

Office of the Operations Officer

APO 634,
24, June, 1943.

SUBJECT: 8-3 Narrative report on operational mission, 25
June, 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO
634, U.S. Army.

1. Bomb loading.

A. The 95th Bomb Group received a bomb loading of
10 500 pounds GP bombs 1/10 second nose fuse and 1/40 second
tail fuse at 1030, 24 June, 1943. Bombs were loaded immediately.

2. Flight plans.

A. The attack order was received at 2051, 24 June,
1943, the 95th Group to lead the 402nd Combat wing which was
to follow the 401st Combat wing.

B. The crews were briefed at 0300 with take-off
at 0620. Take-off was made on time.

C. Eighteen aircraft took-off. Two aborted, one
due to oxygen failure, the second due to engine failure.

3. Unusual occurrences.

A. The weather prevented the primary target from
being attacked, but the 95th group dropped its bombs on a
German convoy which was sighted through a hole in the overcast.
At least one ship was hit, possibly two others.

4. Results and conclusions.

A. Our formation was attacked by three enemy
fighters. One of our ships was damaged seriously but returned
safely.

B. The fighters made the usual head-on attack, and
at least two were destroyed by our gunners.

C. A close group defensive was held in spite of
the fighter attacks and anti-aircraft fire from the convoy.
Sixteen ships dropped their bombs on the convoy.

OLIVER E. COLLS,
Captain, Air Corps,
Operations Officer

25 June, 1943

SUBJECT: S-2 Narrative Report.

TO : Commanding Officer 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 634.

1. Within 9 minutes of 0620, 18 A/C of this group took off on an attack mission on the shipyard at Bremen. Two A/C aborted. No. 0161 returned at 0815. It turned back from 53° 22' N 2° 40' E because the oil was heating. No. 018 returned at 0950. It turned back from 53° 30' N 04° 30' E when the oxygen system went out. Both A/C brought back their bombs with them. Weather which was not good at the base failed to improve over the North Sea. Clouds were reported at nearly every altitude. On approaching the Fresian Islands, the lead group made a turn to return to base. While making this turn, at 0837, this group reported sighting 15 enemy submarines followed by a sighting of a 17 ship convoy. The group descended through a hole in the clouds making its attack on the convoy from 12000 feet. All A/C returned to this base at approximately 1130.

For the command

FLORENCE J. DONOHUE?
Major, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF ARMAMENT OFFICER
APO 634

25 June 1943

SUBJECT: Mission Expenditure report for 25 June 1943.

TO : Commanding General Fourth Bombardment Wing APO 634.

1. Following is the expenditure report for 25 June 1943.

a. Station AAF 119
b. Unit 95th Bombardment Group (H)
c. Type of Ammunition Cal. AP, I&T
d. Gun location and No. of guns.

32 Lower Turret guns	4300
32 Upper Turret guns	1950
16 Right Waist guns	1420
16 Left Waist guns	1875
16 Radio guns	1380
16 Left nose guns	1050
16 Right nose guns	1375
16 Center nose guns	1880
32 Tail guns	6746

SUBJECT: Attack On Convoy Off Juist, 25. 6. 43.

TO : G-2 Officer, 94th Bomb. Group
95th Bomb. Group
96th Bomb. Group
100th Bomb. Group

1. The following information has been received from British sources concerning the attack on convoy off Juist, 25. 6. 43.:

"Various quick sighting reports were received at these Headquarters of major Naval units, U-Boats etc., alleged to be included in this convoy. In fact the convoy consisted of merchant vessels, trawler type auxiliaries and M. class minesweepers. Previously we have always had to explain, either that the presence of a major Naval unit was not probable in this area, or that photographic reconnaissance revealed that such units were elsewhere. In this case we can compare the reports made by the crews with actual photographs and it is requested that NCO's make the utmost of these examples in helping air crews with their ship recognition problems."

