

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

APO 634,
22 June 1943.

SUBJECT: Base Engineering Report on Combat Mission of June 22, 1943.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, Fourth Bombardment Wing, APO 634.
COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of the 95th Bomb Group (H) of June 22, 1943.
 - a. Seventeen (17) airplanes took-off, one (1) returned to base before completing mission.
 - b. Sixteen (16) airplanes completed mission.
 - c. 42-30211 did not return.
2. There was one (1) abortive airplane.
 - a. 42-3277 - Oxygen leak at filler plug ball turret, believed to have been caused by ice.
3. Battle damage is as follows.
 - a. 42-30300 - small flak holes.
 - b. 42-29943 - Right horizontal stabilizer and elevator damaged by gun fire. Blade on #1 prop damaged by 20 mm shell.
 - c. 42-30178 - Slight sheet metal damage.
 - d. 42-30276 - Sheet metal damage. #3 supercharger damaged.
 - e. 42-30194 - Sheet metal damage.
 - f. 42-30283 - Oil cooler damaged. Small flak holes.
 - g. 42-3283 - Bombardier's window cracked. Numerous flak holes.
 - h. 42-30244 - Minor sheet metal damage.
 - i. 42-30286 - Minor sheet metal damage.
 - j. 42-3321 - Gas tank punctured by bullet.
 - k. 42-30173 - Sheet metal damage. Right horizontal stabilizer damaged.
 - l. 42-30188 - Sheet metal damage. Radio Liason set, ball turret, plexi-glass, top turret hydraulic damaged.
 - m. 42-30105 - Sheet metal damage.

CLARENCE D. FIELDS,
Major, Air Corps,
Base Engineering Officer.

LEAD

BENDER

0286
336H

CORNER

MAS-
ON
0283
336C

O'NEAL
3283
336E

THOMPSON

0244
336M

NICH
HAMILTON

0194
3350

JOHNSON

RABIAHADE

3277
↑ 336G

KNOWLTON
0178
3355

TYLER
0300
334C

CORNER

K
336K

BUNN

0211
335

SOUTH

0120

334D
↑

DID NOT TAKE-OFF

EXTRA

0284

272


288

FOR 11 3

JUNE 22, '43.

NIGHT WORKERS

ENR	SHIP	PILLOW	TARGET	FLYING EST. ACT.	TRAILING EST. ACT.	REMARKS
H 3286	0286	BENDER	HULS	0710 0710	1125	
E 3283	0283	O'NEAL	"	0710 0710	1127	
C 0283	0283	MASON	"	0710 0711	1125	
M 0244	0244	THOMESON	"	0710 0711	1134	
G 3277	3277	ROBICHARD	"	0710 0714	0952	BBORTIVE - Oxygen bell helmet face
K 3321	3321	Rothschild	"	0710 0712	1127	
O 0194	0194	HAMILTON	"	0710 0712	1130	
Q 0216	0216	JOHNSON	"	0710 0713	1130	
S 0178	0178	KNOWLTON	"	0710 0714	1132	
C 0300	0300	TYLER	"	0710 0713	1135	
T 0211	0211	BUNCH	"	0710 0715	-	MISSING
D 0420	0420	SOUTH	"	0710		TRAILING - RAN OFF RUNWAY AND GOT STOCK
U 0235	0235	LINDLEY	"	0710 0720	1136	
R 0605	0605	KRING	"	0710 0720	1137	
P 0322	0322	ADAMS	"	0710 0721	1140	
N 0195	0195	EASTLING	"	0710 0724	1138	
O 0173	0173	MASSEY	"	0710 0725	1139	
K 9943	9943	McPHEESEN	"	0710 0722	1138	



Sortie No. 10 }
Mission No. 10 }

22 June 1943

TARGET: Synthetic Rubber Plant at Huls, near Recklinghausen.

17 A/C took off at 0710. 16 attacked target, one A/C aborting by reason of oxygen freezing in ball turret. Lead ship bombed at 0944. Bomb load 7 x 1000 GP. Large fire and heavy smoke over target. Fighter support spelled out U.S. with vapor trails. Morale of crews high after mission. Approximately 80 E/A principally FW 190's and Me 109's, were encountered. Attacks started 20 minutes off Dutch coast and continued until fighter escort met the Group. E/A attacked from all clock positions and from all levels. Attacks not vigorously pressed and lasted about 40 minutes. Flak accurate and from meagre to intense. One A/C (Capt Dunch) was lost. Nose and tail shot off by 4 E/A just after it dropped its bombs. Levelled off at 5000 feet, possibly crash-landed. 4 to 10 chutes reported as seen. E/A claims: 5-5-3.

VIII BC Narrative: Primary effort directed against important Synthetic Rubber Plant at Huls, where 170 B-17's dropped 1202 x 500 and 242 x 1000 GP with good results. As a secondary effort 39 B-17's attackee Ford and General Motors Plants at Antwerp, dropping 191 x 1000 GP with fair results. 21 B-17's from 100th Group carried out an uneventful diversion over North Sea. Bombers attacking Huls and Antwerp received withdrawal support from 23 squadrons of Spits, 2 squadrons of Typhoons, and 8 squadrons of P-47's. 20 heavy bombers mission.

235 dispatched to Huls, 183 attacked, 52 abortives, and 16 missing. E/A claims: 46-21-35. 42 dispatched to Antwerp, 39 attacked, 3 abortives, and 4 missing. E/A claims: 1-2-9.

Bender

Mason O'Neal

Lindley

Thompson

Hamilton

Adams

Kring

Rothschild Robichaud
(ABORT)

Knowlton

Johnson

Eastling

Tyler

McPherson Massey

South
CRASH
MISSING
DOWN
CHANNEL

Punch
(MISSING)

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

APO 634,
22 June, 1943.

SUBJECT: S-3 Narrative Report.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634.

1. The 95th Bomb Group was alerted for a maximum effort mission at 18:20, 21 June, 1943 with a given loading of five one thousand GP bombs, 1/10 second nose fuse and 1/40 second tail fuse. Twenty one aircraft were loaded for the mission with eighteen crews standing by.

2.

A. Field Order No. 1C was received at 11:20, 21 June, 1943.

B. Crews were briefed at 0400. Take-off was at 0710. One aircraft 42-30120 ran off the perimeter path miring down causing some delay and confusion during take-off. Seventeen aircraft took-off. Four aircraft from the 96th Group joined our group making twenty one aircraft departing.

C. The flight plan was followed as ordered, with no changes necessary.

3.

A. Enemy aircraft were numerous, but due to good formation and a great number of bombers their effect was slight.

B. Flak was heavy but did only slight damage.

4.

A. Many Bombardiers and Navigators report excellent bombing results the whole target area being a mass of smoke and flames as the formation broke away.

B. The 95th Group lost one plane, number two wing position of the second element, high squadron.

C. Enemy fighters were aggressive, but seemed to have spent their strength on the leading wing. No new tactics were observed.

D. This group flew a close, tight formation rather than the looser one flown on the two previous raids. It is believed that although a few guns are blocked in tight formation the greater intensity of fire power from such a formation more than offsets the disadvantages. It may be mentioned that a better tight formation is flown thru loose, simply because of the ease of flying tight.

CLIFFORD E. COLE,
Captain, Air Corps,
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

APO 634
22 June, 1945

SUBJECT: Bombing Report of raid on Huls, Germany 22 June, 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634.

1. Complete narrative of mission:
 - a. The new MSM bombsight in conjunction with the low altitude attachment were used as two aids to bombing.
 - b. The Group turned from the I.P. and made a due course for Dorsten thinking that it was the target. They then turned on an 88° heading to the target after sighting smoke from the target's chimneys.
 - c. The bombay doors were opened at Dorsten at hours of 0941.
 - d. The lead bombardier used the low altitude attachment on the bombing run. He had to make one (1) correction for drift and two (2) corrections for range. The bombing run consisted of 30 seconds.
 - e. The enemy resistance to the bombing run was very slight as far as fighters were concerned. The flak was very heavy, intense and highly accurate.
 - f. The S-2 information on the target was excellent and very accurate.
 - g. Over the target area it was estimated that a 2/10 strato cumulus prevailed. The temperature was 32° C.
 - h. There were no unusual tactics by the enemy to interfere with bombing run.
 - i. Due to visual results of the bombing; claims were made that bombs hit just some what over the aiming point.
 - j. There are no suggested tactical changes in bombing technique on any particular target or on all targets.

FRANK T. IMAND
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Group Bombardier.

