs

(d) The second wave of the attack had fighter support. The first wave was unescorted.

(ii) BOMB BURSTS OBSERVED

(a) The first wave of the attack approached the target from East to West, dropping their bombs well within the target area. At least three probable direct hits were registered on the sides of the Eastern Entrance Lock and two direct hits on the roof of the U-Boat shelters, one bomb falling on the entrance to the northernmost block of shelters.

(b) Although barely 20 mins. elapsed between the two waves, the first attack had died away before the second wave came in, approaching from the South West. Most of the bombs fell well within the target area around the Bassin de St. Nazaire. At least one direct hit was registered on the caissons at the Western end of the new lock under construction at the Eastern

/entrance while several

entrance while several other bursts can be seen alongside the lock and at least four additional hits were registered on the U-Boat shelters. Bomb bursts are also seen near warehouses on the quays, on and near light railways serving these quays and near the small floating dock in the Bassin de St. Nazaire. The rest of the bomb bursts seen are among the residential areas west of the target and in the River Loire to the East of the target.

(c) Clouds of smoke swept across the target by the North Easterly wind from the concentration of bombs makes it difficult to see all bomb bursts but a bomb plot of clearly defined bomb bursts in the immediate target area is being issued with this Report.

ANNOTATED PRINT I (94/20-9) First wave of the attack.

A. Shows approx. 12 bomb bursts on the Eastern side of the Bassin de St. Nazaire including three probable hits on the sides of the Eastern Entrance Lock - one on the South Western corner, a second on the Southern Side and the third on the North Eastern corner.

This group also includes several bursts near warehouses on the quays and a direct hit on or beside a light railway servicing these quays. Another bomb burst in this group is seen beside the small floating dock in the North Eastern part of the Bassin de St. Nazaire.

B. A group of approx. 6 bomb bursts on the Western Side of the Bassin de St. Nazaire including 2 direct hits on the U-Boat Shelters, one on the roof at entrance to the Northernmost block and the second on the roof of the central block.

C. A bomb burst is seen on the sidings at the Goods Station adjacent to the Shelters.

D. Bursts from approx. 17 bombs which have fallen in the river South East of the Port.

ANNOTATED PRINT II (351/13-17) Second wave of the attack.

E. Shows smoke from approx. 17 bursts in the immediate vicinity of the target including a direct hit on the caissons, at the Eastern end of the new lock under construction at the Eastern Entrance and a probable additional hit beside the old lock.

F. Shows a considerable volume of smoke arising from approx. 35 bombs which have fallen in sticks on the Western side of the Bassin de St. Nazaire. These include at least four additional hits on the roof of the submarine shelters and three hits on or near railway tracks on the Western side of the port, while the remainder of the bursts are seen among the residential districts South West of the target.

G. Shows approx. 10 bomb bursts round the Southern end of the Bassin de Penhouet. One of these bombs has fallen beside the Drawing Office of the Chantiers and Ateliers de Penhouet which has already been much damaged by previous raids. Off the Western side of the Bassin one of the bombs has fallen on the Boulevard Lefevre while another is seen bursting on the railway sidings immediately West of the latter.

H. Shows approx. 45 bursts from bombs which have fallen in the River Loire East of the port.

/ANNOTATED PRINT NO.III

INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. S.A. 371 (Cont'd)

ANNOTATED PRINT NO. III (95/21-9) First stage of the attack.

A. Bomb bursts seen at A. in Print I with an additional direct hit on the new concrete building over the caisson chamber to the Entrance Lock to the Bassin de Penhouet and one near the North Eastern corner of this lock.

B. Shows bomb bursts at B. in Print I with additional burst on the Submarine Shelters.

C. Bomb bursts seen on railway tracks at C in Print I.

D. Bomb bursts seen at D. in Print I.

I. Two additional bomb bursts in the Bassin de Penhouet and one in a residential area West.

(iv) SMOKE SCREEN.

A smoke screen from small vessels in the Loire and ejectors along roads North and West of the port are seen in its early stages during the first attack. Although it had developed a little by the later stages of the attack it did not obscure the target at any time.

(v) BALLOONS

Balloons where seen are flying in approximately the same positions as previously.

(vi) ACCOMPANYING PRINTS.

Annotated prints I and II and an approximate bomb plot of well defined bomb bursts within the immediate target area are being distributed with this report.