"Another point of interest is the tracks made by the minesweeping devices, which are probably often mistaken for the wake left by the periscopes of a submerged U-Boat. Here again the photographs should be used to demonstrate the wakes left by the M. class minesweepers in the van of the convoy, and it should be explained that the presence of U-Boats in a convoy off this coast is extremely unlikely as they favour the Norwegian coast route to the Atlantic."

C. Norcross
CARL NORCROSS
Lt-Col., AG
A C of S., A-2

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HEADQUARTERS
VIII BOMB COMMAND
A.P.O. 924

Major General Narrative of Operations
Day Operation - 25 June 1943
Mission No. 67

CG, 4TH BOMB WING

COBOMGR 95

25 JUNE, 1943 1430 S-2

Departed off Point X Islands and
X at approximately 1430 hours.

A. 95TH BOMB GROUP

B. 18

C. 0

O. 0

P. 2--10 X 500 G.P. EACH A/C

Q. 0--0--0


25/6/43

SUBJECT: Report of bombing on German convoy in the North Sea.

TO : Commanding Officer, Headquarters 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Complete narrative of mission:

- A. There were no AIDS TO BOMBING set up for the bomb run because of the lack of time.
- B. There wasn't any I.P. to be approached, causing the target to be that of opportunity.
- C. The bombing run was manually controlled and lasted for a period of 50 seconds. Lt. Jones did a marvelous job of quickly setting the prescribed information into the sight in order to maintain good bombing results from a height of 12,400 feet. Bombs were away at 0858 hours.
- D. During the bombing run; flick and pom pom fire was experienced.
- E. This target of opportunity was sighted by the Group Leader while on the return trip and was attacked as a last resort target.
- F. There was an existing overcast of about 8/10 covered.
- G. There were no unusual tactics by the enemy to interfere with the bombing run. There were only 2 fighters reported to have attacked the lead group.
- H. A direct hit was reported to have destroyed one merchant ship; and several hits indicated that another one was damaged.
- I. There are no suggestions as to tactical changes in the bombing technique.


FRANK T. IMAND
1st Lt., AC
Group Bombardier

Group 95
Date 25 June 1943.

0120

0135

0213
~~0850~~
FW190

3267

0182

0154

0218

5895
~~0900~~
FW110

0194
~~Me109~~
~~0902~~
~~0904~~
FW190

3321
~~0902~~
FW190's
0902

0178
~~0925~~
Me109

0161

Combat Duplication
Check Form.

3298

0322
~~0905~~
Me109's
5090

0185

0235
~~0902~~
Me109's
2060

0288

0255
~~0930~~
Me109

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NNJ 742005
By K.C. NARA Date 7/17/97

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

APO 634,
25 June 1943.

SUBJECT: Base Engineering Report on Combat Mission of June 25, 1943.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fourth Bombardment Wing, APO 634.
COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of the 95th Bomb Group (H) of June 25, 1943.
 - a. Eighteen (18) B-17F airplanes took-off, two (2) returned to base before completing mission.
 - b. Sixteen (16) airplanes completed mission.
2. There were (2) two abortive airplanes.
 - a. 42-30181 - Oil temperature 98° believed to have been caused by high power output.
 - b. 42-30185 - Leaking Waist Gunners oxygen regulator.
3. Battle damage is as follows:
 - a. 42-30154 - Dorsal Fin severely damaged, Vertical stabilizer hit by 20 mm, Tail section of fuselage hit by 20 mm, right outboard wing panel hit by 20 mm.

CLARENCE D. FIELDS,
Major, Air Corps,
Base Engineering Officer.

95

FLAK REPORT

DATE June 10

Telephoned by X

Target of Opportunity - 17 Ship convo

1. Route followed.

All planes failed to reach enemy coa.

2. Visibility at target (Any condensation trails?)

~~NEVER REACHED BREMEN~~ Visibility wretched; overcast in a break where convoy was sighted.

3. No. of A/C over target.

16

4. Formation over target, with height of each A/C. Those A/C damaged flak to be circled, and if seriously damaged, insert small "S". If any A/C shot down by flak, say so:-

SEE REVERSE SIDE

No ships hit by AA fire.