0747	290	-2	288	298	Bury St. Edmunds	10°	9000		
0753	49	-6	43	53	Soham	15°	10000		
0810	54 1/2	-10 1/2	44	54	Splasher #5'	15°	-3		
0849	143	+6	149	156	DR 54-13N 04-13E	160°	23000		
0901	143	+6	160	170	DR 53-37N 04-48E	160°	23000	202	
0910	143		156		Enemy Cost (Vlellard)	160°	23000	240	
0919	143		156		Stayoren	160°	23000		Visibility Good
0920	143		156		Deventer	160°	23000		Pilotage procedures followed from cost, +
							23000		IP - Target - Rally - go coast on way out.
0940	160	+9	169	179	Haldern (IP)	160°	23000	230	
0944 1/2					Target (Bombs Away)		2320	245	
0958	270				Isselburg	160°	23000	160	
1002	270				Nijemyn	160°	23000		Heavy fighter attack from 0920 to 1037, heavy, accurate.
1037	280	+2	282	290	Leave Enemy Coast	160°	20000		
1057					Aldeburg	170°			Gentle turn to Base
1103					Base				Base
									Flight first followed well. About 16 min. late to the point from Enemy coast.

SUN		MOON		TWILIGHT	
RISES	SETS	RISES	SETS	A.M.	P.M.

卷之三

WATCH **FAST** **SLOW** **RATE**

SEC'S GAINING PER HOUR— LOSING

COU- RSE	DRI- FT.	TRUE HDNG	VAR.	MAG. HDNG	G/S	DIST.	TIME	E.T.A.	CELESTIAL DATA TIME BODY ALT. A71
258	+1	259	+10	269	143	20	9	0747	WING 0745
290	-2	288	+10	298	132	15	7+2	0756	CBMB
49	-6	43	+10	53	180	52	11	0813	0809
54 $\frac{1}{2}$	-10 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	+10	54	195	65 $\frac{1}{2}$ 49	20		
	-11 $\frac{1}{2}$	43	+8	51	220	114	13 $\frac{1}{2}$ +1 $\frac{1}{2}$	0848	0847
143	+6	149	+7 $\frac{1}{2}$	156 $\frac{1}{2}$	240	121	30+1	0919	0923
160	+9	169	+7	176	230	31	8+2	0929	0932
100	-3	97	+7	104	245	24 $\frac{1}{2}$	6 +2	0937	0939
11	-12	359	+6 $\frac{1}{2}$	05 $\frac{1}{2}$	187	17	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ +1 $\frac{1}{2}$	0944	0944
265 $\frac{1}{2}$	+6 $\frac{1}{2}$	272	+7	279	162	89	33+1	1018	1020
273	+4 $\frac{1}{2}$	277 $\frac{1}{2}$	+8 $\frac{1}{2}$	286	160	101	38	1056	-
273	+3	276	+9	285	172	25	9	1105	1102
347	-10	357	+10	347	170	22	8	1113	-

LOCATION ATION	I.A.S. M.P.H. /K	HEIG- HT & A. TEMP.	T. A. S.	D.R. G.S.	DIS. TO RUN	T. I M E	E.T.A.	GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
	160 /40	9000						
ounds	150 /40	9000						
	150 /40	10000						
# 5'	150 /30	-3 14000	165	184				slightly ahead of 1146.
13 N 12 E	160 /40	23000						turned to left of course to follow jet wing.
37 N 48 E	160 /40	23000	202					Altered course to miss Flak Area (Cross West 1146)
(Wing Hand)	160 /40	23000		240				Crossed Western tip of Island while alighted PK

258	+1	259	+10	269	143	20	9	0141	0745	
290	-2	288	+10	298	132	15	7+2	0756	0646	
49	-6	43	+10	55	180	52	11	0813	0809	
54%	-10%	44	+10	54	195	(55.99)	20	0848	0847	+05- 53-511 02-522F
	-11%2	43	+8	51	220	114	13%21%			
143	+6	149	+7%	156%	240	121	3011	0919	0923	
160	+9	169	+7	176	230	31	8+2	0929	0932	
100	-3	97	+7	104	245	24%	6	0931	0939	
11	-12	359	+6%	05%	187	17	5/2+1%	0944	0944	
265%	+6%	272	+7	279	162	89	33+1	1018	1020	
273	+4½	271%	+8%	286	160	101	38	1056	=	
273	+3	276	+9	285	172	25	9	1105	1102	
347	-10	357	+10	347	170	22	8	1115	✓	

ATIONAL VATION	I.A.S. M.P.H. /K	HEIG- HT & A. TEMP.	T A S.	D.R. G.S.	DIS. TO RUN	T I M E	E.T.A.	GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
	160 140	9000						
Edmunds	150	9000						
	150	10000						
W #5	150 130	-3 14000	165	184				Slightly ahead of 1416. turned to left of course to follow jet wing.
- 13 N 12 E	160	23000						Altered course to 14155
- 37 N - 48 E	160	23000	202					Flak Area (Cross West Line) crossed western tip of island winds checked O.K.
St (McLlward)	160	23000		240				
C 4	160	23000						Visibility Good
101	160	23000						pilotage procedures followed from coast, then IP-target - Wally - 70 west coast on way out.
'7 (GP)	160	23000		230				
(Bugs Rwy)		2320		245				

PILOT

NAV

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

FEB

TO: 0710
LEAVE BASE: 0738
COAST OUT: 0913
ENEMY COAST: 0900
I.P.: 0929
TARGET: 0935
ENEMY COAST: 1029

MEMORANDA

WA

六四

TIME	COURSE	W/V USED &/OR DR.DRIF.	TR- UE HD	MAG- HD- NG.	NAVIGATIONAL OBSERVATION	I.A.S. M.P.H.
						1K
138	258	+1	259	269	BASC	160 140
147	290	-2	288	298	Bury St Edmunds	150
153	49	-6	43	53	Soham	150
1810	54 1/2	-10 1/2	44	54	Splasher H 5'	150 130
849	143	+6	149	156	DR 54-13N 04-13E	160
901	143	+6	160	170	DR 53-37N 04-48E	160

1000								
000 Field					11	-12	359	t.
"								
St. Miech					265 $\frac{1}{2}$	+6 $\frac{1}{2}$	272	t.
"								
51-57N 08:00E					273	+4 $\frac{1}{2}$	277 $\frac{1}{2}$	t.
"								
Felixstowe	290 39	41N 21000	170 -2A	210	273	+3	276	t.
"								
Base		17000	170 -20	195	347	-10	357	t.
"								

TIME	COU- RSE	W/V USED &/OR D.R.DRIF	TR- UE HD NG.	MAG HD- NG.	NAVIGATIONAL OBSERVATION	I.A.S. M.P.H. /K
0708	258	+1	259	269	Base	160 140
0747	290	-2	288	298	Bury St. Edmunds	150
0753	49	-6	43	53	Soham	150
0810	54 $\frac{1}{2}$	-10 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	54	Splasher #5	150 130
0847	143	+6	149	156	DR 54-13N 04-12E	160
0901	143	+6	160	170	DR 53-37N 04-48E	160
0910	143			156	Enemy Cost (Vicallard)	160
0919	143			156	Stavoren	160
0929	143			156	Deventer	160
0940	160	+9	169	179	Haldern (GP)	160
0948 $\frac{1}{2}$					Target (Bombs Away)	

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Navigation Officer
APO 634

22 June 1943

SUBJECT: Navigation report for the operations of the 95th Bombardment Group on 22 June 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634.


1. Several failures of compasses in new planes were reported, due to faulty installation.


2. Navigators report excellent courses were followed by the lead navigator, which enabled the formation to evade the worse flak areas.

3. The flight plan was closely followed, with time being lost over the North Sea to enable the Fourth Wing to follow the First Wing as per schedule.

4. A great improvement was noticed in all log books and position reports, etc. in spite of heavy fighter attacks.

ELLIS B. SCRIPTURE
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Group Navigation Officer.





HEADQUARTERS
NINETY-FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE GROUP WEATHER OFFICER

APO 634
22 June 1943

SUBJECT: Summary of Weather Interrogation Over Route and Target Area for Mission of June 22, 1943 by 95th Bomb Group to Huls, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634, U.S.Army.

1. From this base to the English coast the visibility was reduced by haze to 2-3 miles. Some low scattered stratocumulus at 1000-1500 feet and 6-8/10 cirrostratus above 25,000 feet were noted.

2. From the English coast to 54°N , 4°E the haze prevailed with visibility restricted to 2-4 miles. The cirrostratus gradually thinned to 1-3/10 at 54°N , 4°E .

3. From 54°N , 4°E to the target the visibility improved considerably after reaching the continental coast to an estimated 4-6 miles. Scattered cumulus of fair weather had begun to form at the coast becoming 4-6/10 with bases at 3000 feet and tops at 6-8000 feet over the target. Scattered cirrus from 0-3/10 were noted above 25,000 over the target area. The Temperature over the target at 23,000 feet was -23°C and the general position of the 0°C level for the mission was 12,000 feet.

4. Returning from the target to this base the visibility improved to 10-12 miles over the channel with the only clouds being 4-6/10 cirrostratus above 25,000 feet. From the English coast to this base 6-8/10 altocumulus at 12,000 to 14,000 feet and 3-5/10 cumulus of fair weather were noted and visibility was estimated at 12-15 miles.

