

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

APO 634.
13 June, 1943

SUBJECT: S-3 Narrative Report of Operations, 95th Bombardment Group (H),
June 13, 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, APO 634.

1. Alert and Bomb loading.

a. The 95th Bombardment Group was alerted for a maximum effort mission at 1200, 12 June 1943, with a bomb loading of 10 X 500 lb. GP bombs, 1/10 second nose fuse and 1/100 second tail fuse. This loading was cancelled during the afternoon, but put into orders again at 2115, 12 June, 1943.

2. Attack order.

a. Field order No. 8 was received at 0005.

b. Twenty-nine aircraft were scheduled for take-off to make up the 95th Group and a part of a Composite Group. Crews for both groups were briefed at 0300, 13 June, with take-off time 0600 for the composite group, 0610 for the 95th Group.

c. The 95th Bomb Group was to lead the 402nd Combat Wing, followed by the 96th Group and Composite Group in that order.

d. Twenty-six aircraft actually took-off, on time; twenty-eight crews were available. Two aircraft failed to take-off, one due to mechanical failure and one due to armament failure. Two aircraft were abortive (5882 and 9853) one due to oxygen failure and one due to turbo failure. Twenty-six 24 (?) aircraft were actually over the target.

3. Flight Plan and changes.

a. The flight plan was followed to the target. At the target the leader of the 95th Group was hit by fighter and lost. The leader of the second element immediately flew into the lead position and started to follow the return route as nearly as possible. Fighter attack was heavy. When the lead ship turned from the rally point two groups were observed to the left and slightly ahead, on a heading approximately thirty degrees to the left of the course set up by the navigator of the lead ship. The course of the 95th (2740) was changed to fall in behind the two groups in order to give and receive mutual support and fire power. The 95th Group followed the two groups to the English coast, crossing the coast slightly north of Great Yarmouth, thence to the home base at Framlingham.

4. Unusual occurrences.

a. The fighter attack was in unusually large numbers, many of the attacks being made in formations of three fighters, attacking generally from low eleven o'clock and low one o'clock. Flak was moderate over the target, extremely accurate in range.

4. Results and Conclusions.

a. Bombing results: The bombing was observed by only a few personnel, their reports being estimated from poor to good.

b. Losses: Ten aircraft from the 95th and Composite groups were lost, due generally to fighter attack.

c. Fighter tactics: Generally the attack from fighter were made in formation of threes, head on from low o'clock and low eleven o'clock, passing from high group to low, and many times passing on through the bomber formation.

d. The groups held formation to the target. At the target the lead ship disrupted the formation of the low squadron as it fell, but the formation was closed immediately. The formation used was as set forth by Fourth Wing.

CLIFFORD E. COLE
Captain, Air Corps
Operations Officer

NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 634

13 June, 1943

SUBJECT: S-2 Narrative report on Mission of 13-6-43.

TO: Commanding Officer of the Ninety-Fifth Bombardment Group (H).

1. Part "A" Narrative: On Sunday 13 June, beginning at 0600, 26 aircraft of the 95th Bomb Group took off in two elements, one of 18 A/C, the other of 8 A/C. The larger element was to operate as the lead group of the 402 Wing, the smaller element to form, with other A/C, a composite group as the low group of the same Wing. All A/C reached the target area save two which returned by reason of mechanical failures.

2. Enemy fighters in considerable strength and with marked aggressiveness began their attack on the groups at a point approximately mid-way between Heligoland and the enemy coast. The attack continued to and over the target and was maintained on the briefed course back to a point off the enemy coast reported as $54^{\circ} 35'N$ $08^{\circ} 30'E$. In the attack before reaching the target the lead ship piloted by Capt. Stirwalt, in which Brig. General Nathan B. Forrest Jr. was flying as a combat Wing Commander, was seen to be hit. It was reported as continuing over the target with one engine, No. 6, smoking, dropping its bombs and then was attacked from the nose by a formation three enemy fighters. The A/C was seen to slow down, to have been hit by several explosive shells and to go down banking sharply to the right. Lt. Conley, A/C No. 202, stated his belief that the lead A/C was not out of control and reported eight parachutes as having opened. Lt. Cozens leading the second flight of the lead squadron immediately pulled into the lead position of the group.

3. Clouds made the target difficult to observe and gave cover to enemy fighters who took advantage of the fact and made a second attack on our formation at a point reported as $54^{\circ}N$ $04^{\circ}E$ and also reported as being from 150 to 40 miles off the English coast. This latter attack was made by a smaller number of fighters (5 to 15) described as FW 190's and JU 88's and is reported to have shot down at least two B-17's. Some of our crews reported markings on enemy fighters similar to spitfires and that several B-17's fired recognition signals. Ten of our A/C, three from the composite group and seven from the 95th (lead group) are missing. One of our A/C crash landed at Rook Heath with No. 1 engine out

Narrative continued.

and No. four hit but still running. Two of it's crew members were slightly wounded from gun shot wounds. Heavy battle damage was sustained by the A/C which returned.

4. One B-17 reported in statistical report as having been lost by accident, No. 9763, was lost when another B-17, No. 8791, went out of control under attack by enemy fighters and collided with it. Both were reported as lost.

Note: This aircraft was flown by J. Adams who survived this mission and flew back to base. The colliding aircraft was probably flown by J. Adams ac # 9765 and he is listed as KIA on that mission. Duck.

FLORENCE J. DONOHUE
Major Air Corps,
Intelligence Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

AFPO 634,
13 June 1943.

SUBJECT: Base Engineering Report on Combat Mission of June 13, 1943.

TO : COMMANDER GENERAL, Fourth Bombardment Wing, AFPO 634.
COMMANDING OFFICER, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. The following information is submitted concerning combat mission of the 95th Bomb Group (H) of June 13, 1943.

- a. Twenty six (26) B-17F airplanes took-off, two (2) returned to base before completing mission.
- b. Thirteen (13) airplanes completed mission and returned to base.
- c. Eleven (11) airplanes did not return to base.

2. There were two (2) abortive airplanes.

- a. 42-5932 - Could not control superchargers at high altitude, engine rough, Oxygen leak at filter plug ball turret believed to have been caused by ice.
- b. 42-29853 - No. 3 engine supercharger ran away.

3. Battle damage is as follows:

- a. Engine tank, retracting gear, air duct, oil cooler damage. 42-29787
- b. 42-29768 - wing panel - sheet metal damage.
- c. 42-29807 - No. 2 Prop to be replaced.
- d. 42-3090 - wing damage - sheet metal damage in general.
- e. 42-3213 - No. 1 Engine damaged.
- f. 42-29703 - No. 9 Cylinder No. 2 Engine damaged. Left outboard wing panel to be changed.
- g. 42-29754 - No. 2 and No. 3 props to be changed. Bombardier's window out.
- ~~h. 42-5176 - Supercharger and induction system No. 3 engine out.~~
- i. 42-29591 - Plexiglass Nose and glass in upper turret damaged. Prop nicked.
- j. 42-5791 - Hole in Prop - Outer wing (left) shot up.
- k. 42-29967 - Three (3) small holes in sheet metal.
- l. 42-29919 - Critical damage - possible salvage.

CLARENCE D. FIELDS?
Major, Air Corps,
Base Engineering Officer

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Navigation Officer

APO 634
13 June 1943.

SUBJECT: Navigation report for the operations of the 95th Bombardment Group
on June 13, 1943.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group, APO 634.

1. No instrument failures were reported.

2. After the Wing Leader, Captain Stirwalt, was dislodged from the formation, the lead was taken by Lieutenant Cozens. Lieutenant Pritchard is the Navigator on this plane. Lieutenant Pritchard led the formation over the prescribed course to the departing point on the enemy coast. After putting the plane on course over the North Sea it was discovered that the Wing had split up, and only one plane was following his lead. It was then decided to follow the plane then assuming the new lead for reasons concerning formation homogeneity. This entire formation was attacked at 1130 by a force of ten enemy fighters approximately forty miles north of the Dutch Coast. This attack continued for thirty minutes, after which the formation continued on course to England.

ELLIS B. SCRIPTURE,
2nd Lt, Air Corps,
Acting Group Navigation Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY-FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE GROUP WEATHER OFFICER

APO 634
13 June 1943

SUBJECT: Weather Encountered On Mission of June 13th, 1943 to Kiel,
Germany by the 95th Bombardment Group.

TO: Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H), APO 634, U.S. Army.

1. From this base to the English coast the weather was hazy with visibility from 4-6 miles. Some scattered stratocumulus with bases at 3-4000 feet and tops from 5-6000 feet, and patches of altocumulus at about 12,000 feet were observed.