5. General Axis of attack (from lead A/C if possible)

Heading 177° Mg

6. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing?
10-25 sec. see hasty calculations because of sudden
of coming on course.

7. Turn after bombing.

90° turn to right to resume course.

8. Position of Group in relation to other Groups.

95th group was alone at target of opportunity.

9. What evasive action was taken?

Some ships gained + lost altitude slightly; some did nothing.

10. A short description of Flak en route (if any) and at the target including if possible a suggestion as to type of fire control employed - i.e. Continuous following predicted concentrations, predicted barrages or fixed barrages.

Very meager and highly inaccurate AA fire mostly from automatic weapons (perhaps 37MM guns), bursts from heavier guns 1000 ft above formation which at 12000 ft. All AA fire came from one or two ships, perhaps d.

Any other Comments. Honors, etc.

REGISTRATION 119

FORM 3

DATE 25-6-43

REMARKS

ITEM	SHIP	PILOON	TARGET	TIME		LOADING		REMARKS
				ESTD.	ACTD.	ESTD.	ACTD.	
O	0194	HAMILTON		0620	620	1147	1126 ⁺	
S	0178	KNOWLTON		0620	620 ⁺	1147	1127 ⁺	
W	0218	JOHANSON		0621	621	1148	1126	
K	3321	ROTHCHILD		0621	621 ⁺	1148	1129	
B	0161	PALMER		0622	622 ⁺	1149	0826	Aborted because of ENGINE TROUBLE
F	5873	ROBLAND		0622	622	1149	1128	
V	0235	LINDLEY		0623	622 ⁺	1149	1136	
X	0233	KRING		0623	624 ⁺	1151	1136 ⁺	
P	0322	ADAMS		0624	623	1150	1135	
N	0185	EASTLING		0624	624	1151	0944	Aborted because of OXYGEN TROUBLE
T	0288	ROBINSON		0625	624 ⁺	1151	1138	
O	3298	MASSEY		0625	625	1152	1137	
F	0273	COZENS		0626	625 ⁺	1152	1130 ⁺	
E	0182	NOYES		0626	626	1153	1131	
H	0135	M ^c PERSON		0627	627	1154	1130	
A	3267	THOMAS		0627	627 ⁺	1154	1133	
L	0154	LEMKE		0628	628	1155	1135	
D	0120	SOUTH		0628	628 ⁺	1155	1132	

LOW

HIGH

HAMILTON

0194
335-0

JOHNSON
0218
335-W

KNOWLTON
0178
335-S

Mission #11

COZENS
0273
F

ROTHSCHILD
3321
336-M

LINDLEY
0235
W

McPHERSON
0135
H

NOYES
0182
E

ROBICHAND
5893
336-K

PALMER
0161
336-B

ADAMS
0322
P

KRING
0233
X

THOMAS ✓
3267
R

EASTLING
0185
H

SOUTH
0120
D

LEMKE
0154
L

MASSEY
3298
Q

ROBINSON
0280
T

(Robin
stock)

26000

HAMILTON
10914

(LOW)

JOHNSON
0218

KNOWLTON
10178

(HIGH)

COZENS

McPHERSON
0135

0218

NOYES
0182

ROTHSCHILD

ROBICHAND
5893

3321

PALMER
0161

LINDLEY

ADAMS
0322

0235

KRING
0233

THOMAS

SOUTH
0120

3267

LEMKE
0154

EASTLING
0185

MASSEY
3298

ROBINSON
0280

T
T T

066
032

HANCOCK 37

01/20

227

COZENS
01/73

McPHERSON
32/67
01/35

THOMAS
32/67

NOVES
01/33
(cancer)

SOUTH
01/70
(cancer)

HEMKE
01/54
(cancer)

HAMILTON
01/94

JOHANSON
02/18

ROTHCHILD
33/21
(cancer)

ROBICHAUD
58/93
(cancer)

KNOWLTON
01/78
(cancer)