WALTER S. MILLS, JR.
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Group Weather Officer.

LEAD

BENDER
0286
336H

HOW

LINDLEY
0235
412U

HIGH

HAMILTO
0194
335G

MASON

ONEAL
3283
336E

SOUTH

TYLER
0300
334C

KNOWLTON
0178
335S

ADAMSON
0322
412P

KRING
0105
412R

ROTHSCHILD
3321
336K

ROBICHAUDE
3277
336G

MCPHERSON
0285
412V

MASSEY
0173
412O

SOUTH
0120
334D

¹
Did Not Take Off

EXTRA

0284

BOMBSIGHTS

0286

0244

0194

0300

0235

0255

0283†

SQUADRON HORNET

FORM 3

DATE JUNE 22, '43.

S/N	SHIP	PILOT	TARGET	2113	0125	TAIRTING	REMARKS
				EST.	ACT.	EST.	
H 336	O 286	BENDER	HULLS	0710	0710	1125	
E 3283	O'NEAL	"	"	0710	0710	1127	
C 0283	MASON	"	"	0710	0711	1125	
M 0244	THOMPSON	"	"	0710	0711	1134	
G 3277	ROUCHAUD	"	"	0710	0714	0952	ABORTIVE - oxygen in ball tanks not present
K 3321	Rothschild	"	"	0710	0712	1127	
O 0194	HAMILTON	"	"	0710	0712	1130	
Q 0276	JOHNSON	"	"	0710	0713	1130+	
S 0178	KNOWLTON	"	"	0710	0714	1132	
C 0300	TYLER	"	"	0710	0713	1135	
T 0211	BUNCH	"	"	0710	0715		MISSING
D 0120	SANDICH	"	"	0710			TAIRTING - RAN OFF RUNWAY AND GOT STOCK
U 0235	LINDLEY	"	"	0710	0720	1136	
R 0605	KRING	"	"	0710	0720	1137	
P 0322	ADAMS	"	"	0710	0721	1140	
N 0185	EASTLINE	"	"	0710	0724	1138	
O 0175	MASSEY	"	"	0710	0725	1139	
K 9943	MC PHERSON	"	"	0710	0722	1138	

EXTRA
0284
272
288

der of Groups & Leader

STATION HORSHAM
DATE JUNE 22, '43.
TIME _____
PHONED IN BY _____5
6
7
8

Total No. A/C in each Sqdn: Letters of each are:

Sqdn.	<u>334</u>	<u>2</u> A/C: C K
Sqdn.	<u>335</u>	<u>4</u> A/C: O Q S T
Sqdn.	<u>336</u>	<u>6</u> A/C: H E C M G K
Sqdn.	<u>412</u>	<u>5</u> A/C: U R P A O
Target	<u>1111</u>	<u>G5162</u> ILL

Operational call sign of each sqdn:

Sqdn.	<u>334</u>	Sign <u>J5L</u>	Sqdn. <u>336</u> Sign <u>7UY</u>
Sqdn.	<u>335</u>	Sign <u>J5L</u>	Sqdn. <u>412</u> Sign <u>7UY</u>
Taxi Time 1st A/C	<u>0650</u>	Hrs. T.O. Time 1st A/C	<u>0710</u> Hrs.

E. T. D. Over field 0738 Hrs.
Time: Height: Place of crossing English Coast: OGt:

0809 15,000' CROMER

5. Time: 1025 Height: 22,000' Recrossing enemy coast:
Place of crossing Coast: 50°50'N 4°E In

7. Time: 1108 Height: 23,000' FELIXSTOWE

8. E.T.R. 1147 Hrs.9. MF/DF Section 6

10. Bomb load of each A/C:

Squadron:	<u>334</u> (3) - <u>5 X 1000 DEMOS.</u>
"	<u>335</u> (4) - <u>5 X 1000 DEMOS.</u>
"	<u>336</u> (6) - <u>5 X 1000 DEMOS.</u>
"	<u>412</u> (5) - <u>5 X 1000 DEMOS.</u>

11. Fuel load of each A/C: 1700
12. Actual times off and return by Sqdn: and A/C Letters:

Squadron	A/C Letters	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
<u>334</u>	<u>C : 0713 :</u>	<u>: 335</u>	<u>: 0194</u>	<u>O : 0712 :</u>			
<u>334</u>	<u>D : 0710 :</u>	<u>: 335</u>	<u>: 0276</u>	<u>Q : 0713 :</u>			
<u>334</u>	<u>K : 0722 :</u>	<u>: 335</u>	<u>: 0178</u>	<u>S : 0714 :</u>			
		<u>: 335</u>	<u>: 0211</u>	<u>T : 0715 :</u>			

Squadron	A/C Letters	A.T.O.	A.T.R.	Squadron	A/C Letter	A.T.O.	A.T.R.
<u>336</u>	<u>H : 0710 :</u>	<u>: 412</u>	<u>: 0235</u>	<u>U : 0720 :</u>			
<u>336</u>	<u>E : 0710+ :</u>	<u>: 412</u>	<u>: 0105</u>	<u>R : 0720 :</u>			
<u>336</u>	<u>C : 0711 :</u>	<u>: 412</u>	<u>: 0322</u>	<u>P : 0721 :</u>			
<u>336</u>	<u>M : 0711+ :</u>	<u>: 412</u>	<u>: 0815</u>	<u>OIRS N : 0724</u>			
<u>336</u>	<u>K : 0712 :</u>	<u>: 412</u>	<u>: 0173</u>	<u>O : 0725 :</u>			
<u>336</u>	<u>G : 0714 :</u>	<u>: ABORTIVE</u>					

13. Sqdn.	Letter	Designation	Remarks
:	:	:	
:	:	:	
:	:	:	
:	:	:	
:	:	:	

67/29
CONFIDENTIALHEADQUARTERS
VIII BOMBER COMMAND
A.P.O. 634*Rept Pict*Bomber Command Narrative of Operations
Day Operation - 22 June, 1943
Mission No. 65TARGET: Synthetic Rubber Plant at Huls, near Recklinghausen.
Ford and General Motors Plants at Antwerp.

The primary effort was directed against the important Synthetic Rubber Plant at Huls, where 170 B-17s dropped 1202x500 and 243x1000 G.P. with good results. As a secondary effort 39 B-17s attacked the Ford and General Motors Plants at Antwerp, dropping 191x1000 G.P. with fair results. 21 B-17s of 100 Group carried out an uneventful diversion over the North Sea, and 12 Mitchells of R.A.F. 2 Group escorted by Spitfires carried out a diversionary attack on Rotterdam. The bombers attacking Huls and Antwerp received withdrawal support from 23 Squadrons of Spitfires, 3 Squadrons of Typhoons, and 8 Squadrons of P-47s. Enemy opposition was strong. 20 heavy bombers are missing.

Target	Number of A/C			Personnel Casualties				
	(Dispatched	Attacking	Abortive*	Lost	Claims	(Killed	Wounded	Missing)
	A.	B.						
<u>HULS</u>								

Group									
91	22	16	3	3	5	9-2-4	1	5	41
92	29	25	4	0	1	0-1-1	0	1	10
94	16	9	7	0	2	5-2-2	0	7	20
95	17	16	1	0	1	5-5-3	0	0	10
96	30	24	4	2	2	4-5-6	0	0	20
303	15	14	1	0	1	0-0-1	0	1	10
305	25	18	4	3	1	0-1-0	0	0	10
306	24	16	8	0	1	4-0-0	0	0	10
351	21	15	5	1	1	17-1-12	1	0	10
379	16	14	2	0	1	2-3-5	0	2	10
Composites	20	16	4	0	0	0-1-1	0	0	0
	235	183	43	9	16	46-21-35	2	16	151

ANTWERP

381	22	19	3	0	2	0-1-7	1	0	20
384	20	20	0	0	2	1-1-2	0	3	20
	42	39	3	0	4	1-2-9	1	3	40

DIVERSION

300	21	-	0	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0

*Abortive A. - Mechanical, equipment or personnel failures.

B. - Weather, recall or enemy action.

† Composite Group consists of 13 a/c from 303rd Group and 7 from 379th Group.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY-FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE GROUP WEATHER OFFICER


APO 634
22 June 1943

SUBJECT: Summary of Weather Interrogation Over Route and Target Area for Mission of June 22, 1943 by 95th Bomb Group to Huls, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634, U.S.Army.