2. Over the North Sea the weather was hazy with visibility about 4-6 miles with scattered stratocumulus extending out about 100 miles from the English coast. Some patches of altocumulus were noted.

3. In the vicinity of the base of the Danish peninsula scattered cumulus of fair weather were encountered near the coast, then becoming broken, 6-8/10, over the land and 4-5/10 over the target, Kiel. These clouds had bases estimated at 6-7 thousand feet and tops from 8-10 thousand feet. It was observed that these clouds were much better developed and more dense to the south-east of this region over northwestern Germany. The visibility in this region was unlimited.

4. The conditions encountered on the return trip were much the same over the North Sea as those encountered on the way to the target. Broken cumulus clouds of fair weather with bases at 5-6 thousand feet had developed over this base on return with the visibility unlimited.

1 Carbon to S-2.

WALTER S. MILLS, JR.
2nd Lt., Air Corps,
Group Weather Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
 NINETY-FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H) AIR CORPS
 OFFICE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER

(J-1)

APO 634
 13 JUNE 1943

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 95TH BOMBARDMENT GP.

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, 95TH BOMBARDMENT GP., APO 634.

1. OF THE TWENTY-FOUR (24) AIRCRAFT WHICH WENT OVER THE TARGET, TWELVE (12) WERE AVAILABLE FOR INTERROGATION BY THE COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER, 95TH BOMBARDMENT GP.

2. MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL FAILURES WERE AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) 334K, RADIO COMPASS UNRELIABLE, BEING INVESTIGATED AND CORRECTED;
- (B) 336B, PILOT'S AND COPILOT'S MIKE BUTTONS FAULTY, BEING INVESTIGATED AND CORRECTED; RADIO COMPASS UNRELIABLE, BEING INVESTIGATED AND CORRECTED;
- (C) 336K, INTERPHONE "CALL" POSITION FAULTY, BEING INVESTIGATED AND CORRECTED.

3. OTHER FAILURES BEYOND CONTROL OF THIS DEPARTMENT WERE:

- (A) 334B, COMMAND ANTENNA SHOT AWAY, BEING REPLACED
- (B) 334G, COMMAND ANTENNA SHOT AWAY, BEING REPLACED
- (C) 336G, LIAISON ANTENNA SHOT AWAY, BEING REPLACED
- (D) 412Q, COMMAND ANTENNA SHOT AWAY, BEING REPLACED

4. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS WERE USED SUCCESSFULLY. AIRCRAFT USING THESE AIDS WERE:

- (A) 334K, USED MULTI BEACON GROUP "B"
- (B) 336A, USED SPLASHERS NOS. 4, 5 AND 6
- (C) 336B, USED SPLASHERS NOS. 4 AND 5
- (D) 412Z, USED SPLASHERS NOS. 4, 5, 6 AND 7
- (E) 334B, USED TWO (2) QDM'S ON HOME STATION
- (F) 336A, USED ONE (1) QDM ON HOME STATION
- (G) 336B, USED ONE (1) QDM ON HOME STATION
- (H) 412Q, USED TWO (2) QDM'S ON HOME STATION
- (I) 412Z, USED ONE (1) QDM ON HOME STATION

5. NAVIGATORS GAVE SATISFACTORY REPORTS ON AIDS IN NEARLY ALL CASES. RADIO OPERATORS REPORTED GOOD CONTACTS WITH 4TH BOMB WING STATION AND HOME HF/DF STATION.

RICHARD F. KNOX
 1ST LIEUT., A.C.
 COMMUNICATIONS

HEAD QUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (B)
Office of the Armament Officer

APG 634,
14 June 1943.

SUBJ: T: Ammunition Expenditure Report, Mission for 13 June 1943.
TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, 4th Bombardment Wing, APG 634.

A. Station Number 153

B. Type of Ammunition - AP, I & T.

C. Gun position and number of rounds fired -

20 Upper Turret Guns	- 6500
20 Lower Turret Guns	- 10400
20 Tail Guns	- 8700
20 Waist Guns	- 6800
15 Radio Guns	- 4000
15 Left Nose Guns	- 3000
15 Right Nose Guns	- 3050
7 Center Nose Guns	- 2000
16 Dual Nose Guns	- 2450

D. Eleven aircraft missing loaded with 66000

E. Total amount of ammunition 114,100

F. Type & amount of bombs 156 - 500 # Demolition

For the Commanding Officer:

LEONARD F. DAWSON,
1st Lieut., AC,
Base Armament Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Group Bombardier

13 June 1943
A.P.O. 7634

SUBJECT: Bombing Report.

TO : Commanding Officer, 95th Bombardment Group (H).

1. Target: Kiel, Germany.

2. Bombing Run.

- a. A.P.C.E. was used also the A. B. C. was used.
- b. Maneuvering at the IP was a turn to the left and then a slight evasive action.
- c. Bombay doors were opened 10 seconds after leaving the IP.
- d. Had a good bombing run of about 40 seconds.
- e. The fighter opposition was intense. There wasn't much flak.
- f. The S-2 information on the target was sufficient.
- g. The weather was reported fair.
- h. No unusual tactics by the enemy was used to interfere with the bombing run.
- i. The bombing results were not seen.
- j. No suggestions as to tactical changes in the bombing technique are offered.

FRANK T. IMAND
1st Lt., Air Corps,
Group Bombardier.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

HEADQUARTERS
NINETY FIFTH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
APO 634

13 June 1943.

SUBJECT: Flak Officers' Report on Combat, Mission of 13 June 1943.
TO : Commanding Officer, NinetyFifth Bombardment Group (H),
APO 634.

1. The route followed from coast to target was: Wohrden, Hohenwestedt, and Kiel. The route out was: Kohn, Stenderup and Bredstedt on briefed course.
2. The visibility over the target was good.
3. Number of A/C over target: It was impossible to tell as too many did not return.
4. The number of aircraft damaged by flack cannot be ascertained due to the loss of the lead ship over target, and subsequent partial disintegration of our formation. One aircraft was slightly damaged by flak for sure. The Engineering Department is unwilling to guess whether several other planes were hit by flak or aerial cannon.
5. The general axis of attack was 45° to 50° Magnetic.
6. The formation flew straight and level from 20 to 60 seconds before bombing.
7. The Group was the leader of the formation.
8. The flak route was moderate, but very accurate. Over Kiel it was also moderate and extremely accurate. En route back to the coast little or no flak was encountered. Suggest continuous following, as type of fire control used. One crew reports that an E/A cruised alongside his formation out of range and seemed to be directing ground fire by checking accuracy of red bursts. Accuracy was extremely good.

FLORENCE J. DONOHUE,
Major, Air Corps,
Group Intelligence Officer.

STATION 153

DRAFT	No.	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		Bombs	LANDING		REMARKS	
				Sr.	Act.		Est.	Act.		
	9967	LINDLEY		412	0601				1/240 x	Separate group
	9737	MORISSETTE		412	0602				M	
	5791	ADAMS, J.		412	0602				1/244 x	
	9919	EASTLING		412	0602				1/235 x	
	9835	KRING		336	0605				X	KRING NEVER TOOK OFF
	9855	MASSBY		412	0605				1/205	THE SUPERMERCER RAN AWAY - INTERFERED OUT
	3902	CONLEY		334	0605				1/241 x	Red Alert Ground Fighting
	9827	MASON, K		335	0604				M	
	9709	KNOWLTON		336	0605				M	NEVER TOOK OFF: - PROG
	3286	STONE		412	0605				M	CHASE! NEVER TOOK OFF
	0164	STIRWALT		337	0611				M	304L-V (LIVR) NEVER TOOK OFF
	3090	THOMAS		334	0614				1/251	
	9800	SOUTH		334	0612				1/254 x	
	9807	COZENS		334	0612				1/250 x	
	9768	TYLER		334	0613				1/256 x	YES
	3091	MCPHERSON		334	0613				1/258 x	
	5882	BENDER		336	0628				1/218 x	#3 ENG ROUGH & LEAKING OIL
	9680	NUNES		335	0629				M	OXYGEN SYS FAILED
	9705	ROTHSCHILD		336	0629				1/243 x	Red.
	9815	THOMPSON		336	0630				1/2305 x	

MAIN GROUP

OPPOSITE

20

STATION 153


FORM 3

DATE June 13, 1943

No.	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
			Sq.	Act.	Bombs Est.	Act. Cam.	
9754	MASON, R.C.		336	0630	1	✓✓✓✓ YES	
9702	BENAUD		336	0630	1	M.	
5213	HAMILTON		335	0615	1	✓✓✓✓ x	
9763	RUBIN		335	0615	1	M.	
9675	ADAMS, W		335	0615	1	M. YES	
0118	CORNETT		335	0616	1	M.	
9591	JOHNSON, J		334	0622	1	✓✓✓✓ x	
3206	PEERY		412	0618	1	M.	