SECRET

R.A.F. STATION,
MEDMENHAM
TDW/ME/C

DISTRIBUTION NO.11

Plus	H.Q.F.C.	20
	E	119
	I	17
		156 copies.

"A" FORM

STATION 119

DATE 28, June 1943

TIME 1030

1. Total No. A/C in each Sqdn: Letters of Each are:
Sqdn. 334 A/C: A B C [redacted] H J [redacted] [redacted] F
Sqdn. 335 A/C: O P Y W
Sqdn. 336 A/C: C D G H M
Sqdn. 412 A/C: N P T U W X

2. Target: SAINT NAZZIARE

3. Operational W/T call sign of each sqdn:
Sqdn. 334 Sign 1 N O Sqdn. 336 Sign S 8 P
Sqdn. 335 Sign 1 N O Sqdn. ~~336~~ 412 Sign S 8 P

4. Taxi Time 1st A/C 1140 Hrs. T.O. Time 1st A/C 1155 Hrs.
E. T. D. Over Field 1215 Hrs. @ 2500'

5. Time: 1425 Height: 2000' Place of crossing English Coast: Out: LIZARD POINT

6. Time: 1704 Height: 23,000' Recrossing enemy coast: CASTELLE POINT

7. Time: 1912 Height: 2000' Place of crossing Coast: In: LIZARD POINT

8. E.T.R. 2124 Hrs.

9. IF/DF Section "E"

10. Bomb load of each A/C: 2 x 2000* (1/10 Nose)* (1/40 TAIL)
Squadron: 334 2 X 2000# Squadron: 336 2 X 2000#
Squadron: 336 2 X 2000# Squadron: 412 2 X 2000#

11. Fuel load of each A/C: 10 HRS.

12. COMPOSITE GROUP:

13. 95TH GROUP:

COBOMWG 4 X

COBOMGR 95 X

29/6/43 1:25 S-2

(1) FROM TWO TO FIVE E/A WERE REPORTED ATTACKING OUR FORMATION. THESE WERE FW 190s AND ME 109s. THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE ON THE WAY HOME FROM THE MISSION 70 MILES OFF THE ENGLISH COAST AND 60 MILES WEST OF BREST PENNISULA. E/A CAME IN LOW AND ATTACKED FROM SIX O'CLOCK.

(2) AA FIRE WAS ENCOUNTERED JUST BEFORE ARRIVING AT LINE OF BOMB RELEASE. IT WAS HEAVY FIRE, INTENSE AND ACCURATE. FROM CREWS REPORTS IT WOULD SEEM TO BE OF "PREDICTED CONCENTRATION" FORM.

(3) A/C #284 AND A/C #287 WERE REPORTED DOWN SOUTH OF LIZARD POINT AND CLOSE TO THE ENGLISH COAST. CREWS FROM BOTH SHIPS HAVE BEEN RESCUED. REASON FOR THESE PLANES COMINGDOWN IS NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME. THE THIRD PLANE #286 IS MISSING WITH NO REPORTS AS TO THE FAILURE OR WHERE OR WHAT OCCURRED.

(4) NO A/C CRASHED ON THE BRITISH ISLES. ALL A/C OTHER THAN THE THREE MENTIONED ABOVE RETURNED SAFELY WITH NO SERIOUS DAMAGE.

(5) NOT AVAILABLE.

95 NaRR

(6) ONE OBSERVER REPORTED [illegible]

RALLY POINT.

23 BOATS WERE REPORTED 1/2 MILE SOUTH OF THE TARGET AND 12 SUBMARINES REPORTED 3 MILES DUE EAST OF THE TARGET.

2 SUBMARINES SIGHTED AT 1616 POSITION 46° 40' N 03° 50' W HEADING NORTH.

AT 1620 THREE SHIPS WERE SIGHTED GOING SOUTHEAST AT 46° 50' N 04° W AND AT 1625 GOING NORTH 2 SHIPS AT 46° 55' N 03° 30' W. SOME FLAK FROM THESE SHIPS WERE FIRED AT REPORTING A/C.

6 SHIPS GOING NORTHEAST WERE SIGHTED AT 1650 POSITION 46° 50' N 02° 50' W

3 SUBMARINES CRASH DIVED AT 1717 POSITION 46° 50' N 03° 30' W.

2 LARGE FREIGHTERS GOING NORTH WERE REPORTED AT 47° 25' N 05° 20' W.

B-17s WERE REPORTED DOWN AT FOLLOWING POSITIONS: 49° 53'N 04°50'W, 49°50'N 05°10'W, 48°05'N 07°35'W, 48°25'N 06°W.