1. From this base to the English coast the visibility was reduced by haze to 2-3 miles. Some low scattered stratocumulus at 1000-1500 feet and 6-8/10 cirrostratus above 25,000 feet were noted.
2. From the English coast to 54°N, 4°E the haze prevailed with visibility restricted to 2-4 miles. The cirrostratus gradually thinned to 1-3/10 at 54°N, 4°E.
3. From 54°N, 4°E to the target the visibility improved considerably after reaching the continental coast to an estimated 4-6 miles. Scattered cumulus of fair weather had begun to form at the coast becoming 4-6/10 with bases at 3000 feet and tops at 6-8000 feet over the target. Scattered cirrus from 0-3/10 were noted above 25,000 over the target area. The temperature over the target at 23,000 feet was -23°C and the general position of the 0°C level for the mission was 12,000 feet.
4. Returning from the target to this base the visibility improved to 10-12 miles over the channel with the only clouds being 4-6/10 altocumulus above 25,000 feet. From the English coast to this base 6-8/10 altocumulus at 12,000 to 14,000 feet and 3-5/10 cumulus of fair weather were noted and visibility was estimated at 12-15 miles.


WALTER S. MILLS, JR.
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Group Weather Officer.

TARGET HULSGROUP 95DATE 22/6/43TIME OF ATTACKS 0935 to 1020VICINITY OF ATTACKS
*(out of boundary
to random
with fighter
escort)*

DISCUSSION:

4. None.

Attacks from
 Above - Blue
 Level - Red
 Below - Green.



RE HRM NR18 22/1610B
TO COMBOHWIG FOUR
PRIORITY SECRET U376D
95TH BOMB GROUP (H)

O. 2-6 X 1,000 GP

P. O

Q. 10 MISSING

R. 9--3--1

S. TO FOLLOW

17

12/6

0

0

0

1

0

0

09⁴⁴1/2

23,000

78 X 1,000 GP

1. 85 X 1,000 GP

~~OLD~~ 0

CC C 16 NOT 17 AS SENT

CC L 09441/2 NOT 09331/2 AS SENT

CC XXX ADD N. 2. O UNDER N1

KK WITH R

WYM VA

HRM R 1625/22 HBH VA

1 Typographic error in Teletype
from Col. Harrel's call
inquiring -
explained.
Krause
2100 hrs

JUN 22 1943 18 14

CG, 4TH BOMB WING

X

COBOMGP 95

X

22 JUNE, 1943 1745

PART B NARRATIVE

1. 60 TO 70 E/A ATTACKED OUR FORMATION BETWEEN TEBSELL ON ROUTE TO TARGET AND POINT OF RENDEZVOUS WITH FRIENDLY FIGHTERS. ME 109's PREDOMINATED WITH 110's, FW 190's, JU 88's AND 1 JU 87 ALSO REPORTED. AGGRESSIVE ATTACK OF E/A FALTERED IN FACE OF FIRE POWER OF OUR FORMATION. ATTACKS WERE CHIEFLY FROM 11 AND 1 O'CLOCK AND FROM ABOVE.

2. AA MODERATE TO MEAGER BUT ACCURATE IN RANGE NEAR FRISIAN ISL ND. MODERATE TO INTENSE YET EXTREMELY ACCURATE NEAR TARGET. BURSTS OF USUAL COLOR. A BARRAGE W-S SET UP OVER THE TARGET. AA FIRE REPORTED BY ONE CREW FIRING FROM UNREPORTED POSITION FOR FLAK NORTH OF TARGET.

3. B-17 No. 0211 OF THIS GROUP WAS SEEN TO BE HIT JUST AFTER HAVING DROPPED ITS BOMB LOAD. WAS UNDER ATTACK FROM FOUR FIGHTERS WHICH SHOT OFF ITS NOSE X AND TAIL. WAS SEEN TO LEVEL OFF AT 3,000 FEET. ESTIMATE OF CHUTES FROM 4 TO 10. POSSIBILITY OF CRASH LAND-
ING STATED. A B-17 REPORTED EXPLODING AT 52° 45' N 5° 40' E. ONE

95 HARR

MARRATIVE (CONT)

[REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES]

CHUTE: ANOTHER B-17 REPORTED EXPLODING AT 0935 NEAR VARSEVELD.
A THIRD REPORTED OUT OF FORMATION NEAR MUNSTER EXPLODING AT 0948.
A FOURTH REPORTED HIT OVER TARGET WAS OBSERVED NEAR ARNHEM WITH
8 CHUTES OPENING.

4. NONE

5. 8 A/C SUSTAINED MINOR DAMAGE TO SHEET METAL. FLAK HOLES
SMALL. ONE COOLER SYSTEM DAMAGED ALSO ONE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER.

6. AS MANY AS 40 BARGES WERE SIGHTED AT MOUTH OF RHINE RIVER.
6 SHIPS INCLUDING 2 DESTROYERS WERE REPORTED AT ROTTERDAM. 3 LARGE
AND 2 SMALL FLAT CARS BEARING RAILWAY GUNS WERE REPORTED NEAR
STAVOREN AND A CAMOUFLAGED AIRDROME WEST SOUTHWEST OF APPELDORN.
10 PARACHUTES WERE COUNTED NEAR BRUNEN. A BALLON BARRAGE WEST OF
TARGET AND NORTH OF DORSTEN, SMOKE POTS AT ELBURG AND 6 FRIENDLY
VESSELS ESCORTED BY 7 SMALL ESCORT VESSELS OFF SPLASHER 5 AT 0825
WERE ALSO REPORTED.

7. BOMBING RESULTS WERE CONSIDERED EXCELLENT. LARGE FIRES
DESCRIBED BY ONE OBSERVER AS CHERRY RED AND HEAVY SMOKE AT 15,000
FEET WERE REPORTED. LEADER OF LOW SQUADRON SAID, "WE KNOCKED HELL
OUT OF THE TARGET." ANOTHER OBSERVER SAID, "NO RETURN TRIP HERE!"

8. NEED FOR GREATER STUDY OF AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION, OBJECTION
TO FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT FROM OTHER GROUPS JOINING A FORMATION ON GROUNDS
OF DANGEROUS CROWDING, AND PRAISE FOR APPARENT CAREFUL PLANNING OF
MISSION BY COMMAND OBSERVED BY CREWS. FRIENDLY FIGHTERS REPORTED
MAKING U'S WITH VAPOR TRAILS.

9. 17 B-17's OF 95TH BOMB GROUP TOOK OFF BEGINNING AT 0710
28 JUNE TO ATTACK SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANT AT HULS, GERMANY. 16
ATTACKED THE TARGET, ONE NO. 277 RETURNING AT 0952 FROM 54° N 04° E
BY REASON OF FREEZING OF OXYGEN SYSTEM IN BALL TURRET. ONE AIRCRAFT

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NARRATIVE (CONT)

FAILED TO RETURN. ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF ITS CREW ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE MADE LANDINGS IN HOLLAND. ENEMY FIGHTERS FAILED TO PRESS HOME THEIR ATTACK IN THE FACE OF OUR LARGE AND CLOSE BOMBER FORMATION. FLAK WAS CONSIDERABLE AND ACCURATE AS TO ALTITUDE BUT CAUSED THIS GROUP NO LOSS. CREWS WERE ENTHUSIASTIC IN THEIR REPORTS OF THE BOMBING AND HIGH IN THEIR PRAISE OF RAF FIGHTER WITHDRAWAL SUPPORT. THE LEAD SHIP ON A GOOD RUN ON HEADING OF 90° BOMBED AT 0944½. ENTHUSIASM? MORALE AND CONFIDENCE OF CREWS AT HIGH PEAK.

Telephoned by X Target Huls, Ger

1. Route followed. To target: Vlieland, Holland; Deventer, Holland; Halderen, Holland; TARGET
from target: Coesfeld, Ger; Sliedrecht, Holland; just south of Rotterdam, Holland.

2. Visibility at Target (Any condensation trails?)

$\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{5}{8}$ % cloud coverage, but a ~~bit~~ good sighting for bombs

3. No. of A/C over target.

16

average estimate of ~~16~~ ~~16~~ EA.

4. Formation over target, with height of each A/C. Those A/C damaged by flak to be circled, and if seriously damaged, insert small "S". If any A/C shot down by flak, say So:-

see Reverse side.

5. General Axis of attack (from lead A/C if possible)

97° TRUE

6. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing?

about 40 sec.

7. Turn after bombing. Sharp left turn of 45° , then another almost immediate 45° turn so as to catch lost position.

8. Position of Group in relation to other Groups. Javelin-down, directly behind lead gp, but 1000 ft. lower, and 1000 ft higher than the ~~11~~ following.

9. What evasive action was taken? Constantly weaving, and except for bomb-run no direct course for more than 30 seconds.

10. A short description of Flak en route (if any) and at the target, including if possible a suggestion as to type of fire control employed-i.e. Continuous following predicted concentrations, predicted barrages, or fixed barrages.

AA fire over Frisian Is was accurate but not severe. Several flat cars with guns were observed at STAVOREN, Holland, shooting at our H/e over Zeider Zee.

AA fire over Huls, Germany was very accurate and more than moderately severe. Reports were that AA installations must be N. of red areas on map (RUHR) 4 to 5 miles N Huls.

AA fire was continuous-following, changing to predicted barrage for 3rd group.