GROUP 95

DATE 13/6/43





0920 ME109
0940

9591

1135-7W190

1146 ME109
0932 ME109
ME1090930

9967

5791



9813

0940
0940
0917 ME109

9754

0930
ME109

061 ME 0101

0924 7W190



1130-7W190

9919

0940 ME109



0926 ME109
0940
0940

202



MAIN (MP VP)

HAMILTON
3213

RUBIN
9763

SOUTH
9800

STEWART
0164

Miller
3090

COZENS
9807

M'PHERSON
3091

TYLER
9768

THOMPSON
9813

GOTTSCHILD
9703

BANDER
5882

MINES
9680

PENNING
9702

MASON
9754

PERRY
3206

CORNETT
0118

JOHNSON
9591

CAMERA

CAMERA

ADAMS
9675

W O A (K...)

2200

2200

2200

2200

2200

2200

2200

2200

2200

2200

95

MEAT

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

2000

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 742005
 By K.C. NARA Date 7/17/97

HEADQUARTERS
 VIII BOMBER COMMAND
 A.P.O. 634

Bomber Command Narrative of Operations
 Day Operation - 13 June, 1943
 Mission No. 63

TARGETS: Deschimag U-Boat Building Yard at Bremen
Deutsche Werke U-Boat Building Yards at Kiel.

152 B-17s of 1st Wing and 76 B-17s of 4th Wing were dispatched to attack U-Boat building yards at Bremen and Kiel respectively. Considerable damage was caused in the target area at Bremen, while results at Kiel have not yet been determined due to a lack of strike photographs. 21 a/c of 1st Wing and 16 of 4th Wing attacked German targets of opportunity with poor or unobserved results. 4th Wing encountered approximately 100 e/a in vicious and continuous attacks. There was no fighter support. 26 B-17s were lost and claims against e/a are 41 \neq 7 - 15.

Unit	Number of A/C					Claims	Personnel Casualties		
	(Dispatched)	Attacking	Abortive*	Lost			(Killed)	Wounded	Missing
			A.	B.					
<u>1st Wing</u>									
91	21	17	4	0	0	0-0-1	0	1	0
92	17	16	1	0	0	1-0-0	0	2	0
303	27	24	3	0	0	0-0-0	0	0	0
305	24	15	8	1	1	0-0-0	0	2	10
306	28	28	0	0	1	0-1-0	0	3	10
351	21	12	4	5	2	1-1-0	0	0	12
379	14 ϵ	10	3	1 ϵ	0	0-0-0	0	0	0
	<u>152</u>	<u>122**</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2-2-1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>32</u>
<u>4th Wing</u>									
94	26	22	4	0	9	8-2-3	1	9	80
95	26	24	2	0	10	16-3-4	0	2	103
96	24	14	5	5	3	15-0-7	2	9	30
	<u>76</u>	<u>60ϕ</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>39-5-14</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>213</u>

* Abortive A. - Mechanical, equipment or personnel failures.
 B. - Weather, recall, or enemy action.
 ** - 20 A/C bombed targets of opportunity only; 1 a/c bombed both primary and target of opportunity.
 ϵ - Includes 1 spare which returned as planned.
 ϕ - 16 A/C bombed targets of opportunity.

PART I - 1st Wing

TARGET: Deschimag U-Boat Building Yard at Bremen.

BOMBING RESULTS: 102 B-17s of 1st Wing dropped 1015 x 500 G.P. with damaging effect in the area around Basin I. Strike attack photos show hits on the Atlas Werke Shipyard and adjacent industrial buildings, warehouses on the quay,

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

railway sidings and engine sheds, Jute Spinning Mills, and nearby residential property. Bombing and observation was hindered by slight haze and an effective smoke screen. An additional 202 x 500 G.P. were dropped with poor or unobserved results on targets of opportunity in the area.

REASONS FOR FAILURE TO BOMB: 23 a/c failed to bomb because of mechanical and equipment failures. 3 additional a/c were over target but failed to bomb due to bad formation, and 1 spare returned early as planned. 3 of the lost a/c were not reported as bombing.

ENCOUNTERS: E/a opposition was very slight. Not more than 10 o/a - FW 190s, ME 109s, ME 110s, ME 210s and a JU 88 - were reported sighted as the formation neared Emden on the way to target. The o/a followed the bombers out toward Heligoland, watching for stragglers. One FW 190 was reported as firing, from 7 o'clock and out of range, a projectile of 2" x 8" which passed over tail and right wing of reporting a/c and burst 200 yards beyond with a large white puff. Two instances of air-to-air bombing by FW 190s were reported.

FLAK: Over Bremen intense but generally inaccurate flak was encountered. Inaccurate heavy flak was also reported at Nordorney, Baltrum, Nordholz, Cuxhaven, Wesermunde, Aurich, Langeoog, Emden and Dornum.

CASUALTIES: Personnel: 3 crew members were seriously wounded, 5 slightly wounded, and 32 are missing. 8 crew members from one of lost a/c of 351 Group were rescued by Air Sea Rescue N. of Cromer.

Equipment: 4 B-17s were lost, 2 to flak and 2 for reasons unknown.
Estimated Battle Damage: 22 class "A"; 9 class "AC".

ROUTE: Bases to Splasher No. 4 to 54°40'N-05°00'E to 54°20'N-07°20'E to Baltrum Island, to Leer, to Huntlosen, to target; to Bromervorde, to 54°38'N-05°40'E, to 52°48'N-04°25'E, to Cromer, to bases.

WEATHER: At take-off there was little or no low cloud with a trace of alto-cumulus at 11-12,000 ft. and visibilities of 4-6 miles. On the route out from the English coast to 05°E. there was nil to 3/10 cumulus - base 2500 ft., tops 35-4500 ft. - with small patches of alto-cumulus at 10-12000 ft. and visibility restricted in haze layer to 4-6 miles. From 05°E. to target there was 2/10-4/10 small cumulus, 2-3000 ft. thick, with visibility of 8-15 miles. Over the target there was 1/10-2/10 small cumulus with no medium cloud, and visibility of 6-8 miles in slight haze was further reduced by effective smoke screen. On return route over North Sea visibility was 4-6 miles with 4/10-6/10 small cumulus. Bases on return had 4/10-7/10 small cumulus 2-4000 ft. thick, occasional patches of medium cloud, and visibility of 6-10 miles. Temperatures and winds were as forecast.

OBSERVATIONS: Fairly effective smoke screens were reported at Bremen, Wilhelmshaven and Emden, and a circular smoke screen about 4 miles in diameter was observed from 27000 ft. halfway between Brake and Elsfleth. A large bomb dump was reported seen near the coast at 53°48'N, 08°34'E. A battery of 6 AA guns in the form of a circle was reported 1 1/2 mile S.E. of target. 6 radio towers were observed at 53°40'N, 07°20'E, and 6 others were seen at 53°10'N, 07°50'E. together with a number of barracks buildings. What was believed to be a new A/D with numerous dispersion bays, was seen on Baltrum Island, but no activity was apparent.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PART II - 4th Wing

TARGET: Deutsche Werke U-Boat Building Yards at Kiel.

BOMBING RESULTS: 44 B-17s of 4th Wing attacked the Deutsche Werke U-Boat Building Yards at Kiel, dropping 399 x 500 G.P. No successful strike photos were obtained, and no definite opinions or observations as to bombing results were reported by crews. 16 additional a/c dropped 79 x 500 G.P. in the Kiel Harbor area with undetermined results.

REASONS FOR FAILURE TO BOMB: 11 a/c failed to bomb because of mechanical and equipment failures. 2 additional a/c failed to locate the target and jettisoned their bombs. 3 of the lost a/c were not reported as bombing.

ENCOUNTERS: E/a opposition was the strongest and most aggressive encountered to date. Approximately 100 o/a participated in attacks which began just before landfall was reached, continuing over the target and out to the coast. A second attack of 8 to 15 o/a occurred at 54°19'N-05°38'E. on the way back and continued to within 30 miles of the English coast. E/a consisted mostly of FW 190s with some ME 109s, ME 110s, ME 210s and JU 88s. Frontal attacks predominated though other angles were used to take advantage of the sun and clouds. Attacks were made singly, in pairs, in threes and in V formation of three. Frontal attacks were made by 6 to 8 o/a in tandem. Several attacks were also made against the rear by 6 to 8 o/a in line abreast. E/a carrying bombs would release and then attack from above after the burst.