(7) DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE LEAD SHIP TO BOMB THE TARGET, DUE TO MECHANICAL FAULT, ALL OTHER A/C DROPED THEIR BOMBS ON THE PRIMARY TARGET. THE RESULTS ARE REPORTED GOOD. A FIRST PHASE INTERPRETATION OF THE PICTURES WOULD INDICATE THE REPORT AS ACCURATE.

(8) WHILE THE ROUTE WAS LONG AND SOMEWHAT TEDIOUS THE CREWS WERE PLEASED ON THE CAREFUL PLANNING AND WISE SELECTION OF THE ROUTE TO AND FROM THE TARGET.

(9) 21 A/C OF THE 95TH BOMB GROUP TOOK OFF BEGINNING AT 1155 TO ATTACK THE LOCKS OF THE EAST ENTRANCE TO THE LOIRE BASIN AT ST. NAZAIRE. PARTLY CLOUDY WEATHER OVER ENGLAND GAVE WAY TO EXCELLENT BOMBING WEATHER OVER THE TARGET. 3 A/C ABORTED. THE FIRST #219 AT 1255 FROM A POINT NORTHWEST OF LONDON FOR MECHANICAL FAILURE. THE SECOND #283 AT 1555 FROM 47°03'N 04°55'W WHEN RATE OF CONSUMPTION INDICATED INADEQUATE GAS TO COMPLETE MISSION. THE THIRD #273 REACHED THE TARGET BUT FAILED TO BOMB BECAUSE THE STOP LIMITS WERE NOT PROPERLY SET ON BOMBING DOORS THE BOMBS WERE LATER JETTISONED OVER WATER.

(9) (continued) THE TARGET [redacted] SURELY IDENTIFIED. DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE LEAD SHIP TO BOMB GOOD RESULTS OF THE BOMBING WERE REPORTED.

INTENSE FLAK OVER THE TARGET AND FEW ENEMY A/C OVER WATER ON THE ROUTE BACK WERE REPORTED.

TWO A/C, #284 AND #267 DITCHED SHORT OF THE ENGLISH COAST. ALL CREWS ARE REPORTED SAFE WITH ONE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IN ONE A/C #284. ONE A/C #286 IS UNREPORTED BUT BELIEVED DOWN OVER WATER AS REPORTED LAST APPROXIMATELY 40 MILES FROM ENGLISH COAST. 4 A/C LANDED AT ST. EVAL ON THE RETURN ROUTE AND AFTER REFUELING RETURNED TO THIS BASE, THE LAST AT 2500. THE FORMATION RETURNED AT 2125/.

TARGETS: Eastern Lock Entrance of Bassin de St. Nazaire
Beaumont-le-Roger Airfield

The lock entrances to the Bassin de St. Nazaire were successfully attacked by 158 B-17s which approached in two waves, the first by sea and the second 11 minutes later by way of Brittany. Less than half an hour later 43 B-17s were concentrating bombs on the dispersal area of the important Beaumont-le-Roger Airfield in northern France. Strong e/a opposition was encountered in the St. Nazaire attack from which 8 bombers are missing. All bombers attacking Beaumont-le-Roger returned safely. Claims against e/a are 28 - 6 - 8.

Unit	Number of A/C (Dispatched	Attacking	Abortive* A.	Abortive* B.	Lost)	Claims	Personnel Casualties (Killed	Wounded	Missing)
ST. NAZAIRE									
91	20	18	2	0	1	7-0-0	0	4	10
92	16x	13x	3	0	0	1-1-1	1	1	0
305	21	18	3	0	0	2-1-0	0	0	0
306	21	19	2	0	0	3-0-0	1	0	0
351	20	19	1	0	4	10-3-2	1	2	40
381	22	17	5	0	0	5-1-5	0	2	0
94	13	7	3	3	0	0-0-0	0	1	0
95	21	18	3	0	3	0-0-0	0	1	0
96	16	11	5	0	0	0-0-0	0	2	0
100	21	18	3	0	0	0-0-0	0	1	0
	191	158	30	3	8	28-6-8	3	14	50
BEAUMONT-le-ROGER									
303	18	17	1	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0
379	14	13	1	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0
384	18	13	5	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0
	50	43	7	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0
TOTALS:	241	201	37	3	8	28-6-8	3	14	50

x - Includes 6 YB-40s.
* - Abortive A. - Mechanical, equipment or personnel failures.
B. - Weather, recall, spares or enemy action.