11. Any other Comments, Phenomena, etc.

Y V E
STAND BY FOR "THE" CAST
5-58 STATIONS CLR E

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

03-23-02

5 STAND BY FOR "THE" B/CAST
BSE NR 28 PASS 94 B.G.
HRM NR 28 PASS 95 AND 100 B.G.
SNT NR 27 PASS 96 B.G.

THE NR THE 29/22 2200B CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY
ATT: S-2

4BW U598D 22-6-43

REPORT ON FIRST WING OPERATIONS, JUNE 22

TARGETS: HULS AND ANTWERP

A. DESIGNATED UNITS	91, 92, 303, 305, 306, 351, 279, 94, 95, 96.
B. NO A/C DISPATCHED	235
C. ABORTIVE A/C	43: 2 SPARE FROM 305TH GROUP
D. NO A/C ON TARGET	169 ON PRIMARY HULS (NORTH OF RECKLING- HAUSEN) = 1 A/C ON VLIELAND: 1 ON DORTMUND: 11YB-405
E. NO A/C LOST	16
F. BOMBING RESULTS	GOOD
G. PERSONAL CASUALTIES	2- 21- 160
H. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION	STRONG TO MEDIOCRE
I. FLAK	INTENSE TO MODERATE
J. WEATHER	APPROACHING TARGET 6/10 TO 8/10. CLEAR OVER TARGET
K. OBSERVATIONS AND TONS ON TARGET	427.5 TONS

PART 2 ATTACK ON ANTWERP

A. DESIGNATED UNITS	381- 284
B. NO A/C DISPATCHED	41
C. ABORTIVE A/C	1
D. NO A/C ON TARGET	NO REPORT AS YET FROM 2 A/C LANDED AWAY FROM BASE. PRIMARY 36. G. N. PLANT AT ANTWERP.
E. NO A/C LOST	4
F. BOMBING RESULTS	GOOD TO FAIR
G. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES	1 - 4 - 40
H. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION	STRONG TO MEDIOCRE
I. FLAK	MODERATE
J. WEATHER	" GOOD
K. OBSERVATIONS AND TONS ON TARGET	90 TONS

COMBOMWIG FOUR

CC IN PART 1 D. (NORTH OF RECKLING-HAUSEN)
T.O.D. 2244/22 WMD VA+

Wing SKAT 945

S-1

APPROXIMATELY 80 E/A, PRINCIPALLY FW-190S AND ME-109S WERE ENCOUNTERED. THE ATTACKS STARTED TWENTY MILES OFF DUTCH COAST AND CONTINUED UNTIL FIGHTER ESCORT MET US. FIFTEEN MILES EAST OF ROTTERDAM, ME-110, JU-88, JU-87 AND ME-210 OF VARIED COLORS WERE SEEN. THERE WERE NO PARTICULAR METHODS OF ATTACK, THE E/A COMING IN FROM ALL CLOCK POSITIONS, AND ALL LEVELS, HOWEVER 95 GP REPORTED ATTACKS FROM ABOVE, PRINCIPALLY FROM ELEVEN AND ONE O'CLOCK. ATTACKS WERE NOT VIGOROUSLY PRESSED, AND LASTED APPROXIMATELY FORTY MINUTES. TWO AERIAL BOMBS WERE DROPPED FROM A JU-88, AND VERY LONG CANNON FLASHES WERE SEEN FROM ONE FW-190. OF TWENTY CLAIMS REPORTED FROM ONE GROUP FOURTEEN WERE FRONTAL AND AT ALL LEVELS.

S-2

MEAGRE, ACCURATE GUN FIRE RECEIVED FROM VLIELAND. MEAGRE TO MODERATE INACCURATE RECEIVED FROM WEST COAST OF ZUIDER ZEE. MODERATE TO INTENSE ACCURATE GUN FIRE FROM I.P. TO AND OVER TARGET, MODERATE INACCURATE GUN FIRE RECEIVED FROM ROTTERDAM.

S-3

FIVE B-12 WERE LOST. ONE A/C 02-11 OF THE 95GP HAD ITS NOSE AND TAIL SHOT OFF BY FOUR E/A, JUST AFTER DROPPING ITS BOMBS ON THE TARGET. IT LEVELLED OFF AT 5,000 FT AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT CRASH LANDED. FROM 4-10 CHUTES WERE SEEN. A B-17 EXPLODED APPROACHING I.P. AFOER SPIRALING DOWN TO 20,000' AT 0935, NEAR VARSEVELD AN A/C WAS SEEN TO EXPLODE ALSO NEAR MUNSTER A B-17 EXPLODED AT 0948. A B-17 REPORTED HIT OVER TARGET WAS SEEN NEAR ARNHEM WITH EIGHT CHUTES OPENING.

S-4 NONE

S-5 NOT AVAILABLE

S-6

BALLOON BARRAGE WEST OF TARGET NORTH OF DORSTEN.

S-7

LARGE FIRE AND HEAVY SMOKE OBSERVED OVER TARGET. FIGHTER SUPPORT SPELLED OUT LETTERS "U.S." WITH VAPOR TRAILS. MORALE OF OUR CREWS HIGH AFTER RAID.

S-8

HIGH PRAISE FOR FIGHTER SUPPORT FROM ALL CREWS.

S-9

SIXTY-THREE B-17S OF THE 4TH BOMB WING TOOK OFF STARTING AT 0010, AND FOLLOWED THE BRIEFED COURSE. 49 A/C REACHED THE PRIMARY TARGET DROPPING 243 X 1000 LB BOMBS DOWN BEFORE TARGET. ONE A/C OF 95TH GROUP JETTISONED "2 X 1000" SHOT DOWN. ONE A/C OF 95TH GROUP JETTISONED "2 X 1000". ROUTE WAS FOLLOWED THROUGHOUT. FIGHTER COVER CONSISTING OF SPITFIRES ABOVE AND TYPHOONS BELOW WAS MOST WELCOME, AND HELPED TO RAISE MORALE TO A VERY HIGH POINT. THE CREWS WERE ENTHUSIASTIC UPON RETURN. AN OBSERVATION REPORTED SEVERAL TIMES WAS A "BRICK RED" VAPOR RISING FROM TARGET AFTER BOMBING.

100TH GROUP DIVERSION.

21 A/C OF THE 100TH GROUP FLEW A DIVERSION INTO THE NORTH SEA, AT 0820 HOURS. NO BOMBS WERE CARRIED. ALL PLANES LANDED AT APPROX 1215. NO E/A OR FLAK ENCOUNTERED.

COBOMWIG FOUR

HOLD
TOD 1724/23 P.A. VA+
THE R 231721B VUM VA

STATISTICS.

- 4TH BOMBARDMENT WING 94, 95, 96 GPS.
 - 63
 - 49
 - 0
 - 0
 - 0
 - 14
 - 2
 - 3
 - 0
 - 0
 - 0943-0947
 - 22,000 - 24,000 FT.
 - 243 X 1,000
 -1- 315 X 1,000
 -2- 10 X 1,000
 - 27 X 1,000
 - 35 X 1,000
 - 0-1-6-50
 - 19-12-9

NARRATIVE MISSION, HULS.

1-1 APPROXIMATELY 80 E/A, PRINCIPALLY FW.190S AND ME-109S WERE ENCOUNTERED. THE ATTACKS STARTED TWENTY MILES OFF DUTCH COAST AND CONTINUED UNTIL FIGHTER ESCORT MET US. FIFTEEN MILES EAST OF ROTTERDAM. ME-110, JU-88, JU-87 AND ME-210 OF VARIED COLORS WERE SEEN. THERE WERE NO PARTICULAR METHODS OF ATTACK, THE E/A COMING IN FROM ALL CLOCK POSITIONS, AND ALL LEVELS. HOWEVER 95 P REPORTED ATTACKS FROM ABOVE, PRINCIPALLY FROM ELEVEN AND ONE O'CLOCK. ATTACKS WERE NOT VIGOROUSLY PRESSED, AND LASTED APPROXIMATELY FORTY MINUTES. TWO AERIAL BOMBS WERE DROPPED FROM JU-88, AND VERY LONG CANNON FLASHES WERE SEEN FROM ONE FW-190. OF TWENTY CLAIMS REPORTED FROM ONE GROUP FOURTEEN WERE FRONTAL AND AT ALL LEVELS.

1-2 MEAGRE, ACCURATE GUN FIRE RECEIVED FROM VLIELAND. MEAGRE TO MODERATE INACCURATE RECEIVED FROM WEST COAST OF ZUIDER ZEE. MODERATE TO INTENSE ACCURATE GUN FIRE FROM I.P. TO AND OVER TARGET. MODERATE INACCURATE GUN FIRE RECEIVED FROM ROTTERDAM.