FLAK: Slight to moderate flak, accurate as to altitude but inaccurate as to deflection, was encountered as coast was crossed, over Kiel Canal, and in the target area. Both predicted and barrage fire control was used. Red bursts were reported used as a signal for o/a to break off attacks, with flak becoming more intense after the signal.

CASUALTIES: Personnel: 3 crew members were killed, 3 seriously wounded, 17 slightly wounded, and 213 are missing. 10 crew members from one of lost a/c of the 94th Group were rescued by Air Sea Rescue at 2200 hrs. 13 June.

Equipment: 22 B-17s were lost, 21 to o/a and 1 due to accident, caused by a B-17, going down out of control due to o/a attacks, swerving into another B-17 in the formation.

Estimated Battle Damage: 14 class "A"; 9 class "AC".

ORDERED ROUTE: Bases to Louth to 54°40'N, 05°00'E; to 54°20'N, 07°20'E to 54°06'N, 09°39'E; to target; to 54°19'N-10°28'E; to 54°32'N, 10°33'E; to 54°43'N, 09°58'E; to 54°37'N, 08°58'E; to 54°34'N, 08°20'E; to 54°40'N, 05°00'E; to Splasher No. 5; to bases. Ordered route was generally followed with slight deviations by two groups.

WEATHER: At Kiel, there was 2/10-4/10 cumulus, estimated 2-3000 feet, with visibilities of 15 miles or more. Two Groups reported 5/10-8/10 altocumulus cloud at 12-15000 feet while the third group reported no medium cloud whatever. For the rest of the route weather was generally the same as reported in Part I.

OBSERVATIONS: One B-17 came up out of the clouds and flew alongside formation until attacked by o/a, when it turned toward the German coast. Smoke and 6 balloons were reported at Kiel, one balloon at the extreme height of 24,000 ft.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

A/Ds were reported at 54°06'N-09°36'E. and 54°35'N-09°20'E. Air-to-air bombing was reported with opinion divided as to method of prediction as follows: One crew reports c/a flew alongside, out of range, and then went up and over formation to release bombs. Another crew reports an ME 210 above formation ostensibly acting as bomb director. Other crews believe an c/a about on level with formation gave bombing direction.

HEADQUARTERS
VIII BOMBER COMMAND
A.P.O. 634

Bomber Command Narrative of Operations
Day Operation - 15 June, 1943
Mission No. 64

Heavy cloud conditions and overcast resulted in the recall of the mission shortly before Groups of 4th Wing reached the French coast en route to targets in occupied France. At take-off there was 5/10-7/10 stratocumulus at 4-6000 ft. which increased as the formation progressed to the south to 7 to 9/10 strato-cumulus at 4500 feet with tops at 9000 feet. Over the Channel the cloudiness was similar to that over England with 3 to 4/10 cumulonimbus sticking up through the cumulus and strato-cumulus to 25000 feet. There was also some thin cirro-stratus at 27000 feet. Winds were checked to be correct as forecast.

Of the 155 B-17s dispatched, 21 returned earlier than the main formation - 17 because of mechanical failures, 2 because of personnel failures, and 2 because of personnel and equipment failures. All planes returned safely, and bombs were brought back by all but 9 a/c which jettisoned.


The only encounters were reported by 91st Group. 1 a/c was attacked by a single FW 190, and a second a/c, a straggler, was attacked by approximately 5 FW 190s, level from nose and tail. There were no claims or casualties. Slight to moderate inaccurate flak was reported at Guernsey and Cap de la Hague.

At 0743 hours an unidentified B-17 was observed joining the formation of one Group, behind the observing Group. This a/c took the number 2 position of the lead element of the high squadron, and was seen to leave the formation in the London area on a heading of 210°magnetic, at an altitude of 14,000 ft. It was noted that the waist windows were closed.

C O N F I D E N T I A L


TARGET KielGROUP 95DATE 13-6-43

TIME OF ATTACKS

0915 to 1030
1140 to 1150(1) VICINITY OF ATTACKS
From 30 miles out to sea
to over target - R.P and
back out to sea(2) From 75 mi
to 125 out from
English coast on
return tripAttacks from
Above - Blue
Level - Red
Below - Green.

DISCUSSION:

4. ABOUT 100 E/A COMPOSED OF ME 109's, ME 110's, FW 190's, JU 88's AND A FEW POSSIBLY ME 210's ATTACKED OUR FORMATION. FRONTAL ATTACK PREDOMINATED WITH THE E/A TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SUN AND CLOUDS. THE ENEMY WOULD ATTACK IN FORMATION OF TWO'S AND THREE'S THROUGH THE FORMATION, THEN CIRCLE OUT OF RANGE AND ATTACK AGAIN FROM TWO TO TEN O'CLOCK. CANNON FIRE FROM THE FW 190's WAS REPORTED HAVING THE SAME APPEARANCE AS FLAK. ONE CREW REPORTED THE ME 110's STAYING OUT OF OUR RANGE AND FIRING THEIR 20 MM CANNON. A FEW ME 109's WERE REPORTED TRYING A SNEAK ATTACK AT 6 O'CLOCK ONLY THIRTY MILES FROM THE ENGLISH COAST ON THE WAY BACK FROM THE MISSION. E/A ATTACKS WERE MOSTLY FROM ABOVE AND FROM THE S. ME LEVEL. AS TO THE MARKINGS THE FW'S HAD RED, YELLOW AND WHITE NOSES: THE ME'S WERE PAINTED IN DULL COLORS. THE PLANES TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS ME



DISCUSSION:

4. ABOUT 100 E/A COMPOSED OF ME 109's, ME 110's, FW 190's, JU 88's AND A FEW POSSIBLY ME 210's ATTACKED OUR FORMATION. FRONTAL ATTACK PREDONIMATED WITH THE E/A TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SUN AND CLOUDS. THE ENEMY WOULD ATTACK IN FORMATION OF TWO'S AND THREE'S THROUGH THE FORMATION, THEN CIRCLE OUT OF RANGE AND ATTACK AGAIN FROM TWO TO TEN O'CLOCK. CANNON FIRE FROM THE FW 190's WAS REPORTED HAVING THE SAME APPEARANCE AS FLAK. ONE CREW REPORTED THE ME 110's STAYING OUT OF OUR RANGE AND FIRING THEIR 20 MM CANNON. A FEW ME 109's WERE REPORTED TRYING A SNEAK ATTACK AT 6 O'CLOCK ONLY THIRTY MILES FROM THE ENGLISH COAST ON THE WAY BACK FROM THE MISSION. E/A ATTACKS WERE MOSTLY FROM ABOVE AND FROM THE SAME LEVEL. AS TO THE MARKINGS THE FW'S HAD RED, YELLOW AND WHITE NOSES: THE ME'S WERE PAINTED IN DULL COLORS. THE PLANES ~~IDENTIFIED~~ TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS ME 210's WERE ALL WHITE WITH RED MARKINGS ON THE TOP. FROM FIFTEEN TO TWENTY E/A WERE REPORTED DESTROYED WITH POSSIBLY 10 TO 15 PROBABLE DESTROYED. E/A WHICH ATTACKED FROM CLOSE TO THE ENGLISH SHORE WERE CAMOUFLAGED AND EVEN THOUGH OUR PLANES WERE FLYING AS LOW AS 3500 FEET THE E/A ATTACKED FROM BELOW AND AFTER THE ATTACK WOULD DIVE BELOW AGAIN.

TELEPHONED BY X TARGET KIEL, GERMANY

1. Route followed. Route in: WOHRDEN? HOHEN-ESTEDT-KIEL
Route out: KOHN, STENDERUP, BREDSTEDT ON BRIEFED COURSE.

2. Visibility at Target (Any condensation trails?)

GOOD

3. No. of A/C over target.

Impossible to tell accurately--too many did not return.

4. Formation over target, with weight of each A/C. Those A/C damaged by flak to be circled, and if seriously damaged, insert small "S". If any A/C shot down by flak, say so:

Cannot be ascertained due to loss of lead ship over target, and subsequent partial disintegration of our formation. One A/C slightly damaged by flak for sure. Engineering Dept. unwilling to guess whether several other planes were hit by flak or aerial cannon.

5. General Axis of attack (from lead A/C if possible)

45°--50° Mg

6. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing?

20--60 Seconds

7. Turn after bombing.

No turn. Course led straight into Lubeck Bay.

8. Position of Group in relation to other Groups.

Lead group of formation.

9. What evasive action was taken?

None.