BALMER
01/61
NOV

ADAMS
03/22


LINDLE
02/3
(cancer)

MASSIEY
32/98
(cancer)

FASTI
01/8



REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES



8° E

Osnabrück
331 m

Minden

Hani

53°

Bremen

169 m

Oldenburg

Wilhelmshaven
43 m

Wesermünde


Waddewarden

74 m

Wangeroog

Neuwerk

4°



STAND BY FOR "THE " BROADCAST

BSE NR 19 HRM NR 19 SNT NR 15

PNT - BSE - HRM - SNT - TAF - BMP - NCH = V THE NR 21 261605B PRIORITY
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TAF VIA HRM

ATT A-2

4 BW U702D 26/6/43

NARRATIVE REPORT BREMEN MISSION 25 JUNE 1943

1. APPROXIMATELY 25 E/A ATTACKED FORMATIONS 20-25 MILES FROM GERMAN COAST. ATTACKS WERE NOT PRESSED AND LACKED PERSISTENCY. THEY WERE MOSTLY FW 190 AND ME 109 WITH A FEW ME 210 AND ONE JU 88 SIGHTED. NO UNUSUAL COLORINGS OR MARKINGS. ATTACKS WERE SINGLY AND LASTED ABOUT 15 MINUTES. THEY CAME IN ONE - FIVE - SIX O'CLOCK. LEVEL ABOVE AND BELOW. TWO FW 190 APPEARED TO COME UP FROM EX VICINITY OF THE ATTACKED CONVOY. AIR TO AIR BOMBING FORXXXXX FROM 21,000 FEET ON OUR A/C AT 19,000 FEET. BOMB BURSTS REPORTED 200 YARDS TO LEFT OF BOMBER. THEY BURST LIKE FLAK BUT WERE MUCH LARGER. ONE CREW REPORTS AERIAL BOMB DROPPED FROM TWIN ENGINE SHIP.
2. AA FIRE ENCOUNTERED WAS MEAGER AND INACCURATE. AA GUN FIRE

6. CONVOY OF 20 - 25 SHIPS SIGHTED AT 0600 HRS. AT 53 DEGREES 50 MINUTES NORTH, 07 DEGREES 12 MINUTES EAST. SEVERAL SUBMARINES ALSO REPORTED WITH OR NEAR

XXXXXOR NEAR CONVOY.) ONE SUB OBSERVED FROM 2000 FEET AT 1029 HOURS AT 53 DEGREES 45 MINUTES NORTH, 01 DEGREES 15 MINUTES EAST ON 60 DEGREE COURSE. SUBMERGED ON SIGHTING A/C.

THREE B-17S SUSPECTED OF BEING E/A HEADED TOWARDS GERMANY AT TIME OF ATTACK ON CONVOY. 95 GP SAYS THE NUMBERS WERE 066, 232, 329. 100 B REPORTS THE NUMBERS AS 066, 232, AND 229. 94 GP REPORTS A B-17 FLEW BACK AND FORTH THROUGH FORMATION JUST OFF ENGLISH COAST. IDENTITY NOT KNOWN.

96TH GP REPORT AS A B-17 BEARING 23274 CIRCLED ALL AROUND FORMATION. ANOTHER WITH LETTER BXU OR BXO AND WITH CLOSED WINDOWS ATTEMPTED TO JOIN FORMATION AT 0723 HRS. ANOTHER REPORTS A B-17 AT 5000 FT, WASTE WINDOW CLOSED, SHOOT TWO GREEN FLARES, THEN CROSS IN FRONT OF FORMATION AND FINALLY JOIN GROUP ON RIGHT. ANOTHER REPORTS A B-17 MARKED BJV ON FUSELAGE, SIGHTED BELOW FORMATION SEVERAL MINUTES BEFORE AND AFTER TURN BACK.

94TH FORMATION FOR FIVE MINUTES BEFORE
THEN IT PULLED OUT AND HEADED FOR GERMAN COAST UNMOLESTED BY
ENEMY FIGHTERS.