1-3 FIVE B-12 WERE LOST. ONE A/C 02-11 OF THE 95GP HAD ITS NOSE AND TAIL SHOT OFF BY FOUR E/A, JUST AFTER DROPPING ITS BOMBS ON THE TARGET. IT LEVELLED OFF AT 5,000 FT AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT CRASH LANDED. FROM 4-10 CHUTES WERE SEEN. A B-17 EXPLODED APPROACHING I.P. AFOER SPIRALING DOWN TO 20,000' AT 0935. NEAR VARSEVELD AN A/C WAS SEEN TO EXPLODE. ALSO NEAR MUNSTER A B-17 EXPLODED AT 0948. A B-17 REPORTED HIT OVER TARGET WAS SEEN NEAR ARNHEM WITH EIGHT CHUTES OPENING.

1-4 NONE

1-5 NOT AVAILABLE

1-6 BALLOON BARRAGE WEST OF TARGET NORTH OF DORSTEN.

1-7 LARGE FIRE AND HEAVY SMOKE OBSERVED OVER TARGET. FIGHTER SUPPORT SPELLED OUT LETTERS "U.S." WITH VAPOR TRAILS. MORALE OF OUR CREWS HIGH AFTER RAID.

1-8 HIGH PRAISE FOR FIGHTER SUPPORT FROM ALL CREWS.

1-9 SIXTY-THREE B-17S OF THE 4TH BOMB WING TOOK OFF STARTING AT 0610. AND FOLLOWED THE BRIEFED COURSE. 49 A/C REACHED THE PRIMARY

mission #10

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

1943

STAND BY FOR B/CAST

BSE 12 PASS 94GP

HRM 12 PASS 95 = 100 GPS

SNT 12 PASS 96

BT FIDENPAE BSE - SNT - HRM - TAF V THE NR THE 18/231530B URGENT C
ADV U619D 23 JUNE 1943

ATT: A-2

TELETYPE MISSION REPORT HULS - 22 JUNE 1943, ATT. A-2

STATISTICS.

A - 4TH BOMBARDMENT WING 94, 95, 96 GPS.

B - 63

C - 49

D - 0

E - 0

F - 0

G - 14

H - 2

I - 3

J - 0

K - 0

L - 0943-0947

M - 22,000 - 24,000 FT.

N - 243 X 1,000

N-1- 315 X 1,000

N-2- 10 X 1,000

O - 27 X 1,000

P - 35 X 1,000

Q - 0-1-6-50

R - 19-12-9

NARRATIVE MISSION, HULS.

S-1

APPROXIMATELY 80 E/A, PRINCIPALLY FW.190S AND ME-109S WERE ENCOUNTERED. THE ATTACKS STARTED TWENTY MILES OFF DUTCH COAST AND CONTINUED UNTIL FIGHTER ESCORT MET US, FIFTEEN MILES EAST OF ROTTERDAM. ME-110, JU-88, JU-87 AND ME-210 OF VARIED COLORS WERE SEEN. THERE WERE NO PARTICULAR METHODS OF ATTACK, THE E/A COMING IN FROM ALL CLOCK POSITIONS, AND ALL LEVELS. HOWEVER 95 GP REPORTED ATTACKS FROM ABOVE, PRINCIPALLY FROM ELEVEN AND ONE O'CLOCK. ATTACKS WERE NOT VIGOROUSLY PRESSED, AND LASTED APPROXIMATELY FORTY MINUTES. TWO AERIAL BOMBS WERE DROPPED FROM A JU-88, AND VERY LONG CANNON FLASHES WERE SEEN FROM ONE FW-190. OF TWENTY CLAIMS REPORTED FROM ONE GROUP FOURTEEN WERE FRONTAL AND AT ALL LEVELS.

S-2

MEAGRE, ACCURATE GUN FIRE RECEIVED FROM VLIELAND. MEAGRE TO MODERATE INACCURATE RECEIVED FROM WEST COAST OF ZUIDER ZEE. MODERATE TO INTENSE ACCURATE GUN FIRE FROM I.P. TO AND OVER TARGET, MODERATE INACCURATE GUN FIRE RECEIVED FROM ROTTERDAM.

S-3

FIVE B-12 WERE LOST. ONE A/C 02-11 OF THE 95GP HAD ITS NOSE AND TAIL SHOT OFF BY FOUR E/A, JUST AFTER DROPPING ITS BOMBS ON THE TARGET. IT LEVELLED OFF AT 5,000 FT AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT CRASH LANDED. FROM 4-10 CHUTES WERE SEEN. A B-17 EXPLODED APPROACHING I.P. AFOER SPIRALING DOWN TO 20,000' AT 0935, NEAR VARSEVELD AN A/C WAS SEEN TO EXPLODE= ALSO NEAR MUNSTER A B-17 EXPLODED AT 0948. A B-17 REPORTED HIT OVER TARGET WAS SEEN NEAR ARNHEM WITH EIGHT CHUTES OPENING.

Sortie No. 10 }
Mission No. 10 }

22 June 1943

TARGET: Synthetic Rubber Plant at Huls, near Recklinghausen.

17 A/C took off at 0710. 16 attacked target, one A/C aborting by reason of oxygen freezing in ball turret. Lead ship bombed at 0944. Bomb load 7 x 1000 GP. Large fire and heavy smoke over target. Fighter support spelled out U.S. with vapor trails. Morale of crews high after mission. Approximately 80 E/A principally FW 190's and Me 109's, were encountered. Attacks started 20 minutes off Dutch coast and continued until fighter escort met the Group. E/A attacked from all clock positions and from all levels. Attacks not vigorously pressed and lasted about 40 minutes. Flak accurate and from meagre to intense. One A/C (Capt Dunch) was lost. Nose and tail shot off by 4 E/A just after it dropped its bombs. Levelled off at 5000 feet, possibly crash-landed. 4 to 10 chutes reported as seen. E/A claims: 5-5-3.

VIII BC Narrative: Primary effort directed against important Synthetic Rubber Plant at Huls, where 170 B-17's dropped 1202 x 500 and 242 x 1000 GP with good results. As a secondary effort 39 B-17's attackee Ford and General Motors Plants at Antwerp, dropping 191 x 1000 GP with fair results. 21 B-17's from 100th Group carried out an uneventful diversion over North Sea. Bombers attacking Huls and Antwerp received withdrawal support from 23 squadrons of Spits, 2 squadrons of Typhoons, and 8 squadrons of P-47's. 20 heavy bombers mission.

235 dispatched to Huls, 183 attacked, 52 abortives, and 16 missing. E/A claims: 46-21-35. 42 dispatched to Antwerp, 39 attacked, 3 abortives, and 4 missing. E/A claims: 1-2-9.

BenderMason O'NealLindleyThompsonHamiltonAdamsKringRothschildRobichaud
(ABORT)KnowltonJohnsonEastlingTylerMcPhersonMasseySouthBunch

(MISSING)

SECRET

Page 3

PRELIMINARY INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. S.A.359 (contd).

- E. Bursts on and in the vicinity of the pit head buildings of the Coal Mine Auguste Viktoria III/IV which adjoins and supplies the plant.
- F. The huge volume of smoke and steam believed to be from the main power station and cooling plant. This is seen to move with a small cloud formation above the target.
- G. A very heavy and exceptional discharge of steam from the cooling towers adjoining the power station.

(ix) ANNOTATED PRINT NO. 3. (SAV. 92/12-1)

- H. Two hits which have occurred to pipe lines within the plant. The print also shows further development of the bursts indicated on Annotated Print No. 2.

(x) ANNOTATED PRINT NO. 4. (SAV 306/79 - 5)

- H. A large explosion and column of smoke resulting from direct hits on one or more of three large gasometers situated near the centre of the plant.

- J. Numerous bursts on and in the vicinity of the Wesel-Datteln Canal to the West of the target.

(xi) ANNOTATED PRINT NO. 5. (SAV. 303/118-1)

- K. A striking oblique view showing a late stage of the immense column of smoke and steam rising from the plant after the attack. This column, it will be noted, rises above the surrounding cloud formation to an estimated height of 7500 ft.

SECRETDISTRIBUTION NO. 11.R.A.F. STATION,
MEDMENHAM,
TND/C/PIW/A

Plus H.Q.F.C. 20

E: 119
I: 15
154

(iv) FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS SEEN DURING THE ATTACK.

- (a) The main power station is believed to have been hit. It is seen to be emitting great volumes of smoke and steam which mingling with a great discharge of steam from the cooling towers produces a towering column of smoke and steam which at the end of the attack rises to an estimated height of 7,500'.
- (b) A large explosion and resulting column of smoke which appears to be due to direct hits on one or all of three large gas holders near the centre of the plant is soon during the second phase of the attack.
- (c) Several fires due to direct hits on oil and other pipe lines observed. Two occur within the plant itself and one is seen on the oil pipe line from the Gelsenkirchen Synthetic oil plant near to the point where the line enters the southwest corner of the pl-

(v) ADJOINING COAL MINES AND RAILWAY SIDINGS.