10. A short description of Flak en route (if any) and at the target, including if possible a suggestion as to type of fire control employed--i.e. Continuous following predicted concentrations, predicted barrages, or fixed barrages.

Moderate very accurate flak over Flak Belt on route to target. Moderate and extremely accurate over Kiel. Little or no flak on route back to coast. Cont. following type suggested. One crew reports that an E/A cruised alongside his formation out of range and seemed to be directing ground fire by checking accuracy of red

11. Any other Comments, Phenomena, etc.

4. Formation over target, with weight of each A/C. Those A/C damaged by flak to be circled, and if seriously damaged, insert small "S". If any A/C shot down by flak, say so:

Cannot be ascertained due to loss of lead ship over target, and subsequent partial disintegration of our formation. One A/C slightly damaged by flak for sure. Engineering Dept. unwilling to guess whether several other planes were hit by flak or aerial cannon.

5. General Axis of attack (from lead A/C if possible)

45°--50° Mg

6. How long did formation fly straight and level before bombing?

20--60 Seconds

7. Turn after bombing.

No turn. Course led straight into Lubeck Bay.

8. Position of Group in relation to other Groups.

Lead group of formation.

9. What evasive action was taken?

None.

10. A short description of Flak en route (if any) and at the target, including if possible a suggestion as to type of fire control employed--i.e. Continuous following predicted concentrations, predicted barrages, or fixed barrages.

Moderate very accurate flak over Flak Belt on route to target route back to coast. Cont. following type suggested. Little or no flak on reports that an E/A cruised alongside his formation out of range and seemed to be directing ground fire by checking accuracy of red

11. Any other Comments, Phenomena, etc.

None

TELEPHONE REPORT

1. Name of primary target Kiel Number A/C attacking 17 (24)
2. Name of secondary target On 1st Ta. Number A/C attacking 0
3. Name of L.R. target none Number A/C attacking 0
4. Target of opportunity none Number A/C attacking 0
5. Units participating 95th 224- 325-²²⁶ 412
6. Number of A/C taking off 18 (26)
7. Number of A/C returning early 1 (2)
8. Number of A/C lost or missing as far as known 7 (10)
9. Results of bombing: good....fair....poor....nil.
10. Number of casualties: killed 0; wounded 0; missing 72 (103)
11. Enemy air opposition: considerable......moderate...slight...nil...
12. Flak: intense......moderate...^{very accurate}...slight...nil....
13. Observed fighter support: none

14. Weather as it affected the mission: _____

15. Flash observations of outstanding importance: _____

Telephoned to _____ by 13

Time 1642 Date 13-6-43

TELEPHONE REPORT

1. Name of primary target Kiel Number A/C attacking 7C
2. Name of secondary target Am Ind. Tar. Number A/C attacking 0
3. Name of L.R. target None Number A/C attacking 0
4. Target of opportunity None Number A/C attacking 0
5. Units participating 95th (334 335-326-412)
6. Number of A/C taking off 8
7. Number of A/C returning early 1
8. Number of A/C lost or missing as far as known ~~3~~ 3
9. Results of bombing: good...fair...poor...nil. Don't find reported 3 small 70 alt. to plane search
10. Number of casualties: killed ___; wounded ___; missing 103 31
11. Enemy air opposition: considerable...moderate...slight...nil...
1/4 very accurate
12. Flak: intense...moderate...slight...nil...
1/4 very accurate
13. Observed fighter support: None

14. Weather as it affected the mission: gray fighters cloud
crow & partially obscured target.

15. Flash observations of outstanding importance:
Attack 9 fighters of Eng Coast.
40 Ship friendly coming of Eng Coast.
B. 17's down over target & over water.

Telephoned to _____ by FJD
Time 1642 Date 13-6-43

E EVHVM.

FRA CLR AL-FRA-SNT V COG NR 7 122245B

URGENT SECRET 4BW SEND IN CLEAR BY AUTHORITY LT. COL. TRAVIS
4TH WING FIELD ORDER OXX NO.8.

1. A. FIGHTER SUPPORT . NONE
B. DIVERSIONS (O)XXX (1) 1ST WING WILL BOMB GR3586 LEAVING
SPLASHER NO 4 15 MINUTES BEHIND 4TH WING.
TIME SCHEDULE 1ST WING WILL BE FURNISHED AS SOON AS RECEIVED.
2. TARGETS: PRIMARY =X GR3588 AP4836 ILLUSTRATION 3(-A) 3/4
SECONDARY : INDUSTRIAL TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY IN THIS
AREA.

LAST RESORT: NONE

3. A. ASSEMBLY:

THE 402 COMBAT WING AND 401 COMBAT WINGS WILL FORM THE 4TH AIR
DIVISION FORMATION AND WILL FLY IN THAT ORDER.

THE 95, 96 AND A COMPOSITE GROUPS WILL FORM THE 402 C.W.
AND WILL FLY IN THAT ORDER. 12 A/C OF 95 GROUP WILL FORM THE LEAD
AND LOW SQ. OF THE COMPOSITE GP. 4 A/C OF THE 96 GROUP WILL FORM
THE HIGH SQ OF THE COMPOSITE GROUP.

THE 96 GROUP WILL BE OVER SNETTERTON HEATH AT ZERO HOUR MINUS
50 MINUTES AT 3000 FEET. THE COMPOSITE GROUP WILL BE OVER DOWNHAM
MARKET AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 38 MINUTES AT 2000 FEET. THE 95 GROUPS
WILL ARRIVE OVER SNETTERTON HEATH AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 45 MINUTES
AT 4000 FEET AND WILL PROCEED TO DOWNHAM MARKET ARRIVING AT ZERO
HOUR MINUS 35 MINUTES. THE 96 GROUP WILL JOIN AND FOLLOW THE
95 GROUP AT SNETTERING HEATH. THE COMPOSITE GROUP WILL JOIN AND
FOLLOW THE 95 AND 96 GROUPS AT DOWNHAM MARKET. THE 402 COMBAT
WING WILL PROCEED TO PETERBOROUGH ARRIVING AT ZERO HOUR MINUS
22 MINUTES.

THE 94 GROUP AND A COMPOSITE GROUP WILL FORM THE 401 COMBAT
WING AND WILL FLY IN THAT ORDER.
12 A/C FROM THE 94 GROUP WILL FORM THE LEAD AND LOW SQUADRONS
OF THE COMPOSITE GROUP. 4 A/C FROM THE 96 GROUP WILL FORM THE
HIGH SQUADRON OF THE COMPOSITE GROUP.

THE 401 COMBAT WING, COMPOSITE GROUP WILL ASSEMBLE OVER BISHOPS
STORTFORD AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 49 MINUTES AT 3500 FEET.

THE 94 GROUP WILL BE OVER BISHOPS STORTFORD AT ZERO HOUR
MINUS 44 MINUTES AT 4500 FEET AND WILL PROCEED TO PETERBOROUGH
ARRIVING AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 22 MINUTES. THE COMPOSITE GROUP WILL
JOIN AND FOLLOW THE 94 GROUP OVER BISHOPS STORTFORD

THE 402 COMBAT WING WILL PROCEED FROM PETERBOROUGH TO SPLASHER
NO.4 ARRIVING SPLASHER NO 4 AT ZERO HOUR.

THE 401 COMBAT WING WILL JOIN AND FOLLOW THE 402 COMBAT WING
ALONG THE 4TH AIR VXX DIVISION ASSEMBLY LINE, PETERBOROUGH TO
SPLASHER NO.4.

- B. ROUTE OUT.

ZERO HOUR AT SPLASHER NO.4 TO 5440 0500E TO 5420 0720E
TO I.P. AT 5406 0939E TO TARGET
BOMBING ALTITUDE WILL BE REACHED AT 5416 -0755E

- C. AXIS OF ATTACK:

49 DEG MAG

- D. RALLY POINT: XXXX 5432-1033E

- E. ROUTE BACK:

5419-1028E TO 5432-1033E TO 5443-0958E
5437-0858E TO 5434-0820E TO 5440-0500E TO
SPLASHER NO.5.