7. NO BOMBS ON PRIMARY OR SECONDARY. IN THE ATTACK ON CONVOY
SOME DAMAGE FROM HITS AND NEAR MISSES IS REPORTED ALTHOUGH
PHOTOS SHOWED NONE.

8. GUNNERS SUGGEST MORE ARMOR PIECING AND LESS ~~VINCENDARY~~ ^{INCENDARY}. CLAIM

INCENDARY EXPLODES JUST AFTER LEAVING BARREL WHEN GUN IS HOT,
BLACKENING TOP GLASS OVER PILOT'S COMPARTMENT AND MAKING VISIBILITY ^D

9. 78 A/C OF 4TH WING TOOK OFF. NO A/C REACHED PRIMARY OR
SECONDARY TARGET. FORMATIONS ~~X~~ WERE HARD TO KEEP BECAUSE OF 8-10 TO 6

XX TO 10-10 CLOUDS. LEADING ELEMENT TURNED BACK AT 0838 HRS.

AT 5420 NORTH 0710 EAST AFTR FOLLOWING BRIEF COURSE TO THAT
RØKX POINT. OTHER GROUPS FOLLOWED . 2 A/C, 95TH GP RETURNED
EARLY , ONE BECAUSE OIL WAS HEATING THE OTHER BECAUSE THE

SYSTEM WENT OUT.

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Ygt Probet

11

HEADQUARTERS
VIII BOMBER COMMAND
A.P.O. 634

Bomber Command Narrative of Operations
Day Operation - 25 June 1943
Mission No. 67

TARGETS: Convoys off Frisian Islands and
Targets of Opportunity in Northwest Germany

Adverse weather conditions prevented bombing of scheduled targets, and resulting attacks on convoys, and targets of opportunity in Northwest Germany were scattered with results largely unobserved because of cloud cover. Strong e/a opposition was encountered, especially by 1st Wing a/c, and claims against e/a are 62 - 11 - 40. 18 bombers are missing.

Unit	(Dispatched)	Number of A/C		Abortive*	Lost	Claims	Personnel Casualties		
		Attacking	A.				B.	(Killed)	Wounded
<u>1st WING</u>									
91	18	15	3	0	0	1-0-1	0	0	0
92	23 ^w	19 ^x	3 ^y	1 ^z	0	4-1-4	0	0	0
303	25	18	1	6	3	14-2-8	1	2	21
		19	1	5	1	3-1-3	1	1	11
						2-1-3	0	0	10

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

1/40 sec. tail at 0820 hrs., with a direct hit reported on one vessel. Bombing results were generally unobserved because of cloud, but it is believed the following places were bombed: Tweelbake, or Neuenwege, Ardorf, Bremen, Friedrichskoog, Papenburg, Nordenham, Emden or near Emden and the Island of Terschelling.

4th Wing: 18 B-17s dropped 180 x 500 GP, fused 1/10 sec. nose, 1/40 sec. tail on a German convoy of 4 M/Vs and 11 escort vessels, 21 miles North of Juist Island. Incomplete photographic coverage shows bursts close ahead of a trawler-type auxiliary, causing her to turn sharply to starboard, and crews reported damage from hits and near misses.

REASONS FOR FAILURE TO BOMB: 1st Wing: 48 a/c failed to bomb: 16 for mechanical and equipment failures, 2 for personnel failures; 21 because of adverse weather; 3 were spares and returned as scheduled; and 6 are missing, believed to be lost before bombing.

4th Wing: 60 a/c failed to bomb: 5 for mechanical and equipment failures, and 55 because of adverse weather conditions.

ENCOUNTERS: 1st Wing: Strong opposition was encountered. 100-150 e/a were reported to have made attacks from 0825 to 0945 hrs. while formation was over enemy territory, with attacks being broken off because of bad weather over the North Sea on return route. The majority of e/a were ME-109s and FW-190s, with a few Ju-88s, ME-110s, ME-210s and one Do-217. Attacks were moderate to severe. The majority of formation apparently waiting for

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NN/712005

C O N F I D E N T I A L

but much larger than flak.