- (a) Hits are seen on and in the vicinity of pit-head buildings of the Coal Mine Augusta Victoria iii/iv which adjoins and serves the plant.
- (b) Numerous hits are soon on the railway sidings which are connected to the Eastern side of the plant.

(vi) BURSTS OUTSIDE IMMEDIATE TARGET AREA.

- (a) A certain number of bursts are seen outside the boundary of the plant. Details of those will be given when a full report on bomb plot is issued.

(vii) ANNOTATED PRINT NO. 1 (SAV. 303/11-28)

This print shows the large concentration of bursts which fell across the South side and the South West corner of the plant during the first phase of the attack.

- A. A number of bursts in the vicinity of the point of entry of the oil pipe line from the Gelsenkirchen Synthetic Oil Plant including one direct hit on the pipe resulting in a fire of considerable proportions (marked by arrow on print).
- B. Large concentration of bursts across the Southern part of the works which includes the main power plant, chemical plants, acetylene plants and other vital installations. It will be seen, however, that the South Eastern section of the plant is obscured by cloud and steam but the general development of the bursts suggests that many have almost certainly occurred within this area.

(viii) ANNOTATED PRINT NO. 2. (SAV. 305/79-6)

This print shows the large number of bursts across the Northern and Eastern parts of the plant, which occurred during the second phase of the attack.

- C. Large concentration of bursts across the Northern part of the plant.

- D. Numerous bursts on the railway sidings which serve the Eastern side of the plant.

Capt. Poole

SECRET

(American CONFIDENTIAL)

24.6.43.

PRELIMINARY INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. S.A. 359.

ATTACK ON SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANT HÜLS ON 22.6.43.

SAY 303/111 22.6.43 0936 hrs 1/27,800 (F.L.12") 27,800 'A' and 'B'
 303/112 22.6.43 0938 hrs 1/25,500 (F.L.12") 25,500 'A' and 'B'
 303/113 22.6.43 0940 hrs 1/26,000 (F.L.12") 26,000 'A' and 'B'
 303/114 22.6.43 0937 hrs 1/26,500 (F.L.12") 26,500 'A' and 'B'
 303/116 22.6.43 0940 hrs 1/28,000 (F.L.12") 28,000 'A' and 'B'
 303/17 22.6.43 0940 hrs 1/50,000 (F.L.6") 25,000 'A' and 'B'
 379/4 22.6.43 0940 hrs 1/24,000 (F.L.12") 24,000 'A' and 'B'
 379/5 22.6.43 0939 hrs 1/36,000 (F.L.8") 24,000 'A' and 'B'
 379/6 22.6.43 0938 hrs 1/36,000 (F.L.8") 24,000 'A' and 'B'
 305/78 22.6.43 0935 hrs 1/25,000 (F.L.12") 25,000 'A' and 'B'
 305/79 22.6.43 0937 hrs 1/38,100 (F.L.8") 25,400 'A' and 'B'
 306/78 22.6.43 0938 hrs 1/24,400 (F.L.12") 24,400 'A' and 'B'
 306/79 22.6.43 0941 hrs 1/36,300 (F.L.8") 24,200 'A' and 'B'
 306/80 22.6.43 0938 hrs 1/36,600 (F.L.8") 24,400 'A' and 'B'
 92/12 22.6.43 0939 hrs 1/25,900 (F.L.12") 25,900 'A' and 'B'
 92/13 22.6.43 0936 hrs 1/52,000 (F.L.6") 26,000 'A' and 'B'
 351/10 22.6.43 0941 hrs 1/25,000 (F.L.12") 25,000 'A' and 'B'
 351/11 22.6.43 0935 hrs 1/25,000 (F.L.12") 25,000 'A' and 'B'
 96/7 22.6.43 0941 hrs 1/24,000 (F.L.12") 24,000 'A' and 'B'
 95/10 22.6.43 0942 hrs 1/34,950 (F.L.8") 23,300 'A' and 'B'
 95/11 22.6.43 0945 hrs 1/34,500 (F.L.8") 23,000 'A' and 'B'
 95/12 22.6.43 0943 hrs 1/23,000 (F.L.12") 23,000 'A' and 'B'
 303/118 22.6.43 0947 hrs 1/52,000 (F.L.6") 26,000 'A' and 'B'

(i) INFORMATION RECEIVED ON ATTACK.

- (a) These photographs were taken during a daylight attack on the Synthetic Rubber Plant at HÜLS by 170 aircraft of U.S.A.C. on 22.6.43
- (b) The attacking force had fighter escort during the withdrawal.
- (c) A total of 243 x 1,000 lb. G.P. bombs and 1202 x 500 lb G.P. bombs were dropped.

(ii) NOTE:-

This report combined with the accompanying annotated photographs should be considered as a preliminary interpretation report only. Because of the great concentration of bursts within the target area and the difficulty of interpretation due to ground shadow and the close proximity of bursts it is impossible to give the exact location of every burst or to detail in this report the many parts of the plant that have been hit. A full report accompanied by an approximate bomb plot and annotated photographs showing all bursts will follow.

(iii) BOMB BURSTS OBSERVED.

Photographs show the aircraft to have attacked in two main waves. The first phase shows heavy concentrations across the Southern and South-Western part of the plant. Although cloud and steam obscure the South-east part the development of the bursts suggests that this area also received a number of hits.

The second phase of the attack approximately one minute afterwards shows a heavy concentration of bursts across the North and Northeastern part of the plant and the adjoining railway sidings and coal mine i.e. that part of the plant which was not affected by the first phase of the attack. The whole attack therefore resulted in bomb bursts being distributed over the whole of the plant.

H. Jackson
SECRET.
(American CONFIDENTIAL).
25th July 1943
7

IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K.1618.
(Subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment).

Photographs taken by 542 Squadron on 24th July, 43.

Mean time of photography: 1200 hrs.

SORTIE : D/861.

SCALE: 1/17,700 (F.L.20")

LOCALITY : HÜLS.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

COVER.

The Synthetic Rubber Plant at Hüls is almost entirely covered, the only portion not covered being the extreme S.E. corner, involving two or three small buildings and a few railway lines leading to the plant.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

Those photographs were taken following the attack on 22nd June, 43 by aircraft of U.S.A.A.F. The last report on damage at this plant was K.1275, issued on 12th March, 42.

PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE.

The enlargement (Neg. No. 27584) distributed with this report shows the main damage to the buildings and hits on tracks; no attempt has been made here to mark the craters, which are numerous and in most instances obvious.

It is now seen that the many hits known to have been scored on this plant (reported in S.I. 359) have caused considerable damage. In spite of the camouflage to the main buildings in the centre of the plant, the hits can be seen, though it is not always possible to assess the resulting damage to the buildings.

Only one of the five boiler-house chimneys is smoking and none of the cooling towers is in use.

Preliminary details are as follows:

Boiler house and power plant	at least 3 hits.
Six gas-holders	exploded.
Gas plant	slight damage
Cooling tower	damaged.
Acrylonitrile plant	at least 3 hits.
Probable Acetaldehyde plant	part destroyed.
Ethylene Glycol Derivatives plant	1 hit
Five or six sheds	damaged or part destroyed. (3068 and 3069).

A hit near the pipe line from the Gelsenkirchen Synthetic Oil Plants has caused possible damage to pipe (3071) and there are several hits on works railway sidings and roads.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Authority NN174,005
By K.C. NARA Date 7/7/97

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

SECRET.
Page 2.

There is a profusion of craters both inside and around the works,
especially on the W. side.

One print distributed: enlargement of part of print 3069 to scale of
approx. 1/6,800. (Neg. No. 27584).

Target material used: C.I.U. plan of plant.

DISTRIBUTION NO. 24.

SECRET.

R.A.F. STATION, MELTON MELT.

TAH/KMS/B.

H.Q.P.C.	20
E	135
I	31
Total :	186 copies.

INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K.1618

Photographs taken by 542 Squadron on 24.7.43.

Mean time of photography: 1200 hours.

Sortie D/861

Scale: 1/17,700 (F.L. 20")

Locality: HLS

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

COVER

The Synthetic Rubber Plant at HLS is almost entirely covered, apart from the extreme S.E. part of the Works.

ZONES UNDER REVIEW

These photographs were taken after the daylight attack by aircraft of U.S.A.A.F. on 22.6.43. Immediate Report No. K.1618 was issued on 25.7.43 and the last detailed report was No. K.1273 issued on 12.5.42.

GENERAL STATEMENT

A high proportion of the bombs dropped fell within the target, and considerable damage is seen throughout the plant. Owing, however, to camouflage of the main buildings, the full extent of the damage to several buildings cannot be completely assessed.