DESCENT TO MINIMUM ALTITUDE WILL START AT 5434-0820E

- F. BOMBING ALTITUDE:

LEAD GROUP 402 CW - 26000 FEET
LEAG GROUP 401 CW - 26500

- X. (1) BOMBING LOADING: 10 X 500 LB GP 1/10 SEC NOSE, 1/100 SEC TAIL
1/10 SEC NOSE - 1/40 SEC TAIL FUSE IF
1/100 SEC TAIL NOT AVAILABLE

MAXIMUM EFFORT

(2) ZERO HOUR: 0730 DST 13 JUNE 43

50 MINUTES AT 3000 FEET. THE COMPOSITE GROUP WILL BE OVER DOWNHAM MARKET AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 38 MINUTES AT 2000 FEET. THE 95 GROUPS WILL ARRIVE OVER SNETTERTON HEATH AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 45 MINUTES AT 4000 FEET AND WILL PROCEED TO DOWNHAM MARKET ARRIVING AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 35 MINUTES. THE 96 GROUP WILL JOIN AND FOLLOW THE 95 GROUP AT SNETTERING HEATH. THE COMPOSITE GROUP WILL JOIN AND FOLLOW THE 95 AND 96 GROUPS AT DOWNHAM MARKET. THE 402 COMBAT WING WILL PROCEED TO PETERBOROUGH ARRIVING AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 22 MINUTES.

THE 94 GROUP AND A COMPOSITE GROUP WILL FORM THE 401 COMBAT WING AND WILL FLY IN THAT ORDER.

12 A/C FROM THE 94 GROUP WILL FORM THE LEAD AND LOW SQUADRONS OF THE COMPOSITE GROUP. 4 A/C FROM THE 96 GROUP WILL FORM THE HIGH SQUADRON OF THE COMPOSITE GROUP.

THE 401 COMBAT WING COMPOSITE GROUP WILL ASSEMBLE OVER BISHOPS STORTFORD AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 49 MINUTES AT 3500 FEET.

THE 94 GROUP WILL BE OVER BISHOPS STORTFORD AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 44 MINUTES AT 4500 FEET AND WILL PROCEED TO PETERBOROUGH ARRIVING AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 22 MINUTES. THE COMPOSITE GROUP WILL JOIN AND FOLLOW THE 94 GROUP OVER BISHOPS STORTFORD

THE 402 COMBAT WING WILL PROCEED FROM PETERBOROUGH TO SPLASHER NO.4 ARRIVING SPLASHER NO.4 AT ZERO HOUR.

THE 401 COMBAT WING WILL JOIN AND FOLLOW THE 402 COMBAT WING ALONG THE 4TH AIR VXX DIVISION ASSEMBLY LINE, PETERBOROUGH TO SPLASHER NO.4.

B. ROUTE OUT.

ZERO HOUR AT SPLASHER NO.4 TO 5440 0500E TO 5420 0720E TO I.P. AT 5406 0939E TO TARGET
BOMBING ALTITUDE WILL BE REACHED AT 5416 -0755E

C. AXIS OF ATTACK:

49 DEG MAG

D. RALLY POINT: ~~5432~~ 5432-1033E

E. ROUTE BACK:

5419-1028E TO 5432-1033E TO 5443-0958E
5437-0858E TO 5434-0820E TO 5440-0500E TO
SPLASHER NO.5.

DESCENT TO MINIMUM ALTITUDE WILL START AT 5434-0820E

F. BOMBING ALTITUDE:

LEAD GROUP 402 CW - 26000 FEET
LEAG GROUP 401 CW - 26500

X. (1) BOMBING LOADING: 10 X 500 LB GP 1/10 SEC NOSE, 1/100 SEC TAIL
1/10 SEC NOSE - 1/40 SEC TAIL FUSE IF
1/100 SEC TAIL NOT AVAILABLE

MAXIMUM EFFORT

(2) ZERO HOUR: 0730 DST 13 JUNE 43

4TH AIR DIVISION

PETERBOROUGH - ZERO HOUR MINUS 22 MINUTES

SPLASHER NO.4 - ZERO HOUR

APPROXIMATE TIMES

	5440	0500E	ZERO HOUR PLUS 70 MINUTES		
	5420	0720E	" " " 93	"	"
	5417	0754E	" " " 99	"	"
IP	5406	0939E	" " " 114	"	"
	TARGET				
	5419	1028E	" " " 123	"	"
	5432	1033E	" " " 127	"	"
	5443	0958E	" " " 135	"	"
	5437	0858E	" " " 147	"	"
	5434	0820E	" " " 155	"	"
	5440	0500E	" " " 209	"	"
	SPLASHER NO.5 - " " " 282 "				

K4. INTERVALOMETER SETTING: 100 FEET

5. LEAD GROUP WILL FIRE TWO GREEN FLARES TO DESIGNATE THEY WILL NOT BOMB PRIMARY TARGET, LEAD GROUP WILL FIRE TWO RED FLARES AND OPEN BOMB BAY DOORS TO DESIGNATE NEW IP
- 6) THE SECOND AND THIRD GROUPS OF COMBAT WING FORMATIONS ARE PLACED AT ASSEMBLY POINT FIVE MINUTES AHEAD OF CONTROL TIMES TO FACILITATE ASSEMBLY.

RX

4.

— NORMAL.

5. A. MF/DF SECTION 'G'

D. JAY BEAMS : A-QTE 080 B-QTE 050 C-QTE 076 IN OPERATION FROM ETA TARGET UNTIL END OF MISSION.

E. SPLASHER BEACONS:

3A, 4B, 5C, 6D, 7E, 8F, 10G, AND 11H IN OPERATIONS DURING ENTIRE MISSION

G. CALL SIGNS

ALL AIRCRAFT 1ST BOMB WING W/T- CC9

ALL AIRCRAFT 4TH BOMB WING W/T - Z X 7

H. AUTHENTICATION GROUP: SPARE GP 19

J. COMMAND: R/T CALL SIGNS:

1. 4TH WING DOGWOOD
2. 95 GROUP " ONE
3. 96 GROUP " TWO
4. 402 COMPOSITE GROUP DOGWOOD THREE
5. 94 GROUP " FOUR
6. 401 COMPOSITE GROUP " FIVE

K. LEADER OF LEADING GROUP WILL REQUEST FIX AT ZERO HOUR PLUS

~~99~~ CALL SIGN TO BE USED Z X 70

L. R/T BB CODE WORD FOR RECALL USE OF FORMATION

LEADER STOVE PIPE ECC IN PARA 2 DELETE C AFTER PRIMARY CC IN PARA F 3. (APPROXIMATE TIMES)

5417 0754E " " " 99 " ALTITUDE

SAME PARA WA TARGET 120

CC PARA K. INSERT AFTER PLUS.. 99 MINUTES

MLS BBBB

479

ANNEX NO 1 TO 4TH BOMB WING FIELD ORDER NO.8

JUL 13 1943 12 14 AM

2

SECTION 3(A) TIMES IN FIRST FOUR SENTENCES IN THIRD PARAGRAPH ARE CHANGED AND WILL :

THE 96 GP WILL BE OVER SNETTERING HEATH AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 50 MINUTES AT 3000 FEET. COMPOSITE GROUP WILL BE OVER DOWNHAM MARKET ZERO HOUR MINUS 38 MINUTES AT 2000 FEET. 95 GROUP WILL ARRIVE OVER SNETTERTON HEATH AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 45 MINUTES AT 4000 FEET AND WILL PROCEED TO DOWNHAM MARKET ARRIVING AT ZERO HOUR MINUS 36 MINUTES ✓

SECTION 3(X) CONTROL TIMES ARE CHANGED AND WILL READ:

- 402 COMBAT WING
 - SNETTERTON HEATH - ZERO HOUR MINUS 45 MINUTES
 - DOWNHAM MARKET- " " " 35 "
- 401 COMBAT WING
 - BISHOPS STORTFORD- ZERO HOUR MINUS 44 MINUTES
- 4TH AIR DIVISION
 - PETERBOROUGH - ZERO HOUR MINUS 22 MINUTES
 - SPLASHER NO.4- ZERO HOUR
 - COMBOMWIG FOUR

CC IN SECTION 3(A) CWA WILL READ:

CC IN SECTION 3(X) DOWNHAM MARKET - ZERO HOUR MINUS 33 MINUTES ✓

NOT XX 35 MINUTES AS SENT.

K.M. BBBIN SIG COG 7 INSERT AT END OF SIG COMBMXX

COMBOMWIG FOUR

IN PARA 5E WA 10G ... AND 11H NOT 114

PAR 3A

THE 96 GROUP WILL BE OVER SNETTERING HEATH

V

FRA

R....