FLAK: 1st Wing: Moderate to meagre flak generally inaccurate was reported at altitudes varying from 14,000 to 27,500 ft. A.A. installations were believed to be observed at Emden, Bremen, Heligoland, near Wardenburg, mouth of Elbe river, Friedrichskoog, Cuxhaven, Langeoog, Wilhelmshaven, Scharhorn, Norderney and Oldenburg. Positions were generally uncertain due to heavy clouds. One a/c states it encountered very accurate and intense automatic weapon fire, and one group believed A.A. was radio directed.

4th Wing: Meagre, inaccurate fire was received from attacked convoy, a ship 10 miles off German coast, and from unidentified location over Germany. There were two reports of predicted concentrations.

CASUALTIES: Personnel - 1st Wing: 3 crew members were killed, 4 seriously wounded, 7 slightly wounded and 142 are missing. 9 crew members were rescued by Air Sea Rescue Service.

4th Wing: 3 crew members were slightly wounded and 30 are missing.

Equipment - 1st Wing: 15 B-17s were lost, 3 to c/a and 12 for reasons unknown.

4th Wing: 3 B-17s were lost for reasons unknown.

Estimated Battle Damage: 1st Wing: 23 Category "A" and 16 Category "AC".

4th Wing: 18 Category "A" and 4 Category "AC"

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Group Navigator

A.P.O. # 634
25 June 1943

SUBJECT: Navigation Report of the operations of 25 June 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, Ninety-Fifth Bombardment Group (H).

1. The Ninety-Fifth Bombardment Group took its place at the lead of the 402nd Combat Wing. Take-off, rendezvous, departures, and arrival over Thetford were carried out on schedule.
2. Navigation procedures were difficult because of the constant turning necessary to maintain position.
3. The lead group turned for home base at 0840. The 402nd Combat Wing decided to look for a last target to bomb before returning to the home bases. The leader had in mind a pack of fifteen submarines which had been sighted at 0637. A search through the overcast failed to show the submarine pack, but an eleven ship convoy was sighted off the Friesian Islands. A bomb run was carried out on this convoy at the position (53-55N 06-50W).
4. A course was then plotted and followed to (54-40N 05-00E) and the English coast at (53-58N 01-00E). The lead ship had inoperative radio compass. Observations were checked by the astro-compass.

25 June, 1943

SUBJECT: A A Officer's report.

TO : Commanding Officer 95th Bomb Group (H), APO 634.

1. All A/C failed to reach enemy coast.
2. Until convoy was sighted the visibility was very poor.
3. There was 16 A/C over the target.
4. The A/C were in the Le-May formation over the target, and no A/C were hit by AA.
5. The general axis of attack was 177° Mg.
6. The formation flew straight and level for 10 - 25 sec. All calculations were hasty due to the suddenness with which they came on the convoy.
7. A/C made a 90° turn to the right to resume course.
8. The 95th Group was alone at the target of opportunity.
9. Some A/C gained and lost altitude slightly as evasive action, others did nothing.
10. Very meager and highly inaccurate AA fire was encountered most of it being from automatic weapons (perhaps 37 mm guns). A few burst from heavier guns were 1000 ft. above the formation, which was at 12,000 ft. All the AA fire came from one or two ships, perhaps destroyers.
11. AA fire opened raggedly and late, as though the convoy had been surprised. Indeed I presume they were, as our planes sighted the convoy through a rift in the overcast.

For the command

FLORENCE J. DONOHUE,
Major, Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Communications Officer

(J-1)

APO 634
25 June 1943

SUBJECT: **OPERATIONAL** Communications on 25 June 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, Station #119, APO 634.

1. Of the sixteen (16) aircraft which completed the mission, fourteen (14) radio operators and ten (10) navigators were available for interrogation by the Communications Officer, 95th Bombardment Group.