PART I - St. Nazaire

BOMBING RESULTS: 152 B-17s dropped 300 x 2000 GP, 1/10 sec. nose, 1/40 sec. tail

direct hit on the caissons at the western end. Other bursts were seen alongside the lock, on the roof and entrance of the U-boat shelters, near warehouses on the quays, on and near light railways servicing these quays and near the small floating dock in the Bassin.

REASONS FOR FAILURE TO BOMB: 33 a/c failed to bomb, 29 because of mechanical failures, 1 because of personnel failure, and 3 because they were spares and not needed.

ENCOUNTERS: Up to 100 e/a were reported seen, most of which were FW 190s and Me 109s, with a few Ju 88s and 3 He 113s. 4th Wing a/c, which attacked in the first wave, encountered no e/a until formation was 50 miles west of the Brest Peninsula on the route back, at which time 5 e/a attacked low from direction of 6 o'clock. The second wave, comprised of 6 Groups of 1st Wing, received strong opposition which began at Ploermel and continued to target, with attacks being resumed in the vicinity of Fromentine and continuing to 47°00'N-04°10'W. Later, one of the Groups was attacked off Brest for about 25 minutes. Most of the attacks were from astern, level and high from 12 and 1 o'clock, singly and in two's and three's, peeling off from 4 to 5 in a line and pressing attacks to within 200 yards. E/a were observed taking off from Vannes, assembling at 30,000 ft. and proceeding to Belle Isle to await bombers. 30 e/a were seen taking off from A/D near Malestroit. Colorings noted were: FW 190s - bright green, silver with red strips around nose, black, yellow noses and steel gray tails; Me 109s - steel gray and silver, red and yellow nose; Ju 88s - silver; He 113s - mottled with silver markings.

FLAK: In the first wave of the attack intense accurate falk was encountered at the end of the bombing run in what appeared to be a predicted concentration with subsequent continuous following. The second wave reported flak over the target as intense and inaccurate, except for one Group at 23,000 ft. Meagre inaccurate flak was encountered over St. Brieuc, Brehat, Ploermel, Croisic Point, Bourgneuf, and near Fromentine.

CASUALTIES: Personnel - 3 crew members were killed, 4 seriously wounded, 10 slightly wounded and 50 are missing. 3 crews were saved by Air Sea Rescue Service.

Equipment - 8 B-17s were lost, 1 to e/a and 7 for reasons unknown.
Estimated Battle Damage - 34 Category "A", 23 Category "AC".

FIGHTER SUPPORT: The first wave which came in to attack from sea had no fighter support. The second wave which flew over Brittany was given general support from 20 miles NNW of St. Brieuc to approximately 50 miles inland by 8 Squadrons of P-47s. There was no e/a opposition along the route on which support was provided.

ROUTE: 1st Wing: Start Point to 20 miles NNW of St. Brieuc, to Ploermel, to 47°30'N-02°42'W to target, to bases by sea.
4th Wing: Lizard Point to 48°10'N-06°20'W, to 47°00'N-05°00'W, to 47°30'N-03°50'W, to 46°30'N-03°30'W, to 47°02'N-01°59'W, to target, to bases by sea.

WEATHER: Bases at take-off had 6/10-9/10 stratocumulus at 2000-2500 ft. with 4-6 miles visibility. Cloud amounts decreased as English Coast was reached with nil to 2/10 small cumulus at 4000 ft. reported from the Channel to the target. At St. Nazaire there was nil to 2/10 stratocumulus and unlimited visibility. On the return route conditions were similar to the route in, and bases on return had 6/10 stratocumulus at 2000 ft. and 6 miles visibility.

OBSERVATIONS: Smoke screen at St. Nazaire was reported ineffective, with those seen at Brest and Lorient described as very effective. An airfield, believed to be a dummy, was noted about 6 miles WNW of Vannes. Numerous oblong buildings and cement pen and docks were seen on Noirmoutier Island. One B-17 accompanied by 2 FW 190s and another which followed out of range were reported seen. Also reported was a P-47, apparently armed with 20 mm cannon and having markings identical to our P-47s, which was accompanied by an Me 109 and one other unidentified e/a. This a/c was seen off Brest and 5 to 7 approaches were made without attacking.