FRA R 130001B JLC VA

CGBOMG FOUR
ATTENTION A-2
COBOMGR 95

13-6-43 1945

PART A NARRATIVE

1. ON SUNDAY 13 JUNE, BEGINNING AT 0600, 26 AIRCRAFT OF THE 95TH BOMB GROUP TOOK OFF IN TWO ELEMENTS, ONE OF 18A/C, THE OTHER OF 8 A/C. THE LARGER ELEMENT WAS TO OPERATE AS THE LEAD GROUP OF THE 402 WING, THE SMALLER ELEMENT TO FORM, WITH OTHER A/C, A COMPOSITE GROUP AS THE LEAD GROUP OF THE SAME WING. ALL A/C REACHED THE TARGET AREA SAVE TWO WHICH RETURNED BY REASON OF MECHANICAL FAILURES.
2. ENEMY FIGHTERS IN CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH AND WITH MARKED AGGRESSIVENESS BEGAN THEIR ATTACK ON THE GROUPS AT A POINT APPROXIMATELY MID-WAY BETWEEN HELIGOLAND AND THE ENEMY COAST. THE ATTACK CONTINUED TO AND OVER THE TARGET AND WAS MAINTAINED ON THE BRIEFED COURSE BACK TO A POINT OFF THE ENEMY COAST REPORTED AS $54^{\circ} 35' N 08^{\circ} 30' E$. IN THE ATTACK BEFORE REACHING THE TARGET THE LEAD SHIP PILOTTED BY CAPT. STIRWALT IN WHICH BRIG. GENERAL NATHAN B. FOREST JR. WAS FLYING AS COMBAT WING COMMANDER WAS SEEN TO BE HIT. IT WAS REPORTED AS CONTINUING OVER THE TARGET WITH ONE ENGINE (#4) SMOKING, DROPPING ITS BOMBS AND THEN WAS ATTACKED FROM THE NOSE BY A FORMATION OF 3. ENEMY FIGHTERS. THE A/C WAS SEEN TO SLOW DOWN, TO HAVE BEEN HIT BY SEVERAL EXPLOSIVE SHELLS AND TO GO DOWN BEING SHARPLY TO THE RIGHT. LT. CONLEY A/C (#202) STATED HIS BELIEF THAT THE LEAD A/C WAS NOT OUT OF CONTROL AND REPORTED 8 PARACHUTES AS HAVING OPENED. LT. COZENS LEADING THE SECOND FLIGHT OF THE LEAD SQUADRON IMMEDIATELY MOVED INTO THE LEAD POSITION OF THE GROUP.
4. CLOUDS MADE THE TARGET DIFFICULT TO OBSERVE AND GAVE COVER TO ENEMY FIGHTERS WHO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT AND MADE A SECOND ATTACK ON OUR FORMATION AT A POINT REPORTED AS $54^{\circ} N 04^{\circ} E$ AND ALSO REPORTED AS BEING FROM 150 TO 40 MILES OFF THE ENGLISH COAST. THIS LATTER ATTACK WAS MADE BY A SMALLER NUMBER OF FIGHTERS (5 to 15)

*See written note
on next page.*

NARRATIVE CONT.

DESCRIBED AS FW 190's AND JU 88's AND IS REPORTED TO HAVE SHOT DOWN AT LEAST 2 B-17's. SOME OF OUR CREWS REPORTED MARKINGS ON ENEMY FIGHTERS SIMILAR TO SPITFIRES AND THAT SEVERAL B-17's FIRED RECOGNITION SIGNALS. 10 OF OUR A/C, 3 FROM THE COMPOSITE GROUP AND 7 FROM THE 95TH (LEAD GROUP) ARE MISSING. ONE OF OUR A/C CRASH LANDED AT ROCK HEATH WITH #1 ENGINE OUT AND #4 HIT BUT STILL RUNNING. TWO OF ITS CREW MEMBERS WERE SLIGHTLY WOUNDED FROM GUN SHOT WOUNDS. HEAVY BATTLE DAMAGE WAS SUSTAINED BY THE A/C WHICH RETURNED.

5. ONE B-17 REPORTED IN STATISTICAL REPORT AS HAVING BEEN ~~NOT~~^{LOST} BY ACCIDENT (#9763) WAS LOST WHEN ANOTHER B-17 (#5791) WENT OUT OF CONTROL UNDER ATTACK BY ENEMY FIGHTERS AND COLLIDED WITH IT. BOTH WERE REPORTED AS LOST.

This a/c completed mission!

*Pilot of # 9763 was Sr Rubin (KIA)
Pilot of # 5791 was J Adams who
survived this mission and was later a
POW 10/10/43.
The colliding a/c was probably
9765, pilot Adams who is
listed in an operational record as
KIA during the Kiel mission 13/06/43.
Junk.*

NARRATIVE CONT.

2. BOMBING RESULTS WERE REPORTED FROM POOR TO GOOD BY THE SMALL PERCENTAGE OF A/C WHICH WERE ABLE AND HAD OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE SAME

3. A/C NO. 9853 ABORTED AT 0850 FROM A POINT TWO MINUTES FLYING TIME EAST OF 54° 04' N 05° E. IT WAS FLYING AT 18,000 FEET. ASCRIBED CAUSE WAS A RUNAWAY TURBO ON NO. 2 ENGINE AND THE CUTTING OUT OF THE INTER-PHONE. A/C NO. 882, AT AN ALTITUDE OF 26,000 FEET, RETURNED FROM A POINT NEAR HELIGOLAND STATING THAT HIS NO. 3 ENGINE WAS SHAKING THE AIRPLANE, THAT IT WAS SPURTING OIL, AND THAT HIS OXYGEN SYSTEM WAS OUT.

4. ABOUT 100 E/A COMPOSED OF ME 109's, ME 110's, FW 190's, JU 88's AND A FEW POSSIBLY ME 210's ATTACKED OUR FORMATION. FRONTAL ATTACKS PREDOMINATED WITH THE E/A TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SUN AND CLOUDS. THE ENEMY WOULD ATTACK IN FORMATION OF TWO'S AND THREE'S THROUGH THE FORMATION, THEN CIRCLE OUT OF RANGE AND ATTACK AGAIN FROM TWO TO FOUR O'CLOCK. CANNON FIRE FROM THE FW 190's WAS REPORTED HAVING THE SAME APPEARANCE AS FLAK. ONE CREW REPORTED THE ME 110's STAYING OUT OF OUR RANGE AND FIRING THEIR 20 MILLIMETER CANNON. A FEW ME 109's WERE REPORTED TRYING A SNEAK ATTACK AT 6 O'CLOCK ONLY THIRTY MILES FROM THE ENGLISH COAST ON THE WAY BACK FROM THE MISSION. E/A ATTACKS WERE MOSTLY FROM ABOVE AND FROM THE SAME LEVEL. AS TO THE MARKINGS THE FW'S HAD RED, YELLOW AND WHITE NOSES; THE ME'S WERE PAINTED IN DULL COLORS. THE PLANES ~~IDENTIFIED~~ ^{tentatively} IDENTIFIED AS ME 210's WERE ALL WHITE WITH RED MARKINGS ON THE TOP. FROM FIFTEEN TO TWENTY E/A WERE REPORTED DESTROYED WITH POSSIBLY 10 TO 15 PROBABLY DESTROYED. E/A WHICH ATTACKED FROM CLOSE TO

NARRATIVE CONT.

THE ENGLISH SHORE WERE CAMOUFLAGED AND EVEN THOUGH OUR PLANES WERE FLYING AS LOW AS 35,000 FEET THE E/A ATTACKED FROM BELOW AND AFTER THE ATTACK WOULD DIVE BELOW AGAIN.

2. THE B-17 WAS REPORTED DOWN IN THE OCEAN ABOUT 10 MILES WEST OF GREAT BRITAIN. ONE BOMB WAS DROPPED WITH A HEAVY BOMB CHARGE. THE B-17 WAS SEEN TO HIT WATER AFTER FLYING FOR 10 MILES JUST ABOVE IT. THE CHARGER WAS NOT OFF. POSITION REPORTED AS 55°N 10°W. TWO BOMBING RUNS REPORTED FROM 10°N 10°W, 10°N 10°W. SEVERAL A LANTERN IN NIGHT VISION IN A CLOUD-BANK.

3. TRANSMISSIONS

4. A BOMB BURST AS WELL AS A BOMBING BURST OF SIX WAS REPORTED OVER BRITAIN. ONE OF THESE BOMBINGS WAS REPORTED AT THE EASTERN POINT OF 55,000 FEET. THE BOMB WAS OF THE BOMBING TYPE THE BOMB AS REPORTED WAS A BOMB TO THE E/A IN PARTICULAR FOR AFTER SUCH A BOMB E/A WOULD WITHDRAW AND BE BOMBED AGAIN. ANOTHER BOMB OBSERVED WAS THE E/A FLYING ALONG WITH 1-15 AIRCRAFT AT THE SAME LEVEL AND AT THE SAME RATE OF SPEED. THIS WOULD BE A BOMB OF THE BOMBING OR AIRCRAFT AND SPEED. THIS BOMB WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO THE GROUND INSTALLATIONS TO AIR FORCE. AIRCRAFT WERE REPORTED SEEN AT 55°00'N 10°00'W AND ALSO AT 55°10'N 10°00'W.