2. Mechanical and Electrical failures were as follows:

- (a) 334F, interference weak, being checked and corrected;
- (b) 334L, command transmitter inoperative, being investigated and repaired;
- (c) 3350, interference intermittently inoperative, being checked and corrected;
- (d) 3350, IFF operation causes interference in liaison and compass receivers, being investigated and corrected;
- (e) 336F, VHF channel "d" inoperative, being repaired;
- (f) 336F, radio compass indicator inaccurate in navigator's position, being investigated and corrected;
- (g) 336K, liaison receiver weak, being checked and corrected;
- (h) 412X, liaison receiver faulty, being investigated and corrected.

3. Other failures beyond the control of this department were:

- (a) 334F, liaison and command antennas shot away, being replaced;
- (b) 3350, trailing wire antenna lost, being replaced.

4. Navigational aids were used successfully. Aircraft using these aids were:

- (a) 334A, used splashers No. 5;
- (b) 334D, used splashers No. 5;
- (c) 334E, used splashers Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7;
- (d) 334H, used splashers No. 5;
- (e) 336F, used splashers Nos. 3 and 5;

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Authority NND 74-005
By K.C. NARA Date 7/17/97

(f) 336K, used splasers Nos. 5 and 6;

(g) 412P, used multi beacon group "A", splasers Nos. 3, 5 and 6;

(h) 412T, used splasers Nos. 5 and 6;

(i) 412U, used splasers Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8;

(j) 334E, used one (1) QDM on home station.

5. General reception of beacons and wing ground station satisfactory.

FREDERICK W. GOVEDICH
2nd Lieut., Air Corps
Communications

OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
USAAF STATION 119

File in Mission
Folder.
MISSION 12

28 June 43.

SUBJECT: Photo Interpretation--Convoy Bombed 25 June 43.

TO: Commanding Officer 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Interpretation of the five photo strips of the raid on the Enemy Convoy off the German Coast on 25 June 43 determines the following information subject to the limitation of the field covered by the photographs:

A. The Convoy:

1 Freighter 414' x 45' with bridge+funnel amid ships, and 3 large hatches in the forward well. A large single hatch aft with materiel in the well. Apparently firing from fore and aft decks.

1 Undetermined Ship 288' x 36' with a single gun for and aft, and what appears to be an AA gun aft.

1 Undetermined Ship 252' x 45'.

1 Undetermined Ship 252' x 54', a ship with considerable superstructure and an unusually wide flat stern. Apparently firing amid ships and aft.

1 Small Destroyer 185' x 20' leading nearer group of 3 SS submerging.

8 Submarines underwater except for conning towers which cause wake.

9 Undetermined Craft approximating 150' x 20' with varying superstructures.

B. Hits:

Bombs walked across the course of one of the Small Craft 144' x 23'. The Craft turned to Starboard just prior to the bursting of bombs. In Photo 95-18, the smoke from bomb burst is 202' wide, covering 31' of the bow of the Craft. The bomb hit therefore, 70' in front of the bow and

it is a Near Miss.

It appears that 5 bombs are heading for 5 of the ships, but both bombs and ships are out of camera range before the bombs burst. 3 of these are the 3 Undetermined Ships over 250' long.

C. Flak:

Light Flak is bursting below the A/C formation.

For the Intelligence Officer:

ARNO A. KRAUSE
1st Lt, Air Corps
Interpreter.

CG 4TH BOMB WING

COBOMGP 95

25 June 1943 1700 S-2

X

X

- S.
1. ABOUT FOUR MINUTES AFTER OUR ATTACK ON AN ENEMY SHIPPING CONVOY. APPROXIMATELY 20 E/A, CHIEFLY PW'S (RED AND YELLOW NOSES--SOME
 -- 100'S (GREY--SOME CHOCOLATE COL-

NO. THREE ENGINE SMOKING.

4. NONE.

5. TRAILING EDGE OF RIGHT WING OF ONE B-L& DAMAGED BY 20 MM FIRE FROM PW 190.

6. ENEMY CONVOY OF SIX SHIPS REPORTED ON A HEADING OF 180° TWO MILES FROM SPLASH NO. FIVE AT 0711. FOUR OTHERS, HEADED NORTH, AT SAME PLACE, SIGHTED AT 1056.