Many of the most important plants and buildings have been damaged, including the A.M.C. CONVERTERS Plant, the BUTYLENE GLYCOL Plant, the ALCOHOL Plant, the AEROMONITRILE Plant, the BUTADIENE Plant, the ACETALDENE Plant, the POLYMERISATION building and the GAS COMPRESSION AND FRACTIONATION building. Other damage includes many miscellaneous buildings and sheds throughout the plant destroyed or severely damaged.

At least 6 large gas-holders have been burned out and several cooling towers damaged. The pipe lines, both in the plant, and the one leading to the GELSENKIRCHEN SYNTHETIC OIL Plant have been damaged.

A few points of damage to the railways can be seen, although most of the tracks are S.E. of the plant in the area not seen on this sortie.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE

(The numbers refer to those on annotated print, which is an enlargement of a portion of Print 3069, Neg. No. 27677).

SYNTHETIC RUBBER PLANT, HLS

1. One building (140' x 40') and a small shed have been destroyed and a pipeline damaged.
2. Two sheds (100' x 35') have been destroyed, and three other sheds have received severe damage.
3. One building (375' x 35') has been half destroyed by fire, and a building (230' x 50') has slight roof damage.
4. A building (260' x 130') which is under construction, appears to have received a direct hit at the N.W. end.
5. Several small sheds and possible store buildings appear to have been destroyed.
6. Possible damage from blast to two sheds and built-up embankment.
7. An irregular-shaped building has one end severely damaged by fire and blast, and a small shed has been destroyed.

8. An overhead pipeline has been damaged by fire for at least 200 ft.
9. A small building has possible damage from a near miss.
10. An irregular-shaped shed has one section (130' x 30') destroyed by a direct hit and 2 small buildings have been destroyed.
11. A gas holder has received possible blast damage from a near miss.
12. Two sheds totalling (260' x 130') and a building (70' x 50') have been destroyed or gutted. Another building (260' x 60') has been destroyed and cleared.
13. A gas holder (130' diameter) has been burned out, and a building (240' x 90') appears to have recent roof repairs.
14. Three small buildings have been destroyed or severely damaged.
15. A building (200' x 60') has been 2/3 destroyed, and several small sheds and buildings have been demolished or damaged.
16. A gas holder and cooling tower have received possible damage from blast.
17. Of 2 buildings (125' x 50') one has been destroyed, and the other has severe roof damage.
18. The CATALYST PLANT (430' x 60') has the west end demolished over 500 sq. yds. and an additional 600 sq. yds. of roof destroyed.
19. Four probable oil storage tanks appear burned out.
20. The CO-CONVERTER building (250' x 75') has 1800 sq. yds of roof destroyed. (A most important plant producing ICETYLENE).
21. A gas holder 80' in diameter, has been burned out.
22. A cooling tower (50' in diameter) appears to have received a direct hit and is severely damaged.
23. One building (120' x 30') has been destroyed, another (220' x 70') has been destroyed over 400 sq. yds., and a gas holder (80' in diameter) appears burned out.
24. Three gas holders, 120' and 95' in diameter have been exploded, and 2 to 3 small buildings destroyed.
25. A building (260' x 65') has blast damage to entire roof.
26. An L shaped building (200' x 45') has been damaged over half its area, a building (120' x 120') has recent roof repairs over 400 sq. yds.
27. The POLYMERIZATION building (295' x 290') has received a direct hit near its centre.
28. The GAS COMPRESSION and FRIGERATION building (325' x 230') has received a direct hit on 1/3 end causing 800 sq. yds. of severe damage.
29. The GAS PLANT building (580' x 130') has roof damage at east end.
30. Building (same as above) appears to have 800 sq. yds. of roof damage over western portion.
31. A building (180' x 60') has been 1/3 destroyed.
32. Three small irregular shaped buildings have been destroyed and another damaged.

53. Four sheds have been destroyed by H.E. and fire, and one building (125' x 55') has roof burned off exposing 4 tanks of 30' diameters. The overhead pipeline appears damaged for 100'.
54. At least 1 hit on railway tracks.
55. At least 6 hits on railway tracks.
56. The pipeline to the GELSENKIRCHEN SYNTHETIC OIL Plant has a section severely damaged by blast and fire.
57. Three to four sheds and stores of probable construction job have been destroyed.
58. One gun of a flank position has possibly been damaged from a near miss, and adjoining ammunition stores appear to have been exploded. The additional points of damage may be seen on print 3068 (not distributed) without stores cover.
1. A building (195' x 60') has centre of roof burned off.
 2. Building (140' x 50') (possibly roof over distillation columns) has severe damage to roof from blast and fire.
 3. A building (120' x 60') on top storey severely damaged, and another building (50' x 50') has been destroyed. A shed and loading platform has been destroyed over 400 sq. yds.
 4. A building (400' x 110') has received a direct hit on corner damaging 100 sq. yds.
 5. Stores partly destroyed by a direct hit.
 6. A direct hit has probably cut the railway tracks.
 7. Two to three sheds and stores over an area of 1400 sq. yds have been destroyed by direct hits and fire.
 8. A building (225' x 75') has been slightly damaged by blast at one corner.
 9. There is a concentration of at least 25 craters near the southern boundary of the plant.

One print distributed: Enlargement of part of print 3068, to scale of approx. 1/6,800 (Neg. No. 27677).

SECRET

J. A. P. EDITION,
MCDONNELL
LFB/CMP/GPT/LA

DISTRIBUTION PC. 4

H.Q.P.C.	20
E :	135
I :	<u>31</u>

Total : 186 copies

INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K. 1618 (Cont'd.)

33. A medium size building has been slightly damaged from near miss.
34. The BOILER HOUSE and POWER PLANT appears to have roof damage, however the camouflage makes a detailed assessment impossible.
35. The BUTADIENE PLANT (TOLL HOUSE) (285' x 40') has half of its stacks damaged by direct hits and much of the camouflage is damaged.
36. A small building has been severely damaged over 250 sq. yds.
37. A small building has been severely damaged.
38. A building 130' x 120' has been damaged on one corner, and the camouflage in this area has been destroyed over 5000 sq. yds.
39. A building (130' x 45') has roof lights gone over 2/3 of its area and a small building has been destroyed by a direct hit.
40. A building (65' x 30') has been gutted and camouflage destroyed.
41. A building (230' x 50') has been 1/2 destroyed.
42. A building (180' x 50') has received a direct hit on edge causing 100 sq. yds. of damage.
43. A small building has been destroyed, and 2 of a series of small tanks have been damaged by blast.
44. A shed (60' x 50') has been destroyed.
45. Several small sheds under camouflage have been destroyed, and a small building severely damaged.
46. The ETHYLENE GLYCOL Plant has the camouflage stripped from three of the main buildings (270' x 90', 260' x 50', and 260' x 40') and the corner of the largest building has blast marks over 200 sq. yds. A small building adjacent to above, appears severely damaged by a direct hit.
47. The ALDOL Plant (385' x 75') has 8 of 13 columns severely damaged, the building is camouflaged, but adjacent to its centre part the camouflage has been pierced.
48. Of the possible ETHYLENE GLYCOL derivatives buildings.
 - a. The main building (325' x 225') has 450 sq. yds. of roof gone.
 - b. Irregular shaped building (300' x 60') has blast damage to 200 sq. yds. of roof.
 - c. A small building has received a direct hit damaging 150 sq. yds. and a small shed has been demolished.
49. Possible ETHYLENE GLYCOL DERIVATIVES buildings, one (270' x 80') has received a direct hit on the east end, which has broken the camouflage over 200 sq. yds. Another building (220' x 200') has a probable hit on roof, the camouflage being damaged over 100 sq. yds.
50. The ANHYDROUS NITRILE Plant has the camouflage damaged over 400 sq. yds. and one building (70' x 50') appears to have roof damage.
51. A structure (260' x 45') containing 12 columns in line has suffered a direct hit.

Authority NN1715005

By K.C. NARA Date 7/17/97

HEADQUARTERS

SEVENTH FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H),
Office of the Communications Officer

(J-1)

CONFIDENTIAL

(EQUALS BRITISH SECRET)

APO 634
22 June 1943

SUBJECT: Operational Communications on 22 June 1943,

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, Station #119,
APO 634.

1. Of the seventeen (17) aircraft which went over the target, sixteen (16) were available for interrogation by the Communications Officer, 95th B.G.
 2. Mechanical and electrical failures were as follows:
 - (a) 336C, interphone system faulty, being investigated and corrected;
 - (b) 336K, interphone system faulty, being checked and corrected;
 - (c) 412R, interphone poor at altitude;
 - (d) 412U, interphone system out, being repaired.
 3. Other failures beyond control of this department were:
 - (a) 336C, command antenna shot away, being replaced;
 - (b) 336I, command antenna shot away, being replaced;

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NN 1715-005
By KC NARA Date 7/17/92

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

5. Radio communications and navigational aid reception was quite unsatisfactory. It has again been brought to the attention of this department that Radio Silence should be maintained prior to take-off.

RICHARD F. KNICK
1st Lieut., A.C.
Communications