PART II - Beaumont-le-Roger

BOMBING RESULTS: 43 B-17s dropped 688 x 300 GP fused inst. nose, 45 sec. tail, from 22,000-24,000 ft. at 1736-1740 hours with good results on the west dispersal area of the airfield. In the major concentration bursts were seen near six covered shelters, and at least one a/c received a near miss. An explosion was observed near one shelter as though petrol stores or ammunition had been hit. Hits were also seen on and near a number of small buildings and on the roads within the area. A few bursts were also seen on the railway and highway northwest of Beaumont. Of 18 small e/a visible at time of attack, 5 were in such a position as to have received possible damage.

REASONS FOR FAILURE TO BOMB: 7 a/c failed to bomb, 3 for mechanical and 4 for personnel failures.

ENCOUNTERS: The formation was not attacked directly. Supporting Spitfires took care of the few e/a noted.

FLAK: Meagre inaccurate flak was encountered south of Rouen, over the target, at Thiberville and at Elbeuf. 6 batteries were observed firing in the target vicinity, with a trace of barrage fire and continuous following noted.

CASUALTIES: Personnel - Nil.
Equipment - Nil.
Estimated Battle Damage - 2 Category "A", 4 Category "AC".

FIGHTER SUPPORT: 9 Squadrons of Spitfire IXs provided support for the B-17s and 4 Typhoon bombers supported by 4 Squadrons of fighters carried out a diversionary attack on Morlaix airfield.

ROUTE: Dungeness to 50°20'N-01°10'E, to 50°10'N-00°00'E, to Brighton, to Beachy Head, to 10 miles north of Fecamp, to Fecamp, to Thiberville, to target, to 5 miles west of Elbeuf, to Beachy Head, to bases.

WEATHER: Route conditions were similar to those encountered by a/c attacking St. Nazaire. Weather over Beaumont-le-Roger was reported clear with visibility of 30-40 miles.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

OBSERVATIONS: A large construction crane or gun emplacement was noted under construction at Caudebec. Numerous oil tanks were reported 1 miles south of Lillebourne and south of Le Havre. 3 miles west of St. Valery a large runway was reported. An unidentified B-17 was reported trailing formation on part of diversionary run and was seen again as French coast was approached.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634.

1. All rendzvous and control times met as scheduled.

2. The I. P. was crossed on course, but the lead ship could not drop bombs because of faulty bombay doors.

3. Several planes used the emergency fields for refueling purposes.

4. No instrument failures were reported.

ELLIS E. SCRIPTURE
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Group Navigation Officer.

TO : Commanding Officer 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Interpretation of the four photo strips of the raid on the East Entrance to the Submarine Pens at St. Nazaire on 28 June 43 determines the following information:

A. The Target:

(1) The Locks are under construction and when completed would have passed a ship 410' x 75'. Caisons 51' in diameter block off 322' of the Locks--5 Caisons in the W end, and 8 Caisons in the E end and along the sides.

(2) Ineffective Smoke Screens were laid by 25 small boats moving N in the Loire River.

B. Hits:

(1) Hit inside the Caisons at the W end of the Locks.

(2) Hit inside the future location of the E Gates of the Locks.

(3) Two Hits on the Control Bldg for the Locks, and Two Caisons nearby.

(4) Hit on the newly constructed base for Sea Gates of the Locks leading into the Basin de Penhouet.

(5) Hit on the newly constructed base for Basin Gates of the Locks leading into the Basin de Penhouet.

(6) Hit on the Floating Dry Dock 226' x 41' with 81' Small Craft therein.

(7) Two Hits on the National Marine Warehouses 144' x 41' each near the Floating Dry Dock.

(8) Five Hits on the Submarine Pens.

(9) Hit on the Power Plant 40' x 40' for Hydraulic Machine Shop 190 yds S of the Locks.

(10) Hit on the Hydraulic Machine Shop Bldg 82' x 62'.

(11) Hit on Construction Tool Shacks near the Municipal Power Plant.

(12) Hits on Basin and River Retaining Walls.

(13) Hit on Passenger Station in the Marshalling Yards.

C. Near Misses:

(1) Three Near Misses on the Floating Dry Dock in the Basin de St. Nazaire.

(1) Five bomb craters in the bed of the Locks.
(2) Control Bldg for Locks destroyed.
(3) Two Caisons demolished.
(4) Concrete Mount for Sea Gates of the Locks damaged.
(5) Debris in the bed of the Locks---and no water.
(6) Bomb crater in the base for the Sea Gates of the Locks leading into the Basin de Penhouet.
(7) River Retaining Wall damaged.
(8) Trapped in the Basin de Penhouet and therefore non-operational:
    (a) Floating Dry Dock 245' x 81' with 122' Small Craft therein.
    (b) Two Floating Dry Docks 245' x 61' empty.
    (c) Freighter 591' x 51' being fitted at the Munitions Workshop Dock.
    (d) Several Small Craft.
(9) Trapped in the Basin de St. Nazaire and therefore non-operational:
    (a) Hull of Ship 160' x 40' floating.
    (b) Several Small Craft.

E. General:

(1) The following are under construction in the Ways in the Shipyards N of the Target; with no superstructures completed identification is difficult:
    (a) Ship 740' x 82' with central hatch 185' x 41' suggests an Aircraft Carrier.
    (b) Two Merchant Vessels 535' x 82'.
    (c) Merchant Vessel 452' x 51'.
    (d) Tanker or Collier 452' x 62'.
    (e) Pocket Battleship 411' x 62'.

For the Intelligence Officer:

ARNO A. KRAUSE
1st Lt, Air Corps
Photo Interpreter.

SUBJECT: S-2 Report.

TO : Commanding Officer 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634.

1. 21 A/C of th 95th Bomb Group took off beginning at 1155 to attack the locks of the east entrance of the Loire Basin at St. Nazaire. Partly cloudy weather over England gave way to excellent bombing weather over the target. 3 A/C aborted. The first No. 219 at 1255 from a point northwest of London for mechanical failure. The second No. 283 at 1555 from 47°03' N 04°55'W when rate of consumption indicated inadequate gas to complete mission. The third No. 273 reached the target but failed to bomb because the stop limits were not properly set on bombing doors. The bombs were later jettisoned over water. The target was clearly seen and surely identified. Despite the failure of the lead ship to bomb good results of the bombingwere reported. Intense flak over the target and few enemy A/C over water on the route back were reported. Two A/C No. 267 ditched short of the English Coast. All crews are reported safe with one seriously wounded in one A/C No. 284. One A/C No. 286 is unreported but believed down over water as reported last approximately 40 miles from English Coast. 4 A/C landed at St. Eval on the return route and after refueling returned to this base, the last at 2300. The formation returned at 2125.

For the Command:

FLORENCE J. DONOHUE,
Major, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

SUBJECT: S-3 Narrative Report for Mission 28 June, 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. A bomb loading of 2 X 2000 lb GP bombs, 1/10 second nose fuse and 1/40 second tail fuse setting was received at 1705, 27 June, 1943.

2. Field Order No. 14 came in at 0005, 27 June, 1943. The flight plans were made up as ordered in the field order, the 401st Combat Wing leading, followed by the 402nd Combat Wing, led by the 95th Bombardment Group (H). The crews were briefed at 0900 with take-off at 1155. Twenty one (21) aircraft took off, eight without extra wing tanks having been serviced. One aircraft aborted before reaching the target due to gasoline shortage. Another one aborted because of his extra wing tanks overflowing into the normal tanks. Nineteen ships were over the target. The lead squadron failed to drop on the target because of a malfunction of bomb doors in the lead ship.

3. There were no fighters over the target area. Flak was heavy and concentrated, and caused some damage to our ships, serious damage to one. On the return trip two enemy fighter made two attack on our formation, head-on in the usual manner.

4. a. Our bombs dropped just short of the target, running on and making several direct hits.

b. None of our airplanes were lost over the target. Three, however, were forced to ditch near Lands End because of fuel shortage and flak damage. Two crews were rescued promptly. The third crew at 1000, 29 June, yet remains to be rescued, although their SOS has been received almost continually, according to reports received by Group Operations.

CLIFFORD E. COLE
Captain, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

STAND BY FOR 'THE' BRADCAST

BSE PASS SELF - CO 94 GP = 401 C.W.

HRM PASS SELF - CO 100 GP = CO 95 GP = 402 C.W.

SNT PASS SELF - CO 96 GP

BSE - HRM - TAF VIA HRM - SNT V THE NR 04 2722408 URGENT SECRET
4BW U040E

SEND IN CLEAR AUTHORITY LT. COL. TRAVIS

4TH BOMB WING FIELD ORDER NO. 14

1. A. FIGHTER SUPPORT: NONE FOR 4TH WING

B. DIVERSIONS: FIRST WING WILL SEND TWO GROUCS TO ATTACK TARGET Z-460 TO ATTRACT ENEMY FIGHTERS DURING WITHDRAWAL OF FIRST WING AND FOURTH WING FROM MAIN TARGET.

C. FIRST WING MAIN EFFORT IS ON SAME TARGET AS FOURTH WING, FOLLOWING FOURTH WING TO TARGET BY FIFTEEN MINUTES. FIRST WING ROUTE IS FROM START POINT OVERLNAND DIRECT TO TARGET. RETURN ROUTE VIA SEA.

2. A. TARGETS: PRIMARY: Z 540 MPI 6575 S 5490/8
SECONDARY: NONE
LAST RESORT: NONE

B. FORCE REQUIRED: ALL AVAILABLE A/C WITH LONG RANGE GASOLINE TANKS

C. WING ASSEMBLY LINE: SPLASHER 6 1500 FEET — 1218
SPLASHER 7 1500 FEET — 1234

D. ROUTE OUT:

SPLASHER 14	1500 FEET	0 HR	MINUS	209 MIN
5115-0420 W	1500 "	0 HR	"	185 "
LIZARD POINT	1000 "	0 HR	"	150 "
4810-0620 W		0 HR	"	99 "
05-00		0SHR	"	65 "

2. A. TARGETS: PRIMARY: Z 540 MPI 6575 S 5490/8
SECONDARY: NONE

LAST RESORT: NONE

B. FORCE REQUIRED: ALL AVAILABLE A/C WITH LONG RANGE GASOLINE TANKS

C. WING ASSEMBLY LINE: SPLASHER 6 1500 FEET — 1218
SPLASHER 7 1500 FEET — 1234

D. ROUTE OUT:

	SPLASHER 14	1500 FEET	0 HR MINUS	209 MIN
	5115-0420 W	1500 ''	0 HR ''	185 ''
	LIZARD POINT	1000 ''	0 HR ''	150 ''
S	4810-0620 W		0 HR ''	99 ''
	4700-~~[illegible]~~ 05-00 P W		0SHR ''	65 ''
	4730-0350 W	26,000 ''	0 HR ''	44 ''
	4630-0330 W		0 HR ''	28 ''
I P	4702-0159 W	25,000 ''	0 HR ''	6 ''
	TARGET	25,000 ''	ZERO HOUR	

LEAD GP WILL FLY AT 1000 FT ALT[redacted]R WATER UNTIL

START OF CLIMB [redacted] DE.

E. AXIS OF ATTACK: 334 MAG HEADING

F. RALLY POINT: CASTELLI POINT (4722-0232W) 1000 FT BELOW BOMB ALT.

G. ROUT E BACK: CASTELLI POINT 0 HR PLUS 5 MUIN
4650-0330W 0 HR '' 19 MIN
4700-0500W 0 HR '' 39 ''
4810-0620W 0 HR '' 76 ''
LIZARD POINT 0 HR '' 131 ''
START POINT 0 HR '' 158 ''
BURY ST EDMONDS 0 HR '' 251 ''

RETURN WILL BE MADE AT MINIMUM ALT. DESCENT WILL START AT RALLY POINT .

H. BOMBINGXLALTITUDE PLUS 1000FEET WILL BE REACHED AT 4730-0350W LOOSE 1000 FEET TO BOMBING ALTITUDE JUST SHORT OF I P .

I. BOMBING ALTITUDES: 96 GP 25,000 FT
95 GP 24,000 FT
100 GP 26,000 FT

3. A. THE 96, 95, AND 100 GPS WILL FORM ONE COMBAT WING AND FLY IN THAT ORDER.

100 GP 26,000 FT

3. A. THE 96, 95, AND 100 GPS WILL FORM ONE COMBAT WING AND FLY IN THAT ORDER.

B. 5 A/C OF 94 GP ARE ATTACHED TO THE 95 GP.
8 A/C OF 94 GP ARE ATTACHED TO THE 96 GP.
THEY WILL JOIN THE FORMATIONS OVEGXXXX OVER THE FIELDS OF THE GROUP TO WHICH THEY ARE ASSIGNED.

X. (1) A/C IN EXCESS OF 21 PER GP AT LIZARD POINT WILL RTXXX RETURN TO BASES.

(2) GPS WILL FLY IN ECHELON UP UNTIL BOMBING ALTITUDE IS REACHED.

(3) ZERO HOUR: 1700 DST 28 JUNE 43

(4)

BOMB LOADING : ALL A/C 2 X 2000 LB GP Q/XXX 1/10 NOSE, 1/40 TAIL FUSE.

(5) ON PAST MISSIONS, NAVIGATIONAL ERRORS HAVE RESULTED IN LANDFALLS BEING MADE ON BRSXXX BREST PENINUSULIA INSTEAD OF LIZARD POINT. MAKE LANDFALL WITH CAUTION AND IN GOOD DEFENSIVE FORMATION.

4. NORMAL

5. A. MF/DF SECTION ''E''.

B. COMMAND BOMBER TO BOMBER 5065 KC/S

C. (1) VHF NONE

(2) A. WHENEVER A UNIT OR AN INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT ABANDONS OR FOR ANY REASON LEAVES AN ASSIGNED MISSION THE COMMANDE OF THE UNIT OR THE INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT WILL IMMEDIATELY REPORT THE FACT TO THE 4TH BOMB WING GROUND STATION OVER THE WING OPERATIONAL NET. THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT, THE TIME OF SUCH ACTION, THE EXACT LOCATION AND THE COMMANDES FURTHER INTENTION WILL BE GIVEN.

B. IN THE CASE OF UNITS OF TWO OR MORE AIRCRAFT. THE DEPUTY LEADER WILL TRANSMIT THIS INFORMATION IF THE LEADER FAILS TO DO SO

C. THE MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED IN BOMBER CODE EXCEPT IN CASES OF EXTREME EMERGENCY WHEN IT MAY BE TRANSMITTED IN THE CLEAR.

D. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT OF THE MESSAGE WILL BE OBTAINED

THE DEPUTY LEADER WILL TRANSMIT ...
LEADER FAILS TO DO SO

C. THE MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED IN BOMBER CODE EXCEPT IN CASES OF EXTREME EMERGENCY WHEN IT MAY BE TRANSMITTED IN THE CLEAR.

D. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT OF THE MESSAGE WILL BE OBTAINED FROM THE GROUND STATION.

(3) COMMAND SET.

A. TRANSMITTER SELECTOR SWITCH OF THE COMMAND SET SCR 274 WILL BE PLACED ON STUD NO. 3 AT ALL TIMES EXCEPT WHEN ACTUALLY TRANSMITTING ON THE SELECTED COMMAND CHANNEL.

B. THIS WILL BE DONE SO THAT CREW MEMBERS WILL NOT INADVERTENTLY TRANSMIT ON THIS CHANNEL, THINKING THEY ARE ON THE INTER-PHONE CHANNEL.

D. JAY BEAMS: ''F''-QTE 215 ON FROM E.T.A. TARGET

E. SPLASHER 7A, 8B, 9C, 11D, 12E, 13F, 14G, 15H ON DURING ENTIR E MISSION.

SUBJECT: Meteorological Interrogation Summary for Mission of 28 June 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634.

1. Take-Off: Time 1200 hours. 8-10/10 stratocumulus, bases at 2600 feet. Visibility 5-7 miles, wind North East 13 MPH.

2. Route Out: 5/10 stratocumulus at 52° N, with bases at 3000 feet, becoming scattered cumulus at Lizzard Point, and clear at 49° N, 5° 30' W. Visibility restricted to 5 miles due to haze from 52° N, to Lizzard Point, with tops of the haze layer at 3500 feet. Visibility improving over the water to unlimited at 49° N, 5° 30' W. CAVU from this point on to the target.

3. Target: 1655 hours. Scattered cirrus clouds above 30,000 feet. Visibility was unlimited. Surface wind was 70° velocity 15 MPH. The temperature at 25,000 feet was a minus 22° C.

4. Return Route: Same as in paragraph TWO except the visibility was from 6-10 miles.

5. Base on Return: 2104 hours. 8-10/10 stratocumulus with bases at 3000 feet. The visibility was unlimited. The wind was 360° with a velocity of 12 MPH.

6. Remarks: Cloud forecast was excellent for the first half of the route. The wind forecast was excellent for the entire route. The temperature over the target was found to be much warmer than was forecasted.

WALTER S. MILLS JR.,
2nd Lt. Air Corps,
Group Weather Officer.