THREE D-17'S REPORTED BY CREWS AS SUSPECTED OF BEING ENEMY AND OF HEADING TOWARD ENEMY COAST AT TIME OF ATTACK ON CONVOY. NOS. 066, 232, 329. CHECK WITH 100TH GROUP DISCLOSES THEY HAVE 066, 232 AND 229.

FOUR SUBMARINES REPORTED AT 0830 POSITION $54^{\circ}15'N$ $07^{\circ}06'E$ BY A/C WHICH REPORTED POSITION OF CONVOY AS $53^{\circ}52'N$ $07^{\circ}E$.

TWO OBJECTS WHICH LOOKED LIKE MINES REPORTED AT $54^{\circ}20'N$ $07^{\circ}35'E$.

WAS HEATING. NO. 018 RETURNED AT 0950. IT TURNED BACK FROM 53°30'N
04°30'E WHEN THE OXYGEN SYSTEM WENT OUT. BOTH A/C BROUGHT BACK THEIR
BOMBS WITH THEM. WEATHER WHICH WAS NOT GOOD AT THE BASE FAILED TO
IMPROVE OVER THE NORTH SEA. CLOUDS WERE REPORTED AT NEARLY EVERY ALTI-
TUDE. ON APPROACHING THE FRESLAN ISLANDS, THE LEAD GROUP MADE A TURN
TO RETURN TO BASE. WHILE MAKING THIS TURN, AT 0837, THIS GROUP REPORTED
SIGHTING 15 ENEMY SUBMARINES FOLLOWED BY A SIGHTING OF A 17 SHIP CONVOY.
THE GROUP DESCENDED THROUGH A HOLE IN THE CLOUDS MAKING ITS ATTACK ON
THE CONVOY FROM 12000 FEET. ALL A/C RETURNED TO THIS BASE AT APPROXI-
MATELY 1130.

25 June 1943.

SUBJECT: Meteorological Interrogation Summary for Mission of 25 June 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, APO 634.

1. Take Off: Time 0610 hours. 10/10 Altopcumulus clouds with few breaks existed in several layers at and above 12,000 feet. Visibility was reduced to 4 miles due to haze. A weak frontal system existed just to the West of the station, at the time of take off.

2. Route Out: Clouds lowered rapidly to 10/10 Stratocumulus at 3500 feet, tops 4000 feet with another layer of Stratocumulus 100 feet above lower layer. Above these lower clouds were several layers of Altopcumulus clouds. Fifty miles off the English coast light rain with a solid overcast at 3000 feet was encountered. There was slight improvements on approaching the German coast, but there was still multiple layers of clouds from 3000 feet to the ceiling of the flight which was 19,000 feet. The distance between cloud layers varied from 100 - 3000 feet. There were breaks in the various layers both above and below the formation which was flying 12,000 feet near the German coast. Visibility between cloud layers was 6 miles, but visibility below clouds appeared to be restricted to 4 miles by haze.

3. Target: Not reached due to adverse weather conditions. Base of multiple layers of Altopcumulus at 12,000 feet with lower broken Stratocumulus clouds at 3000 - 4000 feet existed over convoy bombed.

4. Return Route: Same as route out except ceiling down to 2000 feet with 9/10 Stratocumulus, tops at 3000 feet with 9/10 Altopcumulus in layers above.

5. Base on Return: 10/10 Stratocumulus at 1000 feet. Visibility 2 - 4 miles in haze Wind direction 280 deg. 10 mph. There were multiple layers of Altopcumulus above Stratocumulus.

6. The overall accuracy of the forecast was poor. The forecast was altogether to optimistic with regards to clouds coverags along the route and over the target area. The wind forecast was accurate over the entire route. The visibility forecast was pessimistic at bases, but fair along the route.

JAY JACOBS,
Capt., Air Corps,
Station Weather Officer.