5. FLAK WAS MODERATE BUT EXTREMELY ACCURATE OVER THE FLAK BELT ON THE ROUTE TO THE TARGET. IT WAS LIKEWISE OVER KIEL. LITTLE OR NO FLAK WAS ENCOUNTERED ON THE COURSE FROM THE TARGET TO THE COAST ON THE RETURN ROUTE.

6. ONE B-17 WAS REPORTED DOWN IN THE WATER ABOUT 10 MILES WEST OF GREAT YARMOUTH. ONE DINGY WAS NOTED WITH A RESCUE BOAT NEARBY. ONE B-17 WAS SEEN TO HIT WATER AFTER FLYING FOR 10 MILES JUST ABOVE IT. ITS STABILIZER WAS SHOT OFF. POSITION REPORTED AS 53°N 2°40'E. TWO PARACHUTES WERE REPORTED FROM A/C NO. 9737 SEEN NEAR AMRUM TO BE ATTEMPTING A LANDING ON WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SAND-BAR.

7. REPORTED IN 1.

8. A SMOKE SCREEN AS WELL AS A BALLOON BARRAGE OF SIX WAS REPORTED SEEN AT KIEL. ONE OF THESE BALLOONS WAS REPORTED AT THE EXTREME HEIGHT OF 24,000 FEET. ONE CREW WAS OF THE OPINION THAT THE RED AA BURSTS WERE A SIGNAL TO THE E/A TO WITHDRAW FOR AFTER SUCH A BURST E/A WOULD WITHDRAW AND AA BECAME INTENSE. ANOTHER CREW OBSERVED ONE LONE E/A FLYING ALONG SIDE B-17 FORMATION AT THE SAME LEVEL AND AT THE SAME RATE OF SPEED. THIS COULD BE A MEANS OF DETERMINING OUR ALTITUDE AND SPEED. THIS THEN COULD BE TRANSMITTED TO THE GROUND INSTALLATIONS TO AID THEIR FIRE. AIRFIELDS WERE REPORTED SEEN AT 54°06'N 9°39'E AND ALSO AT 54°35'N 9°20'E.

3. TIME SCHEDULES : CONTROL TIMES:

- 402 COMBAT WING
 - SNETTERTON HEATH - ZERO HOUR MINUS 45 MINUTES
 - DOWNHAM MARKET - " " " 33 " "
- 401 COMBAT WING
 - BISHOPS STORTFORD - ZERO HOUR MINUS 44 MINUTES
- 4TH AIR DIVISION
 - PETERBOROUGH - ZERO HOUR MINUS 22 MINUTES
 - SPLASHER NO.4 - ZERO HOUR

APPROXIMATE TIMES

	5440	0500E	ZERO HOUR PLUS 70 MINUTES		
	5420	0720E	" " " 93 "		
	5417	0754E	" " " 99 "		
IP	5406	0939E	" " " 114 "		
		TARGET			
	5419	1028E	" " " 123 "		
	5432	1033E	" " " 127 "		
	5443	0958E	" " " 135 "		
	5437	0858E	" " " 147 "		
	5434	0820E	" " " 155 "		
	5440	0500E	" " " 209 "		
		SPLASHER NO.5	" " " 282 "		

K4. INTERVALOMETER SETTING: 100 FEET

5. LEAD GROUP WILL FIRE TWO GREEN FLARES TO DESIGNATE THEY WILL NOT BOMB PRIMARY TARGET, LEAD GROUP WILL FIRE TWO RED FLARES AND OPEN BOMB BAY DOORS TO DESIGNATE NEW IP.

6. THE SECOND AND THIRD GROUPS OF COMBAT WING FORMATIONS ARE PLACED AT ASSEMBLY POINT FIVE MINUTES AHEAD OF CONTROL TIMES TO FACILITATE ASSEMBLY.

RX

4.

NORMAL.

5. A. MF/DF SECTION 'G'

D. JAY BEAMS : A-QTE 080 B-QTE 050 C-QTE 076 IN OPERATION FROM ETA TARGET UNTIL END OF MISSION.

E. SPLASHER BEACONS:

3A, 4B, 5C, 6D, 7E, 8F, 10G, AND 11H IN OPERATIONS DURING ENTIRE MISSION

G. CALL SIGNS

- ALL AIRCRAFT 1ST BOMB WING W/T- CC9
- ALL AIRCRAFT 4TH BOMB WING W/T - Z X 7

H. AUTHENTICATION GROUP: SPARE GP 19

J. COMMAND: R/T CALL SIGNS:

- 1. 4TH WING DOGWOOD
- 2. 95 GROUP " ONE
- 3. 96 GROUP " TWO
- 4. 402 COMPOSITE GROUP DOGWOOD THREE
- 5. 94 GROUP " FOUR
- 6. 401 COMPOSITE GROUP " FIVE

K. LEADER OF LEADING GROUP WILL REQUEST FIX AT ZERO HOUR PLUS

~~99~~. CALL SIGN TO BE USED Z X 70

L. R/T DO CODE WORD FOR RECALL USE OF FORMATION

LEADER STOVE PIPE ECC IN PARA 2 DELETE C AFTER PRIMARY

CC IN PARA F 3. (APPROXIMATE TIMES)

5417 0754E " " " 99 " ALTITUDE

SAME PARA WA TARGET 120

CC PARA K. INSERT AFTER PLUS.. 99 MINUTES

MLS BBBB

479

IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT No. K.1587
(Subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment).

Photographs taken by 13 Ph Squadron on 20.6.43.

Mean time of photography: 1938 hrs.

SORTIE: AA.105.

Scale: 1/14,000 (F.L.24")

LOCALITY: KIEL

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

COVER AND QUALITY

The harbour and town of KIEL are covered on photos of fair scale and good quality. Only the eastern edge of the HOLZENAU district is covered, and this is largely concealed by cloud.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW


These photographs were taken after the daylight attack by aircraft of U.S.A.A.F. on 13.6.43. The last report on damage to KIEL was No. K.1555 of 24.5.43 relating to Sortie D/575 of 16.5.43.


PROVISIONAL STATEMENT OF DAMAGE


Only a small amount of damage is seen. Two small sheds N.W. of No. 5 Dry Dock in the DEUTSCHE WERKE A.G., have been destroyed. The roof of a shed 175', south of the SOUTH YARD QUAY, is seen to have been damaged, possibly during a previous raid. Minor damage appears to have occurred to harbour installations under construction in the KRIEGSMARINEWERFT. At least 35 craters are seen in the PIETRICHSDORF district, where two buildings in a hutted camp have been severely damaged by H.E. North of the SCHWENTINE RIVER, a number of residential or commercial buildings, probably including a chemists shop and a small post office, have been damaged, some of them severely, by blast. A small building south of the Brill Ground is gutted.

(4005-4007)

/ No print distributed.







95

SHREVEAT ✓
0164

Miller ✓
THOMAS
3090

COZENS ✓
9807

TYLER ✓
9768
CAMERA

McPHERSON ✓
3091

THOMPSON ✓
9813

BENARD ✓
9702

JOHNSON ✓
9591
CAMERA

SOUTH ✓
9800

CORNETT ✓
0118

RUBIN ✓
9763

PERRY ✓
3206

cup

HAMILTON ✓
3213

ADAMS, W ✓
9675

~~ADAMS, W~~
2388

W O A (M...)

BENDER ✓
5882

RUTHSCHILD ✓
9703
MINES

MASON RC ✓
9754
CAMERA

MAIN

ONEAL
2834

STATION 153

FORM 3

DATE June 13, 1943

No.	PILOT	TARGET	TIME OFF		LANDING		REMARKS
			Sq. No.	Act. Time	Est. Time	Act. C.M.	
9754	MASON, R.C.		336	0630 ²⁰	1 ✓ 1744	✓ YES	
9702	RENAUD		334	0630 ⁴⁰	1	M	
3213	HAMILTON		335	0615 ²⁰	1 ✓ 1719	x	
9763	RUBIN		335	0615 ²⁰	1	M	
9675	ADAMS, W		335	0615 ⁵⁰	1	M	YES
0118	CORNETT		335	0616 ⁵⁰	1	M	
9591	JOHNSON, J		336	0622 ²⁰	1 ✓ 1730	x	
3206	PERRY		412	0618 ²⁰	1